Automatically generated transcript. Not manually reviewed. Names, quotations, and speaker attribution may contain errors. In today's episode, I want to offer up one final critique of libertarian free will. And it's not the final critique because nothing else could be said. I mean, I have barely touched on the topic at all. There are so many neuroscientific paths that we could take, so many thought experiments, philosophical things, theological angles that we could take to take a look at the problems with libertarian free will even more. But I wanted to give you what I thought were some of the strongest evidences against the will and just some of the major problems of where things don't sit right. Particularly as they pertain to implications on how libertarian free will doesn't provide us with responsibility or meaning or... The very things that it so chastises determinism or compatibilism for not giving. That was really what I wanted to hit at, is the major moral components that libertarian free will claims to provide. And that's going to be particularly important for this season, because that's really what we're getting at when we go to explore the problem of evil. We're going to be talking about the culpability of God. in creating the world that he did and acting in the way that he does. And so, understanding the human will, as well as what type of will God has, is going to be important as we discuss moral culpability. So as much as neuroscience and all that stuff would be really interesting to pursue, and I definitely think that it's something you should, because it's fascinating some of the experiments that they've done and the things that they've found. Nevertheless, that's not really what we're trying to get at here. It's not a season on free will, it's a season on the problem of evil, and certain aspects of the will are going to be important to understand. And before we get too deep into this episode, I want to give you a fair warning. I don't think that this episode is going to be quite as esoteric or conjectural as our episode on the basis for God's foreknowledge or omniscience, but it's definitely going to be a little bit more off the beaten path. I'm going to be using some thought experiments, which are always open for criticism, like analogies. They're never perfectly... ...perfectly in sync with everything, and you can always kind of nitpick things. And if you try to take the analogy too far, it can be problematic, so not every aspect of the analogy is supposed to hold. But nevertheless, I'm hoping that all of this is going to pan out well enough to give you a final, clearer picture of the problems that arise from holding to a libertarian free will. Now, I'll begin my argument by stating the thesis for this episode very bluntly. If libertarian free will exists, then a perfect world is possible. I'll repeat that because it's very important. If libertarian free will exists, a perfect world is possible. If we turn this into a syllogism of sorts... Given libertarian free will, it is possible for an all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful God to create and maintain a perfect world. We don't live in a perfect world. Therefore, either an all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful God doesn't exist, or libertarian free will doesn't exist. I'm not really a logician, not at all, so I'm sure that that probably isn't a perfect syllogism, which is why I said it's a syllogism of sorts, but that's the basic concept that I'm going to be getting at here. I'm sure some of you are reeling at my brazen assertion that God could maintain a perfect world given libertarian free will. In fact, libertarian free will is supposed to be the very thing that saves God from this assertion. Because people can do whatever they choose, God couldn't guarantee a perfect world. He allows humanity to defy Him with their choice. Now, on its face, that seems like a really fair assessment. I mean, if you have kids, if you've ever been around them, you know that your will is not their will a lot of the time. They will often defy you, but often, not always. Now, here's the thing about libertarian free will. This very thing, which supposedly makes love and responsibility possible, makes it possible that in any given instance, you can choose the good. For the sake of ease, let's just say that your ability to choose the good is 50-50. Your chance of choosing the good is 50%. What is your chance of choosing the good twice in a row? 25%. Three times? 12.5%. You get the point. Of course we know that people will choose to do many good things in their lives, but the chances of one person always choosing the good is infinitesimally small to the point of impossible, at least as far as humans are concerned. But here's the thing, the chances aren't zero. In comparison to infinity, the probability would look extremely achievable. To just kind of give you a taste of how this works, I want you to imagine this very world, but there's just one thing that's different, right? Right now, instead of using your right hand to do whatever it is, you use your right hand to scratch your forehead. That's the only difference in this world versus this other world. Okay? Great. Well, you could have another world, another possible world, where instead of scratching at the exact spot on your forehead that you just did, you scratch a micrometer over to the left. And another world in which the only difference is you scratch a micrometer over to the right. And then two micrometers, and then one world, three micrometers, four micrometers. Like, you can see how the The possible worlds are infinite, practically. And so, what's really fascinating about this is if you think about it, every single realistic fiction book you have ever read actually tells you about a world somewhere. So Sherlock Holmes, for example. There is a world in which a person named Sherlock Holmes lived in England or wherever he lived at the exact same time that the book Sherlock Holmes was written about. But there's a world in which he was just a... I guess they didn't have dry cleaners back then, but I don't know. A horseshoeman. Whatever those guys are called. A shotter. There's another world where Sherlock Holmes existed, and he was a shotter, and he hired a helper, an assistant named Watson. And there's a world in which he didn't hire an assistant named Watson, he hired an assistant named Jake. And there's a world, though, where Sherlock Holmes, a person named Sherlock Holmes, existed and he actually became a detective. And then there's a world in which not only did he become a detective, but he hired an assistant named Watson. And then there's a world in which that happened and he actually had the very first case that he ever solved happen exactly the way that it did, but none of the others. And then there's another world in which he, the first and second case he had, you know, as Arthur Conan Doyle wrote it. And there's a world where those two happened. There's a world where all of those cases happened. And then there's a world where all of those cases happened, and instead of Sherlock Holmes scratching his forehead the way that he did in that one world, he scratched at a micrometer to the left. And there's another world in which all those cases happened exactly as Doyle wrote them, but he scratched his head two micrometers to the left. You get the point, right? You could go on forever and ever because there are so many molecules in the universe, and our interactions with them, with substances, and our choices ourselves impact the world in so many different ways. There are just An infinite, practically, amount of worlds. I'm sure you could number them, like if we had numbers, if we could compute that. Like, it's a finite amount of universes. But practically speaking, it's infinite. Now, I don't know what the chances of Adam and Eve always choosing the good were, or them to choose the good and then their progeny to all choose the good. But assuming libertarian free will... Choosing the good and choosing it again and then again and then again into infinite subsequence was possible. And given an infinite palette of worlds and conditions to create, conditions which I guess don't really matter in libertarian free will anyway since the will is free from all that, well then, that infinitesimally small possibility of achieving this perfection was actually very possible. Not only was it very possible, there are practically an infinite amount of different worlds in which the good was always chosen. That's because in many scenarios where the good was selected and always chosen, there are many, almost infinite iterations of that good. In a world where a neighbor needed to borrow some money, you could have chosen to give him $100 or $500 or $501.37. Or $100 and you scratch your forehead one millimeter to the left. Or another world where you give him $100 and scratch it one millimeter to the right. You get the point, right? There are practically an infinite amount of iterations of possible worlds in which the good was always chosen. Which is something that is very possible if libertarian free will were true. And one of those worlds could have been brought about by God if he's omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. The only way to declare that it was impossible for this to happen would be to say that there is something in God, or something fundamental in his creation, in the angels, in human choice, human nature, which would always lead to a fall and prevent the perpetual choosing of the good. If you're an open theist, you might say that God couldn't tell which world he was creating, and therefore couldn't determine to create one of the many possible perfect worlds. So you think that a perfect world was possible, God just got unlucky and picked the wrong one. No, what he created was kind of a crapshoot. That's all well and good, because at least as far as I've thought about it, that seems consistent. I strongly disagree with the open theists, but... I think that's fairly consistent. They limit God's omniscience. And of course, you know, the open theists, they bear their own problems in regard to historical notions of God's omniscience and sovereignty and... Guaranteeing that everything's going to work out for the good and redemption in the end, and it doesn't resolve all of the other issues that I've talked about in regard to the will and what it fails to obtain, like the problem of the will being based in randomness then. But if you're not an open theist, if God could have created any iteration of the universe that he chose, and you hold to historical understandings of what it means for God to be omniscient, That would then mean that libertarian free will is not true, or God's not good, because look at the world we're in now. So either libertarian free will means that humanity could have always actually chosen otherwise, and God did not bring about one of the almost infinite amount of worlds in which this perfection happened, or libertarian free will doesn't exist. The logic of a possible perfect world given libertarian free will and an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God seems pretty straightforward. Now, I know that's going to be very unsettling for some, because the free will defense for why God allows evil has been a huge staple of Christian apologetics for decades at least, if not much, much longer. I know Alvin Plantinga popularized it, at least a modern version of it, but I think that's kind of been around since the beginning almost. I understand that it's a hard thing to face if it's your first rodeo with the will, but I think it's going to be worth it in the end to take a look at what the will is, especially in light of all of the things that we're coming to understand about it in regard to neuroscience and everything else. Does pretty much all for this episode as it pertains to the will. However, I do have a little off-topic discussion I want to have since we're playing around with the multiverse. Definitely feel free to head out of here because we're going to go a little bit deeper and veer off course a little bit. So if you've had it for now and you want to go just think about this stuff, then have at it. Anyway, while I was doing all this thinking about possible universes, it got me thinking about some of the other notions many Christians hold about God and the good. One of the ideas that a lot of Christians throw around as a theodicy, a defense of how God and evil can coexist, is that the world that we are now in must be the best possible world. And the assumption is that if God is good, then he would seek to bring about the greatest possible good. Which means he would create the best possible world. Now, we could discuss what that good would entail. What does it mean to be the best possible? Many Christians would say that it's the greatest number of people saved, since union with God is the greatest possible good. Minimizing gratuitous evil and pain seems to be part of the greatest good. There are lots of things that we can take into consideration. The assumption is that God, as the ultimate good, must pursue the greatest possible good, if he's to be called good, right? If you're gonna be called good, then pursuing the greatest possible good seems like what a good person, a good being would do. Of course, it's hard for many to see how this world is the greatest possible good. I already showed that on libertarian free will, a perfect world is possible, so this world, in comparison, seems like it's one of the worst you could imagine. Genocides, abuse, trafficking, famines, the horrors abound. On top of that, most conservative evangelicals, and many Christians historically, believe that the vast majority of people in history are going to spend eternity in hell being tortured forever. So while the good multiplies eternally for the few who are saved, the sins and curses and pains will multiply far more exceeding than the good and bliss in the new heavens and earth. Assuming libertarian free will, and what should be the possibility of worlds with far greater good, however you're going to define that, it seems like we're in a very bad world. Sure, I could imagine worse. I'm just finishing up the reading the Red Rising series, and that's a pretty nasty world, right? And I'm sure that's not the nastiest that's out there. There are some very just nasty times and places. I mean, what we're in now is a vicious place as well. The bombing of Gaza, imperialism on display. I'm recording this episode just less than a week into the United States and Israel attacking Iran and just knowing the history of Iran there, which we've talked a lot about throughout our episodes, throughout our seasons, and just the... Just the history of empire and oppression, whether that's the United States and the modern empires, or whether that's the Mongolian Empire, the Roman Empire, it's all just... it's horrid. It really is just horrible. And the world that we live in is filled with so much of this. So, however proponents of this greatest good argument want to paint it, They essentially believe that the salvation of a minority is a great enough good to justify the damnation, torture, and perpetual cursing of a majority, or at least a very significant number of people. Billions to tens of billions or more by the time all is said and done. The good seems more weighty than the evil, and God is bound to the good. Or, to put it in a more theologically accurate way, God, by his nature, desires to do that which most aligns with who he is, which is the good. So in this system, the greatest good system, despite the overwhelming amount of evil that's done, good must just be more valuable, even though it's not more numerous. Because while the praise of the minority of people, of saints, rise up to God day after day, moment by moment, the cursings of the majority of people tormented in the fires of hell will go up and up and up and exponentially increase the amount of evil being done and said in the universe. So to cling to the greatest good idea, you have to believe that the good outweighs the bad in terms of its value. But here's the thing. What if we had this exact same world, but instead of, let's say, you being saved, your neighbor was saved instead? We just kind of swap you out. Like, your neighbor freely chose—randomly chose, whatever—to choose God, and you just randomly freely chose to not follow God. Right? Your neighbor was saved. So, same amount of people saved, just him or her instead of you. Same amount saved, same amount damned. Then what if we had the same world, but instead of just you and your neighbor, we swapped out two billion. I'm sorry, two people. And then we could go up to a hundred or a thousand or a billion. We just swap everybody out. And what if we had the exact same number of people saved? They were just different people. What if God saved the Egyptians from Israelite oppression, choosing them instead, but with the same ultimate results tabulated? And given libertarian free will, all of this is possible, right? God could have chose a different nation, and Israel could have chosen to build an empire and take over Egypt instead of the other way around. Like, obviously, there are geographical things that come into play, but you can imagine a world... Where things are kind of reversed, right? Based on free will choices. There are billions, trillions, Google, busy beaver amounts of permutations, maybe even more, of the greatest good. The exact same events happening, just different actors each time. Like, however you want to think about it, right? Tons and tons and tons of practically infinite permutations. Now, obviously, there are a lot of worlds that would have equal goods to this one. Your neighbor being saved instead of you. Just swap places. And seemingly, a similar world with one more person going to hell, where we're at the world with the greatest good, would be justified if God created that one instead of this one, if you adhere to the greatest good. Okay. So, if the standard that we think emanates from God is this idea of greatest goodness, and God has all of these equally great worlds available to him, and I'll even throw aside all the perfect worlds that I think he has available, just for the sake of argument, then the greatest good possible isn't the creation of this universe that we're in now. Rather, it's the creation of billions, trillions, or more multiverses. A universe where you go to heaven and your neighbor goes to hell isn't as good as a multiverse where you and your neighbor both go to heaven. Sure, we are increasing the number of the damned if you hold to hell as eternal conscious torment, but the standard view is already good with the majority, or at least a significant amount, going to hell. So if we maintain the same proportions and increased those going to heaven, This would essentially multiply the good by however many universes God created. There are a lot of different ways that you can think about this, but I think that given the ethic that many libertarians seem to hold to, along with the permutations that libertarian free will creates, then the multiverse must exist. Whether that's God having all of these universes running simultaneously or consecutively, It seems like the greatest good would be to ensure that all people, essentially all permutations of the greatest good, would run their course, and that would maximize the amounts of good. Now, obviously, there are a lot of other things that come into play here, namely the A Theory of Time, the B Theory of Time, and whether simultaneous universes can run at once or not, whether God would have to enact them one after the other, whatever else. And there's a lot of assumptions there, right? This is speaking to if you hold to libertarian free will or if you're not a universalist, because if you're a universalist, you don't really have that problem because everybody ends up with with union, in union with God at the end anyway, right? This is for a very Western, American, conservative, evangelical bent, which is often the people who are the loudest about the libertarian free will, Arminian theology type stuff. So, nevertheless, right? Take it or leave it. I just think it's a really fascinating type of thought experiment, and a lot of times, whether it's libertarian free will or the greatest good ethic, it leads you to some, maybe not absurd conclusions, because for as weird as the multiverse sounds to me, and for as much as I don't think it's true, if God is all about the greatest good... Then it seems very reasonable and almost kind of mandatory for him to do such a thing because he adheres to his nature all the time. And if the greatest good is that ethic, then a multiverse just seems to make a whole lot of sense. Anyway, that last little bit's just a bunch of interesting food for thought if you like thinking about all these crazy kinds of thought experiments and time travel and multiverse types of things. So I hope you enjoyed. That's all for now. So peace, and because I'm a pacifist, when I say it, I mean it. This podcast is a part of the Kingdom Outpost Network. Please check out the links below to find other great podcasts and content related to nonviolence and kingdom living.