{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","provider_name":"Transistor","provider_url":"https://transistor.fm","author_name":"Public Power Underground","title":"Office Hours w/ Professor Jacob Mays","html":"<iframe width=\"100%\" height=\"180\" frameborder=\"no\" scrolling=\"no\" seamless src=\"https://share.transistor.fm/e/510077bb\"></iframe>","width":"100%","height":180,"duration":5169,"description":"“This paper argues for the centrality of real-time markets, which are cleared sequentially with a single binding interval.”Prof. Dr. Jacob Mays and Paul Dockery have an in-depth discussion in Hollister Hall at Cornell University about Prof. Mays recently released working paper on Sequential Pricing of Electricity. The discussion is only available as a podcast and is published uninterrupted and unedited.Mays, J. (2023). Sequential Pricing of Electricity. Working Paper, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cornell University.You can find the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Share with friends that are electric utility enthusiasts, like us!The conversation explores the paper in 8 parts. 1. The goal of the paper“The goal of this paper is to promote a shift in the discussion of price formation in wholesale electricity markets from a static to a dynamic modeling framework. While the design and analysis of systems with significant reservoir hydropower have long relied on dynamic models, most other systems have come to rely on simpler static models that have nevertheless been useful in contexts with limited variability, uncertainty, and intertemporal constraints. The entry of large quantities of renewable and battery storage has increased the salience of all these factors, necessitating a richer modeling framework.” p. 40“This paper argues for the centrality of real-time markets, which are cleared sequentially with a single binding interval.” p. 3.2. Framework to assess the effect of price formation proposals on market outcomes“This paper develops a framework to assess the effect of such proposals on market outcomes, investigating how choices made by wholesale market operators regarding algorithms for commitment, dispatch, and market clearing can affect incentives for operation and investment.” p. 2“Step 1: specifying the model for operations” Section 3.2.1, p. 15“Step 2: specifying a parameterization” Section 3.2.2, p....","thumbnail_url":"https://img.transistorcdn.com/6v326ZmBUmlimXxBRx4Rp4VF5fcwc0lGqZF9NDhBWos/rs:fill:0:0:1/w:400/h:400/q:60/mb:500000/aHR0cHM6Ly9pbWct/dXBsb2FkLXByb2R1/Y3Rpb24udHJhbnNp/c3Rvci5mbS9kN2Uz/NjY4YmFiNDJiOGU0/YTU3ZTZmM2M3NDMz/OWNmNi5wbmc.webp","thumbnail_width":300,"thumbnail_height":300}