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The Corey will jump in last second. Save

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me from being host. I really don't wanna

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host. I'll... Corey always shows up the last

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minute. It's probably in a meeting. Mid being,

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maybe. Okay. Mean many it's been a calls

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today so we don't have no idea

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why anybody would be in a bunch of

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meetings.

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I'm not. I wasn't that totally.

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We're not gonna talk about that. Alright? Like

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I really... I I agree with Sean, like,

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I just, like, stop going on any type

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of, like, Twitter or Linkedin stuff because I...

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It's everyone just, like, they're 2 sets the

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wall. Wall at the wall. Just so... Everybody's

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got an opinion. And Like who have it.

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Yeah. There's there's 2 prevailing stories right now,

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and it's just sort of like, okay. Can

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we... And White several having Snooze withdrawals apparently.

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We'll have Have. We have those other good

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stuff, but I just don't wanna talk about

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the event. I I do think 1 thing

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I do think that's interesting. Did you guys

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read how, like Mca feed did something similar

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in 20 10. And it was the same.

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It was same Ceo. The same. Was like

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0YII

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did see a good conspiracy there.

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Okay. At at risk of going and actually

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talking about it. I did see a statistic

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that there were something like 8500000.0

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points

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impacted.

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Yeah. By this 1.

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Something Yeah. I don't know if

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that

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number of

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endpoints was impacted by the Mca 1.

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Let's see. Someone... Well, let me ask Chad

40
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Eb real quick. How many

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endpoints

42
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were

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taken

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down

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in the mca feed, 20 10 event.

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Of course, Crowds is the first thing that

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comes up. Really?

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Well, yeah of course. Well, because it's it's

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because the link. The link between the 2.

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Right like, it's just articles everyone

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talking about that. How many cats do you

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have, Sean?

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2 right now. Although my daughters are begging

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for number 3 and I'm like, when the

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house is in better order?

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Those are Rookie numbers.

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Was right I thank God you're here. I

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have 11:11.

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But only 3 your mind? I was about

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to say how many are permanent? I know

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I know you're secret. Are you 3 permanent.

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Pre permanent, 9 foster.

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Once upon a time, I went through our

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house, we had over 30 indoor outdoor cats,

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and I think my mom... I stopped counting

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the number of house plans at at 333

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because I liked the number.

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I come by my Ocd honestly,

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Okay. Your video, Sean. I, don't know. I

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think the rest you're being very upset if

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we start our own so we're still accounting.

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Still, even though get you. Just turn the

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resolution that you're...

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I don't know if that. What are you

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set to? 4 k or bus.

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It it should only be... Doesn't do anything

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80.

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May your only

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I paid for rest stream plus.

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Alright. Using Gpu or acceleration Yeah. I went

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to stream dot r u, and they're like,

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yeah, Free upgrade. Here you go. I was

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like, alright. Cool. You to call, But I

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just had to give like my source number,

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You know, that's it. And I like right.

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My name address.

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K. There's some good stuff, Corey. Good news.

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There's what is too. No. Right That's no.

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There's nothing happened. We don't wanna talk about

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the event.

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There's a couple good articles about Crowds stroke.

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We're not gonna talk about that. I'm pretty

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sure we are That's stroke. Feel like that...

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What what can we really do minimum hasn't

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been said. We should... We should have someone

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collecting memes? Like, like, you got have an

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do, like, meme? Like of. I mean, Crowds

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stroke is the only meme that I thought

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was worth Aaron. Did you see the kit

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kat tweet? Guys No. That actually was pretty

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cool. Kicked back a choice. It was, like,

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your computer's taking a break, so Why don't

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you, and then it had the P,

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like, f and I was like,

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that was golden. Good It was a red.

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It was a red screen of death. Yeah.

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Good job Kat. Red screen of kit kat.

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Red cat green?

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That was good.

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There's a couple other good ones that We're

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floating around. Yeah.

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Cat.

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Oh, no. No. Victim of crowds strength. Well,

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now we can't joke about it. Dang it.

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Yeah.

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And we still joke that Kelly. It's just

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a joke at Kelly's expensive. Now. Before it

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was a joke at just the general public's

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been. Let's see

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I'm I'm gonna pull the politician,

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feel and say, now it... Now it affects

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me so I care.

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Wow.

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So other than Crowds, I mean, nothing else

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happened.

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Those dude, like, like, 4 4 different ransom

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wire actors were, like, arrested

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from 3 different teams. Oh, I thank God,

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I didn't get arrested. I know. Right? That

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I just dodged that 1.

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Should we do, like, a

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off hours betting pool of who's gonna be

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the next vp on the demo democrat side?

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No. I thought you're gonna... You're gonna cross

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that barrier.

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That's... Yeah. That's... No. It's what. We can't

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talk. It's not political. We can't call it.

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It's when don't we... It's not talking about

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politics. It's just meme about who could be

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the Vp. I mean, I said Tiger king.

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And that...

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I I mean, I think there's a chance.

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We're gonna see some cross party

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removal and Elon gonna go for it. Is

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Tiger King and Jail? Yes. Does that matter?

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Also not yet. He did ask trump for

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pardon in.

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He had the limo standing by. Yeah.

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And john that Limo is gonna be standing

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by again for the Vp nomination. Alright. Yeah.

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The rock all the fingers. The the rock

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looking the rock. Roll finger.

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The rock. Remember ancient Chinese

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George clooney George clooney times. And Okay. George

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Clooney is a genuine possible pick. K? Just

156
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throwing that out there.

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He doesn't like please know. Been supporting act

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blue and all that stuff. It could happen.

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Just imagine that there'd be like, cranks all

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over the White House because he's owned to

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like, throw prank and stuff Ocean 13 White

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House edition. I love it.

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40 clooney.

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Hello, and welcome to black hills information securities

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talking about news is 07/22/2024?

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Crowds strike. The apocalypse

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is now over. To Monday.

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Nothing. There's no cleanup. Everything's been resolved. You

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were out all weekend and now everything's fixed.

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It's fine. There's nothing. There's no further actions

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needed.

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I'm sure nothing bad could ever happen ever

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again. So just just relax. Come. That's.

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Just hits hits the reset button on there.

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Game console and it's all good again. This

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is the first time we've ever had, like,

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a specialty, like, in our news board. I

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know other people don't see. There's usually like.

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Threat actors, big news, Microsoft, but this time,

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the top 1 is crowds strike, and there's

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just

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millions of things. And I think that's the

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first time we've ever had that.

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Yeah. I mean, I I guess to be

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clearly,

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to be more specific. There are still people

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who are... In trouble because of this, 1

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of them is our very own Kelly who's

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stranded in Salt Lake City because her airline

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is loose screening at Apparently. She should have

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flown southwest.

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Yeah. Southwest is known to be very not

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have any tech day.

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Nice signal to the first. Windows 3 1

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would be there to save the day.

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Yeah. Yeah. I heard... I mean, they're the

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text there also play a lot of, Dia

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1 on the systems when they're not being

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used? Why not?

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So for anyone that doesn't know, we did

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a kind of emergency webcast on Friday, which

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if you're interested, go ahead and watch the

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recording. I'm sure Ryan will be able to

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find it. But... Kinda just running through the

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history of Ed.

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What... I mean, most of... I I got

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asked about dinner. I I was at a

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dinner party over the weekend, and people were

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asked me like, how is your day on

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Friday And I was like, well, fine because,

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you know, we're the hacker. So, like, we're

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just like, oh, okay. Well, we already did

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our jobs. Good luck. Me

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But a lot of people had a horrible

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day on Friday. We did an emergency webcast.

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People don't know what Ed is. Now they

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00:08:06,395 --> 00:08:07,510
do. People don't know what.

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Blue screens are now they do.

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Basically,

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know, watch that webcast if you want the

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background edge. But we're now we're gonna talk

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about fallout,

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Apparently, Tech debt is good. So Southwest,

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I don't know. Is this like confirmed? Like,

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out how do we know this? That's what

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I wanna know. Did Southwest tweet. We use

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Windows from 19 92. Were good. Well, the

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00:08:27,761 --> 00:08:29,516
article had a link to an earlier article.

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So I guess this... Came out before and

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Southwest was getting black for it. And so,

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like, was just, like, hey by the way.

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I see. Black cloud silver lining

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00:08:37,894 --> 00:08:40,286
You know? Sure. Yeah. I mean, basically,

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for anyone that doesn't know. If you're using

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Windows 3.1, there is not a crowds psych

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Falcon sensor for that version of windows.

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So

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you were good to go.

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00:08:51,296 --> 00:08:53,523
But also probably horribly insecure.

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Apparently, a lot... It it was... I think

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the most interesting thing from my perspective not

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being... I didn't do any. I didn't stay

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up all night. I didn't, you know, have

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to do any real work. But

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00:09:04,173 --> 00:09:06,162
It was fun seeing who uses Crowds strike?

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00:09:06,480 --> 00:09:08,469
Like, I'm always curious. Who's using Crowds right

247
00:09:08,469 --> 00:09:09,980
now. We know pretty much a list of

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00:09:09,980 --> 00:09:11,821
it. Company might crowds right.

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00:09:12,456 --> 00:09:14,068
Yeah. So so the

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00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:16,529
yahoo links to a Cnn article

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00:09:17,140 --> 00:09:17,640
claiming

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00:09:18,187 --> 00:09:20,730
claiming like, oh, Southwest is has 3.1.

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00:09:21,047 --> 00:09:22,874
You go to the Cnn article. They just

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00:09:22,874 --> 00:09:25,575
said Southwest told Cnn, the outage hasn't impacted

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00:09:25,575 --> 00:09:26,211
its operations.

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00:09:26,945 --> 00:09:29,184
So who knows where this information really came

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forward. Show. You, 1. The international space station

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00:09:32,945 --> 00:09:34,804
is using what Windows

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00:09:36,076 --> 00:09:36,474
7.

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00:09:37,031 --> 00:09:39,815
0, so they're on Mca. So Yeah. There's

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00:09:39,815 --> 00:09:42,042
there's a lot of legacy systems out there.

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And

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unfortunately, I think this is gonna send the

264
00:09:46,034 --> 00:09:47,625
wrong message to a lot of people.

265
00:09:48,898 --> 00:09:51,701
I mean, secured out security. Kinda landscape. So

266
00:09:51,701 --> 00:09:53,214
this is roughly what 8 and a half

267
00:09:53,214 --> 00:09:56,025
million computers. Is that, like, the current estimate

268
00:09:56,083 --> 00:09:58,563
that I've heard? That was per mark... Microsoft.

269
00:09:59,596 --> 00:10:01,106
I mean, that's a lot. I I guess

270
00:10:01,186 --> 00:10:02,696
I would say that's not that many, but

271
00:10:02,696 --> 00:10:04,603
it is also, I think the thing to

272
00:10:04,603 --> 00:10:07,009
note is that those 8 ports... 5000000 computers

273
00:10:07,009 --> 00:10:08,929
are usually the most important computers.

274
00:10:09,490 --> 00:10:11,730
Crowds is a product that companies pay millions

275
00:10:11,730 --> 00:10:14,143
of dollars for. And so point you know,

276
00:10:14,383 --> 00:10:16,058
the companies that are shelling up millions of

277
00:10:16,058 --> 00:10:18,052
dollars for security products are often oftentimes the

278
00:10:18,052 --> 00:10:19,887
ones that are doing important things are at

279
00:10:19,887 --> 00:10:20,685
least feel they are.

280
00:10:21,656 --> 00:10:23,807
So I feel like, you know, there might

281
00:10:23,807 --> 00:10:24,843
be 8500000.0

282
00:10:25,082 --> 00:10:26,914
Android phones in India that didn't get affected,

283
00:10:26,994 --> 00:10:28,905
but this... These computers are the ones that

284
00:10:28,905 --> 00:10:30,315
make planes fly and

285
00:10:30,911 --> 00:10:33,138
did all kinds of crazy stuff. So... There's...

286
00:10:33,377 --> 00:10:35,207
I mean, what is the market share? Like,

287
00:10:35,366 --> 00:10:37,330
is... Is is there data on this? So

288
00:10:37,449 --> 00:10:39,284
1 1 thing to think about crowds strike

289
00:10:39,284 --> 00:10:41,676
versus other Ed or. Anyone else. Yeah. Anyone

290
00:10:41,676 --> 00:10:45,106
else. They... From what I've learned in my

291
00:10:45,106 --> 00:10:47,315
history of, like, blue teaming is usually crowd

292
00:10:47,434 --> 00:10:49,816
strike because, like, the number 1, At least

293
00:10:50,055 --> 00:10:51,881
Agree. I feel the same way, but I

294
00:10:51,881 --> 00:10:53,231
don't have any real data to back that

295
00:10:53,231 --> 00:10:54,979
up. Like, it seems like it would it's

296
00:10:54,979 --> 00:10:57,166
either them. Md. I feel I.

297
00:10:57,543 --> 00:10:59,139
I won't confirm my data, but I... Yeah.

298
00:10:59,378 --> 00:11:00,494
I exactly agreed to see there their M

299
00:11:00,494 --> 00:11:01,691
md or your crowds striker right at The

300
00:11:01,691 --> 00:11:02,967
all the others fall a little bit behind.

301
00:11:03,286 --> 00:11:05,535
No 1 like maybe 5 percent per or

302
00:11:05,535 --> 00:11:07,855
10 percent? Yeah. Well crowds has, like, a

303
00:11:07,855 --> 00:11:09,615
ko aid effect. Right? They have, like, a

304
00:11:09,615 --> 00:11:11,695
million different products. And then if you buy

305
00:11:11,695 --> 00:11:14,175
them all, just like Microsoft it, everything works

306
00:11:14,175 --> 00:11:17,062
perfectly. Or Right. But the 1 thing I

307
00:11:17,062 --> 00:11:18,896
know we always talk about is stock prices.

308
00:11:19,534 --> 00:11:21,528
And if they will go up. So if

309
00:11:21,528 --> 00:11:23,043
you check out, I think last time I

310
00:11:23,043 --> 00:11:25,134
checked crowds strikes. Stock prices.

311
00:11:25,615 --> 00:11:27,154
What are they at right now? They're.

312
00:11:27,535 --> 00:11:29,535
Yeah They're at 2 63 right now.

313
00:11:30,254 --> 00:11:32,014
Minus 41 dollars today.

314
00:11:32,907 --> 00:11:33,647
They were

315
00:11:34,024 --> 00:11:36,279
percent. They were at, like, 3 3 90

316
00:11:36,337 --> 00:11:37,853
beforehand, almost 400.

317
00:11:38,570 --> 00:11:40,564
Geez time buy. I was talking to some

318
00:11:40,564 --> 00:11:42,494
other people like, oh, will they bounce back

319
00:11:42,494 --> 00:11:44,807
that type of deal. And Yes. I... This

320
00:11:44,807 --> 00:11:47,838
is a matter greed overrule anything else. Yes.

321
00:11:48,157 --> 00:11:50,151
But they're like, alright. So maybe it'll bounce

322
00:11:50,151 --> 00:11:51,985
back, but let's look at solar wins.

323
00:11:52,955 --> 00:11:54,092
As a

324
00:11:54,705 --> 00:11:56,376
as more of a trial. And if you

325
00:11:56,376 --> 00:11:58,603
look at solar winds, they did not bounce

326
00:11:58,603 --> 00:11:59,103
back

327
00:11:59,413 --> 00:12:01,719
Well, but solar winds, I think wasn't it...

328
00:12:02,037 --> 00:12:04,184
Yeah. I mean... I this is total speculation

329
00:12:04,264 --> 00:12:05,934
We don't know. But, I mean, solar winds

330
00:12:05,934 --> 00:12:08,979
a different stock advice. Solar winds had more

331
00:12:09,288 --> 00:12:10,716
Although, I guess you could argue this is

332
00:12:10,795 --> 00:12:11,374
I don't

333
00:12:11,985 --> 00:12:14,284
this indicates a systemic issue. But I think

334
00:12:14,284 --> 00:12:15,950
the other the other article I wanna point

335
00:12:15,950 --> 00:12:17,955
out is the 1 that that, blame the

336
00:12:17,955 --> 00:12:20,034
dev who pressed deploy. Not the 1 who

337
00:12:20,034 --> 00:12:21,634
wrote the code. Yeah. I I agree with

338
00:12:21,634 --> 00:12:23,554
article. Like, yeah. I read that article a

339
00:12:23,554 --> 00:12:25,642
few times because if you just read, like,

340
00:12:25,722 --> 00:12:27,630
the article title, it's, like, it says, you

341
00:12:27,630 --> 00:12:29,061
know, let's blame the dev who pressed the

342
00:12:29,061 --> 00:12:31,208
button. But if you read the article, it's

343
00:12:31,288 --> 00:12:33,852
Yeah. Kind of the... No. We're not we're

344
00:12:33,852 --> 00:12:35,847
not blaming the dev. I read through the

345
00:12:35,847 --> 00:12:37,444
article a couple of times, and I came

346
00:12:37,444 --> 00:12:38,082
away with the...

347
00:12:38,880 --> 00:12:41,115
Okay. So there's a lot that we can.

348
00:12:41,688 --> 00:12:43,358
Fault. Like, it says in there, like, let's

349
00:12:43,358 --> 00:12:45,027
start with the Ceo and go, well, you

350
00:12:45,027 --> 00:12:46,696
know, the Ceo, they get... Why do they

351
00:12:46,696 --> 00:12:48,286
get paid so much? Because they assume the

352
00:12:48,286 --> 00:12:50,194
risk. Okay. As so let's blame them and

353
00:12:50,194 --> 00:12:52,360
they go, well, That's not really the fair

354
00:12:52,360 --> 00:12:54,910
point. So let's do we...

355
00:12:55,867 --> 00:12:57,620
Because if you blame the Ceo, If you

356
00:12:57,620 --> 00:12:58,975
go, okay. Let's blame the Ceo,

357
00:12:59,947 --> 00:13:01,303
In 20 10, Mca if he had a

358
00:13:01,303 --> 00:13:04,334
similar outage, but let Ceo. He, you know,

359
00:13:04,574 --> 00:13:06,966
Kurt left Mca and found a up as

360
00:13:06,966 --> 00:13:07,626
a Ceo.

361
00:13:08,003 --> 00:13:10,248
Right. Yeah. He was he was totally held

362
00:13:10,248 --> 00:13:12,712
accountable by wiping his tier that was money.

363
00:13:12,950 --> 00:13:15,596
So there was there was some Hearsay reports

364
00:13:15,653 --> 00:13:18,196
from another news cast I listening to that.

365
00:13:18,769 --> 00:13:21,330
Devs at Crowds strike can push to production.

366
00:13:23,570 --> 00:13:25,970
That You mean like single key by themselves?

367
00:13:26,304 --> 00:13:28,137
Yeah. Okay. Yeah. Here here's what I'll say.

368
00:13:28,456 --> 00:13:30,289
Here's how I feel about that. You have...

369
00:13:30,847 --> 00:13:32,919
Like, this is... Should not be a problem.

370
00:13:33,158 --> 00:13:35,329
This does indicate... An issue with the way

371
00:13:35,329 --> 00:13:37,409
that Crowds does Ci cd or whatever you

372
00:13:37,409 --> 00:13:39,190
wanna call it development, Sd,

373
00:13:40,049 --> 00:13:42,049
whatever you wanna, you know, use an acronym

374
00:13:42,049 --> 00:13:42,690
of your choice,

375
00:13:43,264 --> 00:13:43,764
but

376
00:13:44,142 --> 00:13:44,642
code

377
00:13:45,020 --> 00:13:47,176
needs to either be, like, there's basically 2

378
00:13:47,176 --> 00:13:48,852
ways to approach it. 1 is, we push

379
00:13:48,852 --> 00:13:50,369
code to production all the time and we

380
00:13:50,369 --> 00:13:51,806
assume it's going to break and we're fault

381
00:13:51,806 --> 00:13:52,125
tolerant.

382
00:13:52,619 --> 00:13:54,615
That's 1 option. That's fine. That's like the

383
00:13:54,615 --> 00:13:57,009
chaos monkey strategy. I'm okay with that. If

384
00:13:57,009 --> 00:13:58,606
you're allowed to push go to production, but

385
00:13:58,606 --> 00:14:01,081
production is not something that's monolithic and can

386
00:14:01,081 --> 00:14:04,230
break across every user, every endpoint, everything, then

387
00:14:04,288 --> 00:14:06,763
that's fine. Or you have very close and

388
00:14:06,763 --> 00:14:09,397
careful inspection and validation and testing of whatever

389
00:14:09,397 --> 00:14:10,115
code you are pushing.

390
00:14:10,689 --> 00:14:13,083
I think in crowds case because of the

391
00:14:13,083 --> 00:14:15,498
nature of a driver on in the kernel

392
00:14:15,636 --> 00:14:17,870
on an endpoint on 8500000.0

393
00:14:17,870 --> 00:14:18,030
endpoint.

394
00:14:18,841 --> 00:14:20,910
I think it's... You need to have very

395
00:14:20,910 --> 00:14:21,729
close testing

396
00:14:22,104 --> 00:14:24,195
validation checks. Like, you can't just

397
00:14:25,207 --> 00:14:25,605
send it.

398
00:14:26,259 --> 00:14:28,100
So I feel like... Yeah. I mean, it's

399
00:14:28,100 --> 00:14:29,459
it's a mess up, and I I do

400
00:14:29,459 --> 00:14:30,980
think they deserve any hit to their stock

401
00:14:30,980 --> 00:14:34,179
price because this is systemic issue. This is

402
00:14:34,179 --> 00:14:35,514
not like a 1 off

403
00:14:36,114 --> 00:14:39,070
issue. Okay. Wait. That it's systemic on both

404
00:14:39,070 --> 00:14:39,570
the

405
00:14:40,508 --> 00:14:42,605
deployment end, but also on

406
00:14:43,157 --> 00:14:45,407
the end of the clients because

407
00:14:45,941 --> 00:14:48,350
I've I've worked the companies at test and

408
00:14:48,407 --> 00:14:51,404
production and things always end badly, and then

409
00:14:51,524 --> 00:14:53,203
I, perhaps. I worked with the guy who

410
00:14:53,203 --> 00:14:55,461
routinely took down our entire

411
00:14:56,240 --> 00:14:58,637
suite of web apps and still managed to

412
00:14:58,637 --> 00:15:00,235
keep his job because he was good at

413
00:15:00,235 --> 00:15:00,795
other things.

414
00:15:01,449 --> 00:15:03,784
But I've also worked at companies where

415
00:15:04,720 --> 00:15:05,699
before any

416
00:15:06,236 --> 00:15:09,442
mass deployment of an update is done, they

417
00:15:09,442 --> 00:15:11,375
have a limited bank of

418
00:15:11,750 --> 00:15:14,695
representative systems that they test that deployment on.

419
00:15:15,252 --> 00:15:18,355
So not mean it's not rocket strike fail,

420
00:15:18,688 --> 00:15:21,885
to to check their stuff, but also the

421
00:15:22,019 --> 00:15:24,953
the companies that got hit, they also failed

422
00:15:24,953 --> 00:15:27,351
to check their stuff Oh no No

423
00:15:28,227 --> 00:15:30,298
From from... What I understand on the Crowds

424
00:15:30,298 --> 00:15:32,529
side. Yeah. They have their sensor updates and

425
00:15:32,529 --> 00:15:34,759
channel updates. Yeah. The sensor update is more

426
00:15:34,759 --> 00:15:37,089
the definition stuff around what Ed for the

427
00:15:37,089 --> 00:15:39,250
channel update is a lower level thing. This

428
00:15:39,250 --> 00:15:41,570
was a channel update, and while sensor updates

429
00:15:41,570 --> 00:15:43,169
you can toggle and say I want n

430
00:15:43,169 --> 00:15:44,783
or n minus 1 or n my minus

431
00:15:44,783 --> 00:15:46,451
2, so you can phase those in or

432
00:15:46,451 --> 00:15:49,231
you channel updates just magically flow through whenever

433
00:15:49,231 --> 00:15:51,535
crowds. Yeah. So no 1 had any control

434
00:15:51,615 --> 00:15:53,627
In there was no 1 at something on

435
00:15:53,627 --> 00:15:55,166
unless you have firewall

436
00:15:56,025 --> 00:15:58,342
infrastructure or something, Like... Yeah. You got. You

437
00:15:58,342 --> 00:16:00,420
have your critical systems on n minus 3.

438
00:16:00,580 --> 00:16:02,928
And the which still come through. And there's

439
00:16:03,066 --> 00:16:03,225
there's...

440
00:16:04,261 --> 00:16:05,456
I think to get get to the point

441
00:16:05,456 --> 00:16:07,846
on the article that we're we're discussing,

442
00:16:08,736 --> 00:16:10,324
yeah. It does also get into the... Well,

443
00:16:10,483 --> 00:16:13,103
let's let's blame the the customer, and it's,

444
00:16:13,182 --> 00:16:15,247
like, well, you know, but are they are

445
00:16:15,247 --> 00:16:16,994
they to blame because, like, you know, United

446
00:16:16,994 --> 00:16:19,336
and Delta is... Decided to run Ed, on

447
00:16:19,472 --> 00:16:21,299
it just displays flight details.

448
00:16:21,935 --> 00:16:24,318
You have M Ed on it. And I'm

449
00:16:24,318 --> 00:16:26,360
betting that a lot of people even decided

450
00:16:26,559 --> 00:16:28,259
in a chat, not reading the

451
00:16:29,039 --> 00:16:31,039
article would go, okay. Why would you have

452
00:16:31,120 --> 00:16:33,940
Ed r on all of your endpoints. And

453
00:16:34,094 --> 00:16:36,409
the answer is, like, you have some regulations

454
00:16:36,409 --> 00:16:38,107
that go. I need to I need to

455
00:16:38,246 --> 00:16:39,762
fill out a checkbox. Like, it needs to

456
00:16:39,762 --> 00:16:41,678
be everywhere. If anybody asked me why don't

457
00:16:41,678 --> 00:16:43,115
we have... Why do we have Ed and

458
00:16:43,275 --> 00:16:44,905
My. Plants some just like.

459
00:16:45,598 --> 00:16:46,473
I said something...

460
00:16:47,030 --> 00:16:47,609
Do you

461
00:16:48,143 --> 00:16:50,052
I mean, more often than not, it's regulations.

462
00:16:50,704 --> 00:16:52,714
Or things like that. It really is Yeah

463
00:16:52,770 --> 00:16:53,565
mean or do you?

464
00:16:54,678 --> 00:16:56,744
It it it good... It... The article flows

465
00:16:56,744 --> 00:16:58,175
into that too and go, well do you

466
00:16:58,175 --> 00:16:59,447
plan the regulations then.

467
00:17:00,019 --> 00:17:00,837
Not we blame.

468
00:17:01,771 --> 00:17:03,365
I I guess I would say, I think

469
00:17:03,365 --> 00:17:06,711
he blame Crowds strike because the regulation doesn't

470
00:17:06,711 --> 00:17:08,623
require that it auto updates without any approval

471
00:17:08,623 --> 00:17:10,794
from the client. And it also doesn't require

472
00:17:10,794 --> 00:17:13,355
that the, you know, update isn't validated and

473
00:17:13,355 --> 00:17:15,755
checked before deployment. The reason this is affecting

474
00:17:15,835 --> 00:17:17,434
Crowds strikes bottom line is not just because

475
00:17:17,434 --> 00:17:20,486
of sentiment. It's because... People are realizing from

476
00:17:20,486 --> 00:17:23,200
the perspective of companies who purchase Crowds.

477
00:17:23,918 --> 00:17:25,594
We know from the graph that someone sent

478
00:17:25,594 --> 00:17:27,430
in discord. Thank you whoever sent that I

479
00:17:27,430 --> 00:17:30,002
didn't. See It was r a 50. R

480
00:17:30,002 --> 00:17:32,319
set graph. So Crowds track is actually 15

481
00:17:32,319 --> 00:17:34,237
percent of the market. Microsoft is a bigger

482
00:17:34,237 --> 00:17:35,756
player in the market, and there's a lot

483
00:17:35,756 --> 00:17:36,555
of other competitors.

484
00:17:37,208 --> 00:17:39,674
Rest of market, meaning basically other is actually

485
00:17:39,674 --> 00:17:40,709
the biggest shareholder.

486
00:17:41,186 --> 00:17:42,243
So essentially,

487
00:17:43,255 --> 00:17:44,846
there is a lot of Ed vendors out

488
00:17:44,846 --> 00:17:46,851
there is what that graphs says and that

489
00:17:46,851 --> 00:17:48,761
what the data says. That graph has from

490
00:17:49,239 --> 00:17:51,229
Microsoft too though. Just... It's from 20 22.

491
00:17:51,388 --> 00:17:52,820
It's... It's it's a little outdated it's from

492
00:17:53,059 --> 00:17:54,890
Microsoft, but I would believe that. There are

493
00:17:54,890 --> 00:17:57,380
a lot of options you can easily switch

494
00:17:57,380 --> 00:17:59,539
between vendors and that's always gonna be the

495
00:17:59,539 --> 00:18:01,619
k or maybe not easily, but you can

496
00:18:01,619 --> 00:18:03,220
affect... It's not something that is, like,

497
00:18:04,034 --> 00:18:06,670
it is easily switch. It might be in...

498
00:18:06,910 --> 00:18:09,386
It might incur costs, but it isn't like

499
00:18:09,386 --> 00:18:11,158
non compatible or something You know what I

500
00:18:11,158 --> 00:18:13,733
mean? They're they're all very equivalent compatibility.

501
00:18:14,271 --> 00:18:16,107
And the thing is Crowds strike left all

502
00:18:16,107 --> 00:18:18,501
the companies holding the bag of who's gonna

503
00:18:18,501 --> 00:18:20,115
do the cleanup, Thing you who's gonna do

504
00:18:20,115 --> 00:18:22,755
the, like, who's gonna remediate. It wasn't them.

505
00:18:23,394 --> 00:18:25,394
They didn't remediate anything. They said, alright. Here's

506
00:18:25,394 --> 00:18:26,755
you just delete this driver file and you're

507
00:18:26,755 --> 00:18:28,923
good to go. That was That... So I

508
00:18:28,923 --> 00:18:31,310
think from the perspective of the consumer who's

509
00:18:31,310 --> 00:18:32,105
buying Crowds,

510
00:18:32,582 --> 00:18:34,253
you messed up, you left us holding the

511
00:18:34,253 --> 00:18:34,571
bag,

512
00:18:35,304 --> 00:18:37,144
Why don't we just switch? Right? Like, I

513
00:18:37,144 --> 00:18:38,825
think that's why they're... That that that's how

514
00:18:38,984 --> 00:18:40,744
I would feel as the It admin is

515
00:18:40,744 --> 00:18:42,992
product's incredibly expensive. You left us holding the

516
00:18:42,992 --> 00:18:45,215
bag and I can just click enable Microsoft

517
00:18:45,215 --> 00:18:47,200
defender for enterprise in Microsoft And it'll just

518
00:18:47,200 --> 00:18:47,700
magically.

519
00:18:48,549 --> 00:18:52,217
Contract negotiations. Are gonna be real interesting coming

520
00:18:52,217 --> 00:18:54,679
up. Right? Yes they are. But... So or

521
00:18:54,679 --> 00:18:56,744
whoever just signed last week. Yeah. I... I'm

522
00:18:56,744 --> 00:18:58,594
so sorry. On... But

523
00:18:59,365 --> 00:19:01,537
our On on that point, though, like, crowds

524
00:19:01,537 --> 00:19:03,614
does... Like, we said, Crowds does offer everything.

525
00:19:03,773 --> 00:19:06,010
Right? So it's... It probably... It is not

526
00:19:06,010 --> 00:19:07,937
is if... If you did drink the Ko

527
00:19:07,937 --> 00:19:10,163
aid. It's not gonna be as easy as

528
00:19:10,163 --> 00:19:12,865
just flipping the Ed or pushing the executable

529
00:19:12,865 --> 00:19:14,853
for new ed. That's true. Right. They do

530
00:19:14,853 --> 00:19:17,418
have the overwatch. And all the other managed

531
00:19:17,418 --> 00:19:20,135
search, Services? Does Microsoft have a version of

532
00:19:20,135 --> 00:19:21,593
that. Yeah So they have and

533
00:19:22,132 --> 00:19:23,890
pretty much. Right? Yeah. So that's the thing.

534
00:19:24,050 --> 00:19:26,063
It's just... Oh, you... You're chevy blue up

535
00:19:26,063 --> 00:19:27,501
so you switched to ford. Like it like

536
00:19:27,661 --> 00:19:29,419
Got. But but then look at the Microsoft

537
00:19:29,419 --> 00:19:31,336
side. Right? Like, we've been talking about Microsoft

538
00:19:31,336 --> 00:19:33,826
and their licensing fees for the past. Gear

539
00:19:33,826 --> 00:19:36,134
for years. Right? Like, how much... I don't

540
00:19:36,134 --> 00:19:37,486
know what is it like, an E 5

541
00:19:37,486 --> 00:19:39,316
or something like that licensing fee is? And,

542
00:19:39,396 --> 00:19:41,067
like, you don't get all the logging unless

543
00:19:41,067 --> 00:19:42,181
you pay for it type of deal?

544
00:19:42,831 --> 00:19:44,575
I also think Yeah. I mean, Crowds is

545
00:19:44,575 --> 00:19:46,477
insanely expensive, No one's like, oh, the Ed

546
00:19:46,477 --> 00:19:47,983
budget isn't big enough Yeah. Like, if you're

547
00:19:47,983 --> 00:19:49,806
coming from Crowds, the budget is big enough.

548
00:19:50,059 --> 00:19:50,298
Like.

549
00:19:51,654 --> 00:19:53,489
Another thing is I... The Ed market, like,

550
00:19:53,728 --> 00:19:56,280
maybe Alex, Alex, I know Alex does blue

551
00:19:56,280 --> 00:19:57,317
team more than

552
00:19:58,035 --> 00:19:59,231
just as much as me, at least he

553
00:19:59,231 --> 00:19:59,550
used to.

554
00:20:00,682 --> 00:20:02,676
But I feel like the Ed markets kinda

555
00:20:02,676 --> 00:20:04,511
like s. Right now as much like there

556
00:20:04,511 --> 00:20:06,983
isn't really so many. Yeah. There's so many

557
00:20:06,983 --> 00:20:08,977
of them, there isn't, like, a big contenders

558
00:20:08,977 --> 00:20:10,347
as much as they're used to be Right?

559
00:20:10,745 --> 00:20:13,052
Especially with, like, Broad combine out carbon black

560
00:20:13,052 --> 00:20:13,450
recently.

561
00:20:13,927 --> 00:20:16,076
But, like, the 2 biggest I believe are

562
00:20:16,076 --> 00:20:17,746
gonna be carbon black and Md just like

563
00:20:17,746 --> 00:20:19,906
we've been talking about to But even then

564
00:20:20,302 --> 00:20:22,442
Strike? Crowds dried ga I might might mad

565
00:20:22,442 --> 00:20:24,344
it. Well, like, what what else do you,

566
00:20:24,423 --> 00:20:26,088
like, really look at? Like, they're central 1?

567
00:20:27,216 --> 00:20:29,208
Maybe there's some... What else do do you

568
00:20:29,208 --> 00:20:31,518
think you guys think? That other other products?

569
00:20:32,156 --> 00:20:34,068
I I said no 1 is for sure

570
00:20:34,068 --> 00:20:34,546
in the Make,

571
00:20:35,263 --> 00:20:35,741
cortex?

572
00:20:36,314 --> 00:20:37,032
We see a lot

573
00:20:37,671 --> 00:20:39,985
Our customer base. And, like, other, like, I

574
00:20:39,985 --> 00:20:41,821
guess I would say, like, it's tough because,

575
00:20:41,901 --> 00:20:43,497
like, security products are all just made up

576
00:20:43,497 --> 00:20:45,344
products what they actually. Like, what is Ed?

577
00:20:45,583 --> 00:20:48,309
What is Av? What is? El. What is

578
00:20:48,365 --> 00:20:50,352
ransom wear protection, like, I don't know. But

579
00:20:50,352 --> 00:20:52,101
basically, like, I will say, I do think,

580
00:20:52,910 --> 00:20:54,656
on an It level, this also makes the

581
00:20:54,656 --> 00:20:57,751
case for, like, minimalist Ed r's. Right? Like,

582
00:20:58,465 --> 00:21:00,370
something that isn't internal integrated. Oh, yeah. And,

583
00:21:01,339 --> 00:21:03,651
ed Elastic is really good too. It came

584
00:21:03,651 --> 00:21:05,564
from endgame, which was an old small 1.

585
00:21:06,042 --> 00:21:07,797
0, there's a lot. Basically, there's a ton.

586
00:21:08,195 --> 00:21:09,550
But I guess I would say, like,

587
00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:11,813
The biggest thing is

588
00:21:12,186 --> 00:21:14,250
it sucks for crowds because you could be

589
00:21:14,250 --> 00:21:17,426
doing almost everything right and still mess up.

590
00:21:17,997 --> 00:21:20,881
Something critical and have it just destroy your

591
00:21:21,096 --> 00:21:22,606
entire image. Like guess.

592
00:21:23,321 --> 00:21:23,821
That's

593
00:21:24,195 --> 00:21:24,672
true life.

594
00:21:25,244 --> 00:21:27,484
That's... Yeah. It is. Yeah. Like, they're doing...

595
00:21:27,884 --> 00:21:30,684
From from my perspective, like, they're doing almost

596
00:21:30,684 --> 00:21:32,785
everything right? But then they're,

597
00:21:33,164 --> 00:21:35,255
you know, like... And, yeah, people... You know,

598
00:21:35,414 --> 00:21:37,805
people talking about pricing. I mean, I can

599
00:21:37,805 --> 00:21:39,877
tell you you're gonna be paying probably a

600
00:21:39,877 --> 00:21:42,683
thousand dollars in and endpoint. Something like that

601
00:21:42,683 --> 00:21:45,161
or more for Crowds with, like, the Falcon

602
00:21:45,161 --> 00:21:47,238
complete, which I've never talked to a single

603
00:21:47,238 --> 00:21:49,476
customer that doesn't have Falcon complete. No one's

604
00:21:49,476 --> 00:21:51,645
buying Falcon go like, that doesn't even... That

605
00:21:51,645 --> 00:21:52,839
might as well not even exist.

606
00:21:54,113 --> 00:21:55,944
Like, it it's always the big boy, the

607
00:21:56,183 --> 00:21:58,174
Md r, the... Hey, you know, because, like,

608
00:21:58,333 --> 00:22:00,258
Wade said, Part of the selling point of

609
00:22:00,258 --> 00:22:01,315
crowds strike is

610
00:22:01,691 --> 00:22:04,476
it does everything. Right Oh, they respond. They

611
00:22:04,476 --> 00:22:06,147
automatic contain. They do this. They do that,

612
00:22:06,306 --> 00:22:08,787
which maybe people stick around for that. Because

613
00:22:08,787 --> 00:22:11,170
they do they do that pretty well. But

614
00:22:11,170 --> 00:22:13,235
when it takes down your entire It infrastructure,

615
00:22:13,393 --> 00:22:15,855
maybe it's not worth I know. Okay. I

616
00:22:15,855 --> 00:22:17,603
got I got a good pivot about taking

617
00:22:17,603 --> 00:22:20,090
about... Taking down your entire It infrastructure,

618
00:22:20,808 --> 00:22:23,283
which I believe it was an article that's

619
00:22:23,283 --> 00:22:25,199
not about Crowds strike and goes right into

620
00:22:25,199 --> 00:22:25,598
our

621
00:22:26,077 --> 00:22:27,056
conspiracy theory

622
00:22:27,449 --> 00:22:28,348
souls and

623
00:22:29,046 --> 00:22:30,982
heart. D has.

624
00:22:31,680 --> 00:22:34,554
D dhs So has a robot to d

625
00:22:34,554 --> 00:22:37,120
ddos. They're to dos. I'm sorry. All of

626
00:22:37,120 --> 00:22:38,707
the Internet of things in your house.

627
00:22:39,977 --> 00:22:42,755
We'll explain how? What So so I put

628
00:22:42,755 --> 00:22:43,866
the article in private chat,

629
00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:44,940
So

630
00:22:45,559 --> 00:22:47,159
the department of Homeland Security has a robot

631
00:22:47,159 --> 00:22:49,500
like dog, think of the whole Boston dynamics

632
00:22:49,559 --> 00:22:51,399
dog thing that pretty much has a bunch

633
00:22:51,399 --> 00:22:53,079
of cool antennas on its back.

634
00:22:54,368 --> 00:22:56,357
And they don't really tell you how it

635
00:22:56,357 --> 00:22:58,901
works, but it's pretty much meant to roll

636
00:22:58,901 --> 00:23:00,890
up to a house, take out the internet

637
00:23:00,890 --> 00:23:01,367
of things.

638
00:23:01,939 --> 00:23:04,088
Like ring doorbell bells or cameras or that

639
00:23:04,088 --> 00:23:06,397
type of stuff. In order to prevent boob

640
00:23:06,397 --> 00:23:06,897
traps

641
00:23:07,273 --> 00:23:10,162
for any federal law enforcement that are coming

642
00:23:10,393 --> 00:23:13,572
Sure. Boob trap. That's 24. They do give

643
00:23:13,572 --> 00:23:14,764
they do give an active...

644
00:23:15,400 --> 00:23:17,386
They do give an acc explanation of an

645
00:23:17,625 --> 00:23:18,896
Fbi rate that was in Florida.

646
00:23:19,468 --> 00:23:19,968
Where

647
00:23:20,424 --> 00:23:21,243
they saw

648
00:23:21,619 --> 00:23:22,438
the the

649
00:23:22,894 --> 00:23:25,444
the the person living there saw the Fbi

650
00:23:25,444 --> 00:23:26,502
agents coming in

651
00:23:27,054 --> 00:23:29,372
via the ring doorbell belt and then killed

652
00:23:29,372 --> 00:23:32,088
2 of them. Right? So total makes sense

653
00:23:32,088 --> 00:23:33,926
that this was happened. I wanna know how

654
00:23:33,926 --> 00:23:36,019
you how you toss or ring doorbell. They

655
00:23:36,019 --> 00:23:38,257
do not go into that? It doesn't, but

656
00:23:38,257 --> 00:23:38,976
there... There's been

657
00:23:40,494 --> 00:23:42,092
there's been, criminals or,

658
00:23:42,731 --> 00:23:43,930
burglar that have been using...

659
00:23:44,503 --> 00:23:46,570
Ddos technology in order to take down your

660
00:23:46,570 --> 00:23:48,797
front door cameras as well. Yeah. So there's

661
00:23:48,797 --> 00:23:50,546
some knowledge and technology out there that I

662
00:23:50,546 --> 00:23:52,057
haven't looked into yet, but I've seen the

663
00:23:52,057 --> 00:23:54,180
the articles of the alerts going, hey, there's

664
00:23:54,299 --> 00:23:56,124
physical burglar so are like, okay. We'll, just

665
00:23:56,124 --> 00:23:58,505
knock your security cameras offline and Rob your

666
00:23:58,505 --> 00:23:59,616
house, you're not gonna know.

667
00:24:00,489 --> 00:24:02,332
Yeah. I mean, I guess, how is it

668
00:24:02,332 --> 00:24:04,005
gonna work for wired cameras. Bam.

669
00:24:05,599 --> 00:24:08,148
Don't watch through everything Yeah. Windows 3.1

670
00:24:08,148 --> 00:24:10,459
and a hard wired camera. We're not we're

671
00:24:10,459 --> 00:24:12,867
sick we're so safe. Tying it all together

672
00:24:12,867 --> 00:24:15,181
everybody. Bring it together. Oh, yeah. I mean,

673
00:24:15,421 --> 00:24:17,177
I don't know. I I... The concept of,

674
00:24:17,336 --> 00:24:19,172
like, a criminal being smart enough to set

675
00:24:19,172 --> 00:24:21,977
up a boob trap. That uses Iot devices

676
00:24:21,977 --> 00:24:24,787
this see a little bit. The the wasn't

677
00:24:25,163 --> 00:24:27,074
trap is the big Boom. You. Think of

678
00:24:27,074 --> 00:24:28,826
the children a boob trap What is it

679
00:24:28,826 --> 00:24:31,797
like a smart Wifi air cannon or something.

680
00:24:32,676 --> 00:24:35,073
I just imagine imagine If they're jamming,

681
00:24:36,032 --> 00:24:38,750
if they're jamming, what's likelihood that they might...

682
00:24:39,004 --> 00:24:40,520
Triggers some of the boob traps.

683
00:24:41,398 --> 00:24:43,574
That's fair. It's like waiters or a signal

684
00:24:44,031 --> 00:24:45,946
driving before they go in though. That's probably

685
00:24:45,946 --> 00:24:48,186
fine. Ron when... Turn on switch. They turn

686
00:24:48,186 --> 00:24:49,932
on the dog and, like, 5 bombs go

687
00:24:49,932 --> 00:24:51,043
off in a car nearby.

688
00:24:52,392 --> 00:24:52,471
Yeah.

689
00:24:54,234 --> 00:24:56,412
I wanna know why isn't there a Goo

690
00:24:56,472 --> 00:24:59,029
boob trap gift? Oh, here go. What you

691
00:24:59,029 --> 00:25:00,388
because it's like... And I I gonna say

692
00:25:00,388 --> 00:25:02,146
it's like, what is it like, the the

693
00:25:02,146 --> 00:25:04,574
federal government needs to... Start watching movies

694
00:25:05,027 --> 00:25:07,093
more modern than, you know, 19 90 nine's

695
00:25:07,093 --> 00:25:08,840
matrix because I think we're on a news

696
00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:10,588
cast. And they they named some other project

697
00:25:10,747 --> 00:25:12,574
Morph, and they're naming this 1 Neil, and

698
00:25:12,574 --> 00:25:12,892
it's like,

699
00:25:13,705 --> 00:25:16,105
Okay. He's the 1. Yeah. It will we'll

700
00:25:16,105 --> 00:25:18,025
mail you, like, you know, updated

701
00:25:18,985 --> 00:25:20,825
hacker movies if you want to, like,

702
00:25:21,479 --> 00:25:23,632
Also, like, I, I mean, what if you

703
00:25:23,632 --> 00:25:25,728
just live on, like, the third floor apartment.

704
00:25:26,663 --> 00:25:27,722
Yeah. They just

705
00:25:28,099 --> 00:25:29,237
how high how

706
00:25:29,694 --> 00:25:33,215
he'll go. Send everybody there's is incidental casualties

707
00:25:33,215 --> 00:25:36,479
he's lots of out. What's going? Sorry. Sorry.

708
00:25:36,957 --> 00:25:39,106
Everyone else. Your neighbor is getting raided. So...

709
00:25:39,917 --> 00:25:41,587
Ddos for the whole. No internet for you.

710
00:25:42,144 --> 00:25:43,974
Yeah. It's a cool 7500

711
00:25:43,974 --> 00:25:46,494
dollars for that quote. Palm link to the

712
00:25:46,614 --> 00:25:49,112
stream boob traps. Are gonna be.

713
00:25:50,769 --> 00:25:51,269
Iot.

714
00:25:53,325 --> 00:25:53,485
Yeah.

715
00:25:54,137 --> 00:25:55,352
Alright. Enough crowds.

716
00:25:55,885 --> 00:25:57,474
Let's talk other stuff.

717
00:25:58,349 --> 00:26:00,994
Amen. Let's talk about a law enforcement

718
00:26:01,462 --> 00:26:03,208
picking down doors since we're already on that

719
00:26:03,208 --> 00:26:05,826
topic. So how many ransom in where... How

720
00:26:05,826 --> 00:26:08,469
many ransom were people got called into

721
00:26:08,857 --> 00:26:11,244
4. Org, I but 3 got arrested.

722
00:26:11,960 --> 00:26:14,665
1 got sent. I think 3 got sentenced,

723
00:26:15,063 --> 00:26:17,147
I believe. And it's all from different threat

724
00:26:17,147 --> 00:26:19,215
actor groups too, which is kind of... Start

725
00:26:19,215 --> 00:26:21,919
with king... Let's start with tank. Tank. Tank.

726
00:26:23,369 --> 00:26:25,526
I'm. Thomas the to almost the tank engine

727
00:26:25,526 --> 00:26:27,203
is now going to jail for 18 years.

728
00:26:27,443 --> 00:26:28,561
Sorry. To the matrix again.

729
00:26:29,361 --> 00:26:29,520
Yeah.

730
00:26:30,333 --> 00:26:32,163
So this is this is the leader of

731
00:26:32,163 --> 00:26:34,232
the zeus now gang,

732
00:26:34,869 --> 00:26:36,540
which, I guess if you don't remember Zeus,

733
00:26:36,778 --> 00:26:37,256
you're lucky.

734
00:26:37,829 --> 00:26:40,380
Really good is old 1. Right? This is

735
00:26:40,380 --> 00:26:41,097
an old 1.

736
00:26:41,895 --> 00:26:45,004
Yeah. So he got sentenced to 2, I

737
00:26:45,004 --> 00:26:46,142
believe 9 year

738
00:26:47,329 --> 00:26:47,806
sentences,

739
00:26:48,204 --> 00:26:50,056
not consecutive, so he's gonna have to serve

740
00:26:50,192 --> 00:26:50,988
18, I believe,

741
00:26:51,624 --> 00:26:53,948
which it's pretty good. Right? It It's a

742
00:26:53,948 --> 00:26:56,101
lot you're paying more than 73000000.

743
00:26:56,660 --> 00:26:58,893
I'm sure imagine getting, like, 3 dollars in

744
00:26:58,893 --> 00:27:00,328
the mail, and it's like, your Pc got

745
00:27:00,328 --> 00:27:02,801
malware 18 years ago. Here you go. Like,

746
00:27:04,653 --> 00:27:06,571
No. I'm assuming it's companies, but it is

747
00:27:06,571 --> 00:27:09,528
funny to imagine just getting a bitcoin transaction

748
00:27:09,528 --> 00:27:11,126
from Zeus or whatever and it's like, hey,

749
00:27:11,366 --> 00:27:14,014
here's your 3 dollars. Sorry. I hacked computer.

750
00:27:14,491 --> 00:27:16,798
So he was indicted in 20 12, so

751
00:27:16,798 --> 00:27:17,514
it's been a minute.

752
00:27:18,628 --> 00:27:19,741
I think it took them a while. I

753
00:27:19,741 --> 00:27:21,865
mean, it's, like the normal thing where they

754
00:27:22,063 --> 00:27:23,731
ind indictment, and then they have to wait

755
00:27:23,731 --> 00:27:26,351
for them to enter an extradition country, and

756
00:27:26,351 --> 00:27:27,463
they eventually they did.

757
00:27:28,177 --> 00:27:30,004
He he was... He got caught in Geneva

758
00:27:30,004 --> 00:27:30,877
in 20 22.

759
00:27:31,688 --> 00:27:34,799
Man that sucks. So he... He successfully didn't

760
00:27:34,799 --> 00:27:37,590
go on vacation until 10 years later. Whoops.

761
00:27:38,069 --> 00:27:39,845
That was a quick sentence scene at least

762
00:27:40,063 --> 00:27:42,948
so November 20 22 a little bit, a

763
00:27:42,948 --> 00:27:43,448
year

764
00:27:43,904 --> 00:27:46,455
and, like, 9 months. Right? That's not bad.

765
00:27:46,933 --> 00:27:50,059
Well since he was indicted originally... 20 years

766
00:27:50,059 --> 00:27:51,660
before that. They had time to get all

767
00:27:51,660 --> 00:27:54,380
the paperwork in order. The got matrix printer

768
00:27:54,380 --> 00:27:56,299
was able to print within those 10 years.

769
00:27:57,100 --> 00:27:58,220
Not lady ddos.

770
00:27:59,113 --> 00:28:01,269
Yeah. Alright. Well, that's good news. We'll count

771
00:28:01,269 --> 00:28:02,466
that as good news. I mean, I don't

772
00:28:02,466 --> 00:28:03,264
think this is really that.

773
00:28:04,063 --> 00:28:06,138
It's controversial, hopefully But I guess, if you

774
00:28:06,138 --> 00:28:08,229
have if you have free tank shirt, just

775
00:28:08,229 --> 00:28:08,628
let us know.

776
00:28:09,747 --> 00:28:11,904
The other the other good 1 is coming

777
00:28:11,904 --> 00:28:12,623
from the Uk.

778
00:28:13,342 --> 00:28:15,260
But they didn't give us they didn't give

779
00:28:15,260 --> 00:28:17,261
us. Any information on how they did it.

780
00:28:17,499 --> 00:28:18,532
I'm looking for the article.

781
00:28:19,723 --> 00:28:21,470
Scattered spider operator caught.

782
00:28:22,423 --> 00:28:22,923
Oh,

783
00:28:24,582 --> 00:28:26,170
where is it? I read it I swear.

784
00:28:27,044 --> 00:28:29,665
Where... Too arts article? Names for these things.

785
00:28:29,903 --> 00:28:33,121
I swear. Scattered spider the the crowds.

786
00:28:33,896 --> 00:28:36,047
Yeah. Crowds strike martin. Microsoft crowds strike. I

787
00:28:36,047 --> 00:28:37,641
mean, that's the whole reason to be an

788
00:28:37,721 --> 00:28:40,748
Ed threat intel company. Police. Here we go.

789
00:28:40,908 --> 00:28:41,306
Here we go.

790
00:28:42,197 --> 00:28:44,027
This is the teenager. Right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

791
00:28:44,186 --> 00:28:46,415
So 17 year old Mgm. I dude, I

792
00:28:46,415 --> 00:28:47,848
honestly wanna know how they caught him Like,

793
00:28:48,007 --> 00:28:50,009
this is this is pretty legit. So,

794
00:28:50,803 --> 00:28:53,262
Uk police announced in a joint operation with

795
00:28:53,262 --> 00:28:56,117
the country's national crime agency, the Us Fbi.

796
00:28:56,608 --> 00:28:58,987
They arrested a 17 year old suspected of

797
00:28:58,987 --> 00:29:01,682
being connected to the Ransom wear group attack

798
00:29:01,682 --> 00:29:03,902
against Mgm resorts last year. Right?

799
00:29:04,794 --> 00:29:06,952
So he is 17. So the the Uk

800
00:29:06,952 --> 00:29:08,950
is pretty good about not releasing any information

801
00:29:08,950 --> 00:29:11,347
on minors that are caught and hacking. It's

802
00:29:11,347 --> 00:29:13,265
really good once again, another really good dark

803
00:29:13,265 --> 00:29:15,513
diary is actually about that. I mean, it

804
00:29:15,513 --> 00:29:16,866
had to be an ops offset mess up

805
00:29:16,866 --> 00:29:19,653
or maybe, like, Uk's national firewall. I will

806
00:29:19,653 --> 00:29:21,803
say, like, 17 year old kid does not

807
00:29:21,803 --> 00:29:22,303
usually

808
00:29:23,092 --> 00:29:25,160
bring up images of strong ops.

809
00:29:25,876 --> 00:29:27,864
That's good point. Yeah. I mean, it's like

810
00:29:27,864 --> 00:29:29,589
you're... You're being your criminal because you're not

811
00:29:29,789 --> 00:29:31,464
thinking, which means you're probably not gonna be

812
00:29:31,464 --> 00:29:34,257
super sexy safe. Think guys remember from back.

813
00:29:34,576 --> 00:29:36,785
Got another 1 too, though. Right? Like, another

814
00:29:36,904 --> 00:29:38,495
under... I think you was 1 in Florida

815
00:29:38,495 --> 00:29:41,597
that was, like, unknown possibly related to the

816
00:29:41,597 --> 00:29:44,315
group, but not hundred percent confirmed under telling.

817
00:29:44,474 --> 00:29:46,061
If you need more security budget, you just

818
00:29:46,061 --> 00:29:47,490
point to this and, like, 17 year old

819
00:29:47,490 --> 00:29:48,839
kids or hacking Canadian and Gm, we need

820
00:29:48,839 --> 00:29:51,873
more money. Yeah. I mean, after that... After

821
00:29:51,873 --> 00:29:54,748
the Scattered spider alfie, people started doing their

822
00:29:54,748 --> 00:29:56,823
thing, we completely changed what we were doing

823
00:29:56,823 --> 00:29:58,660
and we're like, let's do this instead because

824
00:29:58,660 --> 00:30:00,416
it's way easier than all the hacking we

825
00:30:00,416 --> 00:30:01,707
were doing before, which call him on the

826
00:30:01,707 --> 00:30:03,937
phone, say, hey, my name Bob The admin.

827
00:30:04,096 --> 00:30:05,290
I need a new password. And they're, like,

828
00:30:05,450 --> 00:30:07,202
no problem. It works super well.

829
00:30:08,476 --> 00:30:09,591
So is called a help desk.

830
00:30:10,325 --> 00:30:10,565
Yeah.

831
00:30:11,125 --> 00:30:12,664
Are we gonna say something about

832
00:30:13,125 --> 00:30:14,644
previous... Was gonna say to year to your

833
00:30:14,644 --> 00:30:16,805
comments about, you know, 17 year olds not

834
00:30:16,805 --> 00:30:18,579
really. Bringing up the image of ops sec,

835
00:30:19,380 --> 00:30:20,500
I don't know you guys remember about back

836
00:30:20,500 --> 00:30:21,779
when the Mgm hack was actually going on,

837
00:30:21,859 --> 00:30:24,019
like the actual thumbs that they were sending

838
00:30:24,019 --> 00:30:24,500
back and forth,

839
00:30:25,150 --> 00:30:27,372
we're very, very much tongue and cheek and,

840
00:30:27,531 --> 00:30:29,912
kinda like bra boasting and, you know, giving

841
00:30:29,912 --> 00:30:31,578
a lot of, shit to the, the the

842
00:30:31,578 --> 00:30:33,578
folks on the Mgm side. So it's... And

843
00:30:33,578 --> 00:30:35,809
that level not really shocking that somebody would

844
00:30:35,809 --> 00:30:38,359
screw up, like, on the the Side. The

845
00:30:38,359 --> 00:30:40,112
question is, will they get the bitcoin wallet

846
00:30:40,112 --> 00:30:40,430
or not?

847
00:30:41,162 --> 00:30:41,799
15000000,

848
00:30:42,038 --> 00:30:43,551
a lot of money or house. I the

849
00:30:43,551 --> 00:30:45,701
ransom was somewhere. It was a significant sum

850
00:30:45,701 --> 00:30:47,294
of money. And the same 1,

851
00:30:48,250 --> 00:30:48,887
same vein.

852
00:30:50,019 --> 00:30:53,374
Some charges against some lock actors. Right? According

853
00:30:53,374 --> 00:30:54,434
the just water

854
00:30:54,812 --> 00:30:54,972
anyone?

855
00:30:56,251 --> 00:30:56,890
Wait that it again.

856
00:30:57,623 --> 00:30:59,856
At the water facilities. There's so many criminal.

857
00:31:00,016 --> 00:31:02,089
No. Dude Like, everyone got arrested in the

858
00:31:02,089 --> 00:31:02,966
last week. They're like,

859
00:31:03,764 --> 00:31:05,439
crowds strike happened and no 1 realized. Like,

860
00:31:05,917 --> 00:31:07,526
Fbi is doing good work. Was the 2

861
00:31:07,526 --> 00:31:10,631
lock? Oh right? Yeah yeah. Yeah. You can

862
00:31:10,631 --> 00:31:12,165
try to say their names. I can't

863
00:31:12,859 --> 00:31:13,598
Mi mikhail.

864
00:31:16,542 --> 00:31:18,401
Oh, let's see here. Cecilia.

865
00:31:19,979 --> 00:31:20,479
And

866
00:31:21,177 --> 00:31:21,337
go.

867
00:31:23,748 --> 00:31:25,812
I used to take Russian back. I tried.

868
00:31:26,050 --> 00:31:26,447
I failed.

869
00:31:27,241 --> 00:31:29,726
I a bit feed, and

870
00:31:30,258 --> 00:31:30,758
arthur.

871
00:31:31,624 --> 00:31:33,302
These are for previous folks, but... Was the

872
00:31:33,302 --> 00:31:36,978
current guy. So these are... They put guilty,

873
00:31:37,138 --> 00:31:39,295
which means they were arrested. They actually ended

874
00:31:39,295 --> 00:31:39,775
up in...

875
00:31:40,585 --> 00:31:41,299
Arizona somehow.

876
00:31:42,648 --> 00:31:44,315
And were charged. Oh, no They were sorry.

877
00:31:44,473 --> 00:31:46,933
They were extra expedited. Yeah. In June it

878
00:31:46,933 --> 00:31:49,572
wasn't it? From, yeah, from Canada.

879
00:31:49,970 --> 00:31:51,799
In the crazy, there's 1 more article too,

880
00:31:51,958 --> 00:31:54,027
but that's just an indictment of some people.

881
00:31:54,518 --> 00:31:55,018
So.

882
00:31:55,390 --> 00:31:57,846
And indictment is like, hey, you're bad. Pleading

883
00:31:57,846 --> 00:31:59,431
guilty is more like, you're bad and we

884
00:31:59,431 --> 00:32:01,253
can prove it. Yeah. You're bad. You're going

885
00:32:01,253 --> 00:32:03,579
jail. But, yeah, Some great. How long how

886
00:32:03,579 --> 00:32:05,095
long does 1 go to? Like, what does

887
00:32:05,095 --> 00:32:08,047
a potential sent to your lock bit? 2500

888
00:32:08,047 --> 00:32:10,940
decryption fees? But is between... What... Actually charged

889
00:32:10,940 --> 00:32:11,580
with. Yeah.

890
00:32:12,620 --> 00:32:14,620
Let's see... Charge with... It says charged with

891
00:32:14,620 --> 00:32:16,380
the deploying lock bit ransom, but I'm gonna

892
00:32:16,380 --> 00:32:17,900
go ahead and say that's not a criminal

893
00:32:17,900 --> 00:32:18,620
code right there.

894
00:32:20,952 --> 00:32:24,089
Yeah. So he's been... He's also been sentenced

895
00:32:24,148 --> 00:32:27,184
already in Canada or to 4 years. So...

896
00:32:27,439 --> 00:32:29,434
I guess I'll be able give a quick

897
00:32:29,434 --> 00:32:31,349
review of Us versus Canadian Prison.

898
00:32:32,226 --> 00:32:35,112
Conspiracy to commit to transmit ransom demands. Admit

899
00:32:35,112 --> 00:32:38,449
wire fraud and intentionally damage protective computers, free

900
00:32:38,449 --> 00:32:39,878
actual legal shark. Let's see here.

901
00:32:40,593 --> 00:32:43,269
20 years for wire fraud maximum 25

902
00:32:43,469 --> 00:32:45,858
Yeah. 5 years for the others. So 25

903
00:32:45,858 --> 00:32:47,770
total. So if you do 25 years in

904
00:32:48,009 --> 00:32:49,523
Us Prison, then you have to queue get

905
00:32:49,523 --> 00:32:50,638
out, and then you have to do 4

906
00:32:50,638 --> 00:32:52,391
more years in Canadian Prison, Like, is that...

907
00:32:53,042 --> 00:32:55,190
Is that like, detox from jail or, like,

908
00:32:55,349 --> 00:32:56,065
I don't know how that works.

909
00:32:56,940 --> 00:32:58,928
Or do you... Like, I'm assuming you would

910
00:32:58,928 --> 00:33:00,519
still have to, like, go to Canada and

911
00:33:00,519 --> 00:33:02,366
still go to jail. Like, it doesn't count

912
00:33:02,366 --> 00:33:03,721
as time served because you were in the

913
00:33:03,721 --> 00:33:04,519
different country.

914
00:33:07,549 --> 00:33:09,622
These are all federal crimes too, so it's

915
00:33:09,622 --> 00:33:11,626
completely different. Set of criminals you're gonna be

916
00:33:11,626 --> 00:33:14,805
with. Right? Little federal... Usually federal prison is

917
00:33:14,805 --> 00:33:16,315
a whole different animal than state.

918
00:33:17,031 --> 00:33:18,938
Club fit? Or... Don't ask me how I

919
00:33:18,938 --> 00:33:20,780
know that. Or that just gonna be.

920
00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:26,020
Yeah. Well, okay. Let's talk about this. We

921
00:33:26,020 --> 00:33:28,005
we love talking about This. Let's talk about

922
00:33:28,164 --> 00:33:28,402
Fizz.

923
00:33:29,691 --> 00:33:31,764
Which... Is this is this D dhs? Talking

924
00:33:31,764 --> 00:33:34,156
in the D dhs. That the title includes

925
00:33:34,475 --> 00:33:34,874
Rebuke?

926
00:33:35,512 --> 00:33:37,186
I love that 1. 0, yeah.

927
00:33:37,839 --> 00:33:40,640
So the title is Dhs watchdog, which I'm

928
00:33:40,640 --> 00:33:42,079
sure I really understand what that means, but

929
00:33:42,159 --> 00:33:43,039
I'm just gonna go with it.

930
00:33:43,839 --> 00:33:46,732
Dhs watchdog Rebuke is and law enforcement. Training

931
00:33:46,732 --> 00:33:48,481
center for failing to protect data. So it's

932
00:33:48,481 --> 00:33:50,708
basically someone being, like... You got breached with

933
00:33:50,708 --> 00:33:52,457
the hell man. You said not to get

934
00:33:52,457 --> 00:33:52,696
breached.

935
00:33:53,571 --> 00:33:55,400
This isn't even... This is actually about like

936
00:33:55,400 --> 00:33:58,603
other party. Yeah. Vendor risk. It's pretty egregious

937
00:33:58,603 --> 00:34:00,119
just if you actually look at the details

938
00:34:00,119 --> 00:34:00,677
of the article.

939
00:34:01,395 --> 00:34:02,672
The had a vendor that they were using

940
00:34:02,672 --> 00:34:03,390
for training. Yeah.

941
00:34:04,359 --> 00:34:05,791
And they have the actual findings. It just

942
00:34:05,791 --> 00:34:07,223
there's, like, a bullet list part way through

943
00:34:07,223 --> 00:34:09,371
the article of the the findings that Dhs

944
00:34:09,371 --> 00:34:12,012
had against the vendor. And then told, Sis

945
00:34:12,012 --> 00:34:13,842
said to stop using them val, look at

946
00:34:13,842 --> 00:34:15,116
this stuff. This is ridiculous.

947
00:34:15,911 --> 00:34:17,981
So to stopped using them the day the

948
00:34:17,981 --> 00:34:20,940
day after they just paid them, like, 1500000.0

949
00:34:20,940 --> 00:34:22,713
to keep using them. No.

950
00:34:23,486 --> 00:34:25,952
Yeah. It's brutal. You suck. Here's a paycheck.

951
00:34:27,399 --> 00:34:29,315
Yeah. The Ap team didn't talk to the

952
00:34:29,315 --> 00:34:30,352
security team on that 1.

953
00:34:32,907 --> 00:34:34,982
Yeah I mean, I guess, like, it's interesting

954
00:34:34,982 --> 00:34:35,700
to think about, like,

955
00:34:36,432 --> 00:34:38,340
You would think the government of all places

956
00:34:38,340 --> 00:34:41,602
would have extreme vetting required for, like, third

957
00:34:41,602 --> 00:34:44,650
party vendors. But I guess not. But I

958
00:34:44,650 --> 00:34:46,889
don't guess you've got standards like Fed, which

959
00:34:47,050 --> 00:34:49,530
I'm... Admittedly not personally familiar with having worked

960
00:34:49,530 --> 00:34:51,210
in the government space, but I would think

961
00:34:51,210 --> 00:34:53,543
it would cover basic, Hygiene, like, the stuff

962
00:34:53,543 --> 00:34:55,940
they're calling out article here. But... Yeah. Literally

963
00:34:55,940 --> 00:34:58,418
the hygiene issues to to clarify for listeners.

964
00:34:58,897 --> 00:35:01,626
It says, here's what the contractor... It, they

965
00:35:01,626 --> 00:35:03,777
did not actively monitor their data center or

966
00:35:03,777 --> 00:35:06,645
hardware health alerts. They deployed hardware at the

967
00:35:06,645 --> 00:35:07,760
end of its useful life.

968
00:35:08,335 --> 00:35:10,255
They failed to take snapshots for months before

969
00:35:10,255 --> 00:35:12,175
that it was a hard drive failure Pt

970
00:35:12,175 --> 00:35:14,335
dub did not meet log retention, audit at

971
00:35:14,335 --> 00:35:16,574
long girls and did not obtain authorization, but

972
00:35:16,574 --> 00:35:18,990
shared data with the third party recovery service.

973
00:35:19,470 --> 00:35:21,550
Yeah. Out so. I'm gonna tell you those,

974
00:35:21,710 --> 00:35:23,550
like, all the all the hardware stuff though,

975
00:35:23,789 --> 00:35:25,559
that's not. Federal I don't know. That's not

976
00:35:25,559 --> 00:35:28,026
a huge... Who who... As a security person,

977
00:35:28,185 --> 00:35:29,856
I'm gonna tell you, I'm not monitoring hardware

978
00:35:29,856 --> 00:35:30,015
alerts.

979
00:35:31,209 --> 00:35:31,709
Usually.

980
00:35:32,337 --> 00:35:32,837
And

981
00:35:33,369 --> 00:35:36,626
debating hard security person someone should be. Yeah.

982
00:35:36,943 --> 00:35:38,849
I thought... I think of... Like, between that

983
00:35:38,849 --> 00:35:39,882
and the and, like, the...

984
00:35:40,534 --> 00:35:42,692
Funneling data over. Like, it's just... It's more

985
00:35:42,692 --> 00:35:45,169
about the hygiene that that indicates. Right? Let's

986
00:35:45,169 --> 00:35:47,006
deploy some end of life hardware. Like, let's

987
00:35:47,006 --> 00:35:48,739
not monitor anything. Like, they're that bad on

988
00:35:49,176 --> 00:35:50,762
infrastructure like, how bad have they be it

989
00:35:50,762 --> 00:35:52,507
will they be on security. Do you think

990
00:35:52,507 --> 00:35:55,204
they they didn't house... They didn't house any

991
00:35:55,204 --> 00:35:55,522
federal.

992
00:35:56,175 --> 00:35:58,734
Data then, that's what I... It would be

993
00:35:58,734 --> 00:35:59,694
shooting at at this.

994
00:36:00,335 --> 00:36:02,194
Since it... Because it talks about training

995
00:36:02,574 --> 00:36:05,394
information, I wonder if that training information doesn't

996
00:36:05,608 --> 00:36:06,108
directly

997
00:36:07,036 --> 00:36:09,258
it's been up. Yeah. That's a good thought.

998
00:36:09,814 --> 00:36:12,291
That might explain what the the dis. The

999
00:36:12,291 --> 00:36:14,119
disconnect we're all experiencing right now. Because I'm

1000
00:36:14,119 --> 00:36:16,187
sure the Fed right, The Fed guy was

1001
00:36:16,187 --> 00:36:18,891
probably like a 2800000.0 dollar contract, but this

1002
00:36:18,891 --> 00:36:19,686
was the lowest bidder.

1003
00:36:20,337 --> 00:36:22,320
Who, knows. All we know is they're right

1004
00:36:22,320 --> 00:36:24,542
to complain. We're using sample data.

1005
00:36:25,177 --> 00:36:26,922
They're right to complain and they should...

1006
00:36:27,734 --> 00:36:29,815
Be held accountable because... The the real pillar

1007
00:36:29,815 --> 00:36:30,315
is

1008
00:36:30,614 --> 00:36:31,494
hand out that data.

1009
00:36:32,375 --> 00:36:33,734
Because the pillar is where it says that

1010
00:36:33,734 --> 00:36:35,014
the Cio this...

1011
00:36:35,507 --> 00:36:37,496
Initially cut ties with the contractor only to

1012
00:36:37,496 --> 00:36:39,962
re it used 3 days later as per

1013
00:36:39,962 --> 00:36:40,439
the article.

1014
00:36:42,443 --> 00:36:45,623
And then that the Cio further recommended accepting

1015
00:36:45,623 --> 00:36:48,485
the risk because not having used not having

1016
00:36:48,485 --> 00:36:50,791
the learning management software would be an inconvenience

1017
00:36:50,791 --> 00:36:51,507
to many users.

1018
00:36:52,637 --> 00:36:55,349
This good good decision making progress? Was there

1019
00:36:55,349 --> 00:36:57,344
actually a breach? Or is this just a

1020
00:36:57,344 --> 00:36:59,914
theoretical breed? Is it like, So this is

1021
00:36:59,914 --> 00:37:01,594
a data leakage thing, but there was no

1022
00:37:01,594 --> 00:37:03,355
actual breach. Right? It's like they've sent the

1023
00:37:03,355 --> 00:37:05,514
data to third parties, but third parties never

1024
00:37:05,514 --> 00:37:07,034
actually got breached? Or was there a real

1025
00:37:07,034 --> 00:37:07,275
breach?

1026
00:37:08,248 --> 00:37:10,161
No breach mention. It's hard to tell this

1027
00:37:10,161 --> 00:37:12,176
article has... Is missing so many

1028
00:37:12,713 --> 00:37:13,112
details.

1029
00:37:14,148 --> 00:37:15,584
I think it's like that on purpose. Right?

1030
00:37:15,823 --> 00:37:18,807
They don't even mention. The Yeah. Contractor. Right

1031
00:37:18,864 --> 00:37:22,286
it's... Yeah. Don't mention the contractor Don't mention

1032
00:37:22,286 --> 00:37:23,105
who the watchdog

1033
00:37:23,719 --> 00:37:24,276
organization was.

1034
00:37:25,958 --> 00:37:27,464
What else? I mean, they've they've...

1035
00:37:30,080 --> 00:37:31,190
Why do I feel like this is a

1036
00:37:31,269 --> 00:37:31,983
Bait switch?

1037
00:37:34,472 --> 00:37:37,109
It feels like clickbait because, yeah, we're gonna

1038
00:37:37,109 --> 00:37:39,666
we're gonna say that the Dhs watchdog dog

1039
00:37:39,666 --> 00:37:40,166
is

1040
00:37:40,545 --> 00:37:42,494
somebody. We're not gonna to tell you

1041
00:37:43,188 --> 00:37:45,494
who it is or who the watchdog is

1042
00:37:45,494 --> 00:37:45,994
or

1043
00:37:47,483 --> 00:37:47,722
anyway,

1044
00:37:48,452 --> 00:37:49,111
It just

1045
00:37:49,486 --> 00:37:51,553
part of what frustrate me when I read

1046
00:37:51,553 --> 00:37:53,700
articles like this, especially in the wake of

1047
00:37:53,700 --> 00:37:55,369
of what's going on in the last week.

1048
00:37:55,608 --> 00:37:56,219
Is that

1049
00:37:56,974 --> 00:37:58,644
So much of this stuff is avoid.

1050
00:37:59,518 --> 00:38:02,244
So much of these issues if you just

1051
00:38:02,778 --> 00:38:05,345
stop and do it right? Am I crazy?

1052
00:38:05,973 --> 00:38:06,712
For sales?

1053
00:38:07,325 --> 00:38:09,155
No. You're not. You're a hundred percent. I

1054
00:38:09,155 --> 00:38:10,825
mean, I would say 80 percent of what

1055
00:38:10,825 --> 00:38:12,177
we talk about on the show could be

1056
00:38:12,177 --> 00:38:14,086
remediate by someone at some point being, like...

1057
00:38:14,657 --> 00:38:16,248
Is this the right way to do things?

1058
00:38:16,407 --> 00:38:18,714
Or should we maybe rethink it? I mean,

1059
00:38:18,953 --> 00:38:20,464
I thought it was bad back in the

1060
00:38:20,464 --> 00:38:20,942
nineties?

1061
00:38:21,514 --> 00:38:23,104
And people were asking me to send a

1062
00:38:23,104 --> 00:38:25,252
credit card information over email.

1063
00:38:25,889 --> 00:38:27,559
It hasn't gotten any better.

1064
00:38:28,195 --> 00:38:29,070
No. Not really.

1065
00:38:30,440 --> 00:38:31,639
Speaking of a not getting better.

1066
00:38:33,159 --> 00:38:35,799
Boats boats, boats. For ransom wire ransom wire

1067
00:38:35,799 --> 00:38:37,239
ransom wire. U home.

1068
00:38:38,132 --> 00:38:39,885
Again? No. They didn't get they get they

1069
00:38:39,885 --> 00:38:42,115
didn't get ransom, but they had. So Mer

1070
00:38:42,115 --> 00:38:44,527
max self described the world's largest

1071
00:38:45,143 --> 00:38:47,190
recreational boat and yacht retailer. Yeah

1072
00:38:48,028 --> 00:38:50,846
notified over a hundred and 23000

1073
00:38:51,065 --> 00:38:53,381
individuals whose personal information was stolen in March

1074
00:38:53,381 --> 00:38:54,660
security breach claimed by,

1075
00:38:56,110 --> 00:38:59,614
Ransom gang. So This data is actually... So

1076
00:38:59,614 --> 00:39:01,765
1 when I first read this, I I

1077
00:39:01,765 --> 00:39:03,597
didn't even see recreational boats. I just saw

1078
00:39:03,597 --> 00:39:05,289
yachts, And the first thing I think a

1079
00:39:05,289 --> 00:39:06,650
yachts is just rich people. I'm like, god,

1080
00:39:06,809 --> 00:39:09,130
I don't care it's rich people. Like, but

1081
00:39:09,130 --> 00:39:12,089
that would be an excellent list of whales.

1082
00:39:12,824 --> 00:39:14,740
To fish and try to get money off

1083
00:39:14,740 --> 00:39:17,055
of. That was my, like, number 1 thought

1084
00:39:17,055 --> 00:39:17,374
about this.

1085
00:39:18,412 --> 00:39:20,088
Pretty much they got in. They did catch

1086
00:39:20,088 --> 00:39:20,727
them within,

1087
00:39:21,366 --> 00:39:23,618
10 days of the actual breach, which good

1088
00:39:23,618 --> 00:39:25,296
for them. Like 10 days is I would

1089
00:39:25,296 --> 00:39:27,693
say not it's not like the shining star,

1090
00:39:27,853 --> 00:39:29,291
but at least they weren't in there forever.

1091
00:39:29,451 --> 00:39:30,490
10 days is pretty good.

1092
00:39:31,224 --> 00:39:33,224
And then they were able to ex fill

1093
00:39:33,224 --> 00:39:34,184
everything out, and

1094
00:39:34,824 --> 00:39:36,424
if you want all that information on the

1095
00:39:36,424 --> 00:39:37,144
dark web somewhere.

1096
00:39:37,864 --> 00:39:38,744
Yeah. I mean,

1097
00:39:39,557 --> 00:39:40,455
I feel like

1098
00:39:40,909 --> 00:39:41,966
this could be

1099
00:39:42,739 --> 00:39:45,046
exposure of high net worth individuals and other

1100
00:39:45,046 --> 00:39:45,921
people that are like,

1101
00:39:46,968 --> 00:39:49,509
really don't like having their data exposed. Yes.

1102
00:39:49,905 --> 00:39:50,405
But

1103
00:39:50,938 --> 00:39:52,287
I don't know. I never really know what

1104
00:39:52,287 --> 00:39:54,272
a yacht actually is that that picture and

1105
00:39:54,272 --> 00:39:55,280
the article didn't

1106
00:39:55,798 --> 00:39:57,416
That's you're still me.

1107
00:39:57,954 --> 00:40:00,828
Things are probably still ridiculously expensive, but it'd

1108
00:40:00,828 --> 00:40:02,584
be funny if someone, you know, there there

1109
00:40:02,584 --> 00:40:04,340
could be fallout from something like this. Right?

1110
00:40:04,580 --> 00:40:06,350
Like, who has a yacht and says they

1111
00:40:06,350 --> 00:40:08,344
don't... Who's using a shell corp to buy

1112
00:40:08,344 --> 00:40:11,534
their yachts, like, who's, you know, using someone

1113
00:40:11,534 --> 00:40:14,007
else's yacht or who got a specialty day

1114
00:40:14,007 --> 00:40:15,697
put in their yacht that gold. I don't

1115
00:40:15,697 --> 00:40:17,372
know. There could be some fun details on

1116
00:40:17,372 --> 00:40:18,967
this. I hope a journalist takes it on

1117
00:40:18,967 --> 00:40:21,201
and find some fun little tidbits.

1118
00:40:21,838 --> 00:40:23,753
Who doesn't wanna see photos of inside of

1119
00:40:23,753 --> 00:40:24,630
weird people's yachts.

1120
00:40:27,504 --> 00:40:28,932
Boats boats are expensive, man.

1121
00:40:29,647 --> 00:40:31,472
They're secrets Have another thousand. Yeah. There you

1122
00:40:31,472 --> 00:40:33,377
go. You said it before I did. Right?

1123
00:40:35,469 --> 00:40:37,710
It's a good 1. Alright. What next?

1124
00:40:38,909 --> 00:40:40,510
I don't know. Sean, you got anything you

1125
00:40:40,510 --> 00:40:43,559
wanna talk about? Gotten art. You're gonna... I

1126
00:40:43,559 --> 00:40:45,314
was gonna say, near and dear to my

1127
00:40:45,314 --> 00:40:47,708
heart was the update on solar winds. What?

1128
00:40:48,266 --> 00:40:48,985
Yeah. That was it?

1129
00:40:49,637 --> 00:40:51,391
Yeah. There's a new new ruling on all

1130
00:40:51,391 --> 00:40:54,261
the solar ones suit the Sec versus solar

1131
00:40:54,261 --> 00:40:56,414
ones case. Yes. No. This 1 is actually

1132
00:40:56,414 --> 00:40:58,024
what worth we're talking about because it it

1133
00:40:58,024 --> 00:40:59,462
it gets into you know,

1134
00:41:00,501 --> 00:41:02,338
dropping a lot of the the charges against

1135
00:41:02,338 --> 00:41:04,416
solar winds and also, the interesting thing that

1136
00:41:04,416 --> 00:41:05,590
not a lot of the articles on are

1137
00:41:05,709 --> 00:41:08,416
talking about is they haven't fully exon the

1138
00:41:08,416 --> 00:41:10,487
cease. Where is that article. It's on the...

1139
00:41:10,726 --> 00:41:13,274
They tossed out some charges. They talked about

1140
00:41:13,274 --> 00:41:13,752
charges.

1141
00:41:14,230 --> 00:41:16,717
Talking in a nutshell, it was, basically what

1142
00:41:16,717 --> 00:41:19,588
they said was there was... There were statements

1143
00:41:19,588 --> 00:41:21,423
made by solar winds in the Cis prior

1144
00:41:21,423 --> 00:41:23,257
to the actual, you know, breach, and then

1145
00:41:23,257 --> 00:41:24,786
there were things that happened after after it

1146
00:41:24,786 --> 00:41:27,168
was revealed. They basically threw out everything from

1147
00:41:27,168 --> 00:41:29,074
after the fact and said it was mostly

1148
00:41:29,074 --> 00:41:31,456
hearsay say another nonsense. But they're actually still

1149
00:41:31,456 --> 00:41:33,203
said that the Sec can continue with its

1150
00:41:33,203 --> 00:41:35,600
suit or or statements made in advance of

1151
00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:37,427
the breach. I guess, the logic being something

1152
00:41:37,427 --> 00:41:40,128
like, statements misleading prior. Yeah. They are still

1153
00:41:40,128 --> 00:41:42,448
misleading, and therefore, would impact stock price, And

1154
00:41:42,448 --> 00:41:44,204
therefore comes under the Sec purview,

1155
00:41:45,002 --> 00:41:47,236
which is really for Sec are the ones

1156
00:41:47,236 --> 00:41:49,391
taking this on, not another Doj.

1157
00:41:49,789 --> 00:41:52,204
Price type of entity, but or like a

1158
00:41:52,204 --> 00:41:53,565
state. I don't know someone else.

1159
00:41:54,204 --> 00:41:55,644
Yeah. That that was actually 1 of the

1160
00:41:55,644 --> 00:41:57,975
interesting parts of this is that the Sec

1161
00:41:57,975 --> 00:42:00,521
was basically alleging most of its claims based

1162
00:42:00,521 --> 00:42:03,305
on a couple of old laws around,

1163
00:42:04,512 --> 00:42:05,623
it's the for reps,

1164
00:42:06,337 --> 00:42:08,876
foreign practices Act. I'm, I'm probably garbled that

1165
00:42:08,876 --> 00:42:09,828
a Happy to go find it.

1166
00:42:10,701 --> 00:42:12,367
But anyway, well, there a much of it

1167
00:42:12,367 --> 00:42:14,940
was... You can't... Like, the c the Cis

1168
00:42:14,940 --> 00:42:16,780
or the Ceo made statements that were, like,

1169
00:42:16,859 --> 00:42:18,480
we're totally secure when

1170
00:42:18,780 --> 00:42:21,673
if they had information that indicated otherwise, Yeah.

1171
00:42:21,991 --> 00:42:23,659
They... You know, they could be... But the

1172
00:42:23,659 --> 00:42:25,565
week... I mean, this made... Like, we talked

1173
00:42:25,565 --> 00:42:26,994
about this on the show when it first

1174
00:42:26,994 --> 00:42:28,424
came out because it's actually kind of a

1175
00:42:28,424 --> 00:42:30,744
crazy precedent to set. It basically set the

1176
00:42:30,744 --> 00:42:32,891
president that any Cis cell has to always

1177
00:42:32,891 --> 00:42:34,880
say either of the securities terrible or they

1178
00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:36,471
can never see any Pen test reports.

1179
00:42:37,124 --> 00:42:39,042
Well, that's actually the interesting takeaway. Right? So

1180
00:42:39,042 --> 00:42:40,160
there were there were 2 2 things that

1181
00:42:40,160 --> 00:42:42,557
the Sec was basing on. 1 was, whether

1182
00:42:42,557 --> 00:42:44,395
you're making misleading statements that would impact your

1183
00:42:44,395 --> 00:42:47,117
stock price. And the other more crazy 1

1184
00:42:47,117 --> 00:42:50,061
is, there's a section of the, Sec code

1185
00:42:50,061 --> 00:42:52,462
that basically says, you must... Make,

1186
00:42:53,416 --> 00:42:55,723
controls around assets, and my are supposed to

1187
00:42:55,723 --> 00:42:57,394
be financial assets in the original wording law,

1188
00:42:57,473 --> 00:42:58,826
but around your company assets,

1189
00:42:59,399 --> 00:43:01,235
such that they can only be controlled by

1190
00:43:01,235 --> 00:43:01,634
management.

1191
00:43:02,273 --> 00:43:04,348
And so the Sec was... The Sec was

1192
00:43:04,348 --> 00:43:07,222
trying to argue that the code base was

1193
00:43:07,222 --> 00:43:09,335
its primary asset. And that, therefore,

1194
00:43:09,795 --> 00:43:12,114
the fact that somebody was malicious able to

1195
00:43:12,114 --> 00:43:13,635
access the code base meant that they were

1196
00:43:13,635 --> 00:43:16,207
in violation of that particular clause. The judge

1197
00:43:16,207 --> 00:43:17,958
through that whole section out completely and said

1198
00:43:17,958 --> 00:43:20,027
that's nonsense something. Yeah. That would be the

1199
00:43:20,027 --> 00:43:21,858
same price that would would be, like, every

1200
00:43:21,858 --> 00:43:24,582
developer is violating this act. 24. Yeah. Right?

1201
00:43:24,742 --> 00:43:27,296
Like, that'd be. And great. Yeah. Exactly. And

1202
00:43:27,296 --> 00:43:28,573
to tie this all back together for fun.

1203
00:43:28,813 --> 00:43:30,489
You remember we were talking about the Chevron

1204
00:43:30,489 --> 00:43:33,136
ruling a few weeks back, and The idea

1205
00:43:33,136 --> 00:43:35,208
that under Chevron, you defer to the agency,

1206
00:43:35,367 --> 00:43:36,562
well, this is a case where if you

1207
00:43:36,562 --> 00:43:38,554
defer to the agency, you would go with

1208
00:43:38,554 --> 00:43:39,431
what the Sec said.

1209
00:43:40,244 --> 00:43:42,485
And the Sec interpretation of, well, no. We're

1210
00:43:42,485 --> 00:43:44,325
actually allowed to regulate this would be the

1211
00:43:44,325 --> 00:43:45,765
default under that. And so in the new

1212
00:43:45,765 --> 00:43:47,525
paradigm, you don't have to defer to that

1213
00:43:47,525 --> 00:43:48,724
and a little bit of common sense can

1214
00:43:48,724 --> 00:43:49,285
come in here and say,

1215
00:43:50,016 --> 00:43:52,400
does not apply. So... Yeah. This 1 was

1216
00:43:52,400 --> 00:43:53,989
really interesting. That the the the real killer

1217
00:43:53,989 --> 00:43:56,453
is they did not completely throw out the

1218
00:43:56,453 --> 00:43:59,013
charges against their Cis. So... U He is

1219
00:43:59,013 --> 00:44:01,564
still potentially liable. Yeah. So that is still

1220
00:44:01,564 --> 00:44:03,398
a major shift, you know, in terms of...

1221
00:44:03,637 --> 00:44:04,833
If you guys remember, this is the first

1222
00:44:04,833 --> 00:44:06,927
time Cis has been put up reliability.

1223
00:44:07,639 --> 00:44:09,153
Particularly given that he's not actually on the

1224
00:44:09,153 --> 00:44:11,226
board, and therefore it doesn't have a fiduciary

1225
00:44:11,226 --> 00:44:13,937
responsibility to clients which. That is the traditional

1226
00:44:13,937 --> 00:44:15,292
deli litigation between a lot of board members

1227
00:44:15,292 --> 00:44:16,978
and and other they're just folks is whether

1228
00:44:16,978 --> 00:44:18,589
you have a direct financial

1229
00:44:19,042 --> 00:44:21,186
obligation or not. And that's yeah. Usually shielded

1230
00:44:21,186 --> 00:44:22,933
people outside that now that we got this

1231
00:44:22,933 --> 00:44:24,839
weird thing where we're including Cis in that

1232
00:44:24,839 --> 00:44:25,887
even when they're not an the board, which

1233
00:44:25,887 --> 00:44:26,604
is very strange.

1234
00:44:27,479 --> 00:44:29,231
I mean, I would say, I... I'm can't

1235
00:44:29,231 --> 00:44:31,459
blame about to defend Cis, but I got

1236
00:44:31,539 --> 00:44:33,782
I got a defend Cis because the I

1237
00:44:33,782 --> 00:44:35,847
mean, the president is insane. The president is

1238
00:44:35,847 --> 00:44:36,006
like,

1239
00:44:36,721 --> 00:44:38,786
although, I guess, you know, to to dis

1240
00:44:38,786 --> 00:44:40,930
instill it down even further. I actually am

1241
00:44:40,930 --> 00:44:42,677
okay with companies just giving...

1242
00:44:43,566 --> 00:44:44,679
As we'd have to... It would be a

1243
00:44:44,679 --> 00:44:47,222
cultural ship. Companies would have to say, here's

1244
00:44:47,222 --> 00:44:50,163
the legitimate state of site of cybersecurity. Like

1245
00:44:50,163 --> 00:44:52,071
we have issues that we're working resolve.

1246
00:44:52,644 --> 00:44:54,721
It be much more it would be less

1247
00:44:54,721 --> 00:44:57,278
dog whistle of, like, everything's fine. We're super

1248
00:44:57,278 --> 00:44:59,355
secure. We use military grade encryption and more

1249
00:44:59,355 --> 00:44:59,515
like,

1250
00:45:00,168 --> 00:45:02,003
we're aware of some threats that have been

1251
00:45:02,003 --> 00:45:04,156
presented by our security team. We're working to

1252
00:45:04,156 --> 00:45:06,389
address them. Like, but every company would just

1253
00:45:06,389 --> 00:45:07,426
say that, so it would kind of, like,

1254
00:45:07,745 --> 00:45:09,340
reduce down to, like, the same that we're

1255
00:45:09,340 --> 00:45:10,546
at. Now. Boiler plate.

1256
00:45:11,657 --> 00:45:13,243
But that's... So that's 1 option. If if

1257
00:45:13,243 --> 00:45:14,353
they... I guess if it gets put in,

1258
00:45:14,591 --> 00:45:16,257
that's what they'll have to do. The other

1259
00:45:16,257 --> 00:45:17,685
option would be just be complete head ins

1260
00:45:17,685 --> 00:45:19,539
now San, the Cis knows nothing. So we

1261
00:45:19,539 --> 00:45:21,139
can't make any... Or here. She can't make

1262
00:45:21,139 --> 00:45:21,880
any statements

1263
00:45:22,260 --> 00:45:24,900
that, you know, are misleading or inaccurate to

1264
00:45:24,900 --> 00:45:26,820
investors and the Cis is basically just like,

1265
00:45:26,900 --> 00:45:29,699
a, golden parachute fire position if there's a

1266
00:45:29,699 --> 00:45:31,687
breach. But I mean, if we're assuming the

1267
00:45:31,766 --> 00:45:34,152
Cis has to actually be useful and can't

1268
00:45:34,152 --> 00:45:36,617
be super transparent about the security state of

1269
00:45:36,617 --> 00:45:39,023
things, which there's a legitimate argument to be

1270
00:45:39,023 --> 00:45:41,336
made that if the Cis is, like, we

1271
00:45:41,336 --> 00:45:43,650
have major issues with our exchange servers that

1272
00:45:43,650 --> 00:45:45,803
that's actually like a security threat. Right? Like,

1273
00:45:45,963 --> 00:45:47,735
it's like that you shouldn't probably be talking

1274
00:45:47,735 --> 00:45:48,454
about that publicly.

1275
00:45:48,934 --> 00:45:50,375
So you have to have the ability, like,

1276
00:45:50,855 --> 00:45:51,655
in the article,

1277
00:45:52,535 --> 00:45:54,934
another Cis comes in to defend kind of

1278
00:45:54,934 --> 00:45:58,150
this what precedent this would set essentially meaning,

1279
00:45:58,309 --> 00:45:59,750
like, you wouldn't be able to discuss the

1280
00:45:59,750 --> 00:46:01,829
state of cybersecurity and still keep your job,

1281
00:46:02,309 --> 00:46:04,070
which is totally fair. And I I feel

1282
00:46:04,070 --> 00:46:06,475
like if this if this got if this

1283
00:46:06,475 --> 00:46:08,225
got pushed all the way through, it'd be

1284
00:46:08,225 --> 00:46:09,521
kinda damaging to

1285
00:46:09,975 --> 00:46:11,860
security teams. I because we'll see

1286
00:46:12,378 --> 00:46:13,575
as is a lot of people are talking

1287
00:46:13,575 --> 00:46:15,012
about, you know, be careful about what you

1288
00:46:15,012 --> 00:46:17,326
publish about your company's security posture because it

1289
00:46:17,326 --> 00:46:19,161
might come back to haunt you. And even

1290
00:46:19,161 --> 00:46:21,086
be careful about you say internally because that's

1291
00:46:21,086 --> 00:46:22,596
part of what the basis of the Sec

1292
00:46:22,596 --> 00:46:25,378
lawsuit buzz Was that internal communications did not

1293
00:46:25,378 --> 00:46:28,257
match external communications. Which is Wow. What is

1294
00:46:28,257 --> 00:46:29,535
scary world to live where, like, do you

1295
00:46:29,535 --> 00:46:31,371
have to worry about? Was a problem. Yeah.

1296
00:46:31,850 --> 00:46:34,005
I mean, I think it's, like, I think

1297
00:46:34,005 --> 00:46:36,102
the biggest problem with it from a security

1298
00:46:36,161 --> 00:46:38,172
industry perspective is that it takes security out

1299
00:46:38,172 --> 00:46:39,768
of the conversation 1 way or the other.

1300
00:46:40,168 --> 00:46:42,184
Right? It takes the security

1301
00:46:42,642 --> 00:46:44,239
considerations that need to be made out of

1302
00:46:44,239 --> 00:46:46,809
the conversation for liability reasons that And I

1303
00:46:46,809 --> 00:46:48,487
feel like that just makes it more difficult

1304
00:46:48,487 --> 00:46:50,086
for security to operate and do our jobs,

1305
00:46:50,246 --> 00:46:51,364
Which is really all we're trying to do.

1306
00:46:51,764 --> 00:46:53,682
We're not trying to make shareholder value. We're

1307
00:46:53,682 --> 00:46:55,041
just trying to keep everyone from getting hacked.

1308
00:46:55,200 --> 00:46:55,600
So, like...

1309
00:46:56,731 --> 00:46:57,848
Anyway, that's a good article.

1310
00:46:58,645 --> 00:46:59,443
That we'll check.

1311
00:47:00,240 --> 00:47:02,734
Excuse me being a lawyer. Oh, no. Subscribe

1312
00:47:02,952 --> 00:47:04,387
subscribe to the show or whatever you do

1313
00:47:04,387 --> 00:47:05,919
and we'll talk about solar ones the next

1314
00:47:05,919 --> 00:47:07,757
5 years until that poor case get resolved.

1315
00:47:08,715 --> 00:47:09,035
Sorry.

1316
00:47:09,674 --> 00:47:11,033
Will it ever be... I mean,

1317
00:47:11,992 --> 00:47:13,510
what. I don't think it'll ever go away.

1318
00:47:15,284 --> 00:47:17,125
Yeah. It just is it just me or

1319
00:47:17,125 --> 00:47:18,664
just... Does it seem like

1320
00:47:19,045 --> 00:47:22,175
doing security well keeps getting harder? Because I

1321
00:47:22,175 --> 00:47:24,957
mean, we even had the the Supreme Court.

1322
00:47:25,195 --> 00:47:27,365
I can't read the entire article

1323
00:47:27,978 --> 00:47:30,522
from wired because it's behind a pay wall.

1324
00:47:31,489 --> 00:47:33,814
But it it it looks like

1325
00:47:34,345 --> 00:47:35,321
we are fighting

1326
00:47:36,328 --> 00:47:38,732
that's the 1. We're not only fighting

1327
00:47:39,358 --> 00:47:42,057
the Sec. Now we're fighting the Supreme court,

1328
00:47:42,612 --> 00:47:44,938
and we're just fighting the

1329
00:47:45,391 --> 00:47:48,193
general inertia of of people. It just

1330
00:47:48,503 --> 00:47:49,935
Like I said it. So what is this

1331
00:47:49,935 --> 00:47:52,264
article? What do they knee cap? Tell me

1332
00:47:52,321 --> 00:47:52,798
what happened?

1333
00:47:53,435 --> 00:47:54,946
I couldn't read the chevron ruling.

1334
00:47:55,438 --> 00:47:56,574
Oh, that's the Chevron

1335
00:47:56,947 --> 00:47:59,012
which chevron... You all know. I disagree with

1336
00:47:59,012 --> 00:48:00,442
the take that that 1 is the end

1337
00:48:00,442 --> 00:48:00,918
of, you know,

1338
00:48:01,633 --> 00:48:02,903
regulations as we know it, But I seem

1339
00:48:02,903 --> 00:48:04,333
to be the minority voice on that 1,

1340
00:48:04,492 --> 00:48:06,180
although... There's a lot of fun going around

1341
00:48:06,180 --> 00:48:07,775
if you asked me. Yeah.

1342
00:48:08,333 --> 00:48:09,928
I don't know. I guess I would say,

1343
00:48:10,088 --> 00:48:12,559
like, to answer Braun one's question is security

1344
00:48:12,559 --> 00:48:14,648
getting easier harder. I think... A lot of

1345
00:48:14,648 --> 00:48:17,360
ways it's getting better. It's just changing. The

1346
00:48:17,360 --> 00:48:19,912
landscape is changing. It's more coming... I think

1347
00:48:19,912 --> 00:48:21,108
security in at least in the 10 years,

1348
00:48:21,268 --> 00:48:23,102
I've been in the industry. Has been more

1349
00:48:23,102 --> 00:48:24,114
coming into the light

1350
00:48:24,635 --> 00:48:25,914
which is good and bad at the same

1351
00:48:25,914 --> 00:48:27,994
time. Right? Like, no longer are we hiding

1352
00:48:27,994 --> 00:48:30,155
in the basement just secretly patching systems and

1353
00:48:30,155 --> 00:48:31,434
no 1 knows what we're doing but, like,

1354
00:48:31,594 --> 00:48:32,635
hopefully we're doing our jobs,

1355
00:48:33,209 --> 00:48:35,207
helps, you know, security as an industry is

1356
00:48:35,207 --> 00:48:37,045
being brought way more into the focus of,

1357
00:48:37,205 --> 00:48:39,602
like, this matters. Let's get some transparent transparency.

1358
00:48:39,762 --> 00:48:41,840
Let's get regulations. Let's get things pushed. Let's

1359
00:48:41,840 --> 00:48:44,815
get like, fix this law, make that new

1360
00:48:44,815 --> 00:48:46,974
law. I think there's gonna be good things

1361
00:48:46,974 --> 00:48:48,255
about that, like, 1 good thing that I

1362
00:48:48,255 --> 00:48:49,375
think about the top of my head is

1363
00:48:49,375 --> 00:48:52,349
the whole, like, security researcher thing. Like, Doj

1364
00:48:52,349 --> 00:48:55,329
basically said years ago, we're not prose security

1365
00:48:55,710 --> 00:48:58,109
researchers like stop trying. And I think that's

1366
00:48:58,109 --> 00:49:00,362
a positive for sure. I mean, we also

1367
00:49:00,362 --> 00:49:02,598
talked earlier on the company call about how

1368
00:49:02,598 --> 00:49:04,354
you used to have to install software with

1369
00:49:04,434 --> 00:49:06,670
Floppy disc. So I think... In that respect,

1370
00:49:07,068 --> 00:49:08,686
it's gotten a little bit easier.

1371
00:49:09,319 --> 00:49:11,076
But, I mean, I think it's just being

1372
00:49:11,076 --> 00:49:12,592
brought to the light also means now we're

1373
00:49:12,592 --> 00:49:14,429
in the light. So there's... People are gonna

1374
00:49:14,429 --> 00:49:15,786
say, wait. This is how you do things.

1375
00:49:16,025 --> 00:49:17,462
Don't do that. You're not allowed to do

1376
00:49:17,462 --> 00:49:20,266
that. That's illegal or that's against regulations. And

1377
00:49:20,266 --> 00:49:22,039
so I think it's just getting more complex

1378
00:49:22,096 --> 00:49:23,608
if nothing else, but that's just the nature

1379
00:49:23,608 --> 00:49:26,472
of industry. Like, when when doctors started being

1380
00:49:26,472 --> 00:49:28,875
doctors, they were just, like, what's washing your

1381
00:49:28,875 --> 00:49:31,047
hands? I don't know about germs off like

1382
00:49:32,300 --> 00:49:33,734
you know, It was they were just like,

1383
00:49:34,132 --> 00:49:35,884
putting people's arms off because they couldn't figure

1384
00:49:35,884 --> 00:49:36,681
out what was wrong.

1385
00:49:37,493 --> 00:49:38,870
You know, Reading

1386
00:49:39,646 --> 00:49:41,401
Reading logs is a lot easier. There's just

1387
00:49:41,401 --> 00:49:42,917
a lot more of them, so it's harder.

1388
00:49:43,475 --> 00:49:45,868
Yeah. I, like it... Exactly. And, like, I

1389
00:49:45,868 --> 00:49:47,477
don't know. That's my first all take. I

1390
00:49:47,477 --> 00:49:48,752
don't know, other people might have different take.

1391
00:49:48,911 --> 00:49:51,222
But I think it's just more complex. It's

1392
00:49:51,222 --> 00:49:51,461
more...

1393
00:49:52,178 --> 00:49:54,090
There's more... We... Security has more of a

1394
00:49:54,090 --> 00:49:55,922
role to play, and I think that adds

1395
00:49:55,922 --> 00:49:58,170
complexity and I'll there's also the legal and

1396
00:49:58,170 --> 00:50:01,201
regulatory landscape to mess around with. And not

1397
00:50:01,201 --> 00:50:03,913
just... And the overall landscape of an organization.

1398
00:50:04,072 --> 00:50:06,146
Right? Like, what the tools they're using. There's

1399
00:50:06,146 --> 00:50:06,599
more

1400
00:50:07,117 --> 00:50:08,789
things we have to like, look at snowflake,

1401
00:50:08,948 --> 00:50:11,813
right or the cloud or other other stuff

1402
00:50:11,813 --> 00:50:13,963
vectors that can all be taken advantage of

1403
00:50:13,963 --> 00:50:16,283
the get in. Manages personal phones and stuff

1404
00:50:16,283 --> 00:50:18,110
like that too. I mean, that's true, but

1405
00:50:18,110 --> 00:50:20,255
also, like, think about when people used to

1406
00:50:20,255 --> 00:50:22,321
design horrible Mvc apps, and they all add

1407
00:50:22,321 --> 00:50:24,987
tons of security bot. People's plates Yes. We

1408
00:50:25,046 --> 00:50:26,882
you can get snowflake hacked but at least

1409
00:50:26,882 --> 00:50:28,319
you didn't roll your own encryption and, like,

1410
00:50:28,639 --> 00:50:30,235
forget to do that for your whole company...

1411
00:50:30,554 --> 00:50:32,710
You know what I mean? Like... Well, yeah.

1412
00:50:33,361 --> 00:50:33,679
Sorry.

1413
00:50:34,949 --> 00:50:37,251
I have Mean it's just the threat the

1414
00:50:37,251 --> 00:50:39,315
threat landscape changes over time. Just this just

1415
00:50:39,315 --> 00:50:41,559
the nature of the security. Yeah. I think

1416
00:50:41,639 --> 00:50:43,480
I think it's it's much more complex for

1417
00:50:43,480 --> 00:50:45,579
for staying up to speed than it was

1418
00:50:45,880 --> 00:50:48,199
years ago. Like, years ago, you could just

1419
00:50:48,199 --> 00:50:49,568
kind of... Get a,

1420
00:50:50,601 --> 00:50:52,903
security training, get a security cert, and you

1421
00:50:52,903 --> 00:50:55,840
could just, like, sit in that knowledge for

1422
00:50:55,840 --> 00:50:58,318
years and nothing really required that update. And

1423
00:50:58,318 --> 00:51:00,071
now you just... You really just needs to

1424
00:51:00,071 --> 00:51:02,064
to stay on the cutting edge. A lot.

1425
00:51:02,223 --> 00:51:03,657
You need a lot lot of the updates

1426
00:51:03,657 --> 00:51:05,034
you needed a dial a lot of dynamic

1427
00:51:05,092 --> 00:51:07,101
trainings. And So in 1 way it has

1428
00:51:07,101 --> 00:51:08,377
gotten better, but you need to put that

1429
00:51:08,377 --> 00:51:09,435
time into

1430
00:51:10,451 --> 00:51:11,886
you know, learning and staying up to data

1431
00:51:11,886 --> 00:51:13,402
and things which... Hey. Listen to our news

1432
00:51:13,402 --> 00:51:16,047
and D his and oh, create Yeah. I

1433
00:51:16,047 --> 00:51:18,272
mean, I think, like, the... What's happening,

1434
00:51:18,749 --> 00:51:20,258
a lot of the bridges we talk about

1435
00:51:20,258 --> 00:51:22,641
are people are just running at a really

1436
00:51:22,641 --> 00:51:24,962
fast. Ace and aren't stopping to ask questions

1437
00:51:24,962 --> 00:51:27,109
like, like, you know, to talk about the

1438
00:51:27,109 --> 00:51:29,255
is a third party 1. It's like, no

1439
00:51:29,255 --> 00:51:30,925
1 stopped. They were, like, we need backup.

1440
00:51:31,179 --> 00:51:32,216
Okay. How are we gonna do? Oh, we'll

1441
00:51:32,216 --> 00:51:33,333
just send it to the third party. No

1442
00:51:33,333 --> 00:51:34,050
1 said, hold on.

1443
00:51:34,768 --> 00:51:37,560
We can't send this or Dhs data to

1444
00:51:37,560 --> 00:51:39,634
a third party. We need to, like, we

1445
00:51:39,634 --> 00:51:41,643
no 1 like, stop and said, Hold on,

1446
00:51:41,882 --> 00:51:43,637
I actually know the regulations. You can't do

1447
00:51:43,637 --> 00:51:45,392
that. Right? Like, you can't just be sending

1448
00:51:45,392 --> 00:51:48,025
data to third party. Or like, with Crowds.

1449
00:51:48,438 --> 00:51:50,746
They were running, They were, oh, Ai, machine

1450
00:51:50,746 --> 00:51:54,247
learning, batches, features, sales, money, and they were

1451
00:51:54,247 --> 00:51:56,331
like, hold on. Did anyone like, read the

1452
00:51:56,331 --> 00:51:58,081
code that of that last patch that went

1453
00:51:58,081 --> 00:52:00,388
out, and then they're like, oh, 0, did

1454
00:52:00,388 --> 00:52:01,740
you read it? I thought you read. Like,

1455
00:52:01,820 --> 00:52:02,456
you know, it's, like,

1456
00:52:03,429 --> 00:52:05,666
that pace and complexity does lead to things

1457
00:52:05,666 --> 00:52:07,744
getting forgotten her overlooked. I... And we all

1458
00:52:07,744 --> 00:52:09,741
need to just... I mean, who knows, but

1459
00:52:09,741 --> 00:52:11,353
there's gotta be a fix for that. Yeah.

1460
00:52:11,673 --> 00:52:11,992
Right on.

1461
00:52:12,789 --> 00:52:13,986
Alright. Last article.

1462
00:52:14,465 --> 00:52:17,577
Our favorites our favorite government Si up War

1463
00:52:17,577 --> 00:52:17,896
thunder.

1464
00:52:18,869 --> 00:52:19,369
So

1465
00:52:21,030 --> 00:52:22,869
I didn't realize how many times They've done

1466
00:52:22,869 --> 00:52:25,030
it. But Oh, it's like every week. At

1467
00:52:25,030 --> 00:52:27,992
that's like article. It's... The European typhoon jet

1468
00:52:27,992 --> 00:52:28,310
fighter,

1469
00:52:28,945 --> 00:52:31,722
the A h 64 d Apache Long bill

1470
00:52:31,722 --> 00:52:34,997
attack helicopter, the Chinese V, the 4, the

1471
00:52:34,997 --> 00:52:36,114
M2A4

1472
00:52:36,194 --> 00:52:37,711
Bradley, and then I also know they did

1473
00:52:37,711 --> 00:52:39,547
the f 15 and the f 35.

1474
00:52:40,265 --> 00:52:43,074
So once again, someone is leaked class if

1475
00:52:43,153 --> 00:52:45,219
I had Russian tank information on a War

1476
00:52:45,219 --> 00:52:47,206
thunder to prove a point. It's kind of

1477
00:52:47,206 --> 00:52:49,772
a meme. It's kind of memorized point. So

1478
00:52:49,828 --> 00:52:52,068
study... If I think it's just marketing for

1479
00:52:52,068 --> 00:52:54,850
the military. That's my opinion. They're just leaking

1480
00:52:54,850 --> 00:52:56,679
these documents so people wanna go fly these

1481
00:52:56,679 --> 00:52:58,189
planes and then enlist and there. So you're

1482
00:52:58,189 --> 00:53:00,588
saying War thunder is p your propaganda game.

1483
00:53:00,747 --> 00:53:02,893
That's why that's my that's my conspiracy security

1484
00:53:02,893 --> 00:53:04,641
content. I believe it. I believe it. But

1485
00:53:04,641 --> 00:53:06,072
it is... I mean, it is kind of

1486
00:53:06,072 --> 00:53:08,457
funny. It's just like, a sufficiently motivated threat

1487
00:53:08,457 --> 00:53:12,043
actor. With enough time will eventually gain access.

1488
00:53:12,281 --> 00:53:14,503
But is something they should not haven't been

1489
00:53:14,503 --> 00:53:16,962
able to. So it was leaked was 3

1490
00:53:16,962 --> 00:53:19,212
russia 3 of Russia's main battle tanks, which

1491
00:53:19,212 --> 00:53:21,210
were the t 90 m, the t 90

1492
00:53:21,210 --> 00:53:22,808
s, and the T80B

1493
00:53:22,808 --> 00:53:25,605
vm, which are all currently deployed in the

1494
00:53:25,925 --> 00:53:26,165
Ukraine.

1495
00:53:26,820 --> 00:53:28,659
So those are some of their most recent

1496
00:53:28,659 --> 00:53:30,820
designs actually. So theoretically, we could go get

1497
00:53:30,820 --> 00:53:33,380
those user guides. Right? And then drive a

1498
00:53:33,380 --> 00:53:33,539
tank.

1499
00:53:34,513 --> 00:53:36,428
III already have a link to the Pdf

1500
00:53:36,428 --> 00:53:38,184
if anybody wants it. Please fill... Does it

1501
00:53:38,184 --> 00:53:39,642
have, like, an operators manual

1502
00:53:40,020 --> 00:53:41,776
to see how to drive a tank by

1503
00:53:41,776 --> 00:53:42,666
yourself? Yeah.

1504
00:53:43,937 --> 00:53:45,605
Turn page 782.

1505
00:53:47,352 --> 00:53:49,258
The... This is just great stuff. I couldn't

1506
00:53:49,258 --> 00:53:51,482
believe how many times they've leaked before, like,

1507
00:53:52,213 --> 00:53:55,485
this the this community is just great. That

1508
00:53:55,485 --> 00:53:58,916
is interesting like like, okay. Other games,

1509
00:53:59,648 --> 00:54:02,614
This is like, specifically about military, Yeah. Combat

1510
00:54:02,829 --> 00:54:04,898
simulation. Right? It it makes you think about

1511
00:54:04,898 --> 00:54:06,011
the subject matter,

1512
00:54:06,742 --> 00:54:07,242
does

1513
00:54:07,618 --> 00:54:09,687
actually have an influence on what ends up

1514
00:54:09,687 --> 00:54:11,994
getting discovered about the subject matter. Right? Like,

1515
00:54:12,393 --> 00:54:14,802
if the subject matter was, you know, hacking

1516
00:54:14,939 --> 00:54:15,576
or whatever,

1517
00:54:15,989 --> 00:54:17,266
that would be interesting to see all the

1518
00:54:17,266 --> 00:54:19,523
classified data that would get leaked about hacking

1519
00:54:19,661 --> 00:54:21,178
because, like, you know, it would be... It's

1520
00:54:21,178 --> 00:54:22,455
just funny to think about, like, they happen

1521
00:54:22,455 --> 00:54:25,342
to pick military combat as the, like, subject

1522
00:54:25,342 --> 00:54:27,096
matter. But, I mean, we talked about it

1523
00:54:27,096 --> 00:54:29,407
last week, Disney. Like, people are... If people

1524
00:54:29,407 --> 00:54:31,001
are willing to hack Disney just to see

1525
00:54:31,001 --> 00:54:32,809
those juicy chats about, you know, the next

1526
00:54:33,248 --> 00:54:35,083
Star Wars or whatever. So. I don't know.

1527
00:54:35,243 --> 00:54:37,556
It's weird. Like, you get a sufficiently interested

1528
00:54:37,556 --> 00:54:39,710
of audience and weird stuff happens.

1529
00:54:40,124 --> 00:54:42,358
Oh, it's, you know, white side that, you

1530
00:54:42,358 --> 00:54:44,114
know, leaks are because of the sweaty nerd

1531
00:54:44,114 --> 00:54:46,348
fights. And, yeah. That's it because you get

1532
00:54:46,348 --> 00:54:47,920
into like, a fight and somebody goes, like

1533
00:54:48,039 --> 00:54:49,394
you don't know what you're talking about and

1534
00:54:49,394 --> 00:54:51,306
you're, like, the hell I don't. Like, here's

1535
00:54:51,306 --> 00:54:52,820
the here's the document. It's like, else I

1536
00:54:52,820 --> 00:54:55,052
do the class files. Like, you know, I...

1537
00:54:55,211 --> 00:54:57,293
It's like, you know, represent I know I

1538
00:54:57,293 --> 00:54:59,040
know what I'm talking about. Here's the files

1539
00:54:59,119 --> 00:55:01,343
And Yeah. I mean, the question is what

1540
00:55:01,343 --> 00:55:03,566
percentage of worth under players are actual x...

1541
00:55:04,140 --> 00:55:06,219
Operators of the equipment they... Like, is it,

1542
00:55:06,300 --> 00:55:07,420
like, once you know how to drive a

1543
00:55:07,420 --> 00:55:09,260
tank, you just keep 1... You never wanna

1544
00:55:09,260 --> 00:55:10,860
stop driving a tank or something? I don't

1545
00:55:10,860 --> 00:55:13,592
know. If you see that with pilots, a

1546
00:55:13,592 --> 00:55:15,349
lot, fighter pilots. A lot of them go

1547
00:55:15,349 --> 00:55:16,947
into commercial aviation. Sure.

1548
00:55:17,986 --> 00:55:20,072
Yeah. I mean, I don't know. Or thunder

1549
00:55:20,072 --> 00:55:21,737
keep you to you. I mean, I I

1550
00:55:21,737 --> 00:55:23,324
will say there's also the argument of, like,

1551
00:55:23,879 --> 00:55:25,465
should some of the stuff still be classified

1552
00:55:25,465 --> 00:55:27,344
or is it just stand classified because it

1553
00:55:27,862 --> 00:55:30,009
is because it... I guess it's still in

1554
00:55:30,009 --> 00:55:32,316
muse. So did anybody watch the a... The

1555
00:55:32,396 --> 00:55:33,827
A light on Star Wars?

1556
00:55:34,637 --> 00:55:37,337
Yes. Yeah. Yeah. What it will... So so

1557
00:55:37,337 --> 00:55:38,845
there's a big fight because 1 of the

1558
00:55:38,845 --> 00:55:40,989
big star Wars guys said, like, Si didn't

1559
00:55:40,989 --> 00:55:43,053
exist at that point. Right? And he's technically...

1560
00:55:44,021 --> 00:55:46,800
In the newer newer... The most recent trilogy.

1561
00:55:47,277 --> 00:55:49,898
Monday. K. Adam claimed there's no so everyone

1562
00:55:49,898 --> 00:55:52,201
freaking could blew their mind because, like, hey,

1563
00:55:52,360 --> 00:55:54,288
he would, like, how does he not know

1564
00:55:54,288 --> 00:55:55,886
sis with that? He says it about, like,

1565
00:55:56,126 --> 00:55:58,283
hundreds of years later, like Sis haven't been

1566
00:55:58,283 --> 00:56:00,440
there for a millennia? What if the Disney

1567
00:56:00,440 --> 00:56:01,080
hack occurred?

1568
00:56:01,734 --> 00:56:03,649
Because someone was trying to prove Coyote Moon.

1569
00:56:03,888 --> 00:56:04,047
Correct?

1570
00:56:05,484 --> 00:56:07,638
Trying to find the data, find it trying

1571
00:56:07,638 --> 00:56:08,936
to cheat the tank manual

1572
00:56:09,248 --> 00:56:11,159
for Star wars. That's all I'm saying. Sure.

1573
00:56:11,557 --> 00:56:13,149
No. I mean, yeah. You're right. Like, I

1574
00:56:13,228 --> 00:56:14,104
I guess... Yeah. I mean,

1575
00:56:14,820 --> 00:56:16,094
all I can... The only other thing I

1576
00:56:16,094 --> 00:56:18,004
can think about is just laughing about a

1577
00:56:18,004 --> 00:56:18,855
company coming in for.

1578
00:56:19,450 --> 00:56:21,118
And we're like, okay. What's your like, worst

1579
00:56:21,118 --> 00:56:23,182
case scenario? And they're like, lots leak.

1580
00:56:25,009 --> 00:56:26,676
Well, the... Our chat logs leak is a

1581
00:56:26,676 --> 00:56:28,518
normal scenario because you just assume that do

1582
00:56:28,518 --> 00:56:30,765
damage but it's like, our worry is that

1583
00:56:30,821 --> 00:56:33,918
our fans will post classified documents to our

1584
00:56:33,918 --> 00:56:34,418
servers

1585
00:56:35,268 --> 00:56:37,864
because they're arguing with each other. Can do

1586
00:56:38,460 --> 00:56:39,596
Yeah. Just

1587
00:56:40,288 --> 00:56:42,434
An interesting threat model. It's, like, obviously, they're

1588
00:56:42,434 --> 00:56:44,340
the ones hosting the content. Right? It's like,

1589
00:56:44,500 --> 00:56:45,056
oh, crap.

1590
00:56:45,947 --> 00:56:46,745
It never happened.

1591
00:56:47,304 --> 00:56:48,181
The threat is gone.

1592
00:56:49,696 --> 00:56:51,951
The power of 1. Regarding to the Regarding

1593
00:56:52,089 --> 00:56:55,061
the Disney breaches, don't underestimate the

1594
00:56:55,373 --> 00:56:58,785
power of greed in the movie industry. I

1595
00:56:58,785 --> 00:57:01,641
mean, industrial espionage is just really bad. I've

1596
00:57:01,641 --> 00:57:03,307
had to resign enough Nda,

1597
00:57:03,880 --> 00:57:05,880
over the years just to be able to

1598
00:57:05,880 --> 00:57:08,359
not even look at a script, but look

1599
00:57:08,359 --> 00:57:11,239
at software that might come in contact with

1600
00:57:11,239 --> 00:57:11,719
a script.

1601
00:57:12,849 --> 00:57:14,122
It's scary. Yeah.

1602
00:57:15,155 --> 00:57:17,223
Alright. On that note, it's scary. I think

1603
00:57:17,223 --> 00:57:18,893
we should should we should we call it?

1604
00:57:19,052 --> 00:57:20,897
Yeah. I think we're gonna call it. Where

1605
00:57:20,897 --> 00:57:22,647
right. We we did a lot of... A

1606
00:57:22,647 --> 00:57:24,477
lot of news today. This was actually, like,

1607
00:57:24,637 --> 00:57:26,944
we ran through some stuff. No through... We

1608
00:57:26,944 --> 00:57:29,092
didn't stay free of the crowds stroke issues,

1609
00:57:29,331 --> 00:57:31,099
but We did keep it limited.

1610
00:57:31,578 --> 00:57:33,012
We talked about it enough, I think. Because

1611
00:57:33,012 --> 00:57:34,846
it was new angles too, you know, it

1612
00:57:34,846 --> 00:57:37,316
wasn't just dunking on, you know, like, everybody

1613
00:57:37,316 --> 00:57:37,476
else.

1614
00:57:38,210 --> 00:57:40,289
I do I do feel sorry for the

1615
00:57:40,289 --> 00:57:42,929
the It technicians who have to go and

1616
00:57:43,010 --> 00:57:45,750
Yes. Update and fix all of those systems

1617
00:57:46,050 --> 00:57:46,949
because that is

1618
00:57:47,660 --> 00:57:49,883
it would be so nice if a fix

1619
00:57:49,883 --> 00:57:52,663
could just be pushed out, but having to

1620
00:57:52,663 --> 00:57:54,909
manually go, that is just

1621
00:57:55,537 --> 00:57:57,525
Yeah. Yeah. It's sold. I can think was.

1622
00:57:57,843 --> 00:57:59,672
I mean, there's also, like, to give a

1623
00:57:59,672 --> 00:58:01,501
fun little thought experiment for the last? Like,

1624
00:58:01,581 --> 00:58:02,853
how many people are gonna be provisioned with

1625
00:58:02,932 --> 00:58:04,859
Admin act? Us this weekend and they're never

1626
00:58:04,859 --> 00:58:05,656
gonna have it revoked.

1627
00:58:06,453 --> 00:58:08,525
Oh, that's like Find. That's a good point.

1628
00:58:09,242 --> 00:58:11,050
I get potter right there

1629
00:58:11,489 --> 00:58:13,650
How how many Okay How many, like, let

1630
00:58:13,650 --> 00:58:15,650
me leave everyone with this horrible thought. How

1631
00:58:15,650 --> 00:58:17,730
many users are gonna give be given local

1632
00:58:17,730 --> 00:58:19,570
admin this week and are never gonna have

1633
00:58:19,570 --> 00:58:20,130
it taken away.

1634
00:58:20,860 --> 00:58:22,842
Alright. That'll be the headline for a month

1635
00:58:22,842 --> 00:58:25,220
from now We'll be talking out. Yeah. All

1636
00:58:25,220 --> 00:58:27,123
the figures everyone. Have a good week.