{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","provider_name":"Transistor","provider_url":"https://transistor.fm","author_name":"80,000 Hours Podcast","title":"#118 – Jaime Yassif on safeguarding bioscience to prevent catastrophic lab accidents and bioweapons development","html":"","width":"100%","height":180,"duration":8140,"description":"If a rich country were really committed to pursuing an active biological weapons program, there’s not much we could do to stop them. With enough money and persistence, they’d be able to buy equipment, and hire people to carry out the work. \r\n\r\nBut what we can do is intervene before they make that decision. \r\n\r\nToday’s guest, Jaime Yassif — Senior Fellow for global biological policy and programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) — thinks that stopping states from wanting to pursue dangerous bioscience in the first place is one of our key lines of defence against global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). \r\n\r\nLinks to learn more, summary and full transcript.\r\n\r\nIt helps to understand why countries might consider developing biological weapons. Jaime says there are three main possible reasons: \r\n\r\n1. Fear of what their adversary might be up to \r\n2. Belief that they could gain a tactical or strategic advantage, with limited risk of getting caught \r\n3. Belief that even if they are caught, they are unlikely to be held accountable \r\n\r\nIn response, Jaime has developed a three-part recipe to create systems robust enough to meaningfully change the cost-benefit calculation. \r\n\r\nThe first is to substantially increase transparency. If countries aren’t confident about what their neighbours or adversaries are actually up to, misperceptions could lead to arms races that neither side desires. But if you know with confidence that no one around you is pursuing a biological weapons programme, you won’t feel motivated to pursue one yourself. \r\n\r\nThe second is to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations’ system to\r\ninvestigate the origins of high-consequence biological events — whether naturally emerging, accidental or deliberate — and to make sure that the responsibility to figure out the source of bio-events of unknown origin doesn’t fall between the cracks of different existing mechanisms. The ability to quickly discover the source of emerging pandemics is...","thumbnail_url":"https://img.transistorcdn.com/VO1STE7hN95RRg9QdLo4soV2VhhbR9PF5ZZlRhDYcwE/rs:fill:0:0:1/w:400/h:400/q:60/mb:500000/aHR0cHM6Ly9pbWct/dXBsb2FkLXByb2R1/Y3Rpb24udHJhbnNp/c3Rvci5mbS9zaG93/LzQxNDAyLzE2ODM1/NDQ1NDAtYXJ0d29y/ay5qcGc.webp","thumbnail_width":300,"thumbnail_height":300}