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WEBVTT

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All right, we're ready for departure. Here on the Pilot Project Podcast,

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the best source for stories and advice from the pilots of the

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RCAF. Brought to you by Skies magazine and

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RCAF today. I'm your host, Brian Morrison.

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Today, to mark September 11, we'll be talking

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with three air traffic controllers who were on duty that

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day and through the following days. My first guest is

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retired RCAF Air Traffic Controller Rob

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Hogarth. Welcome to the show, Rob.

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Hi, Brian. Thanks for having me.

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Before we get started, we'll go into Rob's bio.

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Rob joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1983 as an air

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navigator, and in 1986, he reclassified to the air

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weapons controller career field. His postings

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included Canada East and CFB North Bay, where he served as

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a Weapons director, or WD, before upgrading

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to Weapons Assignment Officer Wao. This

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was followed by a tour to Fox main dueline site as

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OPSO, and his first outCan posting, which was to the

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8th Missile Warning Squadron at El Dorado Air Force

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Station in Texas as a mission crew commander and chief of

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Standards and evaluations. After his posting to

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Texas, he returned to North Bay, initially as the operations

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rep in Fighter Group Canadian NORAD Region HQ

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Intelligence Office Then staying in North Bay. Rob was

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assigned to the Canadian Air Defense Sector or CADS as a

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combat ready mission crew commander MCC and

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later to 22 Wing North Bay in the tactics

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and training office. His next move was to the Northeast

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Air Defense Sector, or needs in Rome, New York, as a

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mission crew commander. For the listeners, a small note. I made a

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pronunciation error here, and it is actually pronounced

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NEADS, not Needs. Although not on duty the

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morning of the 911 attacks, as a combat ready MCC at

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Needs, he was a part of the team that helped to develop NORAD's

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rapidly changing doctrine to face a previously

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unforeseen threat. Rob retired on September

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11, 2013, after slightly more than 30 years of

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service to his hometown of Cambridge, Ontario, where he still

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lives. So, Rob, uh, we always ask our guests, where did

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aviation begin for you?

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When I was a young child, I got taken to

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an air show when I was about four or five years old

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up at, what's, Waterloo? Wellington Airport.

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And I got to see the early

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stages of the snowbirds, the Golden

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Sanitairs. Got to see fast

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air for the first time with an F Four fandom.

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And from there I was hooked. As I went

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into high school, we had both the

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London Air Show and the Hamilton Air Show, which were running

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both of them in June at the time. So

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I would go see those and see

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everything from World War II

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warbirds right through to

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state of the art aircraft.

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From there, I, uh, selected Ryerson in

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the Aerospace Engineering program, and then it

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just seemed logical to join the Air Force.

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Yeah, it's funny, those are some of the same air shows that I grew

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up seeing because we're from actually the same hometown

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as we were kind of talking about before the show. And those are just great

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air shows. I loved going to the London International Air Show.

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Growing was, uh, it was a lot

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of fun. It was amazing what you could see because

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it was my first real introduction to static

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air shows where you could actually go and talk to the

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pilots and find out what it was like to

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fly the various types of aircraft.

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So what led you to change trades to the air weapons

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controller trade?

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Well, I started off as a navigator, but that

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just wasn't where my skill set was.

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I tried the school not once, but twice,

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and I'm living proof that the system

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works. I

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wasn't successful in it. The NAV School

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had and maintained a very high standard.

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I didn't meet that standard. And after

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two tries, I moved on to

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air weapons control. And

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to be honest, I had a lot more fun being an air

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weapons controller than I think I ever would have as

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a navigator. So it worked out better for

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me and it worked out better for the RCAF.

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Yeah, that sounds like a success story to me.

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How did you get over the mental hurdle of,

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okay, this didn't work out for me, but I'm not going

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to let it sink me? How did you turn that into something

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positive?

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I think it started with the fact that about

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two thirds of the way through the NAV School, I

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was struggling and I was wondering if this

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was the right choice for me. At the

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time, the NAV school was leading to careers

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in Auroras sea Kings

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and Hercs. My interest had

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always been in fast air combat

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jets, predominantly.

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So the transition to air weapons

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control actually put me more where

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my interests lay.

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Can you explain what an air weapons controller is?

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Air weapons control is the old

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air defense, where we would

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sit there in front of a computer screen that

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takes radar feeds from all of our AOR.

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An AOR is an area of responsibility.

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Feeds it all into one computer.

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We track every aircraft that crosses through

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that radar picture. And if any aircraft

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does anything wrong, an air weapons

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controller would scramble fighter aircraft to go

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up and intercept whatever the aircraft was

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that was doing something wrong and

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take action to correct that behavior.

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It could be something as simple as a flight plan getting

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lost. And so we have to go up and positively identify an

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airplane. It could be a, uh,

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Russian bomber flying off of our coast,

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or it could be, in more recent times, something

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similar to the attacks on 911.

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We merged the career fields of air weapons

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control, which dealt predominantly with

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putting fire and steel on target, basically,

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and then air traffic control

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because we had very similar skill sets. We

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both dealt with talking to aircraft,

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making them go where we needed them to go,

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and keeping safe while we're doing it.

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So shifting gears and talking about the

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topic of today's episode, where were you when you found

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out that a plane had hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center?

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I had actually worked an evening shift the night before,

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so I got off at midnight the night before,

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and I had just started onto what I thought

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was going to be days off.

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So got off at midnight,

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went home, got up the next

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morning, grabbed a coffee. I was sitting in front of my

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computer checking email or whatever,

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and I had the radio playing in the background and

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I heard that an airplane had hit the World Trade

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Center. I looked out the window and it was a

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beautiful, clear, blue sky

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day. And I thought, how could a

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pilot be so dumb that he doesn't see

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one of the biggest buildings in Manhattan on a day when

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the weather is clear in a million?

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And then a little while later, we hear about

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the plane hitting the South Tower. And then

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I realized it wasn't a pilot who

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was dumb. It appeared to be a

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coordinated attack.

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So you were off duty at the time. Were you

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immediately recalled back in?

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No, actually, exactly the

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opposite. I called in and told the

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mission crew commander who was on duty,

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I can be there in five minutes if you need me.

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And he said, no, we've got it.

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For now, the best thing you can do is just stay

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out of our hair because we're really busy.

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Okay?

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Yeah.

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And I guess that way you'd be rested for your own following

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shift.

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Yeah, I got a phone call at about 11:00 in the

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morning and was told, we're doing a

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total unit recall. Everyone has to

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report for duty. Your first task is

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to immediately go to crew rest,

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report at 06:00 this evening, uh, for at

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least a twelve to 14 hours shift.

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Okay. So what was it like when you first arrived

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for work on the night of September 11?

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It was kind of surreal.

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As I pulled up to the entry control point, normally

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we would show them our restricted area badge and

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they'd wave us through. That night

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we pulled up to the entry control point,

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we had to show our restricted area badge,

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military ID. And then they

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went around the car with a mirror on a

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stick and checked under the car to make sure that we weren't

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carrying in some sort of an IED.

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As I get to the entry control point, I

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looked over my right shoulder, and there, on

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the proverbial grassy knoll,

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was a sandbagged bunker with

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one of our security forces with a machine gun

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pointed at the entry control point.

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If someone had done something wrong, there's absolutely

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no doubt in my mind that even though he knew us,

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he would have taken actions to protect the

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unit. Then, as I got into the

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building, there were signs on the doors telling

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the oncoming crew, do not go into the ops

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room. Go to the break room. Before you go

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into the ops room, the unit commander wants to

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address you. So we gathered and

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at this point we hadn't seen what was going on. We

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didn't know how active the ops

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room was. The

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sector commander comes out to the break room

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and he goes, okay, you're all here.

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Before you go into the ops room, I want to let you

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know we are, for all practical

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purposes, in a state of war.

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We control the skies over North America.

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Nobody flies unless the Air Force says it can

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fly. Uh, for all practical

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purposes, it's a no fly zone over Washington,

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DC. The only aircraft that are

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airborne are military

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aircraft, medevacs

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and police helicopters. Nothing

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else is authorized to get airborne in the DC

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area. When you go into the ops

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room, it'll be unlike anytime you've ever

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done it in the past. Every

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console will be manned. We

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had what they call combat air patrols, or

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Caps, over every major city in

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the northeastern US. So

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he was trying to mentally prepare us for what we were

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about to see when we walked in.

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What were your normal duties at that time?

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Well, going in for a night shift, there might

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be some training going on. Perhaps a squadron had

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something that they needed to train that they couldn't get the

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airspace during the day. Or maybe it was

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something that they needed nighttime to train

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to. So after the training was

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done and any maintenance that needed to be

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done, we basically just sat, ah, back

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and monitored the air picture to look

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for anything that one of my former bosses

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referred to as the three DS. We were looking for

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something dumb, dangerous or different.

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And as long as nothing that met

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those criteria happened, we just

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sat there and monitored.

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Okay.

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And if something did happen, we would react

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dynamically to that.

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And on this night, as you went into the ops room,

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how was it different from those normal nights?

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Well, like I said, it was incredibly

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busy. We had every

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console was manned, most of them with

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weapons team members, weapons directors and their

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technicians. We had a couple extra

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surveillance people, a couple extra identification

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people on duty, and the

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ops tempo was incredibly fast. Keep in

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mind, at that time we only had a couple of

257
00:11:53.126 --> 00:11:56.064
active NORAD air defense bases in each

258
00:11:56.102 --> 00:11:58.796
sector. So we're trying to maintain

259
00:11:58.908 --> 00:12:01.536
combat air patrols over. Well, in the

260
00:12:01.558 --> 00:12:04.464
northeast we had, ah, seven different Caps

261
00:12:04.512 --> 00:12:07.444
airborne at the same time. So each of those

262
00:12:07.482 --> 00:12:10.356
would have a couple of fighters assigned to it, plus a

263
00:12:10.378 --> 00:12:12.748
tanker, in order to keep it sustained.

264
00:12:12.944 --> 00:12:15.384
So it was an

265
00:12:15.422 --> 00:12:18.196
incredibly high ops tempo,

266
00:12:18.388 --> 00:12:21.160
and we're working with units that maybe we hadn't worked

267
00:12:21.230 --> 00:12:24.136
for. We had fighter units calling into our

268
00:12:24.158 --> 00:12:27.016
battle staff and saying, I can give

269
00:12:27.038 --> 00:12:29.996
you this number of fighters, I can give you

270
00:12:30.018 --> 00:12:32.604
this type of fighters, and I can arm them in this

271
00:12:32.642 --> 00:12:35.484
manner. Can we help? We had

272
00:12:35.522 --> 00:12:38.476
tanker units calling and saying, hey, I

273
00:12:38.498 --> 00:12:41.244
can get a KC 135 airborne

274
00:12:41.292 --> 00:12:44.064
with this much offload. Where do you want

275
00:12:44.102 --> 00:12:46.464
it? And so we were

276
00:12:46.582 --> 00:12:49.360
just ad hoc. People were calling in,

277
00:12:49.430 --> 00:12:52.196
trying to help us, and we were putting it

278
00:12:52.218 --> 00:12:55.124
together. As assets became available,

279
00:12:55.322 --> 00:12:58.196
we would look at the situation and go, where can

280
00:12:58.218 --> 00:13:00.964
we use them? Um, and we'd send them to

281
00:13:01.082 --> 00:13:01.940
wherever.

282
00:13:02.360 --> 00:13:05.080
So it was something that was just constantly evolving.

283
00:13:05.420 --> 00:13:06.170
Absolutely.

284
00:13:06.780 --> 00:13:09.272
That night, there was so much going

285
00:13:09.326 --> 00:13:12.052
on that information overload

286
00:13:12.116 --> 00:13:14.776
became a real factor. We had all of our

287
00:13:14.798 --> 00:13:17.768
fighter units. We had our region headquarters,

288
00:13:17.864 --> 00:13:20.844
which was down in tyndall air force base. We

289
00:13:20.882 --> 00:13:23.660
had NORAD headquarters, we had anyone

290
00:13:23.730 --> 00:13:26.312
who needed to be there was on this trap.

291
00:13:26.456 --> 00:13:29.372
So you'd spend your first hour working

292
00:13:29.426 --> 00:13:32.150
the trap, building your situational awareness, uh,

293
00:13:32.284 --> 00:13:35.056
finding out who was coming into the mission, who

294
00:13:35.078 --> 00:13:37.584
was leaving the mission, when they were

295
00:13:37.622 --> 00:13:39.920
airborne, when they were landing.

296
00:13:40.500 --> 00:13:43.332
If it was someone who we needed to turn the jets around

297
00:13:43.386 --> 00:13:46.164
and get them airborne again when they

298
00:13:46.202 --> 00:13:48.964
were back onto status, all of that

299
00:13:49.002 --> 00:13:51.764
thing, we would chat to everyone who was

300
00:13:51.802 --> 00:13:54.424
using it. Then we'd go from there

301
00:13:54.542 --> 00:13:57.496
to actually performing the MCC duty, where

302
00:13:57.518 --> 00:14:00.152
you're reacting real time to the

303
00:14:00.206 --> 00:14:01.450
evolving situation.

304
00:14:02.380 --> 00:14:04.824
And after about an hour of

305
00:14:04.862 --> 00:14:07.580
that, you were basically

306
00:14:07.730 --> 00:14:10.140
done. So your next

307
00:14:10.210 --> 00:14:13.208
hour would be, go, relax,

308
00:14:13.304 --> 00:14:16.044
decompress, get ready. Because

309
00:14:16.162 --> 00:14:18.976
at the end of that hour, you'd come back, you'd get a

310
00:14:18.998 --> 00:14:21.916
turnover from whoever was working the chat, and you'd

311
00:14:21.948 --> 00:14:24.480
sit right back down and start the chat again.

312
00:14:24.630 --> 00:14:26.396
Yeah, it sounds really intense.

313
00:14:26.588 --> 00:14:29.248
It was. And

314
00:14:29.334 --> 00:14:31.828
especially because at the beginning, keep in mind,

315
00:14:31.914 --> 00:14:34.820
NORAD had a philosophy that any

316
00:14:34.890 --> 00:14:37.860
attack would come from abroad. We were thinking

317
00:14:37.930 --> 00:14:40.500
in terms of pure nations,

318
00:14:41.240 --> 00:14:43.812
to be blunt, probably russia

319
00:14:43.956 --> 00:14:46.552
at the time. So

320
00:14:46.686 --> 00:14:49.432
the concept of an attack coming from within

321
00:14:49.486 --> 00:14:52.010
the shores of north america proper

322
00:14:52.460 --> 00:14:54.810
was totally new to us.

323
00:14:55.420 --> 00:14:58.124
Did you see your role or mission change in the days that

324
00:14:58.162 --> 00:14:59.500
followed 911?

325
00:14:59.920 --> 00:15:02.830
Yeah, initially, like I said, our,

326
00:15:02.830 --> 00:15:05.420
uh, role prior to that was looking

327
00:15:05.490 --> 00:15:08.476
outwards. So all of our radar picture was along the

328
00:15:08.498 --> 00:15:11.456
coast. We didn't really have a lot

329
00:15:11.478 --> 00:15:14.272
of radar coverage at the time in the center

330
00:15:14.326 --> 00:15:17.184
of the country. So the first thing we

331
00:15:17.222 --> 00:15:20.032
noticed is every time we came on duty, we were getting

332
00:15:20.086 --> 00:15:22.500
access to more and more radars.

333
00:15:23.240 --> 00:15:26.144
But, uh, the doctrine was changing

334
00:15:26.192 --> 00:15:28.724
as well. Our rules of engagement were

335
00:15:28.762 --> 00:15:31.684
changing. There was a term that I heard about

336
00:15:31.722 --> 00:15:34.596
the second or third day after going in that

337
00:15:34.618 --> 00:15:37.352
I'd never heard before in, at that point, about

338
00:15:37.406 --> 00:15:40.296
15 years in the air force. And that was the

339
00:15:40.318 --> 00:15:42.872
term a be no line. And during our

340
00:15:42.926 --> 00:15:45.236
turnover briefing, the outgoing

341
00:15:45.268 --> 00:15:48.036
MCC mentioned that the east

342
00:15:48.068 --> 00:15:50.596
coast of the US. Was a be no

343
00:15:50.638 --> 00:15:53.490
line. And I kind of raised my hand. I went,

344
00:15:53.490 --> 00:15:56.110
uh, I've never heard that. What does that mean?

345
00:15:56.640 --> 00:15:59.344
And he goes, there will be no air

346
00:15:59.382 --> 00:16:02.320
force assets past the coast, over

347
00:16:02.390 --> 00:16:04.896
water. The navy has

348
00:16:04.998 --> 00:16:07.356
everything on the approaches to north

349
00:16:07.388 --> 00:16:09.692
America. There will be no naval

350
00:16:09.756 --> 00:16:12.496
assets, fighters, f, uh,

351
00:16:12.518 --> 00:16:14.880
time over the landmass.

352
00:16:15.560 --> 00:16:18.550
So that was something I had never heard before.

353
00:16:19.640 --> 00:16:22.288
We also started changing our airspace

354
00:16:22.384 --> 00:16:25.124
insofar as protecting

355
00:16:25.172 --> 00:16:28.104
the Washington, DC. Area and

356
00:16:28.142 --> 00:16:30.170
the procedures that go into that.

357
00:16:30.780 --> 00:16:33.396
Our rules of engagement changed

358
00:16:33.508 --> 00:16:35.800
from peacetime

359
00:16:36.320 --> 00:16:39.164
through to wartime. And now

360
00:16:39.202 --> 00:16:40.824
it started to include

361
00:16:40.952 --> 00:16:43.384
contingencies that, uh, weren't

362
00:16:43.432 --> 00:16:46.312
necessarily a part of our, uh, rules of engagement

363
00:16:46.376 --> 00:16:49.310
before. So the first few days,

364
00:16:49.920 --> 00:16:52.544
all of that changed, and it

365
00:16:52.582 --> 00:16:55.376
was developed, for lack of a

366
00:16:55.398 --> 00:16:58.272
better term, on the fly. That's not a really

367
00:16:58.326 --> 00:17:00.804
good way to put it, but it's the best I can think

368
00:17:00.842 --> 00:17:02.864
of. All the bureaucracy

369
00:17:02.992 --> 00:17:05.620
disappeared we were using.

370
00:17:05.770 --> 00:17:08.692
Does it make sense tactically, does it make sense

371
00:17:08.746 --> 00:17:11.684
strategically, and can we actually make it

372
00:17:11.722 --> 00:17:14.632
happen? And if we could answer yes

373
00:17:14.686 --> 00:17:17.428
to all of those that became

374
00:17:17.524 --> 00:17:20.072
our new doctrine, now, that might

375
00:17:20.126 --> 00:17:22.984
change a couple of days later, but, uh, for

376
00:17:23.022 --> 00:17:25.772
today, that was the step, and it was a very

377
00:17:25.826 --> 00:17:27.310
iterative process.

378
00:17:28.720 --> 00:17:31.196
And that's what happened in the first couple of

379
00:17:31.218 --> 00:17:31.790
days.

380
00:17:32.800 --> 00:17:35.132
Did you see anything or were you involved in any

381
00:17:35.186 --> 00:17:37.580
specifically significant events through this?

382
00:17:37.730 --> 00:17:40.464
Yeah, I was. There were a couple that were kind of

383
00:17:40.502 --> 00:17:43.040
funny and a couple that were very

384
00:17:43.110 --> 00:17:45.504
serious. A couple of days

385
00:17:45.622 --> 00:17:48.384
after September 11, while we were

386
00:17:48.422 --> 00:17:50.320
still working on our procedures,

387
00:17:51.160 --> 00:17:54.020
and while the special

388
00:17:54.090 --> 00:17:56.800
ops guys were working on their procedures

389
00:17:56.880 --> 00:17:59.830
because they had their own mission to do,

390
00:18:00.920 --> 00:18:03.880
there was an airplane flying in from, uh, I believe

391
00:18:03.950 --> 00:18:06.852
miami, if I'm not mistaken, into Washington,

392
00:18:06.916 --> 00:18:09.352
DC. And he

393
00:18:09.406 --> 00:18:12.116
reported something unusual

394
00:18:12.228 --> 00:18:14.490
to air traffic control.

395
00:18:15.180 --> 00:18:17.916
Air traffic control then alerted us

396
00:18:18.098 --> 00:18:20.990
and asked us if we had information on it.

397
00:18:21.520 --> 00:18:24.444
And we never did find out exactly what it

398
00:18:24.482 --> 00:18:27.452
was, but we believe to this

399
00:18:27.506 --> 00:18:30.176
day, I'm convinced it was

400
00:18:30.358 --> 00:18:33.248
a special ops team doing

401
00:18:33.334 --> 00:18:35.952
a halo jump, the high altitude, low

402
00:18:36.006 --> 00:18:38.800
opening parachute jump, because

403
00:18:38.870 --> 00:18:40.192
an airplane at about

404
00:18:40.246 --> 00:18:42.772
25,000ft had its

405
00:18:42.826 --> 00:18:45.796
pilot report that he just had this

406
00:18:45.818 --> 00:18:48.804
is an exact quote a dude in

407
00:18:48.842 --> 00:18:51.524
a scuba suit just flew past his

408
00:18:51.562 --> 00:18:54.496
cockpit. So it was probably a little

409
00:18:54.538 --> 00:18:57.416
eye opening for the pilot of the airliner, but

410
00:18:57.518 --> 00:18:59.880
probably a lot eye opening

411
00:19:00.380 --> 00:19:02.036
for the guy doing the jump.

412
00:19:02.148 --> 00:19:03.268
Yeah, no kidding.

413
00:19:03.364 --> 00:19:06.136
So we just about had a midair collision between

414
00:19:06.238 --> 00:19:08.924
some guy doing a halo jump and an

415
00:19:08.962 --> 00:19:11.692
airliner. So that was one of the more

416
00:19:11.746 --> 00:19:14.732
light hearted events. I wasn't on

417
00:19:14.786 --> 00:19:17.516
duty the morning of the attacks, but I seemed to be on

418
00:19:17.538 --> 00:19:20.064
duty when most of the other stuff happened in

419
00:19:20.102 --> 00:19:23.056
the following time frame. Got a

420
00:19:23.078 --> 00:19:25.692
call one Saturday about a month after September

421
00:19:25.756 --> 00:19:28.576
11, and by this time, our

422
00:19:28.598 --> 00:19:30.996
procedures were starting to get a bit more

423
00:19:31.098 --> 00:19:33.604
concrete. And it

424
00:19:33.642 --> 00:19:36.564
was, uh, about an airliner going from

425
00:19:36.682 --> 00:19:38.976
London Heathrow to Miami.

426
00:19:39.168 --> 00:19:42.036
And on board was somebody

427
00:19:42.138 --> 00:19:45.028
who tried to light a bomb

428
00:19:45.124 --> 00:19:46.244
in his shoe.

429
00:19:46.372 --> 00:19:47.384
Oh, yeah.

430
00:19:47.582 --> 00:19:50.424
Obviously, he wasn't successful. But we

431
00:19:50.462 --> 00:19:52.900
scrambled fighters on that jet, uh,

432
00:19:52.900 --> 00:19:55.776
intercepted it, and instead of going to Miami,

433
00:19:55.828 --> 00:19:57.820
we diverted it into Boston.

434
00:19:58.320 --> 00:20:01.096
So I was directly involved with the shoe

435
00:20:01.128 --> 00:20:03.756
bomber. Another one that really sticks in

436
00:20:03.778 --> 00:20:06.680
mind. Probably one of the closest that,

437
00:20:06.680 --> 00:20:09.616
uh, I've personally ever come to being involved with a

438
00:20:09.638 --> 00:20:12.544
shootdown was the

439
00:20:12.582 --> 00:20:15.484
day that President Reagan's body was being flown

440
00:20:15.532 --> 00:20:18.304
from California back to Washington to

441
00:20:18.342 --> 00:20:20.400
Lion State at the Capitol,

442
00:20:21.400 --> 00:20:23.940
we had fighters in a cap over

443
00:20:24.010 --> 00:20:26.784
Washington. These particular fighters

444
00:20:26.832 --> 00:20:29.764
were F 50 e's the Strike Eagles out

445
00:20:29.802 --> 00:20:32.496
of Seymour Johnson. They hadn't

446
00:20:32.528 --> 00:20:35.432
flown in the Washington cap before. So

447
00:20:35.486 --> 00:20:38.392
they enter the cap, they put their radars into

448
00:20:38.446 --> 00:20:41.256
ground mapping mode and try to get a feel for

449
00:20:41.278 --> 00:20:44.136
where all the landmarks were. Well, one of

450
00:20:44.158 --> 00:20:46.908
the restrictions in flying in that area

451
00:20:46.994 --> 00:20:49.736
is you had to have a, uh, transponder

452
00:20:49.928 --> 00:20:52.616
and be positively identified by air traffic

453
00:20:52.648 --> 00:20:55.612
control. We had a target coming in

454
00:20:55.666 --> 00:20:58.604
or a track of interest coming in doing about

455
00:20:58.642 --> 00:21:01.280
100 and 3540 knots

456
00:21:01.700 --> 00:21:03.760
that had no transponder.

457
00:21:04.500 --> 00:21:07.296
So we committed one of the fighters out of the

458
00:21:07.318 --> 00:21:10.176
cap. He went down. He identified it

459
00:21:10.198 --> 00:21:13.024
as a Beach King Air, but he couldn't

460
00:21:13.072 --> 00:21:15.984
get his radar out of ground mapping

461
00:21:16.032 --> 00:21:18.292
mode and into any sort of an air to air

462
00:21:18.346 --> 00:21:21.044
mode. So other than getting the

463
00:21:21.082 --> 00:21:23.544
ID. He was essentially useless to

464
00:21:23.582 --> 00:21:25.610
us. If it got

465
00:21:26.060 --> 00:21:28.584
nasty, we could not have

466
00:21:28.622 --> 00:21:31.544
engaged. So we sent him back

467
00:21:31.582 --> 00:21:34.520
up to the cap because we couldn't use him for anything

468
00:21:34.590 --> 00:21:37.340
else. And we started working through

469
00:21:37.410 --> 00:21:40.364
the chain of command to get

470
00:21:40.562 --> 00:21:43.196
authorization, if we needed it,

471
00:21:43.378 --> 00:21:46.220
to use surface to air missiles which were now

472
00:21:46.290 --> 00:21:48.670
surrounding Washington by this time.

473
00:21:49.040 --> 00:21:51.884
But because the surface to air missiles are army

474
00:21:51.932 --> 00:21:54.624
assets, they have different rules of

475
00:21:54.662 --> 00:21:57.136
engagement set than we do with air to

476
00:21:57.158 --> 00:21:59.984
air. So it has to leave the

477
00:22:00.022 --> 00:22:02.752
NORAD rules of engagement chain

478
00:22:02.896 --> 00:22:05.764
and go to a national chain. So

479
00:22:05.882 --> 00:22:08.788
while they're working the authorization to

480
00:22:08.874 --> 00:22:11.844
find out whether or not they'll be authorized to use

481
00:22:11.882 --> 00:22:14.856
a surface air missile, it overflies one

482
00:22:14.878 --> 00:22:16.920
of the surface air missile sites.

483
00:22:17.500 --> 00:22:20.296
And the captain working at the site

484
00:22:20.478 --> 00:22:23.336
got a tail number for us. And

485
00:22:23.438 --> 00:22:26.316
the reason why we didn't shoot it down is because

486
00:22:26.418 --> 00:22:28.750
somehow, over the years,

487
00:22:29.600 --> 00:22:32.124
my mind has become a receptacle for

488
00:22:32.162 --> 00:22:35.036
useless information. And when

489
00:22:35.058 --> 00:22:37.390
the captain at the Sam site

490
00:22:37.860 --> 00:22:40.096
gave us the tail number, it was

491
00:22:40.278 --> 00:22:43.120
November 24 Sierra Papa

492
00:22:43.460 --> 00:22:45.760
and I just screamed,

493
00:22:46.420 --> 00:22:49.072
Sierra Papa. Tail numbers are reserved for

494
00:22:49.126 --> 00:22:52.000
state police. It's a friendly.

495
00:22:52.740 --> 00:22:55.492
Well, once we had the tail number, we were able to track

496
00:22:55.546 --> 00:22:58.256
it back and find out that, yes, air Traffic

497
00:22:58.288 --> 00:23:00.790
control actually did know who it was.

498
00:23:01.400 --> 00:23:04.200
It was the governor of Kentucky trying to come into

499
00:23:04.270 --> 00:23:07.156
Washington to get there before Reagan's

500
00:23:07.188 --> 00:23:10.072
body did. Oh, my gosh. So we

501
00:23:10.126 --> 00:23:12.872
had, at one point, a fighter sitting right

502
00:23:12.926 --> 00:23:15.816
behind it. We were looking at whether or

503
00:23:15.838 --> 00:23:18.808
not to engage it with a surface to air missile,

504
00:23:18.984 --> 00:23:21.884
but the system worked. When we got a tail number, we

505
00:23:21.922 --> 00:23:24.716
found out it was a friendly. And all of a

506
00:23:24.738 --> 00:23:27.260
sudden, everyone breathed a sigh of relief

507
00:23:27.600 --> 00:23:30.592
and just kind of, okay, let's go back to watching

508
00:23:30.646 --> 00:23:33.056
the big picture. This guy's not a

509
00:23:33.078 --> 00:23:33.760
threat.

510
00:23:34.100 --> 00:23:36.336
Wow, that, uh, is crazy.

511
00:23:36.518 --> 00:23:39.264
So you could go into work on any

512
00:23:39.302 --> 00:23:42.156
given day, and it could be

513
00:23:42.198 --> 00:23:44.772
incredibly boring. Not enough

514
00:23:44.826 --> 00:23:47.796
coffee to keep you awake. Or you could

515
00:23:47.818 --> 00:23:50.560
go in and it could be like the shoe bomber,

516
00:23:50.640 --> 00:23:53.092
and you could wind up as breaking news on

517
00:23:53.146 --> 00:23:54.100
CNN.

518
00:23:55.320 --> 00:23:58.288
Back to 911. What effects did you notice this

519
00:23:58.314 --> 00:23:59.610
had on the local community?

520
00:24:00.140 --> 00:24:02.824
The big one was how the local community,

521
00:24:02.942 --> 00:24:05.432
in particular the hospitality community,

522
00:24:05.566 --> 00:24:08.476
pitched in for us. I don't know how, but

523
00:24:08.498 --> 00:24:11.292
they knew we were working twelve to 14 hours

524
00:24:11.346 --> 00:24:13.900
shifts. So we'd go into

525
00:24:13.970 --> 00:24:16.940
work and all of a sudden food

526
00:24:17.010 --> 00:24:19.840
would just show up. And you knew that the

527
00:24:19.910 --> 00:24:22.304
restaurants were coordinating amongst each

528
00:24:22.342 --> 00:24:25.104
other, because we never had food from

529
00:24:25.142 --> 00:24:28.112
two restaurants show up at the same meal. But

530
00:24:28.166 --> 00:24:31.104
every breakfast, lunch, dinner, and a midnight

531
00:24:31.152 --> 00:24:33.860
snack, there'd be a delivery show up,

532
00:24:33.930 --> 00:24:36.244
and there'd be enough for everyone who was on

533
00:24:36.282 --> 00:24:39.124
duty. So, although the

534
00:24:39.162 --> 00:24:41.796
details of what was going on were

535
00:24:41.978 --> 00:24:44.890
never really common knowledge at the time,

536
00:24:45.500 --> 00:24:48.152
they knew there was something going on, obviously,

537
00:24:48.286 --> 00:24:51.210
because of what we do with there.

538
00:24:52.620 --> 00:24:55.524
But, uh, the whole community chipped

539
00:24:55.572 --> 00:24:58.068
in and did what they could to

540
00:24:58.254 --> 00:25:01.052
feed us, to make sure that for the

541
00:25:01.106 --> 00:25:03.772
people who had kids, made sure their kids were looked

542
00:25:03.826 --> 00:25:06.270
after, because they were working long hours.

543
00:25:06.720 --> 00:25:09.608
Even though they might not know why we were

544
00:25:09.634 --> 00:25:12.576
there for so long, every day, they were

545
00:25:12.598 --> 00:25:15.424
doing their best to take what load they could

546
00:25:15.542 --> 00:25:18.370
off of our mind as far as extra things.

547
00:25:18.980 --> 00:25:19.392
Wow.

548
00:25:19.446 --> 00:25:20.432
That's really amazing.

549
00:25:20.566 --> 00:25:23.268
Yeah, it was. And I've never seen a

550
00:25:23.274 --> 00:25:25.732
community chip in like that before or

551
00:25:25.786 --> 00:25:26.390
since.

552
00:25:27.880 --> 00:25:30.644
How did this impact you personally, both in the short

553
00:25:30.682 --> 00:25:32.576
term and for the rest of your career?

554
00:25:32.768 --> 00:25:35.576
In the short term, we found we were leading kind of a

555
00:25:35.598 --> 00:25:38.536
double life. We'd go into work and

556
00:25:38.558 --> 00:25:40.804
we were on an incredibly high ops

557
00:25:40.852 --> 00:25:43.784
tempo. And then when our shift was

558
00:25:43.822 --> 00:25:46.684
over, we'd go out into the community

559
00:25:46.802 --> 00:25:49.644
and the community at large, it was

560
00:25:49.842 --> 00:25:51.820
largely back to normal.

561
00:25:52.560 --> 00:25:55.560
We'd go home and we'd cut our grass,

562
00:25:55.640 --> 00:25:58.520
we'd play with the dog. We'd amuse

563
00:25:58.600 --> 00:26:00.430
kids. If you had kids

564
00:26:01.840 --> 00:26:04.600
and then you'd go into work again and you were

565
00:26:04.690 --> 00:26:07.584
at that high ops tempo and

566
00:26:07.622 --> 00:26:10.224
it was a real hard transition in a lot of

567
00:26:10.262 --> 00:26:13.252
ways and eventually we got used to that

568
00:26:13.306 --> 00:26:15.712
level of ops tempo became

569
00:26:15.776 --> 00:26:18.084
normal. So the

570
00:26:18.202 --> 00:26:21.110
dichotomy wasn't as great after a while

571
00:26:21.720 --> 00:26:23.220
in the long term.

572
00:26:24.060 --> 00:26:26.792
Well, as you mentioned, my

573
00:26:26.846 --> 00:26:29.172
retirement was September

574
00:26:29.236 --> 00:26:32.104
11, 2013. So it

575
00:26:32.142 --> 00:26:34.836
impacted me enough that I actually picked

576
00:26:34.948 --> 00:26:37.756
the anniversary of the attacks for the day

577
00:26:37.778 --> 00:26:40.364
that I retired. I

578
00:26:40.402 --> 00:26:43.180
also put in a request that

579
00:26:43.250 --> 00:26:46.044
my retirement flag would be

580
00:26:46.082 --> 00:26:48.604
one flown over the Eastern air, uh, defense

581
00:26:48.652 --> 00:26:51.372
Sector on September 11,

582
00:26:51.436 --> 00:26:54.304
2011, the 10th anniversary of the

583
00:26:54.342 --> 00:26:57.164
attacks. So both the flag

584
00:26:57.212 --> 00:26:59.744
that I was presented at my retirement and my

585
00:26:59.782 --> 00:27:02.756
retirement date were on anniversaries of

586
00:27:02.778 --> 00:27:04.016
September 11.

587
00:27:04.128 --> 00:27:06.516
So, obviously for you, this was a bit of a

588
00:27:06.538 --> 00:27:09.268
defining set of events, a defining moment.

589
00:27:09.434 --> 00:27:12.116
It really was. It was after,

590
00:27:12.218 --> 00:27:14.744
like I said, after about 15 years in the Air

591
00:27:14.782 --> 00:27:17.336
Force. I saw the way

592
00:27:17.438 --> 00:27:20.264
tragedy brings out the absolute best in

593
00:27:20.302 --> 00:27:23.092
people, and I truly

594
00:27:23.236 --> 00:27:25.556
understood the concept of brothers in

595
00:27:25.598 --> 00:27:28.430
arms. These are people who,

596
00:27:29.040 --> 00:27:31.550
well, I would protect them with my life.

597
00:27:32.080 --> 00:27:34.988
I would do anything for them. And

598
00:27:35.074 --> 00:27:37.964
we had each other's backs both on duty and

599
00:27:38.002 --> 00:27:40.940
off. I've been retired for almost

600
00:27:41.010 --> 00:27:43.952
ten years, and, um, I'm still in touch with many of the people

601
00:27:44.006 --> 00:27:45.650
who I worked with then.

602
00:27:46.420 --> 00:27:49.296
It's amazing the bonds that you make serving. Like

603
00:27:49.318 --> 00:27:52.172
you said, we really end up with brothers and sisters in arms,

604
00:27:52.236 --> 00:27:55.212
people that you consider family. Okay, Rob,

605
00:27:55.276 --> 00:27:58.164
that's going to wrap it up for our interview. I just wanted to thank you so much

606
00:27:58.202 --> 00:28:00.964
for taking the time out of your day to be here with us

607
00:28:01.002 --> 00:28:03.764
and sharing your experiences from a really

608
00:28:03.802 --> 00:28:05.848
intense experience. So thank you so much.

609
00:28:06.014 --> 00:28:08.280
Thank you for having me. It was a pleasure.

610
00:28:09.820 --> 00:28:12.804
Our second guest is retired RCAF Air Traffic Controller,

611
00:28:12.852 --> 00:28:15.092
Shelley Coulter. Welcome to the show, Shelley.

612
00:28:15.156 --> 00:28:16.216
Thanks for having me.

613
00:28:16.318 --> 00:28:19.016
Shelley Coulter of Ottawa, Ontario, joined the Canadian Armed

614
00:28:19.048 --> 00:28:22.012
Forces in 1990 as a direct entry officer. Having

615
00:28:22.066 --> 00:28:25.004
already received her undergraduate degree in administrative law

616
00:28:25.042 --> 00:28:27.928
from Carlton University, she served with a directorate

617
00:28:27.944 --> 00:28:30.572
of air operations and training as a second Lieutenant before

618
00:28:30.626 --> 00:28:33.564
proceeding to 22 Wing North Bay for training as an air weapons

619
00:28:33.612 --> 00:28:36.512
controller or AWC at the Air Weapons Control

620
00:28:36.566 --> 00:28:39.552
and Countermeasures School. In 1993,

621
00:28:39.606 --> 00:28:42.416
after completing her training as an AWC, shelley was

622
00:28:42.438 --> 00:28:44.964
employed with 21 Squadron, working with NORAD on Air

623
00:28:45.002 --> 00:28:47.956
Sovereignty Operations. In 1994, she

624
00:28:47.978 --> 00:28:50.916
was deployed to Vicenza, Italy, where she worked in the Combined Air

625
00:28:50.938 --> 00:28:53.856
Ops Center as part of NATO's no fly zone over the former

626
00:28:53.888 --> 00:28:56.736
Yugoslavia. Upon her return, Shelley

627
00:28:56.768 --> 00:28:59.544
was promoted to Captain and transferred to 51 Operational Training

628
00:28:59.582 --> 00:29:02.504
Unit in North Bay, where she took up the role of instructing new

629
00:29:02.542 --> 00:29:05.288
weapons controllers. In 1996, Shelley went to

630
00:29:05.294 --> 00:29:08.248
Cornwall to complete crossover training as AWC and

631
00:29:08.254 --> 00:29:11.116
Air Traffic Controller ATC Trades Amalgamated and

632
00:29:11.138 --> 00:29:13.976
was posted to CFB Cold Lake, Alberta as an ATC Tower

633
00:29:14.008 --> 00:29:16.924
controller with Wing operations. In 1999,

634
00:29:16.962 --> 00:29:19.372
she deployed to the Central African Republic as a UN

635
00:29:19.426 --> 00:29:22.396
peacekeeper as part of Op prudence Minerca Upon

636
00:29:22.428 --> 00:29:25.216
her return, Shelley returned to Cornwall and completed her training as an

637
00:29:25.238 --> 00:29:27.804
IFR controller, becoming the first aerospace controller

638
00:29:27.852 --> 00:29:30.736
AEC in the Caf to have been qualified to control in

639
00:29:30.758 --> 00:29:33.744
any airspace in Canada. In June 2001,

640
00:29:33.782 --> 00:29:36.624
Shelley was transferred to the Four Wing Cold Lake Combat Operations

641
00:29:36.672 --> 00:29:39.236
Center, where she assumed duties as the officer in charge of the

642
00:29:39.258 --> 00:29:41.844
center. On September 9, 2001, she

643
00:29:41.882 --> 00:29:44.416
deployed with members of Four Wing Cold Lake to Innovic,

644
00:29:44.448 --> 00:29:46.804
Yukon, where she was on duty during 911

645
00:29:46.852 --> 00:29:49.796
operations. In 2014, due

646
00:29:49.828 --> 00:29:52.676
to injuries sustained during military operations, shelley

647
00:29:52.708 --> 00:29:55.160
released from the calf with almost 24 years total

648
00:29:55.230 --> 00:29:58.024
served. Today we will be focusing on her experiences

649
00:29:58.072 --> 00:30:01.016
on and following 911. So Shelley,

650
00:30:01.048 --> 00:30:03.950
we always ask our guests, where did aviation begin for you?

651
00:30:04.320 --> 00:30:07.244
The first memory that I have of being

652
00:30:07.282 --> 00:30:10.156
really interested in anything, air Force.

653
00:30:10.268 --> 00:30:12.850
I was about three years old,

654
00:30:13.380 --> 00:30:15.952
living with my family along the

655
00:30:16.006 --> 00:30:18.480
southern border of Manitoba and the United

656
00:30:18.550 --> 00:30:21.296
States. One of my father's

657
00:30:21.328 --> 00:30:24.324
friends had his own airplane and took me up

658
00:30:24.362 --> 00:30:27.216
flying with my dad. I was sitting in my dad's

659
00:30:27.248 --> 00:30:29.670
lap and

660
00:30:30.040 --> 00:30:32.420
I had, uh, no fear.

661
00:30:32.760 --> 00:30:35.464
I absolutely loved being up in the air

662
00:30:35.662 --> 00:30:38.344
and flying. The next

663
00:30:38.462 --> 00:30:41.256
experience that I had was during

664
00:30:41.358 --> 00:30:43.412
the centennial

665
00:30:43.476 --> 00:30:45.144
celebrations in

666
00:30:45.182 --> 00:30:48.124
1967. There was

667
00:30:48.322 --> 00:30:50.876
a search and rescue helicopter, uh, an old

668
00:30:50.898 --> 00:30:53.470
Chinook. Well, they were new Chinooks then

669
00:30:54.240 --> 00:30:57.150
that was on display. And I remember

670
00:30:57.840 --> 00:31:00.628
being lifted by the loadmaster or the flight

671
00:31:00.664 --> 00:31:03.472
engineer. I was all of four

672
00:31:03.526 --> 00:31:06.448
years old at the time. And him reaching me just about by the

673
00:31:06.454 --> 00:31:09.308
scruff of the neck and bringing

674
00:31:09.324 --> 00:31:11.910
me up and into the cargo area.

675
00:31:12.280 --> 00:31:15.220
And I thought it was absolutely amazing. But

676
00:31:15.290 --> 00:31:18.244
from a military point of view, I

677
00:31:18.282 --> 00:31:20.230
really didn't think about it until

678
00:31:21.400 --> 00:31:23.876
I hit my glass

679
00:31:23.908 --> 00:31:26.648
ceiling in my previous job

680
00:31:26.734 --> 00:31:29.428
working in the Toronto Dominion Bank.

681
00:31:29.604 --> 00:31:32.344
And so at the age of

682
00:31:32.462 --> 00:31:34.856
26, I had topped out of my

683
00:31:34.878 --> 00:31:37.752
career. I had a friend who was a weapons

684
00:31:37.816 --> 00:31:40.510
controller, and I

685
00:31:40.960 --> 00:31:43.900
considered what he was doing, and I thought,

686
00:31:44.050 --> 00:31:46.844
he's no smarter than I am, I could do his

687
00:31:46.882 --> 00:31:49.856
job. So

688
00:31:50.038 --> 00:31:52.928
I was in Ottawa at the time, went down to the

689
00:31:52.934 --> 00:31:55.916
recruiting center, and submitted

690
00:31:55.948 --> 00:31:58.236
my name as an air weapons controller

691
00:31:58.268 --> 00:32:01.124
candidate. It took about a year for

692
00:32:01.162 --> 00:32:04.020
the whole process to be completed.

693
00:32:04.760 --> 00:32:07.524
And in February of

694
00:32:07.562 --> 00:32:10.512
1990, I received a phone call from the recruiting

695
00:32:10.576 --> 00:32:13.512
center asking if I was still interested

696
00:32:13.646 --> 00:32:16.520
in joining the Canadian forces

697
00:32:16.940 --> 00:32:19.348
as an air weapons controller

698
00:32:19.444 --> 00:32:21.610
recruit. Absolutely.

699
00:32:22.380 --> 00:32:25.224
And a few months later, I

700
00:32:25.262 --> 00:32:27.640
was off to chilliwack BC

701
00:32:27.980 --> 00:32:30.110
and officer cadet training.

702
00:32:30.480 --> 00:32:33.468
So it was, uh, as simple as that. You had a friend who was doing it and you

703
00:32:33.474 --> 00:32:35.644
thought, hey, that sounds like fun. And you went.

704
00:32:35.682 --> 00:32:36.236
For it.

705
00:32:36.338 --> 00:32:36.990
Absolutely.

706
00:32:37.760 --> 00:32:40.736
So we're going to chat now about 911 and your experiences that

707
00:32:40.758 --> 00:32:42.770
day. How did that day start for you?

708
00:32:43.300 --> 00:32:45.616
So we need to back it up

709
00:32:45.718 --> 00:32:48.130
by a, uh, couple of weeks.

710
00:32:48.500 --> 00:32:51.344
Traditionally, the Russian

711
00:32:51.392 --> 00:32:53.828
air force will

712
00:32:53.914 --> 00:32:56.848
deploy to their forward operating bases

713
00:32:56.944 --> 00:32:59.444
in the spring and fall to

714
00:32:59.482 --> 00:33:01.700
do daytime

715
00:33:02.040 --> 00:33:04.648
training. The

716
00:33:04.814 --> 00:33:07.540
members of the combat operations

717
00:33:07.620 --> 00:33:10.248
center normally send up a small group, along

718
00:33:10.334 --> 00:33:12.840
with a small group of

719
00:33:12.910 --> 00:33:15.724
F supporting staff to act

720
00:33:15.762 --> 00:33:18.300
as part of the NORAD

721
00:33:18.640 --> 00:33:21.372
reaction to the Russians for

722
00:33:21.426 --> 00:33:24.060
deployment. There's traditionally a

723
00:33:24.210 --> 00:33:27.004
military air traffic controller that will

724
00:33:27.042 --> 00:33:29.868
go up just to act as a liaison

725
00:33:29.964 --> 00:33:32.732
for the civilian airport and the staff

726
00:33:32.796 --> 00:33:35.264
that are there. And when the F

727
00:33:35.302 --> 00:33:37.968
18s are airborne, the

728
00:33:38.134 --> 00:33:41.124
air traffic controller liaison is always up

729
00:33:41.162 --> 00:33:43.936
in the flight services tower that's

730
00:33:43.968 --> 00:33:46.868
up there. I thought it would be a good opportunity

731
00:33:47.034 --> 00:33:49.620
for me to go up and see

732
00:33:49.770 --> 00:33:52.724
how the operation ran. It

733
00:33:52.762 --> 00:33:55.656
wasn't until later, uh, in

734
00:33:55.678 --> 00:33:57.720
the evening, once it got dark,

735
00:33:58.140 --> 00:34:00.676
that my job kind of kicked

736
00:34:00.708 --> 00:34:03.688
in. So I was up most of

737
00:34:03.694 --> 00:34:05.772
the night on the

738
00:34:05.826 --> 00:34:08.636
10 September while the

739
00:34:08.658 --> 00:34:11.496
CF 18s were flying, monitoring the Russian

740
00:34:11.528 --> 00:34:14.380
bears that were flying out of northern Russia.

741
00:34:14.960 --> 00:34:17.868
I just got into sleep when

742
00:34:17.954 --> 00:34:20.304
all of a sudden there was a lot of banging at my

743
00:34:20.342 --> 00:34:23.340
door. I opened up the door

744
00:34:23.500 --> 00:34:26.396
and there was this giant master corporal

745
00:34:26.428 --> 00:34:29.120
standing at my door that said,

746
00:34:29.270 --> 00:34:32.150
ma'am, you need to go into work.

747
00:34:32.520 --> 00:34:35.412
A plane has just flown into one of the

748
00:34:35.466 --> 00:34:37.172
towers of the World Trade Center.

749
00:34:37.306 --> 00:34:37.892
Wow.

750
00:34:38.026 --> 00:34:39.990
Yeah. Now,

751
00:34:40.840 --> 00:34:43.444
knowing the various

752
00:34:43.492 --> 00:34:46.276
different flight paths and restricted

753
00:34:46.308 --> 00:34:48.730
airspace over New York City,

754
00:34:49.260 --> 00:34:51.930
and how the weather was

755
00:34:52.300 --> 00:34:55.096
pretty much all over North America that day,

756
00:34:55.278 --> 00:34:58.204
there was no way that a

757
00:34:58.242 --> 00:35:01.064
small aircraft would have been flying

758
00:35:01.112 --> 00:35:03.836
in that area just because of the

759
00:35:03.938 --> 00:35:06.764
updrafts. Ah, it's too hard in that part of

760
00:35:06.802 --> 00:35:08.850
New York City to manage.

761
00:35:09.460 --> 00:35:12.272
So it had to have been a fairly large

762
00:35:12.326 --> 00:35:15.296
aircraft and a

763
00:35:15.398 --> 00:35:18.256
fairly large aircraft flying into the

764
00:35:18.278 --> 00:35:20.992
World Trade Centers. That's

765
00:35:21.056 --> 00:35:22.980
something that's done on purpose.

766
00:35:23.640 --> 00:35:26.340
Because as we saw several years

767
00:35:26.410 --> 00:35:28.996
later with the miracle on the

768
00:35:29.018 --> 00:35:31.684
Hudson, captain Sullivan did everything that he

769
00:35:31.722 --> 00:35:34.488
could to avoid built up

770
00:35:34.574 --> 00:35:37.192
areas. So my instinct was

771
00:35:37.246 --> 00:35:39.748
that this was a purpose

772
00:35:39.844 --> 00:35:42.504
driven event. And if my

773
00:35:42.542 --> 00:35:45.304
instincts were right, we were going to need more than

774
00:35:45.342 --> 00:35:48.140
just the one person from my staff

775
00:35:48.560 --> 00:35:51.292
that would normally be on duty. We were going to need

776
00:35:51.346 --> 00:35:53.230
more than one person.

777
00:35:54.320 --> 00:35:57.212
So I m went

778
00:35:57.346 --> 00:35:59.984
and banged on the door of the

779
00:36:00.022 --> 00:36:02.640
master corporal that was on days

780
00:36:02.710 --> 00:36:05.504
off. And when she

781
00:36:05.542 --> 00:36:08.428
opened the door, I said, you need to come with me now, there's

782
00:36:08.444 --> 00:36:11.296
an event going on. And she said, do

783
00:36:11.318 --> 00:36:14.244
I have time to shower? And I said, no, just change

784
00:36:14.282 --> 00:36:17.092
into your flight suit, we're going now. As a matter of fact,

785
00:36:17.146 --> 00:36:19.524
you change. I'll meet you there.

786
00:36:19.722 --> 00:36:22.548
And I started to head

787
00:36:22.714 --> 00:36:25.316
out the personnel barracks

788
00:36:25.508 --> 00:36:28.072
and that's when I saw the second

789
00:36:28.126 --> 00:36:30.792
aircraft on the TV fly into the second

790
00:36:30.846 --> 00:36:33.640
tower. So that's when I

791
00:36:33.710 --> 00:36:36.364
had a good idea that

792
00:36:36.562 --> 00:36:39.324
this was a day of

793
00:36:39.362 --> 00:36:42.268
history. My section was a direct

794
00:36:42.354 --> 00:36:45.132
connection to NORAD. So

795
00:36:45.266 --> 00:36:48.164
that would be with North Bay,

796
00:36:48.312 --> 00:36:50.956
with Winnipeg, and with Colorado

797
00:36:50.988 --> 00:36:53.920
Springs. Up until that

798
00:36:53.990 --> 00:36:56.704
day, NORAD and Air

799
00:36:56.742 --> 00:36:59.692
Sovereignty missions had become kind of a joke

800
00:36:59.836 --> 00:37:02.516
in the military flying community.

801
00:37:02.698 --> 00:37:05.412
It wasn't cool. It wasn't seen as very

802
00:37:05.466 --> 00:37:07.956
operational. Everybody wanted to

803
00:37:07.978 --> 00:37:10.500
go fly air to air

804
00:37:10.570 --> 00:37:13.052
combat. So all of a sudden,

805
00:37:13.216 --> 00:37:15.604
NORAD and Air Sovereignty

806
00:37:15.652 --> 00:37:18.552
Operations went to the

807
00:37:18.606 --> 00:37:20.810
game in town. But

808
00:37:21.500 --> 00:37:24.180
a lot of the corporate knowledge

809
00:37:24.340 --> 00:37:26.824
had been lost because it had been seen as

810
00:37:26.862 --> 00:37:29.852
unimportant. And all of a sudden, the

811
00:37:29.906 --> 00:37:32.524
desk and the operations center that I was running

812
00:37:32.642 --> 00:37:34.860
was the keeper of that corporate knowledge.

813
00:37:35.440 --> 00:37:38.052
So I was spending an awful lot of time sitting

814
00:37:38.136 --> 00:37:41.052
with the detachment commander

815
00:37:41.116 --> 00:37:43.696
and the two I see the number two in

816
00:37:43.718 --> 00:37:46.480
charge of the forward

817
00:37:46.550 --> 00:37:49.264
operating location in Inuvic to get

818
00:37:49.302 --> 00:37:52.132
them educated with the

819
00:37:52.186 --> 00:37:53.104
defense conditions.

820
00:37:53.152 --> 00:37:56.116
The defcons defcon or defense condition is the

821
00:37:56.138 --> 00:37:58.896
US. Military's ranking system for defense readiness,

822
00:37:59.008 --> 00:38:02.004
with five being the lowest perceived threat and one being

823
00:38:02.042 --> 00:38:02.784
the highest.

824
00:38:02.912 --> 00:38:05.320
And the potential

825
00:38:05.900 --> 00:38:08.440
airspace changes that

826
00:38:08.590 --> 00:38:11.448
might happen from a civilian point of

827
00:38:11.454 --> 00:38:13.450
view. If we go to

828
00:38:14.060 --> 00:38:17.004
Defcon Four, Defcon Three, what does

829
00:38:17.042 --> 00:38:19.852
that entail for not just

830
00:38:19.906 --> 00:38:22.744
military aircraft, but for civilian

831
00:38:22.792 --> 00:38:25.724
aircraft as well? I got on my

832
00:38:25.762 --> 00:38:28.560
cell phone and called

833
00:38:28.630 --> 00:38:31.584
back to Edmonton Air

834
00:38:31.622 --> 00:38:34.112
Traffic Center, which was

835
00:38:34.166 --> 00:38:36.976
controlling the airspace for where we

836
00:38:36.998 --> 00:38:39.984
were located. And I needed to know in

837
00:38:40.022 --> 00:38:42.624
my head who I was going to be dealing

838
00:38:42.672 --> 00:38:45.380
with if they shut down civilian airspace.

839
00:38:45.720 --> 00:38:48.580
It just so happened that two days

840
00:38:48.650 --> 00:38:51.188
before we had flown up

841
00:38:51.274 --> 00:38:54.196
to Ennuvik four wing,

842
00:38:54.228 --> 00:38:56.856
cold Lake air traffic controllers had

843
00:38:56.878 --> 00:38:59.864
hosted a golf tournament and they

844
00:38:59.902 --> 00:39:02.600
had invited up members of the

845
00:39:02.670 --> 00:39:05.364
civilian team from Edmonton

846
00:39:05.412 --> 00:39:07.800
Center. So I had been golfing

847
00:39:07.880 --> 00:39:10.652
with the folks that I was now

848
00:39:10.786 --> 00:39:13.644
going to be liaising with. So I

849
00:39:13.682 --> 00:39:16.668
called and left a voicemail for one of the

850
00:39:16.674 --> 00:39:19.616
supervisors, sue, that had been in My

851
00:39:19.638 --> 00:39:22.400
forsome 72 hours earlier.

852
00:39:22.740 --> 00:39:25.244
And I said, Hi, Sue. It's Captain

853
00:39:25.292 --> 00:39:28.176
Coulter. I'm up in Anubic now

854
00:39:28.358 --> 00:39:31.264
and when you get a chance, can you

855
00:39:31.302 --> 00:39:34.116
give me a call? Just trying to get an idea of

856
00:39:34.138 --> 00:39:36.724
what's going on. Then I went over

857
00:39:36.762 --> 00:39:38.550
to Flight Services

858
00:39:39.160 --> 00:39:41.812
and they were having a hard time

859
00:39:41.946 --> 00:39:44.504
understanding that this wasn't an

860
00:39:44.542 --> 00:39:47.352
exercise. They kept referring to it as an

861
00:39:47.406 --> 00:39:50.232
exercise. And I said, no, we

862
00:39:50.286 --> 00:39:53.064
are at, uh, war. For all

863
00:39:53.102 --> 00:39:55.560
intents and purposes, we've been attacked.

864
00:39:56.000 --> 00:39:58.556
We are behaving like we are at war right

865
00:39:58.578 --> 00:40:01.340
now. And just as I'm saying

866
00:40:01.410 --> 00:40:04.190
that, his teletype went off

867
00:40:04.720 --> 00:40:07.404
and it provided an

868
00:40:07.442 --> 00:40:10.368
update acknowledging that there

869
00:40:10.534 --> 00:40:13.504
had been an event in New

870
00:40:13.542 --> 00:40:16.256
York City evolving to

871
00:40:16.438 --> 00:40:19.184
aircraft that had flown into the World

872
00:40:19.222 --> 00:40:22.112
Trade Centers. They didn't have any information, but

873
00:40:22.246 --> 00:40:25.076
they were still in the information gathering phase at that point in

874
00:40:25.098 --> 00:40:27.956
time. I told them I'd be back and I would

875
00:40:27.978 --> 00:40:30.592
keep them up to date anytime I had additional

876
00:40:30.656 --> 00:40:33.336
information. My cell

877
00:40:33.358 --> 00:40:36.276
phone rings and it was sue

878
00:40:36.308 --> 00:40:38.840
from Edmonton Center. I answered it.

879
00:40:38.910 --> 00:40:41.844
Captain Coulter. And she said, Hi, Captain

880
00:40:41.892 --> 00:40:44.680
Coulter. It's sue from Edmonton Center.

881
00:40:44.750 --> 00:40:47.532
I went, sue, it's Shelly. And she went,

882
00:40:47.586 --> 00:40:50.376
Shelly? I said Shelly ATC Shelly cold

883
00:40:50.408 --> 00:40:53.380
Lake. And she went, oh, my God. Am m

884
00:40:53.506 --> 00:40:56.252
I ever glad it's you. So

885
00:40:56.306 --> 00:40:59.120
right away there's that connection that was

886
00:40:59.190 --> 00:41:01.968
needed and that became really

887
00:41:02.134 --> 00:41:04.610
effective in getting information

888
00:41:05.380 --> 00:41:08.304
passed. So she told me

889
00:41:08.342 --> 00:41:10.560
at that point in time that the decision

890
00:41:10.920 --> 00:41:13.604
hadn't become official but it was

891
00:41:13.642 --> 00:41:16.404
very likely that we were going to

892
00:41:16.442 --> 00:41:19.168
see the emergency

893
00:41:19.264 --> 00:41:22.224
grounding of civilian

894
00:41:22.272 --> 00:41:25.080
aircraft uh, before the end of the day.

895
00:41:25.230 --> 00:41:27.656
You'll hear the acronyms Escat or

896
00:41:27.678 --> 00:41:30.632
Skatana bounced around and

897
00:41:30.686 --> 00:41:33.672
it's the emergency coordination of civilian air

898
00:41:33.726 --> 00:41:36.444
traffic. So I go

899
00:41:36.482 --> 00:41:39.096
back to the forward operating location

900
00:41:39.208 --> 00:41:42.110
and pass that on to

901
00:41:43.280 --> 00:41:46.236
the debt commander. So now

902
00:41:46.258 --> 00:41:49.170
he wants to know what Escat and Sketana is.

903
00:41:49.620 --> 00:41:52.192
So now I'm explaining to him, helping him

904
00:41:52.246 --> 00:41:55.212
understand that when they're declared

905
00:41:55.356 --> 00:41:58.268
and the levels that they're declared determine

906
00:41:58.444 --> 00:42:00.804
how much civilian activity is

907
00:42:00.842 --> 00:42:03.684
grounded and who

908
00:42:03.722 --> 00:42:06.612
can fly. As I was there, we find

909
00:42:06.666 --> 00:42:09.312
out that a, uh, third plane

910
00:42:09.376 --> 00:42:11.556
crashes into the

911
00:42:11.578 --> 00:42:13.796
Pentagon a fourth plane

912
00:42:13.828 --> 00:42:16.440
crashes in Pennsylvania.

913
00:42:16.860 --> 00:42:17.610
And

914
00:42:19.180 --> 00:42:21.320
NORAD and

915
00:42:21.470 --> 00:42:24.404
FAA and, uh, Canadian

916
00:42:24.452 --> 00:42:27.348
equivalents all believe that they

917
00:42:27.454 --> 00:42:30.072
are likely additional aircraft

918
00:42:30.216 --> 00:42:32.716
that are out flying around

919
00:42:32.818 --> 00:42:35.020
likely being hijacked.

920
00:42:36.000 --> 00:42:38.344
Move a little bit forward. And

921
00:42:38.482 --> 00:42:41.344
I'm standing in the operations center

922
00:42:41.542 --> 00:42:44.096
and one of the

923
00:42:44.278 --> 00:42:47.260
secure phones in my team's

924
00:42:47.340 --> 00:42:50.304
section of the Op Center rings. So I pick

925
00:42:50.342 --> 00:42:53.284
it up, and it's one of my colleagues in

926
00:42:53.322 --> 00:42:56.310
North Bay who tells me that

927
00:42:56.920 --> 00:42:59.764
we've gone to Defcon Three. I

928
00:42:59.802 --> 00:43:02.548
remember thinking that. I never

929
00:43:02.634 --> 00:43:04.890
thought I would

930
00:43:05.260 --> 00:43:08.136
see that day happen where we had

931
00:43:08.158 --> 00:43:11.130
moved out of Defcon Five into Defcon Three.

932
00:43:11.580 --> 00:43:13.972
After we finished, uh, the authentication

933
00:43:14.036 --> 00:43:16.796
process and I hung up on my

934
00:43:16.818 --> 00:43:19.656
budy from North Bay, I pulled

935
00:43:19.688 --> 00:43:22.172
the Deck Commander aside so nobody else could

936
00:43:22.226 --> 00:43:25.084
overhear us, and I briefed him that

937
00:43:25.122 --> 00:43:27.550
we'd gone to Defcon, uh, three.

938
00:43:28.020 --> 00:43:29.650
And he

939
00:43:30.980 --> 00:43:33.920
asked each of the heads of the different sections

940
00:43:34.420 --> 00:43:37.296
to meet him in one corner of the

941
00:43:37.318 --> 00:43:39.756
Op Center. He was, uh, a lieutenant

942
00:43:39.788 --> 00:43:42.724
colonel and the rest were captains. And

943
00:43:42.762 --> 00:43:45.430
he sat us down and told everybody

944
00:43:45.800 --> 00:43:48.304
ladies and gentlemen, we've been moved to Defcon

945
00:43:48.352 --> 00:43:51.156
Three. Make sure to check on your

946
00:43:51.178 --> 00:43:54.104
folks and check on each other as well

947
00:43:54.222 --> 00:43:56.904
because, uh, we're entering into a

948
00:43:56.942 --> 00:43:59.610
historical point here and

949
00:44:00.220 --> 00:44:03.012
we need to look after ourselves

950
00:44:03.076 --> 00:44:05.996
and look after each other. So now I have to

951
00:44:06.018 --> 00:44:08.892
take all this information and go over

952
00:44:08.946 --> 00:44:11.070
to Flight Services.

953
00:44:12.080 --> 00:44:14.776
I'm over at the FSS tower.

954
00:44:14.968 --> 00:44:17.852
Go in. And I said to him,

955
00:44:17.906 --> 00:44:20.784
we've gone to Defcon Three. I'm expecting us to go

956
00:44:20.822 --> 00:44:23.756
to change the, um, airspace status

957
00:44:23.868 --> 00:44:26.864
anytime now. And he

958
00:44:26.902 --> 00:44:29.664
said, Well, I haven't heard anything and no

959
00:44:29.702 --> 00:44:32.544
word of a lie. His teletype

960
00:44:32.592 --> 00:44:35.412
goes off as we're standing there and it

961
00:44:35.466 --> 00:44:38.196
says, NORAD has transitioned to

962
00:44:38.218 --> 00:44:41.156
defcon three. So finally get back

963
00:44:41.178 --> 00:44:43.430
to the op center and

964
00:44:44.460 --> 00:44:46.516
we received the notification

965
00:44:46.708 --> 00:44:49.704
that the civilian airspace was being

966
00:44:49.742 --> 00:44:52.516
shut down. Planes were being diverted

967
00:44:52.548 --> 00:44:55.320
into Gander and Goosebay.

968
00:44:55.920 --> 00:44:58.270
Only flights that were for

969
00:44:58.960 --> 00:45:01.340
medical emergencies or

970
00:45:01.410 --> 00:45:04.268
for military purposes were to

971
00:45:04.274 --> 00:45:07.070
be airborne, and everything else

972
00:45:07.860 --> 00:45:10.384
was going to be challenged by

973
00:45:10.422 --> 00:45:13.040
military aircraft. We

974
00:45:13.110 --> 00:45:15.436
received notice

975
00:45:15.548 --> 00:45:17.824
that a

976
00:45:17.862 --> 00:45:20.724
Korean airliner was being

977
00:45:20.762 --> 00:45:22.944
diverted from Alaskan

978
00:45:22.992 --> 00:45:25.184
airspace into Canadian

979
00:45:25.232 --> 00:45:28.120
airspace, and that, uh,

980
00:45:28.200 --> 00:45:31.028
we're likely going to scramble the

981
00:45:31.114 --> 00:45:33.976
CF eighteen s after it, which

982
00:45:34.078 --> 00:45:36.584
we actually did. I remember

983
00:45:36.782 --> 00:45:39.556
when the CF 18 pilots,

984
00:45:39.668 --> 00:45:42.520
after they went airborne, you could hear

985
00:45:42.590 --> 00:45:45.050
a pin drop in the op center.

986
00:45:45.680 --> 00:45:48.252
What was pretty much going through everybody's mind

987
00:45:48.386 --> 00:45:51.244
was that each of us

988
00:45:51.282 --> 00:45:52.910
had a hand in

989
00:45:53.840 --> 00:45:56.812
possibly being part of 200

990
00:45:56.866 --> 00:45:59.680
civilians being shot down by

991
00:45:59.750 --> 00:46:01.440
CF 18 aircraft.

992
00:46:01.780 --> 00:46:02.432
Wow.

993
00:46:02.566 --> 00:46:05.410
Yeah. A very sobering moment.

994
00:46:06.580 --> 00:46:09.090
We had no idea who was

995
00:46:09.460 --> 00:46:11.828
behind the attacks. We didn't know if it was the

996
00:46:11.834 --> 00:46:14.404
Russians because of where we were

997
00:46:14.442 --> 00:46:17.364
postured. That was what was

998
00:46:17.402 --> 00:46:20.176
going through our head. Was wondering

999
00:46:20.208 --> 00:46:23.040
if this was the first

1000
00:46:23.130 --> 00:46:26.120
step in a Russian attack on North America.

1001
00:46:26.860 --> 00:46:29.208
We got the notification that Escad and

1002
00:46:29.214 --> 00:46:32.072
Skatana had been implemented, so

1003
00:46:32.126 --> 00:46:34.724
there was nothing flying.

1004
00:46:34.852 --> 00:46:37.644
So when the, uh, fighter pilots got back and

1005
00:46:37.682 --> 00:46:40.444
did their intelligence debrief, the

1006
00:46:40.482 --> 00:46:43.230
first thing that I noted was that

1007
00:46:44.560 --> 00:46:47.068
one of the pilots didn't even take the time

1008
00:46:47.234 --> 00:46:49.520
to change into his flight suit.

1009
00:46:50.740 --> 00:46:53.488
He was wearing sweatpants and a

1010
00:46:53.494 --> 00:46:56.252
rugby shirt, his flying

1011
00:46:56.316 --> 00:46:59.148
boots, and he had his G suit on, but he didn't

1012
00:46:59.164 --> 00:47:02.140
even bother to take the time to, uh, change into his

1013
00:47:02.150 --> 00:47:05.028
flight suit. And they were scrambled to go after

1014
00:47:05.114 --> 00:47:07.604
the Korean airline that

1015
00:47:07.642 --> 00:47:09.590
had gone into

1016
00:47:10.680 --> 00:47:13.436
American airspace responding

1017
00:47:13.488 --> 00:47:16.196
improperly to transponder

1018
00:47:16.228 --> 00:47:19.044
codes. Those are the four digit codes

1019
00:47:19.092 --> 00:47:21.940
that most aircraft

1020
00:47:22.100 --> 00:47:24.600
that are flying on long routes

1021
00:47:24.940 --> 00:47:27.532
use to indicate where

1022
00:47:27.586 --> 00:47:30.508
they are and who they are. What

1023
00:47:30.594 --> 00:47:32.876
happened was

1024
00:47:32.978 --> 00:47:35.884
that because it was an

1025
00:47:35.922 --> 00:47:38.752
unusual day, the words that you

1026
00:47:38.806 --> 00:47:41.648
usually expect to hear out of a

1027
00:47:41.734 --> 00:47:44.444
pilot's mouth or an air traffic controller's

1028
00:47:44.492 --> 00:47:46.950
mouth weren't happening

1029
00:47:46.950 --> 00:47:49.810
m the way that they normally would.

1030
00:47:50.760 --> 00:47:53.044
So the Korean airliner, the air

1031
00:47:53.082 --> 00:47:55.700
crew, when they were told to

1032
00:47:55.850 --> 00:47:58.260
change their code going

1033
00:47:58.330 --> 00:48:00.816
from overseas into Alaskan

1034
00:48:00.848 --> 00:48:03.110
airspace, they

1035
00:48:03.740 --> 00:48:06.730
dialed in an incorrect code.

1036
00:48:07.740 --> 00:48:10.010
They were unaware of

1037
00:48:10.620 --> 00:48:12.730
anything else that was going on,

1038
00:48:13.500 --> 00:48:16.380
because for whatever reason, their company

1039
00:48:16.450 --> 00:48:18.988
operations center hadn't been able to

1040
00:48:19.154 --> 00:48:21.852
let them know that there was this

1041
00:48:21.906 --> 00:48:24.892
major air event that was happening

1042
00:48:24.946 --> 00:48:27.928
in North America. So out of an

1043
00:48:27.954 --> 00:48:30.770
abundance of caution, the

1044
00:48:31.300 --> 00:48:33.280
air traffic controllers

1045
00:48:33.780 --> 00:48:36.476
and, uh, the senior staff

1046
00:48:36.668 --> 00:48:39.200
responsible for Alaskan airspace

1047
00:48:39.620 --> 00:48:41.350
decided to

1048
00:48:42.200 --> 00:48:44.980
change the destination of that

1049
00:48:45.050 --> 00:48:48.048
aircraft from American airspace

1050
00:48:48.144 --> 00:48:49.460
to Yellowknife.

1051
00:48:50.760 --> 00:48:53.684
When the CF 18 pilots

1052
00:48:53.812 --> 00:48:56.628
at our location were doing their debrief,

1053
00:48:56.804 --> 00:48:59.130
one pilot, the number two, said

1054
00:48:59.580 --> 00:49:02.516
it was the eeriest

1055
00:49:02.548 --> 00:49:05.112
thing that he'd ever seen on his

1056
00:49:05.166 --> 00:49:07.996
radar. He said he

1057
00:49:08.018 --> 00:49:10.856
got three hits on his radar.

1058
00:49:10.888 --> 00:49:12.910
He'd never seen anything like it before

1059
00:49:13.680 --> 00:49:16.556
when he went airborne. The first hit on his

1060
00:49:16.578 --> 00:49:19.250
radar was his flight lead.

1061
00:49:20.660 --> 00:49:23.120
The second hit on his radar

1062
00:49:24.180 --> 00:49:26.944
was the tanker, and the

1063
00:49:26.982 --> 00:49:29.040
third hit on the radar

1064
00:49:29.780 --> 00:49:32.224
was the Korean

1065
00:49:32.272 --> 00:49:35.124
airliner. The sky was already empty by that

1066
00:49:35.162 --> 00:49:37.844
point in time. We had

1067
00:49:37.882 --> 00:49:40.704
received word that North

1068
00:49:40.752 --> 00:49:43.572
Bay and Colorado

1069
00:49:43.636 --> 00:49:46.468
Springs, uh, the mountain at Colorado Springs

1070
00:49:46.564 --> 00:49:49.284
had both buttoned up. They'd closed their blast

1071
00:49:49.332 --> 00:49:52.200
doors, something that has only

1072
00:49:52.270 --> 00:49:54.696
happened once before, and that was

1073
00:49:54.878 --> 00:49:57.660
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

1074
00:49:58.080 --> 00:50:00.876
Again, Defcon three. The only time we'd gone to

1075
00:50:00.898 --> 00:50:03.016
it before was during the Cuban Missile

1076
00:50:03.048 --> 00:50:05.310
Crisis. So

1077
00:50:06.000 --> 00:50:08.700
that was September 11.

1078
00:50:10.000 --> 00:50:12.992
By the time September 12 came

1079
00:50:13.046 --> 00:50:15.250
and went, we

1080
00:50:16.260 --> 00:50:19.056
had received notification from the

1081
00:50:19.078 --> 00:50:22.004
Russians that not only were they standing down

1082
00:50:22.042 --> 00:50:24.884
their exercise, but they were going home. They

1083
00:50:24.922 --> 00:50:27.472
were deploying back to their main operating

1084
00:50:27.536 --> 00:50:30.132
bases as a way of

1085
00:50:30.186 --> 00:50:32.732
showing to us that they were not involved

1086
00:50:32.896 --> 00:50:35.480
in what was happening, and

1087
00:50:35.550 --> 00:50:38.344
also, as almost, uh, a

1088
00:50:38.382 --> 00:50:40.664
gentleman's agreement to allow the

1089
00:50:40.702 --> 00:50:43.572
teams that were needed elsewhere

1090
00:50:43.716 --> 00:50:46.524
to go look after what was going

1091
00:50:46.562 --> 00:50:48.030
on at home.

1092
00:50:48.880 --> 00:50:51.516
We started to

1093
00:50:51.618 --> 00:50:53.896
pack up everything and return back to Cold

1094
00:50:53.928 --> 00:50:56.380
Lake on, um, the

1095
00:50:56.530 --> 00:50:58.880
13 September.

1096
00:51:00.260 --> 00:51:01.970
When we got back,

1097
00:51:03.700 --> 00:51:06.432
we were given a couple days just to

1098
00:51:06.566 --> 00:51:09.424
unpack and get a couple

1099
00:51:09.462 --> 00:51:12.404
days rest, and then we're back

1100
00:51:12.442 --> 00:51:14.310
into work working

1101
00:51:15.240 --> 00:51:17.988
an increased ops. Temple until

1102
00:51:18.074 --> 00:51:21.040
we were able, we NORAD

1103
00:51:21.200 --> 00:51:24.024
Canada and the United States and

1104
00:51:24.062 --> 00:51:26.792
the rest of the world were able to identify that

1105
00:51:26.846 --> 00:51:29.764
this was a threat that we hadn't expected

1106
00:51:29.812 --> 00:51:32.520
before. Ironically,

1107
00:51:33.180 --> 00:51:35.932
NORAD Ah was in the middle of an

1108
00:51:35.986 --> 00:51:38.280
exercise on September

1109
00:51:38.360 --> 00:51:41.100
11, so they were already

1110
00:51:41.170 --> 00:51:43.724
in an exercise mode and in an

1111
00:51:43.762 --> 00:51:46.300
exercise beat with their staff.

1112
00:51:46.720 --> 00:51:49.564
There was an Airborne Warning

1113
00:51:49.612 --> 00:51:51.840
and Control Systems aircraft

1114
00:51:52.500 --> 00:51:55.084
that was off the East

1115
00:51:55.132 --> 00:51:57.904
Coast, but it

1116
00:51:57.942 --> 00:52:00.416
was a training mission, so it was all trainees on

1117
00:52:00.438 --> 00:52:03.104
board with instructors sitting

1118
00:52:03.152 --> 00:52:05.940
behind them. And so

1119
00:52:06.010 --> 00:52:08.580
when the two aircraft,

1120
00:52:08.940 --> 00:52:11.860
uh, four aircraft crashed,

1121
00:52:12.440 --> 00:52:15.336
we already had an awax up in the

1122
00:52:15.358 --> 00:52:18.104
air that could help finding the

1123
00:52:18.142 --> 00:52:20.504
additional aircraft if there had been

1124
00:52:20.542 --> 00:52:23.352
any. But as we know now, there

1125
00:52:23.406 --> 00:52:25.930
weren't any additional aircraft at that time.

1126
00:52:26.380 --> 00:52:29.148
That was my experience from the 9

1127
00:52:29.154 --> 00:52:31.852
September 2001 until

1128
00:52:31.986 --> 00:52:33.660
September the 13th.

1129
00:52:34.560 --> 00:52:37.436
How did that impact you in the short term and for the

1130
00:52:37.458 --> 00:52:37.756
rest of.

1131
00:52:37.778 --> 00:52:40.160
Your career in the short

1132
00:52:40.230 --> 00:52:42.960
term? I was angry.

1133
00:52:43.620 --> 00:52:46.352
I was angry that these

1134
00:52:46.406 --> 00:52:49.344
guys felt that this

1135
00:52:49.382 --> 00:52:51.670
was something that they could do

1136
00:52:52.520 --> 00:52:54.310
and get away with.

1137
00:52:54.680 --> 00:52:57.248
Attacking my neighborhood,

1138
00:52:57.344 --> 00:52:59.988
attacking my friends. I had friends

1139
00:53:00.154 --> 00:53:02.928
that grew up in New York, friends that were in the

1140
00:53:02.954 --> 00:53:05.208
Pentagon that day. I had friends in

1141
00:53:05.374 --> 00:53:08.356
Colorado Springs, in the mountain complex and in North

1142
00:53:08.388 --> 00:53:11.210
Bay. I felt like it was a personal attack.

1143
00:53:12.140 --> 00:53:14.360
I remember being

1144
00:53:14.430 --> 00:53:17.004
angry, um, when

1145
00:53:17.202 --> 00:53:19.870
we didn't attack back right away,

1146
00:53:20.800 --> 00:53:23.704
which is the lower ranks.

1147
00:53:23.832 --> 00:53:26.776
Reaction is like, we got to go now. Got to strike

1148
00:53:26.808 --> 00:53:29.212
while the iron is hot. And thank goodness

1149
00:53:29.276 --> 00:53:32.092
that the older gray hair

1150
00:53:32.236 --> 00:53:35.104
does the sober second look and saying, okay, no,

1151
00:53:35.302 --> 00:53:38.210
we need to take a moment here to

1152
00:53:38.580 --> 00:53:41.204
gather information and assess what's going

1153
00:53:41.242 --> 00:53:43.860
on. Now, looking

1154
00:53:43.930 --> 00:53:46.324
back with 22

1155
00:53:46.362 --> 00:53:48.660
years hindsight

1156
00:53:49.080 --> 00:53:51.892
and time in

1157
00:53:51.946 --> 00:53:54.600
the sober second look seat,

1158
00:53:55.020 --> 00:53:57.210
I understand a lot more

1159
00:53:58.620 --> 00:54:01.240
why some of the decisions were made,

1160
00:54:01.390 --> 00:54:03.784
why some of the time was

1161
00:54:03.822 --> 00:54:06.600
taken. There are other decisions that

1162
00:54:06.750 --> 00:54:09.630
I look at and I still question to this day,

1163
00:54:10.000 --> 00:54:12.660
why did it take so long? And,

1164
00:54:12.660 --> 00:54:15.564
um, there's the cognitive part of me that

1165
00:54:15.602 --> 00:54:18.320
goes, the reason that it took so long is

1166
00:54:18.390 --> 00:54:21.024
because we hadn't experienced anything like this

1167
00:54:21.062 --> 00:54:23.728
before. So there

1168
00:54:23.814 --> 00:54:26.752
was, I believe, an awful lot of,

1169
00:54:26.886 --> 00:54:29.616
wait, what? Are you sure?

1170
00:54:29.798 --> 00:54:32.420
Okay, I need to get this from a second source.

1171
00:54:32.840 --> 00:54:35.030
Whereas now

1172
00:54:35.800 --> 00:54:38.340
we would be a lot quicker to respond.

1173
00:54:39.000 --> 00:54:41.540
But like everything else, I'm sure

1174
00:54:41.610 --> 00:54:44.420
that memories

1175
00:54:44.500 --> 00:54:47.050
will fade and,

1176
00:54:47.820 --> 00:54:50.436
uh, information will go into the history books.

1177
00:54:50.628 --> 00:54:53.544
I hope that I'm not right, but

1178
00:54:53.742 --> 00:54:56.476
unless we learn the lesson, we'll be doomed to repeat it

1179
00:54:56.498 --> 00:54:57.164
again.

1180
00:54:57.362 --> 00:55:00.236
Let's hope not. Let's hope we've learned those lessons and learned them

1181
00:55:00.258 --> 00:55:00.636
well.

1182
00:55:00.738 --> 00:55:02.110
Yeah, I hope so.

1183
00:55:04.240 --> 00:55:07.180
As horrible as that day

1184
00:55:07.250 --> 00:55:10.032
was for me, for

1185
00:55:10.086 --> 00:55:13.024
us, for the world, it was

1186
00:55:13.062 --> 00:55:15.424
incredible to be involved in

1187
00:55:15.462 --> 00:55:18.240
it. I had an incredible career.

1188
00:55:18.800 --> 00:55:21.204
Uh, I loved every bit of it, even

1189
00:55:21.242 --> 00:55:23.750
the really crappy stuff.

1190
00:55:24.120 --> 00:55:27.092
It has given me a

1191
00:55:27.146 --> 00:55:28.500
unique perspective,

1192
00:55:29.560 --> 00:55:32.404
and I look forward to in my

1193
00:55:32.442 --> 00:55:35.432
old age, being able to talk

1194
00:55:35.486 --> 00:55:38.456
to some of the junior members of the

1195
00:55:38.478 --> 00:55:41.416
flying community and pass on some of

1196
00:55:41.438 --> 00:55:42.250
my experience.

1197
00:55:42.780 --> 00:55:45.656
Yeah, well, even today you're doing that. This will

1198
00:55:45.678 --> 00:55:48.548
reach a lot of people, and they'll learn from that. And

1199
00:55:48.654 --> 00:55:51.532
I just wanted to thank you so much for

1200
00:55:51.666 --> 00:55:54.124
taking the time to be on the show and to share.

1201
00:55:54.162 --> 00:55:55.470
Your story with us.

1202
00:55:55.840 --> 00:55:58.560
Thank you very much for inviting me

1203
00:55:58.630 --> 00:56:01.564
and for listening

1204
00:56:01.612 --> 00:56:04.240
to my little bit of,

1205
00:56:04.240 --> 00:56:06.610
uh, history. I appreciate it.

1206
00:56:07.620 --> 00:56:10.604
Our final guest today on the Pilot Project podcast is retired

1207
00:56:10.652 --> 00:56:13.464
air traffic controller Bert Petal out of Gander, Newfoundland.

1208
00:56:13.532 --> 00:56:15.316
Welcome to the show, Bert. Thanks for having me.

1209
00:56:15.338 --> 00:56:17.460
I hope you're all having, uh, a great afternoon.

1210
00:56:17.800 --> 00:56:20.644
Yeah, absolutely. Before we get started, we'll go through

1211
00:56:20.682 --> 00:56:23.428
Bert's biography. Albert Burt Petal of

1212
00:56:23.434 --> 00:56:26.404
Gander, Newfoundland, began training as an air traffic controller on

1213
00:56:26.442 --> 00:56:29.256
January 12, 1982. He spent time in

1214
00:56:29.278 --> 00:56:32.008
Moncton learning the basics of ATC before going to

1215
00:56:32.014 --> 00:56:34.724
Gander Tower, where he spent two months learning the visual flight

1216
00:56:34.772 --> 00:56:37.688
rules procedures of ATC. From there, he attended the

1217
00:56:37.694 --> 00:56:40.636
Transport Canada Training Institute in Cornwall, Ontario, for

1218
00:56:40.658 --> 00:56:43.516
an intense course in instrument rules flight procedures. He

1219
00:56:43.538 --> 00:56:46.076
returned to Gander Area Control Center, or ACC,

1220
00:56:46.258 --> 00:56:49.016
for an even more intense round of training. Bert

1221
00:56:49.048 --> 00:56:51.564
earned his instructor rating and helped teach six Japanese

1222
00:56:51.612 --> 00:56:54.544
controllers who were developing procedures for oceanic control between

1223
00:56:54.582 --> 00:56:57.452
Asia and North America. He helped develop the Canadian

1224
00:56:57.516 --> 00:57:00.464
automated air traffic system Cats, which

1225
00:57:00.502 --> 00:57:03.216
became the national operating system for air traffic control in

1226
00:57:03.238 --> 00:57:06.036
Canada. He retired in 2019 as a

1227
00:57:06.058 --> 00:57:08.470
supervisor for low domestic and Gander ACC.

1228
00:57:09.000 --> 00:57:11.136
Burt has seen many things in his career.

1229
00:57:11.248 --> 00:57:14.244
1985 was a bad year with the Air Indian One Eight Two

1230
00:57:14.282 --> 00:57:17.136
bombing, and then the Aero air crash on December twelveTH,

1231
00:57:17.168 --> 00:57:19.988
which was the biggest air disaster to happen on Canadian soil.

1232
00:57:20.084 --> 00:57:22.676
But the one the world would remember most is September 11,

1233
00:57:22.708 --> 00:57:25.476
2001. Bert was the approach controller for Gander

1234
00:57:25.508 --> 00:57:28.476
terminal that morning. So, Bert, where did

1235
00:57:28.498 --> 00:57:29.756
aviation begin for you?

1236
00:57:29.858 --> 00:57:32.780
Well, for me, I, um, was born the

1237
00:57:32.850 --> 00:57:35.784
day after the Queen opened the new, uh, airport

1238
00:57:35.832 --> 00:57:38.732
in Gander. So the new international airport was open the day before

1239
00:57:38.786 --> 00:57:41.392
I was born. So I probably heard

1240
00:57:41.446 --> 00:57:44.176
airplanes as my first things I ever heard in

1241
00:57:44.198 --> 00:57:46.704
life. Gander, of course, was a big

1242
00:57:46.742 --> 00:57:49.472
airport town, and we saw all

1243
00:57:49.526 --> 00:57:52.508
kinds of airplanes from DC Three,

1244
00:57:52.534 --> 00:57:55.444
S 747. I, uh, was actually

1245
00:57:55.482 --> 00:57:58.416
at the airport when the Concord first touched

1246
00:57:58.448 --> 00:58:00.996
down in North America and watched him arrive in

1247
00:58:01.018 --> 00:58:01.472
Gander.

1248
00:58:01.536 --> 00:58:02.116
Oh, wow.

1249
00:58:02.218 --> 00:58:04.884
Growing up in Gander, the airport was a big thing. My dad was

1250
00:58:04.922 --> 00:58:07.816
a meteorologist at the airport. He worked there for 38

1251
00:58:07.838 --> 00:58:10.760
years. And we ride our bike and go up and just go in the office

1252
00:58:10.830 --> 00:58:13.800
and, um, visit them. And you go to the

1253
00:58:13.870 --> 00:58:16.676
international terminal, you didn't know who you'd run into. It could be Frank

1254
00:58:16.708 --> 00:58:19.160
Sinatra or Mohammed Ali or Peter

1255
00:58:19.240 --> 00:58:21.896
Castro. It's a great experience growing

1256
00:58:21.928 --> 00:58:22.316
up.

1257
00:58:22.418 --> 00:58:24.936
That's really cool. So it's really in your blood.

1258
00:58:25.048 --> 00:58:25.660
Yeah.

1259
00:58:25.810 --> 00:58:28.748
My brother is an aircraft maintenance engineer. He was in the

1260
00:58:28.754 --> 00:58:31.744
military, worked in Cold Lake, and, uh, with 510

1261
00:58:31.782 --> 00:58:34.624
Squadron in Winnipeg for 22 years.

1262
00:58:34.742 --> 00:58:37.616
Okay, he's back here now. He still does, uh, maintenance, um, on

1263
00:58:37.638 --> 00:58:40.528
the Cormrand aircraft or, uh, 103 Search and Rescue here

1264
00:58:40.534 --> 00:58:40.956
in Gander.

1265
00:58:40.988 --> 00:58:41.730
Oh, awesome.

1266
00:58:42.820 --> 00:58:45.748
Where were you when you found out that a plane had hit the North Tower of

1267
00:58:45.754 --> 00:58:46.820
the World Trade Center?

1268
00:58:46.970 --> 00:58:49.716
I was actually at home in bed. My wife worked at

1269
00:58:49.738 --> 00:58:52.708
CFB Gander, and we had only arrived home the

1270
00:58:52.714 --> 00:58:55.408
night before. There was 24 of us were on a golf trip to Prince

1271
00:58:55.424 --> 00:58:58.376
Edward Island for five days. So I was home, I

1272
00:58:58.398 --> 00:59:01.396
was in bed, my wife was gone to work, and the phone rang

1273
00:59:01.428 --> 00:59:04.376
and I answered. She said, once, um, you get up and check

1274
00:59:04.398 --> 00:59:07.304
the TV, there appears to be, uh, an airplane has

1275
00:59:07.422 --> 00:59:10.204
hit the North Tower in, uh, New York City and the

1276
00:59:10.242 --> 00:59:12.908
base is going on lockdown. So

1277
00:59:12.994 --> 00:59:15.644
I hung up the phone and turned on the TV. And

1278
00:59:15.762 --> 00:59:18.732
within another five or ten minutes, uh, the shift manager from work

1279
00:59:18.786 --> 00:59:21.692
called and asked me to come in right away, that there was an emergency

1280
00:59:21.756 --> 00:59:23.904
situation. They needed some extra people.

1281
00:59:24.102 --> 00:59:24.850
Wow.

1282
00:59:25.780 --> 00:59:28.656
So your shift manager called and asked you to come

1283
00:59:28.678 --> 00:59:31.184
in. And then can you tell us about how the rest of that day

1284
00:59:31.222 --> 00:59:31.856
went.

1285
00:59:32.038 --> 00:59:34.796
It's a small town. It takes me probably five

1286
00:59:34.838 --> 00:59:37.684
minutes, ten minutes to get to work. So I left and got

1287
00:59:37.722 --> 00:59:40.420
into work. And as I was getting there, they were just

1288
00:59:40.490 --> 00:59:43.380
closing down the US. Airspace. So everything was

1289
00:59:43.450 --> 00:59:46.384
starting to get a little crazy. Everyone was being told

1290
00:59:46.442 --> 00:59:49.412
that they had to land at the nearest available airport.

1291
00:59:49.556 --> 00:59:52.424
On, uh, low domestic, we typically have maybe one or two

1292
00:59:52.462 --> 00:59:55.396
sectors open because we control all of Newfoundland, Labrador

1293
00:59:55.428 --> 00:59:58.124
and all those airports within it. So low domestic is

1294
00:59:58.162 --> 01:00:00.796
28,000ft and below high en

1295
01:00:00.818 --> 01:00:03.324
route. They control 29,000 and

1296
01:00:03.362 --> 01:00:06.348
above and 95 to

1297
01:00:06.434 --> 01:00:09.296
90. Uh, 8% of the airplanes that are coming westbound off the

1298
01:00:09.318 --> 01:00:12.144
ocean. Those days are overflying. They never, ever

1299
01:00:12.182 --> 01:00:15.024
enter low level airspace. But on that

1300
01:00:15.062 --> 01:00:17.232
particular day, of course, they all had to enter

1301
01:00:17.286 --> 01:00:20.000
aerospace. Just wasn't time

1302
01:00:20.070 --> 01:00:22.756
to, um, get strips to the

1303
01:00:22.858 --> 01:00:25.480
low level controllers in the format that we're used to.

1304
01:00:25.480 --> 01:00:28.260
Um, no passing investments to the towers.

1305
01:00:28.600 --> 01:00:31.060
It was, uh, sort of chaotic, uh, starting

1306
01:00:31.130 --> 01:00:34.016
out. So the high level controllers, we

1307
01:00:34.058 --> 01:00:36.888
would coordinate back and forth which,

1308
01:00:36.940 --> 01:00:39.832
uh, airplanes were going to what airport. We basically were working

1309
01:00:39.886 --> 01:00:42.776
with the towers and the airports, asking

1310
01:00:42.878 --> 01:00:45.816
the supervisor would ask how many airplanes they could

1311
01:00:45.838 --> 01:00:48.740
take. And we, as controllers, would send them to the airports that they,

1312
01:00:48.740 --> 01:00:51.468
uh, wanted us to send them to. Majority of the

1313
01:00:51.474 --> 01:00:54.380
airplanes all wanted to come to Gander because Gander was,

1314
01:00:54.380 --> 01:00:57.340
uh, a big international airport, and a lot of those

1315
01:00:57.410 --> 01:01:00.060
pilots are very familiar with Gander.

1316
01:01:00.220 --> 01:01:02.812
Gander was actually backup landing

1317
01:01:02.876 --> 01:01:05.856
spot for the, uh, space shuttle. If they had

1318
01:01:05.878 --> 01:01:08.876
to abort, Gander was an alternate location

1319
01:01:08.908 --> 01:01:11.696
for them to land. So people are very familiar with

1320
01:01:11.718 --> 01:01:12.588
Gander.

1321
01:01:12.764 --> 01:01:15.764
So was it difficult? Did you guys have to take into

1322
01:01:15.802 --> 01:01:18.772
consideration, for example, how much fuel an aircraft had on board

1323
01:01:18.826 --> 01:01:21.732
and where they could get to? Or were there many people who were

1324
01:01:21.786 --> 01:01:24.664
short on fuel? Or was it more a case of people with extra

1325
01:01:24.702 --> 01:01:25.956
fuel and needing to dump?

1326
01:01:26.068 --> 01:01:29.016
No, it was the other way around. Most everyone had

1327
01:01:29.038 --> 01:01:31.550
plenty of fuel. And in actual fact, we,

1328
01:01:31.550 --> 01:01:34.344
uh, opened up, uh, arrival sector for St.

1329
01:01:34.382 --> 01:01:37.176
John's Gander arrival. There was a

1330
01:01:37.198 --> 01:01:40.000
western arrival sector for Steve Millen,

1331
01:01:40.020 --> 01:01:43.016
deer Lake. As well as the low level en route

1332
01:01:43.048 --> 01:01:45.976
sectors, we also opened up a fuel

1333
01:01:46.008 --> 01:01:48.856
dumping sector. So it was one guy that was just directing

1334
01:01:48.888 --> 01:01:51.744
fuel dumps for all the airplanes that had to dump fuel before they could go

1335
01:01:51.782 --> 01:01:53.120
land at an airport.

1336
01:01:53.540 --> 01:01:56.336
And would you guys normally have an area that

1337
01:01:56.358 --> 01:01:59.228
was put aside for fuel dumping? Like, for example, when we're

1338
01:01:59.244 --> 01:02:02.128
in Greenwood, there's an area for fuel dumping, for emergencies. Did you

1339
01:02:02.134 --> 01:02:05.020
have one that was normally set aside, or was this no, not at

1340
01:02:05.030 --> 01:02:05.156
all.

1341
01:02:05.178 --> 01:02:08.036
It's one we did ad hoc. As the airplanes advised us

1342
01:02:08.058 --> 01:02:10.960
that they needed to dump fuel, we'd clear them to a, uh,

1343
01:02:10.970 --> 01:02:13.956
sterilized altitude that they could begin, and I'd just hand them off

1344
01:02:13.978 --> 01:02:16.644
to the guy that was controlling all the fuel dumps. Of course,

1345
01:02:16.762 --> 01:02:19.752
you've got to be 15 miles either side of track, ten minutes

1346
01:02:19.806 --> 01:02:22.788
in trail to dump fuel. So there was a line of airplanes dumping

1347
01:02:22.804 --> 01:02:25.480
fuel north and southbound, staying away

1348
01:02:25.550 --> 01:02:28.456
from all the airports. They're basically out over oceanic

1349
01:02:28.488 --> 01:02:31.292
airspace inside our domestic area, but

1350
01:02:31.346 --> 01:02:34.028
out over, uh, water more than anything else.

1351
01:02:34.194 --> 01:02:37.068
You mentioned strips earlier. Can you explain what a

1352
01:02:37.074 --> 01:02:38.124
strip is?

1353
01:02:38.322 --> 01:02:41.056
Flight, uh, information strip had all the details of the

1354
01:02:41.078 --> 01:02:43.728
airplanes on, uh, low domestic. For a

1355
01:02:43.734 --> 01:02:46.592
westbound strip, the Ident aircraft type,

1356
01:02:46.646 --> 01:02:49.584
its speed would be on the left hand side of the

1357
01:02:49.622 --> 01:02:52.496
strip and a fixed posting. So if you had three or

1358
01:02:52.518 --> 01:02:55.252
four fixed postings going through your airspace, there'd be,

1359
01:02:55.386 --> 01:02:58.196
say, an eastern point, a midpoint across the

1360
01:02:58.218 --> 01:03:01.076
airspace, and, uh, an exit point on the west side. So

1361
01:03:01.098 --> 01:03:03.508
you'd probably have three strips on the board for each individual

1362
01:03:03.594 --> 01:03:06.564
airplane. Eastbound airplanes, of course, were just the opposite.

1363
01:03:06.612 --> 01:03:09.556
They had the, uh, Ident, the aircraft type, the speed

1364
01:03:09.668 --> 01:03:12.532
squat code would be on, uh, the right hand side of the strip.

1365
01:03:12.596 --> 01:03:15.464
Fixed posting would be on the, uh, left on

1366
01:03:15.502 --> 01:03:18.316
high level. The Ident was all in the

1367
01:03:18.338 --> 01:03:21.176
same format, would all be on the left side of the strip,

1368
01:03:21.288 --> 01:03:24.204
but they'd be printed in black for eastbound and

1369
01:03:24.242 --> 01:03:27.036
red for, uh, westbound. So

1370
01:03:27.138 --> 01:03:29.996
there was a big difference in the strip formats between

1371
01:03:30.098 --> 01:03:32.880
low domestic and arrival, as there was for

1372
01:03:32.950 --> 01:03:35.430
high level. But it was, uh,

1373
01:03:35.780 --> 01:03:38.736
such a big rush to get those airplanes on the ground, no one

1374
01:03:38.758 --> 01:03:41.676
expected them to be coming into low level airspace. Towers weren't

1375
01:03:41.708 --> 01:03:44.656
expecting them. So what ended up happening was when

1376
01:03:44.678 --> 01:03:47.044
the high level controller cleared the flight down to

1377
01:03:47.082 --> 01:03:50.036
29,000, they'd come over and give the guy, uh, who was

1378
01:03:50.058 --> 01:03:53.044
going to get the airplane, depending what airport they're going to, we

1379
01:03:53.082 --> 01:03:55.828
would use the high level strip and

1380
01:03:55.914 --> 01:03:58.664
basically passing estimates to the tower net was

1381
01:03:58.782 --> 01:04:01.352
out the window. There's no time to start

1382
01:04:01.406 --> 01:04:04.376
phoning and passing all these estimates. We just do it verbally over

1383
01:04:04.398 --> 01:04:06.904
a hot ride and let them know what the next five or ten

1384
01:04:06.942 --> 01:04:09.416
airplanes would be coming to their airport.

1385
01:04:09.608 --> 01:04:09.964
Wow.

1386
01:04:10.002 --> 01:04:12.844
So you guys were just operating outside of any of your

1387
01:04:12.882 --> 01:04:14.430
standard operating procedures?

1388
01:04:14.430 --> 01:04:17.100
Uh, absolutely, yeah. But it got to

1389
01:04:17.170 --> 01:04:20.104
calm down within the first half hour or so. It was pretty smooth

1390
01:04:20.152 --> 01:04:22.924
operation. We had a bunch of extra people called in.

1391
01:04:22.962 --> 01:04:25.888
So all the high level controllers that were controlling radar had a

1392
01:04:25.894 --> 01:04:28.716
data man, and it would be the data man that would run back and forth

1393
01:04:28.748 --> 01:04:31.600
with the strips. So there was always someone

1394
01:04:31.670 --> 01:04:34.428
watching the airplanes and talking to the airplanes, while there was

1395
01:04:34.454 --> 01:04:37.284
other extra controllers running around doing the grunt work, running

1396
01:04:37.322 --> 01:04:39.876
back for class and off strips and things like that, that we

1397
01:04:39.898 --> 01:04:40.468
needed.

1398
01:04:40.634 --> 01:04:43.316
Did you witness anything that was especially

1399
01:04:43.498 --> 01:04:46.036
significant or dramatic on that

1400
01:04:46.058 --> 01:04:46.630
day.

1401
01:04:47.000 --> 01:04:49.860
Just, uh, when I got there, they were splitting open

1402
01:04:49.930 --> 01:04:52.916
sectors. They were opening a Gander arrival sector, and one of the

1403
01:04:52.938 --> 01:04:55.916
supervisors was initially sitting in so we could get

1404
01:04:55.938 --> 01:04:58.524
the airspace set up and get your radar screen and everything set

1405
01:04:58.562 --> 01:05:01.484
up. I guess he was in a rush to get the first few

1406
01:05:01.522 --> 01:05:04.444
airplanes on the ground. It was a bit of a panic when we first started

1407
01:05:04.482 --> 01:05:07.388
out. We didn't know what we were getting into, so he was

1408
01:05:07.394 --> 01:05:10.296
trying to get them on the ground as fast as he could. And two heavy

1409
01:05:10.328 --> 01:05:12.944
aircraft lined up on final on Gander. The first

1410
01:05:12.982 --> 01:05:15.616
one rolled out long because none of these guys were

1411
01:05:15.638 --> 01:05:18.476
familiar with Gander Airport or we don't have parallel

1412
01:05:18.508 --> 01:05:21.424
runways or high speed taxiways. So the first

1413
01:05:21.462 --> 01:05:24.304
arrival actually was, uh, still on the runway

1414
01:05:24.352 --> 01:05:27.348
when the second guy was close final. So they had to

1415
01:05:27.354 --> 01:05:30.276
pull him up and go around. So that was

1416
01:05:30.298 --> 01:05:33.124
the only close thing that I saw that

1417
01:05:33.162 --> 01:05:36.084
day. I relieved the supervisor at that

1418
01:05:36.122 --> 01:05:39.028
point in time, and I probably had eight or ten airplanes

1419
01:05:39.044 --> 01:05:41.992
on my frequency. I said, Guys, uh, as long as everyone

1420
01:05:42.046 --> 01:05:45.016
has got lots of fuel, you don't have any emergencies, you don't have

1421
01:05:45.038 --> 01:05:47.924
any issues, I'm just going to space you all out 10 miles

1422
01:05:47.972 --> 01:05:50.868
on final. And everyone that was on

1423
01:05:50.894 --> 01:05:53.836
the frequency agreed with that. Just said, yeah, that's a great idea. We

1424
01:05:53.858 --> 01:05:56.680
got lots of room. It was a beautiful VFR day. There was no, uh,

1425
01:05:56.680 --> 01:05:59.340
issues with instrument approaches at all. So

1426
01:05:59.410 --> 01:06:02.092
we're just basically boxing people

1427
01:06:02.146 --> 01:06:04.880
on east and west of the airport. And I was

1428
01:06:04.950 --> 01:06:07.584
just trying to aim them for a ten mile final and

1429
01:06:07.702 --> 01:06:10.624
let one guy go downwind and turn them base leg behind the next

1430
01:06:10.662 --> 01:06:13.636
one and line them all up with 10 miles between them. So they had

1431
01:06:13.658 --> 01:06:16.176
a nice, stable, long final approach.

1432
01:06:16.288 --> 01:06:19.172
And so that all worked out pretty smooth. Yeah, it did.

1433
01:06:19.226 --> 01:06:22.116
Yeah, we had lots of time. There was no panic that

1434
01:06:22.138 --> 01:06:25.104
way. Uh, there was no rush for anyone to get on the ground.

1435
01:06:25.232 --> 01:06:27.740
Once everyone realized they had the land, uh,

1436
01:06:27.740 --> 01:06:30.648
everyone's pretty cooperative, they realized what kind of a

1437
01:06:30.654 --> 01:06:32.088
situation we were in.

1438
01:06:32.254 --> 01:06:35.016
Well, I was going to say it's funny, I think we think of that

1439
01:06:35.038 --> 01:06:37.940
day as a pretty frantic day for air traffic controllers.

1440
01:06:38.020 --> 01:06:40.892
But it sounds like where you guys were working,

1441
01:06:41.026 --> 01:06:43.804
you were able to keep calm and

1442
01:06:43.842 --> 01:06:44.892
just make it happen.

1443
01:06:45.026 --> 01:06:45.516
Yeah.

1444
01:06:45.618 --> 01:06:48.188
Very proud of the team we had here and the controllers we

1445
01:06:48.194 --> 01:06:50.776
had. There was no panic

1446
01:06:50.968 --> 01:06:53.440
initially it was a shock and just trying to get things

1447
01:06:53.510 --> 01:06:56.464
straightened out and how it was going to roll out.

1448
01:06:56.502 --> 01:06:59.356
But once we got into it and, uh, setting

1449
01:06:59.388 --> 01:07:02.348
people up, knew what airports they were going to, it rolled

1450
01:07:02.364 --> 01:07:05.088
out pretty smoothly. We did have some airplanes that

1451
01:07:05.174 --> 01:07:07.764
wanted to go on Toronto or wanted to go to. Different

1452
01:07:07.802 --> 01:07:10.612
destinations, but we were told to have everyone

1453
01:07:10.666 --> 01:07:13.444
on the ground as soon as we can. So it was

1454
01:07:13.482 --> 01:07:16.456
very short discussions with people who wanted to go other words, other

1455
01:07:16.478 --> 01:07:19.336
ways. Uh, I had one near India, wanted to know if he

1456
01:07:19.358 --> 01:07:21.944
could go on to Toronto. I said, Negative, you must now land

1457
01:07:21.982 --> 01:07:24.664
Gander. And nothing else after

1458
01:07:24.702 --> 01:07:27.400
that. He just said, Roger, and

1459
01:07:27.550 --> 01:07:30.072
just end 6000ft fly heading three 10.

1460
01:07:30.126 --> 01:07:32.824
And that was it. I get them lined up for the runway.

1461
01:07:32.952 --> 01:07:35.676
Well, that's what it's like when air traffic control tells you what to

1462
01:07:35.698 --> 01:07:37.196
do. You're going to do it.

1463
01:07:37.298 --> 01:07:39.868
Yeah. It's not ATC suggests,

1464
01:07:39.964 --> 01:07:42.396
it's ATC clears. Uh, that's

1465
01:07:42.428 --> 01:07:43.010
right.

1466
01:07:43.380 --> 01:07:46.368
Now, another really interesting perspective I wanted to

1467
01:07:46.374 --> 01:07:49.324
get from you was the perspective on the ground in Gander.

1468
01:07:49.372 --> 01:07:52.256
Most Canadians, I think, are aware, or at least certainly we

1469
01:07:52.278 --> 01:07:55.152
were back then, that Gander took on an immense amount

1470
01:07:55.206 --> 01:07:58.004
of people who know you just mentioned that Air

1471
01:07:58.042 --> 01:08:00.788
India flight, so they were expecting to go to Toronto. Now they're in

1472
01:08:00.794 --> 01:08:03.696
Gander. So how many people ended up stuck in Gander?

1473
01:08:03.728 --> 01:08:04.580
Temporarily

1474
01:08:05.080 --> 01:08:08.056
6800. Uh, at that time we

1475
01:08:08.078 --> 01:08:11.016
had a population of about 9000, so it was pretty close to

1476
01:08:11.038 --> 01:08:12.660
doubling the size of the town.

1477
01:08:12.820 --> 01:08:15.050
Wow. So where did everybody stay?

1478
01:08:16.060 --> 01:08:18.956
Just, uh, about everywhere uh, you could think of. It

1479
01:08:18.978 --> 01:08:21.400
wasn't just Gander. It was all the communities

1480
01:08:21.480 --> 01:08:24.396
surrounding here. It was Lewisport and Glenwood and

1481
01:08:24.418 --> 01:08:26.460
Appleton and Gambo and Dover.

1482
01:08:27.440 --> 01:08:30.416
A, uh, whole bunch of communities ended up taking for

1483
01:08:30.438 --> 01:08:33.132
all these service groups. Legions

1484
01:08:33.196 --> 01:08:35.904
and Lions Clubs and, uh, all the

1485
01:08:35.942 --> 01:08:38.544
schools. That was one of the first things

1486
01:08:38.582 --> 01:08:41.136
when I, uh, finally got relieved and

1487
01:08:41.318 --> 01:08:43.990
came home. The call went out for

1488
01:08:44.360 --> 01:08:47.332
sleeping bags and air mattresses and things like that.

1489
01:08:47.386 --> 01:08:50.048
So I actually lost three sleeping bags.

1490
01:08:50.144 --> 01:08:52.516
Once everyone was gone, you didn't get anything back?

1491
01:08:52.618 --> 01:08:55.544
Yeah. And how

1492
01:08:55.582 --> 01:08:58.184
was that on the community? Was it tough or did everyone just come

1493
01:08:58.222 --> 01:08:58.904
together?

1494
01:08:59.102 --> 01:09:01.976
Well, as I say, Ganner being

1495
01:09:01.998 --> 01:09:04.452
an airport town, it has an emergency

1496
01:09:04.516 --> 01:09:07.432
plan in preparation for things like this.

1497
01:09:07.486 --> 01:09:10.476
And, uh, things went quite smoothly. The calls just went

1498
01:09:10.498 --> 01:09:13.372
out from, uh, like a local TV station. We had a

1499
01:09:13.426 --> 01:09:15.820
local Rogers cable, a local

1500
01:09:15.890 --> 01:09:18.684
production, and they just got on air. And you turn on

1501
01:09:18.722 --> 01:09:21.488
cable nine and they were just saying, okay, we

1502
01:09:21.494 --> 01:09:23.964
need sleeping bags at Gander

1503
01:09:24.012 --> 01:09:26.236
Academy or we need toilet paper at Gander

1504
01:09:26.268 --> 01:09:29.264
Collegiate. In two or 3 hours you would hear

1505
01:09:29.302 --> 01:09:32.192
the guy on the cable say, okay, stop bringing toilet paper

1506
01:09:32.246 --> 01:09:34.230
to Gander Collegiate. They've got enough.

1507
01:09:36.120 --> 01:09:39.092
So it was amazing for the community to pull together way we did.

1508
01:09:39.146 --> 01:09:42.116
But for the air traffic control part of it, we had

1509
01:09:42.138 --> 01:09:44.724
a busy three or 4 hours. And then we had five

1510
01:09:44.762 --> 01:09:47.684
days doing nothing. We actually turned our cafeteria

1511
01:09:47.732 --> 01:09:50.644
into, uh, takeout space. We cooked meals

1512
01:09:50.692 --> 01:09:53.480
for five days and delivered them to all the schools or all the service

1513
01:09:53.550 --> 01:09:55.364
buildings where people were being stayed.

1514
01:09:55.492 --> 01:09:58.136
Well, I suppose there was nothing going on. There was no one

1515
01:09:58.158 --> 01:09:58.920
flying.

1516
01:09:59.260 --> 01:10:02.028
It was crazy. The first and only time

1517
01:10:02.114 --> 01:10:05.084
in my 36 and a half years that there was not

1518
01:10:05.122 --> 01:10:06.856
a radar target in the sky.

1519
01:10:06.968 --> 01:10:08.632
That must have been kind of eerie.

1520
01:10:08.776 --> 01:10:11.632
Yeah, well, when you look at it, um, as I

1521
01:10:11.686 --> 01:10:14.684
finished up, we were looking probably 16

1522
01:10:14.732 --> 01:10:17.548
to 1800 flights a day going back and forth

1523
01:10:17.564 --> 01:10:20.544
across the ocean. So typically you have an

1524
01:10:20.582 --> 01:10:23.392
eastbound flow that airplanes, uh, start

1525
01:10:23.446 --> 01:10:26.404
heading overseas just around supper time, Newfoundland time,

1526
01:10:26.442 --> 01:10:29.348
and fly until around three or 04:00 in the morning. And

1527
01:10:29.354 --> 01:10:32.164
then eight to 09:00 in the morning, they're turnaround coming back

1528
01:10:32.202 --> 01:10:35.008
westbound and going to North America. So you're

1529
01:10:35.024 --> 01:10:37.464
getting m eight to 900 flights in each

1530
01:10:37.502 --> 01:10:38.164
flow.

1531
01:10:38.292 --> 01:10:39.784
That's wild. Yeah.

1532
01:10:39.822 --> 01:10:42.808
People don't realize how busy it is, but you get a

1533
01:10:42.814 --> 01:10:45.656
clear night here on the west coast of Newfoundland. Look up and all you can

1534
01:10:45.678 --> 01:10:47.620
see is ID, uh, lights.

1535
01:10:47.780 --> 01:10:50.696
Well, that's pretty much where all of the whether they're heading

1536
01:10:50.728 --> 01:10:53.644
to Gander or somewhere beyond. That's where

1537
01:10:53.682 --> 01:10:56.600
most of the tracks across the Atlantic, uh, cross.

1538
01:10:56.680 --> 01:10:59.276
The North Atlantic Track system is developed by the

1539
01:10:59.298 --> 01:11:01.580
Gander planners. So that's part of, uh,

1540
01:11:02.182 --> 01:11:05.116
a function of the oceanic control, uh, sector. So we're

1541
01:11:05.148 --> 01:11:08.076
actually two different area control centers. There's

1542
01:11:08.108 --> 01:11:10.784
Gander, uh, and there's, uh, Domestic and

1543
01:11:10.822 --> 01:11:13.796
oceanic, all in one building. We all work hand in hand

1544
01:11:13.818 --> 01:11:16.036
with each other, but it's considered two pieces of

1545
01:11:16.058 --> 01:11:16.980
airspace.

1546
01:11:18.240 --> 01:11:21.124
Uh, the last thing I wanted to ask you is what

1547
01:11:21.162 --> 01:11:23.832
changes did you see happen in the world of ATC after

1548
01:11:23.886 --> 01:11:26.440
911 specifically related to

1549
01:11:26.590 --> 01:11:28.090
procedures or security?

1550
01:11:28.800 --> 01:11:31.704
Uh, not a lot on our side of it. It's more

1551
01:11:31.742 --> 01:11:34.632
on the airport side through security. Our FAM

1552
01:11:34.686 --> 01:11:37.576
flight program got, uh, canceled every two years.

1553
01:11:37.598 --> 01:11:40.392
We used to be able to take a trip. We'd ride in the cockpit

1554
01:11:40.456 --> 01:11:43.064
and, uh, get familiar with pilot

1555
01:11:43.112 --> 01:11:45.996
procedures just for our own, uh, so we

1556
01:11:46.018 --> 01:11:48.532
knew on the ground what they were doing in the cockpit.

1557
01:11:48.696 --> 01:11:51.484
I've gone to Scotland and went to visit

1558
01:11:51.532 --> 01:11:54.316
Heathrow, flew across in their Canada

1559
01:11:54.348 --> 01:11:57.148
crew, watched the arrival in Heathrow,

1560
01:11:57.324 --> 01:11:59.600
watch all those airplanes around everywhere.

1561
01:12:00.180 --> 01:12:03.036
That's awesome. That's too bad that that ended up canceled.

1562
01:12:03.148 --> 01:12:06.148
Yeah, so that was one of the things that you weren't allowed in the

1563
01:12:06.154 --> 01:12:09.044
cockpit anymore. So the Fan flight program was basically put

1564
01:12:09.082 --> 01:12:10.800
on hold for that period.

1565
01:12:10.960 --> 01:12:13.556
So you didn't see any new emergency plans or

1566
01:12:13.578 --> 01:12:15.152
procedures that came into place?

1567
01:12:15.306 --> 01:12:18.264
Not really, because basically what we had worked so well,

1568
01:12:18.302 --> 01:12:20.970
I don't think it needed to be updated very much.

1569
01:12:21.580 --> 01:12:24.344
That's pretty impressive. Yeah, it's pretty

1570
01:12:24.382 --> 01:12:27.244
amazing that all of the emergency procedures set

1571
01:12:27.282 --> 01:12:29.260
up in Gander worked perfectly.

1572
01:12:29.920 --> 01:12:32.652
As perfectly as we, uh, would have expected them.

1573
01:12:32.706 --> 01:12:34.892
Under those circumstances. You didn't expect

1574
01:12:34.946 --> 01:12:37.772
6700 people to arrive in your town one

1575
01:12:37.826 --> 01:12:38.712
afternoon.

1576
01:12:38.856 --> 01:12:39.644
That's right.

1577
01:12:39.762 --> 01:12:42.592
And right now, the Broadway play

1578
01:12:42.646 --> 01:12:45.616
or the play Come From Away has

1579
01:12:45.638 --> 01:12:48.252
been playing here in Gander all, uh, summer.

1580
01:12:48.396 --> 01:12:51.252
It finishes up next week and there's been people

1581
01:12:51.306 --> 01:12:53.652
here from everywhere, all over the world.

1582
01:12:53.786 --> 01:12:56.500
Asia, Australia. It's crazy.

1583
01:12:56.570 --> 01:12:59.444
So the town has been full of, uh, strangers all

1584
01:12:59.482 --> 01:13:02.372
summer long as well. It's about what happened

1585
01:13:02.426 --> 01:13:04.064
here on 911.

1586
01:13:04.192 --> 01:13:05.056
It's a musical.

1587
01:13:05.088 --> 01:13:07.604
It's crazy. Who would ever thought that you could make a musical

1588
01:13:07.652 --> 01:13:10.456
about a disaster like that? But it

1589
01:13:10.478 --> 01:13:13.410
was based on the stories that this couple came,

1590
01:13:13.410 --> 01:13:16.216
uh, they came here on the 10th anniversary of

1591
01:13:16.238 --> 01:13:19.132
911 and interviewed, uh, as many people

1592
01:13:19.186 --> 01:13:22.076
as they could and they ended up

1593
01:13:22.098 --> 01:13:25.020
writing a musical about it. And it was on Broadway for

1594
01:13:25.170 --> 01:13:26.124
almost four years.

1595
01:13:26.162 --> 01:13:27.612
I think that's amazing.

1596
01:13:27.746 --> 01:13:30.130
It's pretty emotional when you go see it,

1597
01:13:31.060 --> 01:13:33.730
the way you see other people look at it.

1598
01:13:35.140 --> 01:13:38.076
I, uh, golf a lot, and I'm on the executive of the golf

1599
01:13:38.108 --> 01:13:40.864
course here. I was just out doing some

1600
01:13:40.902 --> 01:13:43.664
work one afternoon, I came up on beside number

1601
01:13:43.702 --> 01:13:46.676
14 green. There was a couple there and I hadn't seen them before, and I just

1602
01:13:46.698 --> 01:13:49.588
stopped and spoke to them. I said, how are you enjoying your allen? And

1603
01:13:49.594 --> 01:13:52.496
they said, it was great. I said, it's your first time here? Yeah. We come from North

1604
01:13:52.528 --> 01:13:55.464
Carolina. I said, oh, you must have come to see the play. He said,

1605
01:13:55.502 --> 01:13:57.930
yeah, we did. I said, well,

1606
01:13:58.300 --> 01:14:00.456
I was the approach controller Gadner on

1607
01:14:00.478 --> 01:14:03.288
911, and it was amazing. They just

1608
01:14:03.374 --> 01:14:06.184
came over and wanted to hug me and thank

1609
01:14:06.222 --> 01:14:09.190
us for everything we did. To us, it was much,

1610
01:14:09.190 --> 01:14:12.110
ah, ado about nothing because it's something.

1611
01:14:12.110 --> 01:14:14.988
Ah, we just took on that task and didn't give

1612
01:14:14.994 --> 01:14:17.804
it a second thought, but it seems people really

1613
01:14:17.842 --> 01:14:19.136
appreciated it.

1614
01:14:19.318 --> 01:14:21.952
Oh, yeah. I mean, think about the number

1615
01:14:22.006 --> 01:14:24.252
of aircraft that you safely

1616
01:14:24.316 --> 01:14:27.024
coordinated and got on the ground under

1617
01:14:27.142 --> 01:14:30.016
very extraordinary circumstances. And then when that

1618
01:14:30.038 --> 01:14:33.024
was done, the taking in of so many

1619
01:14:33.062 --> 01:14:36.020
strangers and treating them like family. It's very

1620
01:14:36.090 --> 01:14:38.756
east coast hospitality type of story, for

1621
01:14:38.778 --> 01:14:39.252
sure.

1622
01:14:39.386 --> 01:14:40.736
It worked like a charm.

1623
01:14:40.848 --> 01:14:43.604
Well, Bert, is there anything else you think I should ask you about?

1624
01:14:43.722 --> 01:14:46.610
You're obviously deal, uh, with military, uh,

1625
01:14:46.610 --> 01:14:49.416
aircraft, and we do here a

1626
01:14:49.438 --> 01:14:52.424
lot. We have a lot of, uh, aerospace reservations come through

1627
01:14:52.462 --> 01:14:55.124
here. We have a search and rescue squadron

1628
01:14:55.172 --> 01:14:57.820
here. There used to be a, uh, squadron in, uh,

1629
01:14:57.822 --> 01:15:00.668
Goosebe. I had some funny stories over the years.

1630
01:15:00.754 --> 01:15:03.660
There used to be a lot of German fighter pilots up there training

1631
01:15:03.730 --> 01:15:06.520
and from different countries. And I remember, uh,

1632
01:15:08.000 --> 01:15:10.840
I think it was a tornado. Declared emergency,

1633
01:15:10.920 --> 01:15:13.896
needed to get back to Goose Bay. Roger, us the nature

1634
01:15:13.928 --> 01:15:16.860
of your emergency. Had a bird strike, so

1635
01:15:16.930 --> 01:15:19.656
I got him cleared down to 7000ft, sent him over to Goose

1636
01:15:19.688 --> 01:15:22.676
Ratcon. After he had landed, the tower call me. He said,

1637
01:15:22.698 --> 01:15:25.536
what did that guy say was wrong? I said, he had a bird

1638
01:15:25.568 --> 01:15:28.356
strike. And the guy in the tower said, well, the bird must have been

1639
01:15:28.378 --> 01:15:31.376
sitting in a tree because he's got a piece of a spruce tree sticking

1640
01:15:31.408 --> 01:15:33.104
at the leading edge of his wing.

1641
01:15:33.232 --> 01:15:34.432
Oh, my gosh.

1642
01:15:34.576 --> 01:15:37.176
So there's just been some great experiences over the

1643
01:15:37.198 --> 01:15:37.770
year.

1644
01:15:39.420 --> 01:15:42.376
Okay, well, I think that wraps it up. I just want

1645
01:15:42.398 --> 01:15:45.304
to thank you so much for taking the time out of your day to share

1646
01:15:45.342 --> 01:15:48.024
your experiences with us. And I want to thank you for the work you did that

1647
01:15:48.062 --> 01:15:48.468
day.

1648
01:15:48.574 --> 01:15:49.644
Oh, no problem.

1649
01:15:49.762 --> 01:15:50.700
My pleasure.

1650
01:15:51.040 --> 01:15:53.596
All right, that's going to wrap up our episode. Looking back and

1651
01:15:53.618 --> 01:15:56.584
remembering 911 from a Canadian perspective.

1652
01:15:56.712 --> 01:15:59.324
Did you know that the third Friday of every September is

1653
01:15:59.362 --> 01:16:02.236
Military Family Appreciation Day? There's no way we could

1654
01:16:02.258 --> 01:16:05.148
do this job without them. So for our next episode, we'll be sitting

1655
01:16:05.164 --> 01:16:08.096
down with a few of the spouses of pilots to gain their

1656
01:16:08.118 --> 01:16:11.080
perspective on what it's like to marry into the RCAF. Uh,

1657
01:16:11.080 --> 01:16:14.028
do you have any questions about anything you've heard in this episode or would

1658
01:16:14.054 --> 01:16:16.996
you or someone you know make a great guest on the show? You can reach out

1659
01:16:17.018 --> 01:16:19.892
to us at thepilotprojectpodcast at, uh@gmail.com,

1660
01:16:19.946 --> 01:16:21.444
or on all social media at

1661
01:16:21.482 --> 01:16:24.436
atpodpilotproject. As always, we'd like to thank

1662
01:16:24.458 --> 01:16:27.316
you for all the growth we've been experiencing, and we still need your help with the

1663
01:16:27.338 --> 01:16:30.212
big three that's like and follow us on social

1664
01:16:30.266 --> 01:16:33.124
media, share with your friends and follow and rate us five

1665
01:16:33.162 --> 01:16:36.060
stars wherever you get your podcasts. That's all for now.

1666
01:16:36.130 --> 01:16:38.716
Thanks for listening. Keep the blue side up. See

1667
01:16:38.738 --> 01:16:41.672
you. Engineer

1668
01:16:41.736 --> 01:16:44.520
shut down all four shutting down all four engines.