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His list. Yeah. There the Nsa had a

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list of, like, software, you can... Or programming

3
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language. I was like, cool. I already got

4
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1. I'm good on... I'll call the on

5
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the sega of the job later. You know?

6
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If you get hired at a company and

7
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they're like, we use the Nsa standards programming.

8
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You're like,

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is this...

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Am I a government contractor now? Like, I'm

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scared. I have a Starbucks over here, like

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double shot.

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Dirty Chai latte, and it did not pet

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me up. I tried to. Double shot, dirty

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Chai latte. That's you. That's a guaranteed pep.

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Right. Right? That's why I'm like, oh my

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god. What do I just gross.

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You?

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Gross how dare you? Now it good.

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Shot I don't adding

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to almost anything makes it better. I mean,

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we know makes. What makes Chi dirty. Adding

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espresso. Adding espresso. I I did 2 espresso

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shots, and I'm still just like, at at

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cruising altitude. I'm not definitely

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rant. And what you need is an a

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avocado. That's what you need.

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An alpha. What is that? A avocado is

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ice cream with this espresso on What? Okay.

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I'm freaking amazing. Why haven't I had that.

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I... If you aren't... You're upgrading down all

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just please. If you aren't just taking a

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scoop of vanilla ice cream and shooting espresso

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onto it. You're doing life wrong. I iphone

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breakfast. I even went to, like, an ice

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cream festival

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last week.

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And I did admit. I've never heard of

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that before, but I... I... Now I'm googling.

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Ice cream and espresso because I can't spell

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alpha avocado. It's an Italian thing. Like, like

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all coffee and food things it's an Italian

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thing.

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1 of my favorite ice cream flavors was

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was

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and Jerry's coffee coffee buzz buzz buzz.

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Coffee ice cream is delicious.

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Yeah. It is amazing. I don't think they

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make that anymore. At least, I I was

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haven't seen it in years. I saw... I

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know It got it last year. I don't...

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I haven't taken a look this year. It

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wasn't ben in Jerry's but me. 1 of

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the most dangerous things, you know, some won't

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say how many years ago passed back in

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university at the the the dining hall in

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my 1 campus was the the bottomless ice

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cream dispenser and coffee was 1 of the

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available for. My god.

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That would break me. The freshman 15 would

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be the freshman 01:50.

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It was, like, freshman 40. It was hiking...

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It was no joke.

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Yeah. Ford... Here's a full habit 15. Here's

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a fun

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here's a fun ice cream fact for everyone.

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Does anyone know the biggest ice cream company

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in the United States? It's ben in Jerry's.

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Isn't that crazy? Really? Is there there a

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big... I would have assumed it's something that

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Nest owned. Right? You think it's, like, I

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think it's they're just a small brand No.

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They are the biggest ice cream company in

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the. A lot of Nestle ice cream doesn't

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classify ice cream because it has to have

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a search frozen dairy product. It's frozen dairy

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product. Yeah. I think how they get away

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with. I forget the exact percentage. It's like,

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it's either somewhere in the teens or, like,

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20 percent of butter fat. That needs to

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be A shameful low bar to pass and

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they somehow down. Have you ever... There's like

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that video of people leaving a nestle ice

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cream out in the sun. And it doesn't

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melt.

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Like just like, whip plastic yeah. It's just...

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Yeah. It's it's flat. And then their argument

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is like, well, you don't want your ice

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cream to melt when you're eating it and

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I'm like, Well, then it's not I thought.

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Like, what what is going on. I'm like,

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I guess that's a little bit of logic,

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but

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wait tell sequence.

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What was a sequence of events that caught

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you to go into an ice cream festival?

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Like, were you depressed? Was it a boot

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was it a power?

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I know. Was it a good thing or

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was it great thing? Were you so sad

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that you had to go to an ice

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cream festival. It was also the hottest day.

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Of the year so far in San Diego,

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So it was, like, absolutely horrible because It

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was like, oh, it was outside. It it's

106
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was like, probably in the high nineties, which

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is hot for San Diego. Right? And it

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was a birthday present. So my wife got

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us tickets to this ice cream festival.

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Smart I brought the baby. Right? Went tall,

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tried to ask And then here's the best

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part. There was ass bowls for free. Like,

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this company just giving them out. So I

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just literally, like, did my ice cream tour

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and just stood by the ass bowls and

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just ate, like,

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for those because those are good and healthy.

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Oh, yeah. They're expensive too. So that's a

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good move. Yeah. This sounds like the kind

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of festival I would like to go to

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honestly.

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Yeah. I really give it out free ice

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cream. San Diego has, like, these festivals every

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now and then that are total scams like

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you get there, and they're, like, not ran

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well at all and, like, you realize you

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just paid to get in. Now you have

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to pay for things while you're in and

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tacos and stuff like that. Yeah. So I

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was super skeptical when my wife said she

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got tickets this and then we went. And

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it was pretty good. There was, of course,

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like, humongous lines for all the ice cream,

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but it it was well worth it. I

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would... I I would recommend it again next

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year.

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Here's another trivia before we get started. You

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know that... But ice cream paradox. It's like

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that they actually eat more ice cream in

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cold places and they do in hot places.

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Kind counter.

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Is that all? Yeah. It's a real. I

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think. I mean, I could be lying, but

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I'm pretty sure thrilled. I'm pretty sure they

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eat more... Like, I don't know. They eat

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more... They they eat more ice cream in

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colder climate. Like, if you look at it,

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but I don't know. Something in solar I

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fax code. I I can speak a little

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bit to of experience from that because

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I'm from maine

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during the summer is, like, that's ice cream

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season that's when all the local ice cream

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shops open up. So when I first moved

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here to Florida,

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I was expecting to have ice cream shots

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like ice cream shops everywhere because it's always

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summer. There's never... It's always summer. Always Got

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time. It's so disappointing. There there was almost

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no ice cream shops around when I first...

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There's some now, but when I when I

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first moved at back down here. It was

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crazy to me that there was no ice

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cream. But it's, like, you gorge yourself on

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ice cream over summer summer when you're in

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maine to, like, fat up for the winner

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and then you don't have ice cream at

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all. What you're saying.

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That's what I should do. Hi. I I

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will tell you that, like, San Diego, I

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go to the ice cream shops, like,

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bi weekly, at least, I go to a

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fan... Like, not like, bed and jerry's or,

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like, but, like those fancy hole the wall

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ones that are... Yeah. But there's 1 that

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makes a... It's called strawberry crumble.

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But it's...

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You know those short... The the strawberry short

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cake bars that the ice cream truck used

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to have.

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Like, imagine that, but like, on, like, the

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tenth level, like, made. But like, good. Yeah.

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Yeah. But like, it's like Bo pop tart,

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you go to something like. Fancy bakery and

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they're like, pop tart and you're like, oh,

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and then it's, like, really good, like, Croissant

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or something. They're like, whoa. Pop tart gotta

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level up.

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I can't wait for that sign.

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Fun told Pop parts movie when? I think

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that's out now.

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Okay. It actually hours.

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Yeah. There's a pop tart un

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netflix Un trusted. I thought that was about

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cereal. It's about pop tart. Yeah. Well. It's

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about pop tart. Yeah. I I legit thought

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It was about frosted flakes versus corn flakes

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or... That's what Jerry Seinfeld decided the world

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needed to hear.

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Too.

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I thought we're were gonna wait for John.

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00:06:52,875 --> 00:06:54,794
He said 5 minutes, like, We're waiting for

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00:06:54,875 --> 00:06:57,194
John. We're stalling. I'm doing my best. I'm

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00:06:57,354 --> 00:06:58,714
I'm breaking out all the trivia.

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00:06:59,290 --> 00:07:01,050
I'm breaking out all kinds of trivia. We

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00:07:01,050 --> 00:07:02,250
could probably get started Ryan. You know what

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Wait for John.

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Okay.

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00:07:05,449 --> 00:07:07,345
He can ramp about we can rant about

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00:07:07,545 --> 00:07:09,625
see and memory save programming when he gets

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here what they'll just arrive like, a freight

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00:07:11,545 --> 00:07:14,504
train. Hey kids. What hear about every safe

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programming?

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00:07:15,878 --> 00:07:18,344
Like the Cool Am just start... Oh, yeah.

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This is. They're good. Alright. We're gonna roll

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00:07:21,287 --> 00:07:22,401
it. Roll it.

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00:07:37,586 --> 00:07:40,115
Hello and welcome to Black hills information security

218
00:07:40,234 --> 00:07:42,302
talking about news. It's the first of July

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00:07:42,382 --> 00:07:44,530
Happy Canada day if you're from Canada. I

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00:07:44,530 --> 00:07:46,042
don't know why you're here instead of drinking

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00:07:46,042 --> 00:07:48,527
beers with the buds a, But you're here.

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Team got hacked. That's what we're gonna talk

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00:07:51,480 --> 00:07:53,156
about first. Bam, straight to the hot tape.

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00:07:53,475 --> 00:07:55,390
Damn dude. That was... That's rough.

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00:07:56,365 --> 00:07:58,685
I'm using team viewer. I'm using Team viewer

226
00:07:58,685 --> 00:08:01,085
right now to connect to the news articles.

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00:08:02,605 --> 00:08:04,125
Does that be a problem.

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00:08:05,257 --> 00:08:07,005
I didn't make you guys, so you're gonna

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00:08:07,005 --> 00:08:08,594
have to tell me what happened. I just

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know they said Apt hacked them and that

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stuff okay.

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In pt hack them... What does that even

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00:08:14,661 --> 00:08:16,498
mean? I don't know. I need... I don't

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00:08:16,498 --> 00:08:18,496
know him... It's supposed to be... It's the

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00:08:18,496 --> 00:08:20,987
same group that Hacked Microsoft and Microsoft's doing

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00:08:20,987 --> 00:08:23,385
the Ir on this 1? Wait Really? Hold

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00:08:23,385 --> 00:08:24,983
on. Okay. So Mike is the 1 who

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00:08:24,983 --> 00:08:27,540
actually knows things. How wasn't the guys who

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00:08:27,540 --> 00:08:29,940
hit Microsoft in January. And then Microsoft also

240
00:08:29,940 --> 00:08:31,847
recently disclosed that the scope of that was

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00:08:31,847 --> 00:08:33,356
a bit bigger than originally expected.

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00:08:33,991 --> 00:08:35,818
So it's storm 0558

243
00:08:35,818 --> 00:08:37,984
or whatever or is it another? Midnight midnight

244
00:08:37,984 --> 00:08:38,463
midnight blizzard?

245
00:08:39,181 --> 00:08:40,856
Midnight blizzard? Oh, that sounds like a good

246
00:08:40,856 --> 00:08:42,850
flavor of ice for you you me to?

247
00:08:43,169 --> 00:08:44,126
What I was gonna stop.

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00:08:44,923 --> 00:08:45,881
What would it be? What would it be?

249
00:08:46,040 --> 00:08:46,120
Like,

250
00:08:47,249 --> 00:08:49,796
coffee. No. It have to be, like, berries.

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00:08:50,035 --> 00:08:50,910
But by

252
00:08:51,865 --> 00:08:53,776
Story. You got mid midnight in coming dark.

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00:08:54,110 --> 00:08:57,309
Like... Yeah. Dark maybe chocolate, budge on fudge

254
00:08:57,309 --> 00:09:00,029
anyway. Let's how much worries. Yeah. Sorry.

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00:09:00,750 --> 00:09:03,318
So basically, how this whole all wanda pep

256
00:09:03,318 --> 00:09:05,625
was Friday. There was a tweet out there

257
00:09:05,625 --> 00:09:07,080
about team viewer being

258
00:09:07,534 --> 00:09:10,001
hacked from the Nc group. There was an...

259
00:09:10,319 --> 00:09:11,169
There... It was

260
00:09:11,849 --> 00:09:14,166
sort of hinted that it was their production

261
00:09:14,166 --> 00:09:14,566
environment,

262
00:09:15,045 --> 00:09:17,682
and not the corporate environment. Team viewer came

263
00:09:17,682 --> 00:09:20,000
out very quick very not long after saying.

264
00:09:20,415 --> 00:09:20,495
No.

265
00:09:21,294 --> 00:09:22,754
It was our corporate environment

266
00:09:23,134 --> 00:09:25,535
that was hacked. And as of today, I

267
00:09:25,535 --> 00:09:27,054
was reading 1 of the stories on it

268
00:09:27,054 --> 00:09:28,828
that said, Yeah It was our corporate environment.

269
00:09:29,068 --> 00:09:30,266
Thank God that we've got

270
00:09:31,225 --> 00:09:33,143
segmentation because That prevented them from getting over

271
00:09:33,143 --> 00:09:33,803
to our

272
00:09:34,182 --> 00:09:36,235
production slash customer environment, but

273
00:09:37,075 --> 00:09:38,595
take... I I still take that with a

274
00:09:38,595 --> 00:09:40,674
grain of salt until they are able to

275
00:09:40,674 --> 00:09:42,674
actually give us more information. The other thing

276
00:09:42,674 --> 00:09:44,686
that was revealed today is Microsoft 2 got

277
00:09:44,686 --> 00:09:46,521
hacked by the same Apt group is the

278
00:09:46,521 --> 00:09:48,913
1 doing the Ir on it? Oh, that

279
00:09:48,913 --> 00:09:50,748
ways they got experience. Right? Where do we

280
00:09:50,748 --> 00:09:53,141
still... She's got experience. Oh girl. Gonna be

281
00:09:53,141 --> 00:09:53,380
in.

282
00:09:54,507 --> 00:09:56,728
Couple questions for anyone that doesn't, I don't

283
00:09:56,728 --> 00:09:58,790
know. Does Microsoft normally do I? Or is

284
00:09:58,790 --> 00:10:00,297
this just a special case. So they like,

285
00:10:00,376 --> 00:10:02,295
you know what? Worst screwed so Come on

286
00:10:02,295 --> 00:10:04,436
in. Come into the war everything. They have

287
00:10:04,436 --> 00:10:04,936
everything

288
00:10:05,308 --> 00:10:07,370
cybersecurity. So... The... Yeah. Professional service.

289
00:10:08,084 --> 00:10:09,194
I think get a special case.

290
00:10:10,321 --> 00:10:12,810
Is it? Really? No. All don't say.

291
00:10:13,662 --> 00:10:15,969
God with hot good? No. No No.

292
00:10:17,176 --> 00:10:19,318
Interesting. Yeah. I'm still fighting all of this

293
00:10:19,318 --> 00:10:21,618
stuff, while you guys continue to talk about

294
00:10:21,618 --> 00:10:23,284
because all of my stuff is messed up.

295
00:10:24,014 --> 00:10:24,571
I okay.

296
00:10:25,606 --> 00:10:27,597
Actually. Yeah. John, Let me use Team pure

297
00:10:27,597 --> 00:10:29,109
connecting to your computer? I'll fix your settings

298
00:10:29,109 --> 00:10:30,861
for you. No problem? Oh, yeah. So what

299
00:10:30,861 --> 00:10:32,868
did I miss about team viewer guys. That's

300
00:10:32,868 --> 00:10:33,368
totally

301
00:10:34,064 --> 00:10:34,303
here.

302
00:10:35,180 --> 00:10:37,812
Well, you don't know much is. Securely with

303
00:10:37,891 --> 00:10:40,704
Russia. Yeah. Is well, as long as someone

304
00:10:40,762 --> 00:10:41,161
securing it.

305
00:10:42,449 --> 00:10:43,881
Well, I, you know, I know we've talked

306
00:10:43,881 --> 00:10:45,870
about this before, but yet again, it's still

307
00:10:45,870 --> 00:10:46,767
pretty frightening

308
00:10:47,142 --> 00:10:50,101
that the number of organizations and especially considering

309
00:10:50,101 --> 00:10:52,407
the number of healthcare care organizations that use

310
00:10:52,407 --> 00:10:55,453
team viewer to manage their It assets

311
00:10:55,842 --> 00:10:57,293
You know, we've become a bit

312
00:10:57,744 --> 00:10:59,963
jade about these sorts of attacks, but,

313
00:11:01,390 --> 00:11:02,737
remote connection software,

314
00:11:03,307 --> 00:11:05,869
it is still a a big threat to

315
00:11:06,003 --> 00:11:07,113
organizations, especially

316
00:11:08,065 --> 00:11:10,127
for organizations that don't invest a lot of

317
00:11:10,127 --> 00:11:10,944
money in

318
00:11:12,134 --> 00:11:14,855
other tools to manage their assets. So it...

319
00:11:15,014 --> 00:11:17,975
It's did... It's disturbing, a that that they'd

320
00:11:17,975 --> 00:11:19,894
specifically mentioned that health ice,

321
00:11:20,308 --> 00:11:22,375
ice sac on this. Second of all, we

322
00:11:22,375 --> 00:11:25,102
all know that healthcare care organizations are dramatically

323
00:11:25,397 --> 00:11:27,624
underfunded. And b this comes right around a

324
00:11:27,624 --> 00:11:28,124
holiday

325
00:11:29,055 --> 00:11:29,453
weekend.

326
00:11:30,345 --> 00:11:32,284
So, I I I'm

327
00:11:33,544 --> 00:11:36,105
disturbed and concerned about seeing the fallout of

328
00:11:36,105 --> 00:11:38,678
this. It's gonna be the a rough half

329
00:11:38,678 --> 00:11:40,294
of the of the next

330
00:11:40,672 --> 00:11:41,390
year or so,

331
00:11:42,107 --> 00:11:43,623
as we see what happens from this.

332
00:11:44,500 --> 00:11:46,494
On on the plus side, I will admit,

333
00:11:46,574 --> 00:11:47,872
like, most of these

334
00:11:48,184 --> 00:11:50,093
team viewer es stuff is pretty easy to

335
00:11:50,093 --> 00:11:52,479
build out detection for. Right? If you have

336
00:11:52,479 --> 00:11:54,309
any type of software inventory, which we say

337
00:11:54,309 --> 00:11:56,713
you don't. But then you still have firewall

338
00:11:56,713 --> 00:11:58,387
logs. Right? Like, nobody you just say, okay,

339
00:11:58,626 --> 00:12:00,561
No team fewer or whatever that third party

340
00:12:00,699 --> 00:12:02,691
connection website is. You just block all those.

341
00:12:03,344 --> 00:12:05,262
And then hope this is, like, detection wise.

342
00:12:05,502 --> 00:12:07,259
Hopefully, you're not already using them, or you

343
00:12:07,259 --> 00:12:09,656
build something out to look that if stuff

344
00:12:09,656 --> 00:12:11,015
is trying to connect to 1 of those.

345
00:12:11,269 --> 00:12:13,259
A lot of times, firewalls will actually have

346
00:12:13,259 --> 00:12:15,807
signatures based on, like, third party remote software

347
00:12:15,807 --> 00:12:17,081
and you could just, like, block all those.

348
00:12:17,319 --> 00:12:18,991
Hopefully, if you're using the right firewalls. Right?

349
00:12:19,563 --> 00:12:21,629
The the interesting thing about it is that,

350
00:12:22,264 --> 00:12:23,717
and I was just double checking

351
00:12:24,171 --> 00:12:26,339
enable, which is 1 of the big Rm

352
00:12:26,713 --> 00:12:30,463
software out there. Uses team viewer for their

353
00:12:30,463 --> 00:12:33,984
for the connectivity on it. Supposedly secure, but

354
00:12:34,040 --> 00:12:35,471
that opens up a whole new can of

355
00:12:35,471 --> 00:12:37,355
worms for small that are

356
00:12:37,792 --> 00:12:40,415
using Ms isps that have enable on them.

357
00:12:41,290 --> 00:12:43,038
Well, and this isn't... I I think that

358
00:12:43,038 --> 00:12:44,231
1 of the problems that we run into

359
00:12:44,231 --> 00:12:46,536
as a trap is its team viewer.

360
00:12:47,109 --> 00:12:47,928
It's Kiss.

361
00:12:48,384 --> 00:12:50,457
It's, you know, what was the 1 that

362
00:12:50,457 --> 00:12:52,690
was dragon naturally speaking software. They had it

363
00:12:52,690 --> 00:12:54,444
set up. It... It's all of them. Right?

364
00:12:54,843 --> 00:12:57,567
And none of these programs are inherently bad

365
00:12:57,567 --> 00:12:58,920
in and of themselves. And I feel like

366
00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:00,354
we get into the trap of saying that

367
00:13:00,354 --> 00:13:03,539
it's inherently bad. Whereas a better approach is

368
00:13:03,539 --> 00:13:05,226
to say, do we at least know where

369
00:13:05,226 --> 00:13:07,851
these software, like, programs are in our environment.

370
00:13:08,169 --> 00:13:09,760
And this becomes my point where it's like,

371
00:13:09,839 --> 00:13:11,192
hey, check out Ac hunter,

372
00:13:12,317 --> 00:13:14,615
because it's designed to find this stuff. Like,

373
00:13:14,853 --> 00:13:16,754
that's that's what it does. Whether it's team

374
00:13:16,754 --> 00:13:18,759
gear or what other crock pot

375
00:13:19,068 --> 00:13:22,096
crappy, RAM store of, like, software out there,

376
00:13:22,176 --> 00:13:24,486
like, Ab view or any of those. It's

377
00:13:24,486 --> 00:13:25,761
designed to find these things.

378
00:13:26,652 --> 00:13:28,325
So I I think that taken away from

379
00:13:28,325 --> 00:13:30,794
just being a team viewer problem, making it

380
00:13:30,794 --> 00:13:32,945
a much larger issue and saying, what kind

381
00:13:32,945 --> 00:13:34,777
of remote management software do you have in

382
00:13:34,777 --> 00:13:36,461
your environment? Probably a little bit more of

383
00:13:36,461 --> 00:13:39,239
an important conversation to have from an inventory

384
00:13:39,239 --> 00:13:39,477
perspective.

385
00:13:40,113 --> 00:13:42,256
Well, I can also just give some little

386
00:13:42,256 --> 00:13:44,973
bit of market world contact. So... It's because

387
00:13:44,973 --> 00:13:48,084
anyone wanna guess the annual revenue of Aim

388
00:13:48,084 --> 00:13:48,403
viewer.

389
00:13:49,759 --> 00:13:51,832
Oh, no. Oh, no. No. No. How much

390
00:13:51,832 --> 00:13:53,906
are we talking here? It's a hundred and

391
00:13:53,906 --> 00:13:54,959
61000000

392
00:13:54,959 --> 00:13:55,359
euros.

393
00:13:56,557 --> 00:13:58,016
So what's that?

394
00:13:58,555 --> 00:14:01,512
Yeah. Freedom bucks. Yeah what's the user bucks?

395
00:14:01,672 --> 00:14:03,430
So that's like what Hundred a hundred and

396
00:14:03,430 --> 00:14:05,684
50000000 or something Don't know. Hundred and 80000000

397
00:14:05,684 --> 00:14:07,684
whatever. It's it's a lot of money. Basically,

398
00:14:07,845 --> 00:14:09,605
what my... What I'm my... What I'm trying

399
00:14:09,605 --> 00:14:11,605
to get at is, I think from our

400
00:14:11,605 --> 00:14:13,692
perspective in the world of High end cybersecurity

401
00:14:13,692 --> 00:14:15,681
team viewer might feel like a policy exception.

402
00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:17,749
It's like a don't do it. But I

403
00:14:17,749 --> 00:14:20,388
think, like Kelly alluded to, in the world

404
00:14:20,388 --> 00:14:23,964
of large or medium Ms p's or smaller

405
00:14:23,964 --> 00:14:24,441
businesses,

406
00:14:25,077 --> 00:14:27,159
I think team viewers is really ubiquitous. This

407
00:14:27,159 --> 00:14:28,834
is really scary for all those companies that

408
00:14:28,834 --> 00:14:30,430
are using it. Whether they know they're using

409
00:14:30,430 --> 00:14:32,685
it or not is a different story. But

410
00:14:33,541 --> 00:14:35,147
I think it's... I mean, a hundred and

411
00:14:35,147 --> 00:14:37,054
61000000 dollars is a lot of money.

412
00:14:38,246 --> 00:14:40,788
Yes. So that's, like, they're a big player.

413
00:14:41,106 --> 00:14:42,536
That's a big company.

414
00:14:43,429 --> 00:14:44,790
Their latest statement says,

415
00:14:45,350 --> 00:14:47,670
don't worry. The attack was contained to our

416
00:14:47,670 --> 00:14:50,470
an internal corporate It environment, but good.

417
00:14:51,429 --> 00:14:55,139
Oh, good. That developers never leave secure anything

418
00:14:55,198 --> 00:14:57,833
lying around or go never. That's nothing like

419
00:14:57,833 --> 00:15:00,307
that. I. Yeah. I'm sure there's no way

420
00:15:00,307 --> 00:15:03,032
to pivot from the team corporate environment into

421
00:15:03,032 --> 00:15:03,532
the

422
00:15:03,907 --> 00:15:05,975
customer environments in any... I'll tell you if

423
00:15:05,975 --> 00:15:07,646
there is a way, it definitely was the

424
00:15:07,646 --> 00:15:09,575
intern who acts accidentally left. It was the

425
00:15:09,575 --> 00:15:12,075
internet. Or it was the 1 loan systems

426
00:15:12,294 --> 00:15:13,894
administrator that made a mistake. Oops jeez.

427
00:15:14,855 --> 00:15:16,695
Yeah. I I mean, we don't know the

428
00:15:16,695 --> 00:15:20,147
impact yet, but see turn the intern was

429
00:15:20,147 --> 00:15:22,864
the 1 loan systems administrator and he left

430
00:15:22,864 --> 00:15:25,021
it hard coded inside of a text file

431
00:15:25,021 --> 00:15:27,272
on his desktop that said, password.

432
00:15:27,751 --> 00:15:29,266
Here I thought I was being jade.

433
00:15:31,579 --> 00:15:33,653
You are are clearly more cheated than I.

434
00:15:34,849 --> 00:15:35,248
What?

435
00:15:36,618 --> 00:15:38,129
They're also a German company. I don't know

436
00:15:38,129 --> 00:15:40,277
if that affects anyone's. I know that world,

437
00:15:40,436 --> 00:15:41,152
but... No.

438
00:15:41,868 --> 00:15:43,936
Yeah. I mean I would guess it's... They

439
00:15:43,936 --> 00:15:45,942
have a procedure at least. I think they

440
00:15:45,942 --> 00:15:47,936
also own some other brands didn't they own

441
00:15:47,936 --> 00:15:49,930
log... Or there... They're... They they own some

442
00:15:49,930 --> 00:15:52,243
other brands. Like they're... I don't anyway.

443
00:15:53,439 --> 00:15:53,939
Basically,

444
00:15:54,317 --> 00:15:57,061
it's a big It's a big breach, and

445
00:15:57,277 --> 00:15:59,345
I'm sure we'll see more updates on the

446
00:15:59,345 --> 00:16:01,493
show. So subscribe or whatever you do to

447
00:16:01,493 --> 00:16:04,156
podcast podcasts. Yeah. You should click that like

448
00:16:04,214 --> 00:16:05,089
subscriber whatever.

449
00:16:06,522 --> 00:16:06,999
Our chicken.

450
00:16:07,636 --> 00:16:10,519
Please subscribe to our Rs feed. Wait. Please.

451
00:16:10,758 --> 00:16:12,277
Click our chicken. What what did you just

452
00:16:12,277 --> 00:16:12,356
say?

453
00:16:14,594 --> 00:16:16,991
Rip that with that llama. No.

454
00:16:17,964 --> 00:16:20,137
Damn it. John, You just got, like, vaporize

455
00:16:20,194 --> 00:16:21,867
off the news. Alright. I know.

456
00:16:22,903 --> 00:16:25,293
My audio. I'm still here. My camera keeps

457
00:16:25,293 --> 00:16:26,966
coming. This is my life right now.

458
00:16:28,093 --> 00:16:29,919
I... Everything's just so messed up. But that's

459
00:16:29,919 --> 00:16:32,538
okay. Keep rolling rolling rolling. Yeah. I mean,

460
00:16:32,776 --> 00:16:35,499
does... Kelly, You had a G

461
00:16:36,683 --> 00:16:40,671
government fun story about privacy laws or, I

462
00:16:40,671 --> 00:16:43,144
guess, social media laws. What happened

463
00:16:43,622 --> 00:16:45,217
why... Am I allowed to use Tiktok or

464
00:16:45,217 --> 00:16:46,905
am I not allowed to stick tiktok. I.

465
00:16:47,144 --> 00:16:49,212
Just... Oh, wait. I don't wanna talk about

466
00:16:49,530 --> 00:16:51,280
Tiktok, but I do wanna talk about the

467
00:16:51,519 --> 00:16:52,712
Supreme court. So

468
00:16:53,605 --> 00:16:55,365
today, there's kind of a big news story

469
00:16:55,365 --> 00:16:57,544
that the Supreme Court tossed out

470
00:16:58,084 --> 00:17:00,084
the, state of Florida and the state of

471
00:17:00,245 --> 00:17:01,684
Texas social media laws.

472
00:17:02,657 --> 00:17:06,502
Both Florida and Texas had restricted laws about

473
00:17:06,798 --> 00:17:08,493
social media, companies

474
00:17:09,108 --> 00:17:12,069
moderating content. Now what what does this all

475
00:17:12,069 --> 00:17:13,365
mean? Basically...

476
00:17:14,138 --> 00:17:16,763
I'll summarize for you. Does the intersection of

477
00:17:16,763 --> 00:17:19,388
social media need and free speech need a

478
00:17:19,388 --> 00:17:21,874
stop like? Well, some people think it does.

479
00:17:22,432 --> 00:17:25,325
Basically, these states were saying that the platforms

480
00:17:25,702 --> 00:17:26,601
like Facebook

481
00:17:27,298 --> 00:17:29,531
needed to be treated like a business and

482
00:17:29,531 --> 00:17:32,411
be should be restricted from removing posts.

483
00:17:33,763 --> 00:17:33,922
It...

484
00:17:34,797 --> 00:17:36,547
I'll give you an analogy. Do you remember

485
00:17:36,547 --> 00:17:37,000
newspapers

486
00:17:37,358 --> 00:17:38,714
and he used to write a letter to

487
00:17:38,714 --> 00:17:41,027
the editor, and it... There used to be,

488
00:17:41,745 --> 00:17:44,537
a guideline or a practice that said every

489
00:17:44,537 --> 00:17:46,611
letter that came into the editor needed to

490
00:17:46,611 --> 00:17:49,174
be print it. So states in Texas and

491
00:17:49,174 --> 00:17:51,562
and in Florida we're saying, hey, every post

492
00:17:51,562 --> 00:17:53,734
that goes up on Facebook or social media

493
00:17:54,030 --> 00:17:56,535
needs to be put up there. You can't

494
00:17:56,592 --> 00:17:57,865
restrict people's content.

495
00:17:58,263 --> 00:18:00,571
Basically, they're saying that this is the commons.

496
00:18:00,810 --> 00:18:04,232
Right? Because social media, like Facebook and Twitter

497
00:18:04,232 --> 00:18:07,195
is the commons, if you're restricting access to

498
00:18:07,195 --> 00:18:09,824
the commons in any way, that is a

499
00:18:09,824 --> 00:18:11,019
restriction on free speech. Correct?

500
00:18:12,548 --> 00:18:15,979
Exactly. So the platforms pushed back on the

501
00:18:15,979 --> 00:18:17,734
state of Florida and the state of Texas

502
00:18:17,734 --> 00:18:20,461
saying that their first rights where the first

503
00:18:20,461 --> 00:18:22,236
amendment rights were being denied

504
00:18:22,693 --> 00:18:25,244
because by forcing them to publish all of

505
00:18:25,244 --> 00:18:25,882
the contents,

506
00:18:26,440 --> 00:18:28,765
they were being forced to publish speech that

507
00:18:28,765 --> 00:18:31,625
they didn't want to necessarily dis 7.

508
00:18:32,260 --> 00:18:33,611
So it went all the way up to

509
00:18:33,611 --> 00:18:36,255
the supreme court and the supreme court vacated

510
00:18:36,391 --> 00:18:39,580
this decision, which basically tossed it out. And

511
00:18:39,580 --> 00:18:42,437
the interesting part was they they tossed it

512
00:18:42,437 --> 00:18:45,269
out because they felt that the lower coat

513
00:18:45,470 --> 00:18:48,589
courts didn't actually do a proper analysis of

514
00:18:48,589 --> 00:18:50,369
the first amendment rights. So

515
00:18:50,830 --> 00:18:52,349
I just thought it was kind of interesting

516
00:18:52,349 --> 00:18:52,644
that

517
00:18:53,240 --> 00:18:54,750
it went all way up to the supreme

518
00:18:54,750 --> 00:18:56,578
court, and they tossed it back to the

519
00:18:56,578 --> 00:18:58,803
states saying he didn't actually look at the

520
00:18:58,803 --> 00:19:02,003
first amendment issue. And this helps mediated back.

521
00:19:02,163 --> 00:19:04,077
This doesn't mean it's decided. This just means

522
00:19:04,077 --> 00:19:06,310
it was mediated to the lower ports with

523
00:19:06,310 --> 00:19:08,543
additional... Said. This isn't good enough to be

524
00:19:08,543 --> 00:19:09,441
worth reviewing

525
00:19:09,913 --> 00:19:11,583
check your work and send it back again.

526
00:19:12,060 --> 00:19:12,299
Yeah.

527
00:19:12,935 --> 00:19:14,764
But the but this is an interesting thing.

528
00:19:14,923 --> 00:19:17,150
Right? I mean, you know, however, people wanna

529
00:19:17,150 --> 00:19:19,074
go away. I think that Once again, it

530
00:19:19,074 --> 00:19:20,904
sucks that we get politics wrapped into it.

531
00:19:20,983 --> 00:19:22,415
Right? Like people are like, oh my God,

532
00:19:22,574 --> 00:19:25,143
they're they're limiting conservative speech or

533
00:19:25,454 --> 00:19:28,567
I can't see pictures of hunter Biden We

534
00:19:28,567 --> 00:19:29,206
or whatever.

535
00:19:29,845 --> 00:19:30,345
But

536
00:19:31,362 --> 00:19:32,958
or we can go the other way. It's

537
00:19:32,958 --> 00:19:34,969
like, now Elon Musk is running Twitter. And

538
00:19:34,969 --> 00:19:36,404
it's like, oh, my God. I've got deal

539
00:19:36,404 --> 00:19:38,716
with Nazis. Why doesn't somebody do something about

540
00:19:38,716 --> 00:19:40,709
this? Like, hey. So take all of that

541
00:19:40,709 --> 00:19:42,543
away, but it is an interesting dilemma for

542
00:19:42,543 --> 00:19:43,340
a tech company.

543
00:19:43,834 --> 00:19:46,550
You're going to end up where you're going

544
00:19:46,550 --> 00:19:49,346
to create a platform where people are going

545
00:19:49,346 --> 00:19:50,625
to do stuff. Right?

546
00:19:51,518 --> 00:19:53,193
What is the line that you're going to

547
00:19:53,193 --> 00:19:55,369
set to try to, like, kind of

548
00:19:55,826 --> 00:19:58,954
protect your user base? Right? And I think

549
00:19:58,954 --> 00:20:00,472
that somebody once said it was really, really

550
00:20:00,472 --> 00:20:02,869
fun, kind of quote with Twitter. Twitter's is

551
00:20:02,869 --> 00:20:05,027
not selling like an open form. They're actually

552
00:20:05,027 --> 00:20:05,926
selling content

553
00:20:06,385 --> 00:20:08,474
moderation. What do they do to keep this

554
00:20:08,474 --> 00:20:11,025
form from having tons of child pornography and

555
00:20:11,025 --> 00:20:12,779
just tons of pornography... This before Elon Musk.

556
00:20:13,018 --> 00:20:15,330
But tons of pornography being thrown out there?

557
00:20:15,744 --> 00:20:17,825
People go there because they feel safe. Right?

558
00:20:17,984 --> 00:20:20,144
Like, they're not gonna get just like nailed

559
00:20:20,144 --> 00:20:22,465
with all of these, you know, porn sites

560
00:20:22,465 --> 00:20:24,074
and things like that. Because there's gonna be

561
00:20:24,074 --> 00:20:26,538
some level of content moderation. There's gonna be

562
00:20:26,538 --> 00:20:29,264
some type of, well, content moderation is not

563
00:20:29,400 --> 00:20:30,592
censorship. They're 2 different things,

564
00:20:31,244 --> 00:20:32,840
So I I think that this is an

565
00:20:32,840 --> 00:20:33,340
interesting

566
00:20:33,957 --> 00:20:35,713
interesting thing, but I think it's really funny

567
00:20:35,713 --> 00:20:37,149
how the court just punt on it.

568
00:20:38,027 --> 00:20:39,875
And this was a mix. Decision. This was

569
00:20:39,875 --> 00:20:42,103
5 4 if I remember correctly. Right? I'm

570
00:20:42,103 --> 00:20:44,173
going through. There was so many Supreme Court

571
00:20:44,173 --> 00:20:46,003
things going around. This was 5 4. Right?

572
00:20:48,009 --> 00:20:49,921
Control up. Yes. Yes. 5 4.

573
00:20:50,479 --> 00:20:53,188
Yep. There we go. And this isn't over.

574
00:20:53,347 --> 00:20:55,260
It's gonna get remediate back to lower courts

575
00:20:55,260 --> 00:20:56,296
and it's going to come back up.

576
00:20:57,346 --> 00:20:57,846
But

577
00:20:58,301 --> 00:20:59,893
I don't know. It... It's all kinds of

578
00:20:59,893 --> 00:21:01,724
interesting things are gonna be rolled up in

579
00:21:01,724 --> 00:21:02,839
this. So it it'd be nice, like I

580
00:21:02,839 --> 00:21:05,162
said, if we could have conversations about. What

581
00:21:05,162 --> 00:21:07,570
these media companies need to do, like Facebook

582
00:21:07,627 --> 00:21:10,329
and Linkedin and Twitter and all this stuff?

583
00:21:10,568 --> 00:21:12,078
Like, what where are the bounds that we're

584
00:21:12,078 --> 00:21:13,430
going to have them do and it had

585
00:21:13,430 --> 00:21:15,668
nothing to do with political issue to shore.

586
00:21:16,302 --> 00:21:17,651
Because I think that the politics of it

587
00:21:17,651 --> 00:21:19,713
is mud this and it's making it incredibly

588
00:21:19,713 --> 00:21:21,165
difficult to find a path forward

589
00:21:21,792 --> 00:21:23,621
Oh, that's so much Nuance, John. I thought

590
00:21:23,621 --> 00:21:25,052
we were a headlines, show. Let's go back

591
00:21:25,052 --> 00:21:25,688
to Hot.

592
00:21:26,245 --> 00:21:26,325
Okay.

593
00:21:27,517 --> 00:21:30,142
Porn, lots of it. If you want porn,

594
00:21:30,221 --> 00:21:31,016
you go to here at Twitter.

595
00:21:31,748 --> 00:21:33,978
I guess. I don't know. Okay. Let's talk

596
00:21:33,978 --> 00:21:35,810
about that Ssh Check, what. They feel like,

597
00:21:36,367 --> 00:21:38,757
Ssh. Those those 3 words when you say

598
00:21:39,155 --> 00:21:39,655
Ssh

599
00:21:40,111 --> 00:21:43,144
now. Yeah. That, like, Ssh and exploit is

600
00:21:43,144 --> 00:21:44,494
a scary thing to hear, but this 1

601
00:21:44,494 --> 00:21:46,637
isn't... Doesn't seem to be as scary. At

602
00:21:46,637 --> 00:21:49,908
least from the continuous pen testing side. We're

603
00:21:49,908 --> 00:21:51,180
not seeing a whole lot of traction with

604
00:21:51,180 --> 00:21:51,339
this.

605
00:21:52,055 --> 00:21:52,532
We're seeing...

606
00:21:53,248 --> 00:21:55,156
Obviously, you know, there's some vulnerable systems on

607
00:21:55,156 --> 00:21:57,860
the Internet, but on the... I guess, corporate,

608
00:21:58,274 --> 00:22:00,826
attack surface that we tend to go against,

609
00:22:00,986 --> 00:22:04,256
which are, no, are not necessarily representative of

610
00:22:04,256 --> 00:22:06,170
the whole Internet, but in corporate security, we're

611
00:22:06,170 --> 00:22:07,765
not seeing a huge impact on the Internet,

612
00:22:08,339 --> 00:22:09,640
it seems like it's

613
00:22:10,099 --> 00:22:11,539
kind of a... You know, it's a race

614
00:22:11,539 --> 00:22:12,359
condition. It's

615
00:22:12,819 --> 00:22:13,319
Rc,

616
00:22:13,700 --> 00:22:16,508
but it requires, like, a continuous connection for

617
00:22:16,508 --> 00:22:17,939
6 to 8 hours or whatever.

618
00:22:18,813 --> 00:22:20,641
So there's like a export... It's not just

619
00:22:20,641 --> 00:22:22,809
like, a... Oh, run this Poc.

620
00:22:23,184 --> 00:22:25,368
Yeah. You can see there. It says successful

621
00:22:25,665 --> 00:22:27,260
exploitation. Oh, roll up a little bit. Sorry.

622
00:22:27,579 --> 00:22:30,528
There we Have us demonstrated, Again 32 bit

623
00:22:30,528 --> 00:22:32,463
linux systems with As,

624
00:22:33,252 --> 00:22:35,953
Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average

625
00:22:35,953 --> 00:22:38,098
6 to 8 hours of continuous connections up

626
00:22:38,098 --> 00:22:40,584
to the maximum the server will accept. So

627
00:22:41,609 --> 00:22:43,287
Yeah. It's not like a cool.

628
00:22:44,246 --> 00:22:46,424
From a gap. But in a lab environment

629
00:22:46,563 --> 00:22:48,480
doesn't get a lot of people's blood pumping.

630
00:22:48,640 --> 00:22:51,149
Right? So I guess, if you have old

631
00:22:51,208 --> 00:22:52,803
32 bit systems on the Internet,

632
00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:54,478
don't do that.

633
00:22:55,754 --> 00:22:58,647
Well, and also, you know, be monitoring login

634
00:22:58,705 --> 00:23:00,549
attempt if you have 6 to 8 hours

635
00:23:00,549 --> 00:23:02,059
if someone trying to log in, I'm hoping

636
00:23:02,059 --> 00:23:03,808
you would be able to detect that. I'm

637
00:23:03,808 --> 00:23:04,524
hoping. Okay.

638
00:23:05,716 --> 00:23:07,402
That's a lot of... Network.

639
00:23:08,038 --> 00:23:09,016
What do they called

640
00:23:09,630 --> 00:23:11,540
Wade. What's the Logs?

641
00:23:12,415 --> 00:23:14,246
Net flow. That's what absolutely. That's what I'm

642
00:23:14,246 --> 00:23:16,490
thinking. That loading? Wait. What are you logging

643
00:23:16,490 --> 00:23:19,299
through? Logging 4? What are you waiting?

644
00:23:19,834 --> 00:23:22,700
Rad brought up failed ban? No. Yeah. This...

645
00:23:23,273 --> 00:23:25,187
Is this multiple login attempts or is this

646
00:23:25,187 --> 00:23:28,218
just like, 1 berry mel form login a

647
00:23:28,218 --> 00:23:30,291
attempt? I think it's not login a attempt.

648
00:23:30,530 --> 00:23:32,285
I think it just it's an connection at

649
00:23:32,285 --> 00:23:33,416
attempt. Yeah. So...

650
00:23:34,691 --> 00:23:36,045
So I'm trying to think about how you

651
00:23:36,045 --> 00:23:38,139
would build the detection logic for 1 log

652
00:23:38,356 --> 00:23:41,474
long network connection. Right? And I I will

653
00:23:41,474 --> 00:23:43,300
definitely tell you that's not, like something that

654
00:23:43,380 --> 00:23:45,286
I have ever built. Well, I don't think

655
00:23:45,286 --> 00:23:47,191
I long next... Or is it just like

656
00:23:47,191 --> 00:23:50,311
not long. It's many, many, many repeated over

657
00:23:50,311 --> 00:23:52,143
a long period of even. Even then if

658
00:23:52,143 --> 00:23:53,816
it's hanging off the Internet. Right, like, most

659
00:23:53,816 --> 00:23:55,251
stuff hanging off the Internet, I'm not gonna

660
00:23:55,251 --> 00:23:57,481
like, hopefully, I'm not gonna really care as

661
00:23:57,481 --> 00:23:59,810
much if these connections are coming in because

662
00:23:59,810 --> 00:24:01,965
you're hoping like, firewalls were block. You're gonna

663
00:24:01,965 --> 00:24:03,641
expect it to be scanned by a fire

664
00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:07,240
by the Internet. Yeah. Yeah. But I thought...

665
00:24:07,398 --> 00:24:09,460
Yeah. You don't we have association open the

666
00:24:09,697 --> 00:24:11,521
Internet anyway, Like, anything with them. Yeah. Nothing

667
00:24:11,521 --> 00:24:13,582
with Mfa Right? So... No 1 would do

668
00:24:13,582 --> 00:24:14,734
that. On bernstein

669
00:24:15,515 --> 00:24:17,434
bureau away from me. Now you're taking away

670
00:24:17,914 --> 00:24:20,075
Ssh. What's your head left, man? You get...

671
00:24:20,234 --> 00:24:21,755
You could use Rd p You're fine. Alright?

672
00:24:21,914 --> 00:24:24,247
You're so fast on. Just wanted out the

673
00:24:24,247 --> 00:24:24,646
something.

674
00:24:25,205 --> 00:24:27,523
Yeah. Now Love me and children.

675
00:24:28,801 --> 00:24:31,131
I think the maybe the use case for

676
00:24:31,131 --> 00:24:33,523
this will be, like, Iot and other...

677
00:24:34,559 --> 00:24:35,994
Like, we see a lot of our customers

678
00:24:35,994 --> 00:24:37,669
in... With Cp. We see customers that have,

679
00:24:37,828 --> 00:24:40,557
like, Isp network telecom gear that just they

680
00:24:40,557 --> 00:24:42,395
can't touch and it's just in their networks

681
00:24:42,395 --> 00:24:44,472
and, you know, that it can't be updated

682
00:24:44,472 --> 00:24:46,962
or easily or... Like, edge case. I don't

683
00:24:46,962 --> 00:24:49,189
think anyone's, like, core firewalls are gonna be

684
00:24:49,189 --> 00:24:51,257
vulnerable to this, but... Yeah.

685
00:24:52,451 --> 00:24:55,094
Nope. Alright. The the story that I really,

686
00:24:55,253 --> 00:24:57,724
really, really wanna get to is the Sis

687
00:24:57,724 --> 00:25:00,992
most critical open source projects not using memory

688
00:25:00,992 --> 00:25:03,800
save code. This is the most anticipated rant

689
00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:05,796
of the day. I am going to jump

690
00:25:05,796 --> 00:25:07,553
all over this. This is 1 of the

691
00:25:07,553 --> 00:25:09,709
dumbest effing things I have ever seen.

692
00:25:10,746 --> 00:25:11,385
Full stop.

693
00:25:12,358 --> 00:25:15,070
On the Internet. III know that some people

694
00:25:15,070 --> 00:25:17,065
put a lot of effort into this, you

695
00:25:17,065 --> 00:25:18,820
wasted a tremendous amount of time.

696
00:25:20,190 --> 00:25:21,863
You might as well just be putting out

697
00:25:21,863 --> 00:25:23,935
there. Oh, my god. Code written by humans

698
00:25:23,935 --> 00:25:24,754
has vulnerabilities.

699
00:25:25,768 --> 00:25:26,803
And, you know, you know,

700
00:25:27,520 --> 00:25:28,716
this is 1 of those things that comes

701
00:25:28,716 --> 00:25:29,369
up you know,

702
00:25:30,647 --> 00:25:32,006
I... I've been doing this a long... I

703
00:25:32,006 --> 00:25:33,044
think I say that a lot. I think

704
00:25:33,044 --> 00:25:34,163
there should be a super cut of every

705
00:25:34,163 --> 00:25:35,681
time I've said. I've been doing this a

706
00:25:35,681 --> 00:25:36,240
long time.

707
00:25:36,814 --> 00:25:39,285
And I remember whenever... But this is a

708
00:25:39,285 --> 00:25:41,119
long long time ago, people were, like, you

709
00:25:41,119 --> 00:25:42,177
should use Java

710
00:25:43,750 --> 00:25:46,552
because Java does garbage collection properly. You don't

711
00:25:46,552 --> 00:25:48,165
have to worry about memory vulnerabilities

712
00:25:48,778 --> 00:25:50,289
underneath the hood in Java.

713
00:25:50,925 --> 00:25:51,425
And

714
00:25:51,799 --> 00:25:54,264
if you look inside this article, they actually

715
00:25:54,264 --> 00:25:54,764
reference

716
00:25:55,234 --> 00:25:57,734
Java is 1 of the coding languages

717
00:25:58,275 --> 00:26:00,835
that is a good coding language that people

718
00:26:00,835 --> 00:26:03,406
should be using. Right? Like right there. Other

719
00:26:03,406 --> 00:26:06,901
languages like Go Java C Python, manage memory

720
00:26:06,901 --> 00:26:07,219
through

721
00:26:07,934 --> 00:26:10,953
garbage collection, automatically reclaiming freed memory.

722
00:26:11,604 --> 00:26:13,517
And they immediately flip around and then they

723
00:26:13,517 --> 00:26:16,387
say memory unsafe languages, and they say examples

724
00:26:16,387 --> 00:26:18,381
of these are C c plus plus objective

725
00:26:18,381 --> 00:26:18,540
c,

726
00:26:19,417 --> 00:26:19,917
assembly

727
00:26:21,025 --> 00:26:24,070
like, what the living hell? Like, oh, god.

728
00:26:24,366 --> 00:26:26,991
Oh, jeez. Okay. No no writing and assembly

729
00:26:26,991 --> 00:26:30,193
allows anymore. An assembly allowed. Roller coaster Ty

730
00:26:30,193 --> 00:26:32,664
is banned from the corporate environment. Done. Done.

731
00:26:32,903 --> 00:26:34,976
No roller close to fight ty on this.

732
00:26:35,470 --> 00:26:37,070
And I'm sure that there's somebody, like I

733
00:26:37,070 --> 00:26:38,589
said, they put a lot of effort into

734
00:26:38,589 --> 00:26:39,490
this, but

735
00:26:39,869 --> 00:26:42,269
this is dumb for so many reasons. Right?

736
00:26:42,523 --> 00:26:44,110
And they even mention in that that there

737
00:26:44,110 --> 00:26:46,410
are certain languages that you have to use

738
00:26:46,410 --> 00:26:48,949
for certain use cases for performance or specific

739
00:26:48,949 --> 00:26:51,747
use cases for application. But whenever you're going

740
00:26:51,747 --> 00:26:53,583
through and you're saying, oh, well, if something's

741
00:26:53,583 --> 00:26:56,217
written in c. Therefore it's inherently insecure from

742
00:26:56,217 --> 00:26:59,090
a memory perspective, here use Java,

743
00:26:59,743 --> 00:27:02,213
You just basically shut off, like 50 percent

744
00:27:02,213 --> 00:27:04,523
of the security community. Because let's be honest

745
00:27:04,523 --> 00:27:06,515
for a while, Java was having a security

746
00:27:06,515 --> 00:27:08,826
vulnerability, flat d code, U3D,

747
00:27:09,318 --> 00:27:12,183
all of these different compression decompression algorithms inside

748
00:27:12,183 --> 00:27:14,649
of Java, were just like blowing up with

749
00:27:14,649 --> 00:27:16,161
vulnerabilities all over the place.

750
00:27:16,814 --> 00:27:20,249
So this doesn't help anything. Right? This doesn't

751
00:27:20,249 --> 00:27:23,785
help anything at all. This is very similar

752
00:27:24,098 --> 00:27:25,921
to a number of years ago where somebody

753
00:27:25,921 --> 00:27:27,426
went through the Ssl libraries,

754
00:27:27,902 --> 00:27:29,249
and they did a code audit it, and

755
00:27:29,249 --> 00:27:30,542
they said, here's a whole bunch of vulnerabilities

756
00:27:30,676 --> 00:27:32,995
we discovered. And they didn't even bother talking

757
00:27:32,995 --> 00:27:35,063
to the people at Open Ssl that just

758
00:27:35,063 --> 00:27:37,211
kind of dropped them. Right? Just dropped it

759
00:27:37,211 --> 00:27:40,090
right on top of them. And III don't

760
00:27:40,090 --> 00:27:41,998
know what what's to take this. And seriously,

761
00:27:42,317 --> 00:27:43,930
if we're looking at this entire

762
00:27:44,305 --> 00:27:46,452
situation, what says should be spending its time

763
00:27:46,452 --> 00:27:46,612
on,

764
00:27:47,264 --> 00:27:49,758
Sis should literally be spending its time

765
00:27:50,136 --> 00:27:51,811
teaching people to patch their shit.

766
00:27:52,529 --> 00:27:54,205
And this includes Ci,

767
00:27:54,698 --> 00:27:56,209
because we have a story a little bit

768
00:27:56,209 --> 00:27:57,743
later about vulnerabilities

769
00:27:58,118 --> 00:28:00,346
that Sis got nailed with because they didn't

770
00:28:00,346 --> 00:28:02,591
get patched in time. So if we're trying

771
00:28:02,591 --> 00:28:03,867
to say, what are we going to focus

772
00:28:03,867 --> 00:28:06,021
on. Right? You have all these different things

773
00:28:06,021 --> 00:28:07,398
like let's say, speculative

774
00:28:07,855 --> 00:28:09,690
execution code attacks. We get all worked up

775
00:28:09,690 --> 00:28:12,814
over speculative execution attacks. And those are really

776
00:28:12,814 --> 00:28:15,363
ethane cool from a technical perspective, but it

777
00:28:15,363 --> 00:28:18,072
didn't move the needle ahead anywhere. Like no

778
00:28:18,072 --> 00:28:19,586
1 was like, well, I'm really glad that

779
00:28:19,586 --> 00:28:21,042
we got rid of all of the specter

780
00:28:21,273 --> 00:28:23,496
vulnerabilities that we have no No. No. No.

781
00:28:24,052 --> 00:28:25,981
Everyone got worked up over at what's nailing

782
00:28:26,276 --> 00:28:28,817
organizations is they're not patching their stuff.

783
00:28:29,389 --> 00:28:31,624
So now you have Sis come out and

784
00:28:31,624 --> 00:28:34,019
you start saying that, you know, literally thousands

785
00:28:34,019 --> 00:28:36,733
of organizations using critical software that's written in

786
00:28:36,892 --> 00:28:39,852
C c plus plus. Of course, they are.

787
00:28:40,169 --> 00:28:40,407
Right?

788
00:28:41,042 --> 00:28:43,502
And once again, I come back to, you're

789
00:28:43,502 --> 00:28:46,059
not helping because what's going to have and

790
00:28:46,059 --> 00:28:47,657
now is you're going to have a bunch

791
00:28:47,657 --> 00:28:48,557
of executives

792
00:28:48,935 --> 00:28:50,294
that are gonna go in they're gonna go

793
00:28:50,294 --> 00:28:51,492
to their It staff, and they're gonna say,

794
00:28:51,652 --> 00:28:53,250
yeah, we need to go through. Is anybody

795
00:28:53,250 --> 00:28:53,750
using

796
00:28:54,143 --> 00:28:55,122
c programs

797
00:28:55,898 --> 00:28:57,892
anywhere. And they're gonna go well, sir, yes.

798
00:28:58,052 --> 00:28:59,647
There... There's a number of us that are

799
00:28:59,647 --> 00:28:59,886
using.

800
00:29:00,843 --> 00:29:02,917
Programs written in see. We need to remove

801
00:29:02,917 --> 00:29:05,081
c because This is thing said that they're

802
00:29:05,081 --> 00:29:07,545
using unsafe memory. Where where is this? How

803
00:29:07,545 --> 00:29:08,896
do I get rid of it, sir, you're

804
00:29:08,896 --> 00:29:11,614
using windows. Windows is written at cease. Sir.

805
00:29:12,813 --> 00:29:14,172
We also... Well, let's get rid of Let's

806
00:29:14,172 --> 00:29:16,110
go to Linux then. No, sure. That's.

807
00:29:16,569 --> 00:29:18,088
That's said that's... There's a lot of c

808
00:29:18,088 --> 00:29:20,405
there too, sir, A lot of effing see.

809
00:29:20,645 --> 00:29:21,099
There's

810
00:29:21,460 --> 00:29:21,960
see

811
00:29:22,419 --> 00:29:24,500
everywhere because see is how computers work.

812
00:29:25,700 --> 00:29:26,900
So I I just think that this is

813
00:29:26,900 --> 00:29:28,980
just a waste of time and it's kind

814
00:29:28,980 --> 00:29:31,389
of, like, get back on track, Sis, Get

815
00:29:31,389 --> 00:29:32,984
back on track and trying to spread the

816
00:29:32,984 --> 00:29:34,978
good word about patching, trying to spread the

817
00:29:34,978 --> 00:29:37,769
good word about core security practices and really

818
00:29:37,769 --> 00:29:38,886
try to get us back to where we

819
00:29:38,886 --> 00:29:40,416
need to be. Because the more you start

820
00:29:40,416 --> 00:29:42,729
doing shit like this, the more you're gonna

821
00:29:42,729 --> 00:29:44,563
have people start tuning you out and stop

822
00:29:44,563 --> 00:29:45,361
listening to you.

823
00:29:46,397 --> 00:29:48,710
Oh my god. Totally right. We monthly this.

824
00:29:49,124 --> 00:29:50,875
We need to clip this, Ryan go to

825
00:29:50,875 --> 00:29:52,308
the link I sent you go to page

826
00:29:52,308 --> 00:29:54,877
20. We are gonna send it to Sis

827
00:29:55,173 --> 00:29:56,049
at this email.

828
00:29:57,179 --> 00:29:59,595
For feedback on this. I'm gonna release contact

829
00:29:59,893 --> 00:30:02,607
secured by design at sis DIS dot gov.

830
00:30:03,086 --> 00:30:05,241
Yeah. See I wanna mean official response.

831
00:30:06,134 --> 00:30:07,974
I'm a more serious note net though. I

832
00:30:08,055 --> 00:30:09,494
I will say, I I think, you know,

833
00:30:10,455 --> 00:30:12,134
it's a good example of, like, the top

834
00:30:12,134 --> 00:30:14,134
down governmental. Like, we have an objective and

835
00:30:14,134 --> 00:30:15,585
we're just gonna march towards that thing. Because

836
00:30:15,585 --> 00:30:16,697
if you look, like, this is big thing

837
00:30:16,697 --> 00:30:17,889
right now as this a whole secure by

838
00:30:17,889 --> 00:30:19,399
design initiative. Like, that's been the thing since

839
00:30:19,399 --> 00:30:21,465
like October, and everything is going against that.

840
00:30:21,624 --> 00:30:22,657
And so, like, where are they putting the

841
00:30:22,657 --> 00:30:24,983
month, their energy. It's secure by design. Like,

842
00:30:25,063 --> 00:30:26,342
whatever the hell that means to them. And

843
00:30:26,342 --> 00:30:27,780
so, like, this is clearly 1 of those.

844
00:30:27,940 --> 00:30:29,778
Right? It's like, oh, this thing is unsecured

845
00:30:29,778 --> 00:30:31,057
because it's written in a certain language.

846
00:30:31,696 --> 00:30:34,829
And, like, I guarantee III

847
00:30:34,829 --> 00:30:37,069
guarantee there's a bunch of Phds behind this

848
00:30:37,069 --> 00:30:37,730
that have

849
00:30:38,029 --> 00:30:40,509
in on an enterprise environment ever in their

850
00:30:40,509 --> 00:30:42,829
lives. Right. Yeah. It just re of theory

851
00:30:42,829 --> 00:30:43,285
where

852
00:30:43,805 --> 00:30:46,684
Yes. III think maybe can maybe they should

853
00:30:46,684 --> 00:30:49,325
be, reminded that whatever they used to go

854
00:30:49,325 --> 00:30:50,605
ahead and write up this report.

855
00:30:51,259 --> 00:30:52,138
Was written in sea.

856
00:30:53,816 --> 00:30:56,532
You're saying Latex is it... Yeah. And I

857
00:30:56,532 --> 00:30:59,345
to read and Mike, Mike. Let's not forget

858
00:30:59,345 --> 00:31:01,745
that the protocol stack that transmitted across the

859
00:31:01,985 --> 00:31:04,705
Internet? Also written in see. No.

860
00:31:05,265 --> 00:31:07,439
No. It was. Yeah. The firmware on switching

861
00:31:07,439 --> 00:31:09,596
on that router. At in sincere. I, I...

862
00:31:09,836 --> 00:31:11,993
There's gonna be c there. Jackie. Yeah. I

863
00:31:11,993 --> 00:31:13,991
mean, the threes John so worked up about

864
00:31:13,991 --> 00:31:17,192
this and any, like, person security team member

865
00:31:17,192 --> 00:31:18,782
would be too is because it bur the

866
00:31:18,782 --> 00:31:21,644
lead on real threat. Yes. I mean, or

867
00:31:21,644 --> 00:31:24,108
there's no data that I could find easily

868
00:31:24,108 --> 00:31:27,008
that says, this percentage of vulnerabilities is memory

869
00:31:27,065 --> 00:31:29,768
corruption. This percentage of big breaches was memory

870
00:31:29,768 --> 00:31:31,676
corruption related, but I did some kind of

871
00:31:31,676 --> 00:31:33,744
off offhand research I did that end day

872
00:31:33,744 --> 00:31:34,221
podcast.

873
00:31:34,712 --> 00:31:36,299
That her webcast I did for Black Hills

874
00:31:36,299 --> 00:31:39,313
a couple months ago and like, most big

875
00:31:39,313 --> 00:31:41,479
vulnerabilities we see are not

876
00:31:41,789 --> 00:31:44,505
memory corruption. Most big breaches are not the

877
00:31:44,505 --> 00:31:46,822
result of memory corruption, especially not if we

878
00:31:46,822 --> 00:31:49,074
look at, like, a year rolling window, Let's

879
00:31:49,074 --> 00:31:50,992
think about the last 4 big we've talked

880
00:31:50,992 --> 00:31:52,749
about or even the ones we're talking about

881
00:31:52,749 --> 00:31:55,806
today. Social engineering, patch management.

882
00:31:56,999 --> 00:31:59,875
Business logic flaws. Actually like it's it doesn't

883
00:31:59,875 --> 00:32:01,473
matter what language you write it in. If

884
00:32:01,633 --> 00:32:02,912
I can pick up the phone and reset

885
00:32:02,912 --> 00:32:04,565
the It admins help desk

886
00:32:05,720 --> 00:32:08,189
Mfa tokens. I don't care what language I'm

887
00:32:08,189 --> 00:32:10,579
using to do that. It's gonna work. This

888
00:32:10,579 --> 00:32:12,252
is what what gets me. Like, you know,

889
00:32:12,411 --> 00:32:13,628
our problem is

890
00:32:14,577 --> 00:32:17,605
we're so far behind, like, let's get see

891
00:32:17,605 --> 00:32:20,314
out of our lives. We're so far away

892
00:32:20,314 --> 00:32:22,799
from getting to that. And... Oh, m mfa.

893
00:32:23,038 --> 00:32:25,191
Thank you. Good God. M mfa. Can we

894
00:32:25,191 --> 00:32:27,263
actually get that a hundred and 10 percent.

895
00:32:27,582 --> 00:32:29,097
No. Says it doesn't care about that. It's

896
00:32:29,097 --> 00:32:31,260
not written Rust. But it's not written in

897
00:32:31,260 --> 00:32:33,404
the last seas is for a computer.

898
00:32:34,278 --> 00:32:36,184
But when we're looking at this type of

899
00:32:36,184 --> 00:32:37,932
stuff, Thanks Exchange. They really need to be

900
00:32:37,932 --> 00:32:40,490
doing more out outreach. Like, how do you

901
00:32:40,490 --> 00:32:42,002
get to the people that don't even know

902
00:32:42,002 --> 00:32:43,753
what Sis stands for? That don't know what

903
00:32:43,912 --> 00:32:46,458
Ci is. You know, what... How do we

904
00:32:46,458 --> 00:32:48,948
start reaching these people that aren't even securing

905
00:32:49,259 --> 00:32:52,763
their systems. Like, seriously. That's what their initiatives

906
00:32:52,763 --> 00:32:54,356
should be doing out there. They should be

907
00:32:54,356 --> 00:32:57,223
going town to town, setting up big pizza

908
00:32:57,223 --> 00:32:57,723
gatherings

909
00:32:58,193 --> 00:33:00,422
handing out beer and just saying, hey, can

910
00:33:00,422 --> 00:33:01,695
we talk to you a little bit about

911
00:33:01,695 --> 00:33:04,560
our Lord and savior computer security and really

912
00:33:04,560 --> 00:33:06,888
try to get the word out there as

913
00:33:06,888 --> 00:33:09,446
much as we can rather than having people

914
00:33:09,446 --> 00:33:11,204
go through and say, you know what? I

915
00:33:11,204 --> 00:33:13,442
found out, things written and see can have

916
00:33:13,442 --> 00:33:14,261
memory vulnerabilities.

917
00:33:14,640 --> 00:33:17,042
It's like, yeah. Thank you. Yeah. And I

918
00:33:17,042 --> 00:33:18,867
will say, like, to be clear, I don't

919
00:33:18,867 --> 00:33:21,090
think any of us are against secure by

920
00:33:21,090 --> 00:33:23,947
design. It's just if you prioritize that, it's

921
00:33:23,947 --> 00:33:25,866
number 8 on your list of 10 things

922
00:33:25,866 --> 00:33:28,484
that security should care about. And prioritize by,

923
00:33:28,643 --> 00:33:28,881
like,

924
00:33:29,515 --> 00:33:32,950
real risk. Yeah. No like, and 9 ish

925
00:33:32,950 --> 00:33:35,264
sharks and 10 clouds. That's how low it

926
00:33:35,264 --> 00:33:35,743
is.

927
00:33:36,541 --> 00:33:39,346
It's... Yeah. It's just not that it's shouldn't

928
00:33:39,346 --> 00:33:40,695
be on people's radar and I agree with

929
00:33:40,775 --> 00:33:42,681
John that, like, part of Sci job is

930
00:33:42,681 --> 00:33:45,063
to cut through all the noise and give

931
00:33:45,063 --> 00:33:46,492
a little bit of signal on. Hey.

932
00:33:47,464 --> 00:33:47,964
K.

933
00:33:48,423 --> 00:33:50,900
This is known exploited vulnerability. You should patch

934
00:33:50,900 --> 00:33:53,298
this now. Not Just like... Yeah. But I

935
00:33:53,298 --> 00:33:54,816
got a question. This what happens when they

936
00:33:54,816 --> 00:33:57,387
start getting budget. Like, you know, and Sis

937
00:33:57,387 --> 00:33:59,222
has done some amazing things. Let's just kind

938
00:33:59,222 --> 00:34:01,058
of focus on on this here. Sis has

939
00:34:01,058 --> 00:34:03,133
done a lot of amazing things. But do

940
00:34:03,133 --> 00:34:05,384
they get budget? They're, like, Yeah. Let's start

941
00:34:05,384 --> 00:34:06,984
throwing it at the. Like, is this what

942
00:34:06,984 --> 00:34:09,545
happens when Phds and Bureau start taking over

943
00:34:09,545 --> 00:34:10,105
the process.

944
00:34:10,664 --> 00:34:12,598
I think that's a great research project. I

945
00:34:12,598 --> 00:34:15,143
think it's cool. I think Ci just doesn't

946
00:34:15,143 --> 00:34:17,689
have a good way of everything they release,

947
00:34:18,007 --> 00:34:20,253
feels like it's a... Hey. Cis. Go read

948
00:34:20,253 --> 00:34:22,168
this right now and respond and react. I

949
00:34:22,328 --> 00:34:24,084
I think they need maybe an angle to

950
00:34:24,084 --> 00:34:27,198
publish research, and, you know, like, instead of

951
00:34:27,198 --> 00:34:29,525
it being uni initiative, Why can't it just

952
00:34:29,525 --> 00:34:31,673
be, hey, here's a research paper? Kinda like

953
00:34:31,673 --> 00:34:34,061
how science works. And scientists who publish research

954
00:34:34,061 --> 00:34:35,811
papers aren't like, and by the way,

955
00:34:36,542 --> 00:34:38,529
go to your doctor right now and ask

956
00:34:38,529 --> 00:34:40,357
for Crispr whatever. Like, that's not a thing.

957
00:34:40,516 --> 00:34:42,026
They're just like, hey, we did the thing.

958
00:34:42,184 --> 00:34:43,217
We did an analysis.

959
00:34:43,694 --> 00:34:44,489
Here was the results.

960
00:34:45,458 --> 00:34:46,731
Deal with it what you will instead of

961
00:34:46,731 --> 00:34:49,117
it being an initiative. Oh, hey, Push this.

962
00:34:49,594 --> 00:34:51,742
Do this. It's just like a, here's the

963
00:34:51,742 --> 00:34:54,138
research. Is is there anybody else like, really

964
00:34:54,138 --> 00:34:56,756
po and secured by design? Though? Right? Like,

965
00:34:57,073 --> 00:35:00,182
I I vendor out there? Every vendor, but

966
00:35:00,262 --> 00:35:02,009
I've seen like Sis hitting on this so

967
00:35:02,009 --> 00:35:04,470
hard, Very very hot... Like, I don't see

968
00:35:04,470 --> 00:35:06,454
it as much anyway, like, I feel like

969
00:35:06,454 --> 00:35:08,201
it's a topic that's not as talked about.

970
00:35:08,614 --> 00:35:09,890
At least at least in my point of

971
00:35:09,890 --> 00:35:11,883
view very much, so they're just trying to

972
00:35:11,883 --> 00:35:13,797
catch eyes with this and, like, you come

973
00:35:13,797 --> 00:35:15,471
in for the secure by design, but you

974
00:35:15,471 --> 00:35:16,986
stay for the Mfa paper that we write

975
00:35:16,986 --> 00:35:19,411
later. Like, that guess. But

976
00:35:20,104 --> 00:35:23,206
that important. That's it's backward. Yeah. It's backwards,

977
00:35:23,365 --> 00:35:25,452
but the thing is if If you're pounding

978
00:35:25,452 --> 00:35:26,968
this type of stuff where you're trying to

979
00:35:26,968 --> 00:35:28,325
get the Cis to buy and at least

980
00:35:28,325 --> 00:35:29,841
to sis a little bit even though it

981
00:35:29,841 --> 00:35:31,437
is the wrong thing. I'm playing totally playing

982
00:35:31,437 --> 00:35:32,369
devil's advocate here

983
00:35:33,687 --> 00:35:34,586
John getting

984
00:35:35,682 --> 00:35:37,997
that much is evident. Right? John is like,

985
00:35:38,795 --> 00:35:39,934
I do. I'm.

986
00:35:40,472 --> 00:35:42,164
I look at it, like, We got you

987
00:35:42,164 --> 00:35:44,885
hooked on fentanyl. Now have some broccoli. Peter

988
00:35:44,965 --> 00:35:45,925
Yeah. Yeah.

989
00:35:46,644 --> 00:35:49,445
Hey. Go redesign all your code. The the

990
00:35:49,445 --> 00:35:51,454
tech debt bill is a hundred billion dollars.

991
00:35:51,614 --> 00:35:53,685
Good luck, but don't worry about patch management.

992
00:35:53,924 --> 00:35:55,995
Don't worry about Mfa. All that stuff is

993
00:35:55,995 --> 00:35:57,828
low grade. What you need to do is

994
00:35:57,828 --> 00:36:00,233
write everything in rust. Maybe this you know,

995
00:36:00,792 --> 00:36:02,547
to make the science analogy a little bit

996
00:36:02,547 --> 00:36:04,702
further? Is this like the the paper that

997
00:36:04,702 --> 00:36:07,748
says, Pepsi cures cancer sponsored by Pep or

998
00:36:07,748 --> 00:36:09,521
whatever, Like, is that what it is like

999
00:36:09,976 --> 00:36:12,681
times. Right? So... Yeah. And and and look,

1000
00:36:12,840 --> 00:36:14,670
you you know, if I'm sitting around at

1001
00:36:14,670 --> 00:36:16,341
at a conference God helped me. I'm out

1002
00:36:16,341 --> 00:36:18,767
at night talking computer security at a conference

1003
00:36:19,302 --> 00:36:21,530
anymore. I've done that. I paid my epic

1004
00:36:21,530 --> 00:36:21,769
dues.

1005
00:36:22,406 --> 00:36:24,396
This is a great conversation between a bunch

1006
00:36:24,396 --> 00:36:26,475
of security people to have about which coding

1007
00:36:26,475 --> 00:36:27,665
language the most secure.

1008
00:36:28,935 --> 00:36:31,713
Actually, no. Those languages suck, avoid them. Don't

1009
00:36:31,713 --> 00:36:33,634
ever get in them. Don't party with people

1010
00:36:33,634 --> 00:36:36,106
that have those types of conversations because it

1011
00:36:36,106 --> 00:36:38,100
doesn't matter. At the end of the day,

1012
00:36:38,260 --> 00:36:39,855
the only thing that matters whenever you're looking

1013
00:36:39,855 --> 00:36:41,849
at security with a coding language is who's

1014
00:36:41,849 --> 00:36:42,726
writing that code.

1015
00:36:43,539 --> 00:36:45,134
And, you know, what... You can write secure

1016
00:36:45,214 --> 00:36:46,969
Python. You can write secure c. You can

1017
00:36:46,969 --> 00:36:48,963
write secure c plus plus objective c. You

1018
00:36:48,963 --> 00:36:50,877
can write it in rust. Yes. There are

1019
00:36:50,877 --> 00:36:53,110
certain languages that give you better guard rails

1020
00:36:53,110 --> 00:36:55,030
for protect yourself. But whenever you're looking at

1021
00:36:55,189 --> 00:36:55,689
Ide

1022
00:36:56,062 --> 00:36:58,125
today, and a lot of the compile, whenever

1023
00:36:58,125 --> 00:36:59,632
you're trying to use something like Get ace

1024
00:36:59,632 --> 00:37:00,639
or get or

1025
00:37:01,480 --> 00:37:03,639
string copy, a string copy, all of these

1026
00:37:03,639 --> 00:37:05,960
different things. A lot of the modern compile

1027
00:37:05,960 --> 00:37:07,319
will tell you flat out as soon as

1028
00:37:07,319 --> 00:37:08,519
you do something stupid,

1029
00:37:09,014 --> 00:37:12,051
Don't do that stupid thing. Like you literally

1030
00:37:12,051 --> 00:37:13,809
have to go out of your way to

1031
00:37:13,809 --> 00:37:16,147
make these vulnerabilities in a lot of modern

1032
00:37:16,206 --> 00:37:17,325
development environments.

1033
00:37:17,978 --> 00:37:20,520
So yes, you absolutely have some coding languages

1034
00:37:20,520 --> 00:37:22,189
that are better at handling into the data.

1035
00:37:22,427 --> 00:37:23,936
But I go back to the java thing.

1036
00:37:24,096 --> 00:37:26,734
For years, everyone was saying things like Well,

1037
00:37:26,973 --> 00:37:30,081
Java secure, that was wrong. Oh, it's in

1038
00:37:30,081 --> 00:37:32,154
the paper. In the paper, they say memory

1039
00:37:32,234 --> 00:37:33,668
Safe language languages is like Java. I mean,

1040
00:37:33,748 --> 00:37:35,597
it's like, it's right there. I mean, I

1041
00:37:35,677 --> 00:37:36,576
I also think

1042
00:37:37,192 --> 00:37:38,468
to kind of, like, I think this... They

1043
00:37:38,468 --> 00:37:39,744
could have been a little bit better if

1044
00:37:39,744 --> 00:37:42,137
they had given, like, I do agree with

1045
00:37:42,137 --> 00:37:44,210
the logic, like, if you writing something from

1046
00:37:44,210 --> 00:37:46,222
scratch. If you are starting a new coding

1047
00:37:46,222 --> 00:37:48,060
project today and you're doing it in see,

1048
00:37:48,380 --> 00:37:50,697
I would be like, but why? Rust is

1049
00:37:50,697 --> 00:37:52,935
in the windows Rust is in the Windows

1050
00:37:52,935 --> 00:37:55,183
kernel Rust is an Linux kernel. Yep. There's...

1051
00:37:55,503 --> 00:37:57,895
Like, if you're starting something from scratch, I

1052
00:37:57,895 --> 00:37:59,650
do agree, But that wasn't the angle. The

1053
00:37:59,650 --> 00:38:01,324
angle is. Here's a bunch of open source

1054
00:38:01,324 --> 00:38:03,493
projects, And also let's talk about Who does

1055
00:38:03,493 --> 00:38:05,645
the work on open source projects? Not Ci.

1056
00:38:06,044 --> 00:38:08,755
It's after hours developers that are busting their

1057
00:38:08,755 --> 00:38:10,668
butts, so do this stuff for, like, the

1058
00:38:10,668 --> 00:38:12,671
common and good. Like, they're not like, oh,

1059
00:38:12,751 --> 00:38:14,260
great. Now I have to rewrite and rust.

1060
00:38:14,419 --> 00:38:17,438
Thank God. I'm gonna rewrite the Tcp Protocol

1061
00:38:17,438 --> 00:38:19,185
stack for Bs and what. Yeah.

1062
00:38:20,234 --> 00:38:21,672
Which may have already been done. Those People

1063
00:38:21,672 --> 00:38:23,510
at Bs are weird, but we love them.

1064
00:38:24,789 --> 00:38:26,866
But Charles you know just to fix this,

1065
00:38:27,026 --> 00:38:28,636
like, and I would wanna fix I don't

1066
00:38:28,636 --> 00:38:29,824
wanna say that because I hate that. I

1067
00:38:29,824 --> 00:38:30,855
talk to people all the time they're like,

1068
00:38:31,013 --> 00:38:32,994
I've got a security solution that's gonna solve

1069
00:38:32,994 --> 00:38:35,291
all security problems. Through a mathematical formula.

1070
00:38:35,623 --> 00:38:37,925
And my eyes glass over, and I start

1071
00:38:37,925 --> 00:38:40,147
remembering nursery rhymes from Sesame Street when I

1072
00:38:40,147 --> 00:38:42,527
was 8. But whenever I'm looking at these

1073
00:38:42,527 --> 00:38:44,765
things really what I would recommend is we

1074
00:38:44,765 --> 00:38:47,307
focus on the compile. Where are the compile

1075
00:38:47,307 --> 00:38:49,054
for the code that people are using? The

1076
00:38:49,133 --> 00:38:52,334
Ide ease and, like, really focusing on them

1077
00:38:52,644 --> 00:38:54,560
having the warnings, like, you know, hey, you're

1078
00:38:54,560 --> 00:38:56,556
you're using this function and see. This is

1079
00:38:56,556 --> 00:38:58,312
the right way to do it. Because those

1080
00:38:58,312 --> 00:38:59,908
are gonna be the gateway to actually getting

1081
00:38:59,908 --> 00:39:01,185
that compiled code down.

1082
00:39:02,156 --> 00:39:04,145
I think it's much easier to do that

1083
00:39:04,145 --> 00:39:05,577
than it is trying to say, well, we

1084
00:39:05,577 --> 00:39:07,645
need to strip out all coding languages and

1085
00:39:07,645 --> 00:39:08,202
start over.

1086
00:39:09,333 --> 00:39:12,125
God, Brian's dropping the Os I model is

1087
00:39:12,125 --> 00:39:13,163
in rust. Thank you.

1088
00:39:14,599 --> 00:39:14,838
But

1089
00:39:16,609 --> 00:39:18,526
He's trying to trigger me, man. I'm already

1090
00:39:18,526 --> 00:39:20,524
pissed about this. And and I think the

1091
00:39:20,524 --> 00:39:22,202
reason why I'm so mad about this is

1092
00:39:22,361 --> 00:39:24,532
I've seen this before. Every time there's a

1093
00:39:24,532 --> 00:39:26,445
new coding language, it comes up that everyone

1094
00:39:26,445 --> 00:39:28,599
should use that coding language because it's inherently

1095
00:39:28,599 --> 00:39:30,035
more secure and they're gonna not gonna have

1096
00:39:30,035 --> 00:39:32,587
any security vulnerabilities, and we still have lots

1097
00:39:32,587 --> 00:39:35,226
of exploits happen. We're missing the point. We're

1098
00:39:35,226 --> 00:39:37,449
missing what the center masses is and information

1099
00:39:37,449 --> 00:39:39,512
security for you. Yeah. It's... I mean, even

1100
00:39:39,512 --> 00:39:41,893
in the even in the code security space,

1101
00:39:42,052 --> 00:39:42,425
it's

1102
00:39:42,864 --> 00:39:44,382
oftentimes visit logic flaws,

1103
00:39:45,261 --> 00:39:47,738
authentication, and improper authentication. Like, it's not always

1104
00:39:47,738 --> 00:39:50,615
just memory corruption. Yes. Memory corruption can lead

1105
00:39:50,615 --> 00:39:53,922
to huge bot and worms and stuff. But

1106
00:39:54,299 --> 00:39:54,857
overall, like,

1107
00:39:55,655 --> 00:39:57,409
it's... You know, we talk about layered defenses

1108
00:39:57,409 --> 00:39:58,925
for a reason. Like, you should expect your

1109
00:39:58,925 --> 00:40:00,853
code to be insecure and still operate. Right?

1110
00:40:01,012 --> 00:40:01,727
Like... Mh.

1111
00:40:02,918 --> 00:40:04,745
Anyway. Alright. So getting back to old things,

1112
00:40:04,904 --> 00:40:07,049
there was another vulnerability, the 4... What is

1113
00:40:07,049 --> 00:40:10,226
it Forte, file catalyst workflow sequel injection flaw.

1114
00:40:11,194 --> 00:40:13,813
And I think that this is another example

1115
00:40:13,813 --> 00:40:16,987
of, like, a vulnerability category that just refuses

1116
00:40:16,987 --> 00:40:18,733
to die. It's a vulnerability class.

1117
00:40:19,860 --> 00:40:21,452
I was at a conference a couple of

1118
00:40:21,452 --> 00:40:23,520
weeks ago, and I was teaching some stuff,

1119
00:40:23,599 --> 00:40:25,827
and I brought up web application security testing.

1120
00:40:26,478 --> 00:40:27,591
And how to

1121
00:40:28,148 --> 00:40:30,692
how to get started learning web application security

1122
00:40:30,692 --> 00:40:32,838
assessments. And I was talking about... I think

1123
00:40:32,838 --> 00:40:33,952
it was damn vulnerable linux.

1124
00:40:34,603 --> 00:40:36,112
And 1 of the students was like, yeah.

1125
00:40:36,271 --> 00:40:38,099
Well, I noticed that their sequel injection in

1126
00:40:38,099 --> 00:40:39,609
here. He was polite. He did it afterwards.

1127
00:40:40,007 --> 00:40:42,470
And he said, sequel injection is solved. Isn't

1128
00:40:42,470 --> 00:40:42,629
it?

1129
00:40:43,599 --> 00:40:45,357
And it's like god,

1130
00:40:46,076 --> 00:40:47,034
no. It's not solved.

1131
00:40:47,993 --> 00:40:50,364
These vulnerabilities still exist. They

1132
00:40:50,802 --> 00:40:53,192
still exist in a major way. I actually

1133
00:40:53,192 --> 00:40:54,545
think of in all of our new stories,

1134
00:40:54,704 --> 00:40:56,877
I think there's 2 sequel injection vulnerabilities

1135
00:40:57,332 --> 00:40:58,686
in the new stories that exist.

1136
00:40:59,338 --> 00:41:01,400
So, yes, this is an example of how

1137
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:03,463
these types of vulnerabilities continue to persist. And

1138
00:41:03,463 --> 00:41:06,082
this vulnerability is not an issue in insane.

1139
00:41:06,573 --> 00:41:08,005
This is a vulnerability in the way that

1140
00:41:08,005 --> 00:41:10,333
the application was built the way it's passing

1141
00:41:10,787 --> 00:41:12,457
that those variables that you get from the

1142
00:41:12,457 --> 00:41:14,500
web server back to the back end data

1143
00:41:14,699 --> 00:41:16,139
There was a a vulnerability in 1 of

1144
00:41:16,139 --> 00:41:18,139
the wear clauses where you could basically split

1145
00:41:18,139 --> 00:41:20,159
off and start executing more

1146
00:41:20,619 --> 00:41:20,940
code.

1147
00:41:22,954 --> 00:41:23,992
Standard sequel injection.

1148
00:41:25,191 --> 00:41:27,907
So, yeah, this is a file catalyst workflow

1149
00:41:27,907 --> 00:41:30,235
of vulnerable to sequel injection. Once again, old

1150
00:41:30,235 --> 00:41:32,218
is new. What's new is old. We just

1151
00:41:32,218 --> 00:41:34,519
keep repeating ourselves around and around and around

1152
00:41:34,519 --> 00:41:34,678
again.

1153
00:41:36,423 --> 00:41:38,753
Well, but 10 did sit on this 1

1154
00:41:38,753 --> 00:41:39,472
for quite a while.

1155
00:41:40,590 --> 00:41:42,828
They did finally release their exploit.

1156
00:41:43,467 --> 00:41:45,226
But I think it was well after file

1157
00:41:45,226 --> 00:41:47,154
catalyst had the patch.

1158
00:41:47,791 --> 00:41:49,404
Yeah. They did a nice little simultaneous

1159
00:41:49,938 --> 00:41:52,166
patch and, you know, they they posted a

1160
00:41:52,166 --> 00:41:54,633
bulletin and kind of release the exploit same

1161
00:41:54,633 --> 00:41:57,202
day. So of a nice little coordination. Yeah.

1162
00:41:57,442 --> 00:41:58,961
Then that's the way it should be. That's

1163
00:41:58,961 --> 00:42:00,639
the way we should work together. I'm hoping

1164
00:42:00,639 --> 00:42:01,918
it went well. I don't know anybody at

1165
00:42:01,997 --> 00:42:03,596
10 anymore, but I'm hoping it went well

1166
00:42:03,596 --> 00:42:04,075
on their side.

1167
00:42:04,889 --> 00:42:06,567
Those are 2 stories that I was really

1168
00:42:06,567 --> 00:42:08,725
wanted to talk about. I I think as

1169
00:42:08,725 --> 00:42:10,723
far as... And and and I've seen this

1170
00:42:10,723 --> 00:42:12,880
from other people the whole, I thought we'd

1171
00:42:12,880 --> 00:42:15,606
had fixed this. Years ago. Right? None of

1172
00:42:15,606 --> 00:42:17,279
it's actually been fixed. I mean, all you

1173
00:42:17,279 --> 00:42:19,111
have to do is look at the Top

1174
00:42:19,111 --> 00:42:22,218
10 and how infrequently it changes and how

1175
00:42:22,218 --> 00:42:25,262
much of stuff from 10:15 years ago are

1176
00:42:25,262 --> 00:42:27,654
still sitting in that top 10. Mh.

1177
00:42:28,850 --> 00:42:31,163
Never solved it. No, Mike, We have a

1178
00:42:31,163 --> 00:42:31,482
w.

1179
00:42:32,375 --> 00:42:33,014
Yeah. Right.

1180
00:42:33,574 --> 00:42:34,135
Oh, god.

1181
00:42:35,974 --> 00:42:37,494
John, there was an another of article you

1182
00:42:37,494 --> 00:42:39,835
wanted to talk about. Oh, yeah. This

1183
00:42:40,454 --> 00:42:43,030
korean. Yeah This is pretty gnarly. This is

1184
00:42:43,030 --> 00:42:43,829
an interesting 1.

1185
00:42:44,469 --> 00:42:46,630
This is really, really nasty. So,

1186
00:42:47,510 --> 00:42:49,750
there was some file sharing over bit to.

1187
00:42:50,562 --> 00:42:52,257
And it was using a tremendous

1188
00:42:52,634 --> 00:42:54,568
amount of data that this Isp

1189
00:42:55,103 --> 00:42:56,936
was very frustrated about. And it went up

1190
00:42:56,936 --> 00:42:58,449
to the courts in South Korea, and they

1191
00:42:58,449 --> 00:42:59,087
went back and forth.

1192
00:42:59,819 --> 00:43:00,695
And finally,

1193
00:43:01,651 --> 00:43:04,281
just basically, the court's ruled that Kt was

1194
00:43:04,281 --> 00:43:06,512
right that the company that was using this

1195
00:43:06,512 --> 00:43:08,743
bit warrant to do these files, syncs and

1196
00:43:08,743 --> 00:43:09,141
transfers.

1197
00:43:10,031 --> 00:43:12,178
Shouldn't be doing it without getting pay payments

1198
00:43:12,178 --> 00:43:13,053
back to Kt.

1199
00:43:13,451 --> 00:43:15,518
So Kt had a number of options that

1200
00:43:15,518 --> 00:43:18,381
they could choose. Right? They could have, you

1201
00:43:18,381 --> 00:43:21,108
know, just simply started blocking bit torrent. They

1202
00:43:21,108 --> 00:43:22,705
could have been blocked... Try to block the

1203
00:43:22,705 --> 00:43:23,903
specific type of bit torrent,

1204
00:43:24,782 --> 00:43:26,700
from the traffic that was being generated for

1205
00:43:26,700 --> 00:43:29,175
it. They could have employed sharks. They could

1206
00:43:29,175 --> 00:43:31,157
have gotten some clowns. They could have done

1207
00:43:31,157 --> 00:43:33,059
a number of different things. But they skipped

1208
00:43:33,059 --> 00:43:35,137
over all of those logical things. And they

1209
00:43:35,137 --> 00:43:38,244
went straight into infecting the users that were

1210
00:43:38,244 --> 00:43:40,394
using this service with malware.

1211
00:43:41,031 --> 00:43:43,341
And on some of the computer systems, they

1212
00:43:43,341 --> 00:43:44,866
nuke those systems as well.

1213
00:43:45,502 --> 00:43:47,011
So they basically right here, it says it

1214
00:43:47,011 --> 00:43:49,871
nuke grid service users with malware. Unfortunately, most

1215
00:43:49,871 --> 00:43:52,389
of them were individuals not business corporations to

1216
00:43:52,510 --> 00:43:54,529
and they had no idea

1217
00:43:54,909 --> 00:43:56,829
what was going on. A moved to send

1218
00:43:56,829 --> 00:43:59,309
and install Malware on hundreds of thousands of

1219
00:43:59,309 --> 00:44:02,385
grid services users, seems like a for a

1220
00:44:02,445 --> 00:44:04,525
financial move. And is it likely just wanted

1221
00:44:04,525 --> 00:44:07,005
to stop them from continually using the... What

1222
00:44:07,005 --> 00:44:09,485
is it? Web hard, bit torrent file sharing

1223
00:44:09,485 --> 00:44:12,043
service? But oh, my god. They went straight

1224
00:44:12,043 --> 00:44:13,391
to injecting malware.

1225
00:44:13,947 --> 00:44:14,264
And

1226
00:44:14,820 --> 00:44:16,803
this is what... They wrote a patch, and

1227
00:44:16,803 --> 00:44:18,311
then they were, like, you are being patched.

1228
00:44:18,643 --> 00:44:20,627
Please do not resist and they just deleted

1229
00:44:20,627 --> 00:44:21,365
the problem.

1230
00:44:21,896 --> 00:44:24,039
Oh, yeah. God. The the malware... I mean,

1231
00:44:24,118 --> 00:44:26,360
it is malware because it there are... It

1232
00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:28,119
isn't authorized by the user to do what

1233
00:44:28,119 --> 00:44:30,360
it does. So it's still technically malware. But

1234
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:32,199
all the malware does is just nuke the

1235
00:44:32,199 --> 00:44:34,599
program that generates the traffic. Right? So it's

1236
00:44:34,599 --> 00:44:38,122
like, kind of I mean, it's weird. I

1237
00:44:38,122 --> 00:44:39,477
think the weirdest part of this to me

1238
00:44:39,477 --> 00:44:41,628
is that somehow the courts backed the company

1239
00:44:41,628 --> 00:44:43,793
that, like, just was like, Hey, user's computer,

1240
00:44:43,953 --> 00:44:45,943
we can delete stuff too bad and, like,

1241
00:44:46,102 --> 00:44:47,614
somehow that's okay. Like, that's...

1242
00:44:48,728 --> 00:44:49,922
Seems... I mean, I don't know how would

1243
00:44:49,922 --> 00:44:51,116
that go here? I don't think it would

1244
00:44:51,116 --> 00:44:52,723
go the same. Think about the those Sony.

1245
00:44:52,882 --> 00:44:54,314
This is... This is what Sony did. Right?

1246
00:44:54,473 --> 00:44:56,700
Pretty much. They wrote Yeah. Software onto the

1247
00:44:56,700 --> 00:44:58,927
discs. And whenever you burned a copy, it

1248
00:44:58,927 --> 00:45:01,050
would actually stop you from burning copies. Sony

1249
00:45:01,327 --> 00:45:03,230
Sony did that wine all the way went

1250
00:45:03,230 --> 00:45:05,132
to the court and Sony lost. Like, you

1251
00:45:05,132 --> 00:45:08,383
can't put software on a user's computer like

1252
00:45:08,383 --> 00:45:10,942
that. I think another interesting 1 with this

1253
00:45:10,942 --> 00:45:13,351
is Youtube and Google right now

1254
00:45:13,725 --> 00:45:15,475
or trying to, like, block the ad blockers.

1255
00:45:15,634 --> 00:45:17,066
Right? And try to figure out a way.

1256
00:45:17,638 --> 00:45:18,614
And there were...

1257
00:45:19,226 --> 00:45:20,203
There there was

1258
00:45:20,894 --> 00:45:23,038
drumming around that. The only way for them

1259
00:45:23,038 --> 00:45:24,865
to do that officially would be able to

1260
00:45:24,865 --> 00:45:26,533
run something on the host.

1261
00:45:27,263 --> 00:45:29,809
That isn't technically officially the Chrome browser? At

1262
00:45:29,809 --> 00:45:31,503
least that's what I was reading, which,

1263
00:45:31,878 --> 00:45:33,470
come comes back in this whole thing, like,

1264
00:45:33,549 --> 00:45:36,588
how much power should these organizations have in

1265
00:45:36,588 --> 00:45:38,342
order on your computer. Right? I think in

1266
00:45:38,342 --> 00:45:39,480
the is definitely

1267
00:45:40,016 --> 00:45:42,588
Isn't Youtube just straight up blocking brave

1268
00:45:42,965 --> 00:45:43,762
as a browser now?

1269
00:45:44,971 --> 00:45:46,401
Are they we uses this brave here? Like,

1270
00:45:46,640 --> 00:45:48,150
I do I do wanna use for. I

1271
00:45:48,150 --> 00:45:50,057
can't... Like, a lot of Youtube videos when

1272
00:45:50,137 --> 00:45:51,726
I'm on Brave. Like they do not load.

1273
00:45:53,173 --> 00:45:54,844
It's working for you. Maybe Brave got around

1274
00:45:54,844 --> 00:45:56,673
it, but they did... 1 of those. Yeah.

1275
00:45:56,911 --> 00:45:57,309
I don't know.

1276
00:45:58,423 --> 00:45:58,741
I mean,

1277
00:45:59,630 --> 00:46:01,402
I think it's a weird

1278
00:46:02,175 --> 00:46:03,685
situation. III

1279
00:46:03,685 --> 00:46:05,434
also... I kinda wanna get people's takes on,

1280
00:46:05,593 --> 00:46:06,547
like, peer to peer.

1281
00:46:08,396 --> 00:46:09,911
Well, I guess it it does kinda make

1282
00:46:09,911 --> 00:46:11,986
sense. The whole peer to appear like, I

1283
00:46:12,145 --> 00:46:13,821
I feel mixed feelings about that. On 1

1284
00:46:13,821 --> 00:46:13,981
hand,

1285
00:46:14,951 --> 00:46:16,542
it's not servers that you have to own

1286
00:46:16,542 --> 00:46:18,531
and operate, so that's kind of like efficient.

1287
00:46:18,690 --> 00:46:20,202
But on the other hand, it's also, like,

1288
00:46:20,360 --> 00:46:22,508
the Isp does have to own and operate

1289
00:46:22,508 --> 00:46:23,168
all the

1290
00:46:23,718 --> 00:46:26,031
exchange data. It's gonna be way different in

1291
00:46:26,190 --> 00:46:29,222
Korea. Right? Because Korea can actually charge service

1292
00:46:29,222 --> 00:46:31,614
providers based on the amount of bandwidth they're...

1293
00:46:31,853 --> 00:46:34,740
They're using. Yes. So Net like, the the

1294
00:46:34,740 --> 00:46:36,815
service provider can literally charge Netflix, But like,

1295
00:46:37,054 --> 00:46:39,288
you're using more bandwidth than anyone else. So

1296
00:46:39,288 --> 00:46:41,215
either you have to pay. Or gonna have

1297
00:46:41,215 --> 00:46:42,722
to get away for your customers to pay

1298
00:46:42,722 --> 00:46:45,182
to use your service, which is completely different

1299
00:46:45,182 --> 00:46:46,928
than anywhere anywhere else I've heard at least

1300
00:46:46,928 --> 00:46:49,327
for Internet. Yeah. So when... So by using

1301
00:46:49,407 --> 00:46:50,702
Bit torrent or definitely

1302
00:46:51,078 --> 00:46:54,260
getting around that in a particular way. So

1303
00:46:54,340 --> 00:46:56,329
I I agree with you. It is super

1304
00:46:56,329 --> 00:46:58,337
interesting. I don't know. I... Torn are a

1305
00:46:58,337 --> 00:46:59,614
thing of the past for me. Right? Like,

1306
00:46:59,694 --> 00:47:01,370
there's enough streaming website on the Internet. Don't

1307
00:47:01,370 --> 00:47:03,445
have to or do think anymore. Yeah. But

1308
00:47:03,445 --> 00:47:04,505
presumably, this was

1309
00:47:05,122 --> 00:47:07,547
presumably, this was This was the bit torrent

1310
00:47:07,681 --> 00:47:11,092
protocol being integrated into legitimate software. Yeah. It

1311
00:47:11,092 --> 00:47:14,449
doesn't doesn't blizzard. Use Bit torrent quarantine software

1312
00:47:14,449 --> 00:47:16,769
to for it's did. I thought did. Because

1313
00:47:16,769 --> 00:47:18,530
it's it's more of a protocol now. Right,

1314
00:47:18,690 --> 00:47:20,530
than it is. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, it

1315
00:47:20,530 --> 00:47:22,449
always was. Right? But we associate time with,

1316
00:47:22,609 --> 00:47:24,878
like, pirate bay and, you know, like, downloading

1317
00:47:25,015 --> 00:47:26,210
Torrance. But at the end of the day,

1318
00:47:26,369 --> 00:47:28,122
Bit torn is just a peer to peer

1319
00:47:28,122 --> 00:47:29,635
file transfer protocol.

1320
00:47:30,206 --> 00:47:31,791
You could you could wrap it into any

1321
00:47:31,791 --> 00:47:32,742
number of different pools.

1322
00:47:33,852 --> 00:47:35,199
I mean, I don't know. I I think

1323
00:47:35,199 --> 00:47:37,022
it's... I guess my question is, like,

1324
00:47:37,753 --> 00:47:40,066
So based on how bit torrent works,

1325
00:47:41,023 --> 00:47:43,017
based... I feel like it would overall reduce

1326
00:47:43,017 --> 00:47:44,453
the load on the Is b's network. Right?

1327
00:47:44,692 --> 00:47:45,969
Because you could have plenty of scenarios where

1328
00:47:45,969 --> 00:47:47,005
like, let's say it's a college.

1329
00:47:47,660 --> 00:47:50,539
Am Not just downloading from D swarm, like

1330
00:47:50,539 --> 00:47:52,940
local people. I'm not actually hitting the Isp.

1331
00:47:53,260 --> 00:47:54,940
I feel like if it was centralized It

1332
00:47:54,940 --> 00:47:57,110
like, 10 the data. If it is restricted

1333
00:47:57,110 --> 00:47:59,443
to just local, that would be fine. But

1334
00:48:00,297 --> 00:48:02,289
whenever you're looking at most of the... Whenever

1335
00:48:02,289 --> 00:48:03,962
you have torrance, it's not that. I mean,

1336
00:48:04,041 --> 00:48:06,207
it's based. It's going the place. Yeah Yeah.

1337
00:48:06,605 --> 00:48:08,355
And then the biggest problem is whenever you

1338
00:48:08,355 --> 00:48:10,582
have Cedar that are have really, really, really

1339
00:48:10,582 --> 00:48:11,457
fast connections.

1340
00:48:12,253 --> 00:48:12,784
It just

1341
00:48:13,221 --> 00:48:15,998
consumes a tremendous amount of volume, of traffic.

1342
00:48:16,950 --> 00:48:18,378
And and a lot of times people didn't

1343
00:48:18,378 --> 00:48:19,885
know it. Like, I remember years ago Larry

1344
00:48:20,044 --> 00:48:22,684
Pe myself, camera who wells. There's some other

1345
00:48:22,684 --> 00:48:24,995
people. We were doing research on what was

1346
00:48:24,995 --> 00:48:26,053
actually being leaked

1347
00:48:26,749 --> 00:48:28,981
via torrance. And like you could find people's

1348
00:48:28,981 --> 00:48:31,463
past ports and personal documents and all this

1349
00:48:31,463 --> 00:48:33,293
different stuff. And the vast majority of people

1350
00:48:33,293 --> 00:48:35,760
had no idea at all what they were

1351
00:48:35,760 --> 00:48:37,608
actually sharing. And there was just, you know,

1352
00:48:37,767 --> 00:48:39,364
gigabit of data that was just being, like,

1353
00:48:39,603 --> 00:48:41,699
shovel off of their. That's like the lime

1354
00:48:41,838 --> 00:48:43,833
era. Right? Where, like, by default, it just

1355
00:48:43,833 --> 00:48:45,190
shared your entire c drive.

1356
00:48:48,235 --> 00:48:50,068
That's why I always set my seating to

1357
00:48:50,068 --> 00:48:52,061
0. Now that's that's what you do right

1358
00:48:52,061 --> 00:48:53,336
off the. So you're the problem. You don't

1359
00:48:53,336 --> 00:48:55,349
how many copies and don't valid let look.

1360
00:48:55,589 --> 00:48:57,829
Listen. Do you know have. You don't get

1361
00:48:57,829 --> 00:48:59,109
back. That's 1 of.

1362
00:49:00,070 --> 00:49:02,559
I don't have up and down the same

1363
00:49:02,559 --> 00:49:04,551
speed where I live. Alright? I only have

1364
00:49:04,551 --> 00:49:05,905
so much up, why you think I crash

1365
00:49:05,905 --> 00:49:08,057
on the news so much. They're they're throttle

1366
00:49:08,057 --> 00:49:09,667
me. I have to turn off every computer

1367
00:49:09,667 --> 00:49:11,422
in my house in order to do. My

1368
00:49:11,422 --> 00:49:13,178
excuse. Oh wait. No. That's... You have a

1369
00:49:13,178 --> 00:49:15,731
fiber line. Alright. I I know. That's not

1370
00:49:15,811 --> 00:49:18,134
Don't you. Yeah. You just want to data

1371
00:49:18,134 --> 00:49:20,043
until... I had to use my backup. I

1372
00:49:20,043 --> 00:49:21,100
had to use my backup.

1373
00:49:22,271 --> 00:49:22,430
Yeah.

1374
00:49:24,360 --> 00:49:26,119
Anyone else have articles. We could we could

1375
00:49:26,119 --> 00:49:28,039
follow up to the whole drones as first

1376
00:49:28,039 --> 00:49:29,640
responders. I don't think we got John's take

1377
00:49:29,640 --> 00:49:32,209
on this. Do you this, John? Yeah. I

1378
00:49:32,209 --> 00:49:33,479
don't know. What is the do you know

1379
00:49:33,479 --> 00:49:35,702
about symptoms first responders. So here's the scenario.

1380
00:49:35,861 --> 00:49:37,846
You're just calmly doing heroin in your backyard.

1381
00:49:38,242 --> 00:49:39,513
And then someone calls?

1382
00:49:41,753 --> 00:49:43,742
Calls it... Someone calls the cops and says,

1383
00:49:43,901 --> 00:49:45,889
a guy walking around Naked in the grocery

1384
00:49:45,889 --> 00:49:48,452
store. And I mean, How did I go

1385
00:49:48,452 --> 00:49:50,925
from peacefully doing heroin in my backyard to

1386
00:49:50,925 --> 00:49:53,158
walking around naked in the groceries. No I

1387
00:49:53,158 --> 00:49:55,152
didn't know some other guys. Some other guys.

1388
00:49:55,311 --> 00:49:57,066
Here's the thing, John. I don't know, but

1389
00:49:57,226 --> 00:49:58,597
I live in Portland and I can tell

1390
00:49:58,597 --> 00:50:00,432
you that's the experience that happens to a

1391
00:50:00,432 --> 00:50:02,587
lot of people where I I don't think

1392
00:50:02,587 --> 00:50:04,581
they know where they are or what they're

1393
00:50:04,581 --> 00:50:07,230
doing. So Anyway, you're walking around naked in

1394
00:50:07,230 --> 00:50:09,625
the grocery store looking for pulled milk because

1395
00:50:09,625 --> 00:50:10,583
it's a great choice.

1396
00:50:11,222 --> 00:50:11,722
And

1397
00:50:12,180 --> 00:50:12,420
you...

1398
00:50:13,378 --> 00:50:15,548
Someone calls the cops on you, so rude,

1399
00:50:15,708 --> 00:50:17,945
but whatever. And instead of the cop showing

1400
00:50:17,945 --> 00:50:19,303
up because, you know, you could be armed

1401
00:50:19,303 --> 00:50:19,963
and dangerous.

1402
00:50:20,741 --> 00:50:21,700
It's just a little drone.

1403
00:50:22,351 --> 00:50:24,574
And they're using the drone to kind of

1404
00:50:24,574 --> 00:50:27,670
get eyes on the situation. These D drone

1405
00:50:27,670 --> 00:50:29,599
and as first responder programs are

1406
00:50:29,909 --> 00:50:31,666
They started... I the 1 we talked about

1407
00:50:31,666 --> 00:50:33,422
already was in San Diego was little to

1408
00:50:33,422 --> 00:50:36,376
wade. But they're kind of, like taking over,

1409
00:50:37,094 --> 00:50:39,090
Las Vegas, Lewis, New York City,

1410
00:50:40,061 --> 00:50:40,959
Are kind of

1411
00:50:41,334 --> 00:50:43,402
messing around with it. I guess San Diego

1412
00:50:43,402 --> 00:50:45,471
is the furthest that we've talked about, but

1413
00:50:45,550 --> 00:50:47,075
I think there's other cities as So I

1414
00:50:47,075 --> 00:50:48,821
guess, like, there's a list further down the

1415
00:50:48,821 --> 00:50:51,677
article Yeah. See huge list. Go scroll up.

1416
00:50:51,994 --> 00:50:53,819
Scroll go. I wanna kinda shout out. Doesn't

1417
00:50:53,819 --> 00:50:55,583
that guy look like Blake? It does look

1418
00:50:55,583 --> 00:50:56,562
like... God's look

1419
00:50:57,099 --> 00:50:59,253
like like. Like, what are you doing? Are

1420
00:50:59,253 --> 00:51:00,689
you under your companies are working worth?

1421
00:51:01,328 --> 00:51:02,046
Oh my god.

1422
00:51:04,209 --> 00:51:05,481
The thing it... The 1 thing to mention,

1423
00:51:05,640 --> 00:51:07,946
these drones aren't so little. Like, they're... They

1424
00:51:07,946 --> 00:51:09,378
do have little ones, but these are these

1425
00:51:09,378 --> 00:51:11,206
are some big daddy drones that... Do They

1426
00:51:11,206 --> 00:51:12,081
have taser. Yeah.

1427
00:51:12,733 --> 00:51:14,724
Not yet. They have lasers. Remember like there's

1428
00:51:14,724 --> 00:51:16,260
a guy that says that lasers

1429
00:51:16,715 --> 00:51:19,583
situation down. Once again? Hypothetically. I'm naked in

1430
00:51:19,583 --> 00:51:22,469
my backyard drinking ice cold melt doing heroin.

1431
00:51:23,269 --> 00:51:24,710
And drone shows up.

1432
00:51:25,349 --> 00:51:27,289
We've just gone to bad trip territory

1433
00:51:27,590 --> 00:51:29,030
very quickly. Right?

1434
00:51:29,764 --> 00:51:30,240
The robot

1435
00:51:31,271 --> 00:51:32,009
The robot

1436
00:51:32,461 --> 00:51:35,001
hands on. You have 5 seconds to comply.

1437
00:51:35,159 --> 00:51:35,794
What do?

1438
00:51:37,238 --> 00:51:38,828
I I guess I don't know. I I

1439
00:51:38,828 --> 00:51:40,737
think this could go either way. It could

1440
00:51:40,737 --> 00:51:43,281
actually be beneficial if the data isn't misuse

1441
00:51:43,281 --> 00:51:44,633
in any way, shape or form, but I

1442
00:51:44,633 --> 00:51:46,914
don't think I'm willing to make that Like

1443
00:51:47,034 --> 00:51:49,127
is. I don't know. It's gonna be misused

1444
00:51:49,423 --> 00:51:52,369
never not misused by any agency. Yeah. And

1445
00:51:52,369 --> 00:51:54,201
they're gonna be, like, oh, we're flying over,

1446
00:51:54,280 --> 00:51:56,128
you know, John Be house and he was

1447
00:51:56,128 --> 00:51:58,042
drinking cold milk and his underwear and now

1448
00:51:58,042 --> 00:51:59,477
they take that and put it on tiktok.

1449
00:51:59,557 --> 00:52:00,912
Like, because it's not gonna happen in, like,

1450
00:52:00,992 --> 00:52:04,022
a week. I but you III guess if

1451
00:52:04,022 --> 00:52:05,709
it works and it's working for them. Like,

1452
00:52:06,186 --> 00:52:07,457
it's 1 of the things. I mean, if

1453
00:52:07,457 --> 00:52:09,206
it is working, then let's roll with it.

1454
00:52:09,444 --> 00:52:11,351
Right? Because if I have a choice of

1455
00:52:11,351 --> 00:52:13,259
at some type of drone. However, the hell

1456
00:52:13,259 --> 00:52:15,897
that works whenever I'm stoned and drinking bolton

1457
00:52:15,897 --> 00:52:19,394
mel, dealing with a situation. I'd rather have

1458
00:52:19,394 --> 00:52:20,984
somebody trained on the other side of that

1459
00:52:20,984 --> 00:52:22,351
than a police off whenever sir that is

1460
00:52:22,351 --> 00:52:24,817
only trained and force and restraint and arrest

1461
00:52:25,135 --> 00:52:26,726
True. You know. That's a good point. I

1462
00:52:26,885 --> 00:52:28,237
I know that I sound like a hippie,

1463
00:52:28,396 --> 00:52:29,927
but sir we've gotta get a little bit

1464
00:52:29,927 --> 00:52:31,682
more creative with some of these things. And

1465
00:52:31,682 --> 00:52:33,198
if this... I I don't know how a

1466
00:52:33,198 --> 00:52:35,512
drone works into it. But if it if

1467
00:52:35,512 --> 00:52:38,002
it's if it's that, or an armed police

1468
00:52:38,002 --> 00:52:40,556
officer that had 9 months of training on

1469
00:52:40,556 --> 00:52:41,913
how to use his gun in his nights

1470
00:52:41,913 --> 00:52:44,308
stick showing up, I'm going to take the

1471
00:52:44,308 --> 00:52:45,426
drone every single time.

1472
00:52:46,479 --> 00:52:48,317
I mean, the other thing to think about,

1473
00:52:48,476 --> 00:52:50,713
on the... Like, this is really important, obviously.

1474
00:52:51,033 --> 00:52:53,350
Will this ruined police chase scenes and movies?

1475
00:52:53,764 --> 00:52:56,549
Oh, what run place Chase like blues? Come

1476
00:52:56,549 --> 00:52:56,629
on.

1477
00:52:57,504 --> 00:52:59,733
Come How are you gonna out the stupid

1478
00:52:59,733 --> 00:53:01,300
drone? Or is it easier to out run

1479
00:53:01,339 --> 00:53:02,929
drone than even drone swarms

1480
00:53:03,883 --> 00:53:06,052
Sick man. Drone swarms, not just a drone

1481
00:53:06,109 --> 00:53:08,812
swarm. I'm not, it's a you're that seems

1482
00:53:08,812 --> 00:53:11,054
harder, but we we make a drone For

1483
00:53:11,054 --> 00:53:13,611
the police chase, then it has like explosive

1484
00:53:13,611 --> 00:53:14,970
charge at the top of it that then

1485
00:53:14,970 --> 00:53:16,248
lands on the hood of your car and

1486
00:53:16,248 --> 00:53:17,607
blows your engine you're good. There we go.

1487
00:53:17,767 --> 00:53:19,445
All police chases are done with drones. We're

1488
00:53:19,445 --> 00:53:19,605
fine.

1489
00:53:20,815 --> 00:53:22,247
If that sounds back like a bad idea.

1490
00:53:22,485 --> 00:53:24,395
Probably... It sounds like a horrible idea.

1491
00:53:25,111 --> 00:53:26,862
Was gonna suck is someone's going to roll

1492
00:53:26,862 --> 00:53:28,713
with that. They're gonna be low. That really

1493
00:53:28,713 --> 00:53:31,190
his They already tried something similar. And it

1494
00:53:31,190 --> 00:53:33,427
it was ruled to be not usable. They

1495
00:53:33,427 --> 00:53:34,946
they... I what police department was that they

1496
00:53:34,946 --> 00:53:37,356
were looking into base a vehicle inter predictor

1497
00:53:37,356 --> 00:53:39,510
that basically launched this little thing that would

1498
00:53:39,510 --> 00:53:41,186
go under the car, and I think it

1499
00:53:41,186 --> 00:53:43,101
was designed to fry the electronics on modern

1500
00:53:43,101 --> 00:53:46,544
vehicles. It basically, didn't either as short range

1501
00:53:46,544 --> 00:53:48,855
range something rather with electricity Friday electronics but

1502
00:53:48,855 --> 00:53:50,927
the problem is. Of course, that completely throws

1503
00:53:50,927 --> 00:53:52,376
vehicles in the chaos. You would do this

1504
00:53:52,376 --> 00:53:53,889
in the high speed chase situation. You're at

1505
00:53:53,889 --> 00:53:55,401
cars would be veer all over the place.

1506
00:53:56,038 --> 00:53:57,709
Never saw the light of day for some

1507
00:53:57,709 --> 00:54:00,192
reason. And that's custom because that's this that's

1508
00:54:00,192 --> 00:54:02,101
the problem they have with all high speed

1509
00:54:02,101 --> 00:54:04,885
chases. They're like, no. These are fun. Yeah.

1510
00:54:05,123 --> 00:54:06,396
They are. They're great. They're awesome.

1511
00:54:07,048 --> 00:54:08,826
Did you notice that a lot of people

1512
00:54:08,885 --> 00:54:09,204
die,

1513
00:54:09,763 --> 00:54:11,519
you know, when we do this. Let's not

1514
00:54:11,519 --> 00:54:13,514
do the high speed, Jason thing. Yeah. I

1515
00:54:13,514 --> 00:54:15,510
could see how drones then escalate that up.

1516
00:54:16,083 --> 00:54:17,992
But... Yeah. I I don't know. I think

1517
00:54:18,230 --> 00:54:20,297
I guess my, like, final take on this

1518
00:54:20,297 --> 00:54:21,490
is it's happening.

1519
00:54:21,967 --> 00:54:23,637
This is... I mean, this this is... This

1520
00:54:23,637 --> 00:54:24,137
is

1521
00:54:24,764 --> 00:54:26,430
Yeah. Is this... So I mean, I guess

1522
00:54:26,430 --> 00:54:26,747
we'll see?

1523
00:54:27,541 --> 00:54:29,444
Follow along. We'll talk about it. You know,

1524
00:54:29,523 --> 00:54:31,507
like, I I I'm I'm going to tell

1525
00:54:31,507 --> 00:54:33,511
you guys. This is all shit that we're

1526
00:54:33,511 --> 00:54:35,425
talking about in the comic series the future

1527
00:54:35,425 --> 00:54:37,659
is? Like, you know, what what is all

1528
00:54:37,659 --> 00:54:39,094
of this going to be like, you know,

1529
00:54:39,254 --> 00:54:41,168
in the in the near future. Like, and

1530
00:54:41,168 --> 00:54:41,965
this is, you know,

1531
00:54:42,699 --> 00:54:44,214
I don't know. Like, I I hate it

1532
00:54:44,214 --> 00:54:45,809
whenever people ask me. They're like, john. What

1533
00:54:45,809 --> 00:54:48,303
is your take on Ai. I'm like, it's

1534
00:54:48,362 --> 00:54:50,276
bad. No. It's good. No. It's bad. No.

1535
00:54:50,435 --> 00:54:51,951
It's good. It's like, but you're an expert

1536
00:54:51,951 --> 00:54:54,518
in this No. I'm not. Well, no. Yeah.

1537
00:54:55,156 --> 00:54:57,969
Like, all of this stuff is just weird

1538
00:54:58,027 --> 00:55:00,579
and strange and it's getting weirder, Or is

1539
00:55:00,579 --> 00:55:02,095
it just a factor of us getting old?

1540
00:55:02,589 --> 00:55:04,108
I I don't know. Yes. Both.

1541
00:55:04,827 --> 00:55:06,105
Yeah. I think it's all of the above.

1542
00:55:06,345 --> 00:55:09,701
I also think Neil suarez, great book recommendation

1543
00:55:09,701 --> 00:55:10,260
kill decision.

1544
00:55:12,023 --> 00:55:13,293
Absolutely fantastic.

1545
00:55:13,769 --> 00:55:14,666
Freedom trademark,

1546
00:55:15,516 --> 00:55:15,913
Damon,

1547
00:55:16,866 --> 00:55:18,057
influx, great author,

1548
00:55:18,869 --> 00:55:21,266
Daniel Suarez is is talked about it on

1549
00:55:21,266 --> 00:55:23,664
so many times. Yeah. It's monday. Gentlemen,

1550
00:55:24,064 --> 00:55:25,662
I would like to take the last few

1551
00:55:25,662 --> 00:55:27,740
minutes of our time together before the fourth

1552
00:55:27,740 --> 00:55:29,054
of July to celebrate

1553
00:55:29,513 --> 00:55:30,413
July first

1554
00:55:31,031 --> 00:55:31,531
and

1555
00:55:31,910 --> 00:55:33,268
give you an update on some of the

1556
00:55:33,268 --> 00:55:35,666
new privacy laws that have gone into effect

1557
00:55:35,666 --> 00:55:38,155
around the United States. There's like I wanna

1558
00:55:38,155 --> 00:55:40,070
mention today. Idea if Bart go with it.

1559
00:55:41,106 --> 00:55:42,702
Being sorry to rain on the parade, but,

1560
00:55:43,180 --> 00:55:45,334
I I wanted to, leave with a little

1561
00:55:45,334 --> 00:55:47,742
bit of helpful information. In addition to the

1562
00:55:47,742 --> 00:55:50,773
other helpful information we shared earlier today. Corey,

1563
00:55:50,932 --> 00:55:52,288
you mentioned Portland,

1564
00:55:52,846 --> 00:55:53,325
Oregon,

1565
00:55:53,963 --> 00:55:55,638
and I never say it right. Because I

1566
00:55:55,638 --> 00:55:58,202
used to live in all in Oregon, Wisconsin.

1567
00:55:58,441 --> 00:55:59,259
So I

1568
00:55:59,635 --> 00:56:00,192
if I put...

1569
00:56:00,987 --> 00:56:03,375
It's oregon pronounce wrong. Anyway, It's okay. Or

1570
00:56:03,375 --> 00:56:04,012
gods trail.

1571
00:56:05,304 --> 00:56:06,763
That stayed out there

1572
00:56:07,142 --> 00:56:09,619
that, put into effect a new undue privacy

1573
00:56:09,619 --> 00:56:12,017
law, and I actually wanna draw attention to

1574
00:56:12,017 --> 00:56:14,829
it because they actually did it right. They

1575
00:56:14,829 --> 00:56:17,066
didn't write it for the lawyers. They wrote

1576
00:56:17,066 --> 00:56:20,342
it for small businesses and consumers, and they

1577
00:56:20,342 --> 00:56:22,340
actually came up with an acronym called.

1578
00:56:22,994 --> 00:56:23,313
Locked.

1579
00:56:24,032 --> 00:56:26,905
L, a list of entities that has your

1580
00:56:26,905 --> 00:56:27,405
personal

1581
00:56:27,784 --> 00:56:28,661
information. O,

1582
00:56:29,380 --> 00:56:31,989
teaches consumers how a lock, how to opt

1583
00:56:32,189 --> 00:56:32,428
out,

1584
00:56:33,145 --> 00:56:35,456
c, you can get a copy of your

1585
00:56:36,014 --> 00:56:36,412
of your,

1586
00:56:37,129 --> 00:56:38,244
personal sensitive data,

1587
00:56:39,121 --> 00:56:39,574
k

1588
00:56:39,932 --> 00:56:40,489
know what,

1589
00:56:41,204 --> 00:56:42,476
information a business has on you,

1590
00:56:43,590 --> 00:56:44,885
e, edit any

1591
00:56:45,737 --> 00:56:49,194
inaccuracies in your personal data, and d delete

1592
00:56:49,410 --> 00:56:52,195
information businesses hasn't have on you. So the

1593
00:56:52,433 --> 00:56:54,661
the Oregon Oregon, Sorry. I never get it

1594
00:56:54,661 --> 00:56:57,613
right. Privacy law is actually really good and

1595
00:56:57,613 --> 00:56:59,835
they've got some great resources on there. That

1596
00:56:59,835 --> 00:57:01,105
came into effect today.

1597
00:57:01,898 --> 00:57:04,056
Another 1 I wanna mention is the Texas

1598
00:57:04,136 --> 00:57:06,994
Data Privacy and Security Act. The interesting part

1599
00:57:06,994 --> 00:57:09,320
of this 1 is small businesses are generally

1600
00:57:09,614 --> 00:57:09,852
exempt.

1601
00:57:11,122 --> 00:57:11,916
It also,

1602
00:57:13,601 --> 00:57:16,389
businesses have 45 days to respond to a

1603
00:57:16,389 --> 00:57:17,265
consumer request.

1604
00:57:18,301 --> 00:57:21,191
They're asking businesses to conduct a business

1605
00:57:21,647 --> 00:57:21,885
protection.

1606
00:57:22,459 --> 00:57:25,751
Excuse me, they're asking businesses to conduct data

1607
00:57:26,049 --> 00:57:27,086
protection assessments.

1608
00:57:27,804 --> 00:57:29,320
You know, do you know where your data

1609
00:57:29,320 --> 00:57:31,812
is, is it encrypted? What kind of data

1610
00:57:31,812 --> 00:57:33,031
is it is it sensitive?

1611
00:57:34,129 --> 00:57:37,005
Is it Phi Pii? That sort of thing?

1612
00:57:39,174 --> 00:57:41,009
1 thing that they've done that's kinda interesting

1613
00:57:41,009 --> 00:57:42,146
is they're giving businesses

1614
00:57:42,683 --> 00:57:45,337
30 days to make right if they find

1615
00:57:45,475 --> 00:57:46,352
a violation.

1616
00:57:47,563 --> 00:57:49,552
Not only is there this 30 days to

1617
00:57:49,552 --> 00:57:52,654
cure or fix the violation. They've actually listed

1618
00:57:52,654 --> 00:57:56,019
a monetary penalty of 7500

1619
00:57:56,019 --> 00:57:59,539
dollars for each violation. So Texas is putting

1620
00:57:59,539 --> 00:58:01,059
some skin in the game when it comes

1621
00:58:01,059 --> 00:58:03,713
to their data privacy and Security Act that

1622
00:58:03,713 --> 00:58:06,423
went into effect today July first. The last

1623
00:58:06,423 --> 00:58:09,294
1 I wanna mention is Florida, actually, the

1624
00:58:09,294 --> 00:58:11,787
governor signed a digital bill of rights

1625
00:58:12,657 --> 00:58:14,970
this will send it bill to 62.

1626
00:58:15,289 --> 00:58:17,761
This one's interesting because it... We talked about

1627
00:58:17,761 --> 00:58:20,233
this a little bit in a previous news

1628
00:58:20,233 --> 00:58:22,716
cast. We were talking about biometric data? And

1629
00:58:22,875 --> 00:58:24,090
I think Corey was

1630
00:58:24,625 --> 00:58:26,851
asking, well, what is biometric data Or what,

1631
00:58:26,931 --> 00:58:28,442
you know, how are we talking about it

1632
00:58:28,442 --> 00:58:31,267
or classifying it, Well, they actually did

1633
00:58:31,645 --> 00:58:34,141
identify what is biometric data in this particular

1634
00:58:34,199 --> 00:58:34,758
bill of rights,

1635
00:58:35,396 --> 00:58:36,695
fingerprints, voice,

1636
00:58:37,073 --> 00:58:38,270
retina, iris,

1637
00:58:38,764 --> 00:58:40,282
and then they left it a bit, open

1638
00:58:40,282 --> 00:58:43,238
ended it open ended and called it unique

1639
00:58:43,238 --> 00:58:43,738
bio

1640
00:58:44,996 --> 00:58:45,475
patterns.

1641
00:58:46,684 --> 00:58:48,353
And the other thing I wanna point out

1642
00:58:48,353 --> 00:58:51,870
with the Florida data privacy law is companies

1643
00:58:52,006 --> 00:58:53,141
cannot sell

1644
00:58:53,515 --> 00:58:55,342
sensitive data on children.

1645
00:58:56,232 --> 00:58:58,324
Without receiving a prior,

1646
00:58:59,338 --> 00:59:01,328
consent from parents. And this is the first

1647
00:59:01,328 --> 00:59:03,876
time a state has actually said, you have

1648
00:59:03,876 --> 00:59:06,524
to have prior consent before you sell sensitive

1649
00:59:06,524 --> 00:59:07,482
data on children.

1650
00:59:08,679 --> 00:59:11,950
So while we are talking about earlier stories,

1651
00:59:12,444 --> 00:59:13,957
you know, kind of some doom and gloom.

1652
00:59:14,356 --> 00:59:16,267
We are seeing 1 and more data privacy

1653
00:59:16,267 --> 00:59:17,882
laws popping up in the states

1654
00:59:18,418 --> 00:59:20,967
because there is no federal data privacy law,

1655
00:59:21,126 --> 00:59:23,846
and they're probably will be for, at least

1656
00:59:23,846 --> 00:59:25,755
a few months till after the election.

1657
00:59:27,027 --> 00:59:27,744
That's all I got.

1658
00:59:28,873 --> 00:59:30,171
That is a great

1659
00:59:30,788 --> 00:59:31,027
rundown.

1660
00:59:31,984 --> 00:59:32,861
Thank you very much.

1661
00:59:34,057 --> 00:59:35,733
Alright. Can we can we wrap this up?

1662
00:59:35,892 --> 00:59:37,886
Because it is, you, in in addition,

1663
00:59:38,698 --> 00:59:40,608
but being the first of July. It is

1664
00:59:40,608 --> 00:59:44,291
my anniversary. So oh yeah. The grab

1665
00:59:44,905 --> 00:59:45,143
anniversary.

1666
00:59:45,939 --> 00:59:48,903
Anniversary be 4 years. Pretty excited about that.

1667
00:59:49,063 --> 00:59:50,042
You got you got

1668
00:59:50,581 --> 00:59:52,737
What's your 24 privacy laws? What do you...

1669
00:59:53,057 --> 00:59:56,104
Your 24 is the privacy law. Yep. Nice.

1670
00:59:56,343 --> 00:59:58,096
We made it right past the restraining order

1671
00:59:58,096 --> 00:59:58,733
year. It's great.

1672
01:00:00,884 --> 01:00:03,512
Feeling real strong about all of this. But

1673
01:00:04,880 --> 01:00:07,581
and then also, everybody enjoy the fourth safely,

1674
01:00:07,978 --> 01:00:08,296
and,

1675
01:00:08,932 --> 01:00:11,077
I... With that, Ryan take us out.