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Even if your Android is fully compromised,

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your device is still secure because

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there is this independent second world

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that is in charge of security.

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I just wanted to start

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by asking what's new,

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especially when it comes to consumers.

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So yes, today we are at Ledger Op3n

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in Paris and we announced

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our new product is Ledger Atom.

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We wanted to fix the following problem.

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We wanted to have the user experience

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that you have on the Android-based device

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with the security of the Ledger device.

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And we merged those two things

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in the same device.

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So if I, you know, a lot of people

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might hear this and they already have

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a Pixel or they have a Samsung device.

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What is the difference between

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the security that's typically found

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in a Ledger device and what's

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not in their device?

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Yeah.

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So if you want to have

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a very high level of security,

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such as a use case, such as crypto,

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you need several different properties.

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The first one is to have a secure enclave

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where you will be able to generate secrets

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with a very high entropy and so on.

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The second one also is that the secrets

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must stay inside the enclave

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when you are doing cryptography.

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That means that you need to implement the

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cryptography within the secure enclave.

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And the last one is the display.

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You need to have a way

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to trust what is displayed on your screen.

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When you are using a Google Pixel,

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there are secure elements inside,

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but there is a first problem.

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The first problem is that we

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are not allowed to load our own

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operating system and cryptography

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inside the secure element.

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You can use a StrongBox,

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for instance, on Android.

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What it will do is simply wrapping

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your keys, but as soon as you need

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to sign a transaction, you will need

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to ask StrongBox to give you your keys

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and then compute the signature

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in the rich OS side of things.

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So that means that your keys are exposed

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to any software attacks.

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And there was another issue,

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which is the display.

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Because, for instance, you might think

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about this kind of attack where you think

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you are about to sign a transaction

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that is like sending 0.1 Bitcoin

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to your friend, while under the hood, this

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is another transaction that is signed.

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As you don't have a strong

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link between what is displayed

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and what is actually happening,

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then you cannot trust your display.

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So this is the two main things

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that are missing today

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on the current Android-based architecture,

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and this is what we are solving

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with Ledger Atom.

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So with the screen,

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kind of just to summarize that,

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what you're saying is that there's pieces

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of malware, so if someone gets infected,

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the malware can essentially trick.

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It'll still show the send transaction,

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don't send transaction,

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or install this software, don't install

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this software, but it pretty much changes

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what it looks like someone is doing.

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Exactly.

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Got it.

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And so when that happens,

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when I looked at the demo device,

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there was a bar on the top.

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It's like this little ledger bar

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that says it's secure.

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Is that when that feature is activated?

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Yeah, exactly.

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So you have these two worlds

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that are running in parallel.

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You have Android that is displaying

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the Android application, and you have

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the secure zone that is displaying

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the secure world, as if it would

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be like an individual independent device.

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And then you have this secure bar

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at the top of the screen

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that indicates what is displayed.

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Is it the secure world

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or is it the Android world?

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Otherwise, you might imagine a malware

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that makes you think

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that you are in the secure zone.

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So that's why there was this secure bar

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that indicates if it's Android

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that is actually displayed

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or if it's the secure zone.

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Got it.

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And so something on stage that you were

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talking about and many other people

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as well that we're presenting

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this device is that there seems

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to be kind of two issues, right?

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There's convenience and the typical

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smartphone device that a lot

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of people carry in their pockets.

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It does a million things.

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It has access to their whole life.

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And then you have things

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that are very focused on high security,

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like a hardware wallet, like many of the

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previous devices you guys have launched.

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And the goal with this device

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is to bring those a bit closer together.

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Now, a lot of our audience I know is more

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on the, like they want a smartphone that's

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more private and secure and or open source

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and that's kind of what they're targeting.

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So it was very clear though,

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and you even said to set expectations,

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that this is coming more from

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that security perspective first and then

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you're trying to build that in later.

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Is that kind of a correct way

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to phrase how you guys are handling this?

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No, this is a correct way to present it.

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However, privacy is also something

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that is very important for us.

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On the Android porting,

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we are putting a specific attention

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to privacy, for instance.

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We won't go as far as GrapheneOS,

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for instance, but we are taking plenty

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of ideas from Graphene that will

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be inside the porting of Android.

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On top of this, we also

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have a privacy switch.

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This switch is able to cut directly

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the access of the microphone

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and the camera to the power line.

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That means that when you switch it off,

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like in hardware, it's switched off.

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And we have this kind

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of small privacy features.

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Nice.

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And so let's say I use, like I love

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to use Signal, ProtonMail, a VPN.

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It sounded like there's almost a new

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platform or a new way, potentially

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in the future, for apps to be able

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to use that secure element of the phone.

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By default, they probably don't or won't,

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but apps can choose to use that.

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Is that correct?

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Yeah, exactly.

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This is totally correct.

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On the secure element,

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we have our operating system that provides

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plenty of cryptographic primitives.

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And it's possible to anyone to load

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its own application on the secure element.

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On the Android side, so if you think

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about Signal, so Signal is great.

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It does like end-to-end encryption

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from you to me so that if anyone is trying

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to spy the communication,

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like everything is encrypted,

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it cannot deduce any information.

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However, if I have a malware on my phone,

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whenever I read my Signal message,

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the malware is able

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to read my conversation.

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And by the way, that's

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not science fiction.

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There are Pegasus and all the software

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that are doing this.

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And unfortunately,

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those attacks cost even less now with AI.

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So what we could do is to do a porting

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of the Signal so that the message is

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actually decrypted within the secure zone.

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So as soon as you receive a message,

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you could click on the message, it would

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switch automatically to the secure zone,

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and then the message would be decrypted

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and displayed by the secure world.

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So this is a part of the primitives.

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We don't do the porting of signal,

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but technically it's possible.

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Yeah, that's very cool.

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I mean, I think the way

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that it was presented on stage

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was end-to-end encrypted to the element.

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So like theoretically,

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if two people have like a ledger phone,

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they're both using Signal.

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And theoretically, if there's a Signal

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that goes down to the secure element,

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even malware installed on both people's

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devices wouldn't be able to access,

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which is a pretty impressive thing.

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Because even Meredith is very public

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about the fact that Signal doesn't

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really target endpoint security.

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It's something that users kind

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of have to handle.

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Exactly.

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Very cool.

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So in the future,

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do you hope to prioritize

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more of that like consumer market?

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or is this always something

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that you guys see as a niche product

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for high security individuals?

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I think security

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and privacy shouldn't be a niche.

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I think everyone is becoming

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very aware that, especially with AI,

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that the stakes become really higher

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when it comes to security.

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So the retail market is our first market

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and I think it's not a niche

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and I think the needs

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for security are growing over time.

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So I think that there

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will be a big success for this product.

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Crypto is definitely an important use case

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because this is a use case where security

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is so paramount, but security is important

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for many different use cases.

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Messaging is one of them.

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At the end, we are creating

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like a security platform.

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It's a technology platform.

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So targeting a go-to-market

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that would be more enterprise-focused

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or government-focused is totally possible.

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It's more about creating the go-to-market

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and getting the certification,

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for instance, if you target government

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and this kind of thing.

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This is a part of the thing that we have

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in mind, but we are definitely starting

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with the retail.

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Very nice.

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And I know it's really bad timing with all

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these things because in the last few days,

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there's been that implant attack where

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people were reading the screens and kind

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of getting around the secure enclave.

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But you guys mentioned on stage

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that you're planning to pretty much extend

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the protections of the device so that even

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if someone tries to tamper with the screen

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or get into the device at all,

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it would still trigger.

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What does that look like?

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Let's say I'm an attacker.

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I intercept this phone

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as it's being shipped out.

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I try to get in and let's say

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I somehow got in and changed something

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and then I got it to the person's door.

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What would actually happen

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to that person now?

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So for this kind of attack,

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there are like two main ways.

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00:08:45,700 --> 00:08:47,600
Either you make your device

283
00:08:47,600 --> 00:08:49,420
so simple that anyone can verify

284
00:08:49,420 --> 00:08:52,300
that it's the one that is expected.

285
00:08:52,560 --> 00:08:55,900
So our current devices can be opened

286
00:08:55,900 --> 00:08:57,520
and so on, so you can inspect.

287
00:08:57,520 --> 00:08:59,540
And the second solution is to create

288
00:08:59,540 --> 00:09:01,200
a solution that is robust enough

289
00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:04,420
so that if someone is trying to probe,

290
00:09:04,420 --> 00:09:06,470
modify or anything, it would be detected.

291
00:09:06,470 --> 00:09:09,300
And for Atom, we went through

292
00:09:09,300 --> 00:09:10,840
that route and we worked

293
00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:13,200
for months because the problem

294
00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:15,190
of this solution, of this path,

295
00:09:15,190 --> 00:09:16,840
is that it's much more difficult.

296
00:09:16,840 --> 00:09:18,810
Creating a solution that is robust enough

297
00:09:18,810 --> 00:09:20,860
so that a very motivated attacker,

298
00:09:20,860 --> 00:09:23,280
that like a large criminal organization,

299
00:09:23,820 --> 00:09:25,120
wouldn't be able to break,

300
00:09:25,120 --> 00:09:26,970
that's something that is not easy.

301
00:09:26,970 --> 00:09:29,500
So we worked during months with the Donjon

302
00:09:29,500 --> 00:09:31,510
team that is doing offensive security

303
00:09:31,510 --> 00:09:32,760
and the the hardware team

304
00:09:32,760 --> 00:09:35,380
that was designing this shield in order

305
00:09:35,380 --> 00:09:37,030
to make it robust and resistant.

306
00:09:37,030 --> 00:09:38,400
So we also filed patent

307
00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:41,180
because we did plenty of innovation.

308
00:09:41,180 --> 00:09:43,420
And the idea is to create an active shield

309
00:09:43,420 --> 00:09:45,860
so that if ever you are trying

310
00:09:45,860 --> 00:09:48,640
to move the shield, it would be detected

311
00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:51,440
directly and send a bit directly

312
00:09:51,440 --> 00:09:53,660
to the secure element explaining

313
00:09:53,660 --> 00:09:55,810
that the shield was removed.

314
00:09:55,810 --> 00:09:57,400
And also there was a mesh

315
00:09:57,400 --> 00:09:59,010
circuit that is active.

316
00:09:59,010 --> 00:10:00,460
And if you're trying to drill

317
00:10:00,460 --> 00:10:03,800
into this shield, the circuit is sending

318
00:10:03,800 --> 00:10:06,500
a signal every few microseconds.

319
00:10:06,500 --> 00:10:08,120
And you have like a monitor

320
00:10:08,120 --> 00:10:10,500
that are verifying that the signal arrives

321
00:10:10,500 --> 00:10:11,900
at the right time and so on.

322
00:10:11,900 --> 00:10:13,650
So if you drill into this, like you

323
00:10:13,650 --> 00:10:15,740
would break the circuit and it

324
00:10:15,740 --> 00:10:17,090
would be detected directly.

325
00:10:17,090 --> 00:10:19,090
So that means there is also like a small

326
00:10:19,090 --> 00:10:20,740
cell in order to have battery,

327
00:10:20,740 --> 00:10:22,720
even if the big battery is drained.

328
00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:25,830
So this is all that we have built.

329
00:10:25,830 --> 00:10:27,560
It's much more complicated than this, but

330
00:10:27,560 --> 00:10:29,360
in the main line, this is how it works.

331
00:10:29,360 --> 00:10:29,860
Very cool.

332
00:10:29,860 --> 00:10:31,450
And you teased very briefly

333
00:10:31,450 --> 00:10:33,440
that you're going to retroactively apply

334
00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:35,340
that to your current products as well.

335
00:10:35,340 --> 00:10:37,060
What does that process look like?

336
00:10:37,060 --> 00:10:39,460
That won't be the exact same mechanism

337
00:10:39,460 --> 00:10:42,280
because it completely depends

338
00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:43,880
on the design and so on.

339
00:10:43,880 --> 00:10:48,000
And we won't take the millions of devices

340
00:10:48,000 --> 00:10:50,240
that we created to put this inside

341
00:10:50,240 --> 00:10:52,100
and that wouldn't fit, by the way.

342
00:10:52,100 --> 00:10:55,040
So that won't be the same techniques.

343
00:10:55,260 --> 00:10:57,250
So what we are doing is mostly two things.

344
00:10:57,250 --> 00:10:58,050
So first of all,

345
00:10:58,050 --> 00:11:00,120
strengthening the supply chain security.

346
00:11:00,440 --> 00:11:02,220
So on the manufacturing,

347
00:11:02,220 --> 00:11:04,060
on our supply facility, everything

348
00:11:04,060 --> 00:11:07,100
is very well controlled and so on.

349
00:11:07,100 --> 00:11:09,480
When it comes to our authorized reseller,

350
00:11:09,480 --> 00:11:12,560
we will strengthen the requirements

351
00:11:12,560 --> 00:11:14,100
and audits and so on.

352
00:11:14,100 --> 00:11:15,480
So this is the first part

353
00:11:15,480 --> 00:11:17,030
that we are doing.

354
00:11:17,030 --> 00:11:20,300
So it's ongoing and we will continue.

355
00:11:20,300 --> 00:11:22,880
And on the device side, we will add

356
00:11:22,880 --> 00:11:25,160
an additional countermeasure in order

357
00:11:25,160 --> 00:11:27,100
to give higher guarantee to the user

358
00:11:27,100 --> 00:11:28,700
that the device that he receives

359
00:11:28,700 --> 00:11:31,900
was not tampered during the transport.

360
00:11:31,900 --> 00:11:34,180
I won't explain how it works yet

361
00:11:34,180 --> 00:11:36,640
because we are accelerating on this.

362
00:11:36,640 --> 00:11:38,860
We have several different tracks,

363
00:11:39,100 --> 00:11:40,650
and it's not completely settled

364
00:11:40,650 --> 00:11:42,380
which one will be chosen,

365
00:11:42,380 --> 00:11:44,350
but something will happen, yes.

366
00:11:44,350 --> 00:11:44,700
Got it.

367
00:11:44,700 --> 00:11:46,030
Just a couple more questions here.

368
00:11:46,030 --> 00:11:47,660
Post-quantum, I feel like it's shared

369
00:11:47,660 --> 00:11:49,500
a lot, and there's been a few algorithms

370
00:11:49,500 --> 00:11:50,500
now that have been advertised

371
00:11:50,500 --> 00:11:52,340
as post-quantum, and then we found some

372
00:11:52,340 --> 00:11:53,810
pretty severe vulnerabilities in those,

373
00:11:53,810 --> 00:11:55,810
and NIST actually had to roll them back.

374
00:11:55,810 --> 00:11:57,040
So how can we right now

375
00:11:57,040 --> 00:11:59,660
in 2026 confidently say that a device

376
00:11:59,660 --> 00:12:02,860
is post-quantum for the next...

377
00:12:02,860 --> 00:12:05,050
because we don't know when Q-Day happens.

378
00:12:05,050 --> 00:12:06,900
So what kind of confidence do we have

379
00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:08,260
in the post-quantum right now?

380
00:12:08,260 --> 00:12:10,520
So what you refer to is the attack

381
00:12:10,520 --> 00:12:12,780
that happened on Hawk and others,

382
00:12:12,980 --> 00:12:15,160
and they are part of the second wave

383
00:12:15,160 --> 00:12:16,860
of standardization.

384
00:12:17,060 --> 00:12:19,400
We have the first wave of standardization

385
00:12:19,800 --> 00:12:24,620
that have standardized ML-DSA, FN-DSA,

386
00:12:24,620 --> 00:12:27,080
and hash-based cryptography.

387
00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:30,340
And on these three, we have strong

388
00:12:30,340 --> 00:12:32,990
confidence that they are secure.

389
00:12:32,990 --> 00:12:34,980
At the end, you never know because this

390
00:12:34,980 --> 00:12:37,550
is how our asymmetric cryptography works.

391
00:12:37,550 --> 00:12:39,200
It's just a matter of putting all

392
00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:41,300
the cryptographers working on those trying

393
00:12:41,300 --> 00:12:43,080
to break them doing cryptanalysis.

394
00:12:43,340 --> 00:12:44,690
And if after like 30 years,

395
00:12:44,690 --> 00:12:46,030
this is what we are talking

396
00:12:46,030 --> 00:12:47,020
about for lattices,

397
00:12:47,520 --> 00:12:51,000
if after 30 years, like nothing progressed

398
00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:53,960
and the best attack still requires several

399
00:12:53,960 --> 00:12:56,980
times the age of the universe to break it,

400
00:12:56,980 --> 00:12:58,280
then we think it's secure.

401
00:12:58,900 --> 00:13:01,760
So this is how like cryptography works.

402
00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:03,900
And for the ones that are already

403
00:13:03,900 --> 00:13:05,710
standardized, this is where we are.

404
00:13:05,710 --> 00:13:06,960
We never know, especially

405
00:13:06,960 --> 00:13:09,760
with LLM where like mathematical

406
00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:12,320
like research is going so fast.

407
00:13:12,320 --> 00:13:15,340
So we never know, but we think confidently

408
00:13:15,340 --> 00:13:17,320
that these three at least are secure.

409
00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:20,200
For the second wave, it will take a few

410
00:13:20,200 --> 00:13:23,160
more years where cryptographers are trying

411
00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:24,310
to attack each other.

412
00:13:24,310 --> 00:13:25,960
And we need a second wave because

413
00:13:25,960 --> 00:13:28,339
the first wave was very conservative

414
00:13:28,620 --> 00:13:30,890
and we ended up with quantum algorithms

415
00:13:30,890 --> 00:13:32,340
that are producing very large

416
00:13:32,340 --> 00:13:33,800
signatures and so on.

417
00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:35,500
So there are plenty of engineering

418
00:13:35,500 --> 00:13:37,100
trade-offs that are not so good.

419
00:13:37,100 --> 00:13:38,310
So that's why we are trying

420
00:13:38,310 --> 00:13:40,707
to do lightweight, more lightweight

421
00:13:40,707 --> 00:13:42,470
post-quantum cryptography.

422
00:13:42,470 --> 00:13:43,670
This is the second wave.

423
00:13:43,670 --> 00:13:46,100
And at the end, maybe the solution

424
00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:48,620
is crypto agility, meaning that when you

425
00:13:48,620 --> 00:13:51,240
build the system, your system must be able

426
00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:53,560
to be upgraded to another quantum

427
00:13:53,560 --> 00:13:56,100
signature algorithm just in case

428
00:13:56,100 --> 00:13:58,390
the previous one would be broken.

429
00:13:58,390 --> 00:14:00,240
And on our side, we have an operating

430
00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:02,020
system that can be upgraded.

431
00:14:02,020 --> 00:14:05,100
So when we say we are quantum-ready,

432
00:14:05,480 --> 00:14:07,360
that means that we are integrating

433
00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:08,780
the current standardized

434
00:14:08,780 --> 00:14:11,580
post-quantum signature algorithm.

435
00:14:11,580 --> 00:14:13,400
But if they are new to be added,

436
00:14:13,400 --> 00:14:16,380
we can also upgrade our system.

437
00:14:16,380 --> 00:14:17,100
Very cool.

438
00:14:17,100 --> 00:14:17,880
And the last question I have

439
00:14:17,880 --> 00:14:18,780
is just on usability.

440
00:14:18,780 --> 00:14:20,250
I feel like if someone's interested

441
00:14:20,250 --> 00:14:22,960
in the phone, I feel like the main thing

442
00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:24,610
for the regular person to decide,

443
00:14:24,610 --> 00:14:26,150
is this a phone I should buy at all?

444
00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:27,040
Is it a secondary phone

445
00:14:27,040 --> 00:14:28,130
or is it a primary phone?

446
00:14:28,130 --> 00:14:29,180
Is app compatibility?

447
00:14:29,720 --> 00:14:31,810
So I kind of heard that it might be GMS

448
00:14:31,810 --> 00:14:33,680
compatible, but I know a lot of people

449
00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:35,630
might not like the privacy implications

450
00:14:35,630 --> 00:14:37,280
of going with just regular Google

451
00:14:37,280 --> 00:14:38,680
Play services on the device.

452
00:14:38,680 --> 00:14:40,000
So I know it's a bit early

453
00:14:40,000 --> 00:14:41,970
and the device isn't fully decided yet,

454
00:14:41,970 --> 00:14:43,570
but what are your guys' thoughts

455
00:14:43,570 --> 00:14:44,970
on kind of app compatibility

456
00:14:44,970 --> 00:14:46,470
and the different approaches to doing

457
00:14:46,470 --> 00:14:48,420
that with, is it Ledger OS or Atlas OS?

458
00:14:48,420 --> 00:14:49,910
We have a Ledger operating system

459
00:14:49,910 --> 00:14:51,860
on the secure zone, and for the Android

460
00:14:51,860 --> 00:14:54,660
Zone, this is a regular Android,

461
00:14:54,660 --> 00:14:57,090
and we target to obtain GMS.

462
00:14:57,090 --> 00:14:58,540
So for now, we don't have it.

463
00:14:58,540 --> 00:15:00,380
So we cannot say that we are GMS

464
00:15:00,380 --> 00:15:03,540
compatible because we primarily target

465
00:15:03,540 --> 00:15:06,280
the support of every single Android

466
00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:08,840
application rather than the privacy

467
00:15:08,840 --> 00:15:11,680
feature that you have without GMS,

468
00:15:11,880 --> 00:15:14,900
which are more like the tracking provided

469
00:15:14,900 --> 00:15:17,260
by Google that would be removed.

470
00:15:17,260 --> 00:15:18,960
So the trade-off that we've chosen

471
00:15:18,960 --> 00:15:21,320
was more to have like more compatibility

472
00:15:21,320 --> 00:15:24,060
with more apps and so on because

473
00:15:24,060 --> 00:15:26,950
more and more, like the apps,

474
00:15:26,950 --> 00:15:28,500
for instance, like banking apps

475
00:15:28,500 --> 00:15:31,700
and other apps do not run on Graphene

476
00:15:31,700 --> 00:15:33,600
because of the requirements and so on.

477
00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:38,090
So we prefer going to GMS for this reason.

478
00:15:38,090 --> 00:15:39,140
Makes a lot of sense.

479
00:15:39,140 --> 00:15:40,220
Do you have any,

480
00:15:40,220 --> 00:15:41,920
I know it's tough because you want

481
00:15:41,920 --> 00:15:43,780
to make this a high security phone.

482
00:15:43,780 --> 00:15:45,920
Is there any thought or like maybe down

483
00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:47,720
the road you'll allow like unlocking

484
00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:49,220
a bootloader to flash something else

485
00:15:49,220 --> 00:15:50,660
and then relock the bootloader?

486
00:15:50,660 --> 00:15:52,360
Or is that, I know these questions

487
00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:55,720
are very speculative, and just wondering.

488
00:15:55,720 --> 00:15:56,900
So we don't really plan

489
00:15:56,900 --> 00:15:59,430
to unlock the bootloader, but at the end,

490
00:15:59,430 --> 00:16:01,480
the device architecture is such that even

491
00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:03,330
if your Android is fully compromised,

492
00:16:03,330 --> 00:16:05,350
your device is still secure because there

493
00:16:05,350 --> 00:16:07,660
is this independent, autonomous second

494
00:16:07,660 --> 00:16:09,840
world that is in charge of security.

495
00:16:10,060 --> 00:16:11,440
So even in our model,

496
00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:14,320
like your Android is fully compromised.

497
00:16:14,320 --> 00:16:15,440
As long as you verify

498
00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:17,260
that you are on the secure mode

499
00:16:17,260 --> 00:16:19,430
and what you do on your secure mode

500
00:16:19,430 --> 00:16:21,430
is exactly what you want, all the assets

501
00:16:21,430 --> 00:16:23,930
that are in the secure world stay secure.

502
00:16:23,930 --> 00:16:25,280
So this is really the power

503
00:16:25,280 --> 00:16:27,290
of this architecture.

504
00:16:27,290 --> 00:16:29,380
And I won't ever say that the Android

505
00:16:29,380 --> 00:16:31,500
part won't have vulnerabilities.

506
00:16:31,500 --> 00:16:32,920
Plenty of vulnerabilities,

507
00:16:32,920 --> 00:16:35,260
plenty of maybe exploits.

508
00:16:35,260 --> 00:16:37,620
We will do the secure

509
00:16:37,620 --> 00:16:39,480
updates all the time.

510
00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:41,720
But at the end, it doesn't really matter

511
00:16:41,720 --> 00:16:44,030
because the security is on the other side.

512
00:16:44,030 --> 00:16:45,300
Yeah, I mean, I think the way

513
00:16:45,300 --> 00:16:46,600
to put it is if someone doesn't have

514
00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:48,400
that secure side of the operating system,

515
00:16:48,400 --> 00:16:49,500
if malware gets on your phone

516
00:16:49,500 --> 00:16:51,100
and you unlock your password manager,

517
00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:51,540
sometimes you don't have

518
00:16:51,540 --> 00:16:53,060
to unlock your password manager.

519
00:16:53,060 --> 00:16:54,860
All that data is gone, all your messages.

520
00:16:54,860 --> 00:16:55,910
But if someone theoretically

521
00:16:55,910 --> 00:16:56,940
has that element,

522
00:16:57,180 --> 00:16:58,660
they'll never get the actual hard things.

523
00:16:58,660 --> 00:16:59,560
They're not going to get your seeds

524
00:16:59,560 --> 00:17:00,600
from your cryptocurrency wallet.

525
00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:01,800
They're not going to get your password.

526
00:17:01,800 --> 00:17:02,900
So it's a cool system.

527
00:17:02,900 --> 00:17:03,750
I hope it gets adopted

528
00:17:03,750 --> 00:17:05,400
by other phone companies as well.

529
00:17:05,400 --> 00:17:05,980
So I think it's pretty

530
00:17:05,980 --> 00:17:06,980
revolutionary stuff.

531
00:17:06,980 --> 00:17:08,579
So thank you guys for everything.

532
00:17:08,579 --> 00:17:09,640
And thank you, of course, for your time.

533
00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:11,620
I know you guys are crazy busy right now.

534
00:17:11,620 --> 00:17:12,339
Thank you.

535
00:17:12,339 --> 00:17:13,139
Yeah.