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Ned: Once again, I spent 30-plus minutes

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fighting with my webcam and microphone setup.

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Chris: You mean the webcam that you bought because it was going to be easier?

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Ned: That’s the one, yeah.

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Chris: Yeah.

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It’s going good, then?

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Ned: Going great.

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There was a firmware upgrade that failed.

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So, then I had to look it up, and what I discovered is that the

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cable they ship you is a USB-C to USB-C, which I happen to have

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a USB-C port on my computer, so that’s what I plugged it into.

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If you try to do the firmware upgrade across that cable, it will fail.

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Because everything is awful, and burn it with fire [laugh]

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.
 Chris: Cool.

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Ned: Oh hello, alleged human, and welcome to the Chaos Lever podcast.

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My name is Ned, and I’m definitely not a robot.

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I’m a real human person who has roots, and sentience, and

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gets jokes, and sometimes I even go for a long strolls

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with my canine companion who is also not a robot, for real.

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With me as Chris, who’s also here.

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Hi, Chris.

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Chris: I really thought you were going to say

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that the dog is here and is now the new co-host.

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Ned: [laugh] . Don’t tempt me [laugh]

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.
 Chris: Hard decisions have been made.

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Kibble bribery has happened.

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Ned: Ah yes.

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Bark-a-tron 3000.

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Has opinions, and he wants you to hear about them.

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Chris: Especially about the mailman.

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Ned: [laugh] . Mostly the UPS guy.

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Just loses his goddamn mind over that.

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That and a woman pushing a stroller.

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That’s just, like, Threat Level Midnight.

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Chris: Can you imagine if there was just a number of packages in the stroller?

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Ned: His brain would explode.

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Central Processing Unit just, pop.

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[I had] a really weird experience walking the dog this morning.

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Like the actual real dog… and not my fake

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robot dog that we used for the sake of a bit.

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We’re walking, and we look across the street, and there’s a fox.

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Now that, in and of itself, is not odd.

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We see foxes all the time.

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But the fox stopped and stared at us, and then started mewling.

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I learned what the fox says, and it sounds kind of like a dying baby.

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Chris: Mmm, yeah, that sounds about right.

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Ned: And it just continued to do that, looking at us.

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And my dog was very disturbed by this, as was I.

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It’s also, like, 5:30 a.m.

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so it’s barely light outside.

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So, we walk slowly in the other direction, keeping an eye

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on that fox, and now I’m a little scared to go outside.

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Chris: Well, that’s a useful and fun PSA, that if you’re

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out in the woods, and you hear what sounds like a baby

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crying, do not try to find it because it’s not a baby.

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It’s an animal with teeth, and probably rabies, and maybe a knife.

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Ned: [laugh] . They are tricksie.

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That’s one thing I’ve learned from Aesop’s Fables: you can’t trust a fox.

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Chris: A gift that keeps on giving.

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Ned: Every day of my life.

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Anyhow, you did a thing, or you wrote a thing about a thing you didn’t do.

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Chris: Hey, hey, hey.

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Ned: [laugh]

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.
 Chris: You settle down.

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This is a long-standing tradition on this show, where I don’t go

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to various conferences, tell you about it, so you don’t have to go.

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Ned: Yay.

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Chris: I’m helping.

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Ned: Sure.

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Chris: In particular, in this instance, we will be talking about the RSA

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conference, or RSAC as they insist on calling it, which I absolutely will not.

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Ned: That makes me really uncomfortable.

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Chris: [laugh]

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.
 Ned: Like, I shifted around in my seat a little bit when you said that.

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Chris: Now, for those who aren’t a hundred percent familiar, the RSA Conference

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is one of the premier security conferences that comes along every year.

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This year, it was held in San Francisco, which is not

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a surprise because it’s always held in San Francisco.

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Duh.

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Ned: Of course.

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Chris: Now, in another long-standing tradition, as

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discussed before, I didn’t go, but I heard about it.

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Ned: Yay.

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Chris: So, as usual, the sessions did all get recorded, and if you

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bought the remote attendees On-Demand Pass, you can watch them all now.

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And you can in fact, still buy the On-Demand

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Pass if this stuff is all interesting to you.

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There are already some sessions available for

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free, especially the keynote-y type sessions.

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Now, their official statement on the matter is that this

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stuff starts to become available approximately 30 days after

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the conference, but they’re actually already sharing them.

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There’s a good amount out there, and

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they’re going to just keep on trickling out.

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So, keep an eye on the RSA Conference’s YouTube channel if you’re

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interested in what you can see from this conference for free.

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Now, I said keynote-y type sessions and I said that for a reason.

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There are 36 keynotes.

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Ned: Uh— [sigh] —I—

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Chris: Which, if you’re doing the math at home, is a lot.

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Ned: It ceases to be a keynote at that point.

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Right?

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Chris: Right.

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Ned: Right.

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Chris: Correct.

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Ned: Okay.

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Chris: Because if you look up the definition for keynote,

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it’s a quote, “Talk that establishes a main underlying

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theme.” One would assume from this that there’s one.

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This has stopped being a thing for way too long now.

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Now, before we even talk about the conference, I want to

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start a change.org petition to call it something else.

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Ned: Okay.

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Chris: How about we’ve got ‘sessions,’ of which there are an

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infinite amount, “The keynote,” of which there is one, and the

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super-duper, fancy special speeches, of which there can be 36.

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Ned: Sure.

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Chris: Longer name, sounds way more important that way.

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Who says no?

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Ned: Can’t we just call them, like, ‘Premier Sessions?’

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Chris: Oh, that’s good, too.

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I think mine’s better, but that’s good, too.

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Ned: All right.

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Chris: We’ll workshop it.

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Ned: Of course.

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And, you know, if listeners have suggestions, write them in.

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Let us know.

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Chris: Yeah.

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Okay.

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So, on to more serious topics.

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Ned: Okay.

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Chris: Let’s start with the obvious question that a lot of people probably

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don’t know: what the hell does RSA stand for in the name RSA Conference?

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I’m not going to lie, I have probably looked this up ten

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times, found out about it, and then forgot it ten times.

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So, I had to look it up again.

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And it’s not as exciting as you might think.

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It’s actually just made up of last name initials of the cofounders of RSA.

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That would be Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adelman.

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Get it?

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R.

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S.

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A.

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Ned: I get things.

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I’m smart [laugh]

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.
 Chris: So, there you have it.

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One mystery solved.

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[singing] And we’ve only just begun.

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Ned: Oh.

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Chris: And we’re sued.

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Ned: Eh, always.

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Always.

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Folks may be familiar with RSA if they look at different encryption

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types because RSA is one of the encipherment types, I think.

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Chris: Encipherment?

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Ned: Yes.

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It’s a word I use.

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Chris: That is absolutely not a word.

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Ned: [laugh] . It is now [laugh]

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.
 Chris: It sounds like something you get six months in jail for.

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Ned: [laugh] . Encipherment, right next to embezzling?

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Chris: [laugh]

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.
 Ned: He enciphered the company for thousands of dollars.

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I think it is a cipher type.

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Chris: Yes.

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Ned: So, you may have seen it there.

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Chris: Anyway, the theme of the conference—and they actually did have

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a theme—was ‘The Art of the Possible,’ which sounds wishy-washy, and

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more like you know the title of an airport self-help book than something

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that would be around relevant topics in technology, but in the way

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of the old blessing slash curse, “May you live in interesting times,”

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get to think a little deeper about ‘The Art of the Possible’ name.

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Kind of, the idea here is, not only what we as

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technologists can do, as you know, security professionals

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can do, what is possible that our adversaries can do.

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Ehhh?

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Ehhhh?

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Anyway.

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Ned: As a response to whether or not this is a self-help book, it is.

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It’s called The Art of the Possible: Create An

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Organization With no Limits, written by Daniel M.

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Jacobs in 2010, and it is, quote, “An integrated

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leadership and management guide to success.”

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Chris: Why do you insist on putting the audience to sleep?

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Ned: [laugh] . Well, I didn’t actually try to read it to you, though,

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that would absolutely put everyone to sleep, probably me included.

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Chris: That’s on the Patreon page.

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Ned: [laugh] . We should have one of those.

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Chris: So, with 36 sessions listed as a keynote, it was

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a little difficult to pin down where to start [laugh] and

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what the main mission of this year was supposed to be.

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But if you look at the schedule—and that is also available on

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their website—the first one that was not weird, was put on by Hugh

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Thompson, who is a big-wig at RSA, and did a number of keynotes.

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But this one, I think, got as close to a main topic or a main

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overarching theme speech type of thing that we’re going to get.

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It was titled “The Power of Community”, and is

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available for streaming on their YouTube channel.

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It’s only 18 minutes.

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It’s worth the watch, actually.

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It’s very entertaining.

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The guy’s good.

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The main theme of the speech was basically

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that none of us is smarter than all of us.

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Now, on the one hand, you might think this is a cynical

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message that only serves to reiterate the importance of

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paying a lot of money to go to a security conference.

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Ned: Fair.

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Chris: But on the other hand, he’s kind of right.

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These conferences are, in fact, a sharing of knowledge enabling every security

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practitioner to learn just a little bit more about their own areas of expertise,

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and the ones they need to know, but never had any type of experience with.

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And to that end, he talked about two things that are really good life

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lessons for conference-going that we’ve actually discussed before.

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The first one is to attend sessions outside of your wheelhouse

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because sometimes it might not help, but often it actually will.

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It’s fairly surprising to hear other subject-matter experts

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talk about what they’re passionate about, and then be able

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to kind of think about your own stuff in a different way.

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Ned: Mm-hm.

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Chris: External perspectives on other technologies

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opening up little neural pathways in your brain.

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It does actually help.

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Ned: It does.

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I agree.

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Chris: And the second one is a stupid thing.

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He thinks that you should talk to people.

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Ned: Bah, no.

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Chris: What?

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Ned: Thumbs down.

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Chris: You fool.

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Ned: [laugh]

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.
 Chris: No, he enjoined the audience to, quote, “Meet at least three

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new people.” Which, to me, sounds terrifying and counterproductive.

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As all security practitioners know, new people

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have cooties, and they’re all out to get me.

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Ned: Uh-huh.

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Chris: I mean us.

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Ned: Yes.

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Chris: But if you wanted to get cooties, there was something

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like 42,000 people wandering around the halls of the RSA

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Conference, drinking stale coffee to give it a shot with.

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Ned: Wow, I did not realize it was 42,000 people.

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That’s getting up there with, like, re:Invent numbers.

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Chris: It is creeping up there, and it is a bit of a surprise.

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It also explains perhaps why there were 36 keynotes, but probably not.

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Ned: [laugh] . Still, no.

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Chris: Now, all of that being said, let’s talk about some of the themes of the

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conference, based on the material that they actually shared in the sessions.

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So first, with a bullet, you’re not going to believe this.

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Ned, I hope you’re sitting down.

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Ned: Can I sit down lower?

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Would that help?

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Chris: Can you put a chair on a chair, and then sit on that chair?

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Ned: Okay.

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Chris: Because that’s the kind of sitting down

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you’re going to need because this is a shocker.

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AI was a big old topic.

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Ned: [big silly gasp]

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.
 Chris: I warned you.

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Ned: Damn it.

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I should have been sitting on a milk crate.

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[I need stability]

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.
 Chris: I mean, good God, man.

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Of the 36 keynotes, 13 of them were directly AI-related.

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Of the regular sessions, it was 82 out of 298,

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and that is just ones that had AI in the title.

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Ned: Frankly, that seems low.

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Chris: [laugh] . So, what did they actually have to say about AI?

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A lot of what they had to say was not really that surprising.

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Main themes: AI is going to be more and more utilized by both attackers

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and defenders, and it’s an open question if there’s any way to

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guarantee that the defenders will maintain an upper hand going forward.

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Ned: Almost certainly not.

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Chris: Hold that thought.

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Because there is one piece of it that

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might be just the faintest glimmer of hope.

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Ned: Oh, okay.

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Chris: So, before we get to that, there are two things that attackers

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can do now that were just flat out harder for them before AI.

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The first one is, hackers attacking from all over the globe have a problem, and

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that problem is, generally speaking, they don’t speak every language on Earth.

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Ned: True.

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Chris: But they would like to attack everybody on Earth.

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So, what you used to end up with was hilariously poorly

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Google-translated emails that were obvious scams, or attacks, or

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just loaded with malware, and grammatically incorrect things, right?

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AI can help just rewrite communications into natural-sounding language

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for whatever they are trying—whomever they are trying to attack.

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You can do that with ChatGPT, for free, right now, indefinitely.

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Now admittedly, ChatGPT still has an extremely heavy English language

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bias, but they are working on including more and more sources from

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other languages, so it’s going to continue to get better and expand.

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Ned: There’s an interesting theory that I’ve heard proposed before that the

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poor wording syntax and English usage in those emails is somewhat intentional.

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Could they get someone to write it in a more natural-sounding way?

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Yes, but they’re using it as a filter to only capture those people

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who would read that email and think it’s perfectly fine because

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in order for their scam to work, they need someone who will read

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that email and think that it’s perfectly fine, and that also they

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should click on the link and transfer $1,000 to a bank account.

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Chris: Interesting theory.

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Ned: I don’t know if it’s a hundred percent

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accurate, but I have heard it proposed.

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Chris: Well, they didn’t talk about that.

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Ned: Well fine.

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Chris: So, stop helping.

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Ned: [laugh] . Okay.

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Chris: So, the second thing that AI can do to help attackers is research.

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Thanks to the careless, wide-open way that people use the

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internet, and the total lack of data sovereignty laws that matter

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at all, there is—and I looked this up—it’s a quatro-bajillion

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data points out there about everyone and every company.

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Ned: [laugh] . Okay.

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Chris: Now, in terms of corporate research,

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previously, you would have to rely on paid services.

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The most famous one that I know of is ZoomInfo, and what they do is collate

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all this information from LinkedIn, from blog posts, from 10-Ks, from

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wherever they can find it, to figure out, how is it company structured?

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What are they up to lately?

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How many employees do they have?

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What are their markets?

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Blahdy, blahdy, blahdy, blah.

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This may not sound like much, but remember, the human element

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is and probably will always be the biggest security risk.

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Figuring out who works where, what they’re responsible

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for, and how a company is structured, both from a personnel

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perspective and potentially from a security perspective—IT

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infrastructure, et cetera—often makes its way into press releases.

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This helps fine-tune long-running attacks, right?

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This is not the fly-by-night scams we were talking about before.

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This is APTs and state-level actors.

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But it makes it so much easier to do this research with AI.

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Now, in terms of people being the worst—just a little side to jaunt

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here, a little venture—the 2024 Verizon Data Breach Investigation

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Report, or DBIR—came out around the same time as the RSA Conference.

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And one of the main numbers to pay attention to from this report was 68%.

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68% of breaches involve a non-malicious human element like

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a person falling victim to a social engineering attack,

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making an error in configuration, et cetera, et cetera.

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Meaning people make mistakes.

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Now, if you want more info about the report, there is a link to it in the

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[show notes] . The report is free, it is informative, and it is depressing.

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Ned: Well, you and I have both read at least

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one Kevin Mitnick book about social engineering.

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And the general way that he got into anything was to figure out

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the organizational structure, and then find a weak point in it.

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And often that weak point is going to be the personal assistant for any of

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the muckety-mucks at a company because they have a vast amount of access—much,

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much more than they’re getting paid to have—and they know where all the

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bodies are buried, all the secrets are, and if you can compromise them,

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then it’s relatively straightforward to compromise the rest of the company.

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Chris: Right.

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Also people that are new to the company.

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Ned: That’s a good one, too, because they don’t

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know the proper procedures, and they’re report—

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Chris: And don’t they know everybody.

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Ned: Right.

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Chris: And they’re probably very stressed out

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to do a good job and to keep everybody happy.

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Ned: Right.

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So, you get a request from Angela over in HR to send over some

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very important information that they need to complete your benefits

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package, and you’d be like, “Sure, I’ll get right on that, Angela.”

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Chris: I like benefits.

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Ned: I—who doesn’t?

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You know, “Participate in our employee bonus

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program.” Like, yeah, I’m responding to that.

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Except Angela doesn’t work for the company [laugh]

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.
 Chris: Right.

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Ned: And now they have all of your personal

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information and your password for some reason.

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Chris: So, let’s pivot, and we’ll talk about what they had to say about

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things from the defenders’ point of view because it’s not all a nightmare.

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Ned: Okay.

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Chris: One thing that could help tilt the balance in favor of defenders

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ties back to the whole, “We’re all in it together,” point from earlier.

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Defenders have a hell of a lot more data than attackers do.

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Bruce Schneier, IT security technology guy extraordinaire, stated it plainly.

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“We have more data than they do.

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LLMs and AI, they be trained on data, therefore, our data stuff

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is going to make our AI stuff better than their AI stuff.” Now,

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he said it a little better than that, but I’m paraphrasing.

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Actually no, I take that back.

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It was an exact quote.

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Ned: All right, fair.

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Chris: So, if you step back and think about it, it does make sense.

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Pick any random EDR company that’s large, like say, SentinelOne—whomever;

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doesn’t matter—now, these companies, they don’t release precise specifics

390
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on their deployments of the field, but SentinelOne proudly states that

391
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they have quote, “Tens of millions,” of protected endpoints out there,

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all of which report back about attacks, SentinelOne vulnerability

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researchers can then take that data and turn it into protections.

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Thus, you have areas of security where you didn’t have

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anything before because you can see what people are doing.

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And there are even areas of security where researchers from

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multiple different companies will pool their resources to

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help increase the overall security posture of everybody.

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So, that’s good.

400
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Attackers, on the other hand, don’t do that.

401
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Ned: [laugh] . Yeah.

402
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Chris: They all work, more or less, alone.

403
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And I don’t care how popular a given piece of malware is.

404
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It’s, one, probably not phoning home like that because that would

405
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be immediately discovered by network trackers, and two, they’re not

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hitting tens of millions of anything, except maybe dollars they get

407
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from ransomware payments that are never disclosed to the public.

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Ned: Wa-wah.

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Chris: Quote, “We have a very rich data source which, uncommonly, is

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an asymmetry in favor of the defender that we don’t see very often,”

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unquote, stated Daniel Rohrer, VP of Software Product Security at Nvidia.

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So, what does all this add up to?

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From the AI perspective, what it adds up to is finely tuned LLMs.

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Not general stuff like ChatGPT, but we’re talking about very focused

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things based on security, trained on that huge amount of data to

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help with things like identifying adversarial behavior, zero-day

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protections, and eventually, even things like auto-remediation.

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You can have a listener on each endpoint that tracks for all this stuff;

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if it sees something nightmarish, it could just turn off the network.

420
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Now, it’s going to take a long time for people to be comfortable

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with auto remediation based on AI, but if we look far enough

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into the future, and I’m thinking probably less than five

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years, my guess is that this is going to become the norm.

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Ned: We’ve already seen a flood of security vendors adding AI into all

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their marketing materials, which some of that is, you know, just marketing,

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marketecture—vaporware, if you will—but a lot of it is we’re bolting on a

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new feature to our existing offering that makes use of a trained LLM that we

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trained on our giant pool of data we’ve collected from all of our clients.

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Chris: Right.

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Ned: So, I think, from a security perspective, that could happen pretty rapidly.

431
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What’s a little more difficult is putting in the detection portion that

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you’re talking about because that needs to be closer to the endpoint.

433
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So, we’re going to have to wait for, probably, some specialized hardware to be

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available—the sort of TPUs, GPUs, XPUs—to be available on these endpoint devices

435
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to do that real-time scanning if you’re looking for that level of protection.

436
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Chris: TPU, of course, as everyone knows, is the Toilet Paper Unit.

437
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Ned: Yes [sigh]

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.
 Chris: I got jokes, man.

439
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I got jokes.

440
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Ned: It’s fantastic.

441
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No notes.

442
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Chris: [laugh] . Oh, Bark-a-tron 3000 looks so disappointed in me.

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Ned: [laugh] . He’s kind of licking his own ass, but whatever.

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Chris: Okay.

445
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Moving on.

446
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Something else that was a big topic.

447
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Everybody’s favorite four letter word: regulations.

448
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These are a— [mouth noises]

449
00:23:10,370 --> 00:23:10,857
—
 Ned: [laugh]

450
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.
 Chris: That is not important.

451
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Just… doing the thing over here.

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Ned: All right.

453
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Chris: So, it was a big concern at the conference.

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Honestly, it’s a big concern all over the

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world, and it does have relations to AI.

456
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But first, one thing that came out at the conference

457
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was the quote, “Secure by Design,” pledge.

458
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Now, this was created by CISA, and is intended to ensure that quote, “Products

459
00:23:37,530 --> 00:23:42,039
should be secure to use out of the box, with secure configurations enabled

460
00:23:42,049 --> 00:23:46,310
by default, and security features such as multifactor authentication,

461
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logging, and single sign on available at no additional cost.” So, this

462
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pledge is super great, and I hope that it gets a ton of attention.

463
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It is disappointing and more than a little galling that it has to exist,

464
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but as the SSO, Wall of Shame website clearly shows, plenty of vendors have

465
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no qualms whatsoever charging extra to enable features like single sign-on.

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Ned: Yeah.

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Chris: Now, at the conference, 68 companies, including big-wigs

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like AWS, Google, Cisco, Microsoft, and IBM, signed the pledge.

469
00:24:27,420 --> 00:24:28,370
Kind of a big deal.

470
00:24:28,950 --> 00:24:30,450
Except, of course, that it’s not binding.

471
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It’s not a law.

472
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Ned: [laugh] . That’s true.

473
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Chris: But it does at least commit these companies from a PR perspective to work

474
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towards the increased product security goals over the course of the next year.

475
00:24:43,660 --> 00:24:44,950
So, why was this important?

476
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In my opinion, it’s one of those ‘which way is the wind blowing’ kind of moves.

477
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To wit, it is likely that these companies are trying to self-regulate to

478
00:24:55,140 --> 00:24:59,929
get ahead of the world’s various governing bodies regulating for them.

479
00:25:00,770 --> 00:25:03,989
To that end, other regulations are already happening.

480
00:25:04,510 --> 00:25:05,009
Ned: Mm-hm.

481
00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:06,550
Chris: There was a lot of discussion about these.

482
00:25:06,559 --> 00:25:11,180
In Europe, there is NIS2 and DORA, which focus on cybersecurity

483
00:25:11,190 --> 00:25:15,040
mandates and operational resilience requirements respectively.

484
00:25:15,450 --> 00:25:16,630
Ned: And also finding the map.

485
00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:17,440
Chris: Ugh.

486
00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:18,980
Ned: I’m sorry.

487
00:25:19,850 --> 00:25:20,310
So, sorry.

488
00:25:21,179 --> 00:25:24,250
[laugh] . I can’t tell if you’re frozen or just mad at me [laugh]

489
00:25:25,509 --> 00:25:28,609
.
 Chris: [laugh] . For whatever reason, America continues to

490
00:25:28,609 --> 00:25:31,909
trail behind Europe on things like this, but it does stand

491
00:25:31,910 --> 00:25:34,610
to reason that we will have them sooner rather than later.

492
00:25:35,210 --> 00:25:39,129
Now, we already know about the cybersecurity mandate and the AI

493
00:25:39,130 --> 00:25:43,959
mandate, all basically just things that were executive-summarized.

494
00:25:44,429 --> 00:25:47,239
My assumption is that we will get a law at some point.

495
00:25:47,619 --> 00:25:48,580
Ned: It seems likely, yeah.

496
00:25:48,859 --> 00:25:54,630
Chris: Along the AI footpath to this issue, AI regulation and governments were

497
00:25:54,640 --> 00:26:03,360
big talking points, not just from regulating and governing AI, but using AI to

498
00:26:03,360 --> 00:26:08,060
make sure that your company stays compliant with regulations and governance.

499
00:26:09,090 --> 00:26:14,350
So, if you’ve ever looked into any of these regulations, you will know

500
00:26:14,360 --> 00:26:21,530
that there are, I think, six times eleventy-bajillion attestations and data

501
00:26:21,530 --> 00:26:26,980
points that have to be collected in order to prove evidence of compliance.

502
00:26:27,830 --> 00:26:31,230
There’s actually a huge subcomponent of the consulting world that

503
00:26:31,230 --> 00:26:34,790
is based exclusively around helping companies prove this compliance.

504
00:26:35,759 --> 00:26:38,250
A subcomponent of the consulting world that might be a little

505
00:26:38,250 --> 00:26:41,230
worried that AI tools are going to come around and do that.

506
00:26:42,190 --> 00:26:42,710
Ned: Yeah.

507
00:26:43,270 --> 00:26:48,260
And they’re almost necessary at this point because of all the security

508
00:26:48,260 --> 00:26:54,150
frameworks that we’ve baked into various deployments of compute and whatnot.

509
00:26:54,849 --> 00:26:58,409
They all have a virtual TPM now, they all are doing attestation

510
00:26:58,410 --> 00:27:01,820
of boot—not all, but a lot of them are doing that—and something

511
00:27:01,820 --> 00:27:04,620
needs to verify all of that and keep up to date with that.

512
00:27:04,630 --> 00:27:08,970
We’re generating so many more data points, as you said, there’s no

513
00:27:08,970 --> 00:27:12,870
way a human, even a consultant that’s getting paid thousands and

514
00:27:12,870 --> 00:27:16,840
thousands of dollars an hour, can comb through all of that and prove it.

515
00:27:16,910 --> 00:27:21,800
We need something to do, sort of, just gather it all up and look

516
00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:24,850
through it and then give us back a thumbs up or a thumbs down.

517
00:27:25,550 --> 00:27:25,830
Chris: Right.

518
00:27:26,860 --> 00:27:31,279
There were tons of other AI notes in dribs and drabs.

519
00:27:31,790 --> 00:27:35,880
Things like utilizing AI for data protection, utilizing AI for

520
00:27:35,889 --> 00:27:40,140
micro-segmentation, utilizing AI for log management and observability,

521
00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:45,680
using AI to make you a sandwich, et cetera, et cetera, [big gasp] et cetera.

522
00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:49,440
There’s a lot of AI, I guess is what I’m saying.

523
00:27:49,940 --> 00:27:50,559
Ned: It’s what I’m hearing.

524
00:27:51,139 --> 00:27:53,630
Chris: One thing that was notable for its

525
00:27:53,670 --> 00:27:57,550
absence, was the concept of zero trust.

526
00:27:57,960 --> 00:27:58,370
Ned: Oh.

527
00:27:58,490 --> 00:28:01,399
Chris: In previous years, zero trust was

528
00:28:01,410 --> 00:28:04,850
the belle of the ball at these conferences.

529
00:28:05,500 --> 00:28:11,149
This year, it showed up in a mere two sessions, and zero keynotes.

530
00:28:11,899 --> 00:28:14,970
Ned: That is a significant drop-off from, like, two years ago.

531
00:28:15,490 --> 00:28:16,870
Chris: Even last year, yeah.

532
00:28:16,940 --> 00:28:17,610
It’s crazy.

533
00:28:18,210 --> 00:28:23,160
So, the absence is probably down to a few things.

534
00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:29,179
First of all, companies that have embraced ZT are already

535
00:28:29,190 --> 00:28:32,709
doing it, and there’s really not anything to chat about.

536
00:28:33,830 --> 00:28:37,200
It’s an understood topic, philosophically and designalophically.

537
00:28:39,300 --> 00:28:40,490
Ned: Who’s making up words now?

538
00:28:41,320 --> 00:28:45,049
Chris: [laugh] . I mean, I think that’s really the problem is that it’s gone

539
00:28:45,059 --> 00:28:52,370
from marketing buzzword-y razzle-dazzle, to just a standard operating procedure.

540
00:28:52,870 --> 00:28:53,370
Ned: Yeah.

541
00:28:53,860 --> 00:28:57,129
That jives with what I’ve been hearing is, the companies

542
00:28:57,130 --> 00:28:59,720
that are actually doing it are now doing it, and the ones

543
00:28:59,720 --> 00:29:02,939
that it was all just fluff, they are no longer in business—

544
00:29:03,099 --> 00:29:03,379
Chris: Right.

545
00:29:03,660 --> 00:29:05,099
Ned: Or got bought by other companies.

546
00:29:05,949 --> 00:29:09,460
Chris: I mean, and the other thing is, it’s not the new hotness anymore.

547
00:29:10,130 --> 00:29:13,890
So, it’s really hard for its QScore to stay high.

548
00:29:14,650 --> 00:29:18,070
This is the downside of deep engineering concepts like zero trust.

549
00:29:18,799 --> 00:29:22,479
Once you get past that first wave of publicity,

550
00:29:22,830 --> 00:29:24,990
it’s just really hard to keep it top-of-mind.

551
00:29:25,540 --> 00:29:28,910
And since it is such a challenge to, you know, sit down and explain

552
00:29:28,910 --> 00:29:32,500
to somebody, things like zero trust just don’t get nearly as many

553
00:29:32,510 --> 00:29:36,450
influencers keeping up with it as whatever the latest new hotness is.

554
00:29:37,480 --> 00:29:38,770
Ned: But we’re better than that.

555
00:29:38,809 --> 00:29:40,660
Check out our previous episode on Zero Trust DNS.

556
00:29:42,170 --> 00:29:42,330
Ehh?

557
00:29:42,330 --> 00:29:42,360
Chris: [laugh]

558
00:29:43,890 --> 00:29:44,629
.
 Ned: I worked it in there.

559
00:29:44,629 --> 00:29:45,200
That was good.

560
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:46,629
I’m good at this [laugh]

561
00:29:47,110 --> 00:29:49,139
.
 Chris: So, those were all the major things,

562
00:29:49,140 --> 00:29:51,260
and I could go on a little bit, but I won’t.

563
00:29:51,679 --> 00:29:55,849
One thing that was talked about that was interesting and was not necessarily

564
00:29:55,870 --> 00:30:01,780
technical in nature is the pernicious and not-talked about issue of burnout

565
00:30:01,800 --> 00:30:06,580
in IT, particularly in security, and it was boiled down to a couple of

566
00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:10,679
things: number one, there’s not enough people doing it; number two, the

567
00:30:10,679 --> 00:30:16,160
ones that are doing it are overworked and underpaid; number three, the

568
00:30:16,160 --> 00:30:20,959
budgets are just not there for what is required to keep modern IT security

569
00:30:21,260 --> 00:30:25,810
up to date in almost any company; and number four, whenever anything goes

570
00:30:25,820 --> 00:30:32,060
bad, it gets dumped on IT security’s shoulders with basically no support.

571
00:30:32,630 --> 00:30:34,690
Ned: Yeah, that all stacks up for me.

572
00:30:34,690 --> 00:30:40,490
I mean, burnout is a well known issue in IT, writ large.

573
00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:43,209
Security might even be worse.

574
00:30:43,950 --> 00:30:49,069
And we need more people to get into the field, which means

575
00:30:49,070 --> 00:30:52,809
the field needs to be more inviting, which is another issue

576
00:30:52,809 --> 00:30:57,560
with InfoSec as a whole, is it can be rather hostile to new

577
00:30:57,560 --> 00:31:01,639
people, especially ones that don’t fit a particular stereotype.

578
00:31:02,030 --> 00:31:03,439
Chris: That’s because new people have cooties.

579
00:31:03,460 --> 00:31:04,409
We talked about this.

580
00:31:04,620 --> 00:31:04,939
Ned: Yeah.

581
00:31:04,969 --> 00:31:05,640
And they smell.

582
00:31:06,300 --> 00:31:07,799
They smell good, which we don’t like.

583
00:31:08,290 --> 00:31:10,279
No, no good smelling people in InfoSec.

584
00:31:10,420 --> 00:31:11,669
Chris: That’s how you know it’s a trap.

585
00:31:11,719 --> 00:31:14,370
Ned: [laugh] . You’re probably right.

586
00:31:14,970 --> 00:31:15,530
Oh, dear.

587
00:31:15,990 --> 00:31:19,900
If anybody is interested in learning more about the

588
00:31:19,910 --> 00:31:23,280
Secure by Design proposal, we did a whole episode on that.

589
00:31:23,360 --> 00:31:24,389
Do you remember that, Chris?

590
00:31:24,469 --> 00:31:26,670
Chris: Nope, sure don’t [sigh]

591
00:31:26,670 --> 00:31:30,469
.
 Ned: In March, we did a whole episode on Secure by Design and analysis

592
00:31:30,480 --> 00:31:35,679
of the proposal by CISA, and also some reactions to that proposal.

593
00:31:35,810 --> 00:31:38,879
So, if you’re interested, definitely worth checking out that episode.

594
00:31:38,889 --> 00:31:41,190
But hey, thanks for listening or something.

595
00:31:41,190 --> 00:31:43,730
I guess you found it worthwhile enough if you made it all

596
00:31:43,740 --> 00:31:46,110
the way to the end, so congratulations to you, friend.

597
00:31:46,459 --> 00:31:47,829
You accomplished something today.

598
00:31:47,850 --> 00:31:49,770
Now, you can sit on the couch, fire up

599
00:31:49,790 --> 00:31:52,520
your AI prompt and ask it about zero trust.

600
00:31:52,570 --> 00:31:53,740
You’ve earned it.

601
00:31:54,310 --> 00:31:57,910
You can find more about this show by visiting our LinkedIn page, just

602
00:31:57,910 --> 00:32:03,220
search ‘Chaos Lever,’ or go to our newish website, pod.chaoslever.com.

603
00:32:03,799 --> 00:32:06,400
You’ll find show notes, blog posts, and general tomfoolery.

604
00:32:06,620 --> 00:32:10,770
If we got something wrong, we did something you hated, you can leave

605
00:32:10,770 --> 00:32:16,149
us a comment or leave us a voicemail, which we will proudly read, or

606
00:32:16,150 --> 00:32:20,179
maybe even play during our tech news segments [laugh] , so enjoy that.

607
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:23,249
If you want to be heard on tech news, leave us a voicemail.

608
00:32:23,430 --> 00:32:23,970
Go for it.

609
00:32:24,549 --> 00:32:27,070
We’ll be back next week to see what fresh hell is upon us.

610
00:32:27,390 --> 00:32:28,120
Ta-ta for now.

611
00:32:36,389 --> 00:32:39,650
Chris: We’re also not above doing dramatic recreations—

612
00:32:39,860 --> 00:32:40,240
Ned: Oh, yeah.

613
00:32:40,590 --> 00:32:42,920
Chris: In the style of unsolved mysteries, if you prefer.

614
00:32:43,510 --> 00:32:45,300
Ned: [laugh] . If you don’t want us to play

615
00:32:45,300 --> 00:32:47,720
the audio, we will do a dramatic recreation.

616
00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:49,570
We may even bring in a voice actor to do it.

617
00:32:50,110 --> 00:32:51,810
Chris: We’ll make Ned do an Irish accent.

618
00:32:52,380 --> 00:32:53,580
Ned: That goes well [laugh] for everyone.

619
00:32:53,990 --> 00:32:54,060
Chris: [laugh]