WEBVTT

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An activist has officially been charged

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for using the Graphene OS duress pin

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feature to destroy evidence.

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Facial recognition is running rampant in

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private companies and inside Germany's

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free speech crackdowns.

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We are covering all of this and more

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coming up on this episode of This Week

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in Privacy number sixty four.

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So stay tuned.

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Hello everyone and welcome back to This

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Week in Privacy,

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our weekly series where we discuss the

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latest updates with what we're working on

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within the Privacy Guides community and

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this week's top stories in data privacy

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and cybersecurity.

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I'm Nate and with me this week again

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is Jonah.

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Jonah, how was your week?

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You know, it's been pretty great.

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Lots of stuff going on.

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I think lots of good stories to talk

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about.

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I was ordering some stickers that I could

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hand out at DEFCON when I'm there next

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week.

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Unfortunately, those haven't arrived yet.

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They're arriving in a few hours.

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I wanted to maybe show people what they

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would look like on the stream today.

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Don't have them yet,

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but they are pretty cool.

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And I sent a picture in our supporters

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chat.

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And if anyone will be at DEF CON

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next week again,

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come say hi and I'll give you one.

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That's the only place to get them.

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We don't have them on the store.

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Yeah,

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I showed the picture you sent in the

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supporter chat to my wife and she was

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like, oh, those are so cool.

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So yeah, they look awesome.

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Hopefully I have some extras that I can

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mail out to people afterwards,

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but we'll see.

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We'll see.

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How have you been, Nate?

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Good, good.

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It's been a busy week,

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but I guess we'll talk more in the

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site updates,

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but we got a lot done this week

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and

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Um, yeah, I mean,

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not too much exciting over on my end.

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Just, uh, yeah, all good.

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Well, those updates should be exciting.

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Um, with that, let's talk about.

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Our first story today,

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this was reported by Ars Technica.

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An activist was charged with a felony

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after giving border agent duress code that

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wiped his phone.

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So they say in early twenty twenty five,

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Atlanta resident Samuel Tunick was on his

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way home following a trip abroad after

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landing in the U.S.

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Customs agents demanded access to his

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Google Pixel phone.

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You probably see where that's going.

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It was running an alternative version of

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Android called Graphene OS.

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And we talked about some of this on

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This Week in Privacy episode number thirty

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one.

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Security features.

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Government attorneys and agents claim that

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Tunick was subjected to a standard

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secondary interrogation at an

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international airport.

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During that encounter,

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agents were looking for anything that's

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prohibited.

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However,

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Tunick's legal team alleges he was

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targeted for his activism.

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This is because Tunick was involved with a

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group called Defend the Atlanta Forest,

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which opposed the construction of an

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enormous law enforcement training facility

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in the area often known as Cop City.

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What Tunick didn't know,

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according to his lawyers,

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was that he'd been placed on a watch

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list for his actions and that Customs and

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Border Protection had discussed over email

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plans to detain him upon his arrival back

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in the U.S.

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for suspected terrorism activities.

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So, during this investigation,

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these Border Patrol agents basically said

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they wanted to search his phone for

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evidence of child sexual abuse material.

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We talked a bit about that sort of

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thing in another story last week.

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And if he didn't unlock the device,

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it would be confiscated.

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So what comes into this story and how

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it relates to Graphene OS is the duress

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code is an optional feature of Graphene OS

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that allows a user to set up a

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secondary pin number that when it's

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entered,

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if you're worried about it falling into

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the wrong

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hands,

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or if you're in a situation like this,

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you can basically enter that code on the

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lock screen instead of your regular PIN

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number,

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and it immediately irreversibly wipes the

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eSIM, it wipes the entire device,

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so none of that

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data can be restored.

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The article says that Tunick provided this

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code to an agent who entered it on

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the phone,

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after which the screen went blank,

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flashed several times,

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and the phone appeared to restart.

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All of the data on the phone was

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gone,

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but authorities confiscated it anyways.

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Tunick was allowed to leave at that time.

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But in late twenty twenty five, the U.S.

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Department of Justice opted to file

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criminal charges against him,

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citing a little used statute,

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Title eighteen U.S.

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Code Section two to three to eight.

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That makes it illegal to knowingly destroy

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or damage property to prevent it from

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being seized.

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TechCrunch noted that this appears to be a

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new legal strategy for the government.

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EFF experts who spoke to TechCrunch note

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that they've never seen the law applied in

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this way before.

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So the Department of Justice will need to

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argue that even though Tunick was told

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this was a routine border check,

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he ran afoul of the law by tricking

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an agent into deleting his data.

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If convicted,

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Tunick could face up to five years in

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prison.

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Um,

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four or four media also interviewed Tunick

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and his lawyer,

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and his lawyer said that he only found

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one other case using the same law,

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which was a drug trafficking

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investigation.

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In other posts and outlets,

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I think we have an article from PCMag

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here,

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Graphene OS discussed the case from a

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technical perspective,

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noting that none of their features are

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illegal and that based on current

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evidence,

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Graphene OS phones can withstand forensic

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investigation without requiring the use of

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a duress pin.

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So that is quite a story that I

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think will have a lot of people using

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Graphene OS and maybe the Stores pin

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feature interested.

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Nate,

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I'm really curious what you think about

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all of this first of all.

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Why don't you share your thoughts?

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Yeah, so this is a,

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This is a complicated story in the sense

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that when we first covered this story back

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in – what did we say it was

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there?

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This week in Privacy at Thirty-One,

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I reached out to a friend of mine

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who's a lawyer and asked their expertise.

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And veteran viewers know that right now,

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the entire state of the Fourth Amendment

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as it relates to electronic devices is

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really, really up in the air.

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And –

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The courts are kind of really shy to

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make a ruling and lay down some precedent

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either way.

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So right now – let's see.

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I asked my friend to send me that

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paper she wrote again.

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So basically right now –

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Searches normally require a warrant,

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but at the border, there's an exception,

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and within a hundred miles from land

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borders and coastlines,

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as well as airports,

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international airports,

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and it's worth noting that about

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two-thirds of Americans live in this area.

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So they can do a routine search, which,

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again,

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has not been legally defined by the

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Supreme Court.

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And it just says one that does not

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seriously invade a traveler's privacy.

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And let's see.

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CBP guidance requires reasonable suspicion

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only for advanced searches.

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And a reasonable let's see a search is

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considered advanced if an officer connects

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external equipment through a wired or

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wireless connection to an electronic

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device,

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not merely to gain access to the device,

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but to review,

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copy and or analyze its contents.

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So this, I think,

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would have counted as a routine search.

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I also spoke to,

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let me pull up my notes here.

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I spoke to a friend of mine who

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works in law enforcement to get his take.

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He's very knowledgeable.

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He knows about graphene.

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He knows that it's not something that just

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criminals use.

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He said that he checked the court records

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for federal cases using that section,

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to and he said the only ones that

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he found involved physical property and a

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criminal investigation,

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which he notes based on the information we

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have right now,

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this was not a criminal investigation.

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This was a routine search.

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He said,

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I can't tell you the likelihood of this

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charge sticking because that's beyond the

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scope of my legal knowledge.

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But in his opinion,

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it's kind of a stretch.

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Let me see here.

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I'm trying to make sure I didn't miss

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anything with his take.

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Yeah, so it's very –

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I think what this is ultimately going to

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come down to – and for the record,

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I'm not a lawyer either.

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I don't have any legal training.

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I got really busy,

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and I forgot to send my lawyer friend

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the actual legal paperwork,

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which I think the TechCrunch article links

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to.

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Oh, this one does too actually.

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So there is a link in there if

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you want to read the actual charges.

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I think it's only like two pages.

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It's not that long.

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But from what I'm reading and what I'm

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seeing from other people –

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Trying to charge him under this specific

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statue is kind of weird,

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and it may not stick,

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but I think what might come back to

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bite him is the fact that he gave

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the officer the wrong pin.

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And he knowingly did so,

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although I would like to note that the

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mayor of New York claimed that he forgot

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his phone's password and never faced any

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consequences,

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which I don't think any of us buy

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that.

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But it'd be one thing – like I've

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seen some people say online.

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I think they've even said in our forum

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thread about this that –

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It'd be one thing if, like,

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he wrote down the duress pin in his

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phone and made it look like the actual

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pin,

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or if he made it something easily

00:10:09.562 --> 00:10:11.884
guessable, like, you know, his birth year,

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one, one, one, one, zero, zero, whatever.

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If he had done that and the cop

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just guessed and assumed,

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I think he'd be in a much stronger

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legal position.

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If anything's going to come back to bite

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him,

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I think it's going to be the fact

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that he knowingly gave them a duress pin.

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But it... Yeah, I mean, it's definitely...

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I think it's – I mean all this

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is kind of beating around the bush of

00:10:35.870 --> 00:10:38.253
saying that like I think we all know

00:10:38.293 --> 00:10:39.173
this whole like, oh,

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we think there's CSAM on your phone.

00:10:40.693 --> 00:10:41.173
Like really?

00:10:41.254 --> 00:10:41.995
Why do you think that?

00:10:42.095 --> 00:10:44.777
Like where did that accusation come from?

00:10:44.817 --> 00:10:49.919
Like this – I think any – what's

00:10:49.940 --> 00:10:50.541
the word I'm looking for?

00:10:51.610 --> 00:10:53.272
I think most people can see right through

00:10:53.292 --> 00:10:55.433
it that this was clearly related to his

00:10:55.514 --> 00:10:57.216
activism with the whole StopCopCity thing,

00:10:57.255 --> 00:10:58.258
which, for the record,

00:10:58.378 --> 00:10:59.558
I do want to point out there that

00:10:59.999 --> 00:11:01.520
the last time we talked about a story

00:11:02.261 --> 00:11:04.565
about StopCopCity and Proton turned over

00:11:04.725 --> 00:11:06.005
information to the FBI,

00:11:06.366 --> 00:11:08.107
that person was accused of throwing

00:11:08.149 --> 00:11:10.791
firebombs and being violently aggressive,

00:11:11.231 --> 00:11:17.699
which –

00:11:12.592 --> 00:11:14.495
I advocate for peaceful protest,

00:11:14.615 --> 00:11:15.875
so I don't know what this dude's story

00:11:15.917 --> 00:11:16.037
is.

00:11:16.136 --> 00:11:17.038
I don't know if he was out there

00:11:17.057 --> 00:11:18.818
throwing Molotov cocktails or if he was

00:11:18.839 --> 00:11:20.100
just out holding signs.

00:11:20.541 --> 00:11:21.000
But either way,

00:11:21.081 --> 00:11:22.482
I think there's clearly a link here.

00:11:23.202 --> 00:11:25.225
And yeah,

00:11:25.245 --> 00:11:28.908
I think this is probably going to be

00:11:29.489 --> 00:11:31.150
one of those really big cases that we

00:11:31.191 --> 00:11:32.731
have to keep our eye on and hope

00:11:32.751 --> 00:11:33.133
for the best.

00:11:33.547 --> 00:11:33.947
For sure.

00:11:34.067 --> 00:11:34.467
I mean,

00:11:35.168 --> 00:11:37.548
and Dag Overhull in the chat said exactly

00:11:37.589 --> 00:11:38.070
the same thing.

00:11:38.110 --> 00:11:38.370
I mean,

00:11:38.470 --> 00:11:39.890
the government used three different

00:11:39.931 --> 00:11:41.711
excuses in this Ars Technica article.

00:11:41.731 --> 00:11:45.833
They said they were investigating him for

00:11:46.073 --> 00:11:46.615
terrorism.

00:11:46.914 --> 00:11:49.855
They talked about using CSAM as a

00:11:49.916 --> 00:11:50.297
pretense,

00:11:50.317 --> 00:11:51.758
which is exactly in line with what I

00:11:51.798 --> 00:11:53.479
was talking about last week,

00:11:53.519 --> 00:11:55.799
which is that the government uses these as

00:11:55.820 --> 00:11:57.500
an excuse to search random people,

00:11:57.640 --> 00:11:58.961
often without any evidence

00:11:59.621 --> 00:12:00.163
at all,

00:12:00.302 --> 00:12:02.666
and this is just yet more proof of

00:12:02.686 --> 00:12:03.486
that happening.

00:12:03.506 --> 00:12:04.408
There probably wasn't

00:12:05.807 --> 00:12:07.788
any sort of probable cause whatsoever for

00:12:07.808 --> 00:12:09.749
the things that the government was

00:12:10.068 --> 00:12:11.509
claiming was on his phone,

00:12:11.870 --> 00:12:13.409
which I think is a huge problem for

00:12:13.450 --> 00:12:14.690
their legal case.

00:12:15.049 --> 00:12:17.610
I'm obviously not a lawyer either,

00:12:18.030 --> 00:12:20.532
but I totally agree with what your friend

00:12:20.572 --> 00:12:22.432
was saying too about this specific law.

00:12:23.251 --> 00:12:24.332
When I read this article,

00:12:25.013 --> 00:12:26.572
I think it was posted by Zach Whitaker

00:12:26.773 --> 00:12:27.472
on TechCrunch,

00:12:27.493 --> 00:12:28.553
who is an excellent reporter.

00:12:30.995 --> 00:12:32.735
My immediate reaction was that this is a

00:12:32.775 --> 00:12:35.639
very strange law to charge him with

00:12:36.058 --> 00:12:40.123
because I do think it clearly relates to

00:12:40.222 --> 00:12:41.123
physical property.

00:12:41.464 --> 00:12:45.547
The law says that you can't knowingly

00:12:45.586 --> 00:12:47.448
destroy your damaged property to prevent

00:12:47.489 --> 00:12:49.831
it from being seized by the government.

00:12:50.110 --> 00:12:50.510
However,

00:12:52.822 --> 00:12:54.484
The government did seize his phone,

00:12:54.884 --> 00:12:57.366
and his phone is still fully functional as

00:12:57.386 --> 00:12:57.847
a phone,

00:12:57.927 --> 00:13:01.831
so in what way was the property destroyed

00:13:01.851 --> 00:13:02.613
in a way that

00:13:04.710 --> 00:13:05.750
prevented them from seizing it.

00:13:05.789 --> 00:13:06.350
Obviously,

00:13:06.409 --> 00:13:07.931
the government is after the data,

00:13:07.951 --> 00:13:09.791
they're not after the phone itself,

00:13:09.850 --> 00:13:11.672
but I don't think that this law applies

00:13:12.111 --> 00:13:13.812
at all to this data case.

00:13:15.052 --> 00:13:16.692
There's been a lot of court cases that

00:13:16.732 --> 00:13:17.893
we've seen actually where,

00:13:18.972 --> 00:13:21.313
unrelated to criminal charges whatsoever,

00:13:21.394 --> 00:13:25.235
but it's generally understood that data is

00:13:25.315 --> 00:13:25.495
not

00:13:26.115 --> 00:13:27.316
property in the first place.

00:13:27.355 --> 00:13:29.515
And this US code specifically relates to

00:13:30.897 --> 00:13:31.376
property.

00:13:31.496 --> 00:13:33.498
I think if data was property,

00:13:33.518 --> 00:13:35.778
there'd be a lot more arguments about

00:13:35.818 --> 00:13:37.559
like, oh, these data brokers,

00:13:37.879 --> 00:13:40.000
they're illegally possessing my property,

00:13:40.059 --> 00:13:40.221
right?

00:13:40.240 --> 00:13:41.880
So I can sue them.

00:13:41.961 --> 00:13:44.322
It's basically theft if they're sharing it

00:13:44.361 --> 00:13:45.743
and selling it and whatever.

00:13:46.202 --> 00:13:48.144
But that isn't how the law works.

00:13:49.063 --> 00:13:49.443
Obviously,

00:13:49.484 --> 00:13:50.965
I'm not really sure that's how the law

00:13:50.985 --> 00:13:51.164
works.

00:13:51.225 --> 00:13:53.546
I don't really subscribe to the fact that

00:13:55.456 --> 00:13:57.116
personal data is property,

00:13:58.177 --> 00:13:59.398
I think that would open up a whole

00:14:00.957 --> 00:14:02.937
can of worms that we don't have to

00:14:03.458 --> 00:14:04.278
get into right now.

00:14:04.318 --> 00:14:06.619
But at least at the moment,

00:14:06.979 --> 00:14:08.219
that isn't how it works.

00:14:08.278 --> 00:14:11.279
And I think that because of all these

00:14:11.320 --> 00:14:11.539
things,

00:14:11.600 --> 00:14:13.419
I think these charges are pretty tenuous

00:14:13.480 --> 00:14:13.940
at best.

00:14:16.061 --> 00:14:17.400
This is obviously, to me,

00:14:17.500 --> 00:14:20.100
a case of the government just trying to

00:14:20.260 --> 00:14:22.841
use the court system as a punitive tool

00:14:25.491 --> 00:14:26.975
attack against him because

00:14:29.235 --> 00:14:32.057
It's expensive to go through all of these

00:14:32.116 --> 00:14:32.836
legal proceedings.

00:14:33.157 --> 00:14:34.398
He had to get a lawyer now.

00:14:34.418 --> 00:14:35.719
There's all of these... I mean,

00:14:35.739 --> 00:14:37.620
he has to deal with this lawsuit, right?

00:14:37.799 --> 00:14:38.779
It's annoying.

00:14:39.461 --> 00:14:41.741
And even if you're completely innocent of

00:14:41.841 --> 00:14:42.701
anything you're being...

00:14:43.022 --> 00:14:44.842
or everything you're being accused of,

00:14:45.344 --> 00:14:46.744
it's a whole process.

00:14:46.764 --> 00:14:48.846
And that is the goal of the government

00:14:48.905 --> 00:14:49.905
in these cases.

00:14:49.926 --> 00:14:51.746
It's an intimidation tactic, I think,

00:14:51.787 --> 00:14:56.690
against protesters or activists like Tunic

00:14:56.710 --> 00:14:57.029
here.

00:14:57.690 --> 00:14:58.030
And...

00:14:59.169 --> 00:15:04.115
it is really not a great story um

00:15:04.134 --> 00:15:05.956
the government basically has unlimited

00:15:06.756 --> 00:15:10.801
money resources power in the courts to

00:15:12.743 --> 00:15:15.085
make your life terrible forever until you

00:15:15.105 --> 00:15:19.990
give in so um yeah it's it's a

00:15:20.029 --> 00:15:23.212
very scary and concerning story and

00:15:24.835 --> 00:15:27.198
It's very problematic that this continues

00:15:27.239 --> 00:15:29.001
to be a thing at the border,

00:15:29.081 --> 00:15:32.427
especially with border control agents and

00:15:33.109 --> 00:15:34.250
US citizens.

00:15:34.812 --> 00:15:34.993
So...

00:15:38.109 --> 00:15:38.349
Yeah,

00:15:38.469 --> 00:15:40.650
I think that sort of sums up what

00:15:40.691 --> 00:15:41.150
I was saying.

00:15:42.231 --> 00:15:43.192
Let me see if we had anything else

00:15:43.232 --> 00:15:47.056
in the notes here I didn't talk about.

00:15:47.255 --> 00:15:48.456
I'll add real quick while you're checking

00:15:48.476 --> 00:15:48.677
that,

00:15:48.736 --> 00:15:49.857
that I think you made a really good

00:15:49.898 --> 00:15:51.198
point about data as property.

00:15:52.359 --> 00:15:53.539
This almost feels like a double-edged

00:15:53.559 --> 00:15:55.081
sword where the government either has to

00:15:55.121 --> 00:15:56.863
say, no, he didn't destroy property,

00:15:56.903 --> 00:15:58.224
therefore he didn't do anything wrong.

00:15:58.823 --> 00:16:00.985
Or B, they have to say, okay,

00:16:01.024 --> 00:16:03.067
data is property, which I would imagine,

00:16:03.287 --> 00:16:04.067
again, not a lawyer.

00:16:04.606 --> 00:16:06.128
Now the Fourth Amendment applies a little

00:16:06.148 --> 00:16:06.948
bit more rigidly,

00:16:07.369 --> 00:16:09.090
and they have to stop doing things like

00:16:09.129 --> 00:16:10.571
buying data from data brokers to get

00:16:10.610 --> 00:16:11.772
around a warrant requirement.

00:16:13.111 --> 00:16:14.493
I feel like the government kind of put

00:16:14.513 --> 00:16:16.094
themselves in a corner here with that one

00:16:16.734 --> 00:16:17.414
when you brought that up.

00:16:20.176 --> 00:16:20.956
Yeah, yeah.

00:16:22.580 --> 00:16:23.860
Yeah, the whole data as property thing,

00:16:23.880 --> 00:16:26.423
that's been debated a lot in terms of

00:16:26.985 --> 00:16:29.868
advantages or disadvantages it would have.

00:16:30.067 --> 00:16:31.769
But I mean, in this case,

00:16:33.143 --> 00:16:34.763
like the property itself was not

00:16:34.883 --> 00:16:35.322
destroyed.

00:16:35.383 --> 00:16:37.683
And the article literally says like,

00:16:37.764 --> 00:16:39.903
and I think they say in their documents

00:16:39.943 --> 00:16:41.784
that they did, they seized the device,

00:16:41.804 --> 00:16:42.605
they use that word.

00:16:42.684 --> 00:16:43.705
So like,

00:16:44.404 --> 00:16:47.765
what part of the law was even violated

00:16:47.806 --> 00:16:48.525
in the first place?

00:16:49.166 --> 00:16:49.546
I don't know.

00:16:49.926 --> 00:16:51.067
It's probably a case for like,

00:16:51.447 --> 00:16:54.206
this is a law that's not on the

00:16:54.246 --> 00:16:54.667
books.

00:16:54.866 --> 00:16:56.607
And so they're just they're grasping at

00:16:56.628 --> 00:16:57.427
straws, basically.

00:17:00.361 --> 00:17:03.384
Yeah, I don't know.

00:17:04.064 --> 00:17:04.844
I had a few thoughts,

00:17:05.064 --> 00:17:05.845
if that's all you had.

00:17:08.185 --> 00:17:08.326
Yeah,

00:17:08.405 --> 00:17:10.987
I think the main thing I'll just point

00:17:11.027 --> 00:17:12.327
out again is that, like,

00:17:13.689 --> 00:17:14.689
as Graphene OS said,

00:17:15.409 --> 00:17:17.471
there's probably no good reason to use

00:17:17.490 --> 00:17:18.631
this in the first place because they can't

00:17:18.651 --> 00:17:19.731
get into your phone.

00:17:19.951 --> 00:17:21.512
So I would keep that in mind if

00:17:21.532 --> 00:17:22.432
you're thinking about that feature.

00:17:23.173 --> 00:17:24.233
Anyways, what are you thinking?

00:17:25.076 --> 00:17:25.215
No,

00:17:25.236 --> 00:17:26.558
that's actually very similar to what I was

00:17:26.578 --> 00:17:28.383
going to say is like, I think, like,

00:17:28.403 --> 00:17:29.746
I think the dress pin thing is really

00:17:29.786 --> 00:17:30.106
cool.

00:17:30.366 --> 00:17:31.088
And I think.

00:17:32.167 --> 00:17:33.128
I think it makes sense.

00:17:33.209 --> 00:17:33.368
Like,

00:17:33.469 --> 00:17:34.990
obviously we don't know what was deleted

00:17:35.009 --> 00:17:36.431
from this person's phone and maybe there

00:17:36.451 --> 00:17:38.093
was some really sensitive stuff on there.

00:17:38.192 --> 00:17:39.354
Like not in the sense of CSAM,

00:17:39.413 --> 00:17:40.294
but I mean, maybe there was,

00:17:40.334 --> 00:17:42.135
who knows not, but you know,

00:17:42.155 --> 00:17:43.336
maybe there were like names of other

00:17:43.376 --> 00:17:45.557
protesters and like upcoming plans and,

00:17:46.118 --> 00:17:46.398
you know,

00:17:46.558 --> 00:17:48.840
access into Google docs and like things

00:17:48.881 --> 00:17:49.682
that it's, he's like,

00:17:49.781 --> 00:17:51.123
I don't want the cops to have this.

00:17:51.583 --> 00:17:53.364
And so maybe the lesser evil for him

00:17:53.423 --> 00:17:53.984
was like,

00:17:54.125 --> 00:17:55.486
I need to make damn sure the cops

00:17:55.506 --> 00:17:56.166
don't get into this.

00:17:56.207 --> 00:17:57.367
Like, even though as far as we know,

00:17:57.407 --> 00:17:59.048
they can't get into graphene.

00:17:59.108 --> 00:17:59.288
Like,

00:18:00.625 --> 00:18:02.247
what if that one percent chance they can

00:18:02.267 --> 00:18:03.647
and he decided it wasn't worth it for

00:18:03.689 --> 00:18:05.871
him um so i'm glad this feature does

00:18:05.911 --> 00:18:08.794
exist but i i think that we see

00:18:08.834 --> 00:18:11.537
a lot of people in the privacy space

00:18:11.596 --> 00:18:13.638
set up tools like this um

00:18:15.239 --> 00:18:15.719
I'm just going to say,

00:18:15.818 --> 00:18:17.240
I think sometimes we think we're Mr.

00:18:17.279 --> 00:18:19.500
Robot and we like really get into these

00:18:19.540 --> 00:18:19.861
tools.

00:18:20.260 --> 00:18:21.001
And if you want to set them up,

00:18:21.021 --> 00:18:21.501
that's fine.

00:18:21.541 --> 00:18:22.201
But like, keep in mind,

00:18:22.241 --> 00:18:23.702
there can be consequences for this.

00:18:23.883 --> 00:18:24.742
And, you know,

00:18:24.843 --> 00:18:27.243
when I was twenty and I didn't have

00:18:27.263 --> 00:18:29.224
a family and like, you know,

00:18:29.565 --> 00:18:30.905
I had a dead end job at Walmart,

00:18:30.945 --> 00:18:32.126
like, OK, fine,

00:18:32.207 --> 00:18:34.448
I'll set up the duress pin like I'll.

00:18:35.566 --> 00:18:35.986
Why not?

00:18:36.346 --> 00:18:37.707
I have nowhere to be, but you know,

00:18:37.787 --> 00:18:39.788
if you have people that rely on you

00:18:39.807 --> 00:18:41.028
going to work to keep a roof over

00:18:41.048 --> 00:18:41.847
your head, or, you know,

00:18:41.867 --> 00:18:42.489
like you pointed out,

00:18:42.548 --> 00:18:44.048
uncle Sam has unlimited resources.

00:18:44.088 --> 00:18:45.730
Like that was that whole issue with the,

00:18:45.789 --> 00:18:46.069
what was it?

00:18:46.089 --> 00:18:47.869
The tornado cash developer that recently

00:18:47.911 --> 00:18:48.411
went to jail.

00:18:48.510 --> 00:18:50.431
Like he said that in his interviews is

00:18:50.490 --> 00:18:51.071
he's like, yeah,

00:18:51.152 --> 00:18:52.471
I couldn't keep litigating this case.

00:18:52.511 --> 00:18:53.873
We were already tens of thousands of

00:18:53.913 --> 00:18:54.653
dollars in debt.

00:18:55.119 --> 00:18:56.121
And just digging deeper.

00:18:56.221 --> 00:18:57.901
And the government has infinite pockets,

00:18:58.721 --> 00:18:59.922
thanks to our taxpayer dollars.

00:18:59.981 --> 00:19:00.663
That's a different rant.

00:19:00.962 --> 00:19:02.463
To just keep charging these people

00:19:02.624 --> 00:19:04.605
endlessly and dragging this out in court.

00:19:04.704 --> 00:19:07.125
And so it's just something to keep in

00:19:07.165 --> 00:19:07.326
mind.

00:19:07.566 --> 00:19:08.426
It's a threat modeling thing.

00:19:08.446 --> 00:19:08.926
Like, again,

00:19:08.987 --> 00:19:10.587
some people really do have data where it's

00:19:10.607 --> 00:19:10.788
like,

00:19:10.968 --> 00:19:12.888
I can't risk that one percent chance.

00:19:13.449 --> 00:19:15.009
But, you know,

00:19:15.630 --> 00:19:17.010
I think most of us are probably not

00:19:17.030 --> 00:19:17.550
in that boat.

00:19:17.631 --> 00:19:18.791
And you've got to keep in mind the

00:19:19.112 --> 00:19:20.893
consequences that could rise here.

00:19:20.932 --> 00:19:21.093
Yeah.

00:19:22.816 --> 00:19:24.238
I'll take a look at some chats here

00:19:24.258 --> 00:19:24.659
really quick.

00:19:25.160 --> 00:19:26.060
Yeah, definitely.

00:19:26.221 --> 00:19:28.964
Hello, welcome to the stream.

00:19:29.465 --> 00:19:30.047
Hello, world.

00:19:31.856 --> 00:19:34.137
Peaceboy John, yeah, yeah, Graphene OS.

00:19:34.659 --> 00:19:36.319
Yeah, I mean, it's a great tool.

00:19:37.339 --> 00:19:40.201
I think it's important to note what Deg

00:19:40.261 --> 00:19:41.923
Overholtz said again here in the chat.

00:19:42.503 --> 00:19:43.963
They can't get into Graphene OS as far

00:19:44.003 --> 00:19:44.404
as we know.

00:19:44.765 --> 00:19:46.306
That's certainly true,

00:19:46.326 --> 00:19:47.527
but I think Graphene OS also has a

00:19:47.567 --> 00:19:49.208
lot of features that don't involve

00:19:49.567 --> 00:19:51.888
completely destroying the data.

00:19:52.630 --> 00:19:53.289
Something like,

00:19:53.450 --> 00:19:56.692
I think disabling the USB port is a

00:19:56.731 --> 00:19:59.413
pretty great feature that they have.

00:20:01.457 --> 00:20:03.491
And that comes enabled by default for the

00:20:03.511 --> 00:20:03.773
record.

00:20:04.743 --> 00:20:05.443
Yep, when it's locked.

00:20:05.503 --> 00:20:05.723
I mean,

00:20:05.824 --> 00:20:06.964
and you can take it even further.

00:20:07.005 --> 00:20:08.644
Like, on my Pixel right now,

00:20:08.704 --> 00:20:10.566
I have it completely disabled when the

00:20:10.586 --> 00:20:12.586
phone is on, so it only charges when,

00:20:12.686 --> 00:20:14.307
like, the phone is powered off, basically.

00:20:14.326 --> 00:20:15.747
And that has been fine,

00:20:15.767 --> 00:20:17.428
because I just charge things overnight

00:20:17.508 --> 00:20:17.928
anyways.

00:20:19.429 --> 00:20:20.828
And there's stuff like that.

00:20:20.848 --> 00:20:21.709
They have features, like,

00:20:21.729 --> 00:20:24.069
you can disable Wi-Fi and Bluetooth after

00:20:24.089 --> 00:20:25.150
a certain amount of time, or, like,

00:20:25.170 --> 00:20:27.971
when the phone locks, so that they can't,

00:20:27.990 --> 00:20:28.131
like,

00:20:28.171 --> 00:20:30.251
connect it to a malicious Wi-Fi network or

00:20:30.271 --> 00:20:31.071
something like that.

00:20:31.152 --> 00:20:33.192
So, of course...

00:20:36.198 --> 00:20:37.959
It's not as foolproof as completely

00:20:37.979 --> 00:20:39.440
destroying the data, I'll give you that.

00:20:39.539 --> 00:20:41.261
But exactly like you were saying,

00:20:41.402 --> 00:20:42.982
I think you don't have to do this

00:20:43.042 --> 00:20:43.323
Mr.

00:20:43.363 --> 00:20:48.886
Robot Edward Snowden LARPing thing unless

00:20:48.906 --> 00:20:50.568
you have a really good reason to.

00:20:50.608 --> 00:20:53.049
But I think even in this case,

00:20:54.250 --> 00:20:55.632
even if you know you're being targeted

00:20:56.913 --> 00:20:58.354
because of your activism or something,

00:20:58.394 --> 00:20:59.615
it's pretty unlikely that...

00:21:02.417 --> 00:21:03.499
They're going to use all of these

00:21:03.538 --> 00:21:05.640
resources to get into your phone,

00:21:05.681 --> 00:21:06.701
maybe secret ones.

00:21:06.721 --> 00:21:09.482
If you stole a ton of national secrets

00:21:09.544 --> 00:21:10.284
like Edward Snowden,

00:21:10.344 --> 00:21:11.565
maybe they would take it a bit more

00:21:11.605 --> 00:21:12.045
seriously.

00:21:12.085 --> 00:21:17.529
But even situations like this,

00:21:17.829 --> 00:21:19.770
it's probably overkill.

00:21:21.251 --> 00:21:23.273
uh unredacted said one can say they

00:21:23.334 --> 00:21:24.734
entered the pin and destroyed the data

00:21:24.775 --> 00:21:27.076
themselves um and yeah one could

00:21:27.115 --> 00:21:30.137
definitely say that um this I mean you

00:21:30.157 --> 00:21:31.459
could definitely argue like they should

00:21:31.479 --> 00:21:33.460
have known about this possibility and not

00:21:33.500 --> 00:21:35.560
just done whatever he said but also at

00:21:35.580 --> 00:21:37.281
the same time you know him saying it

00:21:38.303 --> 00:21:41.525
is like um

00:21:42.741 --> 00:21:44.662
probably like that's probably the worst

00:21:44.701 --> 00:21:46.542
thing for his case I still think that

00:21:46.583 --> 00:21:48.823
this case is pretty weak despite that but

00:21:49.222 --> 00:21:51.044
it is a thing I also wonder about

00:21:51.104 --> 00:21:53.763
like writing down the pin on like a

00:21:53.923 --> 00:21:54.884
piece of tape on the back of the

00:21:54.903 --> 00:22:00.125
phone I don't know um but I don't

00:22:00.144 --> 00:22:01.424
know if that would be considered like

00:22:01.586 --> 00:22:03.266
telling them as well but that would be

00:22:03.286 --> 00:22:05.105
a bit like even more of a gray

00:22:05.165 --> 00:22:06.425
area that I think would would have

00:22:06.625 --> 00:22:09.426
benefited him so that's a possibility but

00:22:11.275 --> 00:22:13.536
Yeah, it's – Yeah.

00:22:13.615 --> 00:22:14.756
I just wanted to say in regards to

00:22:14.796 --> 00:22:15.096
that one,

00:22:15.116 --> 00:22:16.396
like I don't think that argument is going

00:22:16.416 --> 00:22:16.777
to fly.

00:22:16.916 --> 00:22:17.897
Like again, not a lawyer,

00:22:17.938 --> 00:22:18.958
but that whole like, well,

00:22:19.137 --> 00:22:20.478
he's the one that entered the pin.

00:22:20.538 --> 00:22:20.719
Yeah,

00:22:20.739 --> 00:22:22.858
but you gave him the wrong pin knowing

00:22:22.919 --> 00:22:23.619
what would happen.

00:22:23.759 --> 00:22:26.641
Like that would be like – I know

00:22:26.661 --> 00:22:28.331
this would –

00:22:28.160 --> 00:22:29.240
I would say this would never happen,

00:22:29.300 --> 00:22:30.682
but I've read crazier stories.

00:22:31.122 --> 00:22:33.743
If the cops raided your home and they

00:22:33.784 --> 00:22:35.025
say, we think you've kidnapped somebody.

00:22:35.065 --> 00:22:35.664
Where are they?

00:22:35.744 --> 00:22:36.445
And you're like, oh,

00:22:36.746 --> 00:22:38.007
they're through that door over there.

00:22:38.267 --> 00:22:39.847
But you booby trap that door.

00:22:40.429 --> 00:22:41.849
You're still going to be held responsible

00:22:41.869 --> 00:22:43.250
for the cop getting injured or killed

00:22:43.310 --> 00:22:44.692
because you knew there was a booby trap

00:22:44.711 --> 00:22:45.352
behind that door.

00:22:46.212 --> 00:22:47.253
And I think it's the same thing here.

00:22:47.273 --> 00:22:48.574
Like, I don't think that argument of like,

00:22:48.594 --> 00:22:48.714
well,

00:22:48.755 --> 00:22:49.795
he's the one that entered it is going

00:22:49.815 --> 00:22:50.715
to fly away.

00:22:51.497 --> 00:22:53.019
Yeah,

00:22:53.099 --> 00:22:56.724
the booby trap thing was crossing my mind

00:22:56.744 --> 00:22:57.006
too.

00:22:57.086 --> 00:22:58.748
I'm glad you brought that up.

00:22:59.189 --> 00:22:59.990
Great minds think alike.

00:23:02.205 --> 00:23:03.707
I remember someone saying your PIN number

00:23:03.787 --> 00:23:05.307
is protected by the First Amendment,

00:23:05.407 --> 00:23:06.688
just not your biometrics.

00:23:07.167 --> 00:23:09.670
That's generally considered to be true.

00:23:10.069 --> 00:23:11.369
That hasn't been tested in courts,

00:23:11.450 --> 00:23:14.311
but pretty much all legal experts agree it

00:23:14.332 --> 00:23:15.711
would be because it's something in your

00:23:15.852 --> 00:23:16.153
mind.

00:23:16.272 --> 00:23:16.813
That being said,

00:23:16.833 --> 00:23:18.374
there have been cases where the government

00:23:18.394 --> 00:23:21.674
just detained some people forever because

00:23:21.714 --> 00:23:23.476
they didn't give up their PIN or because

00:23:23.496 --> 00:23:25.717
they forgot their PIN,

00:23:25.777 --> 00:23:26.576
which is pretty rare,

00:23:26.616 --> 00:23:27.557
but it just goes to show.

00:23:29.736 --> 00:23:34.077
Some of the bad behavior in some cases.

00:23:34.137 --> 00:23:34.258
Yeah,

00:23:34.278 --> 00:23:35.638
I'm glad you highlighted that one because,

00:23:35.679 --> 00:23:35.898
yeah,

00:23:35.999 --> 00:23:38.460
it's – I guess it hasn't been tested

00:23:38.500 --> 00:23:38.740
in court.

00:23:38.759 --> 00:23:39.359
But generally,

00:23:39.900 --> 00:23:43.041
it's – your First Amendment protects – you

00:23:43.082 --> 00:23:44.261
don't have to give up the pin because

00:23:44.281 --> 00:23:45.663
that's a violation of your free speech.

00:23:46.022 --> 00:23:47.443
And I would imagine a violation of your

00:23:47.483 --> 00:23:48.804
right against self-incrimination.

00:23:48.983 --> 00:23:51.164
And we didn't mention it in these show

00:23:51.204 --> 00:23:52.786
notes, but he claims,

00:23:52.826 --> 00:23:53.746
this Samuel Tunick guy,

00:23:54.106 --> 00:23:56.047
he claims that he repeatedly asked for a

00:23:56.086 --> 00:23:57.107
lawyer and was denied.

00:23:57.728 --> 00:23:59.450
So if that's true and they can prove

00:23:59.490 --> 00:23:59.710
that,

00:24:00.471 --> 00:24:01.731
I feel like that's a really strong

00:24:01.771 --> 00:24:02.913
argument that all this stuff is going to

00:24:02.933 --> 00:24:05.115
get thrown out because a lawyer would have

00:24:05.135 --> 00:24:06.738
told him don't give them any pin,

00:24:06.857 --> 00:24:07.818
even if it's a fake pin.

00:24:08.398 --> 00:24:09.380
You know, I think.

00:24:09.500 --> 00:24:10.260
Yeah.

00:24:10.300 --> 00:24:10.582
Yeah.

00:24:10.682 --> 00:24:11.301
I mean,

00:24:11.321 --> 00:24:12.544
that but that is a critical component.

00:24:12.963 --> 00:24:14.826
that was probably like the right move is

00:24:14.865 --> 00:24:17.868
to just shut up don't don't give a

00:24:17.929 --> 00:24:24.654
pin um at all uh sb ass is

00:24:24.694 --> 00:24:26.497
powering off the phone before handing it

00:24:26.596 --> 00:24:28.598
over also illegal powering off important

00:24:28.618 --> 00:24:31.721
to delete the encryption key and and yeah

00:24:31.781 --> 00:24:33.303
getting your phone to like up before first

00:24:33.383 --> 00:24:35.605
unlock state is definitely more secure

00:24:35.625 --> 00:24:36.866
without wiping any of that data

00:24:37.467 --> 00:24:40.451
um that gives you more possibilities for

00:24:40.550 --> 00:24:43.334
for defense in the future um you still

00:24:43.374 --> 00:24:45.155
shouldn't you know give them any pin at

00:24:45.175 --> 00:24:47.179
all like we like we just said but

00:24:47.199 --> 00:24:49.240
i i don't actually know how this would

00:24:49.781 --> 00:24:50.962
work i suspect it would

00:24:52.155 --> 00:24:53.715
not be illegal in the same way at

00:24:53.855 --> 00:24:54.076
all.

00:24:54.435 --> 00:24:54.656
I mean,

00:24:54.777 --> 00:24:56.576
the government can stretch any law to make

00:24:56.616 --> 00:24:57.477
whatever claims they want,

00:24:57.497 --> 00:24:58.636
and maybe they would claim, you know,

00:24:58.717 --> 00:25:00.678
you deleted the encryption key by powering

00:25:00.738 --> 00:25:01.117
it off,

00:25:01.917 --> 00:25:04.397
and that destroyed the evidence or

00:25:04.417 --> 00:25:04.739
whatever.

00:25:05.439 --> 00:25:06.078
Who knows, right?

00:25:06.138 --> 00:25:08.858
But I certainly don't think it would be

00:25:10.539 --> 00:25:15.221
illegal to power off your device before

00:25:15.240 --> 00:25:17.020
you've been informed of the investigation,

00:25:17.060 --> 00:25:17.701
at the very least.

00:25:17.861 --> 00:25:19.622
And I think this is something to consider

00:25:19.801 --> 00:25:20.642
when you're going through...

00:25:22.417 --> 00:25:25.300
these border checkpoints or if you're in a

00:25:25.340 --> 00:25:27.143
situation where you reasonably expect you

00:25:27.163 --> 00:25:28.984
might have an interaction like this with

00:25:30.646 --> 00:25:33.328
some overreaching law enforcement,

00:25:35.010 --> 00:25:36.393
it's probably a good idea to just have

00:25:36.413 --> 00:25:39.336
your device powered off in the first

00:25:39.375 --> 00:25:39.635
place.

00:25:44.585 --> 00:25:47.586
is also probably a good idea to back

00:25:47.665 --> 00:25:49.806
up your devices to the cloud and just

00:25:49.865 --> 00:25:51.885
wipe them before you go through.

00:25:51.925 --> 00:25:55.747
Only keep minimal data on your phone for

00:25:55.767 --> 00:25:57.247
what you need for traveling, basically.

00:25:57.287 --> 00:25:58.548
I think that that's probably one of the

00:25:58.567 --> 00:26:00.788
strongest moves you can do.

00:26:01.748 --> 00:26:02.528
So yeah,

00:26:02.567 --> 00:26:03.588
there's a lot of options that would

00:26:03.608 --> 00:26:06.548
definitely clearly be legal.

00:26:07.788 --> 00:26:10.390
Much more legal compared to the gray area

00:26:10.410 --> 00:26:10.529
that...

00:26:12.755 --> 00:26:13.836
that this case is in.

00:26:13.915 --> 00:26:14.276
But again,

00:26:14.316 --> 00:26:15.496
I think that this case is a pretty

00:26:16.016 --> 00:26:16.836
light gray.

00:26:16.916 --> 00:26:20.097
I think that their case is pretty weak.

00:26:21.459 --> 00:26:22.439
Newlywitch said,

00:26:22.499 --> 00:26:24.099
if the CSAM turns out to be fabricated,

00:26:24.119 --> 00:26:25.759
the privacy community needs to rally

00:26:25.799 --> 00:26:27.401
behind this activist.

00:26:29.142 --> 00:26:30.903
I think it's pretty clear that the CSAM

00:26:30.923 --> 00:26:31.763
accusations are...

00:26:47.842 --> 00:26:52.346
because the government is claiming that

00:26:52.906 --> 00:26:55.250
this is sort of a suspected terrorism

00:26:55.549 --> 00:26:58.633
activity in their behind-the-scenes

00:26:58.732 --> 00:27:00.996
emails, which is not what they told him,

00:27:01.056 --> 00:27:02.557
but that seems to be what they actually

00:27:02.596 --> 00:27:02.938
believed.

00:27:03.298 --> 00:27:05.079
So I think, in my opinion,

00:27:05.119 --> 00:27:05.721
this is just...

00:27:07.078 --> 00:27:09.000
total proof that it's probably like in

00:27:09.019 --> 00:27:10.859
their training or something to just accuse

00:27:10.880 --> 00:27:13.381
people of possessing CSIM wherever they

00:27:13.421 --> 00:27:15.442
can because it's such a I mean it's

00:27:15.781 --> 00:27:17.343
it's difficult to prove it's something you

00:27:17.363 --> 00:27:19.063
could easily plant on people's devices

00:27:19.143 --> 00:27:22.644
it's something that people really don't

00:27:22.684 --> 00:27:24.345
like so it makes all of these headline

00:27:24.384 --> 00:27:27.185
stories but since they're discussing you

00:27:27.205 --> 00:27:29.106
know suspected terrorism activities behind

00:27:29.126 --> 00:27:31.807
the scenes and not and not you know

00:27:31.847 --> 00:27:34.548
investigating him for CSIM before they

00:27:34.588 --> 00:27:36.130
told him that I

00:27:37.311 --> 00:27:41.040
I think it's very clearly a total farce

00:27:41.182 --> 00:27:41.682
basically.

00:27:44.284 --> 00:27:46.944
Yeah, I would imagine the the CSAM thing,

00:27:47.005 --> 00:27:47.285
too,

00:27:47.345 --> 00:27:48.785
is like that is such a horrible thing

00:27:48.825 --> 00:27:50.346
to be charged with that most people would

00:27:50.385 --> 00:27:52.046
probably instinctively just want to clear

00:27:52.066 --> 00:27:53.386
their name right there before those

00:27:53.446 --> 00:27:54.727
accusations get out of control.

00:27:55.267 --> 00:27:56.327
Like, oh, God, no, here,

00:27:56.387 --> 00:27:57.268
please take my phone.

00:27:57.307 --> 00:27:58.288
See, there's nothing on there.

00:27:58.387 --> 00:28:00.328
So I wonder if that's part of why

00:28:00.368 --> 00:28:00.969
they do it, too.

00:28:02.789 --> 00:28:03.710
I wanted to go back real quick to

00:28:03.730 --> 00:28:05.029
the question about powering off your

00:28:05.069 --> 00:28:05.289
phone.

00:28:05.470 --> 00:28:06.631
I've started doing that, actually,

00:28:06.671 --> 00:28:08.050
because my logic is, again,

00:28:08.191 --> 00:28:10.152
I don't have anything that sensitive that

00:28:10.192 --> 00:28:10.372
I would

00:28:12.515 --> 00:28:13.776
I've had my phone blow up.

00:28:14.556 --> 00:28:15.576
So those of you who follow me know

00:28:15.596 --> 00:28:15.777
that.

00:28:16.238 --> 00:28:18.019
And like trying to get back into like

00:28:18.058 --> 00:28:19.579
things like Signal and all my accounts,

00:28:19.619 --> 00:28:20.961
it's like it wasn't really the end of

00:28:20.980 --> 00:28:21.320
the world,

00:28:21.361 --> 00:28:22.362
but it was still kind of a pain

00:28:22.382 --> 00:28:22.842
in the ass.

00:28:23.261 --> 00:28:25.064
So I would rather not factory reset my

00:28:25.104 --> 00:28:25.963
phone if I don't have to.

00:28:26.364 --> 00:28:27.865
So when I go through the airport, yeah,

00:28:27.986 --> 00:28:30.027
I've started just rebooting my phone right

00:28:30.047 --> 00:28:31.907
before I throw it in the thing to

00:28:31.928 --> 00:28:34.851
go through the –

00:28:33.269 --> 00:28:34.950
the x-ray because i actually have had

00:28:34.990 --> 00:28:36.530
computers not like forensically searched

00:28:36.550 --> 00:28:37.411
but i remember one of my it was

00:28:37.451 --> 00:28:39.811
actually my cubes computer um because it's

00:28:39.852 --> 00:28:41.633
literally from like two thousand twelve it

00:28:41.653 --> 00:28:43.074
did go through the airport one time and

00:28:43.094 --> 00:28:44.555
they were like hey we pinged is like

00:28:44.575 --> 00:28:46.336
there's residue on here i'm gonna swab it

00:28:46.355 --> 00:28:47.875
with a cotton swab it never left my

00:28:47.935 --> 00:28:49.676
site she did everything right in front of

00:28:49.696 --> 00:28:50.998
me she never turned it on or opened

00:28:51.018 --> 00:28:52.598
it or anything but she like swabbed it

00:28:52.618 --> 00:28:54.299
with a cotton swab and like okay you

00:28:54.339 --> 00:28:55.759
came back clean everything's good go about

00:28:55.779 --> 00:28:57.840
your way and so i've kind of had

00:28:57.881 --> 00:28:58.281
that that

00:28:58.981 --> 00:29:00.742
walk through my head of like, well,

00:29:01.363 --> 00:29:02.604
I don't want to delete my phone,

00:29:02.723 --> 00:29:05.684
but I also want to keep people out

00:29:05.704 --> 00:29:06.645
before first unlock.

00:29:06.766 --> 00:29:07.506
So yeah, as far as I know,

00:29:07.546 --> 00:29:08.866
that's not illegal because like Jonah was

00:29:08.886 --> 00:29:09.086
saying,

00:29:09.106 --> 00:29:10.428
like nobody came up to me and was

00:29:10.448 --> 00:29:11.387
like, Hey, let me search your phone.

00:29:11.407 --> 00:29:12.689
It's me preemptively getting ahead of

00:29:12.729 --> 00:29:12.888
that.

00:29:12.929 --> 00:29:14.730
Like I am about to give up control

00:29:14.769 --> 00:29:15.349
of my phone.

00:29:15.809 --> 00:29:16.851
Let me go ahead and reboot it.

00:29:16.911 --> 00:29:17.270
And that way,

00:29:17.290 --> 00:29:18.451
if I end up in this situation where

00:29:18.471 --> 00:29:19.571
they say, Hey, we pinged your phone,

00:29:19.592 --> 00:29:20.432
I'm going to take it to a back

00:29:20.471 --> 00:29:21.792
room, have fun.

00:29:22.452 --> 00:29:23.513
It's before first unlock.

00:29:26.299 --> 00:29:26.921
And also real quick,

00:29:26.941 --> 00:29:28.923
Dag Overhaul said have a separate innocent

00:29:28.962 --> 00:29:29.462
profile.

00:29:29.563 --> 00:29:30.243
I mean, yeah,

00:29:30.284 --> 00:29:32.685
that would work except if they do the

00:29:32.705 --> 00:29:34.107
forensic thing because at that point the

00:29:34.147 --> 00:29:34.867
phone's unlocked.

00:29:34.948 --> 00:29:36.190
If they just do like a quick visual

00:29:36.230 --> 00:29:38.192
search, then yeah,

00:29:38.412 --> 00:29:40.053
what are they going to – they're not

00:29:40.073 --> 00:29:41.114
going to find anything there.

00:29:41.193 --> 00:29:43.896
But I don't know.

00:29:43.957 --> 00:29:44.798
That's my thought process.

00:29:46.374 --> 00:29:47.115
I just want to do this.

00:29:47.194 --> 00:29:47.275
Oh,

00:29:47.315 --> 00:29:48.355
the last thing I'll say real quick is

00:29:48.375 --> 00:29:49.556
to definitely go ahead and check out this

00:29:49.576 --> 00:29:51.057
four or four interview with him because

00:29:51.076 --> 00:29:53.538
like it does require a subscription.

00:29:53.919 --> 00:29:55.240
And I mean, it's like what?

00:29:55.359 --> 00:29:56.621
Five bucks a month, ten bucks a month.

00:29:56.641 --> 00:29:57.882
Just get like a one month subscription.

00:29:58.362 --> 00:30:00.183
But it's totally worth reading because

00:30:00.743 --> 00:30:02.525
apparently the cops like had a hidden

00:30:02.565 --> 00:30:03.385
camera on him.

00:30:03.445 --> 00:30:05.968
They had like a tracker on his car

00:30:06.048 --> 00:30:07.229
and he didn't know this at the time

00:30:07.249 --> 00:30:07.769
for the record.

00:30:08.048 --> 00:30:09.710
He had no idea he was this targeted.

00:30:10.211 --> 00:30:11.251
It's just it's so wild.

00:30:12.076 --> 00:30:13.695
That's crazy.

00:30:13.736 --> 00:30:15.396
Just another comment from DakeOverhaul.

00:30:15.616 --> 00:30:17.577
Another YouTuber says he resets his phone

00:30:17.617 --> 00:30:18.377
every time he's flying.

00:30:18.938 --> 00:30:19.678
I mean, yeah,

00:30:19.958 --> 00:30:22.638
that's not really a bad strategy,

00:30:23.638 --> 00:30:25.400
especially if you can back it up and

00:30:25.440 --> 00:30:27.740
restore it easily at your destination.

00:30:28.820 --> 00:30:31.300
Honestly, when I fly to Vegas next week,

00:30:31.340 --> 00:30:32.821
I'll be bringing a wiped...

00:30:33.519 --> 00:30:35.339
macbook that doesn't have any data on it

00:30:35.720 --> 00:30:38.339
um not necessarily for this reason mostly

00:30:38.359 --> 00:30:39.480
because i don't need to bring all of

00:30:39.500 --> 00:30:41.801
my all of the stuff on my laptop

00:30:41.842 --> 00:30:45.702
to defcon but um you know it's typically

00:30:45.742 --> 00:30:49.044
not a bad idea to travel with like

00:30:49.104 --> 00:30:53.105
the minimum uh information you can so

00:30:57.096 --> 00:30:58.959
Yeah, I'm not dedicated enough to do that.

00:30:58.999 --> 00:31:00.441
But if my threat model was high enough

00:31:00.540 --> 00:31:01.903
or if I was flying somewhere where like

00:31:02.022 --> 00:31:03.484
I knew I'm almost certainly going to get

00:31:03.525 --> 00:31:03.765
searched,

00:31:03.786 --> 00:31:04.826
like if I was going to China for

00:31:04.846 --> 00:31:05.407
whatever reason,

00:31:05.468 --> 00:31:07.330
like maybe I would do that.

00:31:07.391 --> 00:31:07.550
But.

00:31:09.092 --> 00:31:10.692
It's definitely more of a concern like

00:31:10.813 --> 00:31:11.753
international borders.

00:31:11.854 --> 00:31:15.214
I don't know how much power TSA has

00:31:15.234 --> 00:31:15.935
in this regard,

00:31:15.955 --> 00:31:17.916
but I don't think they can do full

00:31:17.936 --> 00:31:19.317
law enforcement investigations.

00:31:19.337 --> 00:31:19.817
I'd have to look.

00:31:19.857 --> 00:31:22.419
But border control in the U.S.

00:31:22.459 --> 00:31:23.240
definitely can.

00:31:24.519 --> 00:31:26.280
There's definitely a lot of power that

00:31:26.421 --> 00:31:27.882
border control in other countries would

00:31:27.902 --> 00:31:28.642
have as well,

00:31:28.702 --> 00:31:29.722
no matter where you're traveling.

00:31:29.782 --> 00:31:31.503
So all of those international borders,

00:31:32.865 --> 00:31:34.546
for sure, you should keep that in mind.

00:31:36.426 --> 00:31:37.106
Yeah, agreed.

00:31:40.667 --> 00:31:42.388
I don't have anything else on that story.

00:31:42.429 --> 00:31:42.709
Do you?

00:31:45.050 --> 00:31:48.753
I think we pretty much got it covered.

00:31:50.275 --> 00:31:50.655
Cool.

00:31:50.675 --> 00:31:52.777
I was just going to look really quick

00:31:52.916 --> 00:31:55.298
if we had any comments about this story

00:31:55.358 --> 00:31:56.881
in the forum thread since this was our

00:31:56.980 --> 00:31:59.041
kind of title story.

00:31:59.162 --> 00:32:01.124
But we may have covered a lot of

00:32:01.144 --> 00:32:03.506
the questions here that were answered

00:32:03.526 --> 00:32:03.625
today.

00:32:05.623 --> 00:32:07.923
by or asked by people in the live

00:32:07.983 --> 00:32:11.224
stream um and maybe bob's your uncle said

00:32:11.285 --> 00:32:12.884
i wonder if having an almost bare fake

00:32:12.944 --> 00:32:14.226
android profile with a completely

00:32:14.266 --> 00:32:15.846
different pin is enough for border control

00:32:16.445 --> 00:32:18.207
um yeah i guess it depends on how

00:32:19.146 --> 00:32:22.067
knowledgeable they are like if they're

00:32:22.087 --> 00:32:23.688
only gonna search one profile you could

00:32:23.708 --> 00:32:27.088
just have that one open but um that's

00:32:27.108 --> 00:32:28.390
probably not a path i would

00:32:29.210 --> 00:32:30.770
try to go down necessarily,

00:32:30.810 --> 00:32:34.575
but it could be better than nothing.

00:32:34.934 --> 00:32:39.898
I know that they can get kind of

00:32:40.579 --> 00:32:42.240
mad about you having a blank phone.

00:32:42.260 --> 00:32:43.481
They're like, where's your social media?

00:32:43.521 --> 00:32:44.383
Is this legitimate?

00:32:44.403 --> 00:32:45.144
That sort of thing.

00:32:46.404 --> 00:32:50.627
But it's challenging to defend against the

00:32:50.969 --> 00:32:52.650
government and law enforcement agencies in

00:32:52.670 --> 00:32:53.590
this case because

00:32:55.338 --> 00:32:56.779
They can kind of do whatever they want

00:32:56.839 --> 00:32:58.380
and it gets sorted out later by the

00:32:58.421 --> 00:32:58.800
courts.

00:32:58.980 --> 00:33:02.603
So it's not a super fantastic system,

00:33:02.623 --> 00:33:05.564
unfortunately.

00:33:06.344 --> 00:33:07.484
Yeah, it looks like in the forum thread,

00:33:07.505 --> 00:33:08.806
there was some discussion about this,

00:33:08.865 --> 00:33:11.406
but not really a lot of questions,

00:33:11.487 --> 00:33:14.367
just people kind of talking about all the

00:33:14.387 --> 00:33:15.028
stuff we said,

00:33:15.068 --> 00:33:16.288
somebody linked to that four or four

00:33:16.368 --> 00:33:16.868
article,

00:33:18.009 --> 00:33:19.611
somebody else linked to a Gizmodo article.

00:33:21.146 --> 00:33:24.349
so yeah um just there's one post in

00:33:24.371 --> 00:33:26.653
the forum i'd just highlight a sentence

00:33:26.673 --> 00:33:28.815
from that was from trustee rock nate i'm

00:33:29.076 --> 00:33:30.596
hopeful this case sets a precedent in

00:33:30.636 --> 00:33:32.038
favor of dress pins i think that that

00:33:32.058 --> 00:33:34.361
could be um one of the best outcomes

00:33:34.480 --> 00:33:37.324
of this so we'll we'll see if that

00:33:37.364 --> 00:33:40.607
happens um i guess it depends on how

00:33:42.405 --> 00:33:44.626
tenuous the government thinks that their

00:33:44.646 --> 00:33:46.208
case will be because there's there's also

00:33:46.248 --> 00:33:47.888
cases where you see like things like this

00:33:47.929 --> 00:33:50.590
and then to avoid uh setting a precedent

00:33:50.611 --> 00:33:52.451
the government will very quickly drop it

00:33:52.571 --> 00:33:54.032
but after a lot of time after you

00:33:54.053 --> 00:33:55.134
have to spend a lot of money that

00:33:55.173 --> 00:33:58.715
sort of thing so yeah you never really

00:33:58.996 --> 00:33:59.777
you never really know

00:34:01.876 --> 00:34:02.356
So real quick,

00:34:02.376 --> 00:34:05.259
wanted to mention SB here brought up the

00:34:05.319 --> 00:34:06.980
idea of a password strength checker,

00:34:07.260 --> 00:34:09.483
and somebody else also said something

00:34:09.503 --> 00:34:11.563
about using a strong password.

00:34:12.905 --> 00:34:14.126
I mean, your mileage may vary,

00:34:14.146 --> 00:34:15.887
but I remember Naomi Brockwell did a video

00:34:15.927 --> 00:34:18.630
where she argued that a six-digit PIN is

00:34:18.730 --> 00:34:20.791
probably going to be enough for most

00:34:20.811 --> 00:34:21.090
people.

00:34:21.731 --> 00:34:22.092
I mean, again,

00:34:22.132 --> 00:34:23.672
if you're in a situation where you'd

00:34:23.693 --> 00:34:25.114
rather just wipe the phone completely,

00:34:25.153 --> 00:34:26.074
then you probably shouldn't trust a

00:34:26.094 --> 00:34:27.056
six-digit PIN, but...

00:34:28.677 --> 00:34:29.398
I don't know.

00:34:30.119 --> 00:34:31.460
I it doesn't I guess what I'm getting

00:34:31.501 --> 00:34:31.862
at is like,

00:34:31.961 --> 00:34:33.284
I don't think it necessarily has to be

00:34:33.304 --> 00:34:34.465
this like super crazy,

00:34:34.525 --> 00:34:36.067
like twenty eight character randomly

00:34:36.108 --> 00:34:39.552
generated letter, uppercase, lowercase.

00:34:39.632 --> 00:34:39.913
Like,

00:34:40.713 --> 00:34:41.835
I think there's a middle ground for most

00:34:41.876 --> 00:34:42.115
people.

00:34:42.175 --> 00:34:42.597
But I mean,

00:34:42.916 --> 00:34:44.438
certainly if you want to do that,

00:34:44.458 --> 00:34:44.860
go for it.

00:34:45.184 --> 00:34:47.646
thing with that um is that the length

00:34:47.907 --> 00:34:51.710
of this pin does directly improve like the

00:34:51.769 --> 00:34:54.612
strength of the encryption if somebody is

00:34:55.373 --> 00:34:58.675
able to brute force that data without any

00:34:58.735 --> 00:35:00.898
limits um the reason you can do like

00:35:00.918 --> 00:35:03.079
a six digit pin is because of the

00:35:03.099 --> 00:35:04.199
brute forcing protections

00:35:04.920 --> 00:35:05.400
in a phone,

00:35:05.762 --> 00:35:07.663
and those are generally considered to be

00:35:08.324 --> 00:35:08.983
fairly good,

00:35:09.045 --> 00:35:12.668
especially with modern ones like latest

00:35:12.788 --> 00:35:15.250
iPhones or especially like the Google

00:35:15.469 --> 00:35:18.351
Pixel and the Titan chip on Graphene OS.

00:35:19.293 --> 00:35:21.235
There should be enough rate limiting or

00:35:21.295 --> 00:35:22.715
wiping it after a certain amount of time

00:35:22.755 --> 00:35:26.338
enforced by the operating system that the

00:35:26.378 --> 00:35:27.280
complexity of your pin,

00:35:27.320 --> 00:35:29.221
as long as it's not super simple,

00:35:29.260 --> 00:35:30.422
is not going to be a huge problem.

00:35:31.623 --> 00:35:32.003
But

00:35:34.021 --> 00:35:37.045
we have seen in the past, definitely,

00:35:38.206 --> 00:35:39.748
definitely a good number of cases where

00:35:39.789 --> 00:35:41.751
like we find out celebrate or gray key

00:35:41.871 --> 00:35:44.014
or some of these other tools that these

00:35:44.094 --> 00:35:44.896
agencies are using,

00:35:45.076 --> 00:35:48.239
they can bypass the the rate limiting.

00:35:48.300 --> 00:35:48.480
So

00:35:49.661 --> 00:35:51.623
It is something definitely to consider,

00:35:51.682 --> 00:35:52.822
especially if you're going to be in this

00:35:52.842 --> 00:35:53.342
situation.

00:35:53.623 --> 00:35:56.043
The other thing you could do is have

00:35:56.123 --> 00:35:58.664
a six-digit pin on your profile and have

00:35:58.704 --> 00:35:59.186
a separate,

00:35:59.226 --> 00:36:01.485
longer password on a private space in your

00:36:01.525 --> 00:36:01.847
profile.

00:36:01.867 --> 00:36:03.027
Because private spaces,

00:36:03.067 --> 00:36:03.967
at least on Graphene OS,

00:36:03.987 --> 00:36:05.827
they're fully separate profiles with their

00:36:05.887 --> 00:36:07.168
own encryption keys.

00:36:07.188 --> 00:36:09.409
You can set up a second password for

00:36:09.449 --> 00:36:10.650
them and...

00:36:12.581 --> 00:36:15.943
you could sort out most of your apps

00:36:16.563 --> 00:36:18.184
that might have sensitive information like

00:36:18.204 --> 00:36:20.646
your banking app or your email or whatever

00:36:21.148 --> 00:36:23.028
into a private space like that and just

00:36:23.048 --> 00:36:23.228
keep

00:36:24.605 --> 00:36:27.106
basic things like social media or whatever

00:36:27.146 --> 00:36:29.027
you consider less sensitive in your main

00:36:29.067 --> 00:36:29.487
profile.

00:36:29.547 --> 00:36:32.027
I think that that's one legitimate thing

00:36:32.068 --> 00:36:34.608
you can do as well.

00:36:35.188 --> 00:36:36.909
And Dag Overhaal basically said the same

00:36:36.929 --> 00:36:37.068
thing.

00:36:37.088 --> 00:36:37.228
Like,

00:36:37.289 --> 00:36:38.570
if you can get the keys out of

00:36:38.610 --> 00:36:38.730
it,

00:36:38.750 --> 00:36:41.271
you can brute force those short pins super

00:36:41.351 --> 00:36:41.630
easily.

00:36:41.690 --> 00:36:42.751
So there is that to consider.

00:36:42.831 --> 00:36:44.751
But in theory,

00:36:44.771 --> 00:36:46.132
they can't get the keys out of it,

00:36:46.231 --> 00:36:47.172
and so it should be fine.

00:36:49.583 --> 00:36:54.568
It's not as provenly foolproof as using a

00:36:54.608 --> 00:36:55.070
longer pin.

00:36:55.190 --> 00:36:58.213
So there's trade-offs for sure, for sure.

00:36:58.233 --> 00:37:03.418
Gotcha.

00:37:03.458 --> 00:37:04.438
I think we kind of got it.

00:37:04.918 --> 00:37:07.661
Why don't you take our next story here?

00:37:15.068 --> 00:37:15.268
All right.

00:37:15.329 --> 00:37:16.309
I think I'm back.

00:37:16.530 --> 00:37:17.090
I hope I'm back.

00:37:17.110 --> 00:37:18.431
I don't know what's going on with my

00:37:18.451 --> 00:37:18.630
internet.

00:37:18.670 --> 00:37:19.311
I think you're back.

00:37:19.692 --> 00:37:20.331
I didn't know you left,

00:37:20.351 --> 00:37:22.432
but I can hear you now.

00:37:22.773 --> 00:37:23.974
My internet keeps freezing up.

00:37:24.054 --> 00:37:24.253
Yeah.

00:37:24.273 --> 00:37:24.614
Interesting.

00:37:24.634 --> 00:37:26.315
Weird.

00:37:26.335 --> 00:37:27.456
Before we move on to the next story,

00:37:27.496 --> 00:37:29.516
we did have one question in our forum

00:37:29.536 --> 00:37:31.197
thread that's not related to this story.

00:37:31.318 --> 00:37:31.697
It said,

00:37:31.717 --> 00:37:33.900
are there any privacy alternatives to ring

00:37:33.940 --> 00:37:34.559
cameras?

00:37:37.001 --> 00:37:38.802
I did not do any research on this

00:37:38.942 --> 00:37:39.463
one, but...

00:37:40.612 --> 00:37:40.952
I don't know.

00:37:40.992 --> 00:37:41.211
I mean,

00:37:41.711 --> 00:37:42.992
I'm definitely not a fan of Ring for

00:37:43.072 --> 00:37:44.512
so, so, so many reasons.

00:37:44.572 --> 00:37:46.393
But the one thing I will give Ring

00:37:46.434 --> 00:37:47.873
is that they've got an end-to-end

00:37:47.893 --> 00:37:49.034
encryption that you can enable,

00:37:49.195 --> 00:37:51.155
and I think that's a good start.

00:37:51.255 --> 00:37:52.275
Is it true, though?

00:37:52.376 --> 00:37:54.996
I mean, Anchor had those cameras.

00:37:55.036 --> 00:37:56.536
Was it Eufy or whatever that were supposed

00:37:56.556 --> 00:37:57.536
to be end-to-end encrypted?

00:37:57.657 --> 00:38:01.719
Obviously, they were not.

00:38:01.798 --> 00:38:03.759
Ring has a lot of other privacy problems

00:38:03.978 --> 00:38:05.400
because they have those programs where,

00:38:05.460 --> 00:38:05.719
like,

00:38:06.518 --> 00:38:08.400
you can opt in to share all of

00:38:08.420 --> 00:38:10.440
your camera footage with law enforcement

00:38:11.001 --> 00:38:13.202
or like other programs to search for lost

00:38:13.282 --> 00:38:15.722
dogs or something silly like that.

00:38:15.782 --> 00:38:18.643
So, yeah, it's...

00:38:19.672 --> 00:38:20.492
It's not a great setup.

00:38:21.193 --> 00:38:22.813
There's certainly self-hosted setups you

00:38:22.853 --> 00:38:23.114
can do.

00:38:23.153 --> 00:38:25.835
There's a lot of video recording threads

00:38:25.875 --> 00:38:27.074
on the forum you could look at with

00:38:27.094 --> 00:38:29.076
a lot of different recommended tools.

00:38:30.456 --> 00:38:33.617
There's some sort of cloud-based ones that

00:38:33.637 --> 00:38:35.376
I think are better than others,

00:38:35.416 --> 00:38:37.478
but they're gonna be unsafe if they use

00:38:38.038 --> 00:38:39.739
the internet as an authentication later.

00:38:39.818 --> 00:38:40.659
I'm thinking of like,

00:38:41.338 --> 00:38:43.699
unify unify protect for example they have

00:38:43.880 --> 00:38:47.001
good cameras but there's some like

00:38:47.061 --> 00:38:49.501
reliance on like cloud authentication kind

00:38:49.521 --> 00:38:51.581
of similar to like plex for example which

00:38:51.601 --> 00:38:56.364
isn't like amazing um but there's always a

00:38:56.403 --> 00:38:57.784
trade-off between like features because

00:38:57.884 --> 00:38:59.284
with a lot of like self-hosted ones you

00:38:59.304 --> 00:39:01.045
don't get a lot of useful things like

00:39:01.324 --> 00:39:03.666
notifications uh on your phone when when

00:39:03.706 --> 00:39:05.146
the doorbell rings or something like that

00:39:05.467 --> 00:39:06.447
that you would get from

00:39:08.139 --> 00:39:09.900
bigger tech company apps.

00:39:10.820 --> 00:39:11.081
But yeah,

00:39:11.141 --> 00:39:12.782
I don't have any specific recommendations.

00:39:13.121 --> 00:39:15.123
I would take a look at all of

00:39:15.163 --> 00:39:17.523
the home camera related threats on the

00:39:17.563 --> 00:39:20.565
forum because they are probably more

00:39:21.284 --> 00:39:22.985
knowledgeable than I am right now.

00:39:25.726 --> 00:39:27.407
Yeah, I'm still renting,

00:39:27.467 --> 00:39:29.347
so I haven't had much of an incentive

00:39:29.367 --> 00:39:31.869
to look into home security that deeply.

00:39:32.050 --> 00:39:34.070
But I'm looking here.

00:39:34.250 --> 00:39:34.570
I know...

00:39:36.108 --> 00:39:37.849
I know there was one that one of

00:39:37.909 --> 00:39:39.010
our associates recommended,

00:39:39.050 --> 00:39:40.391
and I passed that along a long time

00:39:40.431 --> 00:39:40.592
ago,

00:39:40.612 --> 00:39:41.773
but I can't remember what episode that

00:39:41.813 --> 00:39:42.032
was.

00:39:44.673 --> 00:39:45.215
AI summary,

00:39:45.235 --> 00:39:46.215
so take it with a grain of salt.

00:39:46.255 --> 00:39:48.016
But according to Brave's AI summary,

00:39:48.476 --> 00:39:49.978
I looked up private doorbell camera.

00:39:50.498 --> 00:39:54.820
It says things like Reolink and Eufy are

00:39:54.860 --> 00:39:56.782
highly recommended because they allow

00:39:57.541 --> 00:39:59.302
local storage without a monthly

00:39:59.342 --> 00:40:01.644
subscription on a micro SD card.

00:40:02.516 --> 00:40:05.159
There's also a TP-Link Taipo, Aquara,

00:40:05.179 --> 00:40:06.199
who I've never heard of.

00:40:07.760 --> 00:40:08.922
And then they said there's actually some

00:40:08.961 --> 00:40:11.224
cameras that work with Home Assistant.

00:40:11.423 --> 00:40:13.626
They're a Chinese company.

00:40:13.945 --> 00:40:15.347
I didn't know they made the cameras they

00:40:15.367 --> 00:40:15.626
make.

00:40:17.987 --> 00:40:22.070
I know they make Z-Wave sensors for Home

00:40:22.090 --> 00:40:22.791
Assistant and stuff.

00:40:23.193 --> 00:40:24.474
I wanted to bring up really quick.

00:40:24.494 --> 00:40:24.653
Sorry,

00:40:24.673 --> 00:40:27.376
I'm trying to bring up a sharing screen

00:40:27.456 --> 00:40:31.380
situation, which I don't know how to.

00:40:32.021 --> 00:40:32.481
How do I?

00:40:33.182 --> 00:40:33.623
I got you.

00:40:33.643 --> 00:40:34.204
How do I share?

00:40:34.244 --> 00:40:34.565
Thanks.

00:40:35.125 --> 00:40:35.925
You can share my screen.

00:40:35.945 --> 00:40:38.329
I have to remove mine.

00:40:38.369 --> 00:40:38.668
That's why.

00:40:39.518 --> 00:40:42.641
uh there we go uh somebody in our

00:40:43.581 --> 00:40:45.784
signal group for supporters which you can

00:40:45.824 --> 00:40:48.626
join by donating at privacyguides.org

00:40:48.806 --> 00:40:52.088
donate um mentioned secluso uh this is a

00:40:52.510 --> 00:40:56.032
raspberry pi based camera setup uh it's

00:40:56.072 --> 00:40:56.913
end-to-end encrypted

00:40:58.614 --> 00:41:01.077
The the secluso people are on our forum

00:41:01.137 --> 00:41:02.518
I believe and there's a thread about it

00:41:02.998 --> 00:41:04.699
and you can even ask them questions there

00:41:04.721 --> 00:41:06.782
and stuff I think that's definitely one to

00:41:06.842 --> 00:41:08.324
look into if you're in more of a

00:41:08.884 --> 00:41:12.347
self hosting state of mind There's also

00:41:12.407 --> 00:41:15.990
frigate and scripted as John points out in

00:41:16.030 --> 00:41:19.193
the YouTube chat I've used

00:41:20.728 --> 00:41:21.891
Ooh, I don't know which one I used.

00:41:21.951 --> 00:41:23.052
I looked at both of them,

00:41:23.492 --> 00:41:25.735
and I used one of them to get

00:41:25.775 --> 00:41:29.039
some of my self-hosted cameras into Apple

00:41:29.079 --> 00:41:29.641
HomeKit,

00:41:29.902 --> 00:41:31.443
which is end-to-end encrypted and provides

00:41:31.463 --> 00:41:32.605
some of those notifications.

00:41:33.867 --> 00:41:35.648
And they integrate with Home Assistant as

00:41:35.708 --> 00:41:35.889
well.

00:41:38.313 --> 00:41:39.534
If only I remembered which one.

00:41:39.576 --> 00:41:42.278
But I think people use both of them,

00:41:43.320 --> 00:41:45.842
and that could be some other self-hosted

00:41:45.902 --> 00:41:47.864
options to look into,

00:41:48.264 --> 00:41:50.047
especially because they work...

00:41:52.463 --> 00:41:56.085
with pretty much any LAN-only cameras.

00:41:56.485 --> 00:41:58.507
Unredacted says, Unify Protect is decent.

00:41:59.748 --> 00:41:59.929
Yeah,

00:42:00.028 --> 00:42:03.331
and there are ways to use Unify products

00:42:03.351 --> 00:42:04.612
without their cloud stuff.

00:42:04.871 --> 00:42:05.992
If you don't connect it to the cloud,

00:42:06.253 --> 00:42:08.815
they have a local web interface that you

00:42:08.835 --> 00:42:09.996
can access everything on.

00:42:11.856 --> 00:42:12.898
It's not open source,

00:42:14.900 --> 00:42:16.561
so you can maybe take that with a

00:42:16.960 --> 00:42:18.061
grain of salt, but...

00:42:20.791 --> 00:42:23.931
Yeah, because something to consider.

00:42:24.552 --> 00:42:25.952
John said scripted as a functional.

00:42:26.052 --> 00:42:28.534
I think I did use scripted.

00:42:28.594 --> 00:42:29.514
I think that is right.

00:42:29.715 --> 00:42:32.996
So yeah, it is pretty, pretty neat.

00:42:33.137 --> 00:42:34.336
I probably wouldn't integrate it with

00:42:34.376 --> 00:42:35.518
Google and Amazon,

00:42:35.557 --> 00:42:36.438
even though it can do that.

00:42:36.617 --> 00:42:37.998
But Apple should be.

00:42:39.385 --> 00:42:41.168
Apple handles that all through the Apple

00:42:41.208 --> 00:42:42.710
TV to encrypt it locally.

00:42:43.471 --> 00:42:44.552
So you do need to have a home

00:42:44.612 --> 00:42:45.213
hub like that,

00:42:45.293 --> 00:42:47.034
but it should be a bit better than

00:42:47.074 --> 00:42:48.617
those products.

00:42:48.697 --> 00:42:50.237
But again, that's not open source either,

00:42:50.278 --> 00:42:51.539
so then you have to trust Apple.

00:42:51.639 --> 00:42:52.360
There's all that stuff.

00:42:53.001 --> 00:42:55.244
If you want a fully local sub-hosted NVR,

00:42:55.545 --> 00:42:56.706
I would look at this Seclusa thing.

00:42:56.726 --> 00:42:58.807
I would look at Frigate because I think

00:42:58.827 --> 00:43:00.250
those are all good options as well.

00:43:01.893 --> 00:43:03.273
I just wanted to say another vote for

00:43:03.434 --> 00:43:05.215
X Protect is, again, AI summary,

00:43:05.235 --> 00:43:06.094
take it with a grain of salt.

00:43:06.496 --> 00:43:07.175
But it did say,

00:43:07.556 --> 00:43:08.215
the last thing it says,

00:43:08.255 --> 00:43:09.836
while local storage enhances privacy,

00:43:09.896 --> 00:43:11.197
note that some manufactured data

00:43:11.217 --> 00:43:12.677
collection may still occur for device

00:43:12.717 --> 00:43:13.237
connectivity.

00:43:13.557 --> 00:43:14.498
For absolute security,

00:43:14.538 --> 00:43:16.619
consider air gap systems like X Protect or

00:43:16.759 --> 00:43:17.579
Unify setups,

00:43:17.898 --> 00:43:19.059
though these are more complex and

00:43:19.079 --> 00:43:20.239
expensive to install.

00:43:20.280 --> 00:43:23.740
So, yeah.

00:43:24.842 --> 00:43:25.722
That's all I got on that one.

00:43:27.514 --> 00:43:28.456
Sweet.

00:43:28.556 --> 00:43:30.697
I think you're up for the next story

00:43:30.737 --> 00:43:31.858
here if you want to.

00:43:32.077 --> 00:43:33.137
I am.

00:43:33.318 --> 00:43:33.938
All right.

00:43:35.000 --> 00:43:36.300
Let's talk about Pokemon.

00:43:38.601 --> 00:43:41.923
My childhood here.

00:43:42.023 --> 00:43:43.204
We're actually going to combine these next

00:43:43.244 --> 00:43:44.585
couple of stories because they're...

00:43:44.664 --> 00:43:47.086
Let me throw this up here real quick.

00:43:47.867 --> 00:43:49.668
These next couple stories are kind of all

00:43:49.708 --> 00:43:52.829
about the rise of how private companies

00:43:52.869 --> 00:43:54.371
are increasingly using surveillance

00:43:54.391 --> 00:43:54.972
technology,

00:43:55.052 --> 00:43:56.432
specifically facial recognition

00:43:56.452 --> 00:43:56.693
technology,

00:43:57.574 --> 00:43:58.496
uh, surveillance technology.

00:43:58.516 --> 00:43:59.637
So this one's pretty quick.

00:43:59.876 --> 00:44:03.639
Uh, this comes from PC or PC gamer,

00:44:03.659 --> 00:44:04.099
excuse me.

00:44:04.981 --> 00:44:06.541
And basically it says that Nintendo

00:44:06.581 --> 00:44:08.742
stores, uh, it says specifically in Japan.

00:44:08.922 --> 00:44:09.903
I don't know if it's worldwide,

00:44:10.063 --> 00:44:11.385
but I think it's just in Japan for

00:44:11.425 --> 00:44:11.585
now.

00:44:12.085 --> 00:44:13.726
They say that basically they're having a

00:44:13.786 --> 00:44:15.909
real problem with scalpers coming in and,

00:44:15.929 --> 00:44:16.108
uh,

00:44:16.188 --> 00:44:18.590
buying up all the cards and then reselling

00:44:18.610 --> 00:44:18.771
them.

00:44:18.871 --> 00:44:20.132
And then there's no, uh,

00:44:20.172 --> 00:44:21.873
cards left over for normal,

00:44:21.913 --> 00:44:22.552
legitimate people.

00:44:23.054 --> 00:44:23.134
Um,

00:44:23.474 --> 00:44:25.376
So they are going to start rolling out

00:44:25.675 --> 00:44:29.239
facial recognition systems to verify that

00:44:29.278 --> 00:44:31.201
customers are only coming in once per day,

00:44:31.260 --> 00:44:32.221
which is apparently the limit.

00:44:32.802 --> 00:44:34.202
They say the exception to this will be

00:44:34.222 --> 00:44:35.824
children under elementary school age,

00:44:35.864 --> 00:44:37.706
so preschoolers up to six years old.

00:44:39.974 --> 00:44:40.414
Let me see here.

00:44:40.474 --> 00:44:40.735
Yeah,

00:44:40.775 --> 00:44:42.476
so this is the once a day to

00:44:42.536 --> 00:44:44.317
ensure that players get more access to the

00:44:44.336 --> 00:44:44.597
stock.

00:44:45.038 --> 00:44:46.478
If the system detects that the same person

00:44:46.539 --> 00:44:47.759
has entered the store more than one a

00:44:47.778 --> 00:44:49.199
day or received more than one entry

00:44:49.240 --> 00:44:49.581
ticket,

00:44:49.681 --> 00:44:51.262
a notification to that effect is displayed

00:44:51.302 --> 00:44:51.702
on the screen.

00:44:51.802 --> 00:44:53.282
Entry will be denied to that person based

00:44:53.322 --> 00:44:54.244
on the system's judgment.

00:44:56.766 --> 00:44:57.505
Yeah,

00:44:57.525 --> 00:44:58.686
the article kind of points out that

00:44:58.706 --> 00:44:59.927
there's really nothing you can do about

00:44:59.947 --> 00:45:00.248
this.

00:45:01.268 --> 00:45:03.550
And they did go on to...

00:45:06.802 --> 00:45:07.804
They're a little more generous than I

00:45:07.824 --> 00:45:08.125
would have been.

00:45:09.445 --> 00:45:10.447
This author basically said,

00:45:10.547 --> 00:45:12.048
I've had loads of issues with the online

00:45:12.088 --> 00:45:12.809
Pokemon Center.

00:45:12.889 --> 00:45:14.431
It's never ending queues and insistence

00:45:14.452 --> 00:45:15.753
that I'm in fact a bot whenever I

00:45:15.793 --> 00:45:17.775
try to try multiple times to get a

00:45:17.835 --> 00:45:19.237
pre-order through because the site keeps

00:45:19.277 --> 00:45:19.739
bugging out.

00:45:20.159 --> 00:45:21.581
While facial recognition systems seem like

00:45:21.601 --> 00:45:22.442
it would be harder to mess up,

00:45:22.461 --> 00:45:23.884
there is always room for error with these

00:45:23.923 --> 00:45:24.164
things.

00:45:24.699 --> 00:45:25.400
And unfortunately,

00:45:25.440 --> 00:45:26.840
they say that facial recognition scans for

00:45:26.900 --> 00:45:28.461
entering stores in Japan are not exactly

00:45:28.521 --> 00:45:28.722
new.

00:45:29.101 --> 00:45:30.682
Gundam stores employ the same system to

00:45:30.722 --> 00:45:32.425
ensure people only buy one exclusive item

00:45:32.445 --> 00:45:32.804
a day.

00:45:33.846 --> 00:45:35.186
It seems like it's currently the best way

00:45:35.206 --> 00:45:37.027
to combat scalpers and get popular stock

00:45:37.108 --> 00:45:37.827
out to more people.

00:45:38.409 --> 00:45:42.030
So I don't know that I agree that

00:45:42.050 --> 00:45:44.632
it's the best way, but yeah,

00:45:44.773 --> 00:45:45.974
I do appreciate them pointing out.

00:45:45.994 --> 00:45:47.034
It's like, yeah, it's a cool idea,

00:45:47.074 --> 00:45:48.275
assuming it works.

00:45:48.596 --> 00:45:50.416
And I also feel the need to point

00:45:50.476 --> 00:45:50.938
out that like,

00:45:51.806 --> 00:45:53.447
these systems have to scan everybody.

00:45:54.086 --> 00:45:54.867
It says like, oh,

00:45:54.927 --> 00:45:56.248
it's not going to work on children up

00:45:56.289 --> 00:45:57.088
to six years old.

00:45:57.228 --> 00:45:57.570
Okay.

00:45:58.309 --> 00:45:59.570
Maybe it's because I'm not a parent and

00:45:59.590 --> 00:46:00.630
I don't really spend a lot of time

00:46:00.650 --> 00:46:01.152
around kids.

00:46:01.572 --> 00:46:02.733
I can't tell how old a kid is.

00:46:03.353 --> 00:46:03.572
I mean,

00:46:03.733 --> 00:46:05.193
pretty much everyone younger than me,

00:46:05.273 --> 00:46:06.114
if they're not a teenager,

00:46:06.175 --> 00:46:06.954
they're like six.

00:46:07.255 --> 00:46:09.217
So I don't know.

00:46:09.356 --> 00:46:10.717
The older you get, at least again,

00:46:10.757 --> 00:46:10.978
for me,

00:46:11.597 --> 00:46:13.338
it's harder to differentiate age brackets.

00:46:13.599 --> 00:46:13.840
Again,

00:46:13.960 --> 00:46:15.840
I can tell it's like you're adolescent,

00:46:15.900 --> 00:46:16.021
you're

00:46:20.224 --> 00:46:20.525
Oh no.

00:46:20.565 --> 00:46:21.387
You're a teenager.

00:46:21.606 --> 00:46:22.809
You're probably a young adult.

00:46:22.849 --> 00:46:24.431
Like, but I don't understand that.

00:46:24.451 --> 00:46:25.833
Like, did I cut out again?

00:46:26.954 --> 00:46:29.737
Yeah, just a bit.

00:46:29.777 --> 00:46:31.018
But yeah, my point is like, you know,

00:46:31.119 --> 00:46:31.280
it's,

00:46:31.400 --> 00:46:33.382
it's age verification is always like so

00:46:33.422 --> 00:46:34.724
bad at doing things and like,

00:46:36.099 --> 00:46:37.402
And I'm also annoyed by the part that

00:46:37.422 --> 00:46:38.682
it says it's based on the system's

00:46:38.722 --> 00:46:39.103
judgment.

00:46:39.143 --> 00:46:39.322
Like,

00:46:39.643 --> 00:46:40.684
I think I'd be a little more comfortable

00:46:40.724 --> 00:46:42.726
if it's like a person will intervene and

00:46:42.746 --> 00:46:44.327
double check the system, but whatever.

00:46:45.949 --> 00:46:47.030
The only other thing I'll add is it

00:46:47.090 --> 00:46:48.672
says that a Pokemon does explain that this

00:46:48.692 --> 00:46:50.213
data will not be held indefinitely and

00:46:50.253 --> 00:46:51.875
will be promptly deleted after a certain

00:46:51.914 --> 00:46:52.554
period of time.

00:46:52.635 --> 00:46:54.777
But this article did not specify what that

00:46:54.817 --> 00:46:55.418
period of time is.

00:46:57.750 --> 00:47:00.371
And then the other story that we're going

00:47:00.391 --> 00:47:02.092
to group in with this one is about

00:47:02.293 --> 00:47:03.253
Madison Square Garden.

00:47:03.333 --> 00:47:04.855
And this is a summary that comes from

00:47:05.335 --> 00:47:05.936
Bruce Schneier,

00:47:05.976 --> 00:47:08.117
but I really liked his summary.

00:47:08.157 --> 00:47:09.077
I think it was really well done.

00:47:09.697 --> 00:47:11.460
So he shared a link to a story

00:47:11.559 --> 00:47:13.081
about how Madison Square Garden is using

00:47:13.141 --> 00:47:14.842
facial recognition software on everyone

00:47:14.862 --> 00:47:15.342
that enters,

00:47:15.943 --> 00:47:21.225
and they flag activists that oppose –

00:47:19.244 --> 00:47:20.266
Using facial recognition,

00:47:20.306 --> 00:47:22.547
they also – I think when this story

00:47:22.567 --> 00:47:23.327
first started breaking,

00:47:23.367 --> 00:47:25.007
it was about a woman who worked for

00:47:25.027 --> 00:47:27.329
a law firm that was involved with suing

00:47:27.349 --> 00:47:28.190
Madison Square Garden.

00:47:28.530 --> 00:47:29.751
Like she wasn't even involved,

00:47:29.791 --> 00:47:30.911
but she worked for the company,

00:47:30.972 --> 00:47:33.052
so they wouldn't let her in in her

00:47:33.092 --> 00:47:34.974
free time to go see a Christmas thing

00:47:34.994 --> 00:47:35.534
with her kids.

00:47:36.434 --> 00:47:38.695
And it turns out that last week the

00:47:38.715 --> 00:47:40.036
system was shut off for Taylor Swift's

00:47:40.077 --> 00:47:40.336
wedding.

00:47:41.311 --> 00:47:44.373
And they said – well,

00:47:44.393 --> 00:47:45.173
I'll read the ending here,

00:47:45.193 --> 00:47:46.054
and then I'll go back and read this

00:47:46.094 --> 00:47:46.914
quote from Evan Greer.

00:47:48.175 --> 00:47:50.835
Bruce said that whatever privacy measures

00:47:50.876 --> 00:47:52.097
Swift had in place for the wedding seemed

00:47:52.117 --> 00:47:52.516
to have worked.

00:47:52.577 --> 00:47:53.858
No photos have leaked online.

00:47:54.378 --> 00:47:55.237
So Evan Greer,

00:47:55.277 --> 00:47:56.639
who is one of the people that Madison

00:47:56.659 --> 00:47:57.559
Square Garden alerts on,

00:47:57.980 --> 00:47:59.500
says that ironically Swift herself has

00:47:59.559 --> 00:48:01.141
reportedly used facial recognition at her

00:48:01.240 --> 00:48:02.702
own concerts to identify stalkers.

00:48:03.021 --> 00:48:04.583
This privacy-for-me surveillance-for-the

00:48:04.623 --> 00:48:05.663
attitude feels like a perfect

00:48:05.702 --> 00:48:07.224
encapsulation of the future we're already

00:48:07.264 --> 00:48:07.563
living in.

00:48:07.963 --> 00:48:09.125
one where wealthy elites can afford

00:48:09.184 --> 00:48:10.846
privacy while the rest of us are forced

00:48:10.885 --> 00:48:12.266
to live in a corporate surveillance

00:48:12.306 --> 00:48:12.847
panopticon.

00:48:15.628 --> 00:48:15.889
Yeah,

00:48:16.009 --> 00:48:17.670
I don't have too much to add to

00:48:17.710 --> 00:48:18.510
that, I don't think.

00:48:18.891 --> 00:48:20.271
I think, Jonah,

00:48:21.052 --> 00:48:22.253
if I can throw it back to you,

00:48:23.333 --> 00:48:24.514
how do you feel about this idea?

00:48:24.534 --> 00:48:26.155
Because a private company, theoretically,

00:48:26.195 --> 00:48:27.695
has a right to do whatever they want,

00:48:27.777 --> 00:48:28.016
right?

00:48:28.097 --> 00:48:29.998
But it feels like there's not a lot

00:48:30.018 --> 00:48:31.599
of regulation over this technology.

00:48:31.778 --> 00:48:32.358
I don't know.

00:48:32.398 --> 00:48:34.960
How do you think we should navigate this?

00:48:35.061 --> 00:48:35.942
Yeah, there's really not.

00:48:37.923 --> 00:48:39.748
Looking at the chat here, unredacted said,

00:48:40.108 --> 00:48:40.871
many U.S.

00:48:40.911 --> 00:48:42.434
states and cities outlaw or restrict

00:48:42.474 --> 00:48:44.398
facial recognition without consent.

00:48:45.079 --> 00:48:45.501
First of all,

00:48:46.601 --> 00:48:48.063
least the first story about the pokemon

00:48:48.103 --> 00:48:50.605
company that that's only in japan as far

00:48:50.644 --> 00:48:52.465
as i know so wouldn't apply here in

00:48:52.485 --> 00:48:57.128
the first place um but also typically you

00:48:57.148 --> 00:48:58.949
can get this consent by basically posting

00:48:59.030 --> 00:49:01.592
signs and i would imagine that they'll do

00:49:01.632 --> 00:49:03.873
that because it's not really like you know

00:49:03.893 --> 00:49:05.414
they they don't have a reason to do

00:49:05.434 --> 00:49:08.436
this secretively they probably will post

00:49:08.456 --> 00:49:10.418
signs to just say hey you know we're

00:49:10.577 --> 00:49:13.039
we're on to you scalpers and and use

00:49:13.059 --> 00:49:15.221
that as a as a deterrent basically so

00:49:17.282 --> 00:49:21.409
I don't think that this is super regulated

00:49:21.530 --> 00:49:23.653
at all, basically, like you were saying,

00:49:23.693 --> 00:49:23.875
Nate.

00:49:24.054 --> 00:49:26.579
And yeah,

00:49:26.719 --> 00:49:27.880
there's nothing you can really...

00:49:29.248 --> 00:49:30.929
do about some of these cases it's just

00:49:30.949 --> 00:49:32.809
gonna be a growing issue I think

00:49:34.311 --> 00:49:37.271
especially in this isn't like the case as

00:49:37.291 --> 00:49:38.992
far as I know with at least the

00:49:39.012 --> 00:49:41.713
Pokemon store story for example but a lot

00:49:41.733 --> 00:49:43.454
of these systems will like link up with

00:49:43.954 --> 00:49:46.755
with law enforcement I know that the

00:49:46.795 --> 00:49:49.137
Madison Square Garden system

00:49:50.036 --> 00:49:52.438
does connect to law enforcement databases.

00:49:53.418 --> 00:49:55.420
The the people who work at Madison Square

00:49:55.440 --> 00:49:55.681
Garden,

00:49:55.740 --> 00:49:57.521
anybody like involved in the with the

00:49:57.561 --> 00:49:58.862
business that they don't get,

00:50:00.503 --> 00:50:01.784
they don't get information,

00:50:02.505 --> 00:50:04.666
unless like a law enforcement agency comes

00:50:04.748 --> 00:50:07.009
back and like, tells them, hey,

00:50:07.088 --> 00:50:08.389
we flagged this person on your cameras,

00:50:08.429 --> 00:50:10.210
but all of that data is basically streamed

00:50:10.271 --> 00:50:12.552
to some law enforcement databases,

00:50:12.592 --> 00:50:15.175
and it's all interconnected.

00:50:17.195 --> 00:50:17.856
The other thing

00:50:19.605 --> 00:50:21.746
yeah i i mean the other thing is

00:50:21.865 --> 00:50:25.086
basically that comment where like when

00:50:25.126 --> 00:50:28.148
businesses are implementing these and

00:50:28.168 --> 00:50:29.688
they're not applying them to everyone like

00:50:29.728 --> 00:50:31.768
you can they're not applying them to

00:50:31.909 --> 00:50:33.728
taylor swift because she demanded privacy

00:50:33.768 --> 00:50:35.730
at her wedding for example which i think

00:50:35.789 --> 00:50:38.630
is reasonable obviously but it is a

00:50:38.670 --> 00:50:41.391
situation where like the wealthy elites uh

00:50:41.572 --> 00:50:41.672
as

00:50:42.411 --> 00:50:43.472
as Evan Greer said,

00:50:43.813 --> 00:50:45.494
can afford privacy while the rest of us

00:50:45.554 --> 00:50:46.974
are forced to live in that corporate

00:50:46.994 --> 00:50:48.335
surveillance panopticon.

00:50:49.356 --> 00:50:50.036
Just like you said,

00:50:50.077 --> 00:50:52.958
I think that is a perfectly apt summary

00:50:53.179 --> 00:50:54.840
of the situation.

00:50:54.880 --> 00:50:57.481
I just wanted to highlight again there.

00:50:58.282 --> 00:51:01.543
It's... Yeah,

00:51:01.684 --> 00:51:05.266
it's just not a great situation.

00:51:05.367 --> 00:51:06.768
It really ties into...

00:51:08.378 --> 00:51:09.739
The whole surveillance camera thing,

00:51:09.778 --> 00:51:12.139
we're being attacked kind of from both

00:51:12.260 --> 00:51:12.980
angles, basically.

00:51:13.000 --> 00:51:15.760
We got cities and law enforcement setting

00:51:15.820 --> 00:51:16.561
up plot cameras.

00:51:16.601 --> 00:51:19.362
We got businesses setting up all of these

00:51:20.581 --> 00:51:22.442
really advanced surveillance systems that

00:51:22.702 --> 00:51:23.563
they're not only, like,

00:51:23.623 --> 00:51:27.344
recording things for a limited period of

00:51:27.403 --> 00:51:28.523
time to, like...

00:51:29.463 --> 00:51:32.083
see who stole something off the shelf or

00:51:32.123 --> 00:51:32.784
something like that.

00:51:32.824 --> 00:51:34.443
But now they're like tracking people in

00:51:34.503 --> 00:51:35.105
real time.

00:51:35.125 --> 00:51:35.605
And they're like,

00:51:36.144 --> 00:51:37.704
doing behavioral analysis.

00:51:37.764 --> 00:51:39.646
And they're like making these huge

00:51:40.085 --> 00:51:43.806
databases of people's data,

00:51:43.907 --> 00:51:44.746
personal information,

00:51:44.766 --> 00:51:47.027
they're linking it all up to to these

00:51:47.088 --> 00:51:48.307
larger systems.

00:51:48.427 --> 00:51:50.329
And this is where it really becomes a

00:51:50.389 --> 00:51:54.230
much larger privacy concern than it was

00:51:54.630 --> 00:51:55.070
before.

00:51:58.907 --> 00:52:00.469
I think now would actually be a good

00:52:00.509 --> 00:52:01.170
time to address.

00:52:01.210 --> 00:52:05.152
We got a question in the supporters signal

00:52:05.172 --> 00:52:08.114
chat right before we started streaming.

00:52:08.856 --> 00:52:09.436
And they said,

00:52:09.496 --> 00:52:10.958
what can everyday people do if they want

00:52:10.978 --> 00:52:12.958
to travel without being tracked by ALPRs

00:52:13.059 --> 00:52:14.481
or other mass surveillance tools?

00:52:14.960 --> 00:52:17.202
And can the ALPRs or other cameras already

00:52:17.342 --> 00:52:19.264
in use track people outside of cars using

00:52:19.324 --> 00:52:21.025
facial recognition or other biometric

00:52:21.085 --> 00:52:21.726
identifiers?

00:52:21.786 --> 00:52:22.907
I think we're actually about to talk about

00:52:22.927 --> 00:52:24.889
that in a minute.

00:52:24.929 --> 00:52:25.909
But yeah, I mean,

00:52:25.969 --> 00:52:27.490
I know there's no easy answers to that

00:52:27.590 --> 00:52:27.670
one.

00:52:28.885 --> 00:52:30.025
do you think there is anything we can

00:52:30.065 --> 00:52:32.166
do as this surveillance?

00:52:32.186 --> 00:52:33.248
Because I actually,

00:52:33.327 --> 00:52:34.489
earlier this year when I was in New

00:52:34.528 --> 00:52:34.768
York,

00:52:35.208 --> 00:52:37.530
I walked right past Madison Square Garden.

00:52:37.670 --> 00:52:38.871
I've actually been in that neighborhood

00:52:39.411 --> 00:52:40.572
for my previous job as well.

00:52:41.172 --> 00:52:42.713
And I remember just walking right past it

00:52:42.733 --> 00:52:44.175
and you look around and they're not even

00:52:44.255 --> 00:52:44.574
subtle,

00:52:44.635 --> 00:52:46.177
like not even just Madison Square Garden,

00:52:46.197 --> 00:52:48.157
but NYPD, like they're not even subtle.

00:52:48.177 --> 00:52:49.418
You look at a light post and you

00:52:49.458 --> 00:52:49.858
see like,

00:52:50.159 --> 00:52:51.360
it looks like one of those stock photos.

00:52:51.380 --> 00:52:52.900
There's like six different cameras pointed

00:52:52.960 --> 00:52:53.581
out in every which way.

00:52:53.601 --> 00:52:54.661
And there's a sign that's like,

00:52:55.101 --> 00:52:58.063
NYPD is surveilling this area or whatever.

00:52:58.204 --> 00:52:58.644
And it's like,

00:52:59.605 --> 00:53:00.326
what is happening?

00:53:02.565 --> 00:53:03.766
Other than moving out of New York and

00:53:03.786 --> 00:53:04.467
never going back?

00:53:04.507 --> 00:53:04.646
Like,

00:53:04.847 --> 00:53:05.887
what do you do you think there's any

00:53:05.967 --> 00:53:06.447
options here?

00:53:06.807 --> 00:53:07.447
Yeah, it's,

00:53:07.887 --> 00:53:10.289
it's really tough to do anything about it

00:53:10.349 --> 00:53:13.050
on like an individual level.

00:53:13.891 --> 00:53:15.731
It's, it's really the thing that it's,

00:53:15.851 --> 00:53:17.751
it's a thing that we have to push

00:53:17.791 --> 00:53:20.012
back against at a larger scale, I think,

00:53:20.092 --> 00:53:21.673
and we just can't find it acceptable.

00:53:22.074 --> 00:53:22.393
I think

00:53:24.237 --> 00:53:26.000
I don't know what point we will reach

00:53:26.019 --> 00:53:27.661
before we finally decide that this stuff

00:53:27.722 --> 00:53:28.663
isn't okay.

00:53:28.682 --> 00:53:30.264
I don't know what it'll take to make

00:53:30.304 --> 00:53:31.306
that happen.

00:53:31.867 --> 00:53:35.150
But yeah, it's a huge problem.

00:53:35.170 --> 00:53:38.074
And I think it's just going unnoticed and

00:53:38.655 --> 00:53:41.458
like, like just by the general population.

00:53:42.039 --> 00:53:42.320
And

00:53:44.913 --> 00:53:47.333
Yeah, it's really hard to, you know,

00:53:47.373 --> 00:53:49.094
you're basically fighting back against

00:53:49.896 --> 00:53:51.637
somebody with the resources of the

00:53:51.677 --> 00:53:53.438
government, because it is the government.

00:53:53.838 --> 00:53:55.639
And they can really, I mean,

00:53:55.699 --> 00:53:56.760
we talk about this all the time,

00:53:57.320 --> 00:53:59.400
you know, if the government is after you,

00:53:59.501 --> 00:54:00.302
right,

00:54:00.322 --> 00:54:01.541
there's not a lot you can do about

00:54:01.561 --> 00:54:01.601
it.

00:54:01.641 --> 00:54:04.643
And that applies even to these situations.

00:54:07.067 --> 00:54:09.847
there's probably like things you could do

00:54:09.887 --> 00:54:12.628
that would be wildly inconvenient like map

00:54:12.728 --> 00:54:14.909
out routes that don't have these cameras

00:54:14.949 --> 00:54:17.010
for example but it's not realistic i think

00:54:17.030 --> 00:54:21.152
to avoid the you know the entire mass

00:54:21.172 --> 00:54:22.893
surveillance system at this time uh

00:54:22.972 --> 00:54:27.793
unfortunately because it's just very um

00:54:27.835 --> 00:54:30.454
just very what's the word i'm thinking of

00:54:30.514 --> 00:54:31.775
it's it's invasive and it's

00:54:33.427 --> 00:54:36.429
pervasive pervasive it's everywhere um

00:54:37.510 --> 00:54:38.990
somebody on our supporters chat said wear

00:54:39.172 --> 00:54:41.653
ir blasters yeah you know blast in with

00:54:41.773 --> 00:54:44.315
lasers i don't know i don't know what

00:54:44.356 --> 00:54:45.637
you can do this is not you know

00:54:45.817 --> 00:54:47.557
advice ir blasters is probably fine i

00:54:47.577 --> 00:54:50.601
don't know how these uh cameras work so

00:54:50.661 --> 00:54:52.422
i can't tell you if that would actually

00:54:52.461 --> 00:54:53.603
work but that would be kind of a

00:54:53.623 --> 00:54:54.704
funny setup

00:54:56.853 --> 00:54:58.534
I almost sent it to our production chat

00:54:58.554 --> 00:55:00.996
the other day since I was working on

00:55:01.016 --> 00:55:01.536
a video.

00:55:02.615 --> 00:55:03.717
We'll go into detail about this later,

00:55:03.737 --> 00:55:05.036
but I'm working on a video about flock

00:55:05.077 --> 00:55:08.797
right now, and I've checked dflock.org.

00:55:09.378 --> 00:55:10.699
I live about a block away from a

00:55:10.739 --> 00:55:11.599
major intersection.

00:55:12.059 --> 00:55:15.661
There are thirteen flock cameras just at

00:55:15.681 --> 00:55:16.400
that intersection.

00:55:18.003 --> 00:55:19.023
Thankfully, most of them,

00:55:19.204 --> 00:55:20.585
I actually don't think any of them are

00:55:20.605 --> 00:55:21.284
pointed at the road,

00:55:21.605 --> 00:55:22.945
except there is one that's pointed.

00:55:22.985 --> 00:55:23.626
It's like, oh,

00:55:23.925 --> 00:55:26.206
that's an intersection that I almost can't

00:55:26.266 --> 00:55:28.586
avoid to get on that main road to

00:55:28.626 --> 00:55:29.967
go anywhere.

00:55:29.987 --> 00:55:30.987
There's one camera.

00:55:31.007 --> 00:55:31.427
I'm like, man,

00:55:31.467 --> 00:55:32.967
that thing has probably caught me so many

00:55:33.027 --> 00:55:34.909
times just going to the store,

00:55:34.969 --> 00:55:36.268
going to the gas station.

00:55:37.228 --> 00:55:37.949
It's ridiculous.

00:55:38.150 --> 00:55:38.969
It's insane.

00:55:38.989 --> 00:55:41.570
That's just in the block around my place.

00:55:41.731 --> 00:55:42.251
It's nuts.

00:55:43.010 --> 00:55:45.251
I feel like we've seen reports of a

00:55:45.331 --> 00:55:46.371
lot of cases where

00:55:48.000 --> 00:55:49.840
Some of these flock cameras are not even

00:55:50.442 --> 00:55:51.862
pointed at roads at all,

00:55:51.902 --> 00:55:54.443
despite ostensibly being license plate

00:55:54.463 --> 00:55:54.724
readers.

00:55:54.764 --> 00:55:56.246
But they're just being used as general

00:55:56.286 --> 00:55:57.445
surveillance cameras in general,

00:55:57.465 --> 00:55:58.847
and they do have a lot of capabilities

00:55:58.907 --> 00:56:02.329
beyond just license plate detection.

00:56:02.650 --> 00:56:04.630
I think that brings us pretty well into

00:56:04.771 --> 00:56:06.532
our next story I want to talk about

00:56:06.572 --> 00:56:08.032
here, which was just the form post.

00:56:09.934 --> 00:56:12.175
was a news report that was written up

00:56:12.215 --> 00:56:13.936
by freya on our team so it's on

00:56:13.976 --> 00:56:16.396
our website but there were some uh good

00:56:16.456 --> 00:56:19.177
comments on there uh from the article

00:56:19.496 --> 00:56:21.757
freya said flock styles license plate

00:56:21.818 --> 00:56:23.958
reader vendor leonardo announced a new

00:56:24.097 --> 00:56:25.918
system called signal trace which somebody

00:56:25.938 --> 00:56:27.358
is talking about in the chat here too

00:56:27.398 --> 00:56:29.159
so we can get into that but it

00:56:29.199 --> 00:56:31.960
can fingerprint your wireless devices when

00:56:31.980 --> 00:56:34.041
you drive by and track you around without

00:56:34.081 --> 00:56:35.661
needing to see your license plate

00:56:36.041 --> 00:56:37.262
When you travel in your car,

00:56:37.501 --> 00:56:38.742
your smartphone, your smartwatch,

00:56:38.842 --> 00:56:39.543
wireless headphones,

00:56:39.563 --> 00:56:41.425
and even your car's infotainment system

00:56:41.505 --> 00:56:43.646
are usually outputting a constant stream

00:56:43.945 --> 00:56:45.067
of RF emissions.

00:56:45.407 --> 00:56:47.108
When all of these individual devices are

00:56:47.128 --> 00:56:47.849
traveling together,

00:56:47.889 --> 00:56:49.929
it's likely to be the same person.

00:56:50.710 --> 00:56:51.731
So the new devices

00:56:52.391 --> 00:56:54.652
for tracking can be retrofitted onto

00:56:54.713 --> 00:56:56.773
pre-existing license plate reader cameras,

00:56:56.833 --> 00:56:58.293
and they're meant to work alongside them,

00:56:58.594 --> 00:57:00.755
storing your device fingerprint alongside

00:57:00.775 --> 00:57:02.875
your license plate number in a centralized

00:57:02.914 --> 00:57:06.456
database that police can access at any

00:57:06.657 --> 00:57:06.976
time.

00:57:08.097 --> 00:57:09.777
One of the most terrifying things about

00:57:09.878 --> 00:57:10.998
this, Freya says,

00:57:11.039 --> 00:57:13.621
is that it not only identifies your car,

00:57:13.661 --> 00:57:16.382
but it tries to identify individual people

00:57:16.501 --> 00:57:17.242
inside the car.

00:57:17.262 --> 00:57:17.762
For example,

00:57:17.822 --> 00:57:19.184
if two people are riding together,

00:57:19.284 --> 00:57:21.806
it can detect each person's individual

00:57:21.826 --> 00:57:23.487
fingerprint separately.

00:57:24.126 --> 00:57:27.208
It also means that the readers work if

00:57:27.228 --> 00:57:27.929
you're not driving.

00:57:27.969 --> 00:57:29.090
Simply walking around,

00:57:29.309 --> 00:57:30.190
biking close enough,

00:57:30.231 --> 00:57:31.992
will likely mean that your unique RF

00:57:32.012 --> 00:57:33.492
fingerprint is now stored in some

00:57:33.512 --> 00:57:33.972
database,

00:57:34.132 --> 00:57:37.175
and your movements can be tracked.

00:57:38.507 --> 00:57:42.371
Kind of ridiculously,

00:57:42.512 --> 00:57:44.514
Leonardo tries to advertise that their

00:57:44.554 --> 00:57:45.315
system, quote,

00:57:45.597 --> 00:57:47.719
respects individuals' privacy rights,

00:57:48.641 --> 00:57:49.501
end quote,

00:57:49.541 --> 00:57:52.286
because the actual data itself isn't

00:57:52.385 --> 00:57:53.467
decrypted or read.

00:57:55.184 --> 00:57:56.264
but as Freya points out,

00:57:56.284 --> 00:57:58.206
this is definitely an example of the

00:57:58.346 --> 00:58:00.326
metadata being more useful than the

00:58:00.365 --> 00:58:01.766
content, even if, you know,

00:58:02.146 --> 00:58:05.286
police can't see what your actual, like,

00:58:05.407 --> 00:58:08.086
MAC address or other device identifier,

00:58:08.728 --> 00:58:14.809
I-M-E-I-I-M-S, M-Z, uh, what have you, um,

00:58:14.869 --> 00:58:15.869
even if they can't read, like,

00:58:15.909 --> 00:58:16.829
the actual numbers,

00:58:16.989 --> 00:58:18.889
this system that Leonardo has built

00:58:20.309 --> 00:58:21.329
basically, uh,

00:58:22.525 --> 00:58:24.527
has already tied all of those identifiers

00:58:24.646 --> 00:58:27.708
to other things that identify you.

00:58:28.869 --> 00:58:31.148
So the content doesn't actually matter.

00:58:31.190 --> 00:58:34.931
It's still a huge privacy concern.

00:58:38.271 --> 00:58:42.914
Yeah, so again,

00:58:43.313 --> 00:58:44.755
it is really a question of what can

00:58:44.775 --> 00:58:46.675
you do to defend yourself against this?

00:58:46.856 --> 00:58:49.077
And it's very tricky because these systems

00:58:49.097 --> 00:58:51.137
are already in place.

00:58:53.849 --> 00:58:54.088
Yeah,

00:58:54.108 --> 00:58:57.130
scarecrows in the chat says surveillance

00:58:57.170 --> 00:58:58.670
cameras respect your privacy because they

00:58:58.690 --> 00:59:00.251
can't see through your clothes or inside

00:59:00.271 --> 00:59:00.592
your bags.

00:59:00.811 --> 00:59:02.773
That's exactly the same sort of argument,

00:59:02.833 --> 00:59:03.032
right?

00:59:03.112 --> 00:59:04.552
If you're tracking all of this metadata,

00:59:04.572 --> 00:59:06.134
you're tracking people exactly where they

00:59:06.213 --> 00:59:07.833
are, what they're doing.

00:59:07.954 --> 00:59:10.215
It's not a privacy-respecting situation

00:59:10.255 --> 00:59:14.177
just because you can't later look up what

00:59:14.617 --> 00:59:18.057
exact device identifier was being tracked

00:59:18.097 --> 00:59:18.659
at that time.

00:59:19.039 --> 00:59:19.259
It's...

00:59:21.202 --> 00:59:22.402
It's a huge privacy problem.

00:59:22.523 --> 00:59:24.864
It's completely ridiculous that they would

00:59:24.905 --> 00:59:27.367
claim otherwise.

00:59:28.047 --> 00:59:30.108
Scarecrows also said that it looked like

00:59:30.128 --> 00:59:32.190
the Texas Department of Transportation has

00:59:32.369 --> 00:59:33.990
antennas on all their camera poles now,

00:59:34.472 --> 00:59:35.652
so they're probably adding that in.

00:59:35.992 --> 00:59:37.253
They haven't seen anything officially

00:59:37.293 --> 00:59:38.775
saying they're Leonardo's signal trace,

00:59:38.815 --> 00:59:40.896
but they look the same.

00:59:41.356 --> 00:59:44.157
So, very, very concerning stuff,

00:59:44.177 --> 00:59:45.760
and I think... I don't know, like...

00:59:46.440 --> 00:59:49.260
how prevalent uh leonardo is compared to

00:59:49.340 --> 00:59:51.780
flock but i'd be concerned about that i

00:59:51.800 --> 00:59:54.742
also wouldn't be surprised if flock um if

00:59:54.762 --> 00:59:55.922
they don't have a product like this

00:59:55.961 --> 00:59:57.842
already is working on something like this

00:59:57.902 --> 01:00:03.563
because as as terracotta pie in the chat

01:00:03.603 --> 01:00:05.764
said uh why the world is just becoming

01:00:05.804 --> 01:00:07.925
so surveilling and intrusive that's that's

01:00:07.945 --> 01:00:11.226
so true and it is a huge it's

01:00:11.246 --> 01:00:11.806
a huge problem

01:00:14.146 --> 01:00:15.967
I mean, that means we fixed crime, right?

01:00:16.128 --> 01:00:17.708
Like, you know,

01:00:17.809 --> 01:00:19.588
there's no place in the world right now

01:00:19.628 --> 01:00:21.469
that an ant can't pass gas,

01:00:21.489 --> 01:00:22.690
that it's not caught on some kind of

01:00:22.731 --> 01:00:23.110
camera.

01:00:23.431 --> 01:00:24.710
So clearly we've solved crime.

01:00:25.592 --> 01:00:27.291
Yeah, we've solved it.

01:00:27.632 --> 01:00:29.413
Nobody has ever done anything bad since we

01:00:29.952 --> 01:00:30.914
added these systems.

01:00:30.934 --> 01:00:34.534
So I guess it's totally worth it.

01:00:34.574 --> 01:00:34.815
Yeah,

01:00:34.875 --> 01:00:36.576
I think – I know it's kind of

01:00:37.315 --> 01:00:38.356
a rhetorical question,

01:00:38.376 --> 01:00:40.557
but I think things like this go –

01:00:40.057 --> 01:00:41.218
I think –

01:00:42.474 --> 01:00:46.237
I know this comes from CalixOS,

01:00:46.759 --> 01:00:48.679
and Henry and I talked about it at

01:00:48.699 --> 01:00:49.400
Surveillance Report,

01:00:49.501 --> 01:00:51.902
but I feel like they really have the

01:00:51.943 --> 01:00:54.545
best model in the sense that privacy is

01:00:54.565 --> 01:00:55.485
a three-pronged approach.

01:00:55.525 --> 01:00:56.507
There's the technical side,

01:00:56.527 --> 01:00:57.248
the legislative side,

01:00:57.268 --> 01:00:58.429
and the education side.

01:00:58.969 --> 01:00:59.230
And

01:01:00.376 --> 01:01:01.956
You know, we've talked about this before,

01:01:01.996 --> 01:01:03.378
like the people who just think like, oh,

01:01:03.438 --> 01:01:03.617
well,

01:01:03.978 --> 01:01:05.679
I'll just use Linux and like all this

01:01:05.760 --> 01:01:06.360
this, you know,

01:01:06.539 --> 01:01:08.181
age verification stuff won't affect me.

01:01:08.501 --> 01:01:08.762
Yeah.

01:01:08.862 --> 01:01:10.583
Until the person you're messaging is using

01:01:10.623 --> 01:01:11.844
Windows and all your stuff is getting

01:01:11.884 --> 01:01:13.664
scraped up in Windows recall and all that

01:01:13.684 --> 01:01:14.144
kind of crap.

01:01:14.746 --> 01:01:16.487
And then, you know, or until like.

01:01:16.873 --> 01:01:19.235
Canada bans encrypted messaging and signal

01:01:19.255 --> 01:01:19.396
says,

01:01:19.436 --> 01:01:20.536
we're not going to service that place

01:01:20.577 --> 01:01:20.956
anymore.

01:01:21.016 --> 01:01:21.978
Like, what are you going to do then?

01:01:22.719 --> 01:01:23.498
And, uh, but you know,

01:01:23.519 --> 01:01:24.519
at the same time, it's like, yeah,

01:01:24.579 --> 01:01:25.860
obviously companies break the law.

01:01:25.900 --> 01:01:28.503
We can't just solely rely on these

01:01:28.603 --> 01:01:29.864
laughably low fines.

01:01:29.905 --> 01:01:31.565
And I think this is a case of

01:01:31.585 --> 01:01:33.307
like the education one where like people

01:01:33.387 --> 01:01:34.469
don't understand.

01:01:35.389 --> 01:01:36.170
And I think a lot of it is,

01:01:36.250 --> 01:01:37.891
um, a lack of,

01:01:39.052 --> 01:01:39.833
I don't want to sound mean when I

01:01:39.873 --> 01:01:40.072
say this,

01:01:40.092 --> 01:01:41.273
but like a lack of empathy in the

01:01:44.594 --> 01:01:45.715
What was her name?

01:01:46.115 --> 01:01:48.277
Shoshana Zuboff in Surveillance

01:01:48.317 --> 01:01:48.856
Capitalism,

01:01:48.916 --> 01:01:49.958
The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.

01:01:49.998 --> 01:01:51.398
She tells a story at the very beginning

01:01:51.898 --> 01:01:54.559
how her house literally exploded.

01:01:54.599 --> 01:01:55.900
It burned down and exploded.

01:01:56.820 --> 01:01:59.302
And she talked about when the house first

01:01:59.342 --> 01:02:00.003
caught fire,

01:02:00.603 --> 01:02:01.943
she was trying to gather up all her

01:02:01.983 --> 01:02:05.905
notes and stuff because she had no frame

01:02:05.945 --> 01:02:11.688
of reference for –

01:02:08.007 --> 01:02:09.007
what was about to happen.

01:02:09.048 --> 01:02:09.208
Like,

01:02:09.248 --> 01:02:10.309
it's just one of those things where like,

01:02:10.550 --> 01:02:11.972
when you don't have a frame of reference,

01:02:11.992 --> 01:02:13.034
you don't even think about it.

01:02:13.094 --> 01:02:14.054
It's, it's the whole, sorry.

01:02:14.114 --> 01:02:15.056
I know I'm rambling a little bit here,

01:02:15.076 --> 01:02:16.056
but I'm, I'm going somewhere with this.

01:02:16.458 --> 01:02:17.139
It's the whole, like, you know,

01:02:17.159 --> 01:02:19.221
when people think like, Oh, well,

01:02:19.320 --> 01:02:20.443
why would anyone want to hack me?

01:02:20.503 --> 01:02:21.324
Like, I'm not interesting.

01:02:21.364 --> 01:02:22.385
Or like, I have nothing to hide.

01:02:22.425 --> 01:02:23.025
It's like, yeah, it's,

01:02:23.166 --> 01:02:25.387
Because you're a decent person whose brain

01:02:25.427 --> 01:02:26.746
doesn't immediately think of all the

01:02:26.827 --> 01:02:28.166
horrible things you could do with

01:02:28.186 --> 01:02:28.887
somebody's data.

01:02:29.427 --> 01:02:31.367
And I think it's the same thing here

01:02:31.407 --> 01:02:32.588
where like normal,

01:02:32.967 --> 01:02:35.528
not crazy people think about surveillance

01:02:35.548 --> 01:02:36.648
cameras and they're like, oh yeah,

01:02:36.668 --> 01:02:38.429
we can find like stolen cars and Amber

01:02:38.449 --> 01:02:40.170
alerts and like deter a crime.

01:02:40.210 --> 01:02:41.490
And like, yeah, this is great.

01:02:42.010 --> 01:02:43.971
And because they're not completely insane,

01:02:44.010 --> 01:02:46.032
they don't stop and think about the cops

01:02:46.072 --> 01:02:47.291
we talked about a couple of weeks ago

01:02:47.331 --> 01:02:48.172
who are like stalking,

01:02:48.532 --> 01:02:49.452
not even their girlfriend,

01:02:49.512 --> 01:02:50.512
a girl who turned them down.

01:02:51.032 --> 01:02:53.275
you know the all the hacked cameras that

01:02:53.295 --> 01:02:55.317
allow pedophiles to look at playgrounds

01:02:55.336 --> 01:02:57.418
that i think we covered one story about

01:02:57.518 --> 01:02:59.641
a camera that was or maybe i wrote

01:02:59.661 --> 01:03:00.621
about it in like a data breach or

01:03:00.641 --> 01:03:02.943
something but like a um flock cameras that

01:03:02.963 --> 01:03:04.585
were like placed inside a gym at a

01:03:04.664 --> 01:03:06.327
community center and rightfully people

01:03:06.347 --> 01:03:07.628
were like why was there even a camera

01:03:07.648 --> 01:03:09.409
in there in the first place like you

01:03:09.429 --> 01:03:11.911
know normal people don't think about all

01:03:11.931 --> 01:03:13.152
the bad things that can happen because

01:03:13.172 --> 01:03:14.213
they're not bad people

01:03:15.215 --> 01:03:16.217
And yeah,

01:03:16.237 --> 01:03:17.277
I think that's really what it is,

01:03:17.356 --> 01:03:18.938
is it's a lack of education where people

01:03:18.998 --> 01:03:19.139
don't.

01:03:19.639 --> 01:03:20.139
And furthermore,

01:03:20.159 --> 01:03:21.539
it's like this is one of the reasons

01:03:21.599 --> 01:03:22.880
I post the data breach thing every week

01:03:23.201 --> 01:03:24.461
is because it's one thing to say this

01:03:24.501 --> 01:03:25.083
could happen.

01:03:25.463 --> 01:03:26.903
It's another thing to show articles and go

01:03:26.923 --> 01:03:29.324
like this does happen all the time.

01:03:29.626 --> 01:03:31.527
Here's the twenty pages of search results

01:03:31.567 --> 01:03:33.108
of all the times this has happened.

01:03:33.568 --> 01:03:34.949
And I think that's when it'll really start

01:03:35.009 --> 01:03:36.289
not not to try and scare people because

01:03:36.309 --> 01:03:36.909
that doesn't work,

01:03:37.231 --> 01:03:38.612
but to just make people realize like this

01:03:38.632 --> 01:03:39.532
is not hypothetical.

01:03:39.572 --> 01:03:41.092
This is not theoretical.

01:03:41.373 --> 01:03:42.873
This is happening.

01:03:43.255 --> 01:03:44.735
And we have to factor that into the

01:03:44.775 --> 01:03:44.996
math.

01:03:45.617 --> 01:03:46.739
Thank you for coming to my TED Talk.

01:03:46.760 --> 01:03:50.367
Tip your service.

01:03:50.427 --> 01:03:51.911
Scarecrow's in the chat here.

01:03:53.443 --> 01:03:54.824
about those cameras you should post a

01:03:54.844 --> 01:03:56.364
picture of these if you can to the

01:03:56.905 --> 01:03:59.164
to the form uh have people take a

01:03:59.184 --> 01:04:01.565
look at them because i think we can

01:04:01.606 --> 01:04:03.186
we can try and track them down yeah

01:04:03.266 --> 01:04:05.126
it is i mean of course these are

01:04:05.146 --> 01:04:06.487
going to go brandless at this point

01:04:06.527 --> 01:04:08.507
because they don't want to get any

01:04:08.768 --> 01:04:11.788
backlash of course um but yeah it's a

01:04:11.827 --> 01:04:14.628
huge huge problem post it on the forum

01:04:14.688 --> 01:04:17.349
discuss dot privacyguides.net it's a great

01:04:17.530 --> 01:04:17.989
great place

01:04:20.525 --> 01:04:20.706
Yeah,

01:04:20.766 --> 01:04:22.786
tag me in that because I'm on the

01:04:22.806 --> 01:04:23.907
board of EFF Austin,

01:04:24.027 --> 01:04:25.887
and I think I know what you're talking

01:04:25.927 --> 01:04:27.509
about, but it's been so long.

01:04:28.168 --> 01:04:29.469
I no longer live in Texas,

01:04:29.668 --> 01:04:31.550
and even at the time,

01:04:31.590 --> 01:04:33.110
I never really stopped and stood on the

01:04:33.130 --> 01:04:33.851
street corner and like,

01:04:34.050 --> 01:04:34.990
let me get a good look at this.

01:04:35.050 --> 01:04:36.612
But yeah,

01:04:37.032 --> 01:04:38.472
tag me because I can share it around

01:04:38.492 --> 01:04:39.512
with the other board members,

01:04:39.532 --> 01:04:42.273
and maybe we can identify what those are

01:04:42.313 --> 01:04:43.153
and figure something out.

01:04:43.175 --> 01:04:44.755
Or maybe somebody already knows for all I

01:04:44.775 --> 01:04:44.855
know.

01:04:44.875 --> 01:04:45.916
I've never asked about them before.

01:04:46.255 --> 01:04:47.115
Yeah.

01:04:49.474 --> 01:04:50.775
Okay.

01:04:50.894 --> 01:04:50.994
Oh,

01:04:51.315 --> 01:04:52.376
the one last thing I wanted to share

01:04:52.476 --> 01:04:54.538
on this topic is somebody left a comment

01:04:54.597 --> 01:04:55.117
on this story,

01:04:55.137 --> 01:04:56.199
which is why I included it as a

01:04:56.239 --> 01:04:57.659
forum post and not an actual story,

01:04:58.139 --> 01:05:00.681
where they said the part about this

01:05:00.782 --> 01:05:03.244
Leonardo thing can track RFID devices such

01:05:03.284 --> 01:05:03.963
as credit cards.

01:05:04.503 --> 01:05:06.266
They said, I cast suspicion on this claim.

01:05:06.646 --> 01:05:09.527
Even if we pretend they aren't –

01:05:10.998 --> 01:05:12.739
trying to scan RFID through the metal

01:05:12.778 --> 01:05:13.639
panels of your car,

01:05:13.679 --> 01:05:15.001
which should normally neutralize RFID.

01:05:15.340 --> 01:05:16.302
I have no idea how they can even

01:05:16.342 --> 01:05:18.523
pretend to scan a passive RFID signal,

01:05:18.543 --> 01:05:19.384
such as that of a credit card,

01:05:19.664 --> 01:05:20.605
from several meters away.

01:05:20.945 --> 01:05:22.085
Its range is a few centimeters.

01:05:22.126 --> 01:05:23.347
The signal-to-noise ratio is going to

01:05:23.367 --> 01:05:24.967
render the signal as unreadable noise at

01:05:25.027 --> 01:05:25.668
any large range.

01:05:26.630 --> 01:05:27.931
They make a really good point because I

01:05:27.951 --> 01:05:29.132
do use Apple Pay sometimes.

01:05:29.152 --> 01:05:30.893
And like, depending on the terminal,

01:05:31.114 --> 01:05:32.596
sometimes like if I'm just a few

01:05:32.755 --> 01:05:33.936
centimeters or inches off,

01:05:34.038 --> 01:05:36.260
it won't read the and I know that's

01:05:36.280 --> 01:05:37.481
like NFC, not RFID.

01:05:37.521 --> 01:05:39.402
But yeah, these things are so low powered.

01:05:39.422 --> 01:05:39.684
It's like,

01:05:39.704 --> 01:05:40.565
how are you going to read that from

01:05:40.625 --> 01:05:41.264
ten feet away?

01:05:41.284 --> 01:05:42.166
That doesn't even make sense.

01:05:42.206 --> 01:05:44.929
So big, if true,

01:05:45.329 --> 01:05:46.570
if they've mastered that technology,

01:05:46.610 --> 01:05:47.192
that's impressive.

01:05:50.856 --> 01:05:51.237
Alrighty.

01:05:53.063 --> 01:05:54.748
I think that'll bring us into the site

01:05:54.768 --> 01:05:56.634
updates if we don't have anything more to

01:05:56.693 --> 01:05:57.295
add to that.

01:05:57.315 --> 01:05:58.257
All right.

01:05:59.664 --> 01:06:01.346
So yeah, in a little bit,

01:06:01.485 --> 01:06:03.507
we're going to give you guys an update

01:06:03.588 --> 01:06:05.730
on a story about some eBay executives.

01:06:05.829 --> 01:06:07.150
If any of you remember that story,

01:06:08.211 --> 01:06:09.632
they threatened and harassed some people

01:06:09.652 --> 01:06:10.813
who left some negative reviews.

01:06:10.934 --> 01:06:12.034
And we're not just talking about like

01:06:12.074 --> 01:06:12.715
legal letters.

01:06:13.496 --> 01:06:14.617
But before we get to that,

01:06:15.036 --> 01:06:16.257
we're going to give you some quick updates

01:06:16.378 --> 01:06:17.398
about what we've been working on at

01:06:17.438 --> 01:06:18.460
Privacy Guides this week.

01:06:18.519 --> 01:06:22.021
So I mentioned I've did some work on

01:06:22.081 --> 01:06:22.762
a flock video.

01:06:22.822 --> 01:06:25.125
That's because our video about Bull Run

01:06:25.284 --> 01:06:26.125
and the NSA's

01:06:28.106 --> 01:06:29.447
It's not the latest attack on encryption,

01:06:29.507 --> 01:06:32.907
but the next chapter in our series is

01:06:32.947 --> 01:06:33.228
done.

01:06:33.527 --> 01:06:34.128
It looks great.

01:06:34.347 --> 01:06:36.048
Thank you to Jordan for all of that.

01:06:36.469 --> 01:06:38.429
And it should be going out to members.

01:06:39.048 --> 01:06:40.789
I think we're trying to release it this

01:06:40.809 --> 01:06:41.130
weekend.

01:06:41.489 --> 01:06:42.510
So if you are not a member,

01:06:42.590 --> 01:06:44.070
definitely sign up,

01:06:44.110 --> 01:06:45.210
get early access to that.

01:06:47.391 --> 01:06:49.731
This is my first time filming a

01:06:50.172 --> 01:06:51.452
storytelling video like that.

01:06:51.472 --> 01:06:52.773
And I'm really excited with how it turned

01:06:52.833 --> 01:06:52.932
out.

01:06:52.972 --> 01:06:54.974
And I think you guys are going to

01:06:55.074 --> 01:06:55.494
enjoy it.

01:06:56.451 --> 01:06:58.572
And then, yeah, just a little teaser.

01:06:58.632 --> 01:07:00.072
Our next video that we're already working

01:07:00.152 --> 01:07:02.134
on is about flock and, uh,

01:07:02.153 --> 01:07:03.614
D flocks national day of action.

01:07:03.875 --> 01:07:06.077
And, um, I believe it was Jonah that,

01:07:06.097 --> 01:07:07.757
that did some digging and realized like,

01:07:08.478 --> 01:07:09.659
man, other than Ben Jordan,

01:07:09.679 --> 01:07:11.400
there's not really a lot of privacy people

01:07:11.440 --> 01:07:12.460
talking about flock.

01:07:12.739 --> 01:07:13.880
And so we thought it would be really

01:07:13.900 --> 01:07:15.681
cool for us to step in and, uh,

01:07:15.702 --> 01:07:17.182
hopefully this will be a really good video

01:07:17.222 --> 01:07:17.382
that.

01:07:17.960 --> 01:07:19.141
Explains what Flock is,

01:07:19.181 --> 01:07:20.521
explains what are all the problems with

01:07:20.561 --> 01:07:20.702
it,

01:07:21.282 --> 01:07:23.202
gives that list of twenty pages of search

01:07:23.242 --> 01:07:24.503
results that I mentioned earlier,

01:07:24.702 --> 01:07:26.224
and is hopefully something you guys can

01:07:26.244 --> 01:07:27.603
share with friends and family to be like,

01:07:27.643 --> 01:07:29.644
hey, go talk to your city councilors,

01:07:29.744 --> 01:07:30.684
email your politicians,

01:07:30.724 --> 01:07:31.784
and tell them you don't want this.

01:07:32.105 --> 01:07:32.284
So,

01:07:33.226 --> 01:07:34.746
that's what we've got going on on the

01:07:34.846 --> 01:07:36.987
video side.

01:07:37.007 --> 01:07:37.286
Sweet.

01:07:38.286 --> 01:07:40.947
On the website community side of things...

01:07:43.045 --> 01:07:44.045
Some stuff I'm working on,

01:07:44.867 --> 01:07:46.588
there's an upcoming kind of redesign of

01:07:46.668 --> 01:07:50.331
the site to make it a bit easier

01:07:50.371 --> 01:07:51.213
to maintain.

01:07:51.972 --> 01:07:53.715
We were using this software called

01:07:54.835 --> 01:07:56.918
MakeDocsMKDocs,

01:07:57.297 --> 01:08:00.380
which is basically being discontinued.

01:08:00.400 --> 01:08:01.822
There's a whole...

01:08:02.663 --> 01:08:03.923
don't know a lot going on with it

01:08:04.384 --> 01:08:05.664
uh so we're working on kind of a

01:08:05.704 --> 01:08:08.327
new yeah that's kind of the driving force

01:08:08.367 --> 01:08:10.307
behind this so we're switching to uh

01:08:10.327 --> 01:08:12.969
should be switching to hugo uh for that

01:08:12.989 --> 01:08:14.331
which should make contributing a little

01:08:14.431 --> 01:08:16.952
easier hopefully and uh we're gonna

01:08:17.393 --> 01:08:19.213
redesign our blog make it a bit easier

01:08:19.274 --> 01:08:23.095
to navigate um besides that i've been

01:08:23.115 --> 01:08:25.938
looking into security keys lately uh

01:08:25.997 --> 01:08:26.359
that's been

01:08:27.768 --> 01:08:28.889
mostly what I'm doing this week.

01:08:28.908 --> 01:08:30.350
There's a lot of stuff going on that

01:08:30.390 --> 01:08:32.332
makes them really annoying to come up with

01:08:32.372 --> 01:08:33.953
good recommendations and criteria.

01:08:34.353 --> 01:08:37.796
A lot of cases where security keys aren't

01:08:37.836 --> 01:08:40.117
certified or they are certified,

01:08:40.197 --> 01:08:42.179
but they don't report themselves as

01:08:42.219 --> 01:08:43.439
certified in some cases,

01:08:43.479 --> 01:08:45.400
so then websites can't tell if they are

01:08:45.440 --> 01:08:48.143
or not and stuff like that.

01:08:48.162 --> 01:08:49.024
There's varying...

01:08:51.128 --> 01:08:52.770
Varying security practices with all of

01:08:52.789 --> 01:08:52.949
these,

01:08:52.989 --> 01:08:54.952
and it's hard to find one super great

01:08:54.992 --> 01:08:55.292
solution.

01:08:55.311 --> 01:08:55.912
Because of course,

01:08:56.372 --> 01:08:58.453
YubiKeys have been traditionally the top

01:08:58.493 --> 01:08:58.994
recommendation,

01:08:59.034 --> 01:09:00.636
but there are drawbacks to them for sure.

01:09:00.676 --> 01:09:02.037
You can't back them up,

01:09:02.056 --> 01:09:03.898
which people find very inconvenient.

01:09:04.198 --> 01:09:05.559
If you switch them out or update,

01:09:05.578 --> 01:09:06.059
you have to...

01:09:07.087 --> 01:09:08.548
switch them out on every single website

01:09:08.569 --> 01:09:10.310
you visit, which is really annoying to do.

01:09:10.369 --> 01:09:11.869
So yeah,

01:09:11.909 --> 01:09:14.252
a lot of a lot of stuff like

01:09:14.292 --> 01:09:14.511
that.

01:09:14.551 --> 01:09:17.613
So continuing to look into those pretty

01:09:17.632 --> 01:09:20.215
much there's a thread on our form at

01:09:20.475 --> 01:09:22.395
discuss the privacy guides.net.

01:09:22.456 --> 01:09:22.796
Again,

01:09:23.275 --> 01:09:25.056
talking about there's like multiple

01:09:25.077 --> 01:09:25.777
threads, basically,

01:09:25.796 --> 01:09:27.198
there's some tool specific ones,

01:09:27.217 --> 01:09:30.560
there's comparison ones where people are

01:09:30.579 --> 01:09:33.161
sharing kind of opinions about all of that

01:09:33.201 --> 01:09:33.440
stuff.

01:09:33.480 --> 01:09:35.021
So if you have any thoughts about

01:09:35.502 --> 01:09:36.903
security keys for some reason,

01:09:38.203 --> 01:09:38.984
you can chime in there.

01:09:40.265 --> 01:09:40.605
Otherwise,

01:09:40.666 --> 01:09:41.926
Free has been working on articles.

01:09:41.966 --> 01:09:42.567
We talked about

01:09:43.621 --> 01:09:44.481
that one earlier,

01:09:44.962 --> 01:09:46.502
but there's been other ones throughout the

01:09:46.523 --> 01:09:46.743
week.

01:09:47.604 --> 01:09:49.945
They get posted to privacyguides.org slash

01:09:50.086 --> 01:09:50.345
news,

01:09:50.386 --> 01:09:51.527
and it's a great way to stay up

01:09:51.766 --> 01:09:53.587
to date with some other stories that we

01:09:53.608 --> 01:09:55.229
don't talk about on this weekly show.

01:09:56.050 --> 01:09:57.730
Some of the stories include over a hundred

01:09:57.871 --> 01:09:59.953
vulnerabilities being found in the IRS's

01:10:00.012 --> 01:10:03.414
contractor handling Americans' tax

01:10:03.475 --> 01:10:03.994
information.

01:10:05.275 --> 01:10:07.898
New dynamic patching in Chrome is going to

01:10:07.997 --> 01:10:09.960
allow updates without restarting the

01:10:09.979 --> 01:10:10.359
browser.

01:10:11.380 --> 01:10:11.920
And then, of course,

01:10:11.960 --> 01:10:14.220
those stories that we talked about today.

01:10:14.541 --> 01:10:16.261
All of the stuff that we just talked

01:10:16.282 --> 01:10:16.921
about in this section,

01:10:16.942 --> 01:10:19.042
it's made possible by our supporters.

01:10:19.063 --> 01:10:20.743
You can sign up for a membership or

01:10:20.983 --> 01:10:23.623
donate at privacyguides.org.

01:10:23.684 --> 01:10:25.744
Or you can pick up some swag merch

01:10:25.805 --> 01:10:27.145
at shop.privacyguides.org.

01:10:27.164 --> 01:10:27.564
Hopefully,

01:10:27.685 --> 01:10:30.065
I can expand some of that stuff with

01:10:30.225 --> 01:10:32.266
new sticker designs in the future,

01:10:32.306 --> 01:10:32.726
but we'll see.

01:10:33.948 --> 01:10:36.090
Privacy Guides, all of us here, of course,

01:10:36.149 --> 01:10:37.109
we are a nonprofit.

01:10:37.170 --> 01:10:39.853
We research and share privacy-related

01:10:40.252 --> 01:10:40.773
information.

01:10:41.113 --> 01:10:43.475
We host communities like our forum,

01:10:43.496 --> 01:10:44.256
for example.

01:10:44.336 --> 01:10:46.757
We have chats on Matrix where people can

01:10:46.938 --> 01:10:50.100
get advice and stay up to date about

01:10:50.541 --> 01:10:53.002
digital privacy and preserving your

01:10:53.042 --> 01:10:53.703
digital rights.

01:10:55.064 --> 01:10:55.385
So yeah,

01:10:55.425 --> 01:10:57.027
with all of that out of the way,

01:10:57.867 --> 01:10:58.106
let's...

01:10:58.967 --> 01:11:01.088
We're going to talk about an update to

01:11:01.128 --> 01:11:06.150
the FCC router ban that we discussed a

01:11:06.211 --> 01:11:07.030
few episodes ago.

01:11:07.051 --> 01:11:08.912
I don't remember exactly when that was.

01:11:09.192 --> 01:11:09.391
First,

01:11:09.492 --> 01:11:12.012
I'll check the chat really quick for some

01:11:12.792 --> 01:11:13.273
stuff.

01:11:13.554 --> 01:11:15.033
Derek, twenty three fifty eight.

01:11:15.073 --> 01:11:16.154
Looking forward to the vlog video.

01:11:16.194 --> 01:11:18.175
Yeah, I hope it'll be good.

01:11:18.414 --> 01:11:19.376
And it's been working on that for a

01:11:19.395 --> 01:11:19.536
bit.

01:11:19.555 --> 01:11:21.237
So hopefully we can get that out pretty

01:11:21.277 --> 01:11:21.556
soon.

01:11:24.597 --> 01:11:25.757
Tony Mojo said the same thing.

01:11:25.978 --> 01:11:26.939
Yeah, I think it should be.

01:11:27.038 --> 01:11:27.479
It should be fun.

01:11:29.162 --> 01:11:30.603
It's definitely a little bit more entry

01:11:30.643 --> 01:11:30.922
level.

01:11:30.983 --> 01:11:32.382
It doesn't dive in super deep.

01:11:32.403 --> 01:11:32.682
But again,

01:11:32.703 --> 01:11:34.524
there's so little content out there as it

01:11:34.583 --> 01:11:36.685
is that I think we kind of wanted

01:11:36.704 --> 01:11:39.145
to start very surface level and give

01:11:39.185 --> 01:11:40.826
people kind of an on-ramp to understand

01:11:40.865 --> 01:11:41.305
the problem.

01:11:41.365 --> 01:11:42.426
At least that's what I was going for.

01:11:44.085 --> 01:11:44.845
Yeah.

01:11:44.944 --> 01:11:46.105
I also just wanted to say real quick.

01:11:46.145 --> 01:11:46.326
Yeah.

01:11:46.365 --> 01:11:48.805
The, the security keys do have drawbacks.

01:11:48.826 --> 01:11:49.905
Like right now I'm trying to get back

01:11:49.945 --> 01:11:51.426
into using the Tor browser a lot more

01:11:51.527 --> 01:11:52.186
and it's like, oh, cool.

01:11:52.247 --> 01:11:53.646
I can't even log into Tudor because I

01:11:53.726 --> 01:11:56.068
added the security key and remove TOTP.

01:11:56.087 --> 01:11:57.868
So yeah, that, that is a bummer.

01:11:57.908 --> 01:11:59.389
I hope Tor can figure that out at

01:11:59.448 --> 01:11:59.889
some point.

01:11:59.948 --> 01:12:01.609
I don't remember if mall that browser has

01:12:01.748 --> 01:12:02.208
enabled it.

01:12:02.269 --> 01:12:03.350
I know they were looking into it at

01:12:03.409 --> 01:12:03.789
one point,

01:12:03.829 --> 01:12:05.130
but I was going to say they haven't

01:12:05.250 --> 01:12:06.189
yet, but I, yeah,

01:12:06.250 --> 01:12:07.050
I know they're trying to,

01:12:07.149 --> 01:12:08.551
so hopefully soon fingers crossed.

01:12:09.920 --> 01:12:12.422
This story was reported by Ars Technica.

01:12:12.603 --> 01:12:15.204
The Trump administration exempts SpaceX's

01:12:15.244 --> 01:12:18.047
Starlink from the FCC ban on foreign-made

01:12:18.667 --> 01:12:19.189
routers.

01:12:19.748 --> 01:12:22.032
A public notice issued by the FCC said

01:12:22.051 --> 01:12:24.012
Starlink routers received approval from

01:12:24.073 --> 01:12:25.154
the Department of Defense.

01:12:25.494 --> 01:12:28.176
SpaceX's exemption is good until February

01:12:28.216 --> 01:12:29.958
first, twenty twenty eight.

01:12:31.340 --> 01:12:32.680
Netgear's exemption,

01:12:32.740 --> 01:12:34.301
which we're going to talk about next,

01:12:34.360 --> 01:12:36.742
is only good until October of twenty

01:12:37.082 --> 01:12:37.722
twenty seven.

01:12:38.483 --> 01:12:40.623
Netgear was the first major vendor to get

01:12:40.724 --> 01:12:42.305
an exception to this rule on April

01:12:42.364 --> 01:12:42.944
fourteenth.

01:12:43.666 --> 01:12:46.846
Amazon then received an exemption for its

01:12:46.947 --> 01:12:48.868
Aero routers and the routers to be used

01:12:48.908 --> 01:12:50.769
for its Leo satellite service.

01:12:51.109 --> 01:12:53.949
I would remind people we talked about this

01:12:53.989 --> 01:12:56.411
in the episode where we first discussed

01:12:56.430 --> 01:12:57.652
this FCC router ban,

01:12:57.692 --> 01:12:59.592
but like there are pretty much

01:13:00.432 --> 01:13:02.176
no routers made in America.

01:13:02.216 --> 01:13:03.838
And it's not like super easy to just

01:13:04.100 --> 01:13:06.765
spin up router factories overnight.

01:13:06.784 --> 01:13:07.426
So of course,

01:13:08.427 --> 01:13:09.569
there would have to be all sorts of

01:13:09.630 --> 01:13:10.652
exemptions to these laws.

01:13:11.172 --> 01:13:11.713
I do think

01:13:13.152 --> 01:13:14.212
We'll get back to this in a second,

01:13:14.233 --> 01:13:15.934
but I do think it's kind of arbitrary

01:13:15.974 --> 01:13:17.975
how these are being applied.

01:13:19.055 --> 01:13:20.996
The article says SpaceX has a factory in

01:13:21.036 --> 01:13:22.617
Texas and some of its routers have the

01:13:22.657 --> 01:13:24.377
words made in the USA printed on them,

01:13:25.179 --> 01:13:27.159
leading some to believe that it might be

01:13:27.199 --> 01:13:29.480
the only major router maker to escape the

01:13:29.560 --> 01:13:30.841
FCC's wide-ranging ban.

01:13:30.862 --> 01:13:31.502
Yeah, exactly.

01:13:32.662 --> 01:13:34.604
But other Starlink routers are made in

01:13:35.203 --> 01:13:35.784
Vietnam.

01:13:37.393 --> 01:13:39.255
So, some discussion topics here.

01:13:39.274 --> 01:13:41.077
The FCC hasn't publicly shared what

01:13:41.136 --> 01:13:43.118
criteria these companies meet to get

01:13:43.158 --> 01:13:43.698
exemptions.

01:13:43.720 --> 01:13:45.721
And this is the main problem that I

01:13:45.761 --> 01:13:47.363
have with all of this stuff.

01:13:47.984 --> 01:13:49.945
It seems to be kind of arbitrary whoever's

01:13:50.046 --> 01:13:52.429
in the Trump administration's favor at any

01:13:52.469 --> 01:13:53.990
given point in time.

01:13:54.591 --> 01:13:56.193
It seems like they are often...

01:13:57.078 --> 01:14:00.506
kind of coerced or threatened into making

01:14:00.546 --> 01:14:02.189
whatever changes the government wants in

01:14:02.229 --> 01:14:03.551
order to preserve their business.

01:14:04.193 --> 01:14:06.297
I am really annoyed right now,

01:14:06.358 --> 01:14:06.918
not because of...

01:14:08.802 --> 01:14:11.123
routers but because of some stuff that's

01:14:11.144 --> 01:14:13.604
happening with the company that makes my

01:14:13.645 --> 01:14:15.765
car i have a pull star too and

01:14:15.805 --> 01:14:17.226
they've been banned from selling new

01:14:17.266 --> 01:14:19.828
models in the us because they're a chinese

01:14:20.188 --> 01:14:23.310
company it's a strange situation because

01:14:23.390 --> 01:14:25.631
like their sister company volvo is owned

01:14:25.671 --> 01:14:27.070
by the same parent company and they

01:14:27.511 --> 01:14:29.932
received an exemption um it seems like

01:14:29.972 --> 01:14:31.694
other car manufacturers are receiving

01:14:31.734 --> 01:14:32.234
exemptions

01:14:32.774 --> 01:14:33.194
as well,

01:14:33.234 --> 01:14:35.215
but that kind of relates to a similar

01:14:35.255 --> 01:14:36.494
thing as these routers where it's

01:14:36.836 --> 01:14:40.176
computers from foreign countries that the

01:14:40.197 --> 01:14:41.877
Trump administration doesn't want in the

01:14:41.957 --> 01:14:42.398
USA.

01:14:42.938 --> 01:14:46.538
It's very strange because all of the

01:14:46.578 --> 01:14:50.039
computers in Polestar's cars as well as

01:14:50.079 --> 01:14:51.501
Volvo's run

01:14:52.994 --> 01:14:56.195
android automotive so like it's it's all

01:14:56.235 --> 01:14:58.516
designed by a by a american company

01:14:58.556 --> 01:15:00.796
basically uh so why they are concerned

01:15:00.817 --> 01:15:02.997
about those computers it's not very clear

01:15:03.018 --> 01:15:05.078
to me but it's just it kind of

01:15:06.059 --> 01:15:07.859
seems to be whoever is putting in the

01:15:07.920 --> 01:15:11.360
effort to basically convince the trump

01:15:11.381 --> 01:15:12.081
administration

01:15:13.597 --> 01:15:14.658
that they should keep their business

01:15:14.698 --> 01:15:16.378
around is getting exemptions.

01:15:16.599 --> 01:15:17.340
And in that case,

01:15:17.380 --> 01:15:20.400
Polestar just didn't really bother with

01:15:20.440 --> 01:15:20.560
it.

01:15:20.701 --> 01:15:22.782
But it's annoying that all that stuff is

01:15:22.801 --> 01:15:24.363
happening in the first place.

01:15:25.422 --> 01:15:28.805
Anyways, I think that was my main thought.

01:15:28.845 --> 01:15:29.545
Nate,

01:15:30.445 --> 01:15:32.286
what were you thinking about this article?

01:15:32.305 --> 01:15:35.207
Did you have any thoughts or questions

01:15:35.228 --> 01:15:35.528
about it?

01:15:36.488 --> 01:15:38.390
Um, not really too much.

01:15:38.409 --> 01:15:39.310
Uh, I mean, you,

01:15:39.610 --> 01:15:40.971
you kind of nailed everything, you know,

01:15:40.992 --> 01:15:42.153
it's like, even from the beginning,

01:15:42.853 --> 01:15:44.354
the government hasn't really said like,

01:15:44.434 --> 01:15:46.875
what exactly is their criteria here?

01:15:46.935 --> 01:15:48.095
What is the threat they're trying to

01:15:48.115 --> 01:15:51.057
defend against just some vague national

01:15:51.097 --> 01:15:51.878
security, which, you know,

01:15:51.899 --> 01:15:53.099
the government's always done like, Oh,

01:15:53.179 --> 01:15:54.079
national security.

01:15:54.119 --> 01:15:55.341
But now they're like really kicking that

01:15:55.381 --> 01:15:56.001
into overdrive.

01:15:56.701 --> 01:15:57.202
And, um,

01:15:58.712 --> 01:16:00.394
I think the article also noted that it's

01:16:00.434 --> 01:16:03.175
interesting that these are all temporary

01:16:05.076 --> 01:16:05.676
exemptions.

01:16:06.676 --> 01:16:08.077
But once they're up, it's like, okay,

01:16:08.136 --> 01:16:08.797
what happens?

01:16:09.797 --> 01:16:10.899
They can reapply,

01:16:10.979 --> 01:16:13.439
but I guess they're also supposed to show

01:16:13.939 --> 01:16:15.661
progress that they're moving manufacturing

01:16:15.680 --> 01:16:18.162
to the U.S., which, like you said,

01:16:18.181 --> 01:16:20.082
just does not happen overnight.

01:16:20.103 --> 01:16:21.643
So, okay, this is an extreme example,

01:16:21.703 --> 01:16:23.144
but –

01:16:23.003 --> 01:16:24.284
I checked on it the other day out

01:16:24.345 --> 01:16:25.286
of sheer boredom.

01:16:26.186 --> 01:16:28.529
Samsung semiconductor factory that they're

01:16:28.548 --> 01:16:29.288
building in Texas.

01:16:29.890 --> 01:16:31.131
That sucker's been under construction.

01:16:31.171 --> 01:16:32.412
I think they broke ground in like twenty

01:16:32.431 --> 01:16:33.632
twenty one or something like that.

01:16:34.233 --> 01:16:38.136
And every year they've been saying we're

01:16:38.155 --> 01:16:39.157
going to start putting out chips in the

01:16:39.176 --> 01:16:39.396
spring.

01:16:39.417 --> 01:16:40.318
We're going to start putting out chips in

01:16:40.337 --> 01:16:40.637
the fall.

01:16:40.859 --> 01:16:42.220
They're still not putting out chips.

01:16:43.207 --> 01:16:44.347
I don't know what they're doing.

01:16:44.627 --> 01:16:45.608
That's happening, I think,

01:16:45.627 --> 01:16:47.788
with a lot of these companies in America.

01:16:47.828 --> 01:16:49.309
There's one in Arizona I know of.

01:16:49.729 --> 01:16:51.789
I don't remember if it's TSMC or Intel,

01:16:51.850 --> 01:16:53.329
but somebody's building a plant out there.

01:16:53.350 --> 01:16:53.810
I think it's TSMC.

01:16:54.250 --> 01:16:57.490
Yeah, and that's been a similar situation.

01:16:58.730 --> 01:17:00.810
Routers might be an easier one to make

01:17:01.091 --> 01:17:01.591
in the U.S.

01:17:01.650 --> 01:17:04.572
I know that they really want chip

01:17:04.612 --> 01:17:06.091
companies to move manufacturing to the

01:17:06.171 --> 01:17:06.351
U.S.,

01:17:06.391 --> 01:17:09.632
but that is such a specialized tool that

01:17:09.733 --> 01:17:10.472
even TSMC...

01:17:12.068 --> 01:17:14.909
is gonna have a very hard time moving

01:17:14.949 --> 01:17:16.711
that manufacturing capacity to the US if

01:17:16.730 --> 01:17:18.992
they want to because it's not just a

01:17:19.032 --> 01:17:21.793
matter of like getting the plans in the

01:17:21.833 --> 01:17:23.515
machines and like making it here some of

01:17:23.555 --> 01:17:27.877
these products require like real experts

01:17:27.957 --> 01:17:29.859
in the field and like pretty much all

01:17:29.899 --> 01:17:31.779
of them in that case are in Taiwan

01:17:32.001 --> 01:17:34.322
so where are they in America who can

01:17:34.381 --> 01:17:36.342
even do this stuff you you actually need

01:17:36.382 --> 01:17:38.364
the people involved in it actually just is

01:17:38.404 --> 01:17:38.784
true that

01:17:40.996 --> 01:17:42.636
there aren't enough people in America who

01:17:42.697 --> 01:17:44.936
know about that stuff to implement these

01:17:44.978 --> 01:17:45.158
things.

01:17:45.177 --> 01:17:46.417
So I think that that's going to cause

01:17:46.978 --> 01:17:47.457
delays.

01:17:47.838 --> 01:17:49.059
I think it's just the thing where like,

01:17:51.520 --> 01:17:55.560
clearly favors Elon Musk, basically.

01:17:56.721 --> 01:17:58.502
That's kind of the favoritism we've seen

01:17:59.703 --> 01:18:01.382
with Tesla and his other companies.

01:18:01.403 --> 01:18:03.283
We've seen it with like OpenAI and Sam

01:18:03.323 --> 01:18:03.644
Altman.

01:18:03.663 --> 01:18:05.685
There's just some companies that the

01:18:05.704 --> 01:18:06.944
government really likes.

01:18:06.984 --> 01:18:08.185
I think we talked about that when

01:18:09.323 --> 01:18:12.505
anthropics fable models where were banned

01:18:12.524 --> 01:18:14.104
by the us government for some period of

01:18:14.145 --> 01:18:15.826
time and that was an american company you

01:18:15.845 --> 01:18:18.146
know there weren't even like chinese

01:18:18.266 --> 01:18:20.046
concerns which is usually the excuse that

01:18:20.067 --> 01:18:23.488
they use um so yeah i i don't

01:18:23.528 --> 01:18:26.069
think anyone's really safe from these

01:18:26.109 --> 01:18:29.350
sorts of restrictions unfortunately yeah

01:18:29.390 --> 01:18:31.251
honestly i was surprised it took starlink

01:18:31.291 --> 01:18:33.931
this long to get the the exception i

01:18:33.952 --> 01:18:35.292
wonder if they just didn't bother to

01:18:36.323 --> 01:18:37.603
to apply for it or something.

01:18:37.643 --> 01:18:39.724
But yeah, it's, it's like you said,

01:18:39.743 --> 01:18:42.043
there's so many like with these, I mean,

01:18:42.064 --> 01:18:42.845
I don't know about routers,

01:18:42.885 --> 01:18:44.204
but with semiconductor factories,

01:18:44.225 --> 01:18:46.865
it's like in some cases there's like very

01:18:46.926 --> 01:18:48.886
specific niche equipment that's made by

01:18:48.926 --> 01:18:50.466
like, I'm not even making this up.

01:18:50.726 --> 01:18:52.386
There's some stuff that's only made by

01:18:52.426 --> 01:18:54.847
like a single company in Germany that has

01:18:54.868 --> 01:18:55.768
like ten people.

01:18:55.948 --> 01:18:58.307
So they're back ordered by like six to

01:18:58.387 --> 01:18:59.988
eighteen months on this equipment.

01:19:00.708 --> 01:19:02.409
And then that's not including the facility

01:19:02.430 --> 01:19:02.630
itself,

01:19:02.649 --> 01:19:04.792
which granted the Samsung semiconductors,

01:19:04.912 --> 01:19:06.653
the conductor factory is like one of the

01:19:06.672 --> 01:19:07.353
biggest in the world.

01:19:07.372 --> 01:19:08.713
So that's probably a bit of an exception,

01:19:08.774 --> 01:19:09.734
but yeah, it's,

01:19:09.854 --> 01:19:11.216
it's not like you just rent an office

01:19:11.235 --> 01:19:11.515
space,

01:19:11.536 --> 01:19:13.237
throw in a few cubicles and start printing

01:19:13.337 --> 01:19:14.097
out stuff.

01:19:14.137 --> 01:19:15.519
Like even with these routers, it's like,

01:19:15.578 --> 01:19:16.960
this doesn't just happen overnight.

01:19:17.119 --> 01:19:17.260
It's.

01:19:18.720 --> 01:19:20.140
Yeah, and it's going to be,

01:19:20.640 --> 01:19:21.921
it's kind of a situation,

01:19:22.541 --> 01:19:24.240
I think a lot of these businesses who

01:19:24.280 --> 01:19:25.921
are affected are going to have to face

01:19:25.962 --> 01:19:26.702
the question of like,

01:19:27.381 --> 01:19:29.762
is it even worth sticking around in the

01:19:29.842 --> 01:19:30.023
US?

01:19:30.042 --> 01:19:32.682
And I think probably more businesses may

01:19:32.823 --> 01:19:34.743
opt out of that than the Trump

01:19:34.804 --> 01:19:36.604
administration probably expects.

01:19:37.484 --> 01:19:39.244
Going back to the whole Polestar thing,

01:19:39.765 --> 01:19:40.364
I know that like,

01:19:40.744 --> 01:19:43.206
it's only five percent of their US sales

01:19:43.225 --> 01:19:45.246
or something like that were in the US.

01:19:45.265 --> 01:19:48.146
They're big in like Europe, for example.

01:19:48.886 --> 01:19:52.350
And in I assume the reason that they

01:19:52.371 --> 01:19:55.755
didn't really pursue an exemption in that

01:19:55.774 --> 01:19:57.936
case was because it'd be way cheaper to

01:19:57.957 --> 01:20:01.159
just drop that five percent of sales than,

01:20:01.421 --> 01:20:01.680
you know,

01:20:01.740 --> 01:20:03.323
try and meet all of these demands that

01:20:03.363 --> 01:20:04.002
the government has.

01:20:04.063 --> 01:20:04.984
And I don't know if that'll be the

01:20:05.024 --> 01:20:07.127
case with like Netgear, for example,

01:20:07.186 --> 01:20:10.050
but spinning up this this manufacturing

01:20:10.069 --> 01:20:11.030
capability is not.

01:20:12.372 --> 01:20:16.515
cheap so giving up on us sales for

01:20:16.536 --> 01:20:18.237
a lot of these companies might actually be

01:20:18.858 --> 01:20:21.800
the more cost-effective way to go even

01:20:22.060 --> 01:20:23.782
even for american companies like like

01:20:23.862 --> 01:20:25.563
netgear is an american company for example

01:20:25.582 --> 01:20:28.246
they just manufacture overseas like pretty

01:20:28.286 --> 01:20:30.868
much every other company in the us does

01:20:31.188 --> 01:20:35.372
so it'll be a weird time in tech

01:20:35.431 --> 01:20:37.393
i think it'll be bad for americans overall

01:20:37.412 --> 01:20:37.814
because

01:20:39.028 --> 01:20:43.672
Americans have gotten really used to tech

01:20:43.733 --> 01:20:45.715
being very cheap.

01:20:46.576 --> 01:20:48.337
If you ask anybody from any other country,

01:20:48.457 --> 01:20:50.079
even like nearby countries like Canada,

01:20:50.100 --> 01:20:52.141
but especially Europe,

01:20:52.261 --> 01:20:54.444
especially like far away from everything

01:20:54.503 --> 01:20:55.784
countries like Australia.

01:20:57.694 --> 01:21:01.436
tech is way more expensive to buy pretty

01:21:01.476 --> 01:21:03.057
much everything in those countries

01:21:03.078 --> 01:21:04.257
compared to the US.

01:21:05.298 --> 01:21:07.000
And I think that changes like this are

01:21:07.020 --> 01:21:09.162
just going to really push up the price

01:21:10.141 --> 01:21:10.421
to...

01:21:12.020 --> 01:21:14.320
like not exorbitant but basically it's

01:21:14.341 --> 01:21:16.981
going to be meeting the the prices of

01:21:17.061 --> 01:21:18.563
other of all these other countries and

01:21:18.603 --> 01:21:19.564
we're just kind of going to be in

01:21:19.583 --> 01:21:23.104
the same boat um we're just not going

01:21:23.125 --> 01:21:24.945
to have the advantages that we've enjoyed

01:21:25.025 --> 01:21:26.947
for for quite a while and that'll be

01:21:27.306 --> 01:21:32.510
probably a shock to a lot of people

01:21:32.869 --> 01:21:33.990
i don't have much more to add to

01:21:34.011 --> 01:21:34.770
that i agree

01:21:36.283 --> 01:21:36.984
Tough times are coming.

01:21:37.604 --> 01:21:37.904
Yeah.

01:21:38.344 --> 01:21:38.564
Well,

01:21:38.585 --> 01:21:41.405
why don't you take us away with our

01:21:41.445 --> 01:21:42.006
next question?

01:21:42.046 --> 01:21:42.867
Speaking of Europe.

01:21:43.627 --> 01:21:43.868
Yeah.

01:21:43.887 --> 01:21:45.189
Speaking of Europe and tough times are

01:21:45.208 --> 01:21:45.488
coming.

01:21:46.890 --> 01:21:49.091
So this next story comes from Telegraph.

01:21:49.351 --> 01:21:50.832
It says inside the dystopian world of

01:21:50.872 --> 01:21:52.413
Germany's free speech crackdown.

01:21:53.394 --> 01:21:54.675
I'm going to read off the notes that

01:21:54.715 --> 01:21:56.055
I made here because this is a very

01:21:56.256 --> 01:21:57.096
long article.

01:21:58.216 --> 01:21:59.457
Definitely worth a read.

01:21:59.597 --> 01:22:00.538
Lots of good stuff in there.

01:22:00.618 --> 01:22:03.560
But I'm going to read off my notes

01:22:03.600 --> 01:22:05.221
just to keep it short.

01:22:05.402 --> 01:22:06.242
to the relevant parts.

01:22:06.742 --> 01:22:09.983
So Berlin police told Dr.

01:22:10.002 --> 01:22:11.903
Ziedelman he had been accused of violating

01:22:12.002 --> 01:22:14.024
a post-Second World War law that bans the

01:22:14.043 --> 01:22:15.404
display of Nazi symbols, slogans,

01:22:15.423 --> 01:22:17.264
and imagery and could now face three years

01:22:17.304 --> 01:22:18.425
in prison if found guilty.

01:22:18.824 --> 01:22:20.204
The sixty-nine-year-old found out the

01:22:20.244 --> 01:22:21.725
offending social media post was a meme

01:22:21.765 --> 01:22:22.626
about Adolf Hitler,

01:22:22.926 --> 01:22:24.225
but it was one in which he criticized

01:22:24.246 --> 01:22:25.645
the Nazi dictator and compared his

01:22:25.666 --> 01:22:27.207
invasion of Czechoslovakia to Vladimir

01:22:27.247 --> 01:22:28.407
Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

01:22:29.487 --> 01:22:31.306
So basically, like,

01:22:31.947 --> 01:22:33.207
I'm saying Hitler is bad.

01:22:33.287 --> 01:22:33.868
Why is this

01:22:36.181 --> 01:22:36.341
Yeah.

01:22:36.362 --> 01:22:36.442
Dr.

01:22:36.481 --> 01:22:38.043
Z is one of thousands of Germans who

01:22:38.163 --> 01:22:40.006
have been threatened with fines or prison

01:22:40.025 --> 01:22:41.988
sentences for social media posts that fall

01:22:42.007 --> 01:22:43.649
afoul of the country's political speech

01:22:43.689 --> 01:22:43.930
laws,

01:22:43.949 --> 01:22:45.992
which are unusually stringent for an EU

01:22:46.131 --> 01:22:46.652
member state.

01:22:47.552 --> 01:22:49.755
One German had his home raided for calling

01:22:49.775 --> 01:22:51.979
a minister a –

01:22:51.396 --> 01:22:52.398
Schwachkopf,

01:22:53.259 --> 01:22:54.500
which I guess is German for dummy.

01:22:54.560 --> 01:22:55.780
And I'm sure all the Germans are laughing

01:22:55.801 --> 01:22:56.761
at my pronunciation right now.

01:22:57.283 --> 01:22:59.725
Another was fined two thousand euros or

01:22:59.744 --> 01:23:01.326
about seventeen hundred pounds for calling

01:23:01.365 --> 01:23:03.628
Friedrich Merz a lying fritz under a law

01:23:03.668 --> 01:23:05.250
that critics claim makes it effectively

01:23:05.310 --> 01:23:06.711
illegal to make fun of politicians.

01:23:07.431 --> 01:23:08.953
The number of investigations under Section

01:23:09.033 --> 01:23:10.854
eighty six a the Nazi symbol band that

01:23:10.873 --> 01:23:11.134
Dr.

01:23:11.154 --> 01:23:12.795
Z was investigated for has more than

01:23:12.854 --> 01:23:14.155
doubled over the past decade,

01:23:14.235 --> 01:23:15.716
according to official police statistics.

01:23:16.037 --> 01:23:17.858
Investigate investigations into the

01:23:17.898 --> 01:23:19.998
political insult law also reached a record

01:23:20.038 --> 01:23:21.100
level in twenty twenty five.

01:23:21.579 --> 01:23:23.180
The surge in cases is so vast that

01:23:23.220 --> 01:23:23.801
the U.N.

01:23:23.841 --> 01:23:25.322
has launched an investigation into free

01:23:25.362 --> 01:23:26.563
speech violations in Germany,

01:23:26.903 --> 01:23:28.043
a step typically reserved for

01:23:28.104 --> 01:23:29.725
dictatorships and banana republics.

01:23:30.364 --> 01:23:31.865
German free speech activists on the left

01:23:31.985 --> 01:23:32.405
and right,

01:23:32.485 --> 01:23:33.686
as well as the Trump administration,

01:23:33.726 --> 01:23:34.868
have also raised the alarm,

01:23:34.948 --> 01:23:36.307
and there are growing calls from some of

01:23:36.328 --> 01:23:37.588
the country's stricter laws to be

01:23:37.649 --> 01:23:40.930
scrapped.

01:23:41.831 --> 01:23:43.872
The fur bears some similarities to the

01:23:43.912 --> 01:23:45.052
speech debate in Britain,

01:23:45.092 --> 01:23:46.573
where citizens have a knock on the door

01:23:46.594 --> 01:23:48.395
from police over opinions posted online.

01:23:49.939 --> 01:23:50.680
Uh,

01:23:50.701 --> 01:23:52.582
this part blew my mind in the case

01:23:52.622 --> 01:23:53.202
of Dr. Z,

01:23:53.242 --> 01:23:55.002
the rise of online portals in Germany,

01:23:55.023 --> 01:23:56.564
which allows citizens to report each other

01:23:56.604 --> 01:23:58.506
for illegal comments seems to be what

01:23:58.525 --> 01:24:00.127
alerted police to a social media post.

01:24:00.567 --> 01:24:03.628
So they literally have like Stasi style

01:24:03.748 --> 01:24:05.650
snitch on your neighbor because something

01:24:05.711 --> 01:24:06.872
he said hurt my feelings.

01:24:07.953 --> 01:24:09.253
Which is pretty insane.

01:24:09.753 --> 01:24:10.935
Another controversial law in Germany's

01:24:10.975 --> 01:24:13.137
free speech debate is section one eighty

01:24:13.278 --> 01:24:14.219
eight of the criminal code,

01:24:14.238 --> 01:24:15.940
which imposes a de facto ban on publicly

01:24:15.980 --> 01:24:17.622
insulting or defaming elected officials.

01:24:18.103 --> 01:24:18.823
In one recent case,

01:24:18.904 --> 01:24:20.505
a pensioner was investigated under Section

01:24:20.585 --> 01:24:22.087
one eighty eight for posting Pinocchio is

01:24:22.127 --> 01:24:23.068
coming on Facebook.

01:24:23.387 --> 01:24:24.609
After he learned that Frederick Mertz,

01:24:24.628 --> 01:24:26.069
the chancellor, was visiting his hometown.

01:24:26.670 --> 01:24:27.069
In November,

01:24:27.090 --> 01:24:28.470
twenty twenty four police in Bavaria

01:24:28.510 --> 01:24:30.051
raided the home of another pensioner

01:24:30.091 --> 01:24:31.431
because he called Robert Habeck,

01:24:31.832 --> 01:24:33.453
the then vice chancellor of Germany,

01:24:34.132 --> 01:24:34.792
again, a dummy.

01:24:35.373 --> 01:24:37.394
The raid was reportedly launched after Mr.

01:24:37.434 --> 01:24:39.274
Habeck personally filed a criminal

01:24:39.314 --> 01:24:40.435
complaint against the pensioner.

01:24:40.895 --> 01:24:41.617
In twenty twenty one,

01:24:41.657 --> 01:24:43.157
police raided a man's apartment in Hamburg

01:24:43.237 --> 01:24:44.057
after he told a senator,

01:24:44.177 --> 01:24:46.378
you're such a D. I'm assuming it's dick.

01:24:46.399 --> 01:24:46.939
I don't know.

01:24:47.760 --> 01:24:48.381
And this year,

01:24:48.701 --> 01:24:50.322
a resident was fined two thousand euros

01:24:50.341 --> 01:24:51.802
for calling Mr. Mertz a lying fritz.

01:24:52.143 --> 01:24:54.283
Officials show a record four thousand

01:24:54.304 --> 01:24:55.744
seven hundred and ninety two section one

01:24:55.765 --> 01:24:57.126
eighty eight cases were filed in Germany

01:24:57.145 --> 01:24:57.886
in twenty twenty five,

01:24:58.225 --> 01:24:59.646
with the numbers rising by nearly eighty

01:24:59.726 --> 01:25:01.368
five percent between twenty twenty three

01:25:01.387 --> 01:25:02.149
and twenty twenty five.

01:25:02.748 --> 01:25:03.510
So, um.

01:25:04.579 --> 01:25:05.462
Yeah, I mean, this is...

01:25:06.682 --> 01:25:09.768
This kind of goes back to the thing

01:25:09.787 --> 01:25:11.131
that I said with the graphene thing,

01:25:11.171 --> 01:25:11.771
where it's like...

01:25:13.675 --> 01:25:15.738
Some people are totally comfortable...

01:25:16.891 --> 01:25:19.094
painting a target on their back because

01:25:19.134 --> 01:25:20.234
it's the principle of the matter, right?

01:25:20.274 --> 01:25:21.975
Like you should be allowed to call your

01:25:22.015 --> 01:25:22.796
politicians names.

01:25:22.895 --> 01:25:23.317
I'm sorry,

01:25:23.377 --> 01:25:25.198
but no matter what politician it is,

01:25:25.658 --> 01:25:26.939
as long as you're not like threatening

01:25:26.979 --> 01:25:27.179
them,

01:25:27.640 --> 01:25:28.820
you should be allowed to say that they're

01:25:28.841 --> 01:25:29.180
stupid.

01:25:29.220 --> 01:25:30.481
You should be allowed to say that they're

01:25:31.042 --> 01:25:31.481
corrupt.

01:25:31.523 --> 01:25:32.582
You should be allowed to say that they're

01:25:32.603 --> 01:25:33.543
not doing a good job.

01:25:33.963 --> 01:25:36.006
Like you should be allowed to criticize

01:25:36.025 --> 01:25:36.166
them.

01:25:36.905 --> 01:25:40.269
And I think if you're,

01:25:41.820 --> 01:25:43.042
It's one of those things where like we're

01:25:43.082 --> 01:25:44.882
seeing this all over the West,

01:25:44.943 --> 01:25:45.542
unfortunately,

01:25:45.663 --> 01:25:46.963
where this kind of stuff is being

01:25:47.024 --> 01:25:47.425
monitored.

01:25:48.604 --> 01:25:49.725
We know that the feds here in the

01:25:49.765 --> 01:25:49.966
U.S.

01:25:49.985 --> 01:25:51.466
at least are monitoring social media.

01:25:51.766 --> 01:25:53.488
That's what services like Palantir do is

01:25:53.507 --> 01:25:54.708
they just scrape social media,

01:25:55.088 --> 01:25:56.609
even the really fringe niche ones that

01:25:56.649 --> 01:25:57.810
only have like one hundred thousand people

01:25:57.890 --> 01:25:58.270
using them.

01:25:58.752 --> 01:26:00.533
So just remember that what you post,

01:26:01.172 --> 01:26:02.274
even if it's like friends only or

01:26:02.293 --> 01:26:02.573
something,

01:26:02.673 --> 01:26:04.015
anything you put in a digital format,

01:26:04.034 --> 01:26:05.176
you should kind of assume it's public.

01:26:06.036 --> 01:26:07.817
And just be aware if you're one of

01:26:07.837 --> 01:26:08.778
those people who's like,

01:26:09.359 --> 01:26:10.439
I'm going to go ahead and stand up

01:26:10.458 --> 01:26:11.659
for my right for free speech.

01:26:11.720 --> 01:26:12.701
Like, that's totally cool.

01:26:13.100 --> 01:26:13.641
I applaud that.

01:26:14.282 --> 01:26:14.922
I do that, too.

01:26:15.162 --> 01:26:16.984
I'm very critical of all levels of

01:26:17.024 --> 01:26:18.064
government on Mastodon.

01:26:18.185 --> 01:26:20.206
But at the same time,

01:26:20.286 --> 01:26:21.407
just you need to be aware of the

01:26:21.426 --> 01:26:22.007
risk you're taking.

01:26:22.307 --> 01:26:25.550
So and Germany needs to figure out what

01:26:25.569 --> 01:26:26.551
they're doing if they're getting

01:26:26.591 --> 01:26:27.712
investigated by the UN.

01:26:27.971 --> 01:26:30.033
I think that's pretty wild.

01:26:30.073 --> 01:26:30.913
I don't know if I have much more

01:26:30.934 --> 01:26:31.635
to add to that.

01:26:31.654 --> 01:26:32.956
Did anything jump out at you that I

01:26:32.996 --> 01:26:33.296
missed?

01:26:33.315 --> 01:26:33.355
No.

01:26:35.735 --> 01:26:36.435
No, I don't think so.

01:26:36.456 --> 01:26:38.817
I think you pretty much covered it.

01:26:40.238 --> 01:26:40.358
Yeah,

01:26:40.377 --> 01:26:43.340
it's just like we talked about earlier in

01:26:43.380 --> 01:26:45.680
terms of government overreach, basically.

01:26:46.681 --> 01:26:49.564
Are you willing to take the risk of

01:26:50.323 --> 01:26:51.944
being targeted by these governments,

01:26:52.005 --> 01:26:53.786
even if you're not doing anything wrong?

01:26:53.845 --> 01:26:57.167
It's a pain.

01:26:57.188 --> 01:27:00.550
It's a hassle that they can really put

01:27:00.569 --> 01:27:00.850
you through,

01:27:00.869 --> 01:27:02.470
and I think that that's a big problem

01:27:03.230 --> 01:27:04.072
we have to face right now.

01:27:08.136 --> 01:27:08.577
Good times.

01:27:13.318 --> 01:27:16.019
I have not heard of this Gulag Archipelago

01:27:17.038 --> 01:27:19.420
that Scarecrow recommends.

01:27:19.859 --> 01:27:21.279
So I don't know.

01:27:21.520 --> 01:27:22.621
I can add that to my reading list.

01:27:22.740 --> 01:27:23.640
I haven't heard of that one before.

01:27:23.921 --> 01:27:25.180
Sounds like something that somebody in

01:27:25.220 --> 01:27:25.900
Russia may have written.

01:27:29.981 --> 01:27:32.042
I'm not seeing any other questions right

01:27:32.082 --> 01:27:32.243
now.

01:27:32.302 --> 01:27:33.703
So I think we can probably jump into

01:27:33.802 --> 01:27:35.463
our story about eBay that I know you

01:27:35.484 --> 01:27:36.543
were interested in.

01:27:37.176 --> 01:27:40.840
Yeah, that's a crazy one.

01:27:42.119 --> 01:27:43.421
Yeah, just checking the chat here,

01:27:43.440 --> 01:27:45.122
but we'll look at this TechCrunch article.

01:27:45.603 --> 01:27:48.585
eBay reaches a fifty six million dollar

01:27:48.765 --> 01:27:50.826
settlement with e-commerce newsletter

01:27:50.845 --> 01:27:54.047
writers it terrorized in twenty nineteen.

01:27:54.347 --> 01:27:55.628
I remember reading about this in twenty

01:27:55.668 --> 01:27:56.048
nineteen.

01:27:57.369 --> 01:27:57.470
Well,

01:27:57.489 --> 01:27:58.751
I guess I didn't remember I read it

01:27:58.831 --> 01:27:59.690
in twenty nineteen, though.

01:27:59.730 --> 01:28:01.532
I thought it was an older story.

01:28:02.313 --> 01:28:03.672
It's a lot more recent than I thought.

01:28:04.974 --> 01:28:06.515
The article says the settlement this week

01:28:06.555 --> 01:28:08.435
resolves a twenty twenty one civil case

01:28:08.456 --> 01:28:10.176
that was brought by the couple against

01:28:11.796 --> 01:28:12.077
eBay.

01:28:12.717 --> 01:28:14.498
The couple is a married couple,

01:28:14.838 --> 01:28:16.440
Ina and David Steiner,

01:28:16.560 --> 01:28:19.021
who were the co-authors of eCommerce

01:28:19.122 --> 01:28:19.542
Bytes.

01:28:20.783 --> 01:28:24.286
They inspired the ire of high-level eBay

01:28:24.365 --> 01:28:26.087
executives, said TechCrunch,

01:28:26.247 --> 01:28:28.708
after occasionally criticizing the company

01:28:28.849 --> 01:28:29.710
in their newsletter.

01:28:30.449 --> 01:28:32.871
uh executives from ebay used sock puppet

01:28:32.911 --> 01:28:34.811
social media accounts to harass the couple

01:28:35.131 --> 01:28:36.792
while also sending them anonymous

01:28:37.052 --> 01:28:39.194
threatening letters and bizarre items in

01:28:39.234 --> 01:28:41.074
the mail including live spiders and

01:28:41.114 --> 01:28:43.496
cockroaches pornographic magazines a

01:28:43.536 --> 01:28:46.957
bloody pig mask a funeral wreath and a

01:28:46.997 --> 01:28:49.559
book about surviving the death of a spouse

01:28:50.118 --> 01:28:52.439
so this is not just the typical legal

01:28:52.479 --> 01:28:54.161
harassment you might see from a company's

01:28:54.220 --> 01:28:55.421
lawyers this is an actual

01:28:56.021 --> 01:28:58.125
criminal harassment and stalking from

01:28:58.204 --> 01:29:00.969
top-level executives at eBay.

01:29:01.430 --> 01:29:03.431
According to previously released court

01:29:03.471 --> 01:29:03.972
documents,

01:29:04.113 --> 01:29:05.756
a plan that was attempted but never

01:29:05.815 --> 01:29:08.179
successfully carried out involved affixing

01:29:08.338 --> 01:29:10.542
a GPS tracking device to the couple's car.

01:29:11.363 --> 01:29:13.224
Yet another internally broached plan at

01:29:13.283 --> 01:29:15.345
eBay involved sending a, quote,

01:29:15.404 --> 01:29:18.127
Samoan gang to the Steiner's home.

01:29:18.966 --> 01:29:20.448
In a statement published Tuesday,

01:29:20.807 --> 01:29:22.988
eBay disavowed its former employees'

01:29:23.029 --> 01:29:24.569
behavior as, quote,

01:29:24.670 --> 01:29:27.091
not representative of eBay's culture.

01:29:29.453 --> 01:29:31.673
So that is a crazy story.

01:29:31.814 --> 01:29:34.916
I know that eBay made that statement.

01:29:35.975 --> 01:29:40.158
statement obviously but uh people up to

01:29:40.198 --> 01:29:43.658
the ceo of the of ebay uh devin

01:29:44.220 --> 01:29:47.961
uh weinig and uh multiple board members

01:29:48.841 --> 01:29:52.722
were involved in this uh the ceo settled

01:29:52.783 --> 01:29:55.604
for two million dollars as part of the

01:29:55.644 --> 01:29:58.706
settlement uh was directly from him uh

01:29:58.746 --> 01:30:00.766
half a million dollars will be paid out

01:30:00.846 --> 01:30:03.328
from uh another ebay executive wendy

01:30:03.988 --> 01:30:08.211
Jones and seven former eBay employees were

01:30:08.270 --> 01:30:10.252
criminally charged and pled guilty in

01:30:10.313 --> 01:30:11.333
relation to this plot,

01:30:11.713 --> 01:30:13.534
including the company's former security

01:30:13.555 --> 01:30:15.077
chief, James Bout,

01:30:15.136 --> 01:30:17.899
who was sentenced to nearly five years in

01:30:17.958 --> 01:30:19.239
prison for this.

01:30:19.380 --> 01:30:22.922
So it's wild.

01:30:24.082 --> 01:30:26.765
eBay is crazy apparently.

01:30:26.945 --> 01:30:28.867
And I believe a lot of the people

01:30:28.907 --> 01:30:29.908
like, um,

01:30:31.569 --> 01:30:32.930
A lot of the people involved are still

01:30:33.029 --> 01:30:35.091
on the, at least the board, I believe.

01:30:35.150 --> 01:30:37.771
I know that the CEO is the former

01:30:37.811 --> 01:30:37.952
CEO.

01:30:37.992 --> 01:30:39.152
I don't know who's involved now,

01:30:39.192 --> 01:30:41.132
but not all of them were, like,

01:30:41.912 --> 01:30:44.293
very punished, basically.

01:30:44.713 --> 01:30:48.255
So... I guess, um...

01:30:50.322 --> 01:30:53.903
Getting fifty six million dollars is not

01:30:53.962 --> 01:30:55.622
the worst outcome for these people.

01:30:55.643 --> 01:30:57.043
They're probably happy about that because

01:30:57.064 --> 01:30:57.503
they settled.

01:30:57.564 --> 01:31:00.804
But it is absolutely crazy that they had

01:31:00.823 --> 01:31:02.545
to go through that in the first place.

01:31:02.845 --> 01:31:03.925
You know,

01:31:03.984 --> 01:31:07.065
a targeted harassment campaign like that

01:31:07.206 --> 01:31:11.747
is not exactly typical of a company like

01:31:12.466 --> 01:31:14.608
eBay.

01:31:14.648 --> 01:31:15.247
So, yeah.

01:31:15.287 --> 01:31:16.688
Was there anything you wanted to discuss

01:31:16.768 --> 01:31:19.088
about this article or any other thoughts

01:31:19.109 --> 01:31:19.828
that you had, Nate?

01:31:20.805 --> 01:31:21.065
No,

01:31:22.729 --> 01:31:24.073
I think partially I wanted to cover it

01:31:24.113 --> 01:31:26.399
because one, like, yeah, it's so wild.

01:31:26.479 --> 01:31:28.965
It's like, these are executives, right?

01:31:29.824 --> 01:31:32.046
And it's funny because I've noticed I've

01:31:32.106 --> 01:31:35.228
worked around every level of employee you

01:31:35.247 --> 01:31:36.908
can imagine from like the entry level

01:31:36.969 --> 01:31:39.770
cashier at the grocery store to like I

01:31:39.810 --> 01:31:42.632
have stood ten feet away from someone

01:31:42.672 --> 01:31:44.333
who's in the top twenty on the Forbes

01:31:44.354 --> 01:31:45.014
billionaire list.

01:31:45.154 --> 01:31:47.136
Like I have worked around everybody you

01:31:47.155 --> 01:31:47.615
can imagine.

01:31:48.195 --> 01:31:52.059
And I've noticed a curve of like.

01:31:53.474 --> 01:31:54.715
I don't want to drop an F-bomb of

01:31:54.755 --> 01:31:57.278
like how many craps they give where like

01:31:57.618 --> 01:31:59.880
the lowest level people don't care.

01:32:00.121 --> 01:32:01.002
Like they're never stressed.

01:32:01.021 --> 01:32:01.402
They don't care.

01:32:01.421 --> 01:32:02.162
Well, I mean, they're stressed,

01:32:02.182 --> 01:32:03.503
but like they don't care because they

01:32:03.524 --> 01:32:04.524
don't get paid enough to care.

01:32:05.246 --> 01:32:06.105
And then on the other end of the

01:32:06.126 --> 01:32:08.389
spectrum is like all the higher executives

01:32:08.408 --> 01:32:09.949
that don't care because they pay someone

01:32:09.989 --> 01:32:10.530
else to care.

01:32:10.930 --> 01:32:11.931
And then right in the middle are all,

01:32:11.971 --> 01:32:12.112
like,

01:32:12.131 --> 01:32:13.072
the middle managers that are just

01:32:13.112 --> 01:32:14.573
constantly stressed and high-strung about

01:32:14.613 --> 01:32:14.972
everything.

01:32:15.393 --> 01:32:16.453
And so it's just weird to me that

01:32:16.474 --> 01:32:16.774
there's, like,

01:32:16.833 --> 01:32:19.135
all these C-suites and executives that

01:32:19.154 --> 01:32:19.635
it's just, like,

01:32:19.994 --> 01:32:21.496
why are you wasting your time because

01:32:21.536 --> 01:32:22.157
somebody, like,

01:32:22.216 --> 01:32:24.238
left you a negative review in their

01:32:24.297 --> 01:32:25.438
personal substack?

01:32:25.658 --> 01:32:26.998
Like, seriously.

01:32:27.439 --> 01:32:28.699
Truly, like,

01:32:29.600 --> 01:32:31.280
when we were talking about this article

01:32:31.320 --> 01:32:31.820
earlier today,

01:32:31.881 --> 01:32:33.402
if you had asked me about this story,

01:32:33.421 --> 01:32:36.103
because I knew of this story.

01:32:36.122 --> 01:32:39.225
I remember reading the original, like,

01:32:40.213 --> 01:32:41.033
story about it.

01:32:41.094 --> 01:32:42.375
But I would have told you,

01:32:43.034 --> 01:32:44.115
I remember this happening in like,

01:32:44.176 --> 01:32:45.496
two thousand eight or two thousand ten or

01:32:45.536 --> 01:32:47.657
like some sometime like early eBay,

01:32:47.676 --> 01:32:48.157
basically,

01:32:48.176 --> 01:32:49.898
where it's maybe it's a small company and

01:32:49.917 --> 01:32:51.078
they're like personally invested.

01:32:51.137 --> 01:32:54.920
But this started in early twenty nineteen,

01:32:54.939 --> 01:32:57.740
this whole thing like eBay is a massive

01:32:57.780 --> 01:32:58.581
company at this point.

01:32:58.621 --> 01:33:01.462
And you're concerned about some couple's

01:33:01.943 --> 01:33:04.444
newsletter on on a blog online.

01:33:05.604 --> 01:33:08.787
It doesn't even make any sense at all.

01:33:09.127 --> 01:33:11.529
It is the wildest story I have ever

01:33:12.449 --> 01:33:12.810
seen.

01:33:14.310 --> 01:33:16.313
And, yeah,

01:33:16.432 --> 01:33:20.216
I guess I don't even know what else

01:33:20.235 --> 01:33:20.855
to say about that.

01:33:20.896 --> 01:33:21.396
It's crazy.

01:33:22.137 --> 01:33:23.037
Yeah, it really is.

01:33:23.798 --> 01:33:25.039
Also, just, you know, privacy.

01:33:25.100 --> 01:33:26.801
Be careful what information you put out

01:33:26.820 --> 01:33:28.122
there, who has access to it,

01:33:28.221 --> 01:33:28.802
all that kind of stuff.

01:33:28.823 --> 01:33:28.922
Yeah,

01:33:28.962 --> 01:33:30.503
you never know who's going to stalk you,

01:33:30.583 --> 01:33:31.164
apparently.

01:33:31.265 --> 01:33:32.865
Seriously, that's so wild.

01:33:32.886 --> 01:33:34.167
You would think they'd have better things

01:33:34.207 --> 01:33:34.447
to do.

01:33:35.404 --> 01:33:36.626
I sure would if I was being paid

01:33:36.645 --> 01:33:39.327
that much.

01:33:39.528 --> 01:33:40.408
Just to backtrack,

01:33:40.427 --> 01:33:41.948
Scarecrow was talking about that book.

01:33:42.809 --> 01:33:43.289
He said, yeah,

01:33:43.310 --> 01:33:44.990
it's about someone's arrest in nineteen

01:33:45.030 --> 01:33:46.652
forty five for private letters to a friend

01:33:46.671 --> 01:33:47.252
about Stalin.

01:33:47.332 --> 01:33:48.792
Imagine your letters from seven years ago

01:33:48.832 --> 01:33:50.134
came back to smack you in this way.

01:33:50.514 --> 01:33:51.494
Eight years of hard labor.

01:33:52.774 --> 01:33:53.055
Yeah,

01:33:53.395 --> 01:33:54.416
I kind of want to point that out

01:33:54.475 --> 01:33:56.738
that not not to fear monger,

01:33:56.778 --> 01:33:58.698
but this is something I hear smart people

01:33:58.738 --> 01:33:59.800
point out all the time is like.

01:34:01.520 --> 01:34:01.740
Again,

01:34:01.780 --> 01:34:03.421
why privacy matters is a lot of the

01:34:03.462 --> 01:34:03.742
time.

01:34:07.332 --> 01:34:09.335
in an authoritarian or repressive regime,

01:34:10.354 --> 01:34:11.496
when the new guys take over,

01:34:11.555 --> 01:34:13.216
they will retroactively punish people for

01:34:13.256 --> 01:34:14.278
things that happened before.

01:34:14.337 --> 01:34:15.779
So in a functioning democracy,

01:34:16.298 --> 01:34:18.039
usually a law will be passed and they'll

01:34:18.060 --> 01:34:19.640
say, okay, from this point going forward,

01:34:19.680 --> 01:34:20.481
this thing is illegal.

01:34:20.981 --> 01:34:22.523
But like when the Taliban took over,

01:34:22.643 --> 01:34:23.963
I distinctly remember this story because I

01:34:23.984 --> 01:34:25.085
remember thinking how sad it was.

01:34:25.425 --> 01:34:27.006
When the Taliban took over in Afghanistan,

01:34:27.025 --> 01:34:27.886
when the US pulled out,

01:34:28.998 --> 01:34:30.859
Afghans were rushing to like delete their

01:34:30.939 --> 01:34:32.560
online presence because for years,

01:34:32.661 --> 01:34:34.341
a lot of them had been like kind

01:34:34.381 --> 01:34:35.622
of slowly westernizing.

01:34:36.323 --> 01:34:37.623
And now they knew that some of the

01:34:37.644 --> 01:34:38.784
stuff they did that was like totally

01:34:38.864 --> 01:34:39.765
innocent, like, you know,

01:34:39.985 --> 01:34:42.146
maybe women wearing blue jeans could get

01:34:42.167 --> 01:34:42.847
them killed now.

01:34:43.307 --> 01:34:45.048
And they were trying so hard to scrub

01:34:45.069 --> 01:34:46.609
their social media presence and stuff like

01:34:46.630 --> 01:34:49.131
that because now what they did in the

01:34:49.171 --> 01:34:50.652
past is yeah.

01:34:50.731 --> 01:34:51.212
And like, I don't,

01:34:51.813 --> 01:34:52.673
I don't think we should all be living

01:34:52.713 --> 01:34:53.913
in fear, but it's just, again,

01:34:53.953 --> 01:34:56.496
be mindful of it's yeah.

01:34:56.515 --> 01:34:57.176
Privacy matters.

01:34:57.235 --> 01:34:58.037
It's very unfortunate.

01:35:01.203 --> 01:35:08.548
But yeah, that's all I had, I think.

01:35:08.628 --> 01:35:11.990
I think those were all our stories.

01:35:12.030 --> 01:35:13.391
So I think we can check around,

01:35:13.452 --> 01:35:15.354
see if we have any more final questions

01:35:15.394 --> 01:35:16.895
before we wrap up here.

01:35:17.435 --> 01:35:19.277
I think we only had one forum post.

01:35:20.603 --> 01:35:21.684
Send them in the chat if you have

01:35:21.724 --> 01:35:21.884
any.

01:35:22.484 --> 01:35:24.204
I did see a forum post I wanted

01:35:24.244 --> 01:35:25.786
to look at, actually.

01:35:25.926 --> 01:35:27.126
Sure.

01:35:27.166 --> 01:35:28.346
One of the top stories from the last

01:35:28.386 --> 01:35:28.587
week.

01:35:29.988 --> 01:35:30.847
Somebody posted on the forum,

01:35:30.887 --> 01:35:32.948
does your privacy setup actually make you

01:35:32.988 --> 01:35:34.550
stand out more?

01:35:34.890 --> 01:35:36.211
They said for the past month and a

01:35:36.230 --> 01:35:36.430
half,

01:35:36.451 --> 01:35:38.072
they've been trying out some VPN services

01:35:38.112 --> 01:35:38.572
on their phone,

01:35:38.591 --> 01:35:41.233
trying to see which one works better.

01:35:42.113 --> 01:35:43.573
So they talked about different VPN

01:35:43.614 --> 01:35:45.595
providers that they used.

01:35:48.564 --> 01:35:51.284
But they said that they received a message

01:35:51.324 --> 01:35:53.605
from their IT department basically saying

01:35:53.645 --> 01:35:54.407
they connected,

01:35:54.426 --> 01:35:57.228
they detected a connection to their work

01:35:57.307 --> 01:35:59.149
email account from an IP address

01:35:59.189 --> 01:36:01.850
associated with Malved VPN and they wanted

01:36:01.890 --> 01:36:03.930
to confirm that it was them and why

01:36:03.970 --> 01:36:06.011
they were using a VPN service for that

01:36:06.652 --> 01:36:07.353
connection,

01:36:07.552 --> 01:36:09.554
which of course did not make them feel

01:36:10.154 --> 01:36:11.173
very private.

01:36:14.186 --> 01:36:14.686
It is.

01:36:15.046 --> 01:36:15.547
So like,

01:36:15.948 --> 01:36:16.927
it is a concern with some of these

01:36:16.948 --> 01:36:17.207
tools.

01:36:17.287 --> 01:36:17.807
Absolutely.

01:36:17.828 --> 01:36:18.708
Uh, we,

01:36:18.729 --> 01:36:20.109
we talk about this a lot more in

01:36:20.208 --> 01:36:23.310
like the browser fingerprinting context

01:36:23.329 --> 01:36:24.930
where it's like using something like

01:36:24.990 --> 01:36:26.351
Mulvet browser, for example,

01:36:26.572 --> 01:36:27.832
or even brave, uh,

01:36:28.252 --> 01:36:29.813
might make you more fingerprintable to

01:36:29.853 --> 01:36:32.014
people who are specifically looking out

01:36:32.054 --> 01:36:32.314
for it.

01:36:32.613 --> 01:36:35.055
A lot of these privacy tools that we

01:36:35.114 --> 01:36:38.095
recommend are really geared towards, um,

01:36:39.547 --> 01:36:41.469
thwarting mass surveillance tools.

01:36:41.488 --> 01:36:43.369
They're effective at blocking like,

01:36:43.449 --> 01:36:45.190
ninety-nine percent of the general things

01:36:45.211 --> 01:36:46.131
that you'll see on sites,

01:36:46.152 --> 01:36:48.533
whether that's like Facebook tracking or

01:36:48.734 --> 01:36:51.774
ad networks or that sort of broad

01:36:53.336 --> 01:36:53.777
surveillance,

01:36:53.796 --> 01:36:57.279
whether that's by companies or otherwise.

01:36:58.038 --> 01:36:58.739
When it comes to like,

01:36:58.859 --> 01:37:01.440
individualized privacy advice,

01:37:01.480 --> 01:37:02.362
it is more of a

01:37:03.974 --> 01:37:06.015
There's a lot of threat modeling you have

01:37:06.034 --> 01:37:06.716
to take into account.

01:37:06.735 --> 01:37:08.077
You have to decide who you're trying to

01:37:08.356 --> 01:37:10.377
defend against from a privacy perspective

01:37:13.420 --> 01:37:14.301
and how you want to stand out.

01:37:14.341 --> 01:37:16.242
Because if people are looking at you

01:37:16.261 --> 01:37:16.862
specifically,

01:37:17.262 --> 01:37:18.804
they can detect that you're using these

01:37:18.863 --> 01:37:23.225
privacy tools and that can be a red

01:37:23.246 --> 01:37:24.627
flag in some cases, like this one,

01:37:24.766 --> 01:37:25.328
for example.

01:37:26.018 --> 01:37:30.400
There are certainly ways to work around

01:37:30.461 --> 01:37:30.801
this.

01:37:32.442 --> 01:37:33.783
One way, like on phones,

01:37:33.842 --> 01:37:35.243
at least Android phones, for example,

01:37:35.323 --> 01:37:38.386
I see people use private spaces or work

01:37:38.426 --> 01:37:40.466
profiles in their main profile because you

01:37:40.487 --> 01:37:43.649
can set a VPN connection for only that

01:37:43.689 --> 01:37:45.130
profile and the apps inside that.

01:37:45.250 --> 01:37:47.752
And then you can have like a private

01:37:47.792 --> 01:37:50.314
space with a VPN for most of your

01:37:50.354 --> 01:37:51.774
general apps and then keep like...

01:37:52.574 --> 01:37:54.636
work stuff for local stuff like your bank

01:37:54.697 --> 01:37:56.858
in a in a profile that doesn't use

01:37:56.877 --> 01:37:57.417
a VPN.

01:38:00.421 --> 01:38:01.541
But yeah,

01:38:01.640 --> 01:38:03.021
it really depends on your individual

01:38:03.042 --> 01:38:04.603
situation in that case,

01:38:04.643 --> 01:38:05.123
which is why

01:38:08.131 --> 01:38:09.551
If you have any questions about that sort

01:38:09.572 --> 01:38:09.832
of thing,

01:38:09.931 --> 01:38:12.213
it'd be great to ask on the forum.

01:38:12.453 --> 01:38:14.414
There were a lot of good responses in

01:38:14.435 --> 01:38:14.935
that thread.

01:38:15.015 --> 01:38:15.836
I won't go through all of them,

01:38:15.876 --> 01:38:17.917
but that was kind of my two cents

01:38:17.938 --> 01:38:20.078
on that, and I wanted to highlight,

01:38:20.399 --> 01:38:20.699
I think,

01:38:21.680 --> 01:38:23.502
a related question here in the chat from,

01:38:23.561 --> 01:38:24.962
and maybe Bob's your uncle.

01:38:25.644 --> 01:38:27.604
If you obfuscate a connection to a VPN

01:38:27.625 --> 01:38:29.405
like you can with Tor Bridges,

01:38:29.426 --> 01:38:31.188
does the ISP still know you're connecting

01:38:31.247 --> 01:38:32.368
to a VPN?

01:38:33.649 --> 01:38:34.670
That is the sort of thing where it's

01:38:34.750 --> 01:38:35.050
also...

01:38:36.211 --> 01:38:38.953
suspicious, or it can be.

01:38:38.972 --> 01:38:42.615
There are different obfuscation methods

01:38:43.636 --> 01:38:45.077
that are less fingerprintable.

01:38:45.136 --> 01:38:47.738
So like web tunnels with Tor, for example,

01:38:48.699 --> 01:38:50.461
are supposed to be less identifiable,

01:38:50.480 --> 01:38:51.761
which is why they can get around

01:38:51.841 --> 01:38:53.122
censorship in some countries.

01:38:53.483 --> 01:38:55.304
I don't know what specific tools you would

01:38:55.425 --> 01:38:56.225
use with a VPN,

01:38:56.244 --> 01:38:58.726
although some of that Tor bridge software

01:38:58.766 --> 01:39:00.368
is kind of generic and could be used

01:39:00.408 --> 01:39:01.488
in theory for that sort of thing.

01:39:01.548 --> 01:39:03.109
But even in that case,

01:39:05.548 --> 01:39:07.670
I think it's a little suspicious if you're

01:39:07.689 --> 01:39:09.390
just sending like a large amount of

01:39:09.411 --> 01:39:11.612
traffic every day to one specific IP

01:39:11.631 --> 01:39:13.993
address and there aren't a ton of ways

01:39:14.113 --> 01:39:17.715
around that so I guess I don't know

01:39:17.755 --> 01:39:18.835
off the top of my head if there's

01:39:18.875 --> 01:39:20.796
any like VPN clients that will rotate

01:39:20.836 --> 01:39:24.257
different connections between different

01:39:24.417 --> 01:39:26.118
IPs or VPNs or whatever I'd have to

01:39:26.139 --> 01:39:29.020
look into that but um I think I

01:39:29.060 --> 01:39:30.841
think either way typically

01:39:32.926 --> 01:39:36.646
Your ISP definitely can detect whether

01:39:36.686 --> 01:39:37.627
you're using a VPN.

01:39:37.648 --> 01:39:39.608
They can also detect whether you're using

01:39:39.847 --> 01:39:40.828
Tor.

01:39:41.088 --> 01:39:41.729
The Tor network,

01:39:41.769 --> 01:39:43.850
maybe that's a common misconception people

01:39:43.890 --> 01:39:44.010
have,

01:39:44.029 --> 01:39:45.810
but it doesn't hide the fact that you're

01:39:45.890 --> 01:39:47.810
using these things or like you're

01:39:48.470 --> 01:39:50.271
devices or whatever from the ISP

01:39:50.292 --> 01:39:50.872
specifically.

01:39:50.912 --> 01:39:53.193
The only thing that it will hide is

01:39:53.632 --> 01:39:55.974
a lot of metadata about that traffic,

01:39:56.894 --> 01:39:58.954
like the domain names you're connecting to

01:39:59.234 --> 01:40:01.235
and IP addresses, etc.

01:40:02.756 --> 01:40:04.337
How much you're sending to like one

01:40:04.516 --> 01:40:06.118
particular source.

01:40:06.438 --> 01:40:09.838
But that's why we say VPNs are,

01:40:10.479 --> 01:40:11.939
they're not like a foolproof solution.

01:40:12.060 --> 01:40:12.300
They're

01:40:14.045 --> 01:40:18.631
Just shifting trust from your ISP to that

01:40:18.650 --> 01:40:20.032
VPN provider in most cases,

01:40:20.072 --> 01:40:23.095
but they're not like the perfect privacy

01:40:23.115 --> 01:40:26.199
tools and they can be detected.

01:40:26.279 --> 01:40:27.681
So it is something that you have to

01:40:29.103 --> 01:40:29.583
keep in mind.

01:40:32.457 --> 01:40:32.877
Yep,

01:40:32.898 --> 01:40:34.038
I don't really have anything to add to

01:40:34.059 --> 01:40:34.238
that.

01:40:34.738 --> 01:40:35.679
I did see that question.

01:40:36.399 --> 01:40:37.359
I thought it was really interesting

01:40:37.380 --> 01:40:38.341
because, yeah, I thought about,

01:40:39.581 --> 01:40:39.980
like you said,

01:40:40.020 --> 01:40:41.162
we usually see it talked about in the

01:40:41.181 --> 01:40:43.323
browser space where if everybody's using

01:40:43.382 --> 01:40:45.123
Movad browser and you've got all the

01:40:45.144 --> 01:40:46.384
shields and uBlock turned on,

01:40:46.423 --> 01:40:47.345
then you stand out.

01:40:47.805 --> 01:40:51.006
But it's definitely a lot different when

01:40:51.025 --> 01:40:53.487
you're talking about very specific use

01:40:53.527 --> 01:40:55.427
cases like at work or they talked here

01:40:55.448 --> 01:40:57.029
about trying to access their bank and

01:40:57.069 --> 01:40:59.390
stuff like that.

01:40:59.409 --> 01:41:00.291
So it's a good thread, though.

01:41:00.591 --> 01:41:01.270
Lots of good info there.

01:41:06.460 --> 01:41:10.443
Check our signal donors chat again real

01:41:10.483 --> 01:41:11.162
quick here.

01:41:13.203 --> 01:41:14.244
Yeah, I've been kind of bouncing around,

01:41:14.284 --> 01:41:16.627
checking the forum thread,

01:41:18.148 --> 01:41:25.631
not seeing anything new.

01:41:25.832 --> 01:41:27.934
Scarecrows in the chat said,

01:41:29.386 --> 01:41:29.787
Zuma?

01:41:30.768 --> 01:41:31.989
I'm not familiar with who that is,

01:41:32.029 --> 01:41:33.792
but they made a video about the government

01:41:33.832 --> 01:41:34.493
vandal events.

01:41:34.533 --> 01:41:36.197
Maybe that's worth checking out.

01:41:36.237 --> 01:41:37.819
I'll have to add it to my list

01:41:38.019 --> 01:41:39.400
of videos.

01:41:41.625 --> 01:41:43.305
I assume there probably are ways of

01:41:43.365 --> 01:41:45.346
obfuscating some of that information,

01:41:45.386 --> 01:41:47.469
but typically with VPN companies also,

01:41:49.010 --> 01:41:53.052
the IP address that you're connecting to

01:41:53.113 --> 01:41:54.975
is visible and known to be a VPN,

01:41:54.994 --> 01:41:56.296
so they can just know that way.

01:41:57.556 --> 01:41:59.297
A lot of the deep packet inspection stuff

01:41:59.318 --> 01:42:00.338
that I've seen is like,

01:42:01.293 --> 01:42:05.175
claims that your ISP could use that to

01:42:05.215 --> 01:42:07.796
detect what specific sites that you're

01:42:08.355 --> 01:42:10.317
connecting to even when you're using a VPN

01:42:10.337 --> 01:42:12.677
and people say the same thing about the

01:42:12.738 --> 01:42:14.337
Tor network that they can use that to

01:42:14.417 --> 01:42:17.639
see to kind of gain more information about

01:42:18.939 --> 01:42:21.600
what you're doing on Tor in addition to

01:42:21.619 --> 01:42:22.860
just the fact that you're connecting to

01:42:22.921 --> 01:42:23.020
it.

01:42:23.440 --> 01:42:26.181
I haven't seen any evidence that that can

01:42:26.242 --> 01:42:29.082
be reliably applied in the real world.

01:42:29.523 --> 01:42:30.023
I know that

01:42:35.685 --> 01:42:36.867
It's all just theoretical,

01:42:36.907 --> 01:42:39.208
and I think that some VPN providers like

01:42:39.288 --> 01:42:45.313
MOLVAD with their data, D-A-I-T-A program,

01:42:45.673 --> 01:42:47.875
they claim to defend against that sort of

01:42:47.895 --> 01:42:48.074
thing,

01:42:48.114 --> 01:42:52.859
but also I've never seen any proof that

01:42:52.878 --> 01:42:55.921
that sort of thing can be reliably used

01:42:56.001 --> 01:42:58.222
outside of lab academic settings,

01:42:58.302 --> 01:43:01.185
basically, with small groups.

01:43:03.335 --> 01:43:04.555
At an ISP scale,

01:43:04.716 --> 01:43:06.475
I don't think that deep packet inspection

01:43:06.536 --> 01:43:07.396
is going to be a huge issue.

01:43:07.436 --> 01:43:08.436
But there are,

01:43:09.356 --> 01:43:10.417
if you are concerned about that,

01:43:10.457 --> 01:43:11.158
there are, of course,

01:43:11.238 --> 01:43:13.158
obfuscation techniques.

01:43:15.560 --> 01:43:16.279
As Unrejected said,

01:43:16.300 --> 01:43:17.840
there's also advanced protocols like

01:43:17.979 --> 01:43:18.381
X-Ray.

01:43:18.560 --> 01:43:20.240
Reality, that's sort of a similar thing.

01:43:22.921 --> 01:43:24.582
Spoof the TLS signatures of other sites.

01:43:24.922 --> 01:43:26.564
I'm not totally for sure with how that

01:43:26.583 --> 01:43:26.743
works.

01:43:26.844 --> 01:43:27.144
I think...

01:43:30.712 --> 01:43:32.912
Similar to web tunnels if I remember

01:43:32.931 --> 01:43:34.453
correctly that Tor has but I could be

01:43:34.573 --> 01:43:35.533
I could be wrong I know a lot

01:43:35.573 --> 01:43:38.493
of these tools Especially ones that

01:43:38.613 --> 01:43:41.894
unredacted org works with you should

01:43:41.913 --> 01:43:43.375
definitely check out their site by the way

01:43:43.395 --> 01:43:44.534
because you're doing a lot of cool stuff

01:43:44.555 --> 01:43:46.314
with like the Tor network and stuff but

01:43:49.355 --> 01:43:51.155
a Lot of those for like anti-censorship

01:43:51.195 --> 01:43:53.117
purposes can get around that sort of thing

01:43:58.377 --> 01:43:59.438
I Would

01:44:00.787 --> 01:44:01.927
I will have to look more into how

01:44:01.948 --> 01:44:03.649
this works because I'm not sure.

01:44:03.748 --> 01:44:06.149
I feel like, like I said before,

01:44:06.248 --> 01:44:07.729
I think sending a lot of traffic to

01:44:07.890 --> 01:44:10.511
one specific server is probably suspicious

01:44:10.650 --> 01:44:11.211
in itself.

01:44:12.051 --> 01:44:13.150
But yeah,

01:44:13.190 --> 01:44:16.492
some of these tools can add more plausible

01:44:16.671 --> 01:44:17.271
deniability.

01:44:17.893 --> 01:44:19.412
But maybe there's other things that it

01:44:19.453 --> 01:44:22.673
does that I don't know or remember off

01:44:22.694 --> 01:44:23.333
the top of my head.

01:44:23.354 --> 01:44:26.395
So I'll have to look into that later.

01:44:28.783 --> 01:44:30.363
I wanted to mention scarecrow said here

01:44:30.404 --> 01:44:30.804
that, um,

01:44:30.884 --> 01:44:32.604
several politicians have suggested that

01:44:32.625 --> 01:44:33.926
this sort of stuff may earn you extra

01:44:33.945 --> 01:44:34.305
scrutiny.

01:44:34.706 --> 01:44:36.106
I remember we covered that story a little

01:44:36.146 --> 01:44:36.287
bit,

01:44:36.306 --> 01:44:37.648
and I think what they were actually saying

01:44:37.688 --> 01:44:39.429
was that it's not so much that using

01:44:39.448 --> 01:44:42.511
a VPN will make you extra interesting.

01:44:43.051 --> 01:44:44.091
It's more that, um,

01:44:44.372 --> 01:44:45.712
so the way that section seven Oh two

01:44:45.752 --> 01:44:48.394
works is any electronic signal that

01:44:48.434 --> 01:44:52.837
crosses international borders becomes a

01:44:52.936 --> 01:44:55.217
fair game for the NSA and

01:44:56.231 --> 01:44:59.020
With a VPN, since they can't, in theory,

01:44:59.563 --> 01:45:01.588
since they can't tell where it's coming

01:45:01.628 --> 01:45:02.572
from originally,

01:45:03.829 --> 01:45:05.631
there's a lot of questions about like,

01:45:05.671 --> 01:45:07.551
does that count as crossing international

01:45:07.570 --> 01:45:07.871
borders?

01:45:07.911 --> 01:45:09.211
Can you collect VPN traffic?

01:45:09.530 --> 01:45:11.591
Because is it somebody from the UK

01:45:11.631 --> 01:45:14.493
connecting here to try and evade age

01:45:14.512 --> 01:45:15.693
verification on Discord?

01:45:16.172 --> 01:45:17.453
Is it, you know,

01:45:17.493 --> 01:45:18.753
somebody from a repressive country?

01:45:19.094 --> 01:45:20.594
Is it somebody in the US who's just

01:45:20.613 --> 01:45:22.675
connected to a nearby server and it didn't

01:45:22.715 --> 01:45:25.015
cross international lines or something

01:45:25.055 --> 01:45:25.454
like that?

01:45:25.515 --> 01:45:26.076
So, or, you know,

01:45:26.095 --> 01:45:27.515
if you use like Proton Secure Core,

01:45:27.916 --> 01:45:29.876
those route through servers that are

01:45:30.016 --> 01:45:31.356
actually owned by Proton.

01:45:31.417 --> 01:45:31.896
So there's like,

01:45:32.261 --> 01:45:33.322
There's a handful in Iceland.

01:45:33.341 --> 01:45:34.582
There's a handful in Switzerland.

01:45:35.261 --> 01:45:36.382
I think there's another country that they

01:45:36.422 --> 01:45:36.842
have a few.

01:45:37.182 --> 01:45:38.224
But so like those would,

01:45:38.283 --> 01:45:39.685
for a US user like myself,

01:45:39.744 --> 01:45:41.645
those would bounce out of the country and

01:45:41.664 --> 01:45:42.386
then back in.

01:45:42.966 --> 01:45:44.466
So I think that's more what it was

01:45:44.506 --> 01:45:44.926
referring to.

01:45:45.006 --> 01:45:46.207
Not so much like, hey,

01:45:46.247 --> 01:45:47.948
let's watch everybody that uses a VPN,

01:45:47.988 --> 01:45:48.868
but more like, hey,

01:45:49.708 --> 01:45:51.270
how do we know if these people are

01:45:51.310 --> 01:45:52.730
supposed to be protected by law?

01:45:52.831 --> 01:45:54.171
Which I would argue the NSA doesn't care

01:45:54.190 --> 01:45:55.372
about anyways, but I digress.

01:45:57.684 --> 01:45:58.144
Sorry,

01:45:58.163 --> 01:45:59.144
I was trying to get something to go

01:45:59.163 --> 01:45:59.264
away.

01:45:59.283 --> 01:45:59.744
I was just going to say,

01:45:59.824 --> 01:46:02.326
Zach from Unredacted also said,

01:46:03.945 --> 01:46:05.567
they take into account how much traffic is

01:46:05.587 --> 01:46:06.728
sent to different IPs.

01:46:06.847 --> 01:46:09.668
I guess there's some VPN clients designed

01:46:09.708 --> 01:46:10.989
for sensory countries that can load

01:46:11.010 --> 01:46:11.670
balance connections.

01:46:11.710 --> 01:46:11.829
Yeah,

01:46:11.869 --> 01:46:13.171
that would be what I'm interested in

01:46:13.470 --> 01:46:15.391
looking into more because I think that

01:46:15.412 --> 01:46:18.372
could be a cool solution,

01:46:18.432 --> 01:46:20.434
but I don't know what they are.

01:46:20.873 --> 01:46:21.073
Again,

01:46:21.094 --> 01:46:22.295
I'll have to look into this after the

01:46:22.335 --> 01:46:22.494
show.

01:46:26.800 --> 01:46:28.202
I don't think I have much else.

01:46:28.481 --> 01:46:29.943
I'm not seeing anything in the signal

01:46:29.962 --> 01:46:30.524
chat.

01:46:31.885 --> 01:46:33.186
Kind of wraps things up.

01:46:33.346 --> 01:46:35.349
I think I just want to share really

01:46:35.389 --> 01:46:35.729
quick.

01:46:36.970 --> 01:46:38.971
Right before this stream,

01:46:39.051 --> 01:46:40.052
I was reading a story,

01:46:40.113 --> 01:46:44.016
and I caught some of Henry from TechLore's

01:46:44.417 --> 01:46:48.001
livestream like an hour before this one,

01:46:48.501 --> 01:46:49.782
where he talked about some stuff about

01:46:49.841 --> 01:46:50.262
Texas...

01:46:52.318 --> 01:46:55.079
getting a court order for Verisign to

01:46:55.100 --> 01:46:57.942
basically revoke another Coventry's .com

01:46:57.962 --> 01:46:58.323
domain.

01:46:58.682 --> 01:46:59.804
I had a lot of thoughts,

01:46:59.904 --> 01:47:01.484
both about that story and also about

01:47:02.865 --> 01:47:04.487
Henry's take on the whole thing,

01:47:04.527 --> 01:47:06.788
so I think I'm going to talk about

01:47:06.849 --> 01:47:10.192
that in a livestream on my channel right

01:47:10.452 --> 01:47:11.051
after this one.

01:47:11.091 --> 01:47:13.293
So if anyone's interested in continuing to

01:47:14.354 --> 01:47:15.676
listen to me talk about stuff,

01:47:15.695 --> 01:47:16.917
you could go over there if you want

01:47:16.936 --> 01:47:18.518
to, but just throwing that out there.

01:47:21.382 --> 01:47:23.885
Otherwise, yeah, Nate,

01:47:23.925 --> 01:47:26.886
you want to wrap things up,

01:47:26.907 --> 01:47:28.729
do you think?

01:47:28.809 --> 01:47:29.408
Yeah, sure.

01:47:29.429 --> 01:47:32.431
I'll let you get to that.

01:47:32.851 --> 01:47:34.453
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01:47:34.493 --> 01:47:36.255
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