{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","provider_name":"Transistor","provider_url":"https://transistor.fm","author_name":"Cybersecurity Tech Brief By HackerNoon","title":"Building a Fake Solar Plant for Cybersecurity Research — Part 3","html":"","width":"100%","height":180,"duration":1506,"description":"\n This story was originally published on HackerNoon at: https://hackernoon.com/building-a-fake-solar-plant-for-cybersecurity-research-part-3.\nDefensive lessons from an exposed ICS/IoT honeypot: keep OT protocols private, block egress, kill default credentials, segment networks, and log behaviour.\nCheck more stories related to cybersecurity at: https://hackernoon.com/c/cybersecurity.\n You can also check exclusive content about #cybersecurity, #ot-security, #ics-security, #honeypot, #network-security, #devsecops, #mitre-attack, #hackernoon-top-story, and more.\nThis story was written by: @arizh0. Learn more about this writer by checking @arizh0's about page,\n and for more stories, please visit hackernoon.com.\nAn exposed energy-themed honeypot gets discovered in under an hour, then faces continuous brute force, web scanning, and protocol-aware Modbus reconnaissance, with zero write or control attempts. Part 3 turns those findings into defence. The same structural controls that stop commodity scanning also shrink the targeted tail: keep OT protocols and management planes off the public internet, block egress by default, remove default credentials, segment IT from OT, and log behaviour instead of bare port contact. Most of it is network architecture, not detection wizardry.\n \n ","thumbnail_url":"https://img.transistorcdn.com/SySK4I0jwuU6AzeawZdYiDqTq8yzBjxJ5qfTpUuAxEo/rs:fill:0:0:1/w:400/h:400/q:60/mb:500000/aHR0cHM6Ly9pbWct/dXBsb2FkLXByb2R1/Y3Rpb24udHJhbnNp/c3Rvci5mbS9zaG93/LzQxMjY2LzE2ODM1/ODIzNTYtYXJ0d29y/ay5qcGc.webp","thumbnail_width":300,"thumbnail_height":300}