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If at all there are age-related laws that require this kind of verification, we can safely say they are requiring users to...

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Age verification laws are spreading fast, and most of the coverage focuses on social media and children's safety without talking about the bigger story underneath that almost nobody's discussing,

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which is what do these laws mean for free software,

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for Linux, for the open source ecosystem,

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and for anybody who believes that tech

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shouldn't require handing over your identity

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to a government or corporation.

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My guest today is Jithandra Pilepu

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from the Free Software Foundation of Europe.

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And he's been deep in this conversation

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and is one of the leading experts in the world about it.

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He's watching how these laws are being written,

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what the terminology actually means

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versus what people think it means,

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and where the real threats to software freedom are hiding.

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This one gets into the weeds in the best way,

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And is definitely a controversial topic and we get into some juicy stories.

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So let's get into it.

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Okay, today I want to welcome on Jithandra, who's a volunteer from the Free Software Foundation.

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Do you want to introduce yourself a little bit?

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Yeah, sure.

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Thanks, Henry, for having me on.

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Really, really a pleasure to be here.

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I follow Techlore for a while now.

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So my name is Jithandra and I'm a lawyer by training.

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and I volunteer with Free Software Foundation Europe

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and I'm based in Germany currently.

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Very nice.

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I want to start this discussion

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and I think you're one of the few people in the world

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who is on the Free Software Foundation.

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You are on the Free Software side of this fight

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and you are a volunteer for the Free Software Foundation of Europe,

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your colleagues with Lucas who we've had on the podcast.

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You're one of the few people that I think can actually clear up something

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that I, and I'm sure hundreds, thousands,

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potentially millions of others

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are not able to make sense of.

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These laws are happening constantly.

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We're seeing Apple roll out age verification features

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in the UK, I think Singapore most recently as well.

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We have the whole stuff going on in the Linux community

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with System D merging the birthdate field.

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California, Colorado, Brazil,

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all these countries are proposing age verification.

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But I want us to really unpack what this means

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because what actually started this interview

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was Lucas posted on Macedon

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the Linux community was being a little bit intense about things and wasn't really understanding what

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was going on. And Lucas is a volunteer for the Free Software Foundation of Europe. And so if he

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says that something's maybe being taken a little too far, then maybe he has a point. And especially

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because I like Lucas and I trust his views on things. So I just want to kind of set the narrative

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before we get into this interview first and kind of the questions I have, as well as probably what

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a lot of people are wondering. So can you just orient us a little bit here just to start this

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off with what is actually happening in the world of age verification and what are kind of the real

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flashpoints in your view before we dive into them? Yeah, for sure. Yeah. Thanks for that context

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setting. Yeah. So in terms of what's really, what we really need to focus at the beginning is the

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terms that we are using we have age verification for instance which literally means or in practice

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also in in the past also meant that show me your papers or things like this like literal government

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id checks and biometric checks and this this is what age verification by the wording itself means

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and that's how it's been used in in different jurisdictions and there's there's one more called

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age estimation and this this is uh basically based uh the algorithm will try to uh determine

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uh the user's age and that's also used in many platforms currently and and we have uh age age

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gating which means kids are not allowed to or below this age group are not allowed to use

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uh anything and it's a outright uh ban sign and then we have self attestation which like from

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from the beginning of internet, we just have the strict checkboxes and that's how the attestation

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began. And yeah, so I think we need to clarify these terms. Otherwise we might end up blanketly

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calling things that's not what they are. So we need to first set these things or like clarify

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these first. And I think we need to look at it in this way because when we say age verification,

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Yeah, it's very controversial and we need to be very careful in this terming.

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For example, with the California law, it's not technically age verification by definition.

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It's asking, in the context of the California bill, it's only asking for self-declaration.

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So they're not verifying anything of that sort.

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So I would not call that age verification per se.

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at least that's as written in the text and based on previous practices around the jurisdictions.

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So I think we need to really look at these things in terms of their terminology and what they're

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actually trying to do to operating systems. Right. So just very quickly, where do you see

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specifically the largest problem from the vantage point of view? And I know you don't formally

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represent the Free Software Foundation of Europe. But what do you and your colleagues actually think

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is the real concern right now that people should be watching between all these different technologies?

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Yeah, I mean, the real concern would be that we need to, at least the free software community

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should be, instead of ringing panic bells, we need to really take a step back and analyze this a bit

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more and see that there's this whole fight right now going around the globe in Europe and also

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elsewhere in the global south, we have this antitrust and competition law issues.

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We are literally, like jurisdictions are literally trying to tackle tech dominance in mobile

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ecosystems.

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And we need to understand this in a broader way that way, so that when we have a very reactive

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approach to these age-related laws, then we are seeing some examples where they've taken

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drastic measures to ban certain regions from using the software, then free software will lose that

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way. We might lose the battle because free software emerges as the alternative to the

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tech dominance that we are currently seeing. And when we work on these issues, we say that

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we already have alternatives to the tech dominant players in the form of free software. We already

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have the alternatives. They are the alternatives and we don't really need a new form of alternatives.

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The alternatives already exist, just that they're limited in many forms and through lobbying and

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there's so many forms where free software is being restricted and we need to look at it in this way

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so that free software should not be removed from a region and then the gatekeepers emerge as the

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only alternative. And I think we need to really be careful that way. So I'm trying to read between

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the lines and the point you're trying to make here. So is the point that you're trying to make that

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the problem that you personally see here is that the big tech companies potentially can still be

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the gatekeepers as part of these laws they're trying to pass globally, whereas you think that

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free software bypasses this or free software should be the verification? I'm just, or are

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these separate issues. Just trying to... Can you repeat again? I lost you there.

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Yeah. So what's the point that you're really trying to make with that statement? Are you saying that

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you don't think big tech companies should be the gatekeepers and it should be free software or it

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should be even footing? How does this tie into the laws? I'm just trying to understand.

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Got it. So what I mean is free software will not emerge as gatekeepers. I mean,

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we have gatekeepers in the form of the big tech. We already know the obvious names and

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free software already offers many alternatives to that. Just that we need to encourage and we need to

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bring free software into limelight and support free software this way. So they emerge as the

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alternative players that lets users control their technology rather than rent seeking and profiting

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our personal data. So free software emerges that way as an alternative. And if we try to take

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drastic measures to limit free software this way as a reactionary approach to age-related laws,

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then this can backfire and it can lead to a loss for free software as an alternative

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to the big tech. And there are ways to actually engage. And for instance, we can talk about the

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Midnight BSD license change.

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That basically changes the entire definition of free and open source software when the definition says that there should not be any discrimination on certain sections of society then in the use of the software.

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And the license change that we saw recently was that users from California are not allowed to use the software.

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Then these are the things that we should be really mindful of because these are core principles of free and open source software.

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and we need to keep that in mind because there are other ways,

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alternative ways to engage with and tackle with this new age-related regimes

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that are coming up rather than just giving a reactionary approach

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and moving so quickly, like rushing into things, basically,

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because it's too early right now.

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Yeah, and I want to ask a little bit more about the midnight BSD situation,

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maybe in a second here.

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Really quickly, you mentioned something earlier, which is self-declaration, which is what California requires.

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We've all experienced this.

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You access a website.

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Oh, are you 18 or older?

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You know, if you're even going to concerts or a comedy show.

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So this is something that's been around for a long time.

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I've seen some people, and how do you view this?

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I know that it's easy to look at laws as they are right now.

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But a lot of people say, well, yeah, it starts as self-declaration.

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But then when they realize everybody lies on it, then the infrastructure is already there to then require the next thing.

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So is that a concern you have?

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Yeah, for sure. I mean, definitely we need to ensure that it doesn't go beyond that.

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Like, I mean, it's there. Yes, there are enforcement issues.

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And there are literally points that say that how do you enforce such kind of self-declaration?

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Anybody can just lie. Then it just becomes moot.

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What do you say to this when somebody says, then it's a lie?

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And for me, yes, it's a lie, but there are governments right now coming up with these laws.

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Let's assume that it's just a checkbox.

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It's just a self-declaration checkbox.

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Then it's not really a useful law per se then, but still it exists and it's a pain to implement this.

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But is there a way around it?

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I would rather implement a self-declaration than just banning a region of users to not use the software.

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I'm again repeating only on the aspect of self-declaration.

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So we should basically ensure that these things don't go beyond that.

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We don't need age assurance technology.

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We don't need some third party verifying somebody's IDs or something like this.

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we've seen how badly they fail in practice.

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And they enable all kinds of malpractices to be done

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when you have a third party do verification.

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And this is literally happening.

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And we have so many precedents of this to use as an example.

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Only on self-declaration, it's still, it's not the sky.

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It's more like sky is falling down,

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like for self-declaration at least, or self-attestation.

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Like it's assuming an environment where a parent or legal guardian

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is trying to set up the account for their kid.

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The premise was that, and only on that premise,

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it should still be fine,

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but we should also make sure that we don't ban children

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from participating in democratic society,

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and we should not ban their curiosity.

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Like, we should let them tinker with devices,

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and this is how kids get into tinkering

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and into the world of free software,

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and that should definitely be encouraged,

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And that's how Play Software will flourish.

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And so we need to strike a balance there.

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Yeah, and I actually asked our private signal group,

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our tech laurens, for any questions they had before this interview.

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And one of them is in regards to kids genuinely using technology

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and having access to technology.

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So I want to ask about that later in the interview as well.

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Before we really dive into the system D stuff,

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MidnightBSD, kind of the Linux side of things,

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I wanted one final distinction to be made here.

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I don't know if this is a distinction made in laws, terminology,

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but it seems like there's two, as a regular person

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who didn't even have the original terminology

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that you outlined kind of in place yet,

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the way I've been looking at it is service-based age verification,

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like for NSFW websites online via the cloud,

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and then also these local, well, they're not always local,

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but it's supposed to be on your operating system,

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like operating system-based age verification.

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Is this distinguished in laws between those two things?

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Do you guys have views between those two approaches or are they actually the same thing behind the scenes, just different implementations?

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That's a really good question because I was going to mention this because right now what we're seeing is there's a shift from, as you said, the service-based angle to the root level or like I'm calling it root level to the operating system layer.

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So the jurisdictions are trying to tackle this from the moment the user sets up the device.

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So earlier it used to be the case that, yeah, you set up the device and you go on internet and you try to download an app or you try to access a service, then there's a verification.

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But we have to also be mindful that there are various lobby forces on this front that are trying to shift burdens on each other.

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And we have to be mindful of that.

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And so the service providers and app providers or app store providers, social media platforms, they do not like to also conduct age verification.

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They basically don't want to have the burden.

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So there is huge lobby forces happening around the globe in different jurisdictions that they're trying to push.

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And the other side is also trying to push.

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And then there is a trial and error on that area.

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So we see one implementation and then it gets backfired.

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It gets pulled off and we see another implementation.

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So there's a huge contracting and contracting forces for this aspect of service layer and operating system layer.

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But yes, on to your question, is there a differentiation?

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It varies region by region.

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Every law is looking at it differently, at least for the California one.

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There seems to be a very concrete differentiation.

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They have what is an open source operating system provider, what is a covered application store.

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They're giving these differentiations, but what we can already see that the shift is happening, that the age-related laws are coming onto the operating system layer.

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So there's definitely a differentiation and there's definitely a change that's happening.

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So the change, from my understanding, the change is pretty obvious that there is huge lobbying happening behind the scenes.

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And what are your views and or the Free Software Foundation of Europe's views on if this is to be rolled out, is there a better approach between those two?

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I wouldn't say like from from my understanding that there is we have seen recently there is there was a jury trial that convicted meta from social of social media practices that were too addictive.

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And it's also proven that they are addictive.

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But YouTube as well, right?

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Yeah, yeah. And so aging of minors, like at what age somebody is called a minor is super subjective right now.

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We cannot just have a blanket universal definition of who a minor is and who a major is right now.

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And it depends on each aspect that we're talking about.

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And for driving, 18 is the usual age.

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Can we directly correlate or like use the same to social media usage?

222
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I don't think so.

223
00:17:05,500 --> 00:17:06,680
Yeah, drinking, for example.

224
00:17:06,819 --> 00:17:08,579
Europe and U.S. is completely different.

225
00:17:08,839 --> 00:17:15,439
Yeah, and in the U.S., we still see people buying booze in paper bags, right?

226
00:17:16,660 --> 00:17:17,839
And I don't know why.

227
00:17:18,220 --> 00:17:20,100
So what was the logic behind?

228
00:17:20,300 --> 00:17:21,000
I'm still not sure.

229
00:17:21,140 --> 00:17:23,400
So that means it's not allowed to drink in public,

230
00:17:24,040 --> 00:17:27,439
but it's okay if you use a paper bag to consume alcohol.

231
00:17:27,860 --> 00:17:29,800
So there was a way around that.

232
00:17:29,900 --> 00:17:33,340
I mean, sure, Australia tried to ban social media for minors,

233
00:17:33,540 --> 00:17:34,980
and it backfired completely.

234
00:17:35,200 --> 00:17:39,840
We literally saw they're openly saying we bypass this using VPNs.

235
00:17:40,040 --> 00:17:42,400
These days, VPNs are used to geoblock content.

236
00:17:42,860 --> 00:17:45,640
You want to access some content somewhere that's restricted.

237
00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:48,140
You use VPN to access that content.

238
00:17:48,340 --> 00:17:51,940
So there are so many ways, but yeah, miners can bypass this.

239
00:17:52,560 --> 00:18:00,040
But we should find a balance, as I said before, that children or miners should not be banned from their curiosity.

240
00:18:00,260 --> 00:18:08,800
because at least from my view and from FSFE, FSFE is a nonprofit that lets users control their own

241
00:18:09,060 --> 00:18:16,020
technology. And that also includes tinkering and tinkering is the core of it. And so that way,

242
00:18:16,740 --> 00:18:21,520
children's curiosity, there should not be much limits on that. So we should strike a balance

243
00:18:21,820 --> 00:18:28,219
there. But at the same time, as I said, these are very addictive areas. And so there are methods

244
00:18:28,340 --> 00:18:33,500
For example, the California law is somewhat designed that way.

245
00:18:34,160 --> 00:18:37,480
But as I said, we need to ensure that it doesn't go beyond that.

246
00:18:38,120 --> 00:18:39,740
It should never go beyond that.

247
00:18:39,810 --> 00:18:47,160
That way, it's playing between self-declaration and self-attestation, but not age verification.

248
00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:51,180
They're not asking for government IDs or anything of that sort.

249
00:18:51,280 --> 00:18:56,800
I mean, yes, if somebody says, yeah, what if this is a self-declaration today?

250
00:18:57,130 --> 00:18:58,220
What is going to happen tomorrow?

251
00:18:59,280 --> 00:19:00,480
Then we will wait and see.

252
00:19:00,570 --> 00:19:08,040
We don't have to be super scared and we don't have to ring all panic bells to say that, yes, the sky is falling down.

253
00:19:08,130 --> 00:19:09,220
We are going to go down.

254
00:19:09,330 --> 00:19:09,820
We are doomed.

255
00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:13,300
I don't see that kind of reactionary approaches.

256
00:19:13,650 --> 00:19:18,060
I see them as very threatening and very risky approaches.

257
00:19:18,290 --> 00:19:20,860
I would say we need to take a step back and analyze this.

258
00:19:21,320 --> 00:19:27,500
California bill already has some exemptions and exemptions is another area that I can,

259
00:19:27,860 --> 00:19:33,960
we can discuss a bit further when doing the interview. Yeah. Yeah. If I could just inject,

260
00:19:34,490 --> 00:19:40,260
I think, I think it's, it's unfair to children because if a kid is on TikTok all day,

261
00:19:40,650 --> 00:19:46,239
instead of paying attention in class, whose fault is that? Is that the school's fault? No. Is it

262
00:19:46,260 --> 00:19:48,180
The kids' fault? No, it's TikTok's fault.

263
00:19:48,500 --> 00:19:51,940
And who's the only person who's not dealing with any real consequences?

264
00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:53,820
It's TikTok.

265
00:19:54,220 --> 00:19:56,120
Like, the schools are dealing with kids who aren't focused.

266
00:19:56,360 --> 00:19:58,060
The kids are completely distracted.

267
00:19:58,420 --> 00:19:59,640
And who's being punished?

268
00:19:59,820 --> 00:20:00,260
The kids.

269
00:20:00,420 --> 00:20:03,420
The kids are the ones who are now banned from accessing different platforms.

270
00:20:03,840 --> 00:20:07,000
And in the process, you know, we have to age verify everybody.

271
00:20:07,980 --> 00:20:10,900
You know, it's very frustrating, I think.

272
00:20:11,140 --> 00:20:18,680
And it's really sad to see that these politicians who say they want the best for kids, and maybe they do, are taking this approach.

273
00:20:19,440 --> 00:20:26,620
Instead of holding the companies accountable that we just found out in trials are now guilty of making their platforms addictive towards children.

274
00:20:27,260 --> 00:20:29,800
So that's my personal, I don't know.

275
00:20:30,420 --> 00:20:31,480
Yeah, I know.

276
00:20:31,720 --> 00:20:36,640
So not every problem can be solved with technology, right?

277
00:20:36,860 --> 00:20:43,280
So it's a social issue and we are trying to, at least with age assurance technology,

278
00:20:44,360 --> 00:20:51,460
and there is this whole area of privacy enhancing tech that is trying to creep into this age-related debate.

279
00:20:51,900 --> 00:20:58,160
Not every problem like this can be solved with technology, but technology is also used to solve some problems.

280
00:20:58,240 --> 00:20:59,540
So it's not the other way around.

281
00:20:59,820 --> 00:21:01,920
So we should also be mindful of that.

282
00:21:02,140 --> 00:21:11,000
And we can also use Lawrence Lessig's example of code and other laws of cyberspace where in his book we have norms and code.

283
00:21:11,880 --> 00:21:21,260
And here, when we use this example for the age laws right now, the laws are trying to control behavior using code.

284
00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:26,660
They're trying to bring in an outcome where code will control the behavior.

285
00:21:27,340 --> 00:21:29,980
But can you really, in code, it's very solid.

286
00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:32,340
It's very hard.

287
00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:34,940
Like it's either this or that.

288
00:21:35,260 --> 00:21:36,200
There is no in between.

289
00:21:37,060 --> 00:21:38,800
But law is very interpretive.

290
00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:40,060
It's very subjective.

291
00:21:40,540 --> 00:21:45,280
And especially age-related issues are very, very subjective, as I explained before.

292
00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:57,600
So when you try to hard code something and require developers to code this into their code base, into their software, then it's either this or that.

293
00:21:57,700 --> 00:22:00,180
And there's no middle ground for that.

294
00:22:00,500 --> 00:22:06,580
it's going to be really hard. So it might not even work, as we've seen in terms of age assurance

295
00:22:06,860 --> 00:22:12,620
technology and age estimation, as I explained before, where the algorithm tries to estimate

296
00:22:12,760 --> 00:22:20,520
your age and people just say, yeah, OK, I would like to verify myself. I'll turn on my camera.

297
00:22:20,700 --> 00:22:27,920
I will scan myself and let the algorithm do its magic. And what would you say to that? I mean,

298
00:22:29,460 --> 00:22:38,440
And in terms of that worst case scenario, and you look at California bill, then there's definitely a difference, a lot of difference, huge difference.

299
00:22:39,280 --> 00:22:40,800
And we should look at it that way.

300
00:22:40,850 --> 00:22:43,240
And it's not really the end.

301
00:22:43,520 --> 00:22:54,800
They're not asking for DRM technology or like Secure Boot or something like that that restricts users to install their whatever software they want on their device.

302
00:22:55,220 --> 00:22:56,100
They're not doing that.

303
00:22:56,390 --> 00:22:58,220
At least the law is not trying to do that.

304
00:22:58,740 --> 00:23:03,220
So there's no restriction on copy left related free software.

305
00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:08,360
And so that way, software freedom is still intact.

306
00:23:10,300 --> 00:23:10,380
Yeah.

307
00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:12,540
Great. Yeah, really well said.

308
00:23:12,790 --> 00:23:14,640
So thanks for expanding on that,

309
00:23:14,640 --> 00:23:15,820
because I think you added a really good language

310
00:23:16,280 --> 00:23:17,880
around what I've been feeling,

311
00:23:18,400 --> 00:23:19,900
quite frustration I've been feeling.

312
00:23:20,520 --> 00:23:20,620
Yeah.

313
00:23:21,240 --> 00:23:22,380
Regarding the controversy now,

314
00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:23,780
on the Linux side of things again,

315
00:23:24,020 --> 00:23:25,380
you brought up MidnightBSD.

316
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:29,800
Can you touch again a little bit on the systemd situation?

317
00:23:30,220 --> 00:23:32,620
How Linux is trying to comply with this?

318
00:23:32,780 --> 00:23:34,420
Maybe the polarization in the community?

319
00:23:35,340 --> 00:23:37,900
And what would be your proposed solution?

320
00:23:38,440 --> 00:23:43,760
What is your best case scenario if you were to help guide things in the best direction?

321
00:23:44,930 --> 00:23:48,320
I mean, I'll try my best, but I might not have a solution.

322
00:23:48,640 --> 00:23:49,600
Yeah, I know it's complicated.

323
00:23:50,540 --> 00:23:53,840
It's a really polarized matter, as you said.

324
00:23:54,440 --> 00:23:58,380
Yeah, even now, we are playing on the borderlines of controversy.

325
00:23:59,750 --> 00:24:00,520
But it's good.

326
00:24:00,780 --> 00:24:07,000
So it's good to discuss this issue because, as you said, we're seeing so many things flying around.

327
00:24:07,350 --> 00:24:11,660
In terms of System D, I mean, they implemented this DOB.

328
00:24:12,540 --> 00:24:20,800
But, I mean, when we talk about, for example, the law and the California bill assumes that for everything, you need to make an account.

329
00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:26,480
There is no account making feature on GNU Linux or something.

330
00:24:26,840 --> 00:24:34,260
There is, but just that it's done very differently to what Microsoft or Apple does in their operating system.

331
00:24:34,350 --> 00:24:40,200
So on GNU Linux, we can create an account and it can get saved locally, right?

332
00:24:40,440 --> 00:24:42,880
And it's also an optional thing.

333
00:24:43,900 --> 00:24:48,220
But when it comes to how Systemd is implementing, I mean, Systemd is the core of it.

334
00:24:48,500 --> 00:24:52,800
So they are trying to implement at least one signal that can deal with this.

335
00:24:52,980 --> 00:25:04,160
So we have to understand that it's data minimization that the law is trying to respect in a way where they're playing at the edge on the borders.

336
00:25:04,620 --> 00:25:12,160
If data minimization, like collect as less data as possible, if that is respected, then I think it's still that way.

337
00:25:12,320 --> 00:25:12,620
It's OK.

338
00:25:13,340 --> 00:25:20,280
But I don't seem to have any proposed solutions for this at the moment.

339
00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:22,960
I'm still grappling my mind around this.

340
00:25:23,510 --> 00:25:23,660
Yeah.

341
00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:24,620
Cool.

342
00:25:24,770 --> 00:25:25,620
I appreciate the honesty.

343
00:25:25,890 --> 00:25:27,200
A couple of questions from our techlorians.

344
00:25:27,580 --> 00:25:31,500
Someone asked, since Linux runs on everything, routers, medical devices, industrial systems,

345
00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:36,500
have lawmakers even considered how to define which devices need to age gate their users?

346
00:25:36,770 --> 00:25:39,740
Are there carve outs for non-consumers or non-interactive devices?

347
00:25:39,930 --> 00:25:42,880
I assume IoT devices, and I guess by extension, free software.

348
00:25:43,420 --> 00:25:51,080
along the way. You mean carve-outs for medical devices? And what do they mean by non-consumers?

349
00:25:51,820 --> 00:25:55,720
Yeah, I think just like companies, like, you know, if a company buys tons of devices,

350
00:25:55,910 --> 00:26:01,300
you can't, like, how does a company age-verify itself? So does the law kind of think about

351
00:26:01,390 --> 00:26:08,679
these edge cases where it's probably not necessary? In terms of, I mean, from what I understood from

352
00:26:08,700 --> 00:26:15,380
the text, it feels like it's more oriented towards Microsoft and Apple and gatekeepers.

353
00:26:15,890 --> 00:26:23,640
My understanding, I'm not a lawyer in the U.S. I don't practice law in the U.S., but at least

354
00:26:23,640 --> 00:26:29,860
the California bill seems like it applies to the gatekeepers per se. We call them gatekeepers in

355
00:26:29,930 --> 00:26:38,660
Europe. But in terms of carve-outs for medical devices, I'm not really sure how that's going to

356
00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:47,980
As long as the age verification, as I said, like if we have data minimization at the core in implementation, collect as less data as possible.

357
00:26:48,660 --> 00:26:50,340
And there is no third party.

358
00:26:50,530 --> 00:26:56,060
There is no third party verifying or there is no third party technology that is trying to verify the user.

359
00:26:56,500 --> 00:27:03,060
From my view, I'm trying to understand where is the window for malpractice here is the question.

360
00:27:03,160 --> 00:27:09,520
like let's play a bit of a devil's advocate here and see where can the malpractice happen or where

361
00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:15,460
is the window of opportunity to even have malpractice if there is no third party tech,

362
00:27:15,840 --> 00:27:21,980
there is no third party involved at all in terms of verifying. Verifying, I'm quoting again because

363
00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:28,740
this is not verifying. This is just declaration and self-attestation. Again, on the premise that

364
00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:31,500
the legal guardian sets it up for their kid.

365
00:27:31,630 --> 00:27:33,160
I know it's a very narrow premise

366
00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:35,980
for such a huge generic issue,

367
00:27:36,660 --> 00:27:39,900
but yeah, in terms of its effectiveness,

368
00:27:40,510 --> 00:27:42,860
I also highly doubt how this can be enforced.

369
00:27:43,600 --> 00:27:47,080
But in terms of its negative impacts on free software,

370
00:27:47,420 --> 00:27:48,620
at least the California bill

371
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,880
seemed to have like zero to none negative effects.

372
00:27:53,580 --> 00:27:53,840
Got it.

373
00:27:54,820 --> 00:27:57,720
Another question, shared devices, secondhand hardware.

374
00:27:58,540 --> 00:28:02,120
Is this something that's been included or thought about in the laws?

375
00:28:03,100 --> 00:28:03,400
Second.

376
00:28:03,810 --> 00:28:04,260
Okay, okay.

377
00:28:04,720 --> 00:28:06,320
Yeah, that's actually a good question.

378
00:28:06,350 --> 00:28:09,880
I mean, there was a date, a timeframe, right?

379
00:28:10,040 --> 00:28:12,620
Like before 2000, 2026.

380
00:28:13,010 --> 00:28:18,580
How do you implement such things when the device is already in use for quite a long time?

381
00:28:18,860 --> 00:28:26,460
But I don't see if it's a fresh account that is being fresh set up that is being conducted on the device.

382
00:28:27,020 --> 00:28:35,400
then maybe the interface will creep into the setup is what I'm trying to understand if in terms of

383
00:28:35,400 --> 00:28:42,360
its real life implementation. So the device changed hands, let's assume, and there is a new setup that

384
00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:46,760
is being done. If it's the old setup, then of course it will not have it for sure. The user

385
00:28:46,760 --> 00:28:53,220
will just continue on to their existing operating system, whatever they have. But if it's a fresh

386
00:28:53,240 --> 00:29:01,660
one they want to reboot again and put a new free software in there and then the interface the age

387
00:29:01,940 --> 00:29:09,760
range pop-up might come out i'm not not sure how that can i mean there are so many uh issues in in

388
00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:15,320
terms of this it's also very too early to even tell because how do you geolocate this like how

389
00:29:15,580 --> 00:29:22,460
how can this be very location specific for example how can debian implement this in california and

390
00:29:22,480 --> 00:29:28,920
how can they differentiate that in Colorado or how can they do this in in Europe and wherever it is

391
00:29:29,020 --> 00:29:35,360
like so they it's it's very very they're like so many sub issues in there in terms of its

392
00:29:35,640 --> 00:29:43,560
enforcement even I cannot really tell how it can be implemented in reality yeah yeah I'm I'm

393
00:29:43,790 --> 00:29:50,100
reminded of how Apple chose to comply with the DMA in Europe where they have these craze like

394
00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:56,080
it's tied, I think your credit, like the actual region of your Apple account is a part of it,

395
00:29:56,300 --> 00:29:59,940
as well as whether or not you're in the region. I think you have like a certain amount of

396
00:30:00,400 --> 00:30:05,400
days or hours that you're allowed to be in the, like it is, you can probably speak to it better

397
00:30:05,410 --> 00:30:11,200
than me, but they truly engineered a problem for it or engineered a solution for this problem.

398
00:30:11,700 --> 00:30:17,100
Yeah, it's just, it's just bogus. It's completely like madness. We actually tested, actually,

399
00:30:17,280 --> 00:30:19,200
That's a good follow-up you had.

400
00:30:19,390 --> 00:30:23,500
We actually tested with a device, with an iPhone from India, I think.

401
00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:30,580
And then we were in Europe and we tried it and nothing worked.

402
00:30:30,830 --> 00:30:31,560
I mean, of course.

403
00:30:32,180 --> 00:30:38,780
So let's take a device from Europe and we have to go somewhere else and try, I guess.

404
00:30:38,920 --> 00:30:42,420
But I mean, we didn't really do that, but we just tried.

405
00:30:42,860 --> 00:30:50,680
But yes, there was a point where an alternative app store was kind of successful in being installed, but there were so many errors in between.

406
00:30:51,030 --> 00:30:52,800
And it was it was insane.

407
00:30:52,980 --> 00:30:56,160
Like I actually screen recorded it and kept it for myself.

408
00:30:58,000 --> 00:30:59,300
So it didn't really work.

409
00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:05,700
So there's it's just I mean, call it whatever you want, malicious compliance or whatever it is.

410
00:31:05,700 --> 00:31:08,160
I mean, I would just call them non-compliant.

411
00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:21,800
Yeah, I guess context for anyone who hasn't followed in Europe, they have the DMA, they have, you know, potentially they're supposed to allow, Apple's supposed to have third party app stores and all this stuff that's EU specific.

412
00:31:22,360 --> 00:31:26,060
When the DMA passed, I guess I was very optimistic and naive.

413
00:31:26,660 --> 00:31:29,920
And I thought that Apple would have to open up globally.

414
00:31:30,500 --> 00:31:37,200
I didn't think they would actually find a way to only pretty much manage almost this like lightweight second version of iOS for one region.

415
00:31:37,280 --> 00:31:38,560
But they chose to do that route.

416
00:31:38,780 --> 00:31:41,100
So, yeah, yeah.

417
00:31:41,660 --> 00:31:43,780
But we still hope that there is hope in DMA.

418
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:48,880
And yes, it's a really tough battle, but I think they can at least.

419
00:31:49,420 --> 00:32:02,700
So, for example, recently I've seen that the UK is trying to also deal with tech dominance with their DMCCA law that they started recently introduced, I think last year.

420
00:32:02,750 --> 00:32:05,560
And they're trying to figure out how they're going to deal with this.

421
00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:09,660
And they are also learning from the experiences of the DMA in the EU.

422
00:32:10,500 --> 00:32:15,680
So, I mean, though they're very close and we have Brexit and they have their own law right now,

423
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:24,740
and they're taking a lot of input from the learnings and experiences that the EU Commission had in terms of dealing with Apple's dominance and Google's dominance.

424
00:32:25,080 --> 00:32:26,400
And they are learning from this.

425
00:32:26,910 --> 00:32:35,500
And of course, they might not use it fully or something, but at least there's some exchange of knowledge in terms of enforcing this.

426
00:32:35,720 --> 00:32:36,880
And I think that's really good.

427
00:32:38,000 --> 00:32:38,080
Yeah.

428
00:32:38,580 --> 00:32:41,440
I wanted to quickly ask about the UK later as well,

429
00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:43,600
because they seem to have, in my view,

430
00:32:43,780 --> 00:32:47,100
some of the most extreme laws right now when it comes to,

431
00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:49,220
like they want to age verify VPNs.

432
00:32:49,660 --> 00:32:51,220
And as far as I've been able to tell,

433
00:32:51,360 --> 00:32:54,220
it seems pretty quite, it's quite invasive.

434
00:32:54,640 --> 00:32:56,940
But again, that's why I want your opinions on it.

435
00:32:57,440 --> 00:32:58,460
But before we get there,

436
00:32:59,120 --> 00:33:00,180
I want to zoom out a little bit

437
00:33:00,300 --> 00:33:02,900
and just ask kind of the why behind all of this.

438
00:33:03,580 --> 00:33:08,280
have you guys seen kind of an overall narrative of if age verification works?

439
00:33:08,450 --> 00:33:11,900
Because, I mean, for chat control, we see Patrick Breyer come out and say,

440
00:33:11,990 --> 00:33:15,900
like, hey, we have some evidence here that shows this stuff doesn't even actually really work.

441
00:33:16,400 --> 00:33:21,260
So is this theater, do we have real evidence that this is there to protect children?

442
00:33:22,220 --> 00:33:26,860
How is this different from, I think, Japan does age verification when you purchase the device.

443
00:33:27,580 --> 00:33:30,900
So if you're buying a phone in cash, you show your ID and you just get the phone.

444
00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:32,540
There's nothing digital at all about that.

445
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:44,780
Yeah, I think don't don't cite me on that. That's something that I think I read. So I'm kind of just asking like why this is happening and if this stuff has even shown to work and why it's being promoted so heavily.

446
00:33:45,580 --> 00:33:58,580
I mean, as I said, there's a lot of business tactics going around and there's a lot of lobbying going around on these issues because there's a huge attempt to shift burden of compliance to one another, one player to another player.

447
00:33:58,900 --> 00:34:03,560
And that results in compliance burdens shifting to downstream or upstream.

448
00:34:03,920 --> 00:34:05,280
It's pretty obvious that way.

449
00:34:05,280 --> 00:34:06,780
So why this is happening?

450
00:34:06,960 --> 00:34:14,800
I mean, yeah, there's so much going on on social media, as we discussed before, with this social media addiction that is scientifically proven that it's addiction.

451
00:34:15,419 --> 00:34:18,200
And lawmakers, of course, want to point fingers at somebody.

452
00:34:20,179 --> 00:34:22,020
And there's a lot of things happening.

453
00:34:22,280 --> 00:34:27,500
And it's not like lawmakers are technologically handicapped or something like this.

454
00:34:27,720 --> 00:34:34,679
They are at least informed well or not, I'm not sure, but they have enough technical input to look at these things.

455
00:34:34,919 --> 00:34:45,980
But when you have such dominance, this is also a classic example of how we have super monopolies in mobile ecosystems right now and how this plays out.

456
00:34:46,399 --> 00:34:55,899
In the global south, they have immense power in terms of shaping policy for digital competition and shifting burden, as I mentioned.

457
00:34:56,520 --> 00:35:06,700
So when you have that kind of power, that kind of corporate power, then of course there can be a chance to shift burdens and maneuver your way around things.

458
00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:13,100
But we have quite vocal civil societies that are working on this aspect.

459
00:35:13,200 --> 00:35:19,000
And I think, for example, Free Software Foundation Europe has been trying to voice this.

460
00:35:19,060 --> 00:35:23,760
And there are other really good civil societies that are trying to voice this and fight this.

461
00:35:24,040 --> 00:35:28,180
And we have research institutions that are trying to work on this.

462
00:35:28,380 --> 00:35:37,540
And we really have problem with super monopolies or gatekeepers or whatever term that we want to use, because in every aspect they have a say.

463
00:35:37,950 --> 00:35:41,580
And in every aspect we have we are right now we're talking about age related issues.

464
00:35:41,860 --> 00:35:52,040
But as you see, we immediately shifted and we were also talking about Apple's dominance and app stores and their proprietary models and how they're restricting user software freedom.

465
00:35:52,300 --> 00:35:57,860
And so we just immediately switched without us knowing, but we were talking already.

466
00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:05,120
So there is an octopus with a lot of tentacles and we need to try to tackle them with different inputs.

467
00:36:05,300 --> 00:36:12,380
And we need as much diverse opinions and inputs as possible on this to tackle such super monopolies.

468
00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:19,840
For example, with copyright, free software kind of resolved it with licenses, with the problem of copyright.

469
00:36:20,620 --> 00:36:30,040
And there are ways and we need to figure this out instead of having a very, very reactionary approach, at least from what I've seen so far.

470
00:36:30,180 --> 00:36:38,020
So we should look at it from a bigger and broader perspective, zoom out a little bit and try to see why this is happening.

471
00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:46,560
I mean, from your question, why this is happening and then figure out the value of what free software is providing to users around the world.

472
00:36:47,420 --> 00:36:52,520
So if we know the value of that, then I think we need to really protect that.

473
00:36:53,900 --> 00:36:54,940
Yeah, well said.

474
00:36:55,140 --> 00:36:57,800
And shameless plug, but highly relevant.

475
00:36:58,060 --> 00:37:01,480
If any of what Jathendra just said resonates with anybody,

476
00:37:02,060 --> 00:37:04,080
and they want to learn more, I interviewed Lucas,

477
00:37:04,500 --> 00:37:07,060
who is also from the Free Software Foundation of Europe.

478
00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:11,060
And I feel like that interview dove pretty much into everything that you just covered

479
00:37:11,300 --> 00:37:16,120
in terms of gatekeepers, what the DMA is trying to do, the big tech companies, etc.

480
00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:19,980
So if you guys want to check that out, I'm going to leave that in the card or also in the description.

481
00:37:20,540 --> 00:37:23,840
One other kind of more meta question about this stuff as a whole.

482
00:37:24,100 --> 00:37:28,560
When I first, and you can even go back and watch, I think it was the interview I did with the Dutch journalist.

483
00:37:29,040 --> 00:37:33,980
It was a very weird interview in the sense of like, we didn't know what we were going to talk about going into it.

484
00:37:34,060 --> 00:37:37,660
But we ended up talking about age verification in that interview very briefly.

485
00:37:37,860 --> 00:37:40,260
And that was recorded almost a year ago at this point.

486
00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:43,220
And my views then, this was before we started seeing what this would look like.

487
00:37:43,760 --> 00:37:45,280
I saw it only from a privacy angle.

488
00:37:46,040 --> 00:37:50,440
And I was like, well, if they can do it in a privacy-respecting way, I don't see the problem.

489
00:37:51,380 --> 00:37:56,700
My views on this have developed over time, and I see other problems outside of just the privacy angle.

490
00:37:57,740 --> 00:38:02,640
So I'd like to just ask you and what your views are, as well as maybe the Free Software Foundation of Europe's views.

491
00:38:03,100 --> 00:38:04,820
What are the actual concerns here?

492
00:38:05,060 --> 00:38:09,280
I'm sure privacy is a layer of it, but is it surveillance infrastructure?

493
00:38:09,580 --> 00:38:10,720
Is it democratic risk?

494
00:38:10,820 --> 00:38:13,400
Is it just the gatekeeper risk that you're talking about?

495
00:38:14,000 --> 00:38:14,580
All of the above.

496
00:38:14,960 --> 00:38:18,520
If you can quickly just speak on what your concerns actually are with this.

497
00:38:18,820 --> 00:38:20,800
I mean, shortly, all of the above, for sure.

498
00:38:21,920 --> 00:38:28,600
But in terms of verification, we have this whole techno-solutionism argument coming in

499
00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:36,720
where we try to solve this issue, at least age-related issue, with a privacy tech of some sort.

500
00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:39,420
Maybe zero-knowledge proofs or something like this.

501
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:50,780
I mean, if, again, that deals with a, if it deals with a third party and there's some sort of third party involved in this, then there's a risk.

502
00:38:51,440 --> 00:38:52,840
Then it's definitely a risk.

503
00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:59,360
And as I said, we cannot really solve every problem with a tech gimmick or something.

504
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:02,820
And so we need to understand it that way.

505
00:39:02,860 --> 00:39:08,520
Yes, of course, if there is age verification being done using age assurance technologies

506
00:39:08,920 --> 00:39:14,420
and requiring government IDs, then definitely it's a privacy issue for sure.

507
00:39:14,560 --> 00:39:20,420
I don't even have to peel the banana even more to say that there's a privacy issue in this.

508
00:39:21,020 --> 00:39:29,860
We have in Europe, there is GDPR that is quite extensive on privacy and data protection that way.

509
00:39:30,500 --> 00:39:40,000
So many, many issues have been determined as violating GDPR and age verification using technology.

510
00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:47,540
And we need to see, I mean, we cannot really say there is definitely an issue, but we cannot really say, yes, this is a violation.

511
00:39:48,080 --> 00:39:52,060
But there is definitely, it is prone to violate many things.

512
00:39:52,700 --> 00:39:57,020
If you have age verification, I mean, please don't take it in one go.

513
00:39:57,180 --> 00:40:00,000
There are, as I mentioned beginning, there are many terms in this.

514
00:40:00,240 --> 00:40:03,800
So verifying means requiring papers, government IDs.

515
00:40:04,220 --> 00:40:08,520
Like Google, for example, recently rolled out government ID checks for developers.

516
00:40:09,040 --> 00:40:11,860
I mean, that's really, that's quite bad.

517
00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:14,840
And it affects FDroid really badly.

518
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:17,920
And FDroid has been quite vocal about it.

519
00:40:18,040 --> 00:40:22,660
And there's this whole campaign, like with Keep Android Open.

520
00:40:23,380 --> 00:40:27,400
And there was some sort of, yeah, and Google looked into the issue.

521
00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:32,900
And now there is some sort of changes in their policy and they're trying to work it out.

522
00:40:33,460 --> 00:40:37,780
But still, they gave this 10-step process for power users.

523
00:40:38,230 --> 00:40:40,960
They have to shut off their device, wait for 24 hours.

524
00:40:41,200 --> 00:40:41,780
It's just insane.

525
00:40:42,540 --> 00:40:44,180
And so there are things like this.

526
00:40:44,580 --> 00:40:47,620
But that is like developer community as a whole.

527
00:40:47,820 --> 00:40:50,320
They objected to this that they don't want to show.

528
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:57,480
And Google, I think if I remember correctly, they said, yeah, just think about it as an airport check when you try to take a flight.

529
00:40:59,600 --> 00:41:05,640
really good association with that too so yeah that's a great yeah they literally wrote this

530
00:41:05,840 --> 00:41:10,660
on their blog i think and can you imagine like they're asking they're even telling you how to

531
00:41:10,890 --> 00:41:16,340
how to analyze this thing like how they're even telling you which kind of analogy you should

532
00:41:16,600 --> 00:41:21,840
understand this issue in it's quite bad timing too because i know in the u.s we have our own

533
00:41:22,140 --> 00:41:27,480
issues right now with our security in airports and our current administration wants to use

534
00:41:28,540 --> 00:41:30,700
immigration enforcement as security officers.

535
00:41:31,270 --> 00:41:34,660
So there's this whole debate of like, should we be doing that in the U.S.?

536
00:41:34,660 --> 00:41:35,340
Is that a good idea?

537
00:41:35,610 --> 00:41:39,280
And so I think for Google to say that being an American company is also quite ironic

538
00:41:40,020 --> 00:41:43,200
because it's like, well, it's kind of not a good analogy, actually.

539
00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:50,580
So requiring ID that way is, I understand age verification as requiring government check.

540
00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:55,240
So that way, for me, it would be a privacy violation for sure.

541
00:41:56,000 --> 00:42:10,620
And I don't need to, if at all there are age-related laws that require this kind of verification, then we can safely say that they are requiring users to have an ID to even use a computer.

542
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:18,320
If at all there are laws about age verification, literal verification, then we can safely say that they're requiring ID to use even a computer.

543
00:42:18,740 --> 00:42:20,640
That's as extreme as it can get.

544
00:42:20,660 --> 00:42:37,020
I wanted to ask, is there any law or framework right now that exists in the world that you think either got this right or closest to right? Like what laws, you seem to be speaking about California's approach as slightly better, but that's just my read on what you've said so far in this interview.

545
00:42:37,960 --> 00:42:51,560
Yeah, I'm using that as an example because that's if we have because I gave the terminologies and explained what they are, then that way California law does not even fit any of the bill.

546
00:42:51,730 --> 00:42:59,280
It just fits the bill that says self-attestation and self-declaration, the least zero to none tech involved at all.

547
00:42:59,890 --> 00:43:07,440
So the Japanese example you gave, the physical device, I mean, I'm not quoting you.

548
00:43:08,360 --> 00:43:15,840
don't quote me but yeah so it it kind of feels that way but yeah as i said we need to ensure

549
00:43:16,000 --> 00:43:21,440
that it doesn't go beyond that and there there are no malpractices done using this or i mean we need

550
00:43:21,540 --> 00:43:27,420
to control it until there i mean it should not go beyond that as it stands right now the california

551
00:43:27,580 --> 00:43:35,700
bill has very very less negative impacts on free software and software freedom that's what i focus

552
00:43:35,700 --> 00:43:41,880
on and I also focus on the competition issues. So that's where this broader angle that we need to

553
00:43:42,160 --> 00:43:49,260
to respect the value that free software provides and that way we need we should not let it evaporate

554
00:43:49,740 --> 00:43:56,400
because it's a viable alternative to big tech dominance. Yeah I did just do a quick check it

555
00:43:56,540 --> 00:44:02,700
seems like I didn't just make it up but it seems like there's a lot of nuance to it so I think I

556
00:44:02,720 --> 00:44:05,920
simplified this quite a lot because there's different ways to fit. So like everything,

557
00:44:06,020 --> 00:44:11,040
I think we have to simplify a bit. Yeah, you asked which, is there anybody who got it right?

558
00:44:11,460 --> 00:44:17,620
I'm not really sure if somebody, if some jurisdiction got this right. At least if you

559
00:44:17,780 --> 00:44:23,700
mean age verification requiring government IDs to use online content, I'm not really sure who got

560
00:44:23,820 --> 00:44:31,980
this right. I don't see any right approach or not that I'm aware of. Yeah. Okay. I have a list of

561
00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:35,480
questions from our TechLorians. Someone asked, who are the companies stepping up to run this

562
00:44:35,660 --> 00:44:39,400
verification? Do they have a good track record? Do they have government ties? Are you seeing any

563
00:44:39,730 --> 00:44:42,980
major players in this space that are behind some of the pushes for this?

564
00:44:43,120 --> 00:44:49,680
I'm not sure. As I said, there are actors from social media platforms and there are actors from

565
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:55,740
app stores and there's so many players. I'm not sure whose names that I can pick.

566
00:44:56,780 --> 00:45:01,160
I am sure that there are many involved in pushing this. I mean, it's very obvious.

567
00:45:02,240 --> 00:45:14,780
Right. Someone asked, and it's a really good question, when the data leaks, if there is a data breach, who's legally responsible? Is it the government? Is it the platform? Is it the third party verifier? What are the fines? Yeah.

568
00:45:15,180 --> 00:45:32,020
Yeah, that's again, that's the thing. Like, of course, then that way, there is a burden on the government also when you have such kind of frameworks that you want to implement, then the governments should also ensure that there are no there's no window of malpractices or there's no window of any failure.

569
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:35,200
Of course, you cannot say that something is perfectly secure.

570
00:45:36,280 --> 00:45:37,520
You really cannot say that.

571
00:45:37,740 --> 00:45:42,080
And for anything, pre-software that way is better because at least you know what's in

572
00:45:42,220 --> 00:45:46,080
there and you can see it, you can verify it, you can audit it.

573
00:45:46,360 --> 00:45:49,180
So, but we cannot say something is perfectly secure.

574
00:45:49,920 --> 00:45:54,020
And, but the, who has the burden and who has the onus, who has the liability?

575
00:45:54,600 --> 00:45:57,000
It seems like it's a distributed liability.

576
00:45:57,320 --> 00:46:13,260
Like government also has some sort of burden that if you have such kind of verification frameworks or something like this, then you should also ensure that these things are done in a very error-free manner.

577
00:46:14,220 --> 00:46:22,040
But if it's on the platform or the provider, then yes, of course, the provider is most likely be liable for this.

578
00:46:22,160 --> 00:46:28,200
If they are doing this via a third party, then yeah, it's, I mean, if you, if you look at a

579
00:46:28,440 --> 00:46:34,400
proprietary model, then that itself is a single point of failure. One thing fails and it falls

580
00:46:34,560 --> 00:46:40,540
like a pack of cards. So yeah. Somebody asked, and you did touch on this already. So if you have

581
00:46:40,640 --> 00:46:46,740
anything more to expand on, someone asked, it was a very good question, would OS level age

582
00:46:46,760 --> 00:46:53,780
verification even be legal in the EU under GDPR? It needs more assessment, but I would say right

583
00:46:53,900 --> 00:47:00,840
now there is none, but there are discussions in EU as well about bringing such laws. We currently,

584
00:47:01,040 --> 00:47:07,680
I think Europe currently has Digital Services Act. It explicitly targets very large online platforms,

585
00:47:08,020 --> 00:47:15,400
VLOPs, which have a certain number of users, certain number of turnover per annum,

586
00:47:16,080 --> 00:47:19,340
which means it's only really focusing on the big, big players.

587
00:47:20,040 --> 00:47:24,040
So it doesn't concern a smaller free software project or something.

588
00:47:24,140 --> 00:47:29,320
But per se, there is no operating system age law in Europe currently,

589
00:47:29,340 --> 00:47:33,340
but it is being discussed is what I read and seeing.

590
00:47:33,880 --> 00:47:37,960
But in terms of if it's GDPR compliant or not,

591
00:47:37,980 --> 00:47:40,900
we need to assess it on a case-by-case basis.

592
00:47:41,140 --> 00:47:44,380
I cannot really say on a general basis that it's compliant,

593
00:47:44,620 --> 00:47:49,520
But I would be on the side that it's on the face of it.

594
00:47:49,570 --> 00:47:57,060
It looks like it will not be compliant if the data is going somewhere else or if it's saved somewhere else.

595
00:47:57,460 --> 00:48:00,720
Even an IP address is considered as personal data under GDPR.

596
00:48:03,240 --> 00:48:06,300
We also touched on this, but I don't know if you wanted to expand at all.

597
00:48:06,300 --> 00:48:12,480
But someone asked specifically about teenage distro maintainers or young developers, people who might be considered minors.

598
00:48:13,280 --> 00:48:18,420
Is age verification directly threatening software freedom and programming education for minors?

599
00:48:18,450 --> 00:48:29,380
Sure. Yeah. As I said, kids and children or minors should not be banned from participating in democratic society and should not be banned from their own curiosity.

600
00:48:29,770 --> 00:48:32,980
For example, Free Software Foundation Europe has a program.

601
00:48:32,990 --> 00:48:38,340
It's called Youth Hacking for Freedom, where we see teenagers also participating.

602
00:48:38,640 --> 00:48:42,980
It's a hacking competition and we see so many teenagers tinkering around.

603
00:48:43,360 --> 00:48:50,780
And it's really fun to see how many, like the cool projects they're trying to build.

604
00:48:51,460 --> 00:48:58,500
And yeah, for sure, there will be impacts if there is a blanket ban, like how we saw in Australia.

605
00:48:58,900 --> 00:49:01,140
First of all, they are not really enforceable.

606
00:49:01,580 --> 00:49:07,740
Second of all, they are really detrimental to the very core of the right to tinker and right to repair.

607
00:49:07,900 --> 00:49:11,400
and just basic curiosity of a child or a teenager.

608
00:49:11,920 --> 00:49:14,220
Yeah, you can be pretty brief here,

609
00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:16,180
but you just mentioned enforceability

610
00:49:16,460 --> 00:49:19,480
and I feel like some countries aren't convinced.

611
00:49:20,140 --> 00:49:21,700
We brought up the UK earlier.

612
00:49:21,830 --> 00:49:25,060
The UK has already started implementing some age verification.

613
00:49:25,700 --> 00:49:27,480
So then everybody moves to VPNs

614
00:49:27,890 --> 00:49:30,020
and then they're like, well, we're going to age verify the VPNs.

615
00:49:31,280 --> 00:49:33,020
And then it's like, well, then do people use Tor?

616
00:49:33,030 --> 00:49:34,340
And they say, oh, we're going to age verify Tor.

617
00:49:34,430 --> 00:49:36,759
So can you walk me through enforceability

618
00:49:36,760 --> 00:49:39,460
and why maybe that's not very enforceable?

619
00:49:39,720 --> 00:49:42,000
And why are these countries convinced it is?

620
00:49:42,760 --> 00:49:46,820
I mean, in the UK one, I'm not sure if it's enforceable.

621
00:49:47,020 --> 00:49:49,380
I'm just, I'm trying to wrap my head around it.

622
00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:54,260
How can a blanket ban, for example, on social media be enforceable?

623
00:49:54,540 --> 00:49:59,000
I mean, it's not going to be so, it's, I don't know.

624
00:49:59,440 --> 00:50:01,580
We've already seen that it's a fail.

625
00:50:02,200 --> 00:50:04,840
And in terms of age verification of VPN,

626
00:50:04,980 --> 00:50:11,480
And again, it's, as I mentioned, it's really a problem if you have a verification for using

627
00:50:11,760 --> 00:50:15,140
something with government ID checks and this kind of stuff.

628
00:50:15,500 --> 00:50:20,880
When you have a law, we have some kind of technological solution that is being developed

629
00:50:20,940 --> 00:50:21,960
to counter that law.

630
00:50:22,260 --> 00:50:24,740
It's a tug of war that's being done everywhere.

631
00:50:24,880 --> 00:50:30,200
And you see there's a law and there is a tech solution or something that is being developed

632
00:50:30,560 --> 00:50:31,580
to bypass that law.

633
00:50:31,760 --> 00:50:33,280
And we see this happening everywhere.

634
00:50:33,940 --> 00:50:39,700
But I'm not sure how the UK edge verification will.

635
00:50:39,890 --> 00:50:41,900
There are so many privacy concerns around it,

636
00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:46,360
and I hope that there is some workable solution around it.

637
00:50:46,840 --> 00:50:51,100
Right now, I don't see how this can be enforced per se.

638
00:50:51,520 --> 00:50:53,480
The final TechLorean question here is,

639
00:50:54,080 --> 00:50:57,600
how do you convince people who don't follow tech that this is a real threat?

640
00:50:57,990 --> 00:51:01,200
And what do you do when both major parties in your country support it?

641
00:51:01,940 --> 00:51:08,640
So I think they're looking for actionable advice that they can share with themselves, their family, to try to be a good part of the movement.

642
00:51:09,670 --> 00:51:13,700
I mean, use as much nice analogies as possible.

643
00:51:14,080 --> 00:51:19,540
I'm coming from the law area and I like analogies and courts also like analogies.

644
00:51:19,740 --> 00:51:21,620
And it makes things simpler.

645
00:51:21,750 --> 00:51:24,420
But yeah, everybody has their own preference.

646
00:51:24,530 --> 00:51:25,640
But it's easier.

647
00:51:25,730 --> 00:51:31,380
Like, I mean, you have, let's look at a train station and where you can score drugs.

648
00:51:32,040 --> 00:51:39,160
Would you ban your kids from going to train station just because there is a chance to score some drugs?

649
00:51:39,470 --> 00:51:44,720
I mean, that's it takes away many things in that example.

650
00:51:44,900 --> 00:51:54,960
So there are ways to explain this to non-tech users how bad this is in terms of like try to simplify the issue, like use use real world analogies.

651
00:51:55,140 --> 00:52:00,660
And also I think you should start from explaining why free software is a better alternative.

652
00:52:00,760 --> 00:52:05,400
If you can manage to explain that to a non-tech user, then you're good.

653
00:52:05,440 --> 00:52:11,180
You can easily explain why age verification per se is bad.

654
00:52:13,420 --> 00:52:20,520
And kind of as an extension of this, my final question to you, you are taking both approaches.

655
00:52:20,640 --> 00:52:24,060
You are acknowledging that this is something that we need to watch carefully.

656
00:52:24,740 --> 00:52:25,480
It might be bad.

657
00:52:25,500 --> 00:52:26,400
It might be very bad.

658
00:52:27,000 --> 00:52:30,020
But we also need to actually not be reactive about it.

659
00:52:30,520 --> 00:52:33,640
And I feel like that you just summed up the two camps right there.

660
00:52:34,020 --> 00:52:35,620
Because there's people who are like, this isn't a big deal.

661
00:52:35,630 --> 00:52:36,700
We don't need to do anything about it.

662
00:52:36,710 --> 00:52:38,520
And there's people who are like, this is a big deal, so I need to react.

663
00:52:38,780 --> 00:52:40,340
And you're taking both positions in a way.

664
00:52:41,319 --> 00:52:47,740
So my question to you is, how can we better facilitate discussions as we try to navigate

665
00:52:48,000 --> 00:52:53,120
this, ideally, as millions of people who don't think age verification is good in the way that

666
00:52:53,120 --> 00:52:53,820
it's being proposed?

667
00:52:54,780 --> 00:52:59,840
So how can we all who are listening to this better engage in this discussion so that we

668
00:52:59,860 --> 00:53:05,740
can have the best result and the best outcome. Okay. So what I tried to do in this whole talk

669
00:53:05,900 --> 00:53:10,960
was that I'm trying to give all the perspectives. I'm trying to summarize because it's really

670
00:53:11,160 --> 00:53:14,600
important to clarify things because there's so many things flying around and so many

671
00:53:15,740 --> 00:53:21,480
misrepresentations that way. And how do we tackle this? I mean, by reactionary, I mean,

672
00:53:21,780 --> 00:53:26,740
panic reactionary. Of course, we have to react. And we react in a way that, as I said,

673
00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:33,720
free software community is being recognized and we also need a place where the lawmakers see that

674
00:53:33,800 --> 00:53:39,260
there are alternatives in the form of free software. And we need to engage with lawmakers

675
00:53:39,700 --> 00:53:45,900
and states to better inform them. For example, we can provide more better inputs from the free

676
00:53:46,100 --> 00:53:52,360
software community perspective, which can shape policies in a better way. So I think that way,

677
00:53:52,420 --> 00:53:54,360
the dialogue should keep going.

678
00:53:55,110 --> 00:53:55,220
Okay.

679
00:53:56,460 --> 00:53:57,380
Well, I really want to thank you

680
00:53:57,380 --> 00:53:58,480
for being on this podcast.

681
00:53:58,960 --> 00:54:01,000
I went into this interview

682
00:54:01,390 --> 00:54:03,000
a little more nervous than normal

683
00:54:03,160 --> 00:54:05,100
because, again, this is a,

684
00:54:05,460 --> 00:54:07,400
it's a bit charged, but also...

685
00:54:07,400 --> 00:54:07,900
Yeah, of course.

686
00:54:09,620 --> 00:54:12,180
No one's, I haven't actually read an article.

687
00:54:12,570 --> 00:54:13,840
I haven't seen a video.

688
00:54:14,700 --> 00:54:16,360
I haven't been able to do my own analysis

689
00:54:16,580 --> 00:54:17,280
of the situation

690
00:54:17,390 --> 00:54:19,140
to actually make sense of what's going on.

691
00:54:19,310 --> 00:54:20,800
So when I walked into this interview,

692
00:54:21,010 --> 00:54:22,220
this felt very new.

693
00:54:23,119 --> 00:54:25,280
and very like, there's a lot on the line

694
00:54:25,310 --> 00:54:26,620
and I want to make sure I get this right.

695
00:54:27,600 --> 00:54:28,800
So I just really want to thank you

696
00:54:28,940 --> 00:54:30,980
for explaining this very nicely.

697
00:54:31,170 --> 00:54:32,600
I think it's going to be a great starting point

698
00:54:32,650 --> 00:54:33,960
for people to kind of make sense

699
00:54:34,240 --> 00:54:35,220
of the current landscape.

700
00:54:36,539 --> 00:54:38,800
And where can people follow your work

701
00:54:39,080 --> 00:54:40,360
and also the Free Software Foundation

702
00:54:40,570 --> 00:54:42,700
of Europe's work on this and anything else?

703
00:54:43,340 --> 00:54:44,480
And also, where would you send people

704
00:54:44,810 --> 00:54:46,140
to kind of just get them involved in this

705
00:54:46,170 --> 00:54:47,020
if they want to get involved?

706
00:54:47,420 --> 00:54:49,520
Talk to your local communities,

707
00:54:49,960 --> 00:54:51,840
wherever Free Software, I mean, it's everywhere.

708
00:54:52,200 --> 00:54:56,140
So, I mean, we are Free Software Foundation Europe and here, I think you can follow our

709
00:54:56,280 --> 00:54:56,680
work there.

710
00:54:56,940 --> 00:55:02,320
And currently it's, I am mostly dealing with dominance and competition issues and how that

711
00:55:02,620 --> 00:55:04,760
impacts free software in general.

712
00:55:05,040 --> 00:55:07,260
And that involves many things.

713
00:55:07,520 --> 00:55:11,680
And it also involves the things that we have discussed today.

714
00:55:12,360 --> 00:55:19,559
And yeah, I think if you can start engaging locally and try to see how things are and

715
00:55:19,580 --> 00:55:22,680
They can be, I don't know where you're trying to,

716
00:55:23,500 --> 00:55:25,080
but I mean, like, where do I send people?

717
00:55:25,260 --> 00:55:26,920
I'm not really sure where I can send them,

718
00:55:27,420 --> 00:55:29,060
but there are really good organizations.

719
00:55:29,420 --> 00:55:32,960
There's also Software Freedom Conservancy in the US

720
00:55:33,740 --> 00:55:35,440
that's also doing really good work.

721
00:55:36,020 --> 00:55:38,800
And I think Bradley Kuhn and Karen Sandler,

722
00:55:39,420 --> 00:55:42,340
they're also working very hard on these aspects

723
00:55:42,580 --> 00:55:44,780
and yeah, shout out to them as well.

724
00:55:45,580 --> 00:55:46,000
Awesome.

725
00:55:46,240 --> 00:55:47,400
Well, thank you so much for your time today.

726
00:55:47,480 --> 00:55:49,720
I know that you're working on a lot of stuff back there.

727
00:55:49,740 --> 00:55:50,580
So I really appreciate you.

728
00:55:51,140 --> 00:55:51,400
Thank you.

729
00:55:51,700 --> 00:55:52,820
Thank you for having me.

730
00:55:52,880 --> 00:55:54,580
And I hope I was useful.

731
00:55:54,960 --> 00:55:57,800
And yeah, it was really great discussing this.

732
00:55:58,100 --> 00:55:59,820
And yeah, thanks a lot for having me.

733
00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:00,940
Yeah, it was a pleasure.

734
00:56:01,640 --> 00:56:01,880
Of course.

735
00:56:02,100 --> 00:56:02,540
Thanks, Jatantra.

736
00:56:03,160 --> 00:56:03,520
Thank you.

737
00:56:03,760 --> 00:56:04,140
Thank you, Henry.

738
00:56:04,920 --> 00:56:06,500
And there is the interview.

739
00:56:06,960 --> 00:56:09,460
I really want to thank him so much for coming on.

740
00:56:09,620 --> 00:56:13,080
He's actually trying to help us think more clearly because these laws are moving very

741
00:56:13,320 --> 00:56:16,220
fast and they're written in languages that are easy to misread.

742
00:56:16,560 --> 00:56:19,240
and the knee-jerk reactions from our own community and myself

743
00:56:19,840 --> 00:56:21,740
can sometimes not be the most productive.

744
00:56:21,880 --> 00:56:23,400
And so I really wanted to bring him on

745
00:56:23,500 --> 00:56:25,180
and actually understand what's going on

746
00:56:25,480 --> 00:56:27,680
from somebody who's able to follow this a little bit better.

747
00:56:27,920 --> 00:56:29,820
We learned today that the terminology matters,

748
00:56:30,040 --> 00:56:31,660
that distinction between age verification,

749
00:56:32,260 --> 00:56:34,700
age estimation, and self-declaration matters,

750
00:56:35,160 --> 00:56:37,200
and who ends up holding the compliance burden

751
00:56:37,780 --> 00:56:39,380
and the data also matters.

752
00:56:39,660 --> 00:56:41,340
If this conversation sparked something for you,

753
00:56:41,440 --> 00:56:42,540
I'd encourage you to look into

754
00:56:42,540 --> 00:56:44,180
the Free Software Foundation of Europe's work

755
00:56:44,320 --> 00:56:46,200
and make sure to get involved with the organizations

756
00:56:46,220 --> 00:56:51,340
pushing back on these laws in ways that protect everyone, including kids. Links are all in the

757
00:56:51,400 --> 00:56:55,920
description. I want to thank Jethandra for coming on and thank you all for watching Techlore Talks.

758
00:56:56,220 --> 00:57:00,340
I learned a lot from this one and it has really helped clear things up for me and kind of helped

759
00:57:00,340 --> 00:57:04,800
me evolve where I can actually kind of see where things are headed in the future. It's really hard

760
00:57:04,800 --> 00:57:08,500
to make content about these topics. So I want to thank you all for listening and for taking your

761
00:57:08,580 --> 00:57:12,420
digital safety seriously and keeping yourself and the people around you a little bit safer.

762
00:57:12,940 --> 00:57:15,780
Thank you all for watching and I'll see you next time on Techlor Talks.

763
00:57:15,960 --> 00:57:19,300
If you like this podcast, you can support it down below by becoming a Techlorian.

764
00:57:19,780 --> 00:57:20,300
See you next time.

765
00:57:49,319 --> 00:57:50,260
*outro music*