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You don't have to trust Obscura for your privacy. You just have to trust that not both Obscura and

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Mullvad is compromised. Hello, everybody, and welcome to Techlore Talks. Today, I have the pleasure

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of inviting Carl from Obscura, the VPN provider, to talk about what Obscura is, what they're trying

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to accomplish, how they are actually somewhat like Mullvad, but a bit different. In fact,

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they use a lot of Mullvad's infrastructure for what they do, the importance of censorship resistance,

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and what they're really bringing to the table,

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which is something genuinely unique in the VPN space I haven't heard before.

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So get ready for a really insightful discussion about VPNs,

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but not just VPNs, the underlying technology that makes them happen

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and what they really mean for this world where we're seeing age verification pop up,

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as well as tools that a lot of people are relying on

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to gain better privacy in light of those things.

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So let's dive into it.

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Welcome on the podcast, Carl.

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It's really great to have you.

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and you're now the second VPN person who's ever been on this podcast.

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So do you want to introduce yourself and who you're from?

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Yeah, I'm Carl. I work on Obscura VPN.

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We're trying to be the first VPN that can't log your activity

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instead of just promising with a pinky promise.

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I used to work on Bitcoin Core.

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I was a Bitcoin Core developer for three and a half years.

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And yeah, I'm all about championing privacy tech, and that's why I'm here.

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Yeah, so do you mind, you know, we need to kind of establish context and maybe the behind-the-scenes tech to kind of break down what you mean by, you know, we know that there's a lot of trust you hand over in your VPN, but what exactly does that trust mean?

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Because you say they're pinky promising, but what exactly does a typical VPN provider actually see, and what are you trusting them on?

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Yeah, maybe we can just start with sort of more on my background and how I came to this, right?

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Like it's not every day that somebody wakes up and is like, I'm going to make a new VPN today and everything else.

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What is it?

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So I grew up for a part of my childhood in China and in London, actually.

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And so I was in London for a few years for primary school.

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And, you know, we did book reports, you know, I sort of paraphrased Wikipedia as everybody

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did for a time.

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And, you know, I had my friends on Facebook and everything else.

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And I went back to Shanghai for middle school.

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And, you know, all of that was taken away from me, basically.

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The Great Firewall had come up.

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I wasn't able to access YouTube or Facebook or any of these niceties.

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And so sort of by necessity, I had to try out all the commercial options back then.

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And these were the old protocols, PPTP, IKEv2, you know, the really old ones that you can still use on iOS nowadays.

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And, of course, you know, experimenting with building my own for my family, for my friends and things like that.

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Right.

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I came here to the States in high school.

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And actually, it was also networking problem because it was a boarding school and you weren't

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allowed to be on the internet after 10 p.m.

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And they did Mac blocking.

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So it was blocking based on Mac addresses, which me and this other Japanese kid figured

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out that if you get the Mac addresses of the library computers and spoof your Mac address,

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on your laptop. Anyway, it's all fun stories like that. And of course, after college, I spent a few

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years on Bitcoin Core. I worked on mostly user trust. That's sort of the theme of what I like to

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work on, right? The question is sort of, even if a piece of software is open source, right?

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How can you trust that what you download corresponds to the source code that you're seeing?

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Because they could just have good source code, and then before they compile it into a binary,

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they put a little backdoor in there and publish a binary that has a backdoor.

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And so when I was working on BiggerCore, I was working mostly on this reproducible process.

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We even made it bootstrappable in the end, so working on user trust then.

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After I took a break from Bitcoin Core in 2022, I was looking around and I was actually one of my good friends, Matt, who was telling me about Apple iCloud Relay.

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And, you know, through all these years, like every time I go back, visit relatives or whatever, I like test out the great firewall.

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I'm like, hey, what new tricks have you got up at Sleaze?

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At a certain point, it started.

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So like OpenVPN was good for a bit and everybody, oh, OpenVPN, pretty good.

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Well, I had the TCP over TCP problem, but whatever.

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OpenVPN was good for a bit.

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And then it started being able to fingerprint OpenVPN, right?

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And then start blocking that.

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So you want to move to something else.

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WireGuard came out and was like a huge, you know, that was monumental, I want to say, what Jason Donnell did.

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And then because it was UDP and there's better performance, yada, yada, yada, emulates IP stack.

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And then the Great Firewall started being able to fingerprint that because that was kind of easy to fingerprint, I will say, the WireGuard handshake.

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And so throughout all of these learnings, I think what we found and now there are better protocols with obfuscation and things like that.

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But the main learning basically from all these years of fighting against the great firewall is that people who restrict networks still want to let some good traffic, what they consider good traffic, out.

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And that is what you need to exploit.

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It's not like we're going to have magically the best cryptography in the world and it's going to look indistinguishable from a pseudo random stream and there are no headers, nothing to fingerprint.

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To someone with a restrictive network, they could just be like, this looks too random.

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I'm going to just drop this.

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I'm just going to drop this connection.

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What you really want is you want some obfuscation so you look like normal traffic.

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You look like regular HTTP traffic.

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And this was what's so brilliant,

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but I don't think they ever stated it in the Apple iCloud relay paper,

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is that because it's a scheme that's based on the Qlik protocol,

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it looks like normal HTTP traffic.

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So sort of on the obfuscation side,

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that was an innovation that they had that they never told anybody,

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I don't think because, you know, you don't like to say these things, but, you know, anybody who understands networking is like, oh, this is great.

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Right. And then the the big, I think, improvement that is sort of at the core of obscure as well is this concept of a multi-party relay or two party relay, let's say.

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So normally, when you use a VPN to access the website, you have you, you connect your computer, your laptop connects to the VPN, right?

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And then the VPN connects to the VPN server, and the VPN server connects to Google.com or something like that, right?

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And so that VPN server being the only man in the middle, they can see who you are, and they know exactly where you're going, right?

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They could correlate this information, build sort of information on this.

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And a lot of times, a lot of these VPN companies, they collect like your credit card information,

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your email, like they know where you live.

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They know everything about you, right?

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And they're this wholly unaccountable, privately owned company.

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And I don't think that I'm not saying that companies do this.

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I'm saying that for even the trustworthy companies, right?

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All it takes is a breach.

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All it takes is a breach that they don't notice for this to be leaked, even if they are trying

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their best to protect their information.

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I think that's a very important point.

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The innovation then of a multi-party relay is that the first hop, in our scheme, the first

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hop is Obscura.

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Obscura sees who you are, right?

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We know that you've paid, you know, if you pay via credit card, then we could technically,

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you know, see your address and things like that, right?

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Because you put it in.

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But we can see who you are, but we can never see where you're going.

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Right. We have no idea where you're going.

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And by the way, with Obscura, you can pay via Lightning and soon Monero.

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So we don't even know anything about you at all.

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Right. But the basis of it is that we can see who you are, but never where you're going.

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And the second hop, which is Mullvad, our partner, doesn't know who you are.

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It just sees it's, you know, one of a thousand users coming from Obscura, let's say.

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And they're the only ones knowing that you, like, one of a thousand obscure users is going to, you know, wick your feet or something like that, right?

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And so that multi-party relay separation really separates who you are from what you do, meaning that no single party can piece together that information.

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Even if, like, we were hacked, let's say, the hackers won't know where you're going, right?

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And that was like core innovation that I think made using a VPN and having privacy when using a VPN require a much lower level of trust in the provider.

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And I was like, this is the basis for the next generation of VPN providers.

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And I'm a VPN nerd, so I got to do it.

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Yeah, thank you for that.

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And so I think the first question that people will ask, and my mind goes to as well when you break this down, is this sounds a lot like a traditional...

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Actually, before we get into multi-hop, because that's where I was going to go with VPNs and how Mullvad, I think, has their multi-hop proton, etc.

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So I'd like to touch on the difference there.

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Can we touch on private relay first?

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Because I think it's one of the most misunderstood technologies, especially in our community.

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I think a lot of people wrote off Private Relay because it's from Apple, which is very fair, very justifiable.

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I get why our community doesn't love Apple.

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They do a lot of crappy things.

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And Private Relay in itself, I think, does have a lot of crappy things because it's not system-wide.

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It's only in the browser.

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It only works in Safari.

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You have to be in the Apple ecosystem to use it.

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So I get those criticisms.

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But if you actually read the white paper and all the people who know what they're talking about, like you alluded to,

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absolutely think that private relay is like this genius new thing that no one's ever really done before.

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So do you mind speaking a little bit more to private relay's tech and why it's cool?

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Oh, 100%. I mean, this is, and I will say I had the same reaction.

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Because like, I remember, everyone I know in your position had had like a, whoa, this is kind of crazy new tech.

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I'm saying like my initial reaction, let's say, because I didn't even read into it because I was like, oh, Apple's doing something, you know, probably not that interesting, you know, I'll table it.

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And then, you know, Matt's a good friend of mine.

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You know, he's a longtime Bitcoin core contributor.

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And like we nerd out about networking things all the time.

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And like he was telling me, hey, read this.

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I was like, OK, I better take this seriously.

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And so I actually read into what it was and I was like, oh, there's no way that this.

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So I think for people who are sort of feel a little bit iffy about the Apple side of things, read up on mask.

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Mask is sort of the generalized, M-A-S-Q-U-E.

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Mask is sort of the generalized protocol that Apple iCloud Relay is operating over.

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And Mask is sort of, there's an IETF working group now working on Mask.

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And, you know, we take a lot of inspiration from Mask.

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We've made a little bit of, a little more optimizations on Mask, you know.

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But, you know, mask is generally the scheme.

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And mask is exactly what I describe of, you know, these multi-party relays, right?

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Being able to set up through open protocols, multi-party relays that are privacy preserving for your IP address.

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And mask works over quick.

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And the quick part, I was talking before a little bit about how quick looks like, well, it's what HTTP, what's underlying HTTP3, right?

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So quick allows your connection to look like regular internet traffic, right?

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If you go on Google.com right now, you're actually using quick to connect to Google.com because most of these big sites have already enabled HTTP3, which runs over quick.

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And so to a network operator, right, your connection over Qwik to Obscura or over iCloud

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Relay looks very similar or is much harder to distinguish from a Qwik connection to Google

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to, you know, regular sites and things like that.

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So that's one big win for using Qwik as the tunneling protocol, tunneling transport protocol.

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The other one is, yeah, the other one is in the old days, before Qwik, we basically just had TCP, right?

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HTTP 1 and HTTP 2 was over the TCP transport protocol.

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And so if you want it to look like HTTP, you need to basically tunnel traffic through TCP.

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But tunneling traffic through TCP is one of the worst decisions that you can make.

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because it leads to, how can I explain this?

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It leads to a conflict in between the TCP connection

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that's carrying your packets from your computer

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to the VPN server and the TCP connection

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that's between you and the end site.

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Because you're basically tunneling one TCP connection

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inside another and TCP is a protocol

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where it tries to do retransmissions and tries to adjust its own windows.

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And it really is meant to operate over something like IP, something that is unreliable, as we say in the networking world.

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And basically, it all just leads to a lot of stuttering, a lot of like, you know, when you see in the video, it just goes, it just sort of fast forwards a little bit.

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And so TCP was terrible. And that was the other innovation is in Qwik, you can do unreliable datagrams, as I was saying before.

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So you avoid completely this problem of things not being smooth, of videos scrolling forward, the jitteriness of the network tunneling, and you preserve the fact that it looks like regular internet traffic, which was so genius.

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So a cool backstory on this.

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I remember I was in love.

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I was in love with mask.

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And I remember I was looking, I looked at the IETF RFCs, right?

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The internet drafts and at the RFCs that I was like, okay, I got to implement this.

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So I implanted the mask UDP extension in both Rust and Go before I was like, okay, this is actually like something that works.

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And then I went to the IETF conference and talked with them about it.

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And to confirm, let's say that I'm, you know, knocking on the right door.

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I don't know.

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I'm going down the right rabbit hole, let's say.

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And yeah, totally.

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It's a great innovation.

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Yeah.

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So one thing also about private relay that I've seen and maybe how does it compare maybe to your model where it is a trustless model for Apple?

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Like you don't have to trust Apple in private relay because they include a partner.

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So is that similar to what you guys are doing?

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Yes, exactly.

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So in private relay, what happens is the two parties are Apple and Cloudflare.

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Oh, well, there's Cloudflare, Akamai, and Fastly, I think are the three.

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They might have added more recently, right?

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So basically, you don't have to trust Apple.

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The two parties are such.

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If both of them were compromised, then that's a different story, let's say.

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But you don't have to trust Apple itself.

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It's multi-party.

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the one you have to you have to make basically make sure that not both of them are compromised

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that's how it works so in obscura it is also the case and that you don't have to trust obscura

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for your privacy you just have to trust that not both obscura and all that is compromised and

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sharing data which you know it wouldn't make any sense for Mullvad to like risk their well-built

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reputation for like little me let's say yeah yeah and i guess um for people who are

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00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:39,880
because you know one of the cool things about being in the position i'm in is over time getting

209
00:18:39,910 --> 00:18:45,360
to know people like you behind the projects a bit better and seeing that 90 percent of people who run

210
00:18:45,500 --> 00:18:51,799
these projects are like wonderful 90 plus percent you know that's not like nine out of ten it's like

211
00:18:51,820 --> 00:18:56,840
a majority of people are like extremely awesome people who are doing some really good work. They

212
00:18:57,040 --> 00:19:03,420
really care about this. And they would never jeopardize their users in a way that was intentional.

213
00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:10,200
No, 100%. But to someone who is more critical, they want like absolute peace of mind, how do they

214
00:19:10,380 --> 00:19:15,700
know? Like, you know, when you say partnership, it sounds like that also could equally mean, well,

215
00:19:15,900 --> 00:19:19,820
we also collaborate on user data. So what does like the partnership look like?

216
00:19:19,880 --> 00:19:29,780
Yeah, interesting. So I'll make two points on this, right? One is what we have with multi-party

217
00:19:30,030 --> 00:19:37,820
relay is strictly better than a single-party relay, right? There is no case in which we are worse in

218
00:19:37,870 --> 00:19:42,800
terms of privacy and being able to access your data than a single-party relay. And when I mean

219
00:19:42,910 --> 00:19:48,519
single-party relay, I mean every single other VPN out there, right? There is no case. So it's a

220
00:19:48,540 --> 00:19:56,100
strict improvement, right? If you want to sort of look more closely on sort of how can you trust that,

221
00:19:56,370 --> 00:20:03,680
you can go to the Obscura VPN app. I mean, you can look at your app on your computer and you can go to

222
00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:11,040
the locations page and you can look at literally the public key, the WireGuard public key of the

223
00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:15,820
Molvat exit that you're connected to and what you're encrypting your data to.

224
00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:22,320
So unless they have, and by the way, you can, there's a link there.

225
00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:30,560
You can click and it links to on Molvat's own server website where they publish the key for

226
00:20:30,760 --> 00:20:31,500
that exit server.

227
00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:38,419
So unless they have, I mean, I think anybody, unless they have given us the WireGuard private

228
00:20:38,440 --> 00:20:46,380
key of their servers where all of their other customers are also on, we cannot see your data.

229
00:20:46,580 --> 00:20:53,500
Like that is basically how it is, right? And of course, I think there's always things that we can

230
00:20:53,620 --> 00:20:59,400
do to improve it. And that's what we want to do, right? We want to push forward this industry. For

231
00:20:59,580 --> 00:21:05,779
example, we want to do reproducible builds. Now we've been very busy getting all the other features

232
00:21:05,800 --> 00:21:10,240
out there like iOS, Monero and Android and everything else.

233
00:21:10,490 --> 00:21:13,620
But we want to do reproducible builds because at the end of the day, you want to look at

234
00:21:13,620 --> 00:21:14,280
our source code.

235
00:21:14,330 --> 00:21:17,220
You want to make sure that that is the app that we are releasing.

236
00:21:17,670 --> 00:21:17,800
Right.

237
00:21:18,700 --> 00:21:22,900
But I think our partnership with all that, I think, is very simple.

238
00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:30,980
We pay them money for, you know, to be able to like send traffic to their servers and that's

239
00:21:31,080 --> 00:21:31,220
it.

240
00:21:31,410 --> 00:21:32,600
You know, it's very simple.

241
00:21:34,100 --> 00:21:34,300
Yeah.

242
00:21:34,460 --> 00:21:39,900
And then do you mind speaking a little bit to the multi-hop now of a traditional VPN provider?

243
00:21:40,240 --> 00:21:42,780
So I use some of these features myself.

244
00:21:43,010 --> 00:21:46,680
So I'm not here to just say, don't use these.

245
00:21:46,880 --> 00:21:48,380
And I'm not just trying to make them look bad.

246
00:21:48,610 --> 00:21:51,040
But I think it's important to talk about what the key differences are.

247
00:21:51,200 --> 00:21:55,200
So like Proton VPNs, multi-hop, Mullvads, multi-hop.

248
00:21:55,290 --> 00:22:00,200
I think even Nord and the more popular VPNs provide similar functionality as well.

249
00:22:00,440 --> 00:22:06,880
So how is you connecting to two different servers from the same company different from what you're doing with Mullvad?

250
00:22:07,260 --> 00:22:12,860
Yeah, I think, you know, when we were just talking about the security, it's all about security model, right?

251
00:22:13,360 --> 00:22:24,340
When we were just talking about the security model, we were like, oh, in two-party relay, as long as both parties aren't collaborating, you have better privacy, right, than a single-party relay.

252
00:22:24,880 --> 00:22:30,980
I mean, in a multi-hop, it's by definition true that the two parties are collaborating

253
00:22:31,230 --> 00:22:32,640
because it's the same entity, right?

254
00:22:32,760 --> 00:22:33,440
It's the same company.

255
00:22:33,780 --> 00:22:39,000
In certain scenarios, it might offer better privacy, but I think it's just a little bit

256
00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:40,280
-- it's qualitatively different.

257
00:22:40,590 --> 00:22:41,040
What are those?

258
00:22:42,180 --> 00:22:46,420
What are the scenarios where it would give you better privacy in like a traditional multi-hop

259
00:22:46,600 --> 00:22:46,700
setup?

260
00:22:47,540 --> 00:22:55,160
let's say you have the two hops in jurisdictions that are not friendly with each other.

261
00:22:55,640 --> 00:23:03,340
So if there's enough people doing multi-hop between these two locations, you may have a big enough

262
00:23:04,140 --> 00:23:12,300
anonymity set versus a global passive adversary. That's sort of the steel man case for multi-hop.

263
00:23:12,740 --> 00:23:21,540
But I think in most, I don't want to be crass, but I think in most cases, it's just you're just adding a little bit of latency for it.

264
00:23:21,540 --> 00:23:22,400
I don't know why.

265
00:23:23,060 --> 00:23:26,080
I think for, you know, I have to believe in my own product.

266
00:23:26,160 --> 00:23:32,860
I think, you know, two-party relay is really the future here because you want separate entities.

267
00:23:33,420 --> 00:23:33,560
Okay.

268
00:23:33,680 --> 00:23:37,720
So, you know, as we've already been talking, I've been laying out some extra questions here.

269
00:23:39,320 --> 00:23:51,640
So, you know, we started this with talking about censorship resistance and kind of your original motivations of trying to bypass the great firewall and then, you know, spoofing Mac addresses and all this fun stuff.

270
00:23:51,760 --> 00:24:03,480
So does Obscura add any layer of censorship resistance that just regular Mullvad would provide you? Is there any difference here? Do you add more or less or is it equivalent?

271
00:24:04,120 --> 00:24:11,680
No, I think we definitely add more in that, you know, the censorship resistant part comes

272
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:13,540
from our obfuscation, right?

273
00:24:13,830 --> 00:24:22,960
Comes from the fact that to a network operator, we look like HTTP3 traffic, which is much harder

274
00:24:22,990 --> 00:24:24,420
for them to differentiate.

275
00:24:24,750 --> 00:24:31,460
There was actually a new paper that came out about the difficulties of quick censorship and

276
00:24:31,500 --> 00:24:32,280
everything else like that.

277
00:24:32,420 --> 00:24:38,680
They were measuring across different nation states that tried to censor QUIC and see sort

278
00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:39,980
of ways to get around that.

279
00:24:40,130 --> 00:24:46,220
And it sort of paints a picture that people are not doing a great job, let's say, at censoring

280
00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:48,260
QUIC because QUIC is pretty hard.

281
00:24:48,540 --> 00:24:48,960
It's QUIC.

282
00:24:49,360 --> 00:24:50,540
It slips by you, I guess.

283
00:24:50,580 --> 00:25:12,640
And so when you connect using WireGuard, let's say, which is what every other sane VPN company would do, when you connect using WireGuard, it's quite easy to fingerprint in that it's UDP traffic.

284
00:25:12,940 --> 00:25:15,719
It has, you know, like the handshake.

285
00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:22,580
I mean, we are UDP traffic too, but it's UDP traffic with a very fingerprintable handshake pattern.

286
00:25:22,980 --> 00:25:25,220
And the packets are very well distinguished.

287
00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:32,960
And there's basically only one reason why you would be using Wirecard in that fingerprintable of a way, right?

288
00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:39,080
Versus for Quick, you could be using Obscure, you could be going on Google.com, you could be doing anything, right?

289
00:25:39,140 --> 00:25:45,100
And that's where the censorship, this is a concept called collateral freedom.

290
00:25:45,700 --> 00:25:50,280
I encourage every listener to look up, there's a Wikipedia page on it.

291
00:25:50,460 --> 00:25:58,060
I think collateral freedom is very important in building censorship resistant tools in people

292
00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:06,899
participating in a way such that we sort of raise everybody up, such that our normal usage

293
00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:12,540
makes everybody more censorship resistant. And I think that's sort of one of the genius strokes,

294
00:26:12,820 --> 00:26:19,560
let's say, of Mask and Quick. Got it. And so for a listener as well as myself, because

295
00:26:20,440 --> 00:26:25,580
my brain, networking and my brain just definitely don't click as well as it might for you.

296
00:26:25,740 --> 00:26:31,139
Okay, sorry. So for the hop, so the censorship that would happen

297
00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:38,420
would be between you and Obscura slash the VPN. So if I was traditionally connecting to Mullvad

298
00:26:38,620 --> 00:26:42,720
and I was in a place that didn't want me to connect to a VPN, it would say, hey, we recognize

299
00:26:42,900 --> 00:26:47,520
this is VPN traffic, so they're going to block it, and then I can't connect to Mullvad. With you guys,

300
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:52,540
you guys have a different protocol so that when I'm connecting to Obscura instead of Mullvad VPN

301
00:26:52,780 --> 00:26:59,200
directly, I'm getting far better ability to blend in with other traffic, so it's harder to block that.

302
00:26:59,780 --> 00:27:05,380
But then once it hits you, you can freely transfer that data to Mullvad without any censorship concerns.

303
00:27:05,460 --> 00:27:06,280
That's exactly it.

304
00:27:07,260 --> 00:27:07,520
Got it.

305
00:27:07,660 --> 00:27:07,780
Okay.

306
00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:09,660
So it's that first hop that you're getting the main benefit.

307
00:27:09,660 --> 00:27:10,420
It's that first hop.

308
00:27:10,720 --> 00:27:12,100
Sorry, I shouldn't explain that.

309
00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:12,980
It's that first hop.

310
00:27:13,120 --> 00:27:14,800
That's the most important hop, right?

311
00:27:14,960 --> 00:27:15,080
Got it.

312
00:27:15,360 --> 00:27:19,720
Because you're probably, you know, connecting through, I don't know, your company Wi-Fi.

313
00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:22,080
You know, it could be anything, right?

314
00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:24,760
A nation state Wi-Fi, you know, whatever, right?

315
00:27:25,520 --> 00:27:27,400
And yes, we blend in better.

316
00:27:27,860 --> 00:27:29,180
We look like normal traffic.

317
00:27:29,660 --> 00:27:33,140
And so it's less likely to be blocked at the first hops.

318
00:27:33,460 --> 00:27:46,360
So what would, if I was a network administrator and I worked for my local company and I was just, you know, snooping on my employees' web traffic, what would Molvad VPN look like on the network versus Obscura?

319
00:27:46,540 --> 00:27:48,220
Like, what would a network administrator see?

320
00:27:48,780 --> 00:27:56,180
So I actually have this on my, I run Ubiquity at home, which is a bit nice.

321
00:27:57,220 --> 00:27:58,760
And you do get a little dashboard.

322
00:27:59,940 --> 00:28:06,160
And so before I built all of this, it was like, I don't know, 90% literally identified WireGuard traffic.

323
00:28:06,460 --> 00:28:13,500
And then now it's like 90% quick traffic with sort of no identification as to what it is.

324
00:28:13,760 --> 00:28:22,080
There is technically a way to identify what host name you're connecting to via this thing called TLS-SNI.

325
00:28:22,300 --> 00:28:23,880
I won't go into the technical details.

326
00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:29,560
It basically just tells you like you're going to google.com or going to youtube.com or whatever,

327
00:28:29,900 --> 00:28:30,040
right?

328
00:28:30,640 --> 00:28:35,740
But there's one guy that I talked to at Google that made a very cool scheme.

329
00:28:35,990 --> 00:28:41,780
So in Google Chrome, this part of the quick packet gets chopped up and then shuffled around.

330
00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:44,240
And so most routers just give up.

331
00:28:44,350 --> 00:28:46,240
They just don't try to even read that part.

332
00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:50,920
And for us, we'll probably implement that at some point.

333
00:28:51,980 --> 00:28:58,540
But also for us, we sort of, because we control the networking stack and we can just set this

334
00:28:58,780 --> 00:29:05,660
to whatever, we sometimes set it to example.com or like just an empty string or something like

335
00:29:05,820 --> 00:29:05,900
that.

336
00:29:05,980 --> 00:29:07,500
And so nobody sees it.

337
00:29:08,300 --> 00:29:12,400
So is that customizable for an Obscura customer or is that just done by default?

338
00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:14,340
That's done by default for them.

339
00:29:14,480 --> 00:29:17,420
We try to make the defaults sane.

340
00:29:18,740 --> 00:29:29,160
And, yeah, and, you know, it's only because we're like a bunch of networking nerds and protocol nerds that we're able to sort of get all this together.

341
00:29:29,440 --> 00:29:30,520
So I'm very happy with it.

342
00:29:31,700 --> 00:29:31,960
Got it.

343
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,220
And then kind of a final question here.

344
00:29:34,720 --> 00:29:37,620
So in this hop, you know, trying to visualize it.

345
00:29:37,640 --> 00:29:45,380
So, you know, someone gets the censorship resistance and they connect through you, which adds a party to remove trust even from Mullvad.

346
00:29:45,860 --> 00:29:47,760
And then you forward traffic to Mullvad.

347
00:29:47,980 --> 00:29:53,020
So then is your exit IP when you're accessing all the websites online going to be Mullvad where

348
00:29:53,360 --> 00:29:56,660
if I access Mullvad's website, it says you're using Mullvad even though I'm using Obscura?

349
00:29:56,840 --> 00:29:57,680
Yeah. Okay.

350
00:29:57,940 --> 00:30:06,620
Yeah. Many people have found this out in that they go to the Mullvad.net/check and it's like

351
00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:11,980
read checkmark and I'm like, yeah, that's how you know that we're working. We're not just like,

352
00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:20,020
oh we're using mulvac you know it works yeah and um i guess one thing obscura probably doesn't

353
00:30:20,260 --> 00:30:24,680
deal with then based on the way that works is you're still going to get blocked on websites that

354
00:30:24,760 --> 00:30:30,480
block mulvac traffic you're probably still going to get captured online so obscura doesn't help that

355
00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:36,219
specific no we don't we don't help with that specific problem right now i think you know we

356
00:30:37,140 --> 00:30:43,160
We're doing research into the best ways to do split tunneling.

357
00:30:43,510 --> 00:30:50,280
Because I think we've had now a couple of VPNs give their try into split tunneling.

358
00:30:50,440 --> 00:30:52,920
You know, some of them are per app.

359
00:30:53,120 --> 00:30:55,080
Some of them try to do per URL.

360
00:30:55,430 --> 00:31:01,700
But that's very, you can leak a lot if you're doing per URL.

361
00:31:03,140 --> 00:31:07,420
And so we're trying to make sure that we do it in the right way.

362
00:31:08,360 --> 00:31:11,660
And I think there will be big news when we do announce what we have.

363
00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:13,400
So stay tuned.

364
00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:15,800
A bit of a niche question, more for myself.

365
00:31:16,320 --> 00:31:19,760
I think for people who are really into networking, they're like, this is a horrible idea.

366
00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:20,360
Never do this.

367
00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:23,380
But I do enjoy using a custom DNS with my VPN connection.

368
00:31:23,840 --> 00:31:25,380
I like having my own filtering.

369
00:31:25,760 --> 00:31:32,540
I don't mind if sites can see like, oh, this one user is using a different DNS from all the other people connected to the same IP address.

370
00:31:33,220 --> 00:31:35,740
I'm fine with that if I need better fingerprint resistance

371
00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:42,900
I'm using Tor. So for me the VPN isn't as hardcore of a tool for that specific use case and I

372
00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:49,280
absolutely love Next DNS and AdGuard and all these tools. Can you still do that with you guys?

373
00:31:49,620 --> 00:31:58,439
So we've I've I did I'm personally not like a custom DNS kind of user so I was kind of

374
00:31:58,460 --> 00:32:05,000
overwhelmed with emails from people. I use the next DNS profile, but it sometimes works with

375
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:11,640
the material and sometimes it doesn't. This is our next big project after, well, not big project,

376
00:32:11,770 --> 00:32:18,700
medium-sized project, let's say, after we are done with our post-IOS cleanup. We're going to do

377
00:32:19,150 --> 00:32:25,560
custom DNS. We're going to do on-demand connections on iOS. This is definitely, that's top of mind.

378
00:32:26,640 --> 00:32:31,240
And yeah, I think, you know, people should be able to customize their system.

379
00:32:31,780 --> 00:32:35,800
I think, you know, advanced users should be able to do whatever they want because we love

380
00:32:36,020 --> 00:32:36,880
networking nerds, you know.

381
00:32:38,460 --> 00:32:38,640
Cool.

382
00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:41,320
And then, you know, I guess I should have asked this earlier.

383
00:32:41,840 --> 00:32:43,020
Why did you guys pick Mullvad?

384
00:32:43,740 --> 00:32:46,660
I know there's a few other trusted VPN providers in the space.

385
00:32:47,080 --> 00:32:51,940
I'd normally say like the most trusted overall seem to be iVPN, Mullvad, and Proton.

386
00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:52,300
Yep.

387
00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:56,800
So I don't know if Mullvad was just a better fit for you guys.

388
00:32:56,870 --> 00:32:58,220
Were they more open to a partnership?

389
00:32:58,790 --> 00:33:01,740
I'd love to hear a little bit more about why you picked Mullvad for that second hop.

390
00:33:01,780 --> 00:33:05,920
It wasn't much of a pick for me.

391
00:33:06,170 --> 00:33:16,060
So I think to me, when I was still in college and using all these different commercial options

392
00:33:16,130 --> 00:33:18,700
and trying them out and everything else like that, right?

393
00:33:18,920 --> 00:33:23,840
When Molvad was like, hey, we don't need your email.

394
00:33:24,310 --> 00:33:25,760
We just need a random number.

395
00:33:26,760 --> 00:33:30,800
That really showed to me like where they're coming from.

396
00:33:31,480 --> 00:33:31,580
Right.

397
00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:37,040
And it's the same stance that we try to take, which is like, what is the least amount of

398
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:41,700
information we can have about you and still be able to provide you the service?

399
00:33:42,400 --> 00:33:42,580
Right.

400
00:33:43,040 --> 00:33:48,640
And that like, just generate a random number, you know, like why do we need an email?

401
00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:57,220
And it made me, you know, it carved out a special place in my heart for them, let's say.

402
00:33:58,360 --> 00:34:07,000
And I think in 2020, I think a COVID weekend project was, you know, they were accepting Bitcoin already.

403
00:34:08,240 --> 00:34:12,960
And, you know, I was like, hey, you guys got to accept Lightning or something.

404
00:34:13,500 --> 00:34:23,740
And so I just emailed them and I was like, hey, can I just resell Molvad for Lightning on my site that I put up in a weekend?

405
00:34:24,460 --> 00:34:32,159
And they replied with a PGP encrypted email being like, yeah, sure, let's do this.

406
00:34:32,659 --> 00:34:42,720
And I started doing this with Molvad and every few years I would top up that little plain HTML website and it worked and people wanted it.

407
00:34:43,679 --> 00:34:54,419
And so when it came time to look at what we should do for Obscura, I was like, you know, there's no, they're my first choice, let's say.

408
00:34:55,080 --> 00:34:55,760
They're my first choice.

409
00:34:55,790 --> 00:35:04,800
And I think they keep doing things that I think make them almost unbeatable in terms of trustworthiness.

410
00:35:05,390 --> 00:35:08,460
Although I will say Proton and IPPN do a lot of things as well.

411
00:35:08,900 --> 00:35:12,500
But they keep doing things like, let's just deprecate OpenVPN.

412
00:35:12,940 --> 00:35:17,140
And to someone who like, think about these things a lot, right?

413
00:35:17,820 --> 00:35:23,720
OpenVPN is a gaping hole in security of any VPN company.

414
00:35:24,760 --> 00:35:36,860
OpenVPN is so complicated of a protocol and of an implementation with so many extensions and all those things that I don't think anybody can audit it.

415
00:35:37,820 --> 00:35:44,640
WireGuard, you can audit, let's say a sufficiently good auditor can audit, let's say in a few days.

416
00:35:45,300 --> 00:35:51,880
OpenVPN would take months. And so it's very different. And that's why we picked them. Yeah.

417
00:35:52,480 --> 00:35:56,820
Great. And then a few more questions that I have. I want to start by just kind of doing a quick

418
00:35:57,280 --> 00:36:03,020
comparison. So maybe just like 30 seconds of just explaining the different users that these tools

419
00:36:03,040 --> 00:36:09,260
are geared towards. So first, if somebody's all in in the Apple ecosystem, why would they pick

420
00:36:09,380 --> 00:36:16,720
Obscura over just using private relay? Right. I think two main things, right? One thing is that

421
00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:22,840
Apple iCloud Relay is only for Safari and only for, you know, your Apple devices. You might have

422
00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:31,200
other devices. Not only is it that it only covers the traffic that gets sent out by Safari and all

423
00:36:31,220 --> 00:36:38,020
those things. So it's not a whole system. It's not a whole IP stack relay. It's only for Safari,

424
00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:45,460
whereas we are a full-on VPN. Every IP packet that gets sent out goes through our tunnel,

425
00:36:46,480 --> 00:36:53,320
and so it'll cover all of your apps. I think a second thing is that it depends on what your trust

426
00:36:53,420 --> 00:37:01,720
model is, right? The two hops in Apple iCloud Relay is Apple and, you know, those Akamai,

427
00:37:01,920 --> 00:37:07,180
Fastly, and Cloudflare, right? Whereas for us, the two hops are Obscura and Mullvad. So,

428
00:37:07,480 --> 00:37:12,980
depends on what your trust model is there, too. And then how would you compare maybe

429
00:37:13,640 --> 00:37:22,400
just regular Mullvad to Obscura? Yeah, regular Mullvad to Obscura, I will say, you know, if you use

430
00:37:22,420 --> 00:37:28,640
Molvat, keep using Molvat. They're a great partner and we love them. I would say the regular Molvat

431
00:37:28,770 --> 00:37:37,020
versus obscure, I think the main thing is the two-party relay, right? You no longer have to worry

432
00:37:37,280 --> 00:37:43,220
about, okay, what if one of Molvat's servers get hacked, let's say, right? If a Molvat server,

433
00:37:43,470 --> 00:37:47,500
if you're just connecting to Molvat, if a Molvat server gets, because I feel like they're the most

434
00:37:47,520 --> 00:37:53,920
trustworthy ones. If the molvat server gets hacked, then in a way that molvat doesn't notice,

435
00:37:54,180 --> 00:37:57,980
I'm sure if they notice, they wouldn't fix it, right? If they get hacked in a way that they don't

436
00:37:58,140 --> 00:38:03,280
notice, then that attacker could be logging everything that's coming in, logging everything

437
00:38:03,420 --> 00:38:09,040
that's coming out, correlating them, building sort of a data set from that, right? Whereas with a

438
00:38:09,060 --> 00:38:14,280
two-party relay, if we get hacked, they still get nothing. If molvat gets hacked, they still get

439
00:38:14,300 --> 00:38:20,800
nothing. It really has to be a double hacking, let's say, and a correlation of things across

440
00:38:21,580 --> 00:38:26,180
different entities for them to get anything. So it's a much, it's a strictly better security

441
00:38:26,600 --> 00:38:32,580
model. And I think a much better security model. Got it. And then two more quick comparisons here.

442
00:38:32,740 --> 00:38:40,620
So one, how about something like a decentralized VPN? So I know IVPN acquired Safeng, who has the

443
00:38:40,640 --> 00:38:44,260
SPN, how would you compare yourself to something like that?

444
00:38:44,500 --> 00:38:51,120
I don't know the specifics of SPN and how they work, but I will say traditionally, and I've

445
00:38:51,300 --> 00:38:54,280
sort of tested some of these, I just haven't tested SPN.

446
00:38:55,420 --> 00:39:03,920
So traditionally, decentralized VPNs have the problem of almost the same as Tor of the exit

447
00:39:04,060 --> 00:39:07,360
nodes are run by volunteers.

448
00:39:08,200 --> 00:39:14,440
Less so on Tor's side, but decentralized VPNs, let's say, they're run by the nature of being

449
00:39:14,580 --> 00:39:15,620
decentralized, let's say.

450
00:39:16,440 --> 00:39:22,020
The exit nodes are run by random people, and all it takes is for a cat to trip over a power

451
00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:28,160
cable and for there to not be a UPS or something like that in the house for your connection to

452
00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:29,180
be interrupted, right?

453
00:39:29,300 --> 00:39:32,220
They might also have limited bandwidth up and down.

454
00:39:32,720 --> 00:39:35,920
It's just not the most reliable thing.

455
00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:42,200
However, I think they offer sometimes better, you know, more hops and things like that for

456
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:44,180
absolute anonymity and things like that.

457
00:39:44,640 --> 00:39:48,320
But I think no VPN is going to be perfect for every use case.

458
00:39:48,730 --> 00:39:55,340
The use case that we want to target is someone who is the use case where the person can have

459
00:39:55,340 --> 00:40:00,180
the VPN on 99% of the time, where it's fit for daily use.

460
00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:06,420
I don't think something like Tor or something like a decentralized VPN is fit for everyday

461
00:40:06,700 --> 00:40:10,020
use because of reliability, because of performance, because of everything else.

462
00:40:10,640 --> 00:40:14,520
And I think Obscura is because I'm talking to you through it right now.

463
00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:16,620
You know, we made the optimization.

464
00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:21,500
We made sure that we have bare metal servers, all optimized Rust software.

465
00:40:22,040 --> 00:40:25,640
We did the work to make sure that is good for daily use.

466
00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:39,860
And the point I also want to make is I think we want in the privacy space to make more tools that are suitable for daily use and suitable for normies.

467
00:40:39,900 --> 00:40:47,260
I don't like that. You know, it's a derogatory term, but, you know, suitable for normies because that's that's the way that we move our cause forward.

468
00:40:47,500 --> 00:40:54,820
Right. That's the way that we expanded and and sort of expanded as a fundamental human right is to make it available for everybody.

469
00:40:56,440 --> 00:41:02,380
Got it. And then is the fourth one was going to be Tor? Is there any specific you want to add to Tor

470
00:41:02,520 --> 00:41:09,360
or is it kind of the same answer as decentralized VPN? Yeah, I mean, I basically covered it all. I

471
00:41:09,360 --> 00:41:15,280
mean, I just wouldn't use Tor to, you know, watch a 4K HDR video, but I do it on Obscure every day,

472
00:41:15,360 --> 00:41:22,200
right? I wouldn't use Tor to do a video call. Although, like, amazing work that the Tor Foundation

473
00:41:22,220 --> 00:41:23,880
of like donate, please.

474
00:41:24,140 --> 00:41:27,340
Like it's amazing work, just different use cases.

475
00:41:27,920 --> 00:41:30,120
What's very interesting is in the Tor config,

476
00:41:30,860 --> 00:41:34,800
there is like a configuration line

477
00:41:35,000 --> 00:41:37,840
that's like just do two hops or something like that.

478
00:41:38,820 --> 00:41:40,920
And if you set it to true, it's basically obscure,

479
00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:42,800
which is really funny.

480
00:41:43,660 --> 00:41:47,520
And it's meant for Tor but better performance,

481
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:50,320
which is like, okay, that's what we are

482
00:41:50,660 --> 00:41:57,660
with professionally run hops, let's say. So it's funny. Let's pivot over to the clients a little

483
00:41:57,660 --> 00:42:03,480
bit more. Reproducible builds. This is something that I like to approach carefully because there's

484
00:42:04,330 --> 00:42:10,900
a lot of very intense people in the community who want best practice everywhere. And they see any

485
00:42:11,100 --> 00:42:16,380
software that's not reproducible and they say, well, I just can't trust it. And then you look at

486
00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:21,120
the actual amount of privacy and security software that we all know to be trusted that is not

487
00:42:21,460 --> 00:42:26,380
reproducible. And it's almost everything. There's very little reproducible software. So can you speak

488
00:42:26,380 --> 00:42:32,220
to the challenges of being reproducible, why you're not currently reproducible, and how you intend to

489
00:42:32,320 --> 00:42:42,340
be reproducible? Okay, so I can go on for days about this. This was my main work on Bitcoin Core.

490
00:42:42,400 --> 00:42:48,300
I think our work in Bitcoin Core basically pioneered bootstrappable reproducible builds.

491
00:42:49,110 --> 00:42:50,680
And so I can go on for days about this.

492
00:42:50,970 --> 00:42:52,580
But what I will say, the challenge...

493
00:42:52,580 --> 00:42:57,120
Do you also mind explaining what reproducible builds are for people who are new to this?

494
00:42:57,150 --> 00:42:57,260
Oh, yes, yes, of course.

495
00:42:57,360 --> 00:42:59,720
Sorry, I should have also asked that as well.

496
00:42:59,720 --> 00:42:59,840
Yes, yes, yes.

497
00:43:01,179 --> 00:43:08,060
So reproducible builds is, I've given the story before of you have a piece of software, let's

498
00:43:08,080 --> 00:43:09,000
Let's just say Bitcoin, right?

499
00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:14,580
Let's just say the Bitcoin Core software and it's all open source and you can see the source

500
00:43:14,740 --> 00:43:14,820
code.

501
00:43:14,860 --> 00:43:15,560
You can look at it.

502
00:43:15,560 --> 00:43:16,240
You can audit it.

503
00:43:16,240 --> 00:43:20,160
You can see that there's no malicious backdoor that's going to steal your money or whatever.

504
00:43:20,920 --> 00:43:27,480
But when you run that software, you download, I don't know, a disk image, a zip file, a whatever,

505
00:43:27,820 --> 00:43:30,540
from Bitcoin Core.org or GitHub or whatever.

506
00:43:31,120 --> 00:43:36,540
How do you know that what you're downloading is what the source code is showing?

507
00:43:37,160 --> 00:43:42,700
that way you're downloading is a binary, is an executable, let's say. They could have just before

508
00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:48,780
they produced this binary, put a little back door in there, you know, compiled their little thing,

509
00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:56,400
and then just distribute it to you, right? And for, let's say, you know, trillion dollar market cap,

510
00:43:57,200 --> 00:44:01,920
digital cash, let's say, I think that's pretty important to make sure that nobody can do that.

511
00:44:02,760 --> 00:44:13,580
And so reproducible builds is one where you have a set process such that given a code repository on GitHub,

512
00:44:15,060 --> 00:44:24,160
anybody on Earth can run a command that would build that repository into the final disk image.

513
00:44:24,550 --> 00:44:28,280
And the final disk image would be bit for bit reproducible.

514
00:44:28,590 --> 00:44:32,380
So every single one and zero would be exactly the same.

515
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:47,380
And so you can have, you know, dozens of people all over the world run the same build and sign their own build and then compare and see that everybody got the same result and nobody was putting a backdoor in it.

516
00:44:47,920 --> 00:44:50,780
Right. This is the beauty of reproducible builds.

517
00:44:52,360 --> 00:45:11,940
However, I will say it is one of the, I get a little joy out of doing it just because like, I'm one of two dozen people in the world who like, you know, enjoy doing it and have contributed to the reproducible builds like website and everything else like that.

518
00:45:13,120 --> 00:45:27,280
But it gets like, for example, in C, you can put in underscore underscore file underscore underscore, which just embeds the current path of the current file inside your program.

519
00:45:28,140 --> 00:45:28,440
Guess what?

520
00:45:28,880 --> 00:45:32,560
Everybody checks out their Bitcoin core directory to a different folder.

521
00:45:32,720 --> 00:45:34,420
Some people put it in documents.

522
00:45:34,560 --> 00:45:36,420
Some people put it in their own folder, whatever.

523
00:45:37,140 --> 00:45:39,240
That makes it unreproducible, right?

524
00:45:39,920 --> 00:45:43,800
Sometimes some programs are like, yeah, I'll just put a timestamp in there.

525
00:45:43,980 --> 00:45:44,580
What's the harm?

526
00:45:44,620 --> 00:45:45,120
I'll just put it.

527
00:45:45,320 --> 00:45:47,300
I produced this thing at this time.

528
00:45:47,460 --> 00:45:49,380
I'll just put it in there so somebody can see it, right?

529
00:45:49,980 --> 00:45:50,320
Guess what?

530
00:45:50,420 --> 00:45:54,080
That makes it unreproducible because one guy is compiling on this day.

531
00:45:54,120 --> 00:45:55,480
The other guy is compiling on this day.

532
00:45:56,140 --> 00:45:58,320
There's a whole slew of things.

533
00:45:58,560 --> 00:46:03,500
And you basically need to look through every build tool and fix every little thing before

534
00:46:03,740 --> 00:46:07,740
it gets to be reproducible and everybody can trust it, right?

535
00:46:08,100 --> 00:46:10,120
So that is why it's such a challenge.

536
00:46:10,840 --> 00:46:16,440
And when tools are not immediately reproducible, especially with like small teams and whatever,

537
00:46:17,000 --> 00:46:18,200
I'm like, I get it.

538
00:46:18,440 --> 00:46:24,440
This is like two people's full-time jobs just to get it to happen within like a year and

539
00:46:24,540 --> 00:46:24,780
a half.

540
00:46:25,120 --> 00:46:27,460
You know, I totally get it.

541
00:46:27,940 --> 00:46:36,680
The reason why we're not reproducible is because this is a harder challenge even than Bitcoin

542
00:46:36,700 --> 00:46:43,420
core because we are working we're building mac os and ios apps and not only are we building mac os

543
00:46:43,420 --> 00:46:51,920
and ios apps we are using their system extension and network extension system which expects files

544
00:46:52,580 --> 00:47:00,040
to be laid out in a very particular way and to be signed in a very particular way

545
00:47:01,520 --> 00:47:11,520
And that verification differs from one operating system to the next and can break unexpectedly on offline systems.

546
00:47:12,220 --> 00:47:22,160
So if you don't do it with Xcode, which is the worst piece of software ever written, if you don't do it with Xcode, you are bound to get it wrong, basically.

547
00:47:22,780 --> 00:47:24,800
And so we have to do it with Xcode.

548
00:47:25,020 --> 00:47:30,420
And Xcode is not something where I'm like, oh, there's this piece of reproducibility problem.

549
00:47:31,000 --> 00:47:32,740
Let me upstream my change.

550
00:47:32,950 --> 00:47:34,500
Let me change Xcode and upstream.

551
00:47:34,580 --> 00:47:36,660
No, I have to work around it somehow.

552
00:47:37,030 --> 00:47:43,380
I have an experimental branch and it works okay, but it is a lot of pain and I need to

553
00:47:43,520 --> 00:47:45,940
rebase over our new changes and everything else.

554
00:47:46,140 --> 00:47:48,420
It's quite a lot to set up.

555
00:47:48,420 --> 00:47:49,820
So I don't blame people.

556
00:47:50,090 --> 00:47:54,400
I think Molvat has now taken the lead in some reproducibility.

557
00:47:54,580 --> 00:47:57,360
They've done it for Android, I think.

558
00:47:58,200 --> 00:48:03,080
Yeah, I think they have it for Android now, which is, you know, props to them.

559
00:48:03,720 --> 00:48:05,560
We should all be aiming for that.

560
00:48:06,180 --> 00:48:16,340
And hopefully Obscura gets enough new users that we can get more people on the team and get more reproducible builds going.

561
00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:19,000
Yeah, it's a tough problem.

562
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:24,740
I mean, literally some of the most trusted projects in this space that people love and adore still aren't fully reproducible.

563
00:48:24,960 --> 00:48:26,860
So it's something I also want to see more of.

564
00:48:27,060 --> 00:48:34,440
But right now, I think it's a very vocal minority, but there's these people that are like, well, if it's not reproducible, then I can't trust it.

565
00:48:34,490 --> 00:48:36,560
And it's like, well, what's your stack then?

566
00:48:37,240 --> 00:48:44,920
You're not going to have a very thorough stack because there's like three pieces of software I can think of off the top of my head that are properly reproducible.

567
00:48:44,940 --> 00:48:47,980
Geeks is the only properly reproducible.

568
00:48:48,380 --> 00:48:54,200
So there's actually, for those freaks out there who are listening, who have that mindset,

569
00:48:55,420 --> 00:49:04,120
you know, like the iceberg, the reproducibility iceberg, an iceberg level lower is bootstrapable

570
00:49:04,360 --> 00:49:04,540
builds.

571
00:49:04,720 --> 00:49:06,840
You should Google what bootstrapable builds are.

572
00:49:07,600 --> 00:49:12,460
Bootstrapable builds is, and this is what I did for Bitcoin Core, by the way, bootstrapable

573
00:49:12,480 --> 00:49:18,900
builds is protecting against an attack called the trusting trust attack that Ken Thompson,

574
00:49:19,840 --> 00:49:27,840
you know, of Unix fame proposed, whereby if you poison one generation of a compiler,

575
00:49:28,420 --> 00:49:36,560
you can have that poison propagate through future generations of compilers, even if the code for each

576
00:49:36,640 --> 00:49:39,740
compiler is good and doesn't have any bugs.

577
00:49:40,460 --> 00:49:44,680
That is sort of like an undetectable virus that can go through.

578
00:49:45,220 --> 00:49:49,540
And bootstrapable builds counters that to a certain degree.

579
00:49:50,040 --> 00:49:54,880
But anyway, that's my little thing for the freaks.

580
00:49:54,880 --> 00:49:54,940
Great.

581
00:49:54,960 --> 00:49:58,160
Now everyone listening is going to go, "I'm not going to trust anything anymore."

582
00:49:58,160 --> 00:49:58,480
No, no, no.

583
00:50:00,620 --> 00:50:05,760
You can at least trust Bitcoin Core, let's say, because we do have bootstrapable builds.

584
00:50:07,060 --> 00:50:12,980
There's actually a ticket open on the tour project that's like, look at what Carl did

585
00:50:13,240 --> 00:50:16,600
for bootstrappable builds for Bitcoin Core and try to copy it.

586
00:50:17,080 --> 00:50:19,060
And I was like, happy to answer questions.

587
00:50:20,340 --> 00:50:20,960
That's cool.

588
00:50:21,330 --> 00:50:21,960
Yeah, very cool.

589
00:50:22,220 --> 00:50:23,200
Good timing, actually.

590
00:50:23,270 --> 00:50:24,740
The next thing on my list here is clients.

591
00:50:25,100 --> 00:50:26,540
So you brought up macOS and iOS.

592
00:50:28,490 --> 00:50:30,080
A lot of questions might come from that.

593
00:50:31,320 --> 00:50:35,080
A, oh, why did this come up 54 minutes into the interview?

594
00:50:35,380 --> 00:50:36,760
I should have probably asked it earlier.

595
00:50:37,340 --> 00:50:38,880
Why did you start on iOS and macOS?

596
00:50:39,780 --> 00:50:44,280
Is your plan to extend to all major operating systems like Linux, Android, etc.?

597
00:50:45,580 --> 00:50:47,020
Yeah, just speaking on that, I guess.

598
00:50:47,880 --> 00:50:50,660
No, Henry, we're just going to forget about the rest of them.

599
00:50:50,900 --> 00:50:54,400
And, you know, we don't want to have a sustainable business.

600
00:50:54,620 --> 00:50:56,660
No, of course, we're going to get everybody.

601
00:50:57,060 --> 00:51:00,260
And this is sort of our main sprint right now.

602
00:51:00,500 --> 00:51:03,600
It's always hard, I think, running one of these software businesses,

603
00:51:04,060 --> 00:51:05,800
like, you know, balancing everything, right?

604
00:51:06,220 --> 00:51:07,760
Like, we want to do Android now,

605
00:51:08,240 --> 00:51:09,940
but we also want to do custom DNS,

606
00:51:10,350 --> 00:51:11,660
but we also want to do on-demand.

607
00:51:11,670 --> 00:51:12,500
We want to do everything

608
00:51:12,750 --> 00:51:13,920
and across all of the platforms.

609
00:51:14,660 --> 00:51:16,600
I will say the reason why we started

610
00:51:17,040 --> 00:51:19,300
with macOS and iOS

611
00:51:20,340 --> 00:51:23,520
is because there's something called the,

612
00:51:24,540 --> 00:51:25,720
I was just mentioning this,

613
00:51:25,840 --> 00:51:27,360
the network extension framework.

614
00:51:27,670 --> 00:51:29,320
And the network extension framework,

615
00:51:29,820 --> 00:51:31,160
I'm, you know, I have love,

616
00:51:31,400 --> 00:51:33,200
love, hate relationship with it for sure.

617
00:51:33,820 --> 00:51:44,820
But the network extension framework allows us to run a VPN in a special sandbox mode

618
00:51:45,120 --> 00:51:52,320
in which we don't have access to sort of the rest of your files and everything else.

619
00:51:53,500 --> 00:51:57,300
And that's very special to macOS.

620
00:51:58,700 --> 00:52:11,220
And macOS also has some integrity things built in, in terms of, which also causes problems, let's say.

621
00:52:12,040 --> 00:52:14,880
What I mean by is program integrity things, right?

622
00:52:15,180 --> 00:52:32,160
So somebody can't just publish an obscure VPN, you know, before we have reproducible builds, can't just publish an obscure VPN on SourceForge.com, on SourceForge and say this is obscure VPN, but it also actually does something bad, let's say.

623
00:52:32,200 --> 00:52:36,400
We know that it comes from us because we go through notarization and things like that.

624
00:52:36,620 --> 00:52:41,560
This actually happened in 2015 to Xcode itself.

625
00:52:42,680 --> 00:52:45,060
The vulnerability was called Xcode Ghost.

626
00:52:45,150 --> 00:52:51,820
So somebody through SEO got the top link for Xcode download and put a malware in there.

627
00:52:52,230 --> 00:52:53,620
And everybody was downloading it.

628
00:52:53,890 --> 00:53:02,320
And this was found in like, and the virus was found in some major apps like WeChat, like the biggest chat platform in China.

629
00:53:02,330 --> 00:53:05,060
Like that was, that had that virus in it, right?

630
00:53:05,420 --> 00:53:07,160
We just don't want any of that.

631
00:53:07,170 --> 00:53:08,720
And we looked into the Linux options.

632
00:53:09,420 --> 00:53:10,620
I am a Linux nerd.

633
00:53:10,640 --> 00:53:14,360
There was not that many good sort of program integrity options.

634
00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:21,220
And of course, the network extension being a little bit sandbox is somewhat unique as well.

635
00:53:21,580 --> 00:53:25,020
And so we thought to release on macOS and iOS first.

636
00:53:25,260 --> 00:53:30,940
But also one of the biggest things is that unfortunately, I use macOS.

637
00:53:31,000 --> 00:53:38,140
and as a macOS, I do not feel comfortable shipping anything

638
00:53:38,680 --> 00:53:42,380
that I haven't used and don't use 24-7, basically.

639
00:53:43,100 --> 00:53:45,100
That's sort of my bar for things.

640
00:53:46,100 --> 00:53:49,820
And I think that's the only way to make sure that we serve our users well.

641
00:53:50,340 --> 00:53:53,440
And so if I'm going to be on macOS, that's what I want to be on.

642
00:53:54,400 --> 00:53:58,100
But I will say to the listeners, we are working as fast as we can

643
00:53:58,120 --> 00:54:00,300
to get it on all other platforms.

644
00:54:01,000 --> 00:54:05,860
And do not worry, all of our engineers are Linux and Android freaks

645
00:54:06,980 --> 00:54:09,900
with one person who uses Windows quite a lot.

646
00:54:10,080 --> 00:54:15,560
So there will be a mutiny before we abandon any of the other platforms.

647
00:54:15,880 --> 00:54:17,220
And, of course, we do want to do them.

648
00:54:18,280 --> 00:54:20,980
Yeah, and not to add pressure,

649
00:54:21,300 --> 00:54:24,100
but do you have a very loose generic timeline

650
00:54:24,380 --> 00:54:27,300
on when to expect kind of those other options?

651
00:54:28,020 --> 00:54:30,400
Yeah, I'm happy to say loosely, let's say.

652
00:54:30,760 --> 00:54:31,680
Android is the next one.

653
00:54:32,460 --> 00:54:34,300
Android is our next big thing.

654
00:54:34,920 --> 00:54:36,200
Windows, I'll be honest.

655
00:54:36,480 --> 00:54:39,260
Windows, we will definitely do it.

656
00:54:39,580 --> 00:54:41,120
It's just way more difficult.

657
00:54:41,510 --> 00:54:44,680
And so we expect it to take much longer to do.

658
00:54:45,600 --> 00:54:47,620
Windows is just not POSIX, right?

659
00:54:47,660 --> 00:54:48,360
It's not Unix.

660
00:54:48,540 --> 00:54:49,780
It's not anything.

661
00:54:50,200 --> 00:54:51,580
It's a custom network stack.

662
00:54:52,220 --> 00:54:53,400
So we'd really...

663
00:54:53,780 --> 00:54:57,340
And hey, if somebody knows the VPN subsystem of Windows very well,

664
00:54:58,080 --> 00:55:03,340
please reach out to us. We would love to learn from you. But Windows is going to be pretty tough.

665
00:55:03,640 --> 00:55:09,620
It's going to take a while longer. So next up after some cleanups for iOS is going to be Android.

666
00:55:11,279 --> 00:55:17,180
Great. Okay, I have just a few questions left. Kind of the next section here is more about like

667
00:55:17,210 --> 00:55:22,859
the day-to-day usage. And then the last thing is maybe a little bit more about you guys as a business

668
00:55:22,880 --> 00:55:29,660
and who your team is. So to start speed. My first thought, one thing I do know about networking is

669
00:55:30,040 --> 00:55:35,140
there's a lot of physics involved and that physics shows up for me as someone who doesn't understand

670
00:55:35,400 --> 00:55:41,780
it as the more hops equals the slower it's going to be. So what's the obscure speed drop off,

671
00:55:41,850 --> 00:55:48,380
if any, when you're doing this extra hop to Moldad servers? Yeah, I think we did do a...

672
00:55:50,000 --> 00:56:00,120
Oh, I don't know to mold that servers, but I think last time I measured versus sort of line speed as in like no VPN was something like 15%.

673
00:56:00,780 --> 00:56:02,340
That was sort of the drop off.

674
00:56:03,470 --> 00:56:12,900
And I'll say that for us, we have made all the precautions to make sure that this is not noticeable at all.

675
00:56:13,520 --> 00:56:24,340
What we've done is we've picked locations and peering locations for our servers that are good for Malvan and for the rest of the internet.

676
00:56:25,380 --> 00:56:28,200
We've made sure that we write everything in Rust.

677
00:56:28,220 --> 00:56:35,040
We try to make sure that we're not incurring any latency where we don't need to be and things like that.

678
00:56:35,460 --> 00:56:45,200
And so what I will say is that for we have gotten, I don't like to toot my own horn, we have gotten emails.

679
00:56:46,290 --> 00:56:47,540
I actually tweeted about this.

680
00:56:48,460 --> 00:56:53,740
There was one guy who emailed me who was like, you know why I don't trust your VPN?

681
00:56:54,480 --> 00:56:56,100
Because it's too fast.

682
00:56:56,630 --> 00:56:59,960
Because I feel like I'm not even protected at all.

683
00:57:00,420 --> 00:57:06,540
And I'm like, can I please use this as marketing?

684
00:57:06,870 --> 00:57:08,600
Like, this is the best testimonial.

685
00:57:09,020 --> 00:57:10,740
He like wrote a whole rant about it.

686
00:57:10,740 --> 00:57:14,120
I was like, thank you, I guess.

687
00:57:15,600 --> 00:57:16,420
That was, yeah.

688
00:57:16,620 --> 00:57:18,360
And, you know, this is my experience, right?

689
00:57:18,460 --> 00:57:20,080
Like, you know, because I use it every day,

690
00:57:20,130 --> 00:57:21,720
this sort of goes back to the OS choice, right?

691
00:57:21,940 --> 00:57:22,860
Because I use it every day.

692
00:57:23,420 --> 00:57:26,740
If anything slows down, I am on my team's case.

693
00:57:26,960 --> 00:57:28,720
Maybe they don't like it, but I'm on my team's case

694
00:57:28,760 --> 00:57:31,220
because I want to make sure that as smooth as possible.

695
00:57:32,080 --> 00:57:35,320
I will say one thing that might be interesting to more technical folks,

696
00:57:35,500 --> 00:57:39,920
which is there is this concept of a performance enhancing proxy.

697
00:57:40,160 --> 00:57:41,180
This is a Wikipedia article.

698
00:57:41,260 --> 00:57:42,220
You can look it up.

699
00:57:43,720 --> 00:57:45,880
It's actually not the case that more hops,

700
00:57:46,140 --> 00:57:52,140
not always the case that more hops equals worse throughput.

701
00:57:53,120 --> 00:57:54,460
The throughput is very important here.

702
00:57:55,140 --> 00:57:55,860
Latency, of course.

703
00:57:56,240 --> 00:58:11,600
Throughput is very important here because in a performance enhancing proxy, basically, if you have stream-like protocols like TCP, what it likes is either have, God, I think it's, what is it called?

704
00:58:11,960 --> 00:58:15,640
the latency bandwidth multiple, something like that.

705
00:58:15,760 --> 00:58:18,980
So basically, if you're on cellular, right,

706
00:58:19,580 --> 00:58:23,220
if you're on cellular and you're connecting directly to google.com,

707
00:58:23,540 --> 00:58:26,360
you have a link that has, sorry, packet loss.

708
00:58:26,400 --> 00:58:31,100
Yeah, you have a link that's high packet loss and high latency, let's say.

709
00:58:31,580 --> 00:58:36,860
However, if you have a hop in the middle, let's say,

710
00:58:37,300 --> 00:58:44,740
a data center that's close to the ISP that the phone's connecting to, you can have one link that

711
00:58:44,770 --> 00:58:51,740
is high loss and low latency. Yeah, exactly. Basically, you trade off one for the other on

712
00:58:51,860 --> 00:58:57,660
one link and you trade off the other part for the other and you get overall better throughput. I'm

713
00:58:57,780 --> 00:59:02,420
sorry, I'm explaining this terribly, but please look up performance enhancing proxy. It's an amazing

714
00:59:02,440 --> 00:59:08,720
concept for the nerds out there. Very cool. And then defaults versus customization. You mentioned

715
00:59:08,820 --> 00:59:13,420
earlier you want the defaults to be beginner friendly. You want people to be able to just use

716
00:59:13,540 --> 00:59:18,360
it. But you also said you want to offer things like custom DNS tools. So currently, how do you

717
00:59:18,780 --> 00:59:23,280
balance this? Are there major features that you allow users to customize at the moment? Yeah, yeah,

718
00:59:23,480 --> 00:59:29,359
100%. So to me, it's like a UX thing, right? This is sort of just the user experience thing. We have

719
00:59:29,380 --> 00:59:36,340
same defaults. And then you can sort of just have a little, you know, like YouTube has stats for

720
00:59:36,560 --> 00:59:40,560
nerds, let's say, right? You know, like just a little, just a little accordion that drops down.

721
00:59:40,680 --> 00:59:44,400
That's like, Hey, here are like the advanced options. Like if you don't know where, and,

722
00:59:44,920 --> 00:59:51,120
you know, for the advanced options, we usually, there's actually one in, in our app right now,

723
00:59:51,250 --> 00:59:57,540
I can look it up. Yeah, exactly. So under network, we have this strict leak protection thing that's

724
00:59:57,560 --> 01:00:00,260
as opposed to protect against tunnel vision, right?

725
01:00:01,700 --> 01:00:03,240
Right now, the UI isn't great.

726
01:00:03,250 --> 01:00:06,900
We have like unstable and then like a whole paragraph explaining like

727
01:00:07,400 --> 01:00:11,000
why you probably don't want this for normal users

728
01:00:11,320 --> 01:00:13,820
because of macOS and iOS bugs always.

729
01:00:14,599 --> 01:00:19,760
And so I think we should always give users the options

730
01:00:20,460 --> 01:00:22,060
to do whatever they want,

731
01:00:22,620 --> 01:00:26,620
but present them in a way such that they can make their own choices.

732
01:00:27,280 --> 01:00:34,300
Now, have I gotten support emails about strict leak protection from people who don't fully

733
01:00:34,500 --> 01:00:38,460
understand what it's doing and have not read that paragraph that we read for them?

734
01:00:39,040 --> 01:00:43,980
Yes, but you know, such is my life and I'm okay with it.

735
01:00:43,980 --> 01:00:45,960
And I'm happy that they're at least using our service.

736
01:00:46,300 --> 01:00:46,660
Yeah.

737
01:00:46,880 --> 01:00:50,120
And then I saw on your website that it's $8 a month.

738
01:00:50,240 --> 01:00:53,780
So it's a little bit more than Mullvad, I assume because you're adding, you know, you still have

739
01:00:53,780 --> 01:00:54,420
to pay Mullvad.

740
01:00:54,480 --> 01:00:55,760
So there's a little extra there.

741
01:00:56,960 --> 01:00:58,300
Do you have annual plans?

742
01:00:58,520 --> 01:01:00,520
Is eight going to be kind of the flat rate?

743
01:01:00,900 --> 01:01:02,380
How many devices does that include?

744
01:01:03,060 --> 01:01:04,440
What's kind of the pricing structure there?

745
01:01:04,460 --> 01:01:09,520
Yeah, so $8 is basically flat.

746
01:01:10,120 --> 01:01:13,580
What we do if you do a year is just 12 times eight.

747
01:01:15,900 --> 01:01:20,360
We don't like to sort of mess with these things until we're further down the line and sort of

748
01:01:20,560 --> 01:01:22,580
understand our users some more.

749
01:01:22,700 --> 01:01:29,000
I also don't want users to be in doubt that we can support ourselves and that we can maintain

750
01:01:29,150 --> 01:01:30,380
this service going forward.

751
01:01:30,680 --> 01:01:32,960
It does cost money to run these servers.

752
01:01:33,340 --> 01:01:38,280
What that gets you is what we say is three active connections.

753
01:01:38,810 --> 01:01:45,640
So if you're connecting through the apps, you can register, you can have 500 Macs and 500

754
01:01:45,720 --> 01:01:53,600
iOS devices, let's say, signed in, but only three can be online as in connected at the

755
01:01:53,650 --> 01:01:54,020
same time.

756
01:01:54,070 --> 01:01:58,320
I think that's a pretty reasonable trade-off there.

757
01:01:58,560 --> 01:02:01,260
We also generate WireGuard configurations.

758
01:02:01,520 --> 01:02:05,100
So for anybody who's not on macOS and iOS, we have WireGuard configurations.

759
01:02:05,540 --> 01:02:07,820
This is a compatibility mode, right?

760
01:02:07,860 --> 01:02:09,800
We were just talking about how the first hop we use Quick.

761
01:02:09,960 --> 01:02:13,160
This is a compatibility mode where we use WireGuard for the first hop.

762
01:02:13,600 --> 01:02:18,660
Obviously, you don't get any of the obfuscation, you know, magic that comes with using our app.

763
01:02:19,800 --> 01:02:34,500
With the WireGuard configuration that you download, that takes up a slot permanently, as in it doesn't matter if you're connected or not, because, you know, WireGuard sort of loosely has, but doesn't really have a concept of connection, let's say.

764
01:02:34,780 --> 01:02:40,360
Got it. Now, just kind of, you know, zooming out and learning more about you guys, the company, etc.

765
01:02:41,200 --> 01:02:43,000
and kind of finishing this out here.

766
01:02:44,120 --> 01:02:44,740
Are you guys open source?

767
01:02:45,000 --> 01:02:46,060
I meant to ask this earlier.

768
01:02:46,100 --> 01:02:46,340
- Oh yeah.

769
01:02:46,560 --> 01:02:48,140
I mean, we have our source code on GitHub.

770
01:02:48,700 --> 01:02:50,520
We need to link it from more pages.

771
01:02:50,600 --> 01:02:52,360
I was just telling--

772
01:02:52,360 --> 01:02:54,640
- I'm on the homepage and I didn't see it there

773
01:02:54,740 --> 01:02:55,560
which is why I wanted to ask.

774
01:02:55,560 --> 01:02:56,780
- That's right, that's right.

775
01:02:58,700 --> 01:03:05,120
It's github.com/sovereign-engineering/obscurevpn-client.

776
01:03:05,240 --> 01:03:06,880
Anyway, we'll put it in the show notes.

777
01:03:09,740 --> 01:03:14,740
I think we have a sync from our internal code base, like every hour or so, or maybe every

778
01:03:14,920 --> 01:03:15,940
push I've forgotten.

779
01:03:16,390 --> 01:03:16,980
So it's all there.

780
01:03:17,160 --> 01:03:19,740
Even in the footer, like in the resources or...

781
01:03:19,740 --> 01:03:23,580
Yeah, I was just talking to our team about it yesterday.

782
01:03:23,670 --> 01:03:28,200
I was like, we don't have any place that links to this and this is completely public.

783
01:03:29,300 --> 01:03:29,580
And yeah.

784
01:03:30,740 --> 01:03:31,180
Cool.

785
01:03:31,370 --> 01:03:32,240
No, that's exciting.

786
01:03:32,420 --> 01:03:33,340
I'm glad it's open source.

787
01:03:33,760 --> 01:03:35,460
And I also wanted to ask about you guys.

788
01:03:35,700 --> 01:03:39,200
So I see some photos as well here and it looks like there's you and three others.

789
01:03:39,850 --> 01:03:41,440
But like, what's your team look like?

790
01:03:41,780 --> 01:03:45,580
When did you guys formally start and kind of become the formal team you are today?

791
01:03:45,810 --> 01:03:47,560
So I'd love to learn a little bit more about you guys.

792
01:03:47,680 --> 01:03:48,560
Yeah, yeah, 100%.

793
01:03:48,720 --> 01:03:51,060
So it's me and four other engineers.

794
01:03:51,620 --> 01:03:52,180
It's so fun.

795
01:03:52,480 --> 01:04:01,979
I went on my whole vision quest after exploring Apple iCloud Relay and Mask and everything else

796
01:04:02,000 --> 01:04:05,500
where I was implementing everything, making sure that it was at all possible.

797
01:04:05,890 --> 01:04:09,840
And then after that, I have a very particular way of finding people and hiring

798
01:04:10,290 --> 01:04:17,740
in that I go to GitHub global code search and just search up people who are using the APIs

799
01:04:18,050 --> 01:04:22,320
and the libraries that we're using and look them up and look up like, you know,

800
01:04:22,350 --> 01:04:23,640
have they opened issues?

801
01:04:23,960 --> 01:04:26,260
Like, you know, are their concerns legitimate?

802
01:04:26,430 --> 01:04:27,400
Like how smart they are?

803
01:04:27,920 --> 01:04:33,980
And very slowly, I, you know, I email people and they come back.

804
01:04:34,220 --> 01:04:36,240
And so I built a team around that.

805
01:04:37,260 --> 01:04:41,220
And they are all, you know, they're all really great engineers.

806
01:04:42,100 --> 01:04:49,260
And that sort of shows, right, in the quality of our software, the quality of our network connections and everything else.

807
01:04:49,560 --> 01:04:55,440
It's funny, somebody made an observation when we were meeting together as the whole team.

808
01:04:55,580 --> 01:04:58,180
Because we're a fully distributed team all across the world.

809
01:04:58,520 --> 01:05:08,120
So we come together sort of twice a year that sort of every walk or every talk is like a tech talk.

810
01:05:09,120 --> 01:05:16,680
You know, because somebody will just start talking about some random obscure corner of the Linux, you know, user space.

811
01:05:16,960 --> 01:05:18,760
And, you know, everybody will listen and learn.

812
01:05:21,140 --> 01:05:21,560
Very cool.

813
01:05:21,960 --> 01:05:31,240
Well, is there anything you feel like that we missed that you'd like to inform our audience about or just any general takes on VPNs?

814
01:05:31,240 --> 01:05:33,200
Or do you think we touched on those things?

815
01:05:33,770 --> 01:05:35,320
I think we touched on most things.

816
01:05:36,230 --> 01:05:46,480
I think that, to my eye, it is time for the VPN industry to level up.

817
01:05:47,340 --> 01:05:52,740
I think it is time to level up to a higher level of trust.

818
01:05:53,830 --> 01:06:03,680
I think the next generation of VPN companies should really have, should at the very least have their source code on GitHub.

819
01:06:03,930 --> 01:06:07,660
I think that's like a piece of software that's processing.

820
01:06:07,860 --> 01:06:08,240
It's rare.

821
01:06:08,430 --> 01:06:08,640
Yeah.

822
01:06:09,120 --> 01:06:14,060
I saw this week that Nord didn't have their app on.

823
01:06:14,270 --> 01:06:15,420
It blew my mind.

824
01:06:15,600 --> 01:06:24,700
I was like, what are you talking, like a piece of software that's processing all of your packets should be at least open source.

825
01:06:25,440 --> 01:06:30,780
Hopefully sandboxed well and a stretch goal would be reproducible.

826
01:06:31,060 --> 01:06:34,240
I feel like that's not too crazy of a claim to make.

827
01:06:34,920 --> 01:06:38,120
I'm sure you saw the viral tweet with Nord.

828
01:06:38,460 --> 01:06:42,280
Someone was like, why is the Nord Mac OS app 430 megabytes?

829
01:06:42,340 --> 01:06:54,460
Right. That was, that was, that's, we are, I think, about 40. And most of that is like two video

830
01:06:54,910 --> 01:07:00,720
tutorials we made for people so that they can navigate the permission prompts in macOS,

831
01:07:00,770 --> 01:07:07,380
which are a little horrendous. But anyway, yeah, I think we should ask more of our VPN providers.

832
01:07:08,240 --> 01:07:12,060
I think they really need to have a good trust story.

833
01:07:12,490 --> 01:07:21,900
But also, I think you VPN providers should have a good story for the trust in their logging

834
01:07:22,320 --> 01:07:23,360
policy, right?

835
01:07:24,840 --> 01:07:32,820
Can we establish something where we don't need to trust that your pinky promise that you don't

836
01:07:32,940 --> 01:07:35,800
log is the truth, right?

837
01:07:36,180 --> 01:07:44,300
where we can have sort of cryptographic, mathematical, or engineering proof that you don't or can't

838
01:07:44,500 --> 01:07:44,640
log.

839
01:07:45,200 --> 01:07:49,120
I think I look forward to seeing everybody's answers to that.

840
01:07:49,400 --> 01:07:49,700
Great.

841
01:07:49,870 --> 01:07:51,040
Well, thank you so much.

842
01:07:51,070 --> 01:07:52,920
And where can people find you?

843
01:07:53,160 --> 01:07:55,220
Go to obscure.net.

844
01:07:55,960 --> 01:07:56,700
Everything is there.

845
01:07:57,090 --> 01:08:05,640
Follow us on Twitter, Mastodon, BlueSky, and Nostr for people who are interested in.

846
01:08:06,320 --> 01:08:09,040
And that and yeah, we look forward to seeing you.

847
01:08:10,260 --> 01:08:10,740
Awesome.

848
01:08:10,960 --> 01:08:12,180
Well, thanks for the great interview.

849
01:08:12,440 --> 01:08:14,660
I learned a lot and hopefully others did too.

850
01:08:15,220 --> 01:08:18,480
Leave any questions down below or go ahead and reach out to Obscura.

851
01:08:19,180 --> 01:08:21,180
I don't want to flag your support team.

852
01:08:21,420 --> 01:08:22,620
So if you are.

853
01:08:23,319 --> 01:08:29,440
The support team is me in my pajamas trying not to fall asleep while answering emails.

854
01:08:31,200 --> 01:08:31,779
But that's fine.

855
01:08:31,799 --> 01:08:32,799
I love talking to people.

856
01:08:34,640 --> 01:08:34,720
Yeah.

857
01:08:34,859 --> 01:08:35,880
Well, thank you, Carl.

858
01:08:36,100 --> 01:08:38,720
and hope to have you back sometime in the future, of course.

859
01:08:39,359 --> 01:08:41,440
And that, my friends, was the end of the interview.

860
01:08:41,779 --> 01:08:42,740
Thank you all for tuning in.

861
01:08:42,870 --> 01:08:45,380
I want to thank Carl for taking the time to be here

862
01:08:45,500 --> 01:08:47,220
and explaining his service to all of you.

863
01:08:47,529 --> 01:08:49,680
And I want to thank you all for learning a little bit more

864
01:08:49,790 --> 01:08:51,819
about how the technology works behind the scenes

865
01:08:52,180 --> 01:08:54,759
so that you can be better educated and make better moves

866
01:08:55,060 --> 01:08:57,400
to better empower yourself and the people around you.

867
01:08:57,779 --> 01:09:00,319
If you enjoy these podcasts, you can support TechLaur down below

868
01:09:00,430 --> 01:09:02,700
by becoming a TechLorean, which gives you really cool,

869
01:09:02,859 --> 01:09:07,380
exclusive access to things in our community and helps keep all these podcasts free to the public.

870
01:09:07,759 --> 01:09:11,440
And of course, we have free ways to support us as well. I'll see you next time on Techlore Talks.

871
01:09:11,799 --> 01:09:13,240
Thank you all again for listening.