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No one is doing the work.

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This idea that, you know, I'll just explore privacy when I need it isn't going to cut it.

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Privacy could be outlawed by the time.

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Today, I'm super excited to have Naomi Brockwell on the channel.

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We've been following each other's stuff for a long time.

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We've been on Signal, but now she is putting out this Surveillance Accountability Act that

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I really wanted to talk about, ask her some questions about it, and also put it in front

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of your court.

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If this bill passes, it would pretty much require the federal government to just get a warrant

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before buying your location data, your financial records,

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or your private information from data brokers.

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So they actually have to go through the proper channels that are typically required.

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Now, we also expand beyond that.

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We talk about the bill itself, of course, what it does, what it doesn't do, and why it matters.

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But we also go through her three-pillar approach to privacy advocacy,

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why decentralization and privacy aren't the same thing and don't guarantee one another,

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even though people treat them like they do,

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the legal pressure that privacy advocates are facing in 2026

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and why it can't just be about technology

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and why she's still optimistic about the fight

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and of course how you can get involved.

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It was a very dense packed interview

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and I think you guys are going to like this one.

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Let's get into it.

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All right, Naomi, I've had you on Signal now for a few years.

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We've kind of teased doing something together for a long time

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and I think now with this bill that you're trying to put forward

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we finally had a really good reason.

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We always had a good reason to bring you on

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but we had a reason to no longer put off bringing you on.

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So welcome.

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We couldn't justify putting it off.

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for sure. But this has been a long time coming and I'm absolutely delighted to be here. I love your

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stuff. You guys are just such a force for good when it comes to biding the surveillance state

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and teaching people about privacy. So thank you for everything that you do.

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Yeah, you as well. And I remember like you've just blown up so much over the years because I

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remember when I found you and you were smaller and I'm like, oh, this is pretty cool and pretty good.

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And then boom, you just blew right by us. So it's cool to see. I'm glad that like we see so many

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people getting traction. We're like one of the smaller people in the space is now on our end,

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which is crazy because there's other large creators too. So it is cool to see this space evolve.

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I think that watching this space has been really interesting because like people like you were

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really trailblazers. You know, before anyone was sounding the alarm about the surveillance state,

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you're out there creating content and teaching people how to protect themselves. And it is

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exciting actually to see more people start to put out content because there's way too much ground

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for any one person to cover.

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And the surveillance state gets so much larger every single day.

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Their tools get more advanced with the introduction of AI

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into all of their surveillance machinery.

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It's just getting harder and harder to cover all of the threats

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that might be out there.

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And I think that we need more people.

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And we need not just creators, but we need individuals

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to really start stepping up and participating in this privacy economy.

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I don't think we'll win if we don't do that.

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We have to kind of make this normal and make this like a mainstream ideal.

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Yeah, and I definitely want to touch on this towards the end because I want to hear, I hear optimism when you're talking.

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So I want to hear from you why you still have optimism and what people can do and the tangible things that maybe you can share with them by the end of the interview.

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I just wanted to start and just touch on you for a second.

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Why do you talk about privacy, surveillance, digital freedom?

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Where did this start for you personally?

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Yeah, I mean, it started, my channel really started as a cryptocurrency channel. I was very interested in Austrian economics. When Bitcoin came along, it seemed like alternative money could be a tool for freedom. I really like the separation of money and state and the idea that you might be able to have an alternative money that couldn't be shut down.

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We've seen alternative monies exist throughout history.

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And governments, if there's a choke point, don't like competition.

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You know, they're thoroughly debasing the currency all the time.

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And so, you know, if something alternative comes along, it tends to be shut down pretty quickly.

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This was a decentralized infrastructure that I found super interesting.

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So I started out focused on decentralized tech, this idea that what if we could have tech that didn't have choke points that could be targeted?

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because we're seeing more and more censorship.

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You know, it's not just like financial control.

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It's actual like censorship and, you know, shutting down like gatekeeping sites, all that

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kind of stuff.

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So I got really interested in decentralized tech.

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But then I realized and for me, it was kind of like the holy grail.

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I was thinking, well, decentralized tech will save us.

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That's all we need.

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And I soon realized that like if we don't know how to use the decentralized tech privately,

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if the government bans the tech, sure, the protocol itself might be like uncensorable.

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or, you know, censorship resistant.

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But if they know you're using it, they'll just target you.

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They'll just go after individuals.

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And so I realized, like, if we don't know how to use the internet privately, all this

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amazing decentralized technology that was being built with Web 3.0 wouldn't be accessible

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to anyone.

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Like, we wouldn't be able to take advantage of it.

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And so I wanted to see kind of this underground railroad of all this uncensorable technology

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be built out and on order for us to actually make sure we could access it into the

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future, privacy became a super big focus of mine. When I realized when I made that pivot and I was

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like, oh my God, like they just target the individuals. It kind of started out as a thought

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experiment. And this was years and years and years and years ago at this stage. But it kind of

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started out like, oh, like if I needed to use the internet privately, could I? You know, I don't need

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to. I have nothing to hide. I'm a normal person. And so then I just started kind of diving into it.

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I was like, OK, if I needed to access this privately, could I?

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And the more I dove in, I was like, wow, the surveillance state is incredibly like it's

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pervasive in everything we do.

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And opting out isn't as simple as like toggling a, you know, a user function.

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And so I've been in that rabbit hole for years and years of this state.

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You know, now I have a 501c3 dedicated to this because it became clear that this is an incredibly

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like hard issue.

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No one is doing the work.

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The people who are building the tools are getting no support.

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And this idea that, you know, I'll just explore privacy when I need it isn't going to cut it

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because privacy could be outlawed by the time that comes around.

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In fact, it almost surely will be.

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They're already arresting privacy developers.

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You know, I think today they just changed the Clarity Act to remove any protections for

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people building decentralized tech, you know, before it was built in to say, you know, we

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won't go after people building decentralized software as like a money transmitter.

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They removed that. Politics isn't going to save us as far as I can see if we just leave it to the people who are currently doing the politics stuff. So we kind of need to fight the battle on all fronts at this stage and double down.

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Yeah, one quick thing. There's a lot to unpack there, and I know you have limited time.

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So normally I think I took notes and I would normally double down on a lot of things you covered.

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But the one thing I do want to touch on is, I think, and you kind of allude to this, that people in a decentralized world just assume because something is decentralized, it means it comes along with privacy.

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So do you mind just quickly touching on that misconception and how you see it and why that is maybe not always the case?

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Oh, yeah, I would say it's rarely the case, actually.

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and you take Bitcoin as an example. In Bitcoin's early years, and I was, you know, a victim to this

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mentality as well at the time, there was this idea that because it's pseudonymous, all you had to do

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was just not link your real world identity and you could remain private. And people don't understand

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how many touch points link your real world identity. It's almost impossible to not link

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your real world identity. The only question is, is someone going to come looking? And that's not a

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robust safety strategy. You're just hoping someone doesn't want to, you know, de-anonymize you.

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And so, yeah, decentralized tech, it's only in really the recent years that I've seen

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a bit of a pivot and people start to really focus on this as the priority that it should be.

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Again, we're so focused on the decentralized infrastructure of something. If there's no

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choke point, we can't stop the system. And that's true. You can't stop the system. You can target

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individuals everywhere and a system can keep running. I mean, you can throw the developers

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in jail, the system will keep running. But individuals will not have the freedom to use

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that system safely if they don't know how to use the internet privately. And that is the big

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difference that people are just not thinking about. They're just thinking about availability

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as enough. You know, like as long as it's available, that's all I need. No, you need to protect

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yourself from those who don't want you using these things. So yeah, I see a lot of really bad privacy

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leakage in the Web3 world. I'm seeing definitely a change in mindset now as more and more people

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are focused on fixing that. Like there was a great thread today based on a video that came out

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recently about the Kohaku wallet. So like the entire kind of Ethereum community is jumping on

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board and explaining all the touch points where you're just leaking privacy all the time. So

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an interesting change of pace now. It's just a question of, okay, now that people are interested,

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can we ramp up fast enough to actually make up for lost time? Because the surveillance state has

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been expanding so quickly. Privacy tech has not kept up. So now that people are starting to wake

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up, can we hit the ground running and actually trying to make a dent? Yeah, it's been cool. You

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know, I was doing marketing for CakeWallet. And so I started to see some of these emerging

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technologies like silent payments for Bitcoin is now a larger discussed thing in this decentralized

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world. We have MWeb for Litecoin. Monero's been there. I know Zcash is also something that you're

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a big fan of. And so we have these tools that are starting to come up and are getting stronger and

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stronger. So I'm hoping that continues to happen in a decentralized space. But I feel like in some

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ways, like you said, this decentralization fights privacy sometimes. We see it's hard because to

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make things more open and sometimes interoperable with different people, sometimes you have to

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expose a little bit more data to make that happen.

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So it's hard to do both.

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But without getting too far down that rabbit hole, you started, or I don't know if you

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started, so maybe you can explain this to me, but my understanding is you started with creating

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content and building awareness for individuals.

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But now you're talking more about politics, you're talking more about your 501c3 and these

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other things that you're trying to do.

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So do you mind kind of explaining the ways to target this?

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So, you know, the way I'm hearing this is maybe education, policy, technology is kind

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of like the three main things.

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I think the Kallax Institute uses kind of a triangle.

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Those are the three parts of the triangle.

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Do you mind explaining kind of the areas that you see yourself and the things that you're

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doing in those areas right now?

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And maybe that leads into kind of the policy work that you're trying to get into.

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Yeah, absolutely.

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And I think that's the great three pillars that you laid out.

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I have like a kind of different categorization that I like to use as well, which is you've got legislation, you've got litigation and you've got technology.

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And I've always been the biggest fan of technology just because I don't like the idea of having to kowtow to politicians to beg for rights that should be mine.

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So if I can just like give people the tools for freedom today and they can just reclaim the freedom of speech and, you know, freedom to associate and financial freedom, that to me is like better than doing a 10 year policy battle where your, you know, fight is going to get watered down by people who don't understand the downstream consequences as it relates to freedom of what they're doing.

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I just see technology as being really impactful.

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And that shifted a little bit because now that the developers of privacy tools have started to be arrested, I kind of realized like, wow, like we need to be in the trenches fighting on all fronts.

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So each of those three areas.

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For people who don't know, do you mind expanding on those stories?

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Because I know some people don't know what you're referring to.

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Yeah.

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So stories, for example, you've got Keanu Rodriguez is a great example.

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his partner, Bill, who created the Samurai Wallet. And they essentially were like, it's insane. I

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laugh because it hurts so much to hear this. They did nothing wrong. They were put in jail for being

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an unlicensed money transmitter, for not registering as a money transmitter. Now,

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Vinson, the regulatory agency in charge of regulating money transmitters, literally said

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samurai is not a money transmitter. And yet the Southern District of New York arrested them and

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threw them in jail for being an unlicensed money transmitter. I mean, it's egregious corruption.

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And really throughout the whole trial, if you just look at all the talking points that were

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brought forth, first of all, they were not allowed to justify why they built samurai and explain,

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like, first of all, they weren't even allowed a motion to dismiss, right? They ended up taking

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like a plea deal before this could even get in front of a jury because it was so clear that the

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judge just would not let information be presented. And so they had this amazing motion to dismiss

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where they had case law, they had Supreme Court precedent, they had all of these things saying,

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if you just build a tool that doesn't make you a part of a conspiracy to do these illegal things,

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this stuff has happened for forever. And just building this neutral technology,

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it doesn't matter if you know theoretically whether it could be used by bad people for bad

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things. It actually is irrelevant when it comes to case law and Supreme Court precedents. Anyway,

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these people have been persecuted because they really were like staunch privacy advocates. And

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that is like Roman Storm is another one who's currently, you know, fighting ongoing battles

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about this, another developer with Tornado Cash. So there are all these people in primarily the

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financial privacy space who are being targeted right now. But that's just because financial

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space is so heavily regulated, right? You're going to see this just skyrocket and balloon

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to cover all kinds of privacy areas in the next three years. So mark my words on that one. This

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is absolutely going to expand. And it's expanded before. I mean, they've already gone after people

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who've created like private telephones and things like that. Slightly different examples, but we're

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going to see more and more entrance into that space. So from my perspective, as soon as you start

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seeing these people involved in these litigation battles, that's a sign to me that we need to be

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part of this kind of litigation battle, you know, either supporting their cases, helping them set

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up better precedents. Because once you get a bad precedent, like you create neutral technology,

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and you're liable for all the users who use that open source neutral technology,

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like that's a terrible precedent. So we kind of need to be in the trenches fighting that.

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And then on the legislative side, I also saw how easy it was in the last,

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you know, especially the last few years, we've just seen politicians signing away our rights

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every single day with these atrocious bills where they're like, yeah, we're just going to gatekeep

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the internet. Now you have to have an ID to use a browser, you know, and the fact that they do it

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with such ease and so quickly, they sign a thing and they're done. Like you can no longer have like

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a free internet. Oh, now your operating system requires you to like verify your age before you

208
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use it. Oh, your 3D printer will no longer actually be able to be used for decentralized means.

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It's all going to be centrally controlled and they're going to block you building certain

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things.

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I mean, that for me was a giant warning sign where I'm like, OK, so we we need to be in

212
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the legislative fight, too.

213
00:15:31,180 --> 00:15:34,420
Like we need to be fighting in every single one of these battles.

214
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And, yeah, it's going to be exhausting.

215
00:15:37,050 --> 00:15:41,020
And, yeah, we're all going to be like just so sick of it by the end of it.

216
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And it's going to be relentless.

217
00:15:42,370 --> 00:15:43,680
And they have way more resources.

218
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But we have no other option.

219
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We have to do this because otherwise you're literally just saying, OK, too many of my

220
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have been taken away. I guess I'll let them take the rest. It's like, no, that's not how it works.

221
00:15:55,920 --> 00:16:00,560
You just keep fighting and you try to preserve every last freedom that you can. So I hope that

222
00:16:00,740 --> 00:16:04,980
people are kind of getting like the bat signal and seeing it being like, okay, it's my call to

223
00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:11,080
action. How can I participate in these three fights? Yeah, I want to ask you about now the bill.

224
00:16:11,500 --> 00:16:17,779
But right before then, a question that came up, I just put out a video like an hour ago about

225
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privacy doomerism.

226
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Because I watched an MKBHD video yesterday

227
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about Android's new launch from Google

228
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and how they're calling it the biggest launch of all time.

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And believe it or not, this is MKBHD.

230
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This is a very popular tech channel

231
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that has nothing to do with privacy.

232
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Lots of comments are in there that are like,

233
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oh my God, this seems like a privacy nightmare.

234
00:16:38,600 --> 00:16:41,340
But on all of them, they're just littered with responses

235
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saying, well, why are you on the internet, LOL?

236
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Privacy was dead long ago.

237
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I'm sure you see these on your YouTube channel.

238
00:16:47,220 --> 00:16:49,420
We've been getting a lot more of them in the last few years.

239
00:16:49,570 --> 00:16:54,700
And so for me, there's this doomerism in these last few years that people feel quite helpless.

240
00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:58,780
So before you touch on the bill, why are you optimistic?

241
00:16:58,970 --> 00:17:01,080
Why should anyone bother even caring or trying?

242
00:17:01,940 --> 00:17:03,700
You're speaking as if, well, we still need to fight.

243
00:17:04,060 --> 00:17:06,699
But if someone's listening to this and they're going, I don't know what to fight for,

244
00:17:07,069 --> 00:17:09,860
what would you tell that person before we talk about what you want to do?

245
00:17:09,910 --> 00:17:11,520
Fight for your freedom. Fight for your rights.

246
00:17:12,020 --> 00:17:15,939
Fight for a world where your choices aren't controlled by a select few

247
00:17:15,959 --> 00:17:20,699
who happen to control the most powerful technology and surveillance apparatus that we've ever seen

248
00:17:20,880 --> 00:17:26,240
in history. First of all, we have reason to be optimistic. Privacy tech has never been better.

249
00:17:26,699 --> 00:17:32,220
We have never seen such cutting edge privacy tooling out there. All of this R&D into homomorphic

250
00:17:32,420 --> 00:17:38,700
encryption and zero knowledge proofs and like all this stuff is incredible. Just even the idea of

251
00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:44,460
Web 3.0 is incredible. This idea that we could have all of these things and communicate with

252
00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:51,260
zero gatekeepers and like you create rails that can't be shut down like this stuff is so incredible

253
00:17:51,620 --> 00:17:56,680
for me the issue is that not enough people are using it not enough people know it exists not

254
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enough people understand it and simultaneously like governments are trying to shut down a lot of

255
00:18:00,860 --> 00:18:06,160
it because they see this as a tool for freedom um and so it means that it's going to be a hard

256
00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:12,520
battle but it's definitely not over for me i see technology as it's neutral you know and that

257
00:18:12,540 --> 00:18:17,240
includes AI. A lot of people feel the doomerism because they see AI as being largely hijacked for

258
00:18:17,360 --> 00:18:23,080
surveillance, which I agree, it has been like overwhelmingly hijacked for surveillance technology.

259
00:18:23,480 --> 00:18:28,500
AI itself is neutral when it comes to whether it could be used for good or bad. You can absolutely

260
00:18:28,900 --> 00:18:34,020
build incredible privacy tooling that makes it so much easier for you to protect yourself with AI.

261
00:18:34,420 --> 00:18:39,400
So for example, you know, you might have something on your machine and you use AI to analyze all the

262
00:18:39,420 --> 00:18:43,760
telemetry leaving your device and figuring out, okay, who was spying on me and then getting the

263
00:18:43,880 --> 00:18:47,880
AI to help you plug it. You've never had that capability before in history. Unless you're a

264
00:18:47,880 --> 00:18:52,440
developer, you couldn't do that. But now you can. Even Mulvatt, I think, released a feature,

265
00:18:52,680 --> 00:18:58,220
DAI TA Data. I believe it uses AI to add noise so that it's hard for people to do

266
00:18:58,900 --> 00:19:04,700
inspection in the traffic. That's a small example. Yeah. White noise is another great example.

267
00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:09,380
An individual can't create enough white noise to really fuel these systems. But

268
00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:15,200
convincing AI can, especially in a world of deep fakes. So of course, they can figure out how to

269
00:19:15,350 --> 00:19:21,540
create traffic and things that can be indistinguishable. So using AI to like, at the end of

270
00:19:21,620 --> 00:19:25,440
the day, AI is essentially powerful compute. And whether you love it or hate it, it's not going

271
00:19:25,660 --> 00:19:31,360
anywhere. Like this is invading every single thing we do. So you can either leave that powerful

272
00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:35,660
compute in the hands of your enemies who are trying to surveil and track everything you're doing.

273
00:19:35,840 --> 00:19:39,660
Or you can say, OK, I may not like this, so maybe you do like it.

274
00:19:39,830 --> 00:19:45,720
But regardless, I'm going to pick up the gauntlet and I'm going to figure out how to use this to protect myself.

275
00:19:46,080 --> 00:19:49,400
You can even use this like for offense instead of defense.

276
00:19:49,740 --> 00:19:53,900
They're like there are a million ways that you can use this powerful tool to your advantage.

277
00:19:54,160 --> 00:19:55,800
So that goes for all of this tech.

278
00:19:56,780 --> 00:19:59,120
The way I see it, people are super dumeristic.

279
00:20:01,860 --> 00:20:02,480
That's a new word.

280
00:20:03,760 --> 00:20:08,040
Because AI really put this front and center for a lot of people.

281
00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:12,960
You know, you've had governments and large corporations with incredible computing power

282
00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:13,880
for a really long time.

283
00:20:14,040 --> 00:20:17,320
And you've had data brokers that have been collecting everything we've been doing for

284
00:20:17,320 --> 00:20:18,160
a really long time.

285
00:20:18,220 --> 00:20:23,580
And they're analyzing this and using inference to figure out and like predictive actions and

286
00:20:23,760 --> 00:20:25,220
capabilities and target us better.

287
00:20:25,580 --> 00:20:31,340
Like these tools have been in the hands of like elite few for a long, long time.

288
00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:34,260
And we've never like paid attention to it.

289
00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:38,880
You know, most people have no idea it's going on or how advanced this stuff was.

290
00:20:39,270 --> 00:20:43,960
And then suddenly we have tools where you can literally run a 7 billion parameter model

291
00:20:44,220 --> 00:20:47,200
on your local hardware, your local computer.

292
00:20:47,630 --> 00:20:53,200
And suddenly you have comparable tech to what only giant governments and corporations used

293
00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:53,680
to have.

294
00:20:54,260 --> 00:20:55,080
That's empowering.

295
00:20:55,380 --> 00:21:00,220
That's a reason to like rejoice because what we're seeing is not like AI just came onto

296
00:21:00,230 --> 00:21:01,600
the scene and it's destroyed everything.

297
00:21:01,760 --> 00:21:07,540
It's like, no, suddenly individuals have the same power in their hands as other people have

298
00:21:07,740 --> 00:21:10,880
previously been using, you know, to target them and to oppress them.

299
00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:16,000
This is great to democratize this technology so that it can't be used as a tool for abuse.

300
00:21:16,580 --> 00:21:21,980
So often we see in history when like governments or corporations have a stranglehold over certain

301
00:21:22,240 --> 00:21:24,360
technology, it does become a weapon for abuse.

302
00:21:24,960 --> 00:21:28,840
And that has been trending in that direction with like privacy disappearing for a long

303
00:21:28,980 --> 00:21:29,200
time.

304
00:21:29,900 --> 00:21:35,660
Suddenly, we all have incredibly powerful compute in our back pocket, and we should use that power.

305
00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:37,760
We should lean into that power.

306
00:21:38,060 --> 00:21:39,400
It's not a time for doomerism.

307
00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:44,820
It's a time to learn how to leverage this technology to save the world, essentially.

308
00:21:46,100 --> 00:21:53,160
Yeah, I recently had one of Mozilla's higher-up individuals from Mozilla to just talk about their new AI stuff,

309
00:21:53,180 --> 00:21:58,000
which was deeply controversial, as you could expect, because they're rolling out AI features in Firefox.

310
00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:07,180
But his whole point is, do we really want Google and a few other AI companies to be the only people at the table talking about how we integrate AI in our browsers?

311
00:22:07,480 --> 00:22:10,280
And they only roll out AI features that integrate with their AI models.

312
00:22:10,800 --> 00:22:14,700
So he's like, we're building the alternative where you can hook in using any AI model.

313
00:22:14,700 --> 00:22:15,460
It can be open source.

314
00:22:15,620 --> 00:22:17,220
It can be, you can bring your own model.

315
00:22:17,920 --> 00:22:26,600
So I went in knowing it would be a bit controversial, but I think it's a good testament to how this is, you know, that's someone who's kind of showing up and trying to see how this can be used for good.

316
00:22:26,760 --> 00:22:28,440
Because otherwise it's just dominated by bad people.

317
00:22:28,700 --> 00:22:31,260
And on that note, people can't throw their hands up in the air.

318
00:22:31,920 --> 00:22:34,420
That whole doomerous culture of like,

319
00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:36,860
well, then throw out your devices, get off the internet.

320
00:22:37,000 --> 00:22:38,680
It's like, that won't save you.

321
00:22:38,880 --> 00:22:40,500
Like flock cameras are everywhere.

322
00:22:40,900 --> 00:22:42,920
Like throwing out your devices won't save you

323
00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:44,740
as you walk down the street and get captured

324
00:22:44,880 --> 00:22:46,560
by every CCTV in the region.

325
00:22:46,680 --> 00:22:47,560
That's why you go in a forest.

326
00:22:48,240 --> 00:22:49,820
Yeah, in a forest.

327
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:52,840
Well, now we've got satellites with high resolution imagery

328
00:22:53,180 --> 00:22:54,720
and drones that will find you.

329
00:22:55,100 --> 00:22:57,120
And like, you can't opt out, guys.

330
00:22:57,440 --> 00:23:01,240
Like, gone is the era where you can be a Luddite and say, okay, I won't participate.

331
00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:02,780
You're forced to participate.

332
00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:06,600
So now you have to decide, like, which weapon are you going to put in your arsenal?

333
00:23:07,380 --> 00:23:09,660
It's just opting out just isn't an option anymore.

334
00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:11,200
That's a good way to put it.

335
00:23:12,380 --> 00:23:12,740
Your bill.

336
00:23:14,140 --> 00:23:14,680
What have you done?

337
00:23:15,620 --> 00:23:16,160
All right.

338
00:23:16,180 --> 00:23:16,560
What happened?

339
00:23:17,560 --> 00:23:23,180
So Ladlow Institute helped create a bill called the Surveillance Accountability Act.

340
00:23:23,960 --> 00:23:32,060
And this bill basically just says what the Fourth Amendment already says, which is if you need to do a search on someone, you need a warrant.

341
00:23:32,800 --> 00:23:35,160
And it's like seems very uncontroversial.

342
00:23:35,540 --> 00:23:41,460
Yet we reached out to like over 200 offices and only two people, you know, signed on to it.

343
00:23:41,600 --> 00:23:44,820
We work closely with Massey's office actually to kind of format this.

344
00:23:45,400 --> 00:23:51,940
And really what this comes down to is this fact that warrant requirements were set up.

345
00:23:52,560 --> 00:23:57,720
And if you're like not from America, basically, you know, there's founding fathers, you have

346
00:23:57,740 --> 00:24:02,560
like a revolution and you have people really angry because they're fighting against the

347
00:24:02,600 --> 00:24:04,840
British crown and the king's men.

348
00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:10,040
They basically had this era of tyranny where there's such abuse of power, where they're

349
00:24:10,100 --> 00:24:14,540
using things called general warrants to literally just like go into people's homes, rifle through

350
00:24:14,620 --> 00:24:18,100
their stuff, try to find any kind of seditious material.

351
00:24:18,340 --> 00:24:22,840
So like if you criticize the crown, they would just go through everything in your life until

352
00:24:23,030 --> 00:24:26,420
they could find whatever fragments to piece together whatever narrative they wanted.

353
00:24:26,730 --> 00:24:31,460
And when you have enough access to someone's life, you can piece together whatever narrative

354
00:24:31,510 --> 00:24:31,840
you want.

355
00:24:32,080 --> 00:24:33,560
So this was being abused in Britain.

356
00:24:33,830 --> 00:24:37,240
So when the founders were writing the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, they were like, okay,

357
00:24:37,290 --> 00:24:42,800
well, how do we stop this super invasive intrusion into people's lives so that they can have

358
00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:47,180
the freedom to live comfortably and safely and not feel like they have to look over their

359
00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:47,500
shoulder?

360
00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:54,360
And so that they could exercise freedom of speech so that they can criticize the crown and like not feel like they could be in danger for doing that.

361
00:24:55,020 --> 00:24:58,400
The Fourth Amendment said, OK, no more general warrants.

362
00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:02,960
If you want to do a search, it has to be specific.

363
00:25:03,140 --> 00:25:06,480
You have to say the person and the place and what you expect to find.

364
00:25:06,720 --> 00:25:09,160
You basically have to make a case for probable cause.

365
00:25:09,520 --> 00:25:15,800
And then they bring in a second branch of government and they have to make that case to the judiciary in front of a judge.

366
00:25:16,180 --> 00:25:21,240
And the judge has to agree with you that you have enough probable cause to invade this person's

367
00:25:21,250 --> 00:25:26,400
life, to intrude and do this search. And so the Fourth Amendment says like no unreasonable searches

368
00:25:26,430 --> 00:25:31,000
and seizures and then lays out this kind of warrant requirement. So fast forward to 2026,

369
00:25:31,780 --> 00:25:36,580
the judiciary is nowhere in sight. There's zero accountability and no one's getting warrants

370
00:25:36,840 --> 00:25:42,040
anymore. They're literally just buying giant data sets from data brokers and searching them at will.

371
00:25:42,380 --> 00:25:46,360
They're literally just going to Google and saying, hey, search your database, intrude

372
00:25:46,460 --> 00:25:48,440
into all of this person's private things.

373
00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:50,760
No probable cause at all.

374
00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:51,620
No reason.

375
00:25:51,820 --> 00:25:53,120
They're going on fishing expeditions.

376
00:25:53,440 --> 00:25:55,960
And this is like really, really scary.

377
00:25:56,300 --> 00:26:01,560
This is exactly the thing that leads to abuse of power, where if you embarrass the government,

378
00:26:02,060 --> 00:26:06,740
suddenly you could become a target and someone might go through your life with this unfettered

379
00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:11,100
access and piece together a narrative that they want to put together in order to target

380
00:26:11,260 --> 00:26:11,360
you.

381
00:26:11,860 --> 00:26:14,380
So this bill basically says like enough is enough.

382
00:26:14,820 --> 00:26:18,860
You know, we have to stop pretending that searching Google's database isn't a search.

383
00:26:18,890 --> 00:26:23,180
We have to stop pretending that, you know, a query of your own database that you bought

384
00:26:23,190 --> 00:26:24,660
from a data broker isn't a search.

385
00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:25,980
So it's a fine search.

386
00:26:26,170 --> 00:26:29,600
It says a search is a meaningful investigation of someone.

387
00:26:30,100 --> 00:26:33,940
And, you know, if you want to do a search on someone, if a government agent wants to

388
00:26:33,940 --> 00:26:35,940
do a search on someone, they need a warrant.

389
00:26:36,500 --> 00:26:38,580
And we're very careful in this.

390
00:26:38,580 --> 00:26:41,060
We don't want to stop law enforcement doing their job, right?

391
00:26:41,240 --> 00:26:42,460
We want to catch bad people.

392
00:26:42,720 --> 00:26:47,180
And I hear so much pushback from people who are like, you know, don't get in the way of

393
00:26:47,300 --> 00:26:47,740
law enforcement.

394
00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:49,180
Of course, we want to catch bad people.

395
00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:49,900
It's like, right.

396
00:26:50,340 --> 00:26:51,580
And this bill doesn't stop that.

397
00:26:51,580 --> 00:26:57,000
It just says they need probable cause, which is exactly what the Bill of Rights says, you

398
00:26:57,020 --> 00:27:02,760
know, is baked into this fundamental freedoms of the founding of America that you don't want

399
00:27:02,840 --> 00:27:06,780
abuse of power and you want to enable the individual to protect themselves.

400
00:27:06,880 --> 00:27:25,760
So it says that and then it also has this other part, the accountability part of this that says if they don't get a warrant, you could sue them, which is huge because so often you have all kinds of like qualified immunity and like no pushback when people with power abuse that power and break the law.

401
00:27:25,860 --> 00:27:28,180
And so this says, no, you can be sued.

402
00:27:28,280 --> 00:27:33,020
An individual has a private right of action and they can actually sue you if you do not do this.

403
00:27:33,260 --> 00:27:36,720
So making people like individually liable was a big part of this.

404
00:27:36,860 --> 00:27:38,900
And that's basically the bill in a nutshell.

405
00:27:40,420 --> 00:27:44,900
Yeah, it's been a problem for years on Surveillance Report, my weekly news podcast.

406
00:27:45,180 --> 00:27:48,280
I'd say almost weekly, if not every other week.

407
00:27:50,360 --> 00:27:57,660
There's some story about some court case or some situation where law enforcement or the federal government

408
00:27:58,020 --> 00:28:02,280
essentially captured user data without ever getting a warrant for it.

409
00:28:02,360 --> 00:28:05,520
And they just tap on a third-party data broker.

410
00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:06,880
They tap on a big tech company.

411
00:28:06,950 --> 00:28:09,440
They tap on a private company that is allowed to collect it

412
00:28:09,470 --> 00:28:12,200
and then they don't actually go through the proper channels

413
00:28:12,270 --> 00:28:13,440
that they're supposed to go through.

414
00:28:13,930 --> 00:28:15,680
So this is a widespread problem.

415
00:28:15,790 --> 00:28:17,840
Our audience probably knows very well about this.

416
00:28:18,100 --> 00:28:20,700
Now, you mentioned people had some pushback regarding the,

417
00:28:21,180 --> 00:28:22,460
I guess I could see someone, right?

418
00:28:22,570 --> 00:28:26,000
And I'm sure you're not disillusioned

419
00:28:26,120 --> 00:28:28,340
by when you put these kind of things forward.

420
00:28:28,550 --> 00:28:30,780
It could sound like, oh, they don't want to catch bad guys,

421
00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:32,200
but you're being very direct about,

422
00:28:32,740 --> 00:28:33,820
we still want to catch bad guys.

423
00:28:34,100 --> 00:28:38,120
But now that person might ask, so what is the point of this?

424
00:28:38,300 --> 00:28:47,240
So do you mind speaking a little bit to what are some of those concerns that you have, something tangible that you can speak to to say, hey, no, actually, we want to catch bad people.

425
00:28:47,300 --> 00:28:48,840
We just want to stop X from happening.

426
00:28:49,020 --> 00:28:51,160
So what is X for that person to understand?

427
00:28:52,180 --> 00:28:56,480
Yeah, I mean, X is abuse of power, which we see routinely.

428
00:28:56,760 --> 00:29:00,460
When you don't have a paper trail, when you don't have accountability or oversight, that

429
00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:04,300
like always leads invariably to abuse of power.

430
00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:08,940
So one of the things I think it was in the 40s, the Supreme Court had a great quote because

431
00:29:09,100 --> 00:29:13,320
like sometimes we think of law enforcement or we think of government as like this monolithic

432
00:29:13,660 --> 00:29:13,760
entity.

433
00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:15,380
Government is a single thing.

434
00:29:15,620 --> 00:29:15,980
It's not.

435
00:29:16,340 --> 00:29:20,580
We have three distinct branches of government and sometimes they work at odds.

436
00:29:20,740 --> 00:29:22,260
Sometimes they work in unison.

437
00:29:22,500 --> 00:29:27,680
But the idea is to spread out that power instead of centralizing it to try to avoid abuse of power.

438
00:29:28,380 --> 00:29:33,680
With warrant requirements kind of out the window, we've lost some of those like guardrails.

439
00:29:34,020 --> 00:29:36,280
And that's just going to lead to terrible abuse of power.

440
00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:40,060
Like you should never have law enforcement deciding on the limits of their own power.

441
00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:40,960
And why is that?

442
00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:44,000
Like, let's presume that there's never corruption.

443
00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:52,140
Let's presume that no one ever like chooses to abuse power or do bad things.

444
00:29:52,300 --> 00:29:56,680
and they're all saints. I mean, obviously, that's a terrible assumption. But even giving that benefit

445
00:29:56,880 --> 00:30:02,040
of the doubt, law enforcement have their own agenda. Their purview is to solve the case,

446
00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:06,500
to close the loop, to put the dots together and figure out where they lead. Like they have a

447
00:30:06,740 --> 00:30:11,880
narrative in their head. And so what was so important about this guardrail was to make them

448
00:30:12,140 --> 00:30:16,400
actually have to slow down and think carefully about this. So they just don't go after innocent

449
00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:20,700
people. You know, there are so many cases where innocent people go to jail because it seems like

450
00:30:20,720 --> 00:30:26,300
all of the evidence leads up to it. But it turns out to be wrong. The narrative that they put

451
00:30:26,520 --> 00:30:32,780
together, it seems to make sense, but it didn't make sense. It was incorrect. So this idea that

452
00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:39,520
law enforcement should have someone else judging the intrusion into people's life is super important.

453
00:30:39,860 --> 00:30:46,299
They have this agenda, solve the case. The judiciary is meant to be the one that is not

454
00:30:46,320 --> 00:30:51,940
like super involved in this. They are detached. They're somewhat neutral in theory, and they

455
00:30:52,010 --> 00:30:56,920
should be able to look at this and say, is that a justified intrusion into someone's life? And that

456
00:30:57,020 --> 00:31:02,320
is super important. They are weighing what law enforcement wants to do, which is get bad guys

457
00:31:02,800 --> 00:31:07,220
with, okay, well, how do we do that while protecting individual rights and, you know,

458
00:31:07,650 --> 00:31:12,560
civil liberties, all of that sort of thing. Now, in the forties, the Supreme Court said,

459
00:31:12,660 --> 00:31:17,020
They actually referred to law enforcement, you know, this competitive enterprise of ferreting

460
00:31:17,180 --> 00:31:20,620
out crime because they recognize that, yes, it is often competitive.

461
00:31:20,940 --> 00:31:22,840
You know, if you catch the bad guys, you'll get a promotion.

462
00:31:23,070 --> 00:31:27,720
Like there's a lot of inbuilt incentives into this, which is why you want this detached.

463
00:31:27,770 --> 00:31:31,320
And they called it a detached and neutral magistrate to weigh in.

464
00:31:31,620 --> 00:31:33,320
So that's the idea of the warrant requirement.

465
00:31:33,460 --> 00:31:35,500
It's not because these are bad people necessarily.

466
00:31:35,980 --> 00:31:37,900
It is just because they have their own agenda.

467
00:31:38,160 --> 00:31:46,200
And it's super important to have someone who's not like day to day involved in this, you know, maniacal drive to like find the bad person.

468
00:31:46,330 --> 00:31:53,260
You want them to have like an outsider perspective to say, OK, you really want to intrude on this person's life.

469
00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:57,900
What's your probable cause? What do you expect to find? Why is this person in particular?

470
00:31:58,500 --> 00:32:06,240
And this not only stops abuse of power, but in theory, it definitely curtails it because someone has to make their case.

471
00:32:06,420 --> 00:32:10,780
They can't just say, this person said something bad about the king, and therefore, you know,

472
00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:11,700
we've got to go through this stuff.

473
00:32:11,810 --> 00:32:15,720
Like, no, the judiciary is meant to be there to be like, okay, we'll sound this out.

474
00:32:16,300 --> 00:32:18,180
But it also creates a paper trail.

475
00:32:18,600 --> 00:32:23,440
The number of searches that go on right now where there's zero accountability whatsoever

476
00:32:23,790 --> 00:32:28,340
and zero paper trail of this, like with the FISA courts, for example, you know, hundreds

477
00:32:28,450 --> 00:32:33,380
of thousands of queries into these databases where the FISA court like found that what

478
00:32:33,400 --> 00:32:40,320
seven of them were legitimate in one of the most recent audits. That's insane, right? That sort of

479
00:32:40,680 --> 00:32:47,580
lack of accountability needs to be stopped. So that's kind of what we want to put guardrails

480
00:32:47,980 --> 00:32:54,500
back on to protect. So let me try to summarize this. You can throw it back at me if you want to

481
00:32:54,640 --> 00:33:01,540
change it. So pretty much in law enforcement and just the way this government, not just a single

482
00:33:01,540 --> 00:33:05,080
government, as you expressed, but the people who make up the government, they have a job to keep

483
00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:09,300
people safe and catch bad people and make sure everything's moving accordingly. Pretty much what

484
00:33:09,380 --> 00:33:14,760
you're saying is that the current ratio of the amount of searches they're doing isn't actually

485
00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:19,420
corresponding to the people that are actually doing something wrong, and a lot of innocent

486
00:33:19,620 --> 00:33:22,660
people are getting caught in there. And so would you say it's accurate that your bill is trying to

487
00:33:22,680 --> 00:33:27,640
help correct that ratio so that there is more accountability and that the number of people that

488
00:33:27,660 --> 00:33:32,880
they're going after is actually equivalent to the people actually doing something wrong by the law.

489
00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:39,500
Yeah. And it's not just a ratio. It's qualitative as well. So quantity is a huge thing. We just have

490
00:33:40,159 --> 00:33:44,480
unfettered access to our lives and infinite searches because they're querying their own

491
00:33:44,640 --> 00:33:49,180
databases. They're just buying the data instead of ever getting a warrant. So it's like it is

492
00:33:49,720 --> 00:33:54,900
quantitative, but it's also qualitative in that they have to prove themselves before intruding.

493
00:33:55,540 --> 00:33:58,740
You know, it's not just the hassle of having a government intrude in your life that you

494
00:33:58,980 --> 00:33:59,480
protect against.

495
00:34:00,080 --> 00:34:02,720
It's the power that comes from information.

496
00:34:03,460 --> 00:34:08,860
And you don't want to just have unfettered power in the hands of like the most powerful

497
00:34:09,100 --> 00:34:09,860
entities of society.

498
00:34:09,970 --> 00:34:14,020
You don't want to just keep giving them all the information in the world because that

499
00:34:14,240 --> 00:34:15,080
entrenches their power.

500
00:34:15,470 --> 00:34:21,260
You know, that gives them the ability, in theory, to go after opposition party, go after

501
00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:26,379
independent media, go after investigative journalists and whistleblowers and dissidents,

502
00:34:26,710 --> 00:34:32,020
protest movements, shut down protest movements in advance. If you just have unfettered access to all

503
00:34:32,020 --> 00:34:36,419
the information about someone's life, you can preemptively decide who is going to be a problem

504
00:34:36,820 --> 00:34:43,200
and silence them in advance, right? So it's just a huge amount of power. So what this requirement

505
00:34:43,460 --> 00:34:48,520
does is it says, no, it has to be qualitative. You have to have probable cause. You can't just have

506
00:34:48,760 --> 00:34:53,500
unfitted access at any time you want, you have to actually make a case that they committed a crime.

507
00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:58,340
Why do you think, because I think people actually really, this has been a guarantee for hundreds of

508
00:34:58,440 --> 00:35:02,560
years now, that law enforcement can't just walk into your house. I think a lot of people know and

509
00:35:02,760 --> 00:35:06,740
understand, oh, I can say you need a warrant to just enter my house. Why do you think the digital

510
00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:10,480
realm is different? Why do you think people hold a different standard? And nowadays, you can actually

511
00:35:10,580 --> 00:35:14,700
get a lot more sensitive data digitally than you ever could from just walking into someone's house,

512
00:35:15,140 --> 00:35:19,940
yet people seem to have a lower standard for that. Do you have any speculation on why that is?

513
00:35:20,420 --> 00:35:26,140
Yeah, it's a few reasons. First of all, digital surveillance is not visible to the eye. You know,

514
00:35:26,240 --> 00:35:30,480
it's not like someone's pounding on your door and you get that physical interaction with them.

515
00:35:30,860 --> 00:35:34,800
You know, when that happens, it's very clear when a government is intruding into your protected

516
00:35:35,060 --> 00:35:40,120
space. When they're querying Google's database and going through all of your emails from the last 15

517
00:35:40,120 --> 00:35:44,460
years and, you know, checking all of your private messages and checking, you know, the

518
00:35:44,600 --> 00:35:49,440
flock cameras to see everywhere you've traveled and like all of this stuff, they could do it

519
00:35:49,480 --> 00:35:50,680
without you even knowing.

520
00:35:50,900 --> 00:35:54,940
And that's huge power that they get from getting access to that information without you even

521
00:35:55,520 --> 00:35:58,820
knowing, realizing that the scales have been tipped away from you.

522
00:35:59,460 --> 00:36:03,940
And so just the fact that they're not aware of it is a big reason for a long time.

523
00:36:04,160 --> 00:36:07,780
And second, you know, we set up these atrocious precedents in the court.

524
00:36:07,780 --> 00:36:12,820
So we decided on this thing called the reasonable expectation of privacy test.

525
00:36:12,920 --> 00:36:14,740
And this was set up in a case called CATS.

526
00:36:14,960 --> 00:36:18,500
And this was in the 70s where, you know, it's pre-internet, right?

527
00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:25,000
And in the CATS case, they basically, it was a case about a telephone booth and the government

528
00:36:25,280 --> 00:36:26,680
like bugs the booth.

529
00:36:27,180 --> 00:36:32,740
And it was a case that said, okay, was this person in the booth protected under the Fourth

530
00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:33,080
Amendment?

531
00:36:33,440 --> 00:36:44,380
And it turns out that, yes, he was, because there was a reasonable expectation of privacy when they went into this glass enclosure, even though it was a public space, this idea that they were still protected.

532
00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:49,280
Now, how do you decide whether something is reasonable?

533
00:36:49,580 --> 00:36:52,380
Like, what is someone's expectation of privacy?

534
00:36:52,620 --> 00:36:53,760
How do you answer that question?

535
00:36:54,180 --> 00:36:58,040
So then the courts came up with this way to answer it called the third party doctrine.

536
00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:03,300
And they said, OK, well, if you give your data to a third party, you've given up your

537
00:37:03,460 --> 00:37:05,100
Fourth Amendment protections over it.

538
00:37:05,100 --> 00:37:07,540
You can no longer reasonably expect to have privacy.

539
00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:14,900
Now, this, again, was in the 70s, where it was pertaining to very narrow types of records,

540
00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:16,320
very limited information.

541
00:37:16,450 --> 00:37:17,640
One of them was bank records.

542
00:37:17,710 --> 00:37:19,160
One of them was telephone records.

543
00:37:19,740 --> 00:37:25,080
And that precedent, unfortunately, has been held by the Supreme Court all the way to today.

544
00:37:25,720 --> 00:37:28,420
and the internet runs entirely on third parties.

545
00:37:28,740 --> 00:37:31,220
Every single thing we do runs on third parties.

546
00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:34,000
So we went from this precedent that was set up where it's like,

547
00:37:34,300 --> 00:37:37,220
okay, a person understands the telephone number,

548
00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:40,280
the telephone company knows which number you dialed.

549
00:37:40,540 --> 00:37:43,720
So they reasonably gave up their privacy.

550
00:37:44,840 --> 00:37:47,400
We're presuming that an individual when they pick up their phone

551
00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:52,040
understands that like, okay, so the CCP is in our critical infrastructure.

552
00:37:52,300 --> 00:37:53,400
They're going to be collecting my data.

553
00:37:53,820 --> 00:37:54,820
Verizon's going to collect it.

554
00:37:54,940 --> 00:37:56,100
They're selling it to third parties.

555
00:37:56,460 --> 00:37:57,320
They're going to take that data.

556
00:37:57,620 --> 00:38:01,680
I've got all of these like femto cells that are intercepting the call to track my location.

557
00:38:02,160 --> 00:38:07,140
They're like rogue cell towers that are being sold to like the mafia in some other country.

558
00:38:07,640 --> 00:38:12,520
Like no one is picking that up and saying by dialing this number, I'm voluntarily giving

559
00:38:12,660 --> 00:38:16,360
up my right to privacy because it's going through third party rails.

560
00:38:16,780 --> 00:38:17,740
It's just insane.

561
00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:23,540
So the Supreme Court absolutely needs to and the courts in general need to update their

562
00:38:23,560 --> 00:38:28,340
idea of what a reasonable expectation of privacy. No, the average person is not making these

563
00:38:28,520 --> 00:38:34,060
calculations before they use the digital world. Most of them don't even understand what is going

564
00:38:34,300 --> 00:38:39,380
on. They have no idea how this technology works. And for the courts to argue that they have like

565
00:38:39,520 --> 00:38:45,180
voluntarily given up their right to privacy in this space is really crazy to me. I mean,

566
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:51,120
I'll give you a different example, right? If I sign a contract with a company and that company says,

567
00:38:51,180 --> 00:38:55,280
I'm going to protect your data and I'm never going to share it with anyone, even the government,

568
00:38:55,560 --> 00:39:00,840
and you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this. I would, as a logical person, presume

569
00:39:01,200 --> 00:39:04,840
I have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Like we literally just signed a contract that says,

570
00:39:05,060 --> 00:39:11,200
I'll protect my privacy. The courts say that that contract is completely irrelevant when it comes

571
00:39:11,260 --> 00:39:15,860
to Fourth Amendment law. They say they disregard it. They say it doesn't matter what contract you

572
00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:19,780
have. That was a third party and we set up a president in the 70s. And so we're just going

573
00:39:19,800 --> 00:39:23,760
to stick with that. That's atrocious. We need to update this for the digital age. We need to

574
00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:27,680
understand that digital data is property. You know, when I give my photos to Google,

575
00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:32,880
I am not giving up the right to that photos. They're still my photos, you know. And so there's

576
00:39:32,920 --> 00:39:37,240
this idea of bailment, which is another way to address this issue, right? Like when I give my

577
00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:43,480
keys to the valet, that's a bailment. I don't give away the right to my car because I handed my keys

578
00:39:43,620 --> 00:39:47,160
to a third party. I expect they'll give those keys back. When I take my dog to the kennel,

579
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:48,220
That's a bailment.

580
00:39:48,800 --> 00:39:50,680
You know, they're going to give my dog back, right?

581
00:39:50,820 --> 00:39:51,940
I didn't hand over the rights.

582
00:39:52,150 --> 00:39:56,720
So if I give my data to a company and we sign a contract saying they will protect the privacy,

583
00:39:57,200 --> 00:39:59,620
I have not given up my right to that data.

584
00:39:59,980 --> 00:40:03,700
It should be specified in the contract and protectable under that contract.

585
00:40:04,410 --> 00:40:06,420
But that's just not the way we do it right now.

586
00:40:06,490 --> 00:40:10,520
So we have terrible court precedents and lack of awareness for my very long-winded answer

587
00:40:10,800 --> 00:40:15,880
for like why we, you know, why this has become so normalized today and people throw their

588
00:40:15,900 --> 00:40:19,420
hands up in the air and just think, well, of course the government can get access to everything in the

589
00:40:19,580 --> 00:40:25,180
digital space. Like, no, that's not the way it should be. And we need to fix it before the balance

590
00:40:25,260 --> 00:40:29,180
of power tips so far away from the individual that, you know, we can't reclaim our freedoms.

591
00:40:30,580 --> 00:40:35,900
Right. And so how does, you know, the bill that you're proposing, what does realistic success look

592
00:40:36,040 --> 00:40:40,640
like for you? I know we talked a little bit backstage and you were kind of sharing, well,

593
00:40:41,460 --> 00:40:45,220
you have different expectations than maybe getting this passed right now, but it sounds like you have,

594
00:40:45,280 --> 00:40:48,260
you know, you're planting seeds. So do you want to maybe speak to that?

595
00:40:49,000 --> 00:40:55,460
Yeah, this is a multi-year effort. So right now, no politicians are getting like constituents

596
00:40:55,720 --> 00:41:00,340
calling them to say, I'm a single issue voter. My issue is privacy, right? It just doesn't happen.

597
00:41:00,490 --> 00:41:04,380
And so that's why it's so easy for these politicians to sign away our rights.

598
00:41:05,120 --> 00:41:09,500
That's why when it comes to the next age verification bill, they won't hesitate because

599
00:41:09,700 --> 00:41:13,640
they have lobbyists at their door every day saying how much children need to be protected and how,

600
00:41:13,720 --> 00:41:18,660
you know, these handcuffs on the internet will help. They have no one from the privacy space

601
00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:23,880
calling them and saying, I will not vote you back into power if you get rid of my privacy.

602
00:41:24,600 --> 00:41:29,680
So through this multi-year effort, obviously, it's going to be really hard to get this bill passed

603
00:41:29,800 --> 00:41:34,700
because no politician currently supports it. As I said, like we've reached out to over 200 offices

604
00:41:35,160 --> 00:41:40,280
and even though everyone was like, oh, well, this is important, but not my top priority. We need to

605
00:41:40,300 --> 00:41:44,980
make it their top priority, right? Politicians really care largely about being reelected. It

606
00:41:44,990 --> 00:41:50,360
sounds very cynical, but I have a very cynical view of politics. So if we can tell them that

607
00:41:50,520 --> 00:41:57,140
actually there is, you know, their future political career on the line, if they actually don't

608
00:41:57,840 --> 00:42:03,840
reflect the will of their constituents, there's power in that. So I would say the biggest thing

609
00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:09,120
that we could do right now, I would love to see more co-sponsors for this bill. So like call your

610
00:42:09,140 --> 00:42:12,880
representative, ask them to co-sponsor the Surveillance Accountability Act. That would be

611
00:42:13,030 --> 00:42:18,180
a huge thing. From there, we start to get the narrative rolling. You know, it's just about

612
00:42:18,480 --> 00:42:23,800
making officers aware that privacy is a big issue for more people than they realized. They don't

613
00:42:23,900 --> 00:42:29,700
come to that awareness unless we're really vocal about it. Yeah. And I guess this is a perfect

614
00:42:29,890 --> 00:42:35,500
segue into kind of the last section of this interview for me, which is practical things for

615
00:42:35,500 --> 00:42:40,140
everybody. It's going to touch on some things you covered earlier as well. I think my first question

616
00:42:41,180 --> 00:42:46,540
is, I think at the very beginning you said politics won't save us. And right now you just

617
00:42:46,580 --> 00:42:51,200
said you're cynical about politics and yet we're also kind of counting on politics a little bit

618
00:42:51,340 --> 00:42:57,540
here to try to help us. So do you mind sharing this difficult relationship and how you kind of

619
00:42:57,720 --> 00:43:02,480
grapple with that? Yeah. So I used to be a completely like don't even bother with politics

620
00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:06,360
person, like more of an agorist who's like, just reclaim your freedom through tech.

621
00:43:07,240 --> 00:43:08,620
You know, you can do it today instantly.

622
00:43:09,760 --> 00:43:10,500
Which is common.

623
00:43:10,680 --> 00:43:12,300
We see this in our community a lot as well.

624
00:43:13,020 --> 00:43:18,020
Yeah, but I think we need to fight on all fronts now, honestly, because it is so easy

625
00:43:18,110 --> 00:43:20,580
for politicians to just sign away privacy.

626
00:43:22,460 --> 00:43:24,940
And so I want to see pushback.

627
00:43:25,070 --> 00:43:29,740
I want to see these people who are just gabbling with our freedom be held accountable for this.

628
00:43:30,100 --> 00:43:31,920
I want to see people push back against them.

629
00:43:32,500 --> 00:43:35,400
I'm kind of disgusted by a lot of the stuff that goes on.

630
00:43:35,630 --> 00:43:39,860
And I want to see these people, like they shouldn't go to bed at night thinking,

631
00:43:39,950 --> 00:43:43,540
I did a really great thing, you know, making all these people vulnerable by

632
00:43:44,400 --> 00:43:48,160
mandating the collection of their data in these databases that will end up being hacked by people

633
00:43:48,210 --> 00:43:49,420
and end up all over the dark web.

634
00:43:49,570 --> 00:43:51,680
And then they'll have someone do a wrench attack at their front door.

635
00:43:52,040 --> 00:43:55,380
I don't want them to have this false sense that they did good in the world

636
00:43:55,800 --> 00:43:57,480
by eliminating privacy in society.

637
00:43:57,830 --> 00:44:02,080
I want them to understand that they have paved the way to one of the most dystopian futures

638
00:44:02,100 --> 00:44:06,640
could possibly imagine if we don't course correct. So I want to see people reach back out to them.

639
00:44:06,700 --> 00:44:13,460
I want to see people voice their support for privacy legislation so that they understand that

640
00:44:13,620 --> 00:44:18,560
people care about this stuff and maybe they will think twice. The way I see it is that tech will

641
00:44:19,040 --> 00:44:25,000
be the thing that saves us, but we need to slow down the rapid expansion of the surveillance state.

642
00:44:25,280 --> 00:44:30,620
We need to at least be trying to slow that movement. It's going to keep continuing in

643
00:44:30,640 --> 00:44:35,720
that direction, but we need to make it move slower. And we can do that to buy us time because

644
00:44:36,440 --> 00:44:41,340
the tech, the proliferation of tech tools isn't there yet. We need to get it there. And so we need

645
00:44:41,520 --> 00:44:47,200
all of this like steamrolling head with mandated ID verification to like really take a backseat.

646
00:44:47,740 --> 00:44:56,100
So I have a complicated relationship with politics. And I would say that politics alone is not going

647
00:44:56,120 --> 00:45:01,300
to save us. And ultimately, politics will not be the thing that saves us. You know, we're only

648
00:45:01,440 --> 00:45:07,720
heading in one direction with that. But fighting the political battle can help save us by buying us

649
00:45:07,900 --> 00:45:12,840
time for all of these other battles that I think will ultimately be the tools for freedom that we

650
00:45:12,900 --> 00:45:18,820
can rely on. Yeah, I get the comment constantly. And I've been getting it for years now, which is

651
00:45:18,820 --> 00:45:22,140
people are like, I don't know why I even bother talking about these bills or anything, because

652
00:45:22,140 --> 00:45:24,000
people say it doesn't matter, it's all about the tools,

653
00:45:24,160 --> 00:45:26,720
and then vice versa, you get people on both angles.

654
00:45:26,890 --> 00:45:30,380
But I like that you take a very nuanced kind of middle ground.

655
00:45:30,700 --> 00:45:33,220
There is a place for both of them, especially right now.

656
00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:36,220
Now, there's two things, because I've been doing a lot of coverage

657
00:45:37,350 --> 00:45:39,640
for age verification, chat control, etc.,

658
00:45:39,640 --> 00:45:40,820
all these different problems.

659
00:45:41,090 --> 00:45:42,360
They perform very well on YouTube.

660
00:45:42,810 --> 00:45:45,240
It resonates with people, people get passionate about this,

661
00:45:45,260 --> 00:45:46,140
people are getting involved.

662
00:45:46,390 --> 00:45:49,340
But I still see two overwhelming comments I wanted to ask you about.

663
00:45:49,520 --> 00:45:57,940
The first one is, we talked about doomerism already from the privacy angle, but I see equal doomerism for this whole phrase, which is contact your reps.

664
00:45:58,560 --> 00:46:03,680
A lot of people hear this advice, they go, well, they're not going to listen to me.

665
00:46:04,160 --> 00:46:05,280
So why am I going to bother?

666
00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:10,500
How would you address that comment, which I'm sure you see a lot too as a response to this, to what you're trying to do?

667
00:46:12,060 --> 00:46:16,740
So I'm going to give you a peek behind the curtain of how laws get passed.

668
00:46:17,040 --> 00:46:18,420
It's total political game.

669
00:46:18,660 --> 00:46:25,240
It is all about, you know, leveraging positions and agreeing to sign on to this thing so that you can get your thing.

670
00:46:25,320 --> 00:46:29,620
But ultimately, the end game is one thing and it is re-election.

671
00:46:30,260 --> 00:46:37,640
You may have like a handful, a smattering of people who are in politics just for, you know, fighting for what they truly believe in.

672
00:46:38,100 --> 00:46:39,480
Those people are few and far between.

673
00:46:40,240 --> 00:46:43,860
Some would argue that maybe they don't exist at all, but they're definitely rare.

674
00:46:44,120 --> 00:46:45,560
Politicians want to get re-elected.

675
00:46:45,900 --> 00:47:06,520
There are two ways that a politician can get reelected. One of the main ways, which I would say almost everyone does, is just campaign contributions. They'll literally really give you a price. If you go to an office and sign on to this bill, they'll basically say, okay, well, that'll be $30,000. And of course, they don't phrase it so bluntly, but that's the gist of it.

676
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:13,200
you need to give $30,000 as a lobbyist to their next campaign in order to actually get this passed.

677
00:47:13,230 --> 00:47:18,120
And if you can offer that support, they might vote, agree to vote for your bill, which is just

678
00:47:18,480 --> 00:47:24,480
horrendous. Now, the route that I went was not that route because we're a tiny 501c3 non-profit

679
00:47:24,610 --> 00:47:29,860
in the privacy space and obviously don't like, you know, have money to just be giving to politicians.

680
00:47:29,960 --> 00:47:33,600
And even if we did, like, it just seems so gross.

681
00:47:34,300 --> 00:47:39,660
The other way that politicians can get reelected other than campaign contributions is their

682
00:47:40,080 --> 00:47:40,280
constituents.

683
00:47:40,900 --> 00:47:46,560
If constituents do not vote for them or tell them this is a single issue and I will not

684
00:47:46,760 --> 00:47:49,180
vote for this, that gets them worried as well.

685
00:47:49,540 --> 00:47:55,540
So actually, there is tremendous power because politicians are so preoccupied with re-election.

686
00:47:55,920 --> 00:48:00,000
There's tremendous power in voicing your opinion and saying, you cannot vote for this.

687
00:48:00,200 --> 00:48:01,620
I will not vote you in.

688
00:48:01,920 --> 00:48:02,840
I'm a single issue voter.

689
00:48:03,140 --> 00:48:08,080
You know, if you vote for this ID verification law or, you know, I will vote for you if you

690
00:48:08,220 --> 00:48:10,060
are someone who respects my privacy.

691
00:48:10,340 --> 00:48:14,500
Here is a bill that will really protect privacy in the digital age.

692
00:48:14,610 --> 00:48:15,900
I want to see you vote for it.

693
00:48:15,900 --> 00:48:17,260
I want to see you co-sponsor it.

694
00:48:17,470 --> 00:48:18,640
So these things do make a difference.

695
00:48:18,870 --> 00:48:24,860
I don't think that we should feel that our actions don't have any impact.

696
00:48:25,280 --> 00:48:30,860
Basically, if you get like, you know, 10 people to call a specific rep, that's enough to at least

697
00:48:31,400 --> 00:48:35,840
get that rep briefed, you know, that, okay, 10 people talked about this issue and it'll be part

698
00:48:35,840 --> 00:48:40,760
of their briefing. You get like a hundred people call up, like that's a bigger briefing right there.

699
00:48:40,980 --> 00:48:45,280
You get like a thousand people in a district call up and suddenly they're like, okay, this seems like

700
00:48:45,280 --> 00:48:50,220
a really big issue for our constituents. Maybe this should be part of our stump speech during our

701
00:48:50,240 --> 00:48:56,480
re-election campaign. Like in aggregate, we have huge power and we should not forget that. Sometimes

702
00:48:56,740 --> 00:49:01,100
as an individual, it feels overwhelming in this fight because it's David against Goliath, but

703
00:49:01,400 --> 00:49:07,760
ultimately in aggregates, like in solidarity with each other, we have huge power. So we actually need

704
00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:13,160
people to activate and, you know, take a stand on this stuff and voice their opinion. If we all

705
00:49:13,500 --> 00:49:18,380
lie down flat and just say like, okay, you know, I like, there's nothing I can do. Why even bother?

706
00:49:18,920 --> 00:49:24,120
We do, all of us, and we do, like, each of our neighbors and our family and our friends, we do them all a disservice.

707
00:49:24,540 --> 00:49:33,300
We understand that privacy is important, so we need to vocalize that with these people who, like, decide on these policies, for better or worse, on all of our lives.

708
00:49:34,460 --> 00:49:35,180
Yeah, beautifully stated.

709
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:42,300
The second overwhelming thing I see, and then we'll kind of get into the last practical tips here, very common on these videos I make.

710
00:49:42,420 --> 00:49:45,380
Oh, my gosh, I see so much finger-pointing, right?

711
00:49:45,580 --> 00:49:47,760
It's like, oh, those dirty Democrats are behind this.

712
00:49:47,940 --> 00:49:51,940
Those rascal Republicans, those crazy centrists are the ones behind this.

713
00:49:54,700 --> 00:50:01,240
So can you maybe shed light on kind of the partisan slash bipartisan angle of,

714
00:50:01,580 --> 00:50:05,760
because people hear politics and they instantly think, oh, there must be a side to this.

715
00:50:06,660 --> 00:50:09,220
So can you speak to where this bill fits into that,

716
00:50:09,230 --> 00:50:14,260
if this bill is supposed to be partisan or bipartisan and how you personally view these kind of debates?

717
00:50:15,600 --> 00:50:17,440
Yeah, privacy is a universal right.

718
00:50:17,840 --> 00:50:21,780
Privacy protects everyone in society. It doesn't matter which way you vote. You need privacy

719
00:50:22,360 --> 00:50:26,460
because if one day someone comes to power who doesn't like someone like you, privacy is the

720
00:50:26,470 --> 00:50:33,000
only thing that's going to protect you. So I think that like overwhelmingly this issue is bipartisan.

721
00:50:33,760 --> 00:50:39,100
And we see that because every time, you know, if the Republicans are in power, you know,

722
00:50:39,460 --> 00:50:43,320
all the Democrats are pro-privacy. And when the Democrats are in power, all the Republicans are

723
00:50:43,340 --> 00:50:50,500
word privacy. It blows my mind. And what we see year after year is the surveillance state gets

724
00:50:50,660 --> 00:50:55,600
bigger and bigger. It does not matter which side is in power. Surveillance powers are going through

725
00:50:55,600 --> 00:51:01,160
the roof. It is not just a matter of policies, which are just expanded. We've got the Bank

726
00:51:01,340 --> 00:51:08,000
Secrecy Act regime, which just gets expanded year after year. We have Pfizer 702 that just gets

727
00:51:08,020 --> 00:51:13,720
reauthorized every single time. We have like the advances in technology where we're not even

728
00:51:13,940 --> 00:51:18,780
deciding legislation or litigating this stuff. You know, we're just quietly implementing it.

729
00:51:19,060 --> 00:51:23,600
So now we have like drones surveying properties and we have flock cameras tracking everywhere you

730
00:51:23,720 --> 00:51:28,260
go. And we have governments putting SDKs in apps to monitor your movements and harvest your

731
00:51:28,740 --> 00:51:33,940
social graph and access things that like the average person has no idea they're getting access

732
00:51:33,960 --> 00:51:40,280
to. So surveillance capabilities are skyrocketing year after year. It does not matter who is in power.

733
00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,320
And I think that all of this partisan politics is such a distraction, in my opinion. It's like,

734
00:51:45,740 --> 00:51:50,600
look over here, guys, while we just slowly grow the surveillance infrastructure year after year.

735
00:51:51,040 --> 00:51:56,760
And honestly, it's so tempting to every regime that comes to power because it seemed dangerous

736
00:51:56,870 --> 00:52:00,980
when it's in their hands, but now it's in your hands. So you can use it as a tool for good.

737
00:52:01,420 --> 00:52:06,840
And you have to kind of remind these people, it's not about whether or not you're going to use this as a tool for good.

738
00:52:07,180 --> 00:52:13,980
It's whether you are implementing this systemic regime that has the possibility to eliminate freedom for all future generations.

739
00:52:14,200 --> 00:52:18,960
Like, do we want our children to grow up in a world where they no longer have the option of privacy?

740
00:52:19,620 --> 00:52:21,780
Because that is what we are doing right now.

741
00:52:22,160 --> 00:52:26,540
Every administration that comes into power thinks it's OK now because we control the keys.

742
00:52:26,720 --> 00:52:32,040
no they are setting up a landscape that will be inherited by someone else and one day this is a

743
00:52:32,200 --> 00:52:37,320
ticking time bomb and one day someone will come into power and it's game over there will be so

744
00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:40,880
much surveillance we will not have opposition parties that can push back we will not have

745
00:52:41,020 --> 00:52:44,420
whistleblowers talking about corruption and accountability we will not have investigative

746
00:52:44,580 --> 00:52:49,620
journalists speaking truth to power we won't have like any of these self-correcting mechanisms in

747
00:52:49,820 --> 00:52:54,119
society anymore because they can't function safely because no one has a private space to retreat to

748
00:52:54,140 --> 00:52:59,100
anymore to protect themselves. So yeah, it's a completely bipartisan issue. People should not

749
00:52:59,130 --> 00:53:04,640
be distracted by whoever happens to be in power at any given time. This is systemic and we need to

750
00:53:04,900 --> 00:53:10,800
make a change. Yeah. And so if people are hearing this and they go, all right, I'm inspired,

751
00:53:10,870 --> 00:53:15,000
I'm going to get involved. Can you just give them the quick ways to do that? As easy as possible.

752
00:53:15,170 --> 00:53:18,300
And of course, we'll try to leave things linked in the description and show notes, whether it's

753
00:53:18,300 --> 00:53:22,040
your bill or just generally speaking. For sure. I would say go to

754
00:53:22,660 --> 00:53:27,180
surveillanceaccountability.com. On the support page there, we have a link that shows you how to

755
00:53:27,660 --> 00:53:32,500
find your rep if you don't know who your rep is. We have a script you can literally copy and paste

756
00:53:33,460 --> 00:53:39,720
that says co-sponsor this bill. That would be a huge support. That is a big thing people could

757
00:53:39,720 --> 00:53:44,280
do right now. And really, as I said, we don't expect this bill to pass. This is a multi-year

758
00:53:44,420 --> 00:53:49,500
effort for us. And a lot of these bills, they will die in committee. They might sit there for a while,

759
00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:52,580
But we need to get this information to politicians.

760
00:53:52,910 --> 00:53:57,040
We need to tell them privacy is a value because this doesn't just affect this bill.

761
00:53:57,050 --> 00:54:02,020
It affects every surveillance bill that comes across their desk, that they decide whether

762
00:54:02,020 --> 00:54:03,140
or not they're going to vote for.

763
00:54:03,250 --> 00:54:05,140
They need to know that we care about privacy.

764
00:54:05,500 --> 00:54:09,100
So please reach out to your rep and tell them that you care about privacy.

765
00:54:09,350 --> 00:54:12,920
You know, I think just constantly trying to proliferate privacy tools.

766
00:54:13,200 --> 00:54:20,160
So all of the great channels out there like yours, you know, if you have a video that you

767
00:54:20,180 --> 00:54:24,080
that you love, that teaches people how to integrate one of these privacy tools into your life,

768
00:54:24,380 --> 00:54:30,540
share it with people, maybe handhold them, try to get them onboarded on this. We need to onboard

769
00:54:30,740 --> 00:54:35,060
people to these tools. If we don't support the privacy ecosystem and give them our business,

770
00:54:35,760 --> 00:54:40,460
we're basically giving our money to their competitors who are just like harvesting us

771
00:54:40,580 --> 00:54:44,900
for data. So we either support the people trying to build a better future or we're supporting their

772
00:54:45,120 --> 00:54:49,180
competition. So like with our choices, I really do think we need to just get more involved in the

773
00:54:49,200 --> 00:54:50,000
privacy ecosystem.

774
00:54:50,940 --> 00:54:55,380
Yeah, really well said. And there's also another hybrid option out there too. I know professionals

775
00:54:55,700 --> 00:55:00,740
out there really don't like some of the open source tools, whether it's image editing. I've

776
00:55:00,740 --> 00:55:04,480
seen a really good thing out there, which is if you're paying for Adobe, even if you're not going

777
00:55:04,480 --> 00:55:08,340
to use the open source alternatives, pay the same amount to the open source alternatives.

778
00:55:08,600 --> 00:55:09,280
Oh, I like that.

779
00:55:09,440 --> 00:55:13,840
They can still eventually someday maybe compete, right? So that way you can still contribute to

780
00:55:13,980 --> 00:55:17,359
both. You don't have to choose one or the other, but obviously in the perfect world, we're doing

781
00:55:17,400 --> 00:55:22,640
only the better ones, right? I'm going to do that. That's not something I do. I pay for all the free

782
00:55:22,820 --> 00:55:27,440
tools that are out there. I will donate to them because we need to keep this sustainable for them.

783
00:55:27,860 --> 00:55:31,780
But now I'm going to start implementing what you just said. Even if I don't use them,

784
00:55:32,790 --> 00:55:36,200
can I contribute to a world where one day they might be good enough that I can use them?

785
00:55:37,100 --> 00:55:41,260
Yeah. Well, Naomi, it's been awesome to have you on. I'd love to have you back on at some point.

786
00:55:41,420 --> 00:55:45,320
You're awesome. And I know a lot of our audience love your work. And I'm just really grateful to

787
00:55:45,340 --> 00:55:49,440
have you not I mean you're still doing an incredible coverage on your channel with the

788
00:55:49,690 --> 00:55:54,360
content but now you're even spreading a little bit wider and covering other places to be and I know

789
00:55:54,400 --> 00:55:58,560
it's much appreciated and so yeah I just want to thank you for your work and thank you for everything

790
00:55:58,570 --> 00:56:03,440
you've done over the years yeah and thank you too for all of the work that you do I I'm so grateful

791
00:56:03,580 --> 00:56:07,980
that channels like yours exist you do such tremendous good teaching people about these tools so thank you

792
00:56:07,980 --> 00:56:14,060
so much for having me yeah thanks Naomi I want to give a huge thanks to Naomi for the time and for

793
00:56:14,060 --> 00:56:18,960
the work, both public facing and the legislative groundwork that doesn't make it onto a YouTube

794
00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:19,400
video.

795
00:56:19,840 --> 00:56:21,540
So I know she's covered videos about it as well.

796
00:56:21,920 --> 00:56:25,180
I'll leave her channel down in the description if you want to check out more of her and what

797
00:56:25,260 --> 00:56:25,640
she's doing.

798
00:56:25,860 --> 00:56:27,900
There's a huge overlap in the stuff that we talk about.

799
00:56:28,000 --> 00:56:31,340
And of course, I'm going to leave links to the bill that will also have instructions to

800
00:56:31,640 --> 00:56:32,420
contact your representatives.

801
00:56:32,920 --> 00:56:35,620
All of that's going to be down in the description that can take five minutes.

802
00:56:35,840 --> 00:56:39,500
And it's part of the fight that we always talk about and can very much move the needle.

803
00:56:39,720 --> 00:56:42,840
This is one of my favorite interviews, and I really hope that you all took as much from

804
00:56:42,940 --> 00:56:43,820
it as I did.

805
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:45,680
And that's why I like running this podcast.

806
00:56:45,950 --> 00:56:47,700
And so if you guys like this kind of stuff

807
00:56:47,770 --> 00:56:48,760
and you want to see more of it,

808
00:56:48,810 --> 00:56:51,460
you can join the Techlorians down in the description.

809
00:56:51,860 --> 00:56:52,900
We have a private signal group.

810
00:56:52,990 --> 00:56:55,240
I have a private RSS feed so you can keep up with news

811
00:56:55,310 --> 00:56:56,280
and things that are happening.

812
00:56:56,430 --> 00:56:57,780
And we have some other perks down there.

813
00:56:58,050 --> 00:57:00,780
But most importantly, you get to keep this content going and growing

814
00:57:01,190 --> 00:57:02,820
and we can get more really exciting guests.

815
00:57:03,300 --> 00:57:04,660
See you all next time on Techlor.

816
00:57:04,890 --> 00:57:06,700
Thank you all for watching and don't forget to get involved.

817
00:57:35,840 --> 00:57:35,860
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