1 00:00:01,660 --> 00:00:04,520 This week's surveillance report covers Dashlane, the password manager, 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:07,000 who has confirmed that hackers stole some customers' 3 00:00:07,220 --> 00:00:07,880 password vaults. 4 00:00:07,960 --> 00:00:09,040 We're going to talk about what's happened. 5 00:00:09,440 --> 00:00:14,240 The Pentagon has come forward and has admitted that U.S. troops are targeted with commercial location data, 6 00:00:14,380 --> 00:00:19,040 which is the same problems we talk about, hitting the people that supposedly don't have to deal with this. 7 00:00:19,140 --> 00:00:21,580 And there are some broader implications there I want to touch on. 8 00:00:21,900 --> 00:00:26,960 Europe is accelerating its move away from U.S. technology with Nextcloud's EuroOffice launching, 9 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:29,860 as well as Tuda, the email provider joining as well. 10 00:00:30,140 --> 00:00:37,980 And then there's a wild meta AI account takeover story where hackers literally just asked AI chatbots to get access to Instagram accounts. 11 00:00:38,300 --> 00:00:39,480 And the AI said, sure, 12 00:00:39,740 --> 00:00:40,060 why not? 13 00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:40,520 Hello, 14 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:40,840 everybody, 15 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:44,100 and welcome to the Techlore Surveillance Report hosted by yours truly, 16 00:00:44,340 --> 00:00:44,540 Henry. 17 00:00:44,730 --> 00:00:49,560 And this is your essential weekly tech news delivering deep analysis on the latest threats to security, 18 00:00:49,720 --> 00:00:49,940 privacy, 19 00:00:50,260 --> 00:00:56,240 and digital freedom and empowering you to reclaim control and defend your rights. 20 00:00:56,640 --> 00:00:58,260 All right, we had some juicy, 21 00:00:58,660 --> 00:00:58,920 juicy, 22 00:00:59,740 --> 00:01:01,680 juicy stories this week, 23 00:01:02,200 --> 00:01:03,440 starting with what we never 24 00:01:03,600 --> 00:01:07,640 want to hear back here, right, which is a password manager that gets in some way potentially 25 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:08,240 compromised. 26 00:01:08,840 --> 00:01:09,000 Now, 27 00:01:09,340 --> 00:01:14,540 this has a lot of asterisks on it, but it is quite reminiscent of that last pass 28 00:01:14,560 --> 00:01:16,500 data breach that we dealt with a few years ago. 29 00:01:17,040 --> 00:01:18,680 So Dashlane is a password manager. 30 00:01:18,980 --> 00:01:19,940 Theoretically on paper, 31 00:01:20,180 --> 00:01:21,260 one of the better ones, 32 00:01:21,420 --> 00:01:22,740 they actually started pivoting towards 33 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:26,660 doing some more open source stuff, which I really liked when they started doing that. 34 00:01:27,060 --> 00:01:27,240 Now, 35 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:31,260 pretty much they came forward yesterday at the time of recording and said that hackers 36 00:01:31,680 --> 00:01:35,900 obtained at least a dozen encrypted vaults used for storing customer passwords during 37 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:36,960 a week in cyber attack. 38 00:01:37,300 --> 00:01:42,500 Now, if you're newer to the concept of password managers, the idea is you have a vault that 39 00:01:42,500 --> 00:01:44,540 is synced over the cloud with all of your passwords. 40 00:01:45,320 --> 00:01:46,000 But ideally, 41 00:01:46,700 --> 00:01:49,480 everything you do in that vault is encrypted on your device before it touches 42 00:01:49,520 --> 00:01:50,000 their servers. 43 00:01:50,240 --> 00:01:52,740 and so they can't actually see inside of the vault. 44 00:01:53,030 --> 00:01:55,740 Now, before we get into the repercussions of this 45 00:01:55,860 --> 00:01:56,540 and what it means, 46 00:01:56,950 --> 00:01:59,840 just to target what might have happened first, 47 00:02:00,080 --> 00:02:01,200 Dashlane came forward and said 48 00:02:01,200 --> 00:02:03,360 there was no evidence of compromise on its own systems, 49 00:02:03,880 --> 00:02:05,400 but it has not yet said how the hackers 50 00:02:05,580 --> 00:02:07,440 were able to defeat its two-factor protections 51 00:02:07,840 --> 00:02:09,399 in order to access customer accounts. 52 00:02:09,640 --> 00:02:12,320 You can read their original announcement if you want to, 53 00:02:12,500 --> 00:02:14,400 but it is very light on details. 54 00:02:14,700 --> 00:02:16,520 They say that they brute-forced 55 00:02:16,550 --> 00:02:18,800 the company's two-factor authentication system, 56 00:02:19,180 --> 00:02:22,420 and it granted the hackers access to about 20 customer accounts. 57 00:02:22,590 --> 00:02:25,760 So then they were able to download a copy of their encrypted vaults. 58 00:02:25,960 --> 00:02:29,240 They did say they've taken steps to mitigate the risk of future incidents. 59 00:02:29,920 --> 00:02:31,660 And like TechCrunch says here in the article, 60 00:02:31,860 --> 00:02:33,500 without saying what those were. 61 00:02:33,940 --> 00:02:35,360 The spokespeople for Dashlane, 62 00:02:35,530 --> 00:02:36,160 as of yesterday, 63 00:02:36,320 --> 00:02:37,940 did not respond to a request for comment. 64 00:02:38,260 --> 00:02:40,880 They did not say if it knows who targeted its customers 65 00:02:41,050 --> 00:02:43,920 or if the hackers contacted Dashlane with demands like a ransom. 66 00:02:44,320 --> 00:02:48,100 Now, there's an Ars Technica article that came out today with a few more details. 67 00:02:48,520 --> 00:02:53,860 And when I say few, I'm being a little bit generous there because there's still a lot that's not really clear. 68 00:02:54,280 --> 00:02:58,820 Now, the reason why there's confusion is because Dashlane isn't being very specific on what's going on. 69 00:02:58,950 --> 00:03:01,400 Pretty much the Ars Technica article speculates, 70 00:03:01,640 --> 00:03:01,860 you know, 71 00:03:02,090 --> 00:03:05,100 are they trying to brute force the accounts directly by trying different codes? 72 00:03:05,350 --> 00:03:07,220 Are they trying to do something called 2FA fatigue? 73 00:03:07,780 --> 00:03:09,700 When you spam somebody over and over, 74 00:03:09,920 --> 00:03:12,440 eventually they click approve and let the attacker in anyway. 75 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:18,200 But it's also plausible that the attack exploited features that allow Dashlane users to enroll new devices in their accounts. 76 00:03:18,620 --> 00:03:21,280 pretty much we have no idea why there were all these prompts. 77 00:03:21,460 --> 00:03:23,000 These are just small little nuggets 78 00:03:23,200 --> 00:03:24,300 of information we have, 79 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:26,820 and everything beyond that is a bit of speculation. 80 00:03:27,180 --> 00:03:28,240 Now, there are a few things 81 00:03:28,340 --> 00:03:34,540 that are confirmed that I think we can already start to form reasonable kind of takeaways about. 82 00:03:35,020 --> 00:03:35,840 So the first thing, 83 00:03:36,060 --> 00:03:38,620 you know, a lot of people are going to point to, and I know Dashlane is going to 84 00:03:38,740 --> 00:03:40,960 point to the fact, especially in marketing and PR, 85 00:03:41,580 --> 00:03:43,460 that these were encrypted vaults. Now, 86 00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:44,340 this is a 87 00:03:44,320 --> 00:03:44,740 good step, 88 00:03:44,960 --> 00:03:47,620 right? We saw this sort of as well with LastPass, 89 00:03:47,780 --> 00:03:49,360 where at least the most sensitive data 90 00:03:49,920 --> 00:03:51,440 was, you know, part of an encrypted vault. 91 00:03:51,640 --> 00:03:53,540 But what we learned is because of the security of 92 00:03:53,540 --> 00:03:57,320 their master password and the amount of iterations required to break into the vault, all this 93 00:03:57,560 --> 00:04:02,040 technical stuff, especially in combination with people using weak master passwords, 94 00:04:02,240 --> 00:04:02,980 we have seen 95 00:04:03,320 --> 00:04:07,320 millions of dollars that have been drained in things like cryptocurrencies tied to the LastPass 96 00:04:07,480 --> 00:04:07,840 data breach, 97 00:04:08,150 --> 00:04:10,400 all because originally encrypted vaults were taken. 98 00:04:10,840 --> 00:04:12,380 But to this day, there are 99 00:04:12,360 --> 00:04:15,660 people who are still trying to break into those vaults computationally. 100 00:04:15,910 --> 00:04:16,980 And so that is my concern 101 00:04:17,030 --> 00:04:17,940 with this one as well. 102 00:04:18,380 --> 00:04:19,540 Yes, hackers stole, let's say, 103 00:04:19,780 --> 00:04:21,620 20 encrypted vaults, 104 00:04:22,060 --> 00:04:22,700 but now they can start 105 00:04:22,850 --> 00:04:24,840 hitting that starting today and people with really, 106 00:04:25,020 --> 00:04:27,340 really weak master passwords may be at risk. 107 00:04:27,520 --> 00:04:27,780 So 108 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:33,240 no matter what password manager you're using, this is a good takeaway for you to make sure your master 109 00:04:33,380 --> 00:04:35,920 password is as strong as it could possibly be. 110 00:04:36,160 --> 00:04:38,280 Now, I think the second very clear takeaway that 111 00:04:38,300 --> 00:04:41,440 is not polarizing is that Dashlane needs to step the hell up. 112 00:04:41,940 --> 00:04:43,860 If they want in any way to retain 113 00:04:43,980 --> 00:04:48,720 their reputation as being a trusted password manager, which is probably the most sensitive 114 00:04:48,860 --> 00:04:50,960 piece of software anybody can use. 115 00:04:51,120 --> 00:04:54,120 This is people's access to literally their life, 116 00:04:54,520 --> 00:04:55,320 everything in their life. 117 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:58,520 Dashlane needs to step the hell up or else they're going to end up like 118 00:04:58,640 --> 00:05:02,780 LastPass and be a literal laughingstock of the password manager industry, which is a bummer because 119 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:08,040 I think Dashlane has actually tried to really fix their reputation in the last several years. 120 00:05:08,520 --> 00:05:11,840 So I would love to see Dashleen step forward and at least say, 121 00:05:12,000 --> 00:05:12,060 hey, 122 00:05:12,310 --> 00:05:14,440 we don't know what's going on yet. We're doing investigations. 123 00:05:14,720 --> 00:05:15,560 Here's what we do know. 124 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:16,740 And instead, 125 00:05:16,900 --> 00:05:18,320 they're kind of just ignoring everything. 126 00:05:18,850 --> 00:05:20,900 My optimistic side is saying, 127 00:05:21,060 --> 00:05:21,200 hey, 128 00:05:21,420 --> 00:05:27,280 you know, there's a lot going on. They probably need to investigate what's going on. It's going to take them a few days. They want to make sure they get all the details right. 129 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:28,980 All those things can be true, 130 00:05:29,620 --> 00:05:31,940 but I still think even with that optimistic lens, 131 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:41,560 there's no reason they can't be reaching out to people who are legitimately concerned about this if they're dashling customers and letting those customers know directly what they're doing, 132 00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:43,820 not just saying generic, 133 00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:47,920 vague stuff that doesn't really mean anything that's leaving everybody to have to guess what's going on. 134 00:05:47,920 --> 00:05:49,460 I think this is the worst case scenario. 135 00:05:49,760 --> 00:05:51,920 These are always quite juicy stories, 136 00:05:52,080 --> 00:05:54,100 and we see a lot develop really quickly. 137 00:05:54,620 --> 00:05:57,460 And so I'm watching this quite closely, so make sure to stay subscribed. 138 00:05:57,660 --> 00:05:59,260 I'm sure we'll have more updates on this one. 139 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:00,400 It's a pretty big story, 140 00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:02,440 and I know it always gets people concerned 141 00:06:02,540 --> 00:06:04,700 when there's a new password manager data breach. 142 00:06:11,120 --> 00:06:12,820 All right, coming soon, we still have Europe, 143 00:06:13,040 --> 00:06:16,560 who's trying to pull away from U.S. big tech with some really interesting initiatives. 144 00:06:17,020 --> 00:06:19,740 We have hackers who hijacked Instagram celebrity accounts 145 00:06:19,840 --> 00:06:22,820 by just asking AI to do it, and it said sure. 146 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:27,140 But before we get there, we have this really interesting story. 147 00:06:27,260 --> 00:06:30,060 So before I even touch on the story directly, 148 00:06:30,220 --> 00:06:31,400 a little bit of context. 149 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:36,180 And this is a recurring pattern in the privacy digital rights space, 150 00:06:36,340 --> 00:06:40,900 which is you can't only give good things to good people. 151 00:06:41,180 --> 00:06:43,120 We need to make things universal, 152 00:06:43,620 --> 00:06:47,080 and that is just the reality of how this all works. 153 00:06:47,400 --> 00:06:50,060 If we want people to have access to encryption, 154 00:06:50,320 --> 00:06:52,020 everybody needs access to encryption. 155 00:06:52,540 --> 00:06:53,700 So if we want law enforcement, 156 00:06:53,960 --> 00:06:55,020 if we want military, 157 00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:57,480 etc., to have access to encryption, 158 00:06:57,870 --> 00:07:01,700 that also means regular people like you and I should also have access to encryption. 159 00:07:02,180 --> 00:07:05,580 This is something that I like to consider, oh, a basic human right, right? 160 00:07:05,610 --> 00:07:07,280 We think privacy is a basic human right. 161 00:07:07,640 --> 00:07:11,680 Access to security can in some ways be justified as a basic human right. 162 00:07:11,870 --> 00:07:14,480 And I would say digital rights are human rights, 163 00:07:14,720 --> 00:07:14,840 right? 164 00:07:15,220 --> 00:07:17,680 Now, a lot of times those in power like to fight this narrative. 165 00:07:17,980 --> 00:07:22,160 But then we have these fun moments where it actually switches and we actually can say, 166 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:22,720 You see, 167 00:07:22,900 --> 00:07:27,340 look what happens when you don't take these problems seriously and it actually ends up impacting you. 168 00:07:28,020 --> 00:07:30,460 We had the Salt Typhoon hacks not too long ago, 169 00:07:30,860 --> 00:07:33,340 which pretty much was created because of a backdoor. 170 00:07:33,500 --> 00:07:40,000 Those same backdoors that they're trying to implement into everybody's messages and everybody's web traffic all around the world right now. 171 00:07:40,320 --> 00:07:42,040 People seem to be proposing backdoors, 172 00:07:42,300 --> 00:07:49,200 but then we see the big guys who have a backdoor and it gets exploited and they deal with one of the worst hacks ever. 173 00:07:49,980 --> 00:07:55,640 And now we continue this trend because U.S. troops were targeted with location data. 174 00:07:56,110 --> 00:08:00,340 Now, this came from Senator Ron Wyden, who has a history of covering a lot of these privacy-based 175 00:08:00,690 --> 00:08:00,820 problems. 176 00:08:01,660 --> 00:08:05,700 And he pretty much said that the U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed that adversaries 177 00:08:05,710 --> 00:08:10,900 have targeted and surveilled serving military personnel on the battlefield using commercial 178 00:08:11,120 --> 00:08:11,760 location data, 179 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:15,500 the latest demonstration of how information collected from phones and 180 00:08:15,640 --> 00:08:18,260 computers can be abused to track and target individuals. 181 00:08:18,700 --> 00:08:21,220 We talk about this a lot on the podcast. 182 00:08:21,650 --> 00:08:22,600 Pretty much law enforcement, 183 00:08:22,780 --> 00:08:23,200 the FBI, 184 00:08:23,380 --> 00:08:26,040 and other government agencies in the U.S., they need 185 00:08:26,180 --> 00:08:29,940 to normally get a warrant to just, you know, access information about you. 186 00:08:29,950 --> 00:08:33,539 There needs to be a reasonable cause to have to investigate people. 187 00:08:33,919 --> 00:08:36,180 They need a judge to say that makes sense. 188 00:08:36,500 --> 00:08:38,039 Now you can go ahead and pursue them. 189 00:08:38,520 --> 00:08:40,120 I don't think many people who listen to this podcast, 190 00:08:40,400 --> 00:08:40,760 nor myself, 191 00:08:41,180 --> 00:08:42,680 think that law enforcement 192 00:08:42,940 --> 00:08:45,460 shouldn't be allowed to pursue people that they think are doing something wrong. 193 00:08:45,660 --> 00:08:48,340 But there should be some layer of accountability. 194 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:53,200 Typically, they have to get a warrant to search things like your house or anything in your physical life. 195 00:08:53,290 --> 00:08:56,280 They can't just walk all over you without a judge saying that's okay. 196 00:08:56,960 --> 00:09:02,360 Now, the problem with the digital space is that even though those laws technically are kind of supposed to exist, 197 00:09:03,180 --> 00:09:06,980 they just get around them by purchasing data from other people who collected it legally. 198 00:09:07,420 --> 00:09:10,580 Because there is no privacy regulation in the U.S. 199 00:09:10,820 --> 00:09:11,260 especially, 200 00:09:11,660 --> 00:09:14,900 What happens is you download an app for a calculator, 201 00:09:15,140 --> 00:09:15,580 Duolingo, 202 00:09:15,880 --> 00:09:16,380 whatever. 203 00:09:16,680 --> 00:09:18,000 I'm just using random apps. 204 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:21,640 I'm not saying these specific apps do this, but pretty much any app you download from the 205 00:09:21,640 --> 00:09:25,480 app store probably comes with third-party trackers and SDKs inside of that app. 206 00:09:25,500 --> 00:09:29,680 And what happens is that these actually secretly collect lots of data on your phones and your 207 00:09:29,780 --> 00:09:30,080 devices. 208 00:09:30,520 --> 00:09:32,520 It sends it to these weird industries, 209 00:09:32,820 --> 00:09:35,580 and these industries collect all of this data 210 00:09:35,940 --> 00:09:38,040 about you, this massive surveillance economy. 211 00:09:38,500 --> 00:09:40,640 And then the FBI and law enforcement, 212 00:09:40,810 --> 00:09:43,360 because they can't get data about individuals without a warrant, 213 00:09:43,510 --> 00:09:43,640 say, 214 00:09:43,840 --> 00:09:51,980 you know what, let's just skip the whole process and let's just purchase the data from these data brokers that are actually allowed to collect the data because there's nothing stopping them from collecting that data. 215 00:09:52,440 --> 00:09:53,520 So for years, 216 00:09:53,780 --> 00:09:59,560 all of us have been screaming that this needs to be fixed. This is a massive loophole, 217 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:01,500 not only for basic democracy, 218 00:10:01,780 --> 00:10:02,300 but why? 219 00:10:02,800 --> 00:10:04,100 Why would anybody want this? 220 00:10:04,260 --> 00:10:13,160 Why is it okay for when you download an app for now everywhere you go throughout your life to be sent to some random data brokers who don't care about you or your privacy or your safety? 221 00:10:13,380 --> 00:10:16,820 And then from there, they can just give it to anyone who wants to pay them for it. 222 00:10:16,860 --> 00:10:17,860 That's pretty messed up. 223 00:10:18,140 --> 00:10:19,600 Politicians have ignored this problem. 224 00:10:19,960 --> 00:10:21,100 And you know what? Politicians 225 00:10:21,260 --> 00:10:24,440 themselves are now starting to finally deal with these consequences. 226 00:10:24,920 --> 00:10:26,200 The reality is that the 227 00:10:26,420 --> 00:10:32,120 Minnesota assassin who assassinated those politicians in Minnesota found their addresses 228 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:35,220 from people searching websites that were free and accessible. 229 00:10:35,560 --> 00:10:37,800 It was on his notepad, and it's how he 230 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:38,780 found those people. 231 00:10:39,120 --> 00:10:42,240 So I finally get to my point I'm trying to make here, which is we have this 232 00:10:42,260 --> 00:10:47,280 history of things just impacting us mere mortals who just want to live and exist and not be 233 00:10:47,620 --> 00:10:47,820 exploited. 234 00:10:48,220 --> 00:10:50,200 But now it's starting to hit those in power too. 235 00:10:50,480 --> 00:10:51,660 It hit politicians, 236 00:10:51,900 --> 00:10:52,760 it hit people like 237 00:10:52,840 --> 00:10:54,780 cellular companies as part of Salt Typhoon, 238 00:10:55,020 --> 00:10:56,720 and now it's hitting military personnel. 239 00:10:56,960 --> 00:10:57,100 Because 240 00:10:57,420 --> 00:10:59,200 military personnel are not immune to this problem, 241 00:10:59,380 --> 00:11:00,920 they're not able to opt out either. 242 00:11:01,100 --> 00:11:02,020 The reality is 243 00:11:02,200 --> 00:11:09,179 nobody is probably reasonably able to 100% opt out of this system because no one actually cares about 244 00:11:09,200 --> 00:11:10,540 dealing with the root system. 245 00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:13,920 So I wanted to shed light on this story because to me, 246 00:11:14,100 --> 00:11:20,040 it's a demonstration of how these problems are so out of control now in 2026 that even people that 247 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:25,200 you think should get exceptions to it, which I don't agree with, but even the people you think 248 00:11:25,540 --> 00:11:28,320 should be exempted from these problems are not. 249 00:11:28,540 --> 00:11:29,760 They can't get around them either. 250 00:11:29,980 --> 00:11:30,620 I just really 251 00:11:30,760 --> 00:11:35,020 hope that this wakes people up. I'm really happy that Senator Ron Wyden is calling this out, 252 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:38,680 and he constantly does these call-outs to try to draw attention to these problems. 253 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:40,240 I'm really glad there's coverage for this. 254 00:11:40,780 --> 00:11:42,600 And those are at least my two cents on it. 255 00:11:42,860 --> 00:11:44,300 I'd love to hear what you guys think in the comments 256 00:11:44,560 --> 00:11:46,320 because I think this is ridiculous. 257 00:11:46,540 --> 00:11:47,240 It's getting out of control. 258 00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:49,800 Oh, and one more thing I forgot to mention about this story. 259 00:11:50,020 --> 00:11:52,660 Senator Ron Wyden actually called this whole location 260 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:56,200 data tracking industry slash the whole data broker industry 261 00:11:56,400 --> 00:11:57,600 a national security threat. 262 00:11:57,740 --> 00:11:59,380 And for the first time in a long time, 263 00:11:59,900 --> 00:12:01,520 I actually agree with how that word is utilized. 264 00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:03,640 For context, we have platforms like TikTok 265 00:12:03,940 --> 00:12:05,740 that have been called a national security threat 266 00:12:05,900 --> 00:12:08,820 because they collect sensitive data and send it to China. 267 00:12:09,320 --> 00:12:11,420 But really what that was, in my view, 268 00:12:11,680 --> 00:12:15,080 is it's China that had a platform that was used by almost every American. 269 00:12:15,490 --> 00:12:18,680 And that was a huge power shift towards China big tech companies. 270 00:12:19,430 --> 00:12:20,860 But we don't care if Meta, 271 00:12:21,040 --> 00:12:21,500 if Google, 272 00:12:21,800 --> 00:12:24,720 if Facebook or Facebook is Meta, but you guys get what I'm saying. 273 00:12:24,990 --> 00:12:27,440 We don't care if US big tech companies collect that data. 274 00:12:27,920 --> 00:12:31,620 And I think that this is really more proof to that sentiment that I have, 275 00:12:31,780 --> 00:12:37,440 which is these data brokers that collect all this data and then they might sell it to Chinese companies anyway. 276 00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:39,880 Why is that not a national security risk? 277 00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:47,280 So I think that this word national security risk is being thrown around a lot in the digital space, but it's being used to justify really crappy things. 278 00:12:47,560 --> 00:12:55,800 And I actually really appreciate how Senator Ron Wyden used this specific threat as a truly genuine national security threat, which I think it is. 279 00:12:55,900 --> 00:12:58,860 All right, coming soon, we have a lot of European updates, 280 00:12:59,020 --> 00:13:05,520 and we also have Meta, who did something crazy with their AI agents that just granted people access to other people's accounts. 281 00:13:06,080 --> 00:13:10,880 Ridiculous, but nothing we wouldn't expect from Meta. But I quickly wanted to shout out our sponsor first, 282 00:13:11,140 --> 00:13:15,440 which today is Easy Opt-Out. If you haven't heard of Easy Opt-Out before, 283 00:13:15,620 --> 00:13:19,820 they are an automated service that tries to remove your information from people searching websites. 284 00:13:20,100 --> 00:13:22,720 It's actually quite related to that story that we just talked about. 285 00:13:22,880 --> 00:13:25,980 There's two main methods to remove your information from these people search websites. 286 00:13:26,260 --> 00:13:27,920 There's the manual one, which works very well, 287 00:13:28,100 --> 00:13:29,700 but you have to continually do it yourself. 288 00:13:30,220 --> 00:13:31,700 And it isn't just a one-time thing. 289 00:13:31,760 --> 00:13:32,960 You have to always do the maintenance, 290 00:13:33,500 --> 00:13:36,500 or you can just pay for an automated service to take care of it for you. 291 00:13:36,720 --> 00:13:38,680 And that's personally what I like to do as well. 292 00:13:38,800 --> 00:13:41,220 Because it's only $20 a year, it does the opt-outs for me. 293 00:13:41,340 --> 00:13:42,360 I don't have to think about it. 294 00:13:42,380 --> 00:13:46,840 I just get an email every few months that says they opted me out, and then I kind of just move on with my life. 295 00:13:46,960 --> 00:13:50,640 It's just run by a couple guys who realized that they could offer the same service for a lot cheaper. 296 00:13:51,060 --> 00:13:53,360 They were verified by Consumer Reports Independent Research, 297 00:13:53,720 --> 00:13:55,220 and they actually tied with Optory 298 00:13:55,580 --> 00:13:57,180 in terms of the best kind of performance, 299 00:13:57,440 --> 00:13:59,240 but Optory has a much higher price tag. 300 00:13:59,680 --> 00:14:02,720 And a lot of people in our community actually like combining the two tools. 301 00:14:02,900 --> 00:14:07,060 They use free Optory to scan to see which sites they're on, and then they just have easy 302 00:14:07,280 --> 00:14:09,500 opt-outs do the removals, and then they can compare the difference. 303 00:14:09,980 --> 00:14:12,040 When people in my life find their name, their home addresses, 304 00:14:12,280 --> 00:14:13,360 and information about themselves 305 00:14:13,500 --> 00:14:15,640 and their family online on these people-searching websites, 306 00:14:15,860 --> 00:14:17,280 and they ask me what to do about it, 307 00:14:17,360 --> 00:14:19,120 I just tell them to go with easy opt-outs. 308 00:14:19,280 --> 00:14:23,540 That is the number one recommendation I have, and it's who I still personally use to this day. 309 00:14:23,630 --> 00:14:26,240 I want to thank Easy Optouts for all of their support over the years. 310 00:14:26,330 --> 00:14:27,900 We couldn't do this podcast without them. 311 00:14:28,190 --> 00:14:30,880 So go check them out down in the description if you want to get started today. 312 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:33,480 And now let's go back into the stories. 313 00:14:39,740 --> 00:14:41,300 All right, so now we're going to talk about Europe. 314 00:14:41,430 --> 00:14:43,800 And we have two core stories that are quite different, 315 00:14:44,160 --> 00:14:48,200 but the first story has a ton of stories within it, and it has to do with the Euro office. 316 00:14:48,580 --> 00:14:53,460 The idea is that Microsoft Office is a centralized big tech company, 317 00:14:54,500 --> 00:14:55,580 in addition to all these 318 00:14:55,650 --> 00:14:58,980 other ecosystems that exist as Microsoft Office alternatives, 319 00:14:59,180 --> 00:15:01,100 also being from big tech companies. 320 00:15:01,660 --> 00:15:04,440 Many of those big tech companies happen to be US-based. 321 00:15:05,140 --> 00:15:08,420 And so as you can tell, there's a bit of a geopolitical angle to this as well. 322 00:15:08,450 --> 00:15:11,600 But pretty much Europe has come forward and said, we don't want big tech companies running 323 00:15:11,690 --> 00:15:12,540 our entire tech stack, 324 00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:14,440 especially from a government perspective. 325 00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:15,540 But also, 326 00:15:15,990 --> 00:15:22,040 we don't really want all of our businesses and all the things that are happening in Europe to be running through U.S. big tech companies. 327 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:23,700 I'm sure this is a privacy thing. 328 00:15:23,820 --> 00:15:24,940 It's a digital sovereignty thing. 329 00:15:24,940 --> 00:15:26,880 They want data to be flowing through their own channels. 330 00:15:27,170 --> 00:15:30,080 The idea behind EuroOffice is exactly what it sounds like. 331 00:15:30,300 --> 00:15:34,780 They are coming forward and saying we want a European-based alternative to Microsoft, 332 00:15:35,080 --> 00:15:35,320 Google, 333 00:15:35,660 --> 00:15:36,020 big tech, 334 00:15:36,440 --> 00:15:36,580 etc. 335 00:15:36,900 --> 00:15:41,780 Now, the people who are making this happen is essentially a collaboration between tons of different projects. 336 00:15:42,100 --> 00:15:46,940 I'm not even going to get into the whole drama because there was a ton of drama around OnlyOffice 337 00:15:47,100 --> 00:15:50,420 because OnlyOffice has a license that they didn't agree with. 338 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:52,560 I'm just, I'm not going to get into it. 339 00:15:52,780 --> 00:15:53,700 I'm about to explain it. 340 00:15:54,080 --> 00:15:57,480 I'm not going to explain it because I'm just not going to get into it. 341 00:15:57,540 --> 00:16:01,660 If you care about reading about licenses and open source drama, you can do that. 342 00:16:01,960 --> 00:16:03,500 All those resources exist online. 343 00:16:03,720 --> 00:16:05,660 So I'm at least making you aware of them. 344 00:16:05,920 --> 00:16:06,640 So if adopted, 345 00:16:06,860 --> 00:16:10,259 the package will direct money towards products that contribute to Europe's 346 00:16:10,280 --> 00:16:10,500 economy, 347 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:12,500 and independence from foreign firms, 348 00:16:12,680 --> 00:16:14,440 cut red tape for data transfers, 349 00:16:14,940 --> 00:16:15,920 beef up research and 350 00:16:16,230 --> 00:16:17,560 innovation through leadership initiatives, 351 00:16:17,740 --> 00:16:19,600 incentivize countries to share digital capacities 352 00:16:19,690 --> 00:16:20,980 in new Euro Cloud Forum, 353 00:16:21,410 --> 00:16:24,760 and require EU governments to come up with national strategies to boost the 354 00:16:24,900 --> 00:16:26,160 adoption of cutting-edge tech, 355 00:16:26,480 --> 00:16:27,060 including AI. 356 00:16:27,360 --> 00:16:29,880 The package will also seek to ramp up the bloc's 357 00:16:29,910 --> 00:16:31,080 demand for advanced chips, 358 00:16:31,350 --> 00:16:34,700 a response to criticism by the industry with a series of industrial 359 00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:37,060 initiatives to revise the 2023 CHIPS law. 360 00:16:37,240 --> 00:16:39,940 The Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen, 361 00:16:40,140 --> 00:16:41,680 I hope I said that correctly, said, 362 00:16:41,690 --> 00:16:45,340 we cannot afford to depend on others for the technologies that keep our hospitals running, 363 00:16:45,650 --> 00:16:46,740 our energy grids stable, 364 00:16:47,000 --> 00:16:47,960 and our services secure. 365 00:16:48,480 --> 00:16:49,800 This is about protecting our citizens, 366 00:16:50,080 --> 00:16:50,840 defending our interests, 367 00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:52,140 and making our own choices. 368 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:55,980 So yeah, they've replaced Google with French search engine Quant, 369 00:16:56,340 --> 00:16:58,880 which I know a lot of you in the audience actually know about. 370 00:16:59,580 --> 00:17:00,500 We have Nextcloud, 371 00:17:00,700 --> 00:17:03,760 who has pretty much come forward and has embraced this as well. 372 00:17:04,199 --> 00:17:04,959 And then we have Tuda, 373 00:17:05,140 --> 00:17:07,199 the email provider who's also a part of this. 374 00:17:07,560 --> 00:17:09,439 A lot of people might be wondering, Proton. 375 00:17:09,740 --> 00:17:13,319 Now, my understanding is that Proton is Swiss-based, 376 00:17:13,520 --> 00:17:15,300 so they're not technically in the EU. 377 00:17:16,000 --> 00:17:17,560 That's my assumption on why that's happening. 378 00:17:18,339 --> 00:17:20,420 But again, this is all kind of unfolding. 379 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:22,680 It's kind of hard to make sense of what's going on here. 380 00:17:22,780 --> 00:17:24,420 This is a bit messy to read about, 381 00:17:24,600 --> 00:17:27,560 and I'm kind of waiting for a more formal united front 382 00:17:27,819 --> 00:17:29,680 on this because it seems like day by day, 383 00:17:29,860 --> 00:17:30,960 this is looking a little bit different. 384 00:17:31,340 --> 00:17:32,920 So I'll keep you all updated. 385 00:17:33,200 --> 00:17:34,200 Stay subscribed to the podcast, 386 00:17:34,460 --> 00:17:36,880 and I'll try my best to update you all as more information 387 00:17:37,140 --> 00:17:37,700 comes to light. 388 00:17:38,220 --> 00:17:39,960 All right, now there's a second story from Europe, 389 00:17:40,120 --> 00:17:41,500 which is France-specific. 390 00:17:41,940 --> 00:17:47,320 And this is a French article translated into English, which has, I don't think, any English 391 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:48,940 article written on the internet about it. 392 00:17:49,140 --> 00:17:50,480 Actually, it's even paywalled. 393 00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:55,840 So I don't have the full primary information, which normally doesn't mean I cover it on 394 00:17:55,840 --> 00:17:56,260 this podcast. 395 00:17:56,860 --> 00:18:01,620 The only reason I'm going to cover it on this podcast with all of those asterisks is because 396 00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:06,580 there's a person named Nelian who's on the podcast called Comfort Zone, and they actually 397 00:18:06,780 --> 00:18:07,640 talked about this problem. 398 00:18:07,960 --> 00:18:11,120 And I have a lot of trust in how they communicated the problem. 399 00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:14,340 And so I'm going to relay more or less what they shared. 400 00:18:14,450 --> 00:18:17,640 And so if anything is wrong, blame them. 401 00:18:18,220 --> 00:18:19,700 But pretty much. 402 00:18:19,810 --> 00:18:20,800 So a bit of context. 403 00:18:20,870 --> 00:18:25,860 We talked recently about how RCS is now getting end-to-end encryption between iOS and Android devices. 404 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:32,000 This means that those green messages between iOS and Android can now be supported with end-to-end encryption. 405 00:18:32,360 --> 00:18:35,440 It's not going to have signal level protections on metadata or anything like that. 406 00:18:35,580 --> 00:18:38,960 But this is huge for keeping out just basic people from your messages. 407 00:18:39,680 --> 00:18:39,760 Now, 408 00:18:40,340 --> 00:18:41,300 the technology is there. 409 00:18:41,420 --> 00:18:42,160 It's fully supported. 410 00:18:42,360 --> 00:18:43,620 It's available in tons of countries. 411 00:18:43,760 --> 00:18:45,320 I think it's still technically in beta, 412 00:18:45,800 --> 00:18:46,340 but this works. 413 00:18:47,180 --> 00:18:47,920 But not in France. 414 00:18:48,400 --> 00:18:48,800 So, 415 00:18:49,420 --> 00:18:50,540 Neil Leon in the podcast, 416 00:18:50,820 --> 00:18:51,180 not me, 417 00:18:51,380 --> 00:18:53,900 I believe what this article goes on to claim, 418 00:18:55,200 --> 00:18:57,200 but I have to relay through what I heard, 419 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:00,200 was that the technology is actually fully there 420 00:19:00,360 --> 00:19:02,000 and embraced by cellular companies, 421 00:19:02,420 --> 00:19:05,080 or at least it's possible to be embraced by the cellular companies in France, 422 00:19:05,420 --> 00:19:07,680 But they aren't doing it because of government pressure. 423 00:19:08,040 --> 00:19:16,740 And this is another weird political situation because apparently there are some cell carriers in France right now that want to do certain mergers and they want to stay on the good side of the government. 424 00:19:17,060 --> 00:19:27,140 But the government doesn't really want RCS to be rolled out yet because they still want to continue looking at everybody's messages via SMS without end-to-end encryption. 425 00:19:27,720 --> 00:19:35,040 So we have this really interesting dynamic in France right now where we have politics getting in the way of basic security going out to every single French citizen. 426 00:19:35,140 --> 00:19:37,240 So I wanted to at least put this on your radar. 427 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:38,980 I'm not even going to add commentary on it yet. 428 00:19:39,140 --> 00:19:41,080 I'm mostly reeling what they said on their podcast. 429 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:43,960 So at least it puts it on our radar. 430 00:19:44,260 --> 00:19:48,260 And I'll try to update you guys as I learn more about this. And there's more primary sources. 431 00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:52,100 If you are French and you do have better resources to share with me regarding that, 432 00:19:52,420 --> 00:19:56,180 I always appreciate those. A lot of stories actually come from you all who submit them. 433 00:19:56,360 --> 00:19:57,480 So I really appreciate it. 434 00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:03,720 All right, 435 00:20:03,980 --> 00:20:08,480 and now we continue the series of Meta just doing Meta things. 436 00:20:09,260 --> 00:20:10,340 I can't stand Meta. 437 00:20:11,090 --> 00:20:12,060 I can't stand Facebook. 438 00:20:12,270 --> 00:20:13,980 I can't stand Mark Zuckerberg. 439 00:20:14,240 --> 00:20:17,660 So I'm going to do my best not to get too angry at this. 440 00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:19,160 But this is just embarrassing. 441 00:20:19,290 --> 00:20:19,680 I mean, 442 00:20:20,170 --> 00:20:23,500 so Meta has AI support chatbots now. 443 00:20:25,220 --> 00:20:32,220 And apparently hackers literally just asked it for the ability to access different accounts. 444 00:20:32,660 --> 00:20:38,400 This hacked the Barack Obama White House account and the chief master sergeant of Space Force's account. 445 00:20:38,860 --> 00:20:48,500 Literally all the attackers had to do to break into these accounts was they used a VPN to approximately match the location to their target Instagram accounts region. 446 00:20:49,120 --> 00:20:55,980 They began a password reset process and then they asked Meta AI support chatbot to change the email address associated with the account. 447 00:20:56,400 --> 00:20:57,040 That is it. 448 00:20:57,300 --> 00:20:57,700 Now, Henry, 449 00:20:57,900 --> 00:21:00,380 luckily this wasn't available to the public for very long. 450 00:21:00,560 --> 00:21:00,660 Oh, 451 00:21:00,920 --> 00:21:01,940 no, you're wrong about that. 452 00:21:02,100 --> 00:21:03,800 It was active in the wild for months, 453 00:21:04,000 --> 00:21:06,420 going as far back as February of this year with 454 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:09,180 hackers compromising thousands of accounts. 455 00:21:09,650 --> 00:21:13,600 The only difference is that they finally compromised high profile accounts. 456 00:21:13,670 --> 00:21:16,060 So people actually figured out what was going on. 457 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:20,780 This is the same company that's trying to install, you know, tracking software on all 458 00:21:20,780 --> 00:21:21,360 their employees' 459 00:21:21,760 --> 00:21:22,020 cursors. 460 00:21:22,240 --> 00:21:25,400 This is the same person who doesn't want their own children on their platforms. 461 00:21:25,760 --> 00:21:28,640 Mark Zuckerberg doesn't let his children go on these platforms. 462 00:21:29,180 --> 00:21:34,360 This is the same platform that's been investing heavily in trying to duplicate their CEO as an AI clone. 463 00:21:34,500 --> 00:21:37,140 This is the same company that tried that whole metaverse thing. 464 00:21:37,140 --> 00:21:48,860 This is the same company that is coming forward and trying to get everybody to use meta Ray-Bans so that they can start enabling facial recognition software and be able to easily find people all around them. 465 00:21:49,660 --> 00:21:55,100 It's unbelievable just how freaking dystopian this company tries to be, like, 466 00:21:55,380 --> 00:21:55,760 intentionally. 467 00:21:57,160 --> 00:21:58,400 I cannot stand them. 468 00:21:58,500 --> 00:21:58,620 Now, 469 00:21:59,100 --> 00:21:59,260 you know, 470 00:21:59,460 --> 00:22:00,660 get away from that. 471 00:22:00,820 --> 00:22:02,940 Pretty much some actionable things. 472 00:22:03,100 --> 00:22:03,420 Luckily, 473 00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:08,100 people who had stronger MFA methods enabled weren't actually impacted by this. 474 00:22:08,260 --> 00:22:12,760 So this also means that all these people that were hit by this literally didn't have basic 2FA enabled, 475 00:22:13,020 --> 00:22:15,540 which is also a problem. And that's equally embarrassing, 476 00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:19,560 especially for something as, you know, mainstream as some of these people, 477 00:22:19,760 --> 00:22:19,840 right? 478 00:22:19,940 --> 00:22:24,380 these people you think would have proper security on their social media accounts like Barack Obama 479 00:22:24,620 --> 00:22:25,520 and the Space Force, 480 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:27,420 you know, Chief Master Sergeant. 481 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:28,980 I don't know how high that is, but that 482 00:22:29,240 --> 00:22:34,500 sounds high to me. When I zoom out, I just think about all the work that I put into my digital 483 00:22:34,640 --> 00:22:37,120 safety as well as probably a lot of you who listen to this podcast. 484 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:39,220 And then I remember how much Meta 485 00:22:39,440 --> 00:22:43,560 actually cares about keeping you safe and how they're willing to just throw that away just for 486 00:22:43,920 --> 00:22:44,040 whatever, 487 00:22:44,380 --> 00:22:48,839 whatever they're prioritizing next to try to keep investors interested and not realize 488 00:22:48,860 --> 00:22:51,520 that everything that Meta's done the last 10 years isn't original, 489 00:22:51,740 --> 00:22:52,780 nor does it probably deserve 490 00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:56,760 the massive amount of money that they generate based on just exploiting people. 491 00:22:57,200 --> 00:22:58,160 Those are my 492 00:22:58,320 --> 00:23:00,640 strong opinions that are really leaking here. 493 00:23:00,860 --> 00:23:01,520 I'm getting carried away. 494 00:23:01,720 --> 00:23:02,760 My point that I'm trying to 495 00:23:02,880 --> 00:23:06,960 make here is that we put a lot of effort into this and some people clearly don't. And I think 496 00:23:07,060 --> 00:23:12,400 it's a good reminder that as long as you're doing quite a bit more than maybe what the regular worst 497 00:23:12,600 --> 00:23:13,500 case scenario is doing, 498 00:23:13,900 --> 00:23:16,720 you're probably going to stay pretty far ahead of most of these attacks. 499 00:23:16,920 --> 00:23:20,460 So even if you enabled SMS 2FA or email 2FA, 500 00:23:20,710 --> 00:23:28,380 if you just did some more basic stuff and you maybe weren't trusting Facebook along the way, you're probably going to avoid most privacy and security problems on the internet. 501 00:23:28,430 --> 00:23:33,420 So I think it's always a good reminder that even when we go far and beyond with these things, 502 00:23:33,700 --> 00:23:36,260 a lot of times it's the basics that can really keep us safe. 503 00:23:36,620 --> 00:23:38,620 So I saw this as a good reminder of that. 504 00:23:38,910 --> 00:23:46,660 One final update is that Instagram is actually starting to alert users who were targeted by those hackers during those AI chatbot attacks. 505 00:23:47,260 --> 00:23:52,680 so ideally you're going to be alerted if this hits you and you can see screenshots in the video as 506 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:57,360 well of what that looks like and you can learn more by checking out the show notes in the description 507 00:24:03,300 --> 00:24:08,380 all right everybody we are now going to get into the defense bulletin this is split up into three 508 00:24:08,600 --> 00:24:12,979 sections the first section is the data breaches we're just going to rip through these and these are 509 00:24:13,420 --> 00:24:13,960 the data breaches. 510 00:24:14,400 --> 00:24:15,420 The next thing is the threats, 511 00:24:15,740 --> 00:24:17,460 which is the things that you should be watching 512 00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:21,320 out for because they could hit you or they maybe already did hit you and what you can do about them. 513 00:24:21,720 --> 00:24:25,000 And then we have the open source updates. To start with data breaches, we have the Carnival 514 00:24:25,360 --> 00:24:25,500 Cruise. 515 00:24:26,020 --> 00:24:28,880 That's confirmed a data breach affecting nearly 6 million people. 516 00:24:29,360 --> 00:24:30,360 And so if you have used 517 00:24:30,540 --> 00:24:31,960 them or you intend to use them, 518 00:24:32,120 --> 00:24:34,600 this is a good thing to look into and you can find more information 519 00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:35,680 in the show notes. 520 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:39,719 We also have Charter Communications that had a data breach affecting 521 00:24:39,740 --> 00:24:44,000 almost 5 million accounts. The thing that kind of upsets me about this is that it actually happened 522 00:24:44,010 --> 00:24:44,780 in early April, 523 00:24:46,020 --> 00:24:48,640 but they only confirmed the breach earlier this week. 524 00:24:49,060 --> 00:24:51,920 So very lame of them to not have 525 00:24:52,140 --> 00:24:55,720 very much discussion about this. And they just started revealing formal details now, 526 00:24:56,340 --> 00:24:57,220 but there 527 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:58,980 are details now. So you can see if you're affected, 528 00:24:59,310 --> 00:25:00,660 you can learn more in the show notes. 529 00:25:00,940 --> 00:25:01,100 All right, 530 00:25:01,200 --> 00:25:02,880 this next story is just a quick update. 531 00:25:03,120 --> 00:25:04,820 It's not quite a data breach. 532 00:25:05,160 --> 00:25:06,120 It's an update to one, 533 00:25:06,220 --> 00:25:11,340 But California Attorney General is suing 23andMe over that 2023 breach exposing health data. 534 00:25:12,120 --> 00:25:15,560 If you were listening to the podcast back then, it's something we covered extensively, 535 00:25:16,110 --> 00:25:18,100 but they are now trying to hold them a bit more accountable. 536 00:25:18,540 --> 00:25:21,660 I don't want to do too much coverage for it because there's still a lot to be 537 00:25:22,460 --> 00:25:25,260 seen as to what this is going to look like. 538 00:25:25,470 --> 00:25:26,200 But if you stay subscribed, 539 00:25:26,580 --> 00:25:29,140 I'm sure we're going to cover updates once this finally comes to fruition. 540 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:32,820 All right, this is a wearable health tech startup called UltraHuman. 541 00:25:32,860 --> 00:25:36,400 I have not heard of this company before, but they said that hackers access customers' 542 00:25:36,660 --> 00:25:38,720 wellness data via an internal tool. 543 00:25:39,120 --> 00:25:40,540 And so if you use this tool, 544 00:25:40,700 --> 00:25:42,620 look into this in the show notes. 545 00:25:42,940 --> 00:25:44,120 It's pretty important stuff. 546 00:25:44,500 --> 00:25:49,780 Next up, we have a prison calling service called Paytel, P-A-Y space T-E-L. 547 00:25:50,280 --> 00:25:59,220 And they have finally secured a publicly exposed cloud server that stored hundreds of thousands of driver's licenses and other sensitive information about people who used its service. 548 00:25:59,540 --> 00:26:05,660 This is really geared towards devices in prisons across much of the U.S. for inmates to receive calls. 549 00:26:05,900 --> 00:26:10,940 I don't know how many of our listeners this directly applies to, but if you know anyone who might have used this service, 550 00:26:11,200 --> 00:26:14,280 I suppose that's something to dig into if you want to learn more. 551 00:26:14,560 --> 00:26:15,600 This one was fascinating. 552 00:26:15,760 --> 00:26:20,860 So Grand Theft Auto V has a cheat service that got hacked exposing thousands of gamers. 553 00:26:21,120 --> 00:26:22,460 So it's called Atlas Menu. 554 00:26:23,060 --> 00:26:25,420 And if you think I know what the hell any of this is, 555 00:26:26,480 --> 00:26:28,760 that would be quite an assumption on your end 556 00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:29,940 because I've never heard of these things. 557 00:26:30,340 --> 00:26:32,440 So if you're a pro gamer like me, 558 00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:34,900 you're going to know what Atlas Menu is. 559 00:26:35,160 --> 00:26:36,860 So the stolen data included users' 560 00:26:37,080 --> 00:26:37,580 email addresses, 561 00:26:37,860 --> 00:26:39,120 usernames, scrambled passwords, 562 00:26:39,300 --> 00:26:39,920 IP addresses, 563 00:26:40,140 --> 00:26:40,800 and support tickets. 564 00:26:41,400 --> 00:26:42,940 And that's all on how I've been pwned. 565 00:26:42,940 --> 00:26:44,600 And you can read a lot more about this 566 00:26:44,820 --> 00:26:46,240 and you'll probably learn more from it 567 00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:48,580 than you will from me in the show notes. 568 00:26:48,900 --> 00:26:49,880 This isn't really a data breach, 569 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:51,440 but I still wanted to put it on your radar. 570 00:26:51,780 --> 00:26:54,620 just a quick little recap story on TechCrunch. 571 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:57,860 That's the worst hacks and breaches of 2026 so far. 572 00:26:58,190 --> 00:27:00,240 And it kind of just recaps all the main ones. 573 00:27:01,120 --> 00:27:03,120 I'm not going to get into it too much in this episode. 574 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:04,600 We don't have enough time, 575 00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:06,520 but I wanted to at least put it on your radar. 576 00:27:06,860 --> 00:27:08,820 All right, now we're going to get into the threats. 577 00:27:08,930 --> 00:27:11,920 These are things that may impact the software you use on a daily basis 578 00:27:12,170 --> 00:27:13,520 that you should be very aware of. 579 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:15,800 The only thing is we have a lot of stories this week. 580 00:27:15,890 --> 00:27:17,640 And so I do want to go through them pretty quickly 581 00:27:17,840 --> 00:27:19,560 so I don't waste too much of your time. 582 00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:24,020 So the first one is that Google has fixed one actively exploited Android zero-day flaw. 583 00:27:24,460 --> 00:27:28,100 So make sure you're getting up to date and you're still ideally getting software updates 584 00:27:28,270 --> 00:27:31,260 at minimum on your Android devices so you get these kind of patches. 585 00:27:31,720 --> 00:27:34,980 And if you want to learn more about the zero-day, you can check it out in the show notes. 586 00:27:35,360 --> 00:27:39,540 We also have Google Chrome that's adding session cookie theft protection for all users. 587 00:27:40,040 --> 00:27:44,080 Now, this is a very common attack that impacts especially people like YouTubers and people 588 00:27:44,130 --> 00:27:45,000 in public positions, 589 00:27:45,700 --> 00:27:46,300 where essentially, 590 00:27:46,580 --> 00:27:48,960 you know, you have a logged in browser that you're 591 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,140 logged into your YouTube account with, your Twitter, 592 00:27:51,350 --> 00:27:51,500 etc. 593 00:27:51,900 --> 00:27:53,560 And someone hacks your computer and they 594 00:27:53,780 --> 00:27:54,840 steal the cookies from your browser. 595 00:27:55,080 --> 00:27:58,520 Google has rolled something out as a way to cryptographically 596 00:27:58,780 --> 00:28:00,680 bind session cookies to a specific device, 597 00:28:00,910 --> 00:28:02,660 which would prevent hackers from just stealing your 598 00:28:02,750 --> 00:28:02,880 cookies. 599 00:28:03,160 --> 00:28:05,540 This is rolling out to Google Workspace customers, 600 00:28:05,940 --> 00:28:07,240 Workspace individual subscribers, 601 00:28:07,500 --> 00:28:09,220 and users with personal Google accounts. 602 00:28:09,510 --> 00:28:11,560 And it will be enabled by default for all Google 603 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:12,440 Workspace customers. 604 00:28:13,090 --> 00:28:15,060 This is built into at minimum Chrome. 605 00:28:15,930 --> 00:28:17,560 And I guess it's to be seen, 606 00:28:17,740 --> 00:28:22,100 I haven't heard yet how this applies to other Chromium-based browsers, and so I need to do 607 00:28:22,160 --> 00:28:22,960 more research on this, 608 00:28:23,190 --> 00:28:25,460 and I'll try to report those updates in future episodes. 609 00:28:26,220 --> 00:28:31,260 Acer has confirmed that they are looking to address two maximum severity zero-day vulnerabilities 610 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:37,420 affecting their Wave 7 mesh routers, and so if you have this router, this is a strong story to 611 00:28:37,590 --> 00:28:39,540 follow to see if you're impacted by this. 612 00:28:40,020 --> 00:28:43,339 There's a service called GOGS, which is a self-hosted 613 00:28:43,360 --> 00:28:43,840 Git service, 614 00:28:44,130 --> 00:28:47,920 and there was a zero-day flaw that let hackers get remote code execution. And so if 615 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:49,000 you use this service, 616 00:28:49,560 --> 00:28:51,040 definitely look into this story. 617 00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:52,940 There's a new denial-of-service attack 618 00:28:53,380 --> 00:28:56,320 called HTTP2 bomb, 619 00:28:56,580 --> 00:28:59,920 which can be launched from a single machine to take down web servers within 620 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:01,040 seconds. 621 00:29:01,520 --> 00:29:04,520 The attack is actually quite interesting, and I think it was actually discovered. Yes, 622 00:29:04,610 --> 00:29:07,680 it was discovered by OpenAI's Codex software agent, 623 00:29:07,860 --> 00:29:08,620 which is fascinating. 624 00:29:08,830 --> 00:29:09,220 Now, the really 625 00:29:09,360 --> 00:29:13,320 important thing here is that systems running behind CDNs or reverse proxies do not expose 626 00:29:13,340 --> 00:29:17,380 vulnerable HTTP 2 endpoint and are a lot more difficult to target. 627 00:29:18,310 --> 00:29:18,640 And actually, 628 00:29:18,820 --> 00:29:19,100 this problem 629 00:29:19,220 --> 00:29:22,920 was already fixed in Nginx version 1.29.8. 630 00:29:23,510 --> 00:29:25,200 And if you want to read more about this to see if you 631 00:29:25,300 --> 00:29:27,760 have properly patched it, I would check it out in the show notes. 632 00:29:27,940 --> 00:29:29,020 It's a fascinating attack. 633 00:29:29,460 --> 00:29:33,340 This one is a pretty big story. It almost was a main story this week, but I had some other things 634 00:29:33,370 --> 00:29:35,640 I wanted to focus on a bit more to put on your radar. 635 00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:37,980 But there were dozens of Red Hat packages 636 00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:40,720 that were backdoored through its official NPM channel. 637 00:29:41,260 --> 00:29:41,620 Fortunately, 638 00:29:41,940 --> 00:29:43,300 Red Hat did say they removed 639 00:29:43,320 --> 00:29:44,020 malicious packages. 640 00:29:44,180 --> 00:29:46,940 They said the packages are strictly limited to internal development, 641 00:29:47,340 --> 00:29:52,200 and the malicious code was never published for customer consumption via the console.redhat.com 642 00:29:52,600 --> 00:29:52,740 system. 643 00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,600 All right, we have our new weekly tradition of some WordPress plugin attacks. 644 00:29:56,820 --> 00:29:59,600 So the newest one is WPMapsPro, 645 00:30:00,100 --> 00:30:01,040 which is a WordPress plugin, 646 00:30:01,300 --> 00:30:02,740 has a bug that was exploited 647 00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:05,040 to create admin accounts on WordPress websites. 648 00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:07,400 So if you use that plugin, you need to look into this. 649 00:30:07,700 --> 00:30:11,920 And up next, we have the next WordPress plugin, which is a critical kirky flaw, 650 00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:14,960 K-I-R-K-I, kirky. 651 00:30:16,360 --> 00:30:22,600 And there was a critical privilege escalation vulnerability that impacted that plugin so that you could take over any user account, 652 00:30:22,860 --> 00:30:24,440 including those belonging to admins. 653 00:30:24,520 --> 00:30:25,620 So if you use this plugin, 654 00:30:25,780 --> 00:30:27,120 you need to look into that. 655 00:30:27,740 --> 00:30:32,480 WordPress malware also had a campaign that hides payloads in Steam profiles. 656 00:30:33,040 --> 00:30:40,240 So nearly 2,000 WordPress websites were infected with malware that relies on Steam community profile comments to hide command and control data. 657 00:30:40,480 --> 00:30:43,820 You can defend against this by checking for references to Steam community URLs, 658 00:30:44,180 --> 00:30:46,260 suspicious external JavaScript injections, 659 00:30:46,620 --> 00:30:48,900 outbound connections from WordPress service to Steam, 660 00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:53,760 and unexpected scripts loading from domains like hellomyworld.info. 661 00:30:54,060 --> 00:30:55,460 There's other indicators as well. 662 00:30:56,160 --> 00:30:58,600 So if you are a WordPress admin, this is a story to look into. 663 00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:02,180 Okay, there were over 116,000 Minecraft systems 664 00:31:02,700 --> 00:31:04,760 infected in Weed Hack malware campaign. 665 00:31:05,620 --> 00:31:07,300 This is targeting Minecraft players 666 00:31:07,500 --> 00:31:11,220 and has infected more than 116,000 systems since January. 667 00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:14,400 It's distributed through Microsoft-related malicious mods, 668 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:14,820 clients, 669 00:31:15,100 --> 00:31:15,900 cheats, and utilities 670 00:31:16,140 --> 00:31:19,160 that are promoted all over YouTube and SEO poisoning. 671 00:31:20,040 --> 00:31:21,360 So if you're a Minecraft player, 672 00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:22,360 look into this 673 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:24,260 because it seems like this impacts a ton of things 674 00:31:24,300 --> 00:31:25,120 in that ecosystem, 675 00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:26,860 and I couldn't even begin to tell you 676 00:31:26,960 --> 00:31:27,960 what some of these things are. 677 00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:29,200 Like Donut Duper, 678 00:31:29,360 --> 00:31:32,580 oh God, if you use Donut Duper, you got to check this out. 679 00:31:32,940 --> 00:31:33,780 I don't know what it is, 680 00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:34,860 but it's in the screenshot. 681 00:31:35,200 --> 00:31:38,640 I'm not going to put too much time into this story as I'm doing for the others, 682 00:31:38,980 --> 00:31:42,640 but this is just a PSA that hackers are trying to steal Signal users' 683 00:31:42,900 --> 00:31:43,060 backups 684 00:31:43,300 --> 00:31:44,820 in a new wave of widespread attacks. 685 00:31:45,060 --> 00:31:46,640 The article covers more about this. 686 00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:49,220 I would really recommend reading it if you are a Signal user, 687 00:31:49,540 --> 00:31:52,360 but if you're not going to read the article and you're a Signal user, 688 00:31:52,900 --> 00:31:55,960 just make sure you're aware that there are phishing attacks on Signal. 689 00:31:56,180 --> 00:32:00,320 Signal has actually recently added a lot more warnings and confirmations to try to combat this 690 00:32:00,620 --> 00:32:00,680 problem. 691 00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:05,760 Another super quick PSA, the FBI's warning of fake FIFA websites running World Cup fraud 692 00:32:05,940 --> 00:32:06,040 schemes. 693 00:32:06,320 --> 00:32:06,380 Again, 694 00:32:06,540 --> 00:32:08,800 this all just falls into the same bucket of phishing attacks. 695 00:32:09,400 --> 00:32:10,300 So these are the 696 00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:14,300 current things that are being targeted to try to trick people into thinking they're on real websites. 697 00:32:14,500 --> 00:32:16,440 So if you're in any way engaging with the World Cup, 698 00:32:16,640 --> 00:32:17,860 just make sure you're accessing official 699 00:32:18,040 --> 00:32:22,060 websites and you can always read more by going to the show notes to see what these attacks actually 700 00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:22,620 look like. 701 00:32:22,840 --> 00:32:25,920 This is another story that we just don't have very much time to cover this week. 702 00:32:26,080 --> 00:32:26,900 There's too many stories. 703 00:32:27,000 --> 00:32:28,460 I think there was over 50 this week, 704 00:32:28,740 --> 00:32:30,940 but websites can now spy on you through your hard drive. 705 00:32:31,520 --> 00:32:34,560 We used to have a research section on surveillance report, 706 00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:37,100 which is the perfect category for stories like this, 707 00:32:37,240 --> 00:32:39,720 which is researchers find a really interesting way 708 00:32:39,940 --> 00:32:43,840 to be able to spy on you in a very weird side channel attack 709 00:32:44,140 --> 00:32:47,800 kind of movie-esque style of tracking people. 710 00:32:48,360 --> 00:32:50,540 But rarely does that really directly translate 711 00:32:50,640 --> 00:32:52,080 into what's possible on the internet. 712 00:32:52,500 --> 00:32:54,600 And that's probably a pretty similar situation here. 713 00:32:54,700 --> 00:33:01,840 Now, there is a full research paper that details this, but it actually does fingerprinting remotely using OFPS-based SSD timing. 714 00:33:02,180 --> 00:33:04,580 So you can read this whole research article if you want. 715 00:33:04,900 --> 00:33:07,540 There's no indications of these being performed in the wild. 716 00:33:07,860 --> 00:33:09,140 And if you are super, 717 00:33:09,360 --> 00:33:09,600 super, 718 00:33:10,000 --> 00:33:15,300 I guess, concerned about this, you pretty much just have to close your tabs when you're done with them. 719 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:19,760 So this rewards all of you people like me who like to keep their browsers very neat and tidy. 720 00:33:19,860 --> 00:33:21,060 And this is probably the real solution. 721 00:33:21,120 --> 00:33:24,080 They propose ways for browsers to shut down all of these side channels. 722 00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:26,780 So it's very likely if this is a serious enough problem, 723 00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:29,080 browsers are going to patch it before it ever impacts you. 724 00:33:29,300 --> 00:33:30,780 This is another update. 725 00:33:32,020 --> 00:33:34,720 My gosh, this is a person we've been talking about the last several weeks now. 726 00:33:35,020 --> 00:33:35,800 Nightmare Eclipse. 727 00:33:36,270 --> 00:33:42,160 Pretty much Microsoft started making some vague legal threats against Nightmare Eclipse. 728 00:33:42,880 --> 00:33:45,180 And the cybersecurity community has kind of stepped up 729 00:33:45,300 --> 00:33:47,400 and for the most part has backed up Nightmare Eclipse 730 00:33:47,620 --> 00:33:49,740 and is saying that Microsoft is being really unprofessional. 731 00:33:50,220 --> 00:33:53,519 So if you want to learn more about this and learn more about Nightmare Eclipse 732 00:33:53,520 --> 00:33:55,940 and this whole drama between Microsoft and Nightmare Eclipse, 733 00:33:56,480 --> 00:33:56,820 check it out. 734 00:33:57,100 --> 00:34:00,900 I think overall the InfoSec and cybersecurity community is leaning. 735 00:34:01,580 --> 00:34:04,040 I don't know if they necessarily like Nightmare Eclipse, 736 00:34:04,120 --> 00:34:06,740 but they disagree on how Microsoft is approaching all of this. 737 00:34:06,880 --> 00:34:08,460 So check out the show notes if you want to learn more. 738 00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:09,080 All right, everybody. 739 00:34:09,220 --> 00:34:11,879 And now we're going to get into the open source news 740 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:15,020 where we just cover open source and open source adjacent news. 741 00:34:15,080 --> 00:34:18,980 But I actually think this week we are 100% completely open source. 742 00:34:19,260 --> 00:34:20,879 No debates, no questions asked. 743 00:34:21,320 --> 00:34:25,240 So we're going to start with Tor browser with version 15.0.15, 744 00:34:25,419 --> 00:34:25,899 which was released. 745 00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:28,560 It seems like a pretty, pretty minor update. 746 00:34:28,740 --> 00:34:32,300 It just updated some of the extensions and it fixed a few bugs. 747 00:34:32,500 --> 00:34:35,580 So nothing too serious there, but make sure you get up to date if you're using the Tor 748 00:34:35,740 --> 00:34:35,940 browser. 749 00:34:36,680 --> 00:34:39,419 Mullvad had a security assessment of their Android app. 750 00:34:39,540 --> 00:34:41,520 Mullvad is an open source VPN provider. 751 00:34:41,740 --> 00:34:43,460 They're very well respected in the community. 752 00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:45,460 It's pretty much like an audit. 753 00:34:45,840 --> 00:34:47,740 So you can read the audit and see what they found. 754 00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:49,240 They have an overview of findings. 755 00:34:49,899 --> 00:34:51,639 And it's always good to see audits. 756 00:34:51,639 --> 00:34:55,440 The reason why you want to do audits over time is that audits are a snapshot in time. 757 00:34:55,540 --> 00:34:56,600 And so as of today, 758 00:34:56,820 --> 00:34:58,120 this is what Mullvad might look like. 759 00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:00,880 But starting next week, they're going to start pushing out more code. 760 00:35:00,980 --> 00:35:02,440 And maybe it's not the same thing. 761 00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:07,420 And so it's really cool how providers like Mullvad continually do more audits over time. 762 00:35:07,580 --> 00:35:08,640 This one is really interesting. 763 00:35:08,900 --> 00:35:09,040 Now, 764 00:35:09,260 --> 00:35:11,740 I'm pretty far removed from Gmail. 765 00:35:12,780 --> 00:35:14,880 I've been using Proton for a long time. 766 00:35:15,140 --> 00:35:20,640 So I don't really quite envision exactly how this works, but I think I get the picture. 767 00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:23,160 So Proton released this new feature, 768 00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:28,380 which they're kind of marketing as a way to use Gmail a bit more privately. 769 00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:33,180 So what you can do now is you can connect Gmail into your Proton account. 770 00:35:33,720 --> 00:35:34,820 You connect them. 771 00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:38,300 Connecting your Gmail does not give Google access to your Proton Mail inbox. 772 00:35:38,440 --> 00:35:39,480 They make that very clear. 773 00:35:39,860 --> 00:35:44,480 So this is supposed to be like a transition for people who aren't ready to leave Gmail overnight. 774 00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:47,980 but they want to start using a privacy-first email provider. 775 00:35:48,370 --> 00:35:51,740 So now you can actually send emails from your Gmail address 776 00:35:52,410 --> 00:35:54,500 from directly inside of Proton. 777 00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:56,340 This also includes importing your emails. 778 00:35:56,410 --> 00:35:58,680 The idea here is if you're a Gmail customer, 779 00:35:58,800 --> 00:36:00,020 you've been using Gmail for 10 years, 780 00:36:00,240 --> 00:36:02,240 and you want to start dipping your toes in Proton, 781 00:36:02,300 --> 00:36:03,920 it'll import all of your Gmail emails. 782 00:36:03,950 --> 00:36:08,200 You can even still send emails through your Gmail address from Proton, 783 00:36:08,940 --> 00:36:11,200 but you can kind of start transitioning things slowly. 784 00:36:11,760 --> 00:36:14,099 Really, I think what this is doing is it's making it easier 785 00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:16,280 for people to move to a privacy-first email provider. 786 00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:17,760 And I think they're well aware of that. 787 00:36:17,820 --> 00:36:19,920 They know that if they get people starting to use them, 788 00:36:20,280 --> 00:36:22,280 it's probably likely that they'll move to it 789 00:36:22,540 --> 00:36:23,460 permanently down the road. 790 00:36:23,860 --> 00:36:24,940 I think this is great. 791 00:36:25,260 --> 00:36:26,680 Obviously, it's great for Proton, 792 00:36:26,900 --> 00:36:28,700 but I think really this is great 793 00:36:28,840 --> 00:36:30,100 for just people who are new to this. 794 00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:31,860 I know a lot of people have been using Gmail 795 00:36:32,100 --> 00:36:33,040 for like 10 plus years, 796 00:36:33,420 --> 00:36:34,440 and that is actually the main reason 797 00:36:34,520 --> 00:36:36,360 they never are going to switch to a different provider. 798 00:36:36,480 --> 00:36:38,040 The friction point is just too high. 799 00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:39,700 And so the more that we can reduce 800 00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:40,960 that friction point, the better. 801 00:36:41,460 --> 00:36:43,299 And this is a place where I think I'd love to see 802 00:36:43,340 --> 00:36:48,940 to also be able to step up and offer similar ability for people to quickly migrate from old 803 00:36:49,200 --> 00:36:49,340 services. 804 00:36:49,600 --> 00:36:52,040 I can't say I'm going to use this, and I'm sure a lot of you in our audience probably 805 00:36:52,220 --> 00:36:56,040 won't use this either. But this is a good thing to recommend to friends and family in your life 806 00:36:56,200 --> 00:36:58,180 that are already thinking about maybe leaving Gmail. 807 00:36:58,440 --> 00:37:00,700 Now it's one less reason for them not to 808 00:37:00,700 --> 00:37:00,980 do it. 809 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,920 Now we have just a few more Linux stories here. 810 00:37:04,100 --> 00:37:06,340 Rocky Linux hit version 10.2, which brings 811 00:37:06,520 --> 00:37:09,200 post-quantum cryptography and Flatpak default, 812 00:37:09,500 --> 00:37:10,460 which is really awesome. 813 00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:11,559 And that actually comes 814 00:37:11,580 --> 00:37:13,620 right off of another big update from Rocky Linux 815 00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:16,000 just a few days ago, which was 9.8, 816 00:37:16,200 --> 00:37:17,620 which had major software updates 817 00:37:17,720 --> 00:37:19,000 and a new image builder feature. 818 00:37:19,420 --> 00:37:21,760 OpenSUSE Tumbleweed has updated their desktop environments, 819 00:37:21,980 --> 00:37:22,460 their kernel, 820 00:37:22,780 --> 00:37:24,280 and security fixes as well. 821 00:37:24,330 --> 00:37:26,980 So you can learn more about that in the show notes. 822 00:37:26,990 --> 00:37:30,420 And we also have NixOS that hit version 26.05. 823 00:37:31,160 --> 00:37:32,560 So if you want to learn more about that, 824 00:37:32,820 --> 00:37:35,480 there's also more information about that in the show notes. 825 00:37:35,900 --> 00:37:37,440 And that, my friends, is going to conclude 826 00:37:37,580 --> 00:37:39,180 this week's Techlore Surveillance Report. 827 00:37:39,680 --> 00:37:41,420 If this analysis helped you reclaim control, 828 00:37:41,460 --> 00:37:44,140 you can become a Techlorian by visiting the link in the show notes. 829 00:37:44,380 --> 00:37:46,020 I absolutely love doing this, 830 00:37:46,140 --> 00:37:48,540 and I couldn't do it without all of our community support. 831 00:37:49,000 --> 00:37:51,000 And you'll also gain access to exclusive communities 832 00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:52,340 like the private signal group. 833 00:37:52,780 --> 00:37:55,140 You'll also get some perks like my private RSS feed, 834 00:37:55,220 --> 00:37:56,420 which I'm updating throughout the week 835 00:37:56,580 --> 00:37:58,040 to keep track of all these stories. 836 00:37:58,160 --> 00:38:01,320 And so if you want to access my RSS feed as I'm collecting them, 837 00:38:01,780 --> 00:38:02,820 that's how you can do it. 838 00:38:03,180 --> 00:38:05,380 And if you don't want to support us via the paid method, 839 00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:07,620 you can still do it for free by just leaving a rating. 840 00:38:08,100 --> 00:38:09,640 You can also share the episode with people 841 00:38:09,640 --> 00:38:11,480 in your life to help keep them safer as well. 842 00:38:12,200 --> 00:38:14,060 Other than that, just keep enjoying the episodes 843 00:38:14,600 --> 00:38:17,060 and I'll be happy to keep delivering them each week. 844 00:38:17,580 --> 00:38:18,260 Thank you all for listening 845 00:38:18,560 --> 00:38:20,260 and I'll see you in the next episode of Surveillance Support. 846 00:38:20,360 --> 00:38:22,380 And also don't forget to check out Easy Opt Outs, 847 00:38:22,440 --> 00:38:24,960 our sponsor from this week's episode in the description. 848 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:26,020 See you next week.