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If you multiply 15 by 600 plus data brokers, that's 10 full days worth of work.

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Who has time for that?

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The data broker industry has been out of control for years.

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And the best advice I've had to share thus far is to sign up for a service to remove it for you or do it manually.

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Neither of which is necessarily a great choice because either you have to hand over money and data to a private middleman company to do it for you,

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or you have to go through the gruesome process of doing it yourself on a frequent basis,

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because it's not just a one-time thing.

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So when California, the state I reside in, announced DROP,

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which is a government-run operation to try to take care of this problem in a slightly different way,

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I was quite interested.

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But I avoided it for myself because I didn't quite know what to expect,

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if it was safe, and if it's something that was worth recommending to you all.

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So today, I am honored to have Tom on from the CPPA, where I ask,

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How does Drop work? Is it privacy respecting? How does it compare to a private company's opt-out?

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What inspired it? Are other states or countries looking to follow it? And who have they spoken to

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to try to help them in this journey as well? It is a very fascinating interview. I learned a lot

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about Drop, and it cleared up pretty much every question I had about Drop. This is one of those

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interviews where I'm literally asking everything I've been thinking about. So I learned just as

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much as you all do. Without further ado, let's go over to Tom. Hello, today I have Tom Kemp on. Do

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you want to quickly just introduce yourself and what you do? Sure. Thanks for having me on. My name

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is Tom Kemp. I'm the executive director of the California Privacy Protection Agency, or commonly

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known as Cal Privacy. Yeah, so my first question actually on that note is that it used to be CPPA.

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That's still your domain, like on the emails that we exchange is still CPPA. But now I saw the Cal Privacy rebrand. Do you want to maybe speak to that for a second? Yeah, sure. Here in California,

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we have the CCPA, the California Consumer Privacy Act, that was amended with the passage of Prop 24,

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the California Privacy Rights Act, or CPRA, that created the CPPA, the California Privacy Protection

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Agency. So I think we've got a four-letter acronym overload going on here. And here in

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California, the transportation is known as Caltran. Here I live in the peninsula, it's Caltrain,

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you know, Cal Water, Cal This. So I just thought we would remove one four-letter acronym from

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what we have to memorize and just kind of streamline and say, we're the agency in California

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that does privacy. So that's the genesis of trying to be more user-friendly and spare people from

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having to learn another acronym. So yeah, that's fun. And what was your history beforehand? And

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what kind of led you to this role and what you do now? Yeah, so I've historically been an

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entrepreneur in Silicon Valley, and started companies and really got heavily involved in

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my last company in cybersecurity. And after that company was acquired, I really started digging

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into privacy. I did volunteer on Prop 24 on the campaign, which passed overwhelmingly here in

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California with 9.3 million voters. And as I said before, that was CPRA 2020. That was CPRA,

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which amended the CCPA and created the Cal Privacy Agency. And then that really gave me the bug

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to do policy work. And so I just started advising state legislators. So I was the one that proposed

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the California Delete Act to State Senator Josh Becker that became SB 362 that created this drop

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system. We could probably talk more about that later. I worked with legislators in Washington,

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state of Vermont, other places as well. And so when this opportunity came up to run the Cal Privacy Agency, I jumped at the opportunity. One reason was to be able to implement this system that

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the Delete Act called for, but also just given my strong interest and desire in enabling privacy

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rights at scale and making privacy easier, I just thought it was a really good fit, especially with

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my management background that I had. So this is my first time in government. I've been doing it for

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a year and a half. It's an amazing team. And we're doing some really cool things here in California

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as it relates to privacy. Yeah, it's interesting. You don't see that kind of, especially, I guess,

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it's from a lot of people listening's perspective, right? The big tech companies in Silicon Valley

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aren't privacy friendly. And a lot of times what we've seen is they try to water down a lot of the

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maybe you now want to do. So do you want to speak to that relationship? And if anybody's listening

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to this going, oh, is this another entrepreneur from Silicon Valley trying to get involved in

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politics and not be pro-consumer? Because I know that's probably where a lot of people's minds go.

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Well, I did write a book called Containing Big Tech. So I think that kind of shows where I'm at.

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But I'm also historically been an entrepreneur. And I think that there is an opportunity

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to balance the innovation economy while providing guardrails and protecting people.

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And so clearly there are things that are legal in the United States from a constitutional

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perspective, as well as state laws.

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But at the same time, there's more that can be done in terms of trying to balance innovation

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with protecting people as well.

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And I think that's been a big focus of mine, which is making sure that Californians can operationalize privacy rights.

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Because the fundamental problem that we have in the United States is that we have an opt out system.

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And so the onus is on the consumer to tell businesses not to do things with with their data.

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People also refer to that as the notice and choice where you get the privacy policy.

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And of course, to participate in today's modern economy, people usually say yes to the collection because they want to communicate with their friends.

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They want to buy goods, et cetera.

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And so in the end, what privacy really represents is a never ending set of chores that the consumer is forced to do in terms of contacting each of every site and say, well, don't sell my information or with these data brokers, delete my information, please.

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And so what we're trying to do here in California is rebalance thing by providing this drop system, the delete request and opt out platform that enables mass deletion at scale from data brokers.

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We're really heavily pushing what we call an opt out preference signal, which is a switch you can put in your browser that sends messages to every business that you visit via browser to not sell or share.

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So we're trying to kind of.

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That's GPC.

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Yeah, the global privacy control, we call it in our regulations, the opt-out preference. So yeah, it's a balancing act that we have and we have to work within the framework of the laws that exist. But we're working very hard to kind of make sure that Californians have a fair shot, so to speak, to be able to protect themselves in an economy that really considers personal information as part of the oil that it consumes.

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That's kind of the challenge and the focus.

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It's a quality opportunity for us to make things better.

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And that's what we're trying to do here at Cal Privacy.

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Yeah, to start with just Cal Privacy, you know, my order of events here is that we had the GDPR in Europe.

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And it was kind of the first of its time where we have real privacy rights that were given to regular people that they can actually act on.

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And for the most part, it's still really the main thing.

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I think Brazil has done something similar.

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We have other countries finally start to pop up.

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But the U.S. has never, to my understanding, done anything like this.

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And so do you mind expanding on what this looks like and why it's done on a state level?

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Yeah, just overall the origin and how it compares to other things that exist right now.

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Yeah, sure.

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So, I mean, at the federal level, there are privacy laws, but they're very focused on a given sector of the economy.

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So you have HIPAA that has protections for health information.

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There is some protections in Gramm-Leach-Bliley as it relates to financial information.

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But those laws were passed 25, 30 years ago.

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And obviously, Europe, as you said, was the first with GDPR.

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And then there was a person here in California, a gentleman by the name of Alistair McTaggart,

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who after GDPR came out was at, I think, a cocktail party.

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He was talking with, I think, someone from Google or one of the big tech companies.

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And that person started describing to Alistair, like, you won't believe the type of information we have on each and every one.

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And that inspired him to try a ballot proposition in 2018 to actually have the first state comprehensive privacy law.

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And he was in a good enough financial situation to pay for the ballot signatures.

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And so he actually qualified to have the California Consumer Privacy Act be a ballot initiative.

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Now, California had just passed a law that said that in the 2018 timeframe that the legislature has within 30 days the opportunity,

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if they work with the entity bringing forth a ballot initiative, that if they're able to pass

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a comparable law, that the ballot initiative would go away. And what happened in 2018 is that the tech

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industry started really rallying against having the nation's first comprehensive privacy law.

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And then all of a sudden Cambridge Analytica happened. And then that opposition went away.

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And the legislature here in California said, you know, we're going to look really stupid that this

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on the ballot. And so they took over the California Consumer Privacy Act. And then within 30 days of

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the ballot initiative being qualified, they passed the CCPA. And that was signed by then

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Governor Brown. But guess what happened in 2019 that industry said, let's water it down, right?

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And all these bills came forth to kind of weed whack at the CCPA. And then Alistair in 2020 said,

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Well, nuts to that. What I'm going to do is I'm going to come up with this ballot proposition, Prop 24, that sets a high floor and a higher floor than what existed with the CCPA.

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And you can't go below that. And I'm going to take that directly to the voters.

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And that's how I got involved. I worked six months as a full time volunteer on the campaign.

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Didn't know Alistair from before. And it was amazing that nine point three million people voted for this ballot initiative.

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That's one of the top vote getters for any type of legislation in any state in the history of the United States.

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So that tells you people really care about privacy.

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It created the actual agency itself, took a year or so for the agency to get up and running.

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And I'm the second executive director.

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We're an independent agency. We're the only independent agency that does privacy in the United States.

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were governed by a five-member board, and they appoint the executive director to run the day-to-day

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operations. And that's what I do. So that's kind of the brief history. And so clearly,

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the CCPA was influenced by GDPR, and people often refer to it as the California's equivalent to GDPR.

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There's a lot of similarities, but there are some differences. An opt-out, which we have,

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versus an opt-in is the primary difference.

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And then that really kind of kicked off

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the other states going out there.

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And we now have 23 states that actually have privacy laws

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and we still don't have a federal equivalent.

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I see.

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And there's a lot of good stuff there.

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So I'm going to try to keep my questions here

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as punctual as I can.

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I think the first thing,

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initial reaction hearing this is it's really cool to hear. You know, there's this sentiment that

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people don't care about privacy, but when you have one of the top votes be in support of something

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that's pro-privacy, I think it means that people just don't know what to do to reclaim their privacy

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is probably my guess. I 100%. You know, people always talk about the privacy paradox, and they

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say, you know, consumers talk a big game about privacy, but they just go ahead and just hit the

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accept button, right? And so they talk the talk, but they don't walk the walk. And from my perspective

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is that, well, they have to hit the accept button to participate in today's modern economy,

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right? But they really do care about privacy. And then once they hit the accept button,

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it's just too darn difficult for them to kind of control the usage of their information.

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And so what we're trying to do is within this opt-out paradigm, we're trying to say is like, look, let's give consumers tools to enable privacy at scale. Case in point, the drop system with data brokers. There are hundreds of data brokers that you and I don't have a direct relationship with.

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And if we were to reach out under CCPA and exercise our right to delete, we would have to contact each one individually, maybe spend 10, 15 minutes.

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Each one kind of has a different process.

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And if you multiply 15 by the 600 plus data brokers that are registered with the state, that's 10 full days worth of work.

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Who has time for that?

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Similarly, to tell businesses not to sell or share your personal information, you have to go to each website, scroll to the bottom, configure cookies.

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That may take a couple of minutes.

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Who has time for that as well?

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And that's why we're very supportive of the opt-out preference signal, the global privacy control, which is a switch that you can flip on your browser to universally send that message.

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And what we did was last year is we sponsored AB 566 that requires browser vendors to put that into their actual product itself.

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That becomes effective January 1st, 2027.

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So, yeah, this whole operationalizing privacy, enabling privacy at scale, dealing with the after effects of an opt out model are all things that we literally here at Cal Privacy think about every day.

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And we just want to make privacy easy for Californians.

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Drop is a huge step forward.

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The opt-out preference signal is a huge step forward, plus a bunch of privacy tips that

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we put at privacy.ca.gov.

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So we are laser focused on that, if that's any consolation, as you think about all the

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issues associated with surveillance, privacy, et cetera.

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Yeah, and I want to touch on the drop in just a second here.

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But just very quickly, you mentioned opt-in versus opt-out as a difference between what California is doing versus what Europe's doing.

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And do you mind just quickly teasing what you've seen, what you like about different implementations outside of California and what you think other people might be doing better, where you think California is doing better, just to kind of help people understand the landscape of the different approaches to these different laws around the world right now?

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Yeah, I mean, Europe has opt-in and that's unless you explicitly, you know, say, OK, you can collect my information by default, the collection does not occur.

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The issue that they have in Europe is that if you're an American, travel to Europe, or if one of your listeners is there's this concept of cookie fatigue, where every time you visit a website, you got to deal with this pop-up and just kind of confirm your choices.

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And so people are frustrated with what they call cookie fatigue. In the United States, it's an opt-out model that by default, if you accept the terms, they're going to collect your information and there's further stuff buried in the fine print with what they do with it.

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And then you have to go back and explicitly tell the business to not sell it or delete it, etc.

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And as I just walked you through, that can be very time consuming.

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And all the other states, because of, you know, kind of constitutional rulings, and I won't bore your listeners with that.

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That's kind of why we have, you know, it's a First Amendment.

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Seems like, you know, tech history always plays the First Amendment card, but that was kind of the card that was played.

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And so by default, privacy laws in the U.S. to not run the risk of constitutional challenges have defaulted to an opt out model.

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So that's kind of where where we're at. And then but the opt out model has the painful choices of chasing after all the businesses.

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While in Europe, you've got the cookie fatigue aspect of it as well.

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So we're just trying to kind of break the wheel, so to speak, here in California.

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And I think other states are looking to adopt it.

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I was very encouraged to see Connecticut.

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They just passed a DeleteX style law.

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There's 12 other states that require businesses to support the opt-out preference signal.

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And I think all consumers will be able to take advantage of the fact that California is requiring browser vendors to add this into the solution.

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So things are getting better and California is impacting other states, which is what we've historically done when it comes to consumer protection.

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It's called the California effect.

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You know, we did that with food safety.

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We did that with automobiles, emissions and other things as well.

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But that's almost a whole nother podcast in itself.

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Yeah.

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And I guess just to clarify, because I know some people are using acronyms like GPC, opt out signals.

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A lot of our audience is more technical who's already been here and aren't new.

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They're probably using Brave, which I think auto enables this by default for everybody.

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So privacy-first browsers are already doing this.

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But is the regulation that you said that's coming out January of 2027,

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it requires it to be baked into any browser?

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And then does it require it to be on or off by default?

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Or it just requires the functionality?

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So if you're using Chrome, you're probably going to have to turn it on when that happens.

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Yeah, it's actually a law.

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So it's in the statute, to get technical.

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Regulations are things that are associated with laws that provide further clarity.

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And the law says that browsers have to offer this capability.

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GPC is an implementation.

195
00:18:54,940 --> 00:18:59,060
It's probably the implementation of an opt-out preference signal.

196
00:18:59,840 --> 00:19:08,399
And so browsers have to offer it to the extent that which ones have it turned on by default

197
00:19:08,420 --> 00:19:13,200
and the other, that will be determined by the actual browser vendors themselves.

198
00:19:14,300 --> 00:19:14,500
Got it.

199
00:19:15,220 --> 00:19:15,340
Okay.

200
00:19:15,550 --> 00:19:17,600
Do you want to quickly just expand on Drop first?

201
00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:19,160
Why this was the next?

202
00:19:19,420 --> 00:19:24,180
There's, I feel like so many different privacy issues right now in the world that I'm sure

203
00:19:24,340 --> 00:19:26,580
you're more than familiar with with everything that you've done.

204
00:19:27,010 --> 00:19:29,520
So why was this the first thing that you guys wanted to target?

205
00:19:29,720 --> 00:19:37,419
Well, as an agency, we just can't do something as significant without the legislature and

206
00:19:37,440 --> 00:19:42,400
the governor signing laws that tell us to do something like this. And so we deliver this

207
00:19:42,960 --> 00:19:49,300
to Californians on January 1st because we were required to by statute. So in 2023,

208
00:19:50,590 --> 00:19:55,240
Senate Bill 362, the California Delete Act passed. And as I mentioned before,

209
00:19:56,200 --> 00:20:01,100
I advised State Senator Becker on this. And this is not an original idea. In fact,

210
00:20:01,420 --> 00:20:08,780
Tim Cook at Apple in a op-ed in Time magazine talked about a data broker clearinghouse.

211
00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:14,820
There's obviously earlier variations of this, like the FDC's do not call list.

212
00:20:15,420 --> 00:20:18,420
Obviously, that has some, you know, it's not the most perfect thing.

213
00:20:18,540 --> 00:20:20,480
You know, it's not an original idea.

214
00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:33,280
But what happened in 2023 was that there were a lot of headlines about how, for example, hackers were using data broker data to dox individuals.

215
00:20:33,940 --> 00:20:43,760
And, you know, this is in the COVID timeframe where education leaders, health care, local health care leaders were being targeted and doxed.

216
00:20:43,820 --> 00:20:47,400
We had the overturn of Roe v. Wade.

217
00:20:47,570 --> 00:20:52,420
And so there were significant concerns about reproductive health information being sold

218
00:20:53,080 --> 00:20:58,980
or people being tracked down based on geolocation, visiting a reproductive health care clinic,

219
00:20:59,250 --> 00:20:59,580
et cetera.

220
00:20:59,590 --> 00:21:05,420
So there was just a lot of negative headlines about the misuse of geolocation information,

221
00:21:06,210 --> 00:21:06,660
et cetera.

222
00:21:07,300 --> 00:21:13,700
And so what existed in California was a registry law that passed in 2019.

223
00:21:14,410 --> 00:21:18,200
The first data broker registry law was passed in Vermont in 2018.

224
00:21:18,950 --> 00:21:24,900
The goal of the registry was to at least provide some transparency to who data brokers are,

225
00:21:25,060 --> 00:21:30,860
because by definition, data brokers are entities that you or I don't have a direct relationship

226
00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:33,700
with that collect and sell our personal information.

227
00:21:33,740 --> 00:21:41,220
So the thought process is combined with the CCPA that if you had a list, you could then manually contact each and every one.

228
00:21:41,760 --> 00:21:56,760
But what I recommended to Senator Becker is to let's create through legislation an accessible deletion mechanism that allows a consumer to put some basic personal information into a website, have it stored in a secure manner.

229
00:21:57,080 --> 00:22:06,240
And then the registered data brokers will have to connect into that secure website, do record matching and then delete their information.

230
00:22:06,360 --> 00:22:09,400
So in the end, it becomes kind of a big delete button in the sky.

231
00:22:10,080 --> 00:22:21,240
So instead of spending 10, 15 minutes contacting 600 plus data brokers, that you could spend five, six, seven minutes at this one website and have it be done with.

232
00:22:21,500 --> 00:22:29,740
So the beauty of this drop system that was called forth by the accessible deletion mechanism, it does enable the deletion at scale.

233
00:22:29,900 --> 00:22:37,060
It also addresses another kind of a loophole or actually two loopholes that are in California's privacy law.

234
00:22:37,600 --> 00:22:44,360
The first of which is the right to delete in CCPA is data collected from a consumer.

235
00:22:44,570 --> 00:22:48,700
But by the very nature of data brokers, they don't collect data from consumers.

236
00:22:48,870 --> 00:22:50,560
They collect data about consumers.

237
00:22:51,220 --> 00:22:57,900
And so a lot of times people were doing deletion requests to data brokers and data brokers said, I don't have to delete anything because I didn't get it from you.

238
00:22:57,900 --> 00:22:59,160
And that frustrated consumers.

239
00:23:00,220 --> 00:23:08,260
And so this addresses that, that data brokers have to delete any personal information about the consumer submitting a drop request.

240
00:23:08,660 --> 00:23:19,300
And then the second issue is data brokers, after doing a deletion, assuming that they agree to do a deletion with this loophole about collected from versus about,

241
00:23:19,840 --> 00:23:28,720
that they could just simply just repopulate their databases with personal information, thus forcing a consumer to rinse and repeat and go back.

242
00:23:28,980 --> 00:23:33,380
So if you have to spend 10 days to go through 600 data brokers, guess what?

243
00:23:33,490 --> 00:23:35,120
Six months later, you have to repeat.

244
00:23:35,510 --> 00:23:38,740
But the drop system is you do it once.

245
00:23:39,520 --> 00:23:43,180
It deletes all the information irrespective of how it's collected.

246
00:23:43,520 --> 00:23:49,260
And it's a perma delete in that data brokers have to maintain a suppression list and not

247
00:23:49,740 --> 00:23:55,660
import any information from people that submitted requests through the drop system as well.

248
00:23:55,800 --> 00:24:00,520
So it's an incredibly powerful solution that addresses loopholes.

249
00:24:00,630 --> 00:24:09,160
It enables scale that is kind of unheard of in this digital economy in terms of enabling privacy rights.

250
00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:11,840
Yeah, okay, there's a lot there.

251
00:24:12,020 --> 00:24:16,920
So just some of the facts first, because I do have some of the facts that I have here.

252
00:24:17,410 --> 00:24:23,720
So you open these requests in January 1st of this year, so people could have already started submitting earlier this year.

253
00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:29,960
Brokers have to act on August 1st, which is in just a little over a week from the time we're recording.

254
00:24:30,480 --> 00:24:32,840
So by the time you're listening to this, I'm assuming it's already live.

255
00:24:33,080 --> 00:24:33,860
Is that accurate?

256
00:24:34,440 --> 00:24:34,660
Yeah.

257
00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:37,920
So January 1st, we open up the website.

258
00:24:38,260 --> 00:24:40,500
It's at privacy.ca.gov.

259
00:24:40,760 --> 00:24:42,540
It's on the homepage right there.

260
00:24:42,540 --> 00:24:43,160
You just click.

261
00:24:43,360 --> 00:24:49,320
I want to be very clear to anyone that this is, well, A, it's only available to Californians.

262
00:24:49,640 --> 00:24:51,900
So hopefully it'll be California envy.

263
00:24:52,320 --> 00:24:58,460
Oftentimes people trash California, but this is an example of some innovation happening in California.

264
00:24:58,620 --> 00:25:00,620
And as I mentioned before, Connecticut did that.

265
00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:04,720
And there's like six or seven other states that are proposing this or thinking about this.

266
00:25:04,800 --> 00:25:07,780
And of course, if we're successful, I think this will further drive.

267
00:25:07,940 --> 00:25:14,520
So it's free and it's paid for by the actual data brokers as part of their registration process.

268
00:25:15,380 --> 00:25:17,580
I saw that. So it doesn't use taxpayer money, right?

269
00:25:18,200 --> 00:25:20,760
Zero. Zero, zero, zero.

270
00:25:21,100 --> 00:25:23,240
I wanted to actually say something funny that I normally,

271
00:25:23,660 --> 00:25:25,120
because you mentioned California hate,

272
00:25:25,120 --> 00:25:26,900
and I'm very biased because I live in California,

273
00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:29,280
but when I travel abroad to other states,

274
00:25:29,350 --> 00:25:31,040
they always ask, oh, so how's it going over there?

275
00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:34,340
Kind of with this implication that everything's burning down

276
00:25:34,580 --> 00:25:35,400
in this state, apparently.

277
00:25:35,730 --> 00:25:38,480
Well, sometimes there are bad fires, but that aside,

278
00:25:38,670 --> 00:25:39,960
I normally say, yeah, you know,

279
00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:42,720
people always say nobody wants to live in California.

280
00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:43,840
There's just too many people there.

281
00:25:44,490 --> 00:25:46,240
And that's kind of what I always tell them.

282
00:25:47,200 --> 00:25:48,120
Again, I'm very biased.

283
00:25:48,150 --> 00:25:50,940
I do love this state, but I just like,

284
00:25:51,020 --> 00:25:58,160
wanted to share that. That actually is from Yogi Berra. He said that about a restaurant,

285
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:06,520
no one goes there anymore because it's too crowded. So I agree with you about California.

286
00:26:07,340 --> 00:26:11,380
I saw, you know, there's this weird stat. Again, I'm trying to understand how this works because

287
00:26:11,430 --> 00:26:17,119
you mentioned it's permanent. It's a permanent suppression list. Yes. But I also saw that drop

288
00:26:17,440 --> 00:26:19,700
checks things every 45 days.

289
00:26:20,300 --> 00:26:22,720
So do you mind expanding on this nuance here?

290
00:26:22,720 --> 00:26:22,860
Yeah, sure.

291
00:26:22,990 --> 00:26:23,740
So actually, yeah.

292
00:26:23,770 --> 00:26:25,880
So it opened January 1st.

293
00:26:26,140 --> 00:26:30,800
And so far, we've had 375,000 people sign up,

294
00:26:30,870 --> 00:26:35,200
which is pretty incredible in that deletions haven't begun.

295
00:26:35,510 --> 00:26:37,520
So starting August 1st,

296
00:26:37,570 --> 00:26:40,060
the data brokers have to connect into the system.

297
00:26:40,520 --> 00:26:44,859
And then they have a 45-day window starting August 1st

298
00:26:44,900 --> 00:26:52,200
to download the list, and I'll explain that if you want in more detail, and then process the

299
00:26:52,360 --> 00:27:00,200
deletions. And then they have another 45 days to report back the statuses so Californians can see

300
00:27:00,340 --> 00:27:07,700
the status of the deletions. And then after that, on a 45 rolling day basis, any net new requests

301
00:27:08,020 --> 00:27:13,420
or updates from existing consumers that put their information, like they've added a new email,

302
00:27:13,720 --> 00:27:20,860
they have to process. So it's a rolling process that starts on August 1st. So if anyone submitted

303
00:27:21,100 --> 00:27:28,280
their request, they'll see the deletions really kicking in by mid-September. And then probably by

304
00:27:28,400 --> 00:27:33,660
the end of October, their drop profile will be updated to tell you exactly who deleted your data.

305
00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:40,619
And then it just starts rolling from there as well. So that's it at a high level, right? And I can

306
00:27:40,640 --> 00:27:46,160
kind of get into the guts of how it works and how it's secure. But basically, the point is,

307
00:27:46,340 --> 00:27:52,240
is that the site's open, it's free. And then starting August 1st on a 45 day basis,

308
00:27:52,660 --> 00:27:58,720
all the 600 plus data brokers will connect in and begin deleting and then subsequently giving

309
00:27:59,100 --> 00:28:05,000
you updates that you can view inside your little portal or your profile inside the drop system.

310
00:28:05,280 --> 00:28:08,080
So I think this is the biggest piece here

311
00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:11,020
because for the last five plus years,

312
00:28:11,260 --> 00:28:13,420
I feel like when I started doing this 10 years ago,

313
00:28:13,460 --> 00:28:15,080
this wasn't as much of a well-known thing,

314
00:28:15,180 --> 00:28:16,120
these people searching websites.

315
00:28:16,380 --> 00:28:18,700
But I feel like five to seven years ago

316
00:28:18,800 --> 00:28:20,640
is when I started seeing these commercial services

317
00:28:20,820 --> 00:28:22,560
that try to remove them

318
00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:24,560
and they try to automate this painful process

319
00:28:24,660 --> 00:28:25,320
that you discussed.

320
00:28:25,460 --> 00:28:27,340
Because like you said, it's not just one time.

321
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:28,700
I feel like that's the biggest misconception.

322
00:28:28,960 --> 00:28:30,180
People say, I'm going to do it manually.

323
00:28:30,260 --> 00:28:31,880
I can set a weekend aside to do this.

324
00:28:32,200 --> 00:28:34,400
They do it, but then the information comes back up

325
00:28:34,420 --> 00:28:34,920
in two months.

326
00:28:35,660 --> 00:28:39,180
So is what you're building its own brand new system?

327
00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:44,420
Because you're implying this is a whole system that data brokers have to register for, sign up for.

328
00:28:44,620 --> 00:28:45,220
There's a portal.

329
00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:55,320
And so is this something that private companies cannot hook into, which means they're going down a completely different avenue of accomplishing this goal than what you guys are doing now?

330
00:28:56,520 --> 00:29:10,900
Well, I mean, certainly this does commodify certain aspects of paid solutions in terms of what they offer, because we do facilitate deletions from 600 data brokers.

331
00:29:11,420 --> 00:29:23,340
And we also do have the advantage that by law, it does require a perma deletion and kind of an on by an ongoing suppression list that the data brokers have to maintain.

332
00:29:23,740 --> 00:29:30,420
The other advantage is that the enforcement that we have is very significant.

333
00:29:30,710 --> 00:29:40,600
So we have a dedicated enforcement agency and the statute, i.e. the law itself, allows us to do fines of $200 per day per incident.

334
00:29:40,660 --> 00:29:46,520
So just imagine, say, at the end of the year, there's close to a million Californians signed up.

335
00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:53,940
And in a given data broker's database, there's, say, 200,000 records that would have matched.

336
00:29:54,360 --> 00:29:58,600
But for whatever reason, the data broker decides not to delete it.

337
00:29:58,820 --> 00:30:01,500
Maybe they're playing games or something like that.

338
00:30:01,560 --> 00:30:03,420
And we find out about that.

339
00:30:03,760 --> 00:30:11,160
The fines would then be $200 times 200,000, which is $40 million per day.

340
00:30:11,630 --> 00:30:15,120
So that's a pretty big stick that Cal Privacy has.

341
00:30:15,540 --> 00:30:20,680
Now, I am very supportive of third-party privacy tools.

342
00:30:20,990 --> 00:30:27,440
So we basically, with DROP, we in California are raising the floor, but we're not placing

343
00:30:27,490 --> 00:30:28,040
a ceiling.

344
00:30:28,340 --> 00:30:46,320
I think that there is a lot of value for third-party privacy tools because sometimes their ecosystem of businesses that they do deletions are not technically data brokers and are not registered under our definition in the law, number one.

345
00:30:46,880 --> 00:30:57,520
Number two, there's additional things that can be done from a privacy perspective that third-party tools can help, like, for example, helping facilitate deletions from Google search results.

346
00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:02,740
There's locking down social media settings, things of that nature as well.

347
00:31:03,100 --> 00:31:12,340
So what we're trying to do is we're just raising the floor, but there's still a very high ceiling for third parties that consumers should take advantage.

348
00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:15,320
And that's actually in the original Prop 24.

349
00:31:15,480 --> 00:31:22,580
It did talk about the concept of authorized agents, creating a healthy third party privacy ecosystem as well.

350
00:31:22,920 --> 00:31:24,760
And we want to encourage that.

351
00:31:25,000 --> 00:31:37,020
Now, the last question is that you had is currently today, there isn't a way for a third party software product to help facilitate deletions.

352
00:31:37,220 --> 00:31:45,180
There is the ability within drop. There is the ability for someone to help like an elderly parent submit it.

353
00:31:45,180 --> 00:31:48,620
But then they have to sign under perjury that they actually did it.

354
00:31:48,700 --> 00:31:54,040
So we do allow the usage of authorized agent, but it's more on a one off basis today.

355
00:31:54,260 --> 00:32:00,520
but there is not a programmatic way for a third party to kind of feed information into drop.

356
00:32:01,030 --> 00:32:06,480
But that's something that we're going to continue to explore. We do want to plug into other ecosystems.

357
00:32:07,180 --> 00:32:12,780
And so that's something that could be on the table. And we're just right now just trying to launch it and have the successful deletion.

358
00:32:12,880 --> 00:32:21,240
So that could be a potential version, too. But all TBD, we're just focused on making sure the data brokers process the deletions at this stage of the game.

359
00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:48,580
That's great. Yeah. And I guess just to keep it really practical, I think I can use myself here as a pretty probably reflective example of at least our audience. And then it'll tie into people who don't do this as well in a second here. But traditionally, the way I deal with this problem, I don't have the time to do this manually. I focus a lot on prevention. And I do want to ask about prevention in a second here because I still personally see these tools as a removal. It's not dealing with whatever is actually causing that data to be collected in the first place.

360
00:32:48,760 --> 00:32:51,640
And I went with Consumer Reports.

361
00:32:51,750 --> 00:32:54,940
They did a research paper, which was from back in 2024.

362
00:32:55,370 --> 00:32:56,600
So it's over two years old now.

363
00:32:56,690 --> 00:32:58,780
So it's hard to know how relevant it still is today.

364
00:32:59,100 --> 00:33:01,660
But Optory and Easy Opt-Outs were the two best performers.

365
00:33:02,380 --> 00:33:03,540
And Easy Opt-Outs is far cheaper.

366
00:33:03,630 --> 00:33:05,540
And so I just went to use Easy Opt-Outs.

367
00:33:05,540 --> 00:33:06,720
And that's pretty much what I do.

368
00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:10,300
If someone is using a tool just for data removal,

369
00:33:10,780 --> 00:33:12,940
they're not trying to do the Google search removal,

370
00:33:13,390 --> 00:33:15,919
then it almost becomes this, it seems like a choice

371
00:33:15,940 --> 00:33:17,460
between do I do California drop

372
00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:20,280
or do I pay for a service like easy opt-outs?

373
00:33:20,480 --> 00:33:21,560
But I don't want to single them out,

374
00:33:21,700 --> 00:33:22,900
just any paid provider.

375
00:33:23,020 --> 00:33:24,960
And let's say someone finds that it's effective.

376
00:33:25,940 --> 00:33:28,040
How do I as a consumer decide between

377
00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:29,180
do I do both of them?

378
00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:30,560
Do I only have to do drop?

379
00:33:30,860 --> 00:33:33,020
Is there some other benefit to using the paid service?

380
00:33:33,560 --> 00:33:35,220
What's your suggestion to a person like that?

381
00:33:35,220 --> 00:33:36,140
And if someone's new

382
00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:37,460
and they don't have anything right now,

383
00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:39,640
what would you say to them?

384
00:33:39,840 --> 00:33:42,440
Well, people that are very privacy conscious,

385
00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:44,720
you know, someone that may have been in a,

386
00:33:44,900 --> 00:33:50,440
unfortunately, a domestic violence situation, someone that's worrying about being doxxed,

387
00:33:50,940 --> 00:33:56,960
someone that has experienced identity theft or identity fraud, someone that has an elderly

388
00:33:57,220 --> 00:34:02,240
parent that may have dementia or Alzheimer's that could be targeted. I certainly would recommend

389
00:34:02,920 --> 00:34:11,199
for those people to have kind of a defense in depth type approach to use multiple tools at

390
00:34:11,220 --> 00:34:17,960
your disposal to ensure the individuals are protected. Now, clearly, if you're a Californian,

391
00:34:18,379 --> 00:34:27,980
it's free. We clearly tell you that these are the 600 plus data brokers that will check and see if

392
00:34:27,980 --> 00:34:34,740
their deletions occur. As I said before, we have a very definitive definition of what a data broker

393
00:34:34,760 --> 00:34:41,919
is. And what we see with some of these authorized agent solutions, and there's a lot of good ones

394
00:34:42,159 --> 00:34:50,300
out there, that they may be doing deletions from companies that may have first-party relationships

395
00:34:50,860 --> 00:34:56,720
or are not technically a data broker under our law. So from a Venn diagram perspective,

396
00:34:57,820 --> 00:35:04,740
a lot of these kind of supplement, complement what we're doing as well. And so I would

397
00:35:04,760 --> 00:35:09,480
But, you know, simply if you're a Californian, I would sign up for drop.

398
00:35:09,900 --> 00:35:18,900
But if you're highly sensitive to the potential misuse of your personal information, I would encourage to check out third party tools as well.

399
00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:21,800
Again, what we're trying to do is just raise the floor.

400
00:35:21,900 --> 00:35:26,260
But there's so much that needs to be done from the ceilings always growing.

401
00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:32,340
And you do need free to other free tools, not from the state, paid solutions.

402
00:35:33,160 --> 00:35:35,540
We need to raise education, et cetera.

403
00:35:35,860 --> 00:35:37,260
I never want to send the message,

404
00:35:37,760 --> 00:35:40,600
just use Drop and everything will be hunky-dory, right?

405
00:35:40,740 --> 00:35:42,280
You need to do multi-factor authentication,

406
00:35:42,780 --> 00:35:44,140
maybe get a password manager.

407
00:35:44,340 --> 00:35:45,660
The list goes on right there.

408
00:35:45,740 --> 00:35:47,260
But at least we raised the floor.

409
00:35:47,700 --> 00:35:50,140
Yeah, when you were mentioning those really,

410
00:35:51,520 --> 00:35:52,720
I guess, more extreme situations

411
00:35:52,860 --> 00:35:54,340
where people really need the utmost privacy,

412
00:35:54,420 --> 00:35:56,380
I know there's also California Safe at Home program.

413
00:35:56,660 --> 00:35:58,080
Is that done by a different agency?

414
00:35:58,200 --> 00:35:59,480
Are you guys involved with that too?

415
00:35:59,900 --> 00:36:02,120
We're not involved in that particular one.

416
00:36:02,300 --> 00:36:06,440
Yeah, that's a great example of kind of a defense in depth type approach.

417
00:36:06,900 --> 00:36:17,720
And then obviously when January 1st kicks in, you know, we probably won't have the same marketing campaign with the cute raccoon here in California telling people to use the drop system.

418
00:36:17,840 --> 00:36:26,460
But we will heavily promote in January people turning on the switch to do the opt out preference signal to do not sell share.

419
00:36:26,600 --> 00:36:33,240
So that's another aspect of a protection layer that people should be doing, which is a tool.

420
00:36:33,770 --> 00:36:37,640
And then furthermore, we do have a bunch of privacy tips.

421
00:36:37,710 --> 00:36:40,100
We tell people to turn third-party cookies off.

422
00:36:40,100 --> 00:36:45,920
We tell people to stop tracking, to enable app tracking transparency, things of that nature.

423
00:36:46,100 --> 00:36:47,640
We do have a set of recommendations.

424
00:36:48,100 --> 00:36:55,040
What we're trying to do is if we can get the five or six top recommendations and have people do it in a 15-minute time period,

425
00:36:55,520 --> 00:36:57,440
then that will go a massive way,

426
00:36:57,860 --> 00:36:59,700
but there's still always going to be more things

427
00:36:59,770 --> 00:37:01,280
that need to be done that could be done

428
00:37:01,420 --> 00:37:03,980
by other free tools, third parties, et cetera.

429
00:37:04,980 --> 00:37:05,500
Got it.

430
00:37:05,630 --> 00:37:06,700
Okay, and now I want to get into

431
00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:09,020
just a few technical pieces here

432
00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:10,840
on how data is stored,

433
00:37:11,250 --> 00:37:12,640
what happens when someone submits their data,

434
00:37:12,720 --> 00:37:14,640
how they can trust the privacy and security here.

435
00:37:14,690 --> 00:37:17,300
But before I get there, just a very quick question.

436
00:37:17,500 --> 00:37:18,900
I think it's important to address

437
00:37:19,140 --> 00:37:21,200
because it's something I hear a lot from people in my life,

438
00:37:21,420 --> 00:37:23,960
and I know you guys might get it too, I don't know,

439
00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:28,360
but there's this association that every politician in the world has never used a computer before.

440
00:37:28,940 --> 00:37:34,440
And so I think people have this inherent distrust towards a government-run program from a tech perspective.

441
00:37:35,020 --> 00:37:39,860
So do you mind just expanding on who runs the tech behind the scenes and some of their backgrounds

442
00:37:40,080 --> 00:37:43,160
so people can understand the people who built this?

443
00:37:43,580 --> 00:37:45,600
And then we can kind of dive into that, what they built.

444
00:37:45,680 --> 00:37:49,840
Well, it starts at the leadership, which is myself.

445
00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:57,100
So I was a longtime Silicon Valley technologist with a computer science degree.

446
00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:06,940
And my last company had a multi-tenanted cloud service that supported hundreds of thousand users across the world.

447
00:38:07,380 --> 00:38:13,860
And we've built a product team from some top experts that have come from industry.

448
00:38:14,110 --> 00:38:19,780
The infrastructure is hosted by the California Department of Technology.

449
00:38:20,580 --> 00:38:25,380
that hosts the Franchise Tax Board and other government platforms.

450
00:38:25,710 --> 00:38:27,700
And so there's a very robust security.

451
00:38:27,810 --> 00:38:38,320
So we're part of that ecosystem of state government services that provide even more sensitive use cases for consumers,

452
00:38:38,660 --> 00:38:40,580
like the filing of their taxes.

453
00:38:40,710 --> 00:38:42,280
So we're part of that infrastructure.

454
00:38:42,530 --> 00:38:44,180
And again, this was proposed.

455
00:38:44,800 --> 00:38:51,820
And I advised, you know, as a technologist, the state senator a few years ago on this.

456
00:38:52,020 --> 00:38:54,960
So I think it's a pretty robust platform.

457
00:38:55,300 --> 00:38:58,060
Knock on wood, we haven't had any unplanned downtime.

458
00:38:58,880 --> 00:39:02,920
The satisfaction ratings that we get are very high.

459
00:39:03,200 --> 00:39:10,820
They're in the 4.x range on a scale of 5, which is really good for a consumer facing

460
00:39:11,200 --> 00:39:11,280
products.

461
00:39:11,440 --> 00:39:17,800
take into account that, you know, California has a population of people speaking dozens of languages.

462
00:39:18,460 --> 00:39:23,220
And, you know, we have people that are in their 80s and 90s using this system.

463
00:39:23,430 --> 00:39:31,160
So to be able to maintain in such a diverse consumer population, such high ratings says that we're doing a good job.

464
00:39:32,460 --> 00:39:34,540
Great. Yeah, I'm not questioning this.

465
00:39:34,620 --> 00:39:37,260
It's just I think it's important to ask because I know there's an association.

466
00:39:37,350 --> 00:39:39,700
Yeah, no, it's a good question.

467
00:39:39,940 --> 00:39:45,420
And I think, you know, some of the one question is like, well, you know, are you going to keep my data secure?

468
00:39:45,530 --> 00:39:47,260
So let's just jump right into that. Right.

469
00:39:47,530 --> 00:39:52,860
You first have to verify your residency and we leverage a technology called the California Identity Gateway.

470
00:39:53,580 --> 00:40:02,780
And it either uses your personal information to do quick lookups with state records to like your taxes and all that stuff to verify if you're a resident.

471
00:40:03,180 --> 00:40:10,280
or it uses your login.gov federal account, which you use for Social Security, and you have to be at

472
00:40:10,370 --> 00:40:16,920
level two, which is that at some point you may have had to provide your ID to login.gov. And at

473
00:40:17,080 --> 00:40:21,860
that point, if you are verified that you're a resident, we simply just get back the message,

474
00:40:22,160 --> 00:40:28,120
yes, this is a resident. We don't know anything about your login.gov account, etc. Then you go to

475
00:40:28,140 --> 00:40:35,680
the drop form and you put your name or variations of your name, you put your data birth and you put

476
00:40:35,900 --> 00:40:42,960
your zip code. Now you can stop there, right? But you can also put your email addresses and we

477
00:40:43,380 --> 00:40:47,620
require multi-factor authentication. You can put phone numbers. We require multi-factor authentication.

478
00:40:48,030 --> 00:40:54,460
You can also stop there. Or we ask for three bits of additional information, mobile advertising ID,

479
00:40:54,500 --> 00:41:00,900
which is used by data brokers that track your geolocation, a connected TV ID, or your VIN,

480
00:41:00,980 --> 00:41:05,920
because a lot of data brokers kind of sell car-related stuff. When you hit submit after

481
00:41:06,440 --> 00:41:11,200
spending, again, five, six minutes putting this basic information in about you, and you can control

482
00:41:11,280 --> 00:41:16,160
how much information you want, the more information you provide will facilitate more matching,

483
00:41:16,560 --> 00:41:23,120
you hit the submit button. And immediately that data is stored in kind of five separate areas,

484
00:41:23,260 --> 00:41:28,860
and it's hashed. And so what we do is we have identifiers associated with your name,

485
00:41:29,340 --> 00:41:36,640
date of birth, and zip code. That's one. We have it with your email address, hashed. We have it with

486
00:41:36,760 --> 00:41:41,880
your phone number, hashed. We have it with your mobile advertising ID or connected TV ID, hashed,

487
00:41:41,980 --> 00:41:46,840
and your VIN. So those are kind of like the five separate databases. All the data is hashed.

488
00:41:47,260 --> 00:41:57,720
Starting August 1st, the data brokers using the same hashing algorithm and based on the data they have and the identifiers have to hash their information.

489
00:41:58,480 --> 00:42:10,100
And then every 45 days, they see if they can match their data with one of the five or multiple of the five hashed information of identifiers that we have.

490
00:42:10,540 --> 00:42:17,220
if there is a match, then they know who that individual is and they're required to then delete

491
00:42:17,580 --> 00:42:22,100
all the information, even if it just matches against an email address. So if they have email

492
00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:28,120
address and all this other data right there, and then they have to maintain a suppression list of

493
00:42:28,260 --> 00:42:34,420
all these hash values from here on out. So if they ever get any new data, they have to validate it

494
00:42:34,560 --> 00:42:40,500
against that right there. So I don't even know if, Henry, if you signed up because the data

495
00:42:40,520 --> 00:42:47,040
has been hashed and the data brokers can't figure out, they can't supplement their databases,

496
00:42:47,390 --> 00:42:50,900
which would be against the law and illegal. And we would hammer them if they did,

497
00:42:51,340 --> 00:42:58,540
because the algorithm doesn't allow you to magically unlock all the hash values. The only

498
00:42:58,720 --> 00:43:03,840
time they know if someone's in the system, if they already had that user's information in the system

499
00:43:03,860 --> 00:43:10,460
itself. So that's kind of at a technical level what happens. After they do the deletion processing,

500
00:43:11,000 --> 00:43:17,140
they go back and 45 days after they've done the deletion, they can then update the statuses of

501
00:43:17,280 --> 00:43:22,880
each and every record. And then Californians can go back into the drop system and see for the 600

502
00:43:23,140 --> 00:43:31,600
plus data brokers, 75 deleted, 410 said, you know, not record, not found, etc. And there's different

503
00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:37,000
kind of statuses associated with records right there. So it's a closed loop system. And the last

504
00:43:37,120 --> 00:43:41,140
thing is, is that Californians, if they have a new zip code, phone number, email address, or they

505
00:43:41,490 --> 00:43:46,660
figure out how to get their mate on their Android phone, they can go back and update it, their

506
00:43:46,860 --> 00:43:53,040
existing profile to enhance the ability to match against these different databases that the data

507
00:43:53,160 --> 00:43:59,980
brokers have. Got it. So for a non-technical person, pretty much, let's say, I'll just use my

508
00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:05,240
name Henry. Henry is never actually sitting on a database somewhere. There's just a derivative of

509
00:44:05,240 --> 00:44:11,000
the name Henry that's just random gibberish that nobody as a human or a computer can read directly

510
00:44:11,500 --> 00:44:16,000
unless someone else also created a hash of the name Henry and then those two derivatives

511
00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:24,340
essentially match. So is that like the basic TLDR? Yes, basically. But obviously it's not just Henry.

512
00:44:24,700 --> 00:44:30,380
your full name concatenated with your date of birth, concatenated with your zip code. That's

513
00:44:30,560 --> 00:44:35,940
one unique identifier. The easier one is your email address. That is just by itself. There's

514
00:44:35,940 --> 00:44:44,020
no concatenated information. So if you're, it's, you know, henry at gmail.com and we validated

515
00:44:44,660 --> 00:44:50,880
through multi-factor authentication that you control that, right? Then that becomes a bunch

516
00:44:50,900 --> 00:44:54,080
of random numbers and letters and all that stuff.

517
00:44:54,430 --> 00:44:57,180
And only if you actually have that in your database

518
00:44:57,410 --> 00:44:59,440
and you do a hashing of that and it matches,

519
00:44:59,610 --> 00:45:01,800
then you'll know like, oh, well, Henry used this system.

520
00:45:02,300 --> 00:45:06,140
And so any records associated with henry at gmail.com

521
00:45:06,540 --> 00:45:08,220
has to be deleted by the data broker.

522
00:45:09,280 --> 00:45:10,500
Wow, nice system.

523
00:45:10,720 --> 00:45:13,600
I mean, I feel like it's one of those underrated things

524
00:45:13,760 --> 00:45:15,980
that you guys probably geek out about behind the scenes

525
00:45:16,160 --> 00:45:19,200
that most people won't know, but it's well thought out.

526
00:45:19,240 --> 00:45:24,820
I mean, look, I understand there's a healthy skepticism like, oh, well, if I give my information,

527
00:45:24,920 --> 00:45:27,340
the data brokers are just going to get it and they're going to sell it.

528
00:45:27,480 --> 00:45:30,200
Well, no, it's actually based on the technical implementation.

529
00:45:30,960 --> 00:45:35,880
Unfortunately, I just don't have an easy elevator pitch to say besides saying no,

530
00:45:36,420 --> 00:45:40,120
there's a bunch of hashing and secure technology that ensures that.

531
00:45:40,240 --> 00:45:42,480
With folks like yourself, I do get into details.

532
00:45:43,120 --> 00:45:46,860
The other kind of objection is like, well, this only applies to California data brokers.

533
00:45:47,140 --> 00:45:54,020
Actually, no, it applies to data brokers that have Californians data, irrespective of where they are in the world.

534
00:45:54,200 --> 00:45:59,500
So we have people that have registered in our registry that are overseas and other states, et cetera.

535
00:45:59,760 --> 00:46:05,220
Yeah. So those are some of the two top kind of like concerns that people have at the initial reaction.

536
00:46:05,660 --> 00:46:08,560
But most people are like, you know what, I'm in so much pain.

537
00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:13,940
I'm just going to go ahead and sign up for it anyways, even without hearing that we actually address some of the concerns.

538
00:46:15,040 --> 00:46:19,920
Yeah. And let's say somebody doesn't like it anymore. They say, I don't trust this anymore.

539
00:46:20,580 --> 00:46:22,260
I assume they can delete their account when they're.

540
00:46:23,140 --> 00:46:28,420
Yeah. Or they can also specify like, actually, I love these data brokers. I'm going to uncheck

541
00:46:28,640 --> 00:46:33,020
the data brokers. So as opposed to doing all data brokers, you can select which data brokers

542
00:46:33,960 --> 00:46:36,860
you do or don't want to have process your information.

543
00:46:37,520 --> 00:46:40,680
Great. Is there anything else technical that you wanted to clear up before I kind of

544
00:46:40,920 --> 00:46:44,200
start zooming back out again that you see that are any common misconceptions?

545
00:46:44,380 --> 00:47:04,580
No, no. I think that, you know, people also ask about the timing and there's actually a piece of proposed legislation that would move the 45 window to 30 days as well. So sometimes say, well, why is it every 45 days? Or other people in January said, well, why is it August 1st? Why isn't it real time? And, you know, that's what the law called for.

546
00:47:04,620 --> 00:47:10,860
It kind of makes sense to give time for the data brokers to figure out how to connect into the system, what to do and all that stuff.

547
00:47:10,980 --> 00:47:16,900
But some data brokers will wait to the very last day to connect in and begin the 45-day clock.

548
00:47:17,300 --> 00:47:26,380
But if you have submitted before August 1st, you'll definitely see the impact by less data floating out there by mid-September.

549
00:47:26,960 --> 00:47:31,280
And all the statuses will come back by the end of October inside the drop system.

550
00:47:32,720 --> 00:47:32,980
Got it.

551
00:47:34,740 --> 00:47:36,700
I guess this is a consumer complaint, right?

552
00:47:36,820 --> 00:47:39,360
I go on these sites, one of them claims they remove your data

553
00:47:39,600 --> 00:47:41,660
from 6 million data brokers, I'm exaggerating.

554
00:47:41,820 --> 00:47:44,420
And then one says 200, one says 500, one says 800.

555
00:47:44,740 --> 00:47:48,480
There's these various numbers, but when I look at the sites that they claim,

556
00:47:49,260 --> 00:47:50,780
a lot of them look like the same site,

557
00:47:50,920 --> 00:47:52,300
just with a slightly different domain.

558
00:47:52,500 --> 00:47:54,700
And so you guys have your own number as well.

559
00:47:54,900 --> 00:47:58,420
Do you have any kind of insight into how this works?

560
00:47:58,800 --> 00:48:01,080
What is maybe a little bit more accurate, what's less accurate,

561
00:48:01,120 --> 00:48:02,300
and why there's this discrepancy?

562
00:48:02,320 --> 00:48:06,320
I can't talk about third-party products, but we do have the data broker registry.

563
00:48:06,780 --> 00:48:09,880
It's actually, we're going to move it over to privacy.ca.gov.

564
00:48:10,060 --> 00:48:12,380
It's on the cppa.ca.gov website.

565
00:48:12,730 --> 00:48:15,720
And it's going to be updated in early August.

566
00:48:15,930 --> 00:48:19,300
Right now, it shows 581 registered data brokers.

567
00:48:19,900 --> 00:48:23,880
That number is going to go up because we've gotten some additional registrations as people

568
00:48:24,120 --> 00:48:25,580
look to meet the August 1st deadline.

569
00:48:25,920 --> 00:48:29,780
But once you go to the data broker registry, you can see who's registered.

570
00:48:30,060 --> 00:48:31,140
And there's a couple of things.

571
00:48:31,820 --> 00:48:38,020
So when I say we have over 600 data brokers, that means there's 600 distinct businesses that have that.

572
00:48:38,310 --> 00:48:42,220
But we also ask, like, well, what websites do you operate?

573
00:48:42,430 --> 00:48:50,100
And you can be able to see that some of these businesses operate five, 10 different types of websites, right?

574
00:48:50,700 --> 00:49:00,200
And so if you were to actually look at the websites that would be covered by the drop system, it's well over 700, you know, maybe close to 800 as well.

575
00:49:00,300 --> 00:49:02,540
I just don't know what the numbers are off the top of my head.

576
00:49:03,020 --> 00:49:06,280
But there's a lot of data brokers operate multiple ones as well.

577
00:49:06,780 --> 00:49:11,900
So you could argue that we address in excess of 700 different websites that may have your

578
00:49:12,060 --> 00:49:16,540
information, but in the end, it maps to 600 sites as well.

579
00:49:16,960 --> 00:49:22,920
And we've been very active with our enforcement of going after businesses that need to register.

580
00:49:23,260 --> 00:49:28,860
And in fact, over the last year or so, we've had 12 enforcement actions against data brokers

581
00:49:28,880 --> 00:49:30,800
and fine them tens of thousands of dollars.

582
00:49:31,120 --> 00:49:34,380
So this is a constant thing that we're focusing on

583
00:49:34,480 --> 00:49:37,360
is making sure that all the data brokers

584
00:49:37,430 --> 00:49:39,400
that are in the system are in the system

585
00:49:39,490 --> 00:49:41,120
or should be in the system are in the system.

586
00:49:41,360 --> 00:49:43,220
What have the data brokers said about this?

587
00:49:43,840 --> 00:49:48,880
Do you have any notable examples of an interaction?

588
00:49:49,090 --> 00:49:51,060
I assume most of them are against this kind of stuff,

589
00:49:51,360 --> 00:49:53,260
but what's been the overall reaction from that?

590
00:49:53,560 --> 00:49:57,860
Well, clearly in 2023, they weren't happy with this

591
00:49:58,060 --> 00:50:04,100
And they spent a lot of money lobbying here in Sacramento, hundreds of thousands of dollars.

592
00:50:04,450 --> 00:50:10,860
The data brokers had one of those trucks that just drove around the Capitol with puppies on it for some reason.

593
00:50:10,910 --> 00:50:16,100
I don't know what the significance of puppies and data brokers are, but they had some puppies and dogs on it.

594
00:50:16,360 --> 00:50:18,560
But, you know, they had their shot, right?

595
00:50:18,900 --> 00:50:25,400
They were unable to convince the legislature and the governor that this bill should not go forward.

596
00:50:25,680 --> 00:50:33,700
And to the data broker's credit, now that they've saw kind of the, you know, what was passed, that we've had very good interactions with data brokers.

597
00:50:34,040 --> 00:50:47,240
And I think they now realize that from a society perspective, that society wants this particular industry to be more, instead of being the Wild West, to be a little bit more regulated and giving consumers more control.

598
00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:52,660
and since you know the delete act passed we've seen other states come up with registries

599
00:50:53,340 --> 00:50:59,480
and we saw connecticut adding this and i think you know again people are all eyes are in california

600
00:50:59,520 --> 00:51:05,200
in this one little area and if we're successful and so far we have been it's going to get to the

601
00:51:05,380 --> 00:51:09,820
point where politicians and other states that their constituents are going to say why does my

602
00:51:10,100 --> 00:51:16,599
aunt in california or why does henry and you know have this on the podcast i listen to but i don't

603
00:51:16,600 --> 00:51:22,660
have it. So that will apply pressure if we're successful in this. And I kind of jokingly say

604
00:51:22,820 --> 00:51:27,800
that people will have California envy because we have tools like this and people in other states

605
00:51:27,980 --> 00:51:34,480
don't. Yeah, I hope to see this expand. But this is perhaps a silly question, but it's important

606
00:51:34,620 --> 00:51:40,040
to ask, I think, because it's an overly simplistic way of looking at things. But why is this

607
00:51:40,320 --> 00:51:45,660
retroactive at all? Like, why can't California just go and ban the data brokers? Like, you guys

608
00:51:45,680 --> 00:51:51,500
just can't exist, go away. So why, why is that still allowed to exist? Like, what is the valid

609
00:51:52,260 --> 00:51:56,880
kind of role that they're playing, perhaps from a legal side of things?

610
00:51:57,320 --> 00:52:02,740
Obviously, we're in a democracy and businesses and people have constitutional rights. And the

611
00:52:02,900 --> 00:52:06,800
people here in California, as well as the legislature have the power, people via the

612
00:52:06,980 --> 00:52:12,660
ballot propositions and people in the legislatures have, you know, the power to do that. And so,

613
00:52:13,140 --> 00:52:30,520
You know, I think what's happening is there has been a realization that this kind of unchecked collection and selling of our information, while it has generated billion dollar plus businesses, it's facilitated e-commerce, it provides more targeted advertising.

614
00:52:30,560 --> 00:52:43,360
So in theory, businesses could be more effective in selling their goods to people that are interested, that there's been a double-edged sword that some of this data has become increasingly weaponized.

615
00:52:43,420 --> 00:52:45,240
And we see that with surveillance pricing.

616
00:52:45,860 --> 00:52:51,560
We see that with geolocation being sold to the federal government, like DHS, ICE, etc.

617
00:52:52,380 --> 00:53:04,140
We've seen instances in which a gay priest's geolocation was tracked down from that person being in gay bars and he got fired from that.

618
00:53:04,660 --> 00:53:13,100
We've seen instances in which data from Muslim prayer apps and the users a number of years ago was sold even to the government.

619
00:53:13,140 --> 00:53:22,960
We've seen instances in which Minneapolis politicians have been killed because their killers were able to look very easily look up their home addresses.

620
00:53:23,760 --> 00:53:30,700
So that's the downside. Right. And so what's happening is the legislature is looking at this.

621
00:53:30,700 --> 00:53:37,700
And the kind of the one major step was the Delete Act. And now this year in California, there's additional legislation.

622
00:53:38,020 --> 00:53:44,600
For example, there is a bill to ban the sale of geolocation, which there's over 100 data brokers.

623
00:53:44,760 --> 00:53:47,500
If you go to the registry, you'll be able to sort by geolocation.

624
00:53:47,740 --> 00:53:50,940
I think there's 110 different data brokers that sell geolocation.

625
00:53:51,100 --> 00:53:53,320
That would kind of put them out of business right there.

626
00:53:53,660 --> 00:54:00,000
There's another proposed law that would ban the sale of all sensitive personal information.

627
00:54:00,660 --> 00:54:02,500
So there is movement happening.

628
00:54:02,540 --> 00:54:10,200
I think it just kind of takes, you know, specific harms to occur before the visibility is raised.

629
00:54:10,200 --> 00:54:13,480
There was enough harm happening to pass the LEAD Act.

630
00:54:13,800 --> 00:54:26,260
Now, I think because of the sale of geolocation to the federal government that states, other states have actually leapfrogged California and have enacted laws to ban the sale of geolocation information.

631
00:54:26,860 --> 00:54:28,140
And now we're looking at sensitive.

632
00:54:28,260 --> 00:54:29,300
So it's happening.

633
00:54:29,580 --> 00:54:31,140
Sometimes it takes a little bit longer.

634
00:54:31,600 --> 00:54:34,760
And unfortunately, people may have to suffer some harms.

635
00:54:35,160 --> 00:54:42,220
But I do see kind of the evolution of privacy laws occurring kind of in real time, not only in California, but across the U.S.

636
00:54:43,080 --> 00:54:44,420
Great. That's a perfect segue.

637
00:54:45,120 --> 00:54:47,520
You know, I think I want to say, yes, near verbatim here.

638
00:54:47,660 --> 00:54:50,800
How does someone in another state actually advocate for their own version of drop?

639
00:54:51,160 --> 00:54:54,420
So just a regular person, they have that envy, perhaps, for this thing.

640
00:54:54,720 --> 00:55:01,580
How can they help in this journey of getting it and wherever they live around the state or even in other countries, I suppose, too?

641
00:55:02,080 --> 00:55:07,940
What I would do is contact your local state house or assembly person.

642
00:55:08,340 --> 00:55:19,060
Oftentimes they have town halls and or your whoever your state senator is and just go to a town hall and just say, hey, I'm sick of getting like here's the big thing.

643
00:55:19,240 --> 00:55:21,620
People are so sick of getting text scams.

644
00:55:21,960 --> 00:55:25,920
I don't know if you get them as well about like, I forgot to pay a bridge toll, right?

645
00:55:26,180 --> 00:55:27,800
That's a very common one as well.

646
00:55:28,320 --> 00:55:39,680
And there's been other instances in which people's elderly parents have been defrauded because you can literally buy from data brokers lists of people with Alzheimer's.

647
00:55:39,900 --> 00:55:45,900
Now, obviously, oftentimes purchases are for very good reason to advertise medicine or do studies.

648
00:55:47,060 --> 00:55:55,820
But there's also bad people that will buy lists of Californians or people from Kansas with Alzheimer's to do negative things as well.

649
00:55:56,080 --> 00:56:06,760
So, you know, if you're a citizen in another state, just bring up these real world harms and say, hey, there is something that is very popular in California.

650
00:56:07,200 --> 00:56:20,180
And by the way, part of our statute requires Cal Privacy to work with other jurisdictions, because if other jurisdictions are doing privacy-centric things, it further cements the privacy rights we have in California.

651
00:56:20,700 --> 00:56:24,720
So we're actively talking with people in other states and collaborating.

652
00:56:24,980 --> 00:56:31,420
In fact, we even have foreign nations contacting us about the data broker industry as well.

653
00:56:31,700 --> 00:56:35,420
So we're in a very much collaborative share, best practices.

654
00:56:36,620 --> 00:56:46,300
There's a willingness that we have to potentially even share technology with other states and other jurisdictions as well, because that would benefit all of us.

655
00:56:46,620 --> 00:56:55,080
You know, all votes would rise. So, yeah, start like what I did, which is like, you know, have a conversation with your local state center and say, I got a good idea.

656
00:56:55,180 --> 00:57:05,360
What do you think about it? And to be candid, I actually find a lot of politicians to be very receptive of ideas and want to show that they care about their constituents.

657
00:57:05,380 --> 00:57:10,860
ones. Yeah. Are you able to share the four countries or is that confidential? It's factual

658
00:57:11,220 --> 00:57:18,740
that there's seven other states that have been or are considering delete act style laws, one of which

659
00:57:19,060 --> 00:57:24,940
is Connecticut that did pass it. Vermont passed a law that they're going to do a study of a delete

660
00:57:25,160 --> 00:57:31,660
act style system. But there have been proposals in Nebraska, Illinois, and a couple other states,

661
00:57:31,940 --> 00:57:32,840
New Jersey as well.

662
00:57:33,180 --> 00:57:37,660
They just come out with a law with the registry and they're also and New York is also considering

663
00:57:37,750 --> 00:57:37,900
it.

664
00:57:37,910 --> 00:57:43,560
And then, yes, there have been other foreign countries that have expressed interest in

665
00:57:43,620 --> 00:57:43,760
this.

666
00:57:43,870 --> 00:57:48,920
It is public knowledge as it relates to states and proposed legislation.

667
00:57:50,480 --> 00:57:50,720
Got it.

668
00:57:51,140 --> 00:57:53,000
When do you think this will ever go federal?

669
00:57:53,660 --> 00:57:59,040
Just privacy regulation, not necessarily drop, but you said 23 states have this and it's

670
00:57:59,120 --> 00:57:59,620
still not federal.

671
00:57:59,820 --> 00:58:00,860
So what's been the hold up there?

672
00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:07,780
There's been two big issues. Issue number one is a private right of action. And most states don't

673
00:58:07,840 --> 00:58:12,020
have a private right of action. And enforcement is done by attorney general. In the case of

674
00:58:12,240 --> 00:58:17,240
California, enforcement is done by attorney general and Cal Privacy. But there are a lot of people that

675
00:58:17,420 --> 00:58:24,620
want the ability for consumers to sue if their privacy has been violated. And so that's been a

676
00:58:24,780 --> 00:58:30,640
hang-up. The second big hang-up, but probably the biggest hang-up, is preemption. Because what is

677
00:58:30,660 --> 00:58:39,960
happening is that oftentimes federal proposals have a very low ceiling. And so, yes, privacy would be

678
00:58:40,120 --> 00:58:47,080
in all 50 states, but existing states like California would actually lose privacy rights

679
00:58:47,660 --> 00:58:53,140
because these federal proposals don't include this. Best example is that there is a federal

680
00:58:53,360 --> 00:58:58,460
proposal called the Secure Data Act that Republicans have submitted, and it doesn't

681
00:58:58,480 --> 00:59:04,620
have anything equivalent to the DELETE Act, and it doesn't require an opt-out preference signal or

682
00:59:04,900 --> 00:59:10,140
global privacy control, which means that given that 12 states support and require the GPC,

683
00:59:10,860 --> 00:59:17,640
100 million residents would lose the ability to do the opt-out preference signal, and 40 million

684
00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:23,280
Californians plus I don't know how many people are in Connecticut, 43 million people would lose this

685
00:59:23,300 --> 00:59:30,800
drop. And so that's unacceptable for states like California to not be able to go over federal

686
00:59:31,060 --> 00:59:36,520
standards, which is very common with other federal laws like HIPAA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley, that we have

687
00:59:36,520 --> 00:59:42,040
the opportunity and ability to build upon these. And so we always prefer a federal piece of

688
00:59:42,260 --> 00:59:49,360
legislation to be a high floor. But unfortunately, what we've seen is when a privacy bill is submitted,

689
00:59:49,380 --> 00:59:58,700
It's a very low ceiling and it removes rights that people have and that caused problems with certain politicians as well.

690
00:59:58,860 --> 01:00:02,080
And so that's kind of the bottleneck that that's occurred at the federal level.

691
01:00:02,520 --> 01:00:04,880
So in the meantime, states have just moved forward.

692
01:00:05,960 --> 01:00:08,200
Got it. Makes a lot of sense. And thanks for cleaning it up.

693
01:00:08,280 --> 01:00:12,040
But that's the context that is it's hard to just find without having someone to ask.

694
01:00:12,360 --> 01:00:16,400
Kind of the last thing I want to ask you, and this is how I'm overall going to close this interview.

695
01:00:16,780 --> 01:00:18,280
It starts with a bit of a story here.

696
01:00:18,420 --> 01:00:20,240
I started to create a Venmo account

697
01:00:20,450 --> 01:00:22,180
because I had to share some money with friends.

698
01:00:22,320 --> 01:00:23,800
And I used to have a Venmo account.

699
01:00:23,850 --> 01:00:25,440
I stopped using it, so I deleted it.

700
01:00:25,680 --> 01:00:27,400
And then I spun up this new one.

701
01:00:27,740 --> 01:00:31,700
And it's not uncommon because I use privacy tools sometimes

702
01:00:31,970 --> 01:00:35,380
and I have an email alias that I use for different things.

703
01:00:36,140 --> 01:00:37,840
So it's not uncommon for sometimes them to be like,

704
01:00:37,930 --> 01:00:39,940
hey, we need to verify your information a little bit more.

705
01:00:39,970 --> 01:00:42,920
And I expected it to be KYC, upload my ID and all that.

706
01:00:43,160 --> 01:00:45,040
I was fine going into it with that.

707
01:00:45,610 --> 01:00:46,600
So I did everything they asked.

708
01:00:46,760 --> 01:00:48,660
I uploaded my ID, I gave them all my information,

709
01:00:48,820 --> 01:00:49,920
and then they froze my account.

710
01:00:50,900 --> 01:00:53,940
And then this kind of data,

711
01:00:54,800 --> 01:00:56,620
it was pretty much held hostage, this account,

712
01:00:56,780 --> 01:00:58,480
because they froze the account,

713
01:00:58,540 --> 01:01:00,200
which means I couldn't do anything with the account.

714
01:01:00,500 --> 01:01:02,260
But then when I asked them to delete the account,

715
01:01:02,320 --> 01:01:04,240
they said they won't delete an account that's frozen.

716
01:01:04,600 --> 01:01:08,340
So then I was like, what do I do here as a consumer?

717
01:01:08,620 --> 01:01:10,660
So I started doing research,

718
01:01:10,820 --> 01:01:13,380
so I did reach out to privacy at Venmo.com,

719
01:01:13,540 --> 01:01:17,140
which is, and I started like a CPA request

720
01:01:17,610 --> 01:01:21,440
to try to maybe, you know, go down a different avenue.

721
01:01:22,180 --> 01:01:23,400
But then they also rejected it.

722
01:01:23,410 --> 01:01:25,220
They said, well, we have to keep the account frozen.

723
01:01:25,290 --> 01:01:27,140
We can't delete any data on the frozen account.

724
01:01:27,330 --> 01:01:32,060
And so where I'm going here with this is,

725
01:01:32,470 --> 01:01:34,820
A, I think it's pretty crappy what they did.

726
01:01:34,910 --> 01:01:37,260
I think it really sucks because now I don't have the service

727
01:01:37,580 --> 01:01:39,000
and also my data is being held hostage.

728
01:01:39,700 --> 01:01:41,300
But how can people utilize their rights?

729
01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:43,520
You know, there's all these tools right now

730
01:01:43,520 --> 01:01:47,660
to come out around the world between states, countries, and I want this to be pretty global

731
01:01:47,820 --> 01:01:53,380
advice if you're able to. How can people locate what tools they have and actually utilize those

732
01:01:53,620 --> 01:01:57,580
tools? And when those tools aren't working, what's kind of next? Like, what do I have

733
01:01:57,800 --> 01:02:02,000
as my next point of action in this kind of personal saga for me?

734
01:02:02,460 --> 01:02:10,020
Yeah. Last year, a social media account deletion bill was passed. And I don't know when it becomes

735
01:02:10,040 --> 01:02:16,480
effective, but that kind of hit upon that issue, not with Venmo per se, but more like, you know,

736
01:02:16,560 --> 01:02:21,840
the social accounts that they were kind of in that same trap that they could just couldn't get rid

737
01:02:21,840 --> 01:02:29,060
of it, et cetera. And so you may want to look at that and you may even want to say, hey, this

738
01:02:29,340 --> 01:02:34,720
actually should, you can talk to your local assembly or state senator and say, love this, but

739
01:02:34,780 --> 01:02:41,460
tell them this story and maybe the bill can be enhanced to include these type of apps as well.

740
01:02:41,680 --> 01:02:48,480
So trust me, there is the power of advocacy that if you go to a town hall or pick up the phone and

741
01:02:48,660 --> 01:02:55,580
call, people will listen to you. And I've seen so many examples of that. The second thing is,

742
01:02:55,620 --> 01:03:01,660
is that if your privacy rights have been violated, you can actually, if you're a Californian,

743
01:03:02,300 --> 01:03:04,420
You can file a complaint with us.

744
01:03:04,880 --> 01:03:08,020
Since inception, we've gotten 14,000 complaints.

745
01:03:08,620 --> 01:03:13,100
We, on average, get 150 plus complaints per week.

746
01:03:13,760 --> 01:03:15,340
We have a team that goes through that.

747
01:03:15,680 --> 01:03:23,240
We've actually have had enforcement actions against companies that were triggered by privacy

748
01:03:23,660 --> 01:03:23,820
complaints.

749
01:03:23,930 --> 01:03:28,300
So there are government agencies, at least in California, we're the privacy agency.

750
01:03:28,900 --> 01:03:30,980
DFPI is for financial issues.

751
01:03:31,580 --> 01:03:36,360
There's the attorney general. They have complaint forms. And I can't speak for the other ones,

752
01:03:36,920 --> 01:03:41,840
but I know for a fact that we've actually done enforcement actions based on consumer complaints.

753
01:03:42,160 --> 01:03:47,700
And then finally, on privacy.ca.gov, even if you're not in California, if you go to the tips

754
01:03:48,200 --> 01:03:52,860
area, those are tips that anyone can take advantage of where we document the things

755
01:03:53,280 --> 01:03:57,320
that you can do to better protect your privacy. A lot of them are things that you probably have

756
01:03:57,340 --> 01:04:03,040
talked about on your podcast, you know, password managers, multi-factor authentication, turn off

757
01:04:03,140 --> 01:04:08,640
location tracking, reset your mobile advertising ID or delete it, you know, things of that nature

758
01:04:08,760 --> 01:04:13,460
as well. We document those things, turn off third-party cookies, all that stuff is documented.

759
01:04:14,180 --> 01:04:18,280
That's great. Is there anything that you feel like we didn't cover today that you wanted to

760
01:04:18,700 --> 01:04:25,480
share? No, this has been a great conversation. I greatly appreciate all the questions and the

761
01:04:25,500 --> 01:04:30,120
interest you have. Hopefully this was a value or checked off some questions that you may have had.

762
01:04:30,579 --> 01:04:36,440
Huge. I mean, so, you know, I've been using a private service and even when I try to give

763
01:04:36,540 --> 01:04:41,180
like recommendations for people, when they ask me what I'm doing or they want to get advice,

764
01:04:41,860 --> 01:04:45,480
I'm always saying, well, I don't know yet about Drop. You know, it hasn't actually started yet.

765
01:04:46,480 --> 01:04:49,800
And I'm still a bit unclear in some of the details. And so I think actually later today,

766
01:04:49,900 --> 01:04:53,560
I'm going to go ahead and I haven't done it yet. So I'm going to do it. I'm going to do the Drop.

767
01:04:53,660 --> 01:04:55,000
I know, right?

768
01:04:55,090 --> 01:04:56,340
I'm one of the later people.

769
01:04:57,220 --> 01:04:59,000
But I'm also more skeptical of these kind of things

770
01:04:59,170 --> 01:05:00,560
because I know what it means

771
01:05:00,630 --> 01:05:01,980
to have to upload your identification.

772
01:05:02,290 --> 01:05:03,460
And so having this conversation

773
01:05:03,590 --> 01:05:04,760
really cleared a lot of things up for me.

774
01:05:04,760 --> 01:05:05,820
So I'm going to go ahead and give that a shot.

775
01:05:06,080 --> 01:05:07,520
And I'm sure I'll do a video reporting

776
01:05:07,620 --> 01:05:10,000
how it all goes once I get through it.

777
01:05:10,000 --> 01:05:10,360
That'd be great.

778
01:05:10,440 --> 01:05:11,400
Let me know.

779
01:05:11,660 --> 01:05:14,780
And yeah, you only have to do your photo ID

780
01:05:14,920 --> 01:05:16,280
if you use the login.gov

781
01:05:16,430 --> 01:05:18,900
to verify that you're resident right there.

782
01:05:18,900 --> 01:05:20,200
And that's not our requirement.

783
01:05:20,400 --> 01:05:21,940
That's just login.gov.

784
01:05:22,200 --> 01:05:28,880
And we made that as one of the options that there's a lot of people, especially older people, have social security accounts.

785
01:05:29,040 --> 01:05:31,080
So it just made it easy for them to get in.

786
01:05:31,460 --> 01:05:37,040
Most people use the first option for residency verification, which is put some basic personal information.

787
01:05:37,580 --> 01:05:40,180
And then it's like, OK, yeah, you pay taxes here.

788
01:05:40,200 --> 01:05:41,260
You look to be a real human.

789
01:05:41,640 --> 01:05:42,480
You've got a real phone number.

790
01:05:42,840 --> 01:05:43,580
Boom, you're a resident.

791
01:05:44,220 --> 01:05:47,620
And then you can go straight in and put the basic information into the drop platform.

792
01:05:48,580 --> 01:05:48,960
That's perfect.

793
01:05:49,640 --> 01:05:50,500
Yeah, well, thank you, Tom.

794
01:05:50,580 --> 01:05:53,640
This has been invaluable to myself and I know many other people listening.

795
01:05:54,560 --> 01:05:57,640
And I will keep up with everything that you guys are doing.

796
01:05:57,770 --> 01:05:58,220
This is awesome.

797
01:05:58,540 --> 01:05:59,900
Yeah, well, thanks a lot.

798
01:06:00,580 --> 01:06:05,860
And that, everybody, is the interview with Tom from the CPPA regarding most particularly

799
01:06:06,350 --> 01:06:06,480
Drop.

800
01:06:06,740 --> 01:06:09,900
It's something that I've avoided for months now because I didn't know whether or not to

801
01:06:10,080 --> 01:06:10,400
trust it.

802
01:06:10,430 --> 01:06:15,480
But after having this interview, I felt a lot more confident proceeding with Drop and combining

803
01:06:15,570 --> 01:06:20,140
it with easy opt-outs, at least for now, is going to be my strategy leaving this interview.

804
01:06:20,220 --> 01:06:28,320
I think no matter what, if you have friends or family members and you are based out of California, this is a great tool to recommend to them, especially if they're using nothing right now.

805
01:06:28,400 --> 01:06:31,420
I think this is probably one of the best entry points that we've seen.

806
01:06:32,020 --> 01:06:40,500
And if you're outside of California and you want something similar to this, it's worth pointing to the California stuff that they're doing and saying, hey, we want this too.

807
01:06:41,160 --> 01:06:44,880
And maybe other people will start communicating that as well and we can start to see this spread.

808
01:06:45,080 --> 01:06:49,820
If you enjoyed this interview, you can support Techlore Talks down in the description by becoming a TechLorean.

809
01:06:49,880 --> 01:06:51,640
or just join our newsletter.

810
01:06:51,710 --> 01:06:53,260
If you want to keep up with the latest news,

811
01:06:53,700 --> 01:06:56,540
I'll keep you all updated on if there's anything going on to drop,

812
01:06:56,770 --> 01:07:00,480
any data breaches, and anything to help keep control of your digital life

813
01:07:00,630 --> 01:07:04,020
so that you know what's going on without needing to follow all the news yourself.

814
01:07:04,380 --> 01:07:05,180
Thank you all for listening.

815
01:07:05,640 --> 01:07:06,340
Thank you all for learning.

816
01:07:06,700 --> 01:07:08,820
And I'll see you next time on Techlore Talks.