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Whatever you're giving them, every single click, every page, every object on the web page,

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they don't even need to know what websites you're going to.

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They can actually figure it out through them.

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How much can your ISP see about your web traffic?

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Does encrypted DNS even mean anything if there are still parts of it that aren't quite as encrypted as they should be?

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What's the difference between DNS over HTTPS versus DNS over TLS versus the brand new DNS over Quick?

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What does a privacy-respecting DNS mean?

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What even is a DNS?

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Today, we are going to have pretty much a masterclass with Quad9 on DNS.

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Now, this isn't actually necessarily structured as a formal masterclass,

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but I think this interview itself really gets to the core of pretty much every major question right now in 2026

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regarding privacy, security, DNS, censorship, circumvention, and really everything else you need to know all in one place.

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I really enjoyed doing this one, and I learned a lot from it, so I hope that you all feel the same way coming out of it.

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And now let's get to the interview.

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Why don't you just intro Quad9 a little bit for people who don't know who you guys are?

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So Quad9 is a nonprofit.

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We're based in Switzerland.

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And our mission is to give a basic cybersecurity and privacy protection to as many people as possible at no cost.

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And so we do that by running a recursive DNS resolver located at 9.9.9.9, hence the name Quad9.

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And we give that service away to everybody for free.

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And so, I mean, the first question I'm sure I would ask and many other people is, okay, so how is it free? How do you do that?

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Well, actually, the first question people ask is, what's recursive DNS? Because the tech folks know what that is.

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Got it. So how do we give that away for free? So Quad9 has been around for about 10 years.

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And we were founded and we've been essentially kept running by a combination of grants, sponsorships.

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And now we're actually starting to branch out into figuring out how do we have sustainable income models. So we're actually looking at some of the aggregated data that we have and we're figuring out some ways to monetize some of that as well without jeopardizing user privacy.

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So we are primarily grant and sponsorship funded, but kind of shifting to a mix of trying to come up with some commercial services on the back end while maintaining that grant and sponsorship method going forward.

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People think that we're doing the right thing and they give us money to do the right thing.

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Not as many people as I would like, but we are still continuing on.

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We've been going strong for 10 years and continue to expand.

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Yeah, that's great.

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I'll ask you a little bit more about that because I know some people in our audience, they're going to hear what you just said and they're going to think, oh, wow, that's scary.

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So we'll make sure we can dig into that more and what that looks like.

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Now, if somebody is kind of new to this and kind of like what you were saying, what's recursive DNS?

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Where do you normally start in explaining this to people?

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I know you used a bit of a different analogy last time we had you on than what most people are used to.

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Well, now you've put me on the spot.

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I'm not sure if I'm going to use the same analogy or not.

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So I'm going to go with what I think is most useful.

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So basically the DNS is the equivalent of the phone book of the internet.

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And that's kind of the most common analogy where your computer doesn't actually understand how to use names.

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So when you type in www.amazon.com, your computer doesn't actually know what that means.

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It doesn't know how to get to that server.

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So what it does is that the first thing your computer does is it talks to a recursive resolver.

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It takes that name, gives it to the recursive resolver, and what it's expecting back is an IP address.

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And you've probably seen those or at least references to those, even if you're not a computer person at all.

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And the IP address is what your computer can then use to communicate to the Amazon server to get the content, to get the page load.

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And so Quad9 replaces what typically is provided by your ISP or your school or whatever your organization is.

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Usually there's a recursive resolver somewhere inside that organization that does this very simple job.

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It's actually not very simple, but it does this mapping of names to numbers.

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So it's a phone book where you hand off the task of looking things up in the phone book to the recursive resolver, and it hands you back a number.

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We replace that.

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We're kind of an over-the-top service that does exactly the same thing, but with a few added benefits.

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You mentioned that you are trying to give people privacy through this service.

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So what is typically the concern with maybe a default DNS?

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And we'll talk about how people can maybe see what their default is.

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But what's actually being collected?

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What's the real concern here?

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Right.

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There have been great advances in the last 15 years or so with the encryption of web pages,

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right? You see HTTPS encryption has been really, really moving forward quickly. And that's great

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where people can't snoop on the actual content that you're looking at. For the most part,

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there still are some unencrypted things, but for the most part, things are encrypted. However,

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DNS has not been encrypted and that's actually been much slower to convert.

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So if someone can actually look at the pointers you're doing, like in other words, if they're

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looking at the names you're looking up, they don't even need to see the content. They can kind of

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figure out where you're going and what you're doing. So whoever runs the recursive resolver,

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you need to trust them a lot because whatever you're giving them, every single click, every

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page, every object on the webpage you're looking at creates a name to number mapping. And if

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someone's looking at all those and can associate that with you as a person, then they don't even

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need to know what websites you're going to through looking at the content. They can actually figure

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it out through the metadata. And so when Quad9 does that, when we do that as a service, we do not

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collect any information about you, the individual. In fact, we don't even want to know who you are.

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There's no signup. There's no username required. There's no identification that we ask for. So you

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basically just change the resolver on your laptop or on your phone to Quad9, and that's all you have

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to do. There's nothing else. There's no software. We don't track any unique identifiers. We are a

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Swiss organization. And so we are bounded by extremely strict laws around what we can do with

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data. So we don't simply say we don't collect your data. There are legal constraints about what we can

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do with your data and we can't change our mind. Unlike a US corporation, which can at any time

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basically say, well, you know what, we're doing something different with your data today and

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good luck. We can't do that. And interestingly in Switzerland, and this is kind of the reason

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And people ask, why Switzerland?

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The penalties for us changing our mind and not doing what we say we're going to do, those

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are actually criminal penalties.

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They're not civil penalties.

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In the United States or even in Europe, if you violate someone's privacy, there's civil

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constraints, right?

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There's a fine that you pay and maybe there's something that your company has to do to remediate

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the problem.

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In Switzerland, actually, our foundation council and potentially me and other directors, or

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not directors, but other people in the company, we might go to jail.

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So we have to do what we say we're going to do.

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And so that's why the privacy guarantee with Quad9

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is so much stronger than in other places.

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Yeah, I think the analogy you used last time,

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or it might be confusing interviews,

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but it was a map that I remember.

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Yep, I've used the map analogy as well.

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Yeah, so I guess if people want to see that one,

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the old interviews there, if they really want to view it.

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And I think that's the one with Nate.

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So if I'm kind of new to DNS,

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and again, we'll get more technical in a second here,

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but just for the people who are newer,

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if I'm new to DNS,

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It sounds like I already have a default DNS provider

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that's being used on my computer, it's required,

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and if I swap that to be yours,

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I am getting better privacy

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because you're not collecting all the data

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my normal DNS would collect.

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So how can someone see what their current DNS provider is

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and what are their options?

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Because I think there's you,

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but do you have other DNS providers

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that you think are also good to look into?

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So let's start with how do you see it.

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So typically in your TCP IP settings,

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whether you're on Mac or Windows,

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you have to kind of dig down into the settings.

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Normally your DHCP service,

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whether it's that your router at home

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or whether it's your ISP or your enterprise router,

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it's going to hand back to you

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the IP address you should be using

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for your temporary connection.

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And when you sit down, open up your laptop,

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you get an IP address, a default gateway,

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and then also a DNS server.

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And so those are typically automatically configured.

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You can, however, statically configure it.

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And the details of exactly how you do that,

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we can go to our website

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and we have configuration guides for Windows and Mac.

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And for mobile devices,

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it actually gets a little more complicated.

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Android, it's actually somewhat simpler.

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There's a feature in Android called Private DNS

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and you can put in our settings in there.

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In fact, some phones even come with Quad 9

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basically as in a pull-down list.

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And then iOS is the hardest one.

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Interestingly, you can't actually see

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what your DNS provider is in an iPhone or an iPad device.

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They really hide that quite effectively

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so that people don't stick their fingers in it,

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which I think is unfortunate.

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We have an MDM profile that you can load to override that.

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And interestingly, the best way to override it is to go into your router at home.

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And instead of using the default that your router hands out, go into your router and say, you know, hand out 9.9.9.9 as the DNS server.

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And it will then tell your iPhone to do the right thing.

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So iOS is a little tougher.

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And also Android, we have an app on the F-Droid store called Quad9 Connect, which you can download.

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Not only will it not change the default on your Android device,

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but it also gives you some stats, which is nice.

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You don't have to have that app, by the way.

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It'll work fine without it,

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but having some statistics sometimes is nice.

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Nice.

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And then on the iOS side of things,

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there are a few other DNS providers,

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and they go inside the VPN section,

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and they swap the DNS provider there.

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Is there a reason you guys go for this profile approach?

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Well, essentially, that's the same thing.

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That is the method we're using.

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So it's an XML blob that you download.

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So it's more or less exactly the same model.

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It's just that we distribute it as a text file.

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There's nothing particularly fancy about it.

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We're trying not to make other changes.

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Like when you download our system as a VPN profile,

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we're not trying to actually divert all your traffic.

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We're just grabbing the DNS traffic

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and sending that to our resolvers.

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So I'm sorry that iOS is not a particularly clean method,

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but Apple has not made that as easy as we would like.

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Yeah, it's interesting because, you know,

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Apple's done a lot of good stuff.

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in some areas.

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I think lockdown mode is very cool.

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I think advanced data protection in iCloud is very cool.

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But even with these really good features

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that can prevent government-grade spyware,

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Apple still hasn't documented and made it clear

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when traffic actually goes through a VPN or not,

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which for some threat models is pretty critical

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if you think about it.

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I like a lot of the stuff Apple's doing.

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I give them credit for doing a lot of things the right way.

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But it all still is within their sandbox.

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They don't want traffic leaving their control.

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There's an argument that they say, well, it's better and safer if Apple does all that.

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I don't quite agree.

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I think that people should have choice, more easily have choice as to where their data is

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going and who protects it.

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But that's a philosophical difference between Apple and my own views, I think.

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And other platforms' views, too.

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I think Apple is kind of the best at that right now.

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A couple things to clarify, and then a couple more technical things that I know some of the

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technical folks will appreciate.

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So first, one of the things I get asked a ton is,

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where do I set my DNS?

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Now I know you kind of mentioned the system DNS,

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but on the consumer end, they can change it in their browser.

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The browser lets you change your DNS provider.

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They can change it sometimes per program.

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Some programs let you set a DNS inside just that program.

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They can also set it on the operating system.

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You mentioned the router even, so it would go through your router.

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So it's confusing to a regular person.

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So where do you normally start this conversation

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to kind of ground people?

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This is one of the biggest problems with what we do is explaining how people can be protected by what we do, or both their privacy and their security, is because that configuration is still difficult and there are so many fractured places where it can be done.

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We, of course, are interested in having end users use the platform.

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We love having individual users figure it out, convert over, and start to use Quad9.

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But quite honestly, that isn't where most of our users come from.

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And the reason for that is complexity.

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Most of the users on the Quad9 platform from everything we've been able to determine are coming from organizations or even households where there's a very technical person at the very bottom of the organization chart who says, you know what?

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I like Quad9.

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I like what they stand for.

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I like the fact that I get added security and privacy for my end users.

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So I'm going to configure this on the router and everyone's going to get it.

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And they're not even going to notice.

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And that goes for sysadmins at small or medium sized companies and even some big companies, but not many.

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And then also for households, where if someone who's listening to this podcast, as an example, is going to log into their parents' router, and they're going to make sure that everything in the household is using 9.9.9.9 because it's handed out in the DHCP server.

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We're a very small shop, right?

227
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So the smaller you are, the harder it is to make things very simple.

228
00:12:45,540 --> 00:12:46,420
We don't do software.

229
00:12:46,480 --> 00:12:48,399
We're not a software shipping organization.

230
00:12:49,240 --> 00:12:49,960
We do services.

231
00:12:50,460 --> 00:12:57,340
So software is what makes things easy for people if you do it right, where they download a program and it does the thing and changes the service.

232
00:12:57,460 --> 00:12:59,360
And then the queries would use Quad9.

233
00:12:59,680 --> 00:13:00,580
We have that for Android.

234
00:13:00,740 --> 00:13:01,480
It works quite well.

235
00:13:01,700 --> 00:13:02,700
But we don't have that for Windows.

236
00:13:02,940 --> 00:13:03,840
We don't have that for Mac.

237
00:13:04,220 --> 00:13:07,700
We don't have that for, you know, iOS is sort of a half measure.

238
00:13:07,860 --> 00:13:11,540
And that's because of our size and the fact that we're a services company, we're not a

239
00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:12,220
software company.

240
00:13:12,540 --> 00:13:17,620
That said, again, most of our users are brought to us by somebody who's sophisticated, deciding

241
00:13:17,740 --> 00:13:22,560
that they want to give the benefits to a group of people who aren't necessarily as sophisticated.

242
00:13:23,220 --> 00:13:26,300
And those often are the people that need the protection, the cybersecurity protection,

243
00:13:26,340 --> 00:13:30,780
which I haven't even talked about. They need that the most. And then privacy is sort of the second

244
00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:36,800
most interesting thing that they have. So, you know, I'd say that under 10%, probably less of our

245
00:13:36,940 --> 00:13:41,080
end users actually go in and configure this themselves. You know, 90% of our users, I'm going

246
00:13:41,080 --> 00:13:45,940
to guess, are actually, they're using Quad9 and they don't even know it because someone is looking

247
00:13:46,140 --> 00:13:50,860
out for them. Got it. And then I have a couple of follow-up questions there, but I'll let you expand

248
00:13:50,980 --> 00:13:54,519
on the cybersecurity stuff because it sounded like you wanted to get to that. Sure. Privacy is a big

249
00:13:54,540 --> 00:13:58,540
reason for using Quad9. We don't collect user personal information. We don't collect IP addresses.

250
00:13:59,120 --> 00:14:05,320
We never even write IP addresses to any storage mechanism ever. However, a lot of people don't

251
00:14:05,330 --> 00:14:09,140
care as much about privacy. They care about sort of the opposite side of the coin, which is

252
00:14:09,460 --> 00:14:13,280
cybersecurity. They don't want to be defrauded. They don't want to have botnets installed on their

253
00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:18,060
laptops. They don't want to have phishing attacks. And they're trying to protect people, again,

254
00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:23,479
who might be more vulnerable to this. Quad9 has the other party trick we have is that we have a

255
00:14:23,500 --> 00:14:30,820
block list. On our primary service, 9999, we have a list, a rotating list of around roughly 4 million

256
00:14:31,460 --> 00:14:38,720
different malicious domains that we keep rotating. These are supplied to us by about 35 or more

257
00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:44,760
partners, mostly very relatively well-known cybersecurity companies who give us lists of

258
00:14:44,940 --> 00:14:50,680
domain names that they know are malicious. So that's command and control systems, it's stalkerware,

259
00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:55,540
it's phishing. If you try to look up one of those names on our system, we basically refuse the

260
00:14:55,660 --> 00:15:00,260
lookup. We hand back what's called an NX domain. And we actually tag that with an indicator that

261
00:15:00,380 --> 00:15:06,060
says, we gave you back a zero answer, a null answer, because this was a prohibited site.

262
00:15:06,210 --> 00:15:09,880
This is a user choice. You can choose to use this blocking service or not. We actually have

263
00:15:09,930 --> 00:15:17,259
different flavors. So 9999 has blocking enabled, 99910 does not. Most people choose the blocking

264
00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:22,380
enabled service, because why not? So a lot of people, especially in, you know, not to generalize,

265
00:15:22,380 --> 00:15:26,460
but in North America, as an example, and Western Europe, they're really interested in cybersecurity

266
00:15:26,840 --> 00:15:32,760
component because we're giving away for free a service that typically costs quite a bit if you

267
00:15:32,760 --> 00:15:37,200
were to try to build it yourself or to try to buy that service from somebody. We have what we think

268
00:15:37,320 --> 00:15:43,019
is one of the best combinations of malware and other blocking that you can get. Privacy to them

269
00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:47,720
is an extra. In other parts of the world, privacy is the primary reason and cybersecurity is an extra.

270
00:15:48,140 --> 00:15:52,860
So it depends on who I'm talking to as to what the biggest interest is. But again, a small home,

271
00:15:52,900 --> 00:15:57,740
right, where there's people who are not necessarily as technically capable, you get the benefit of if

272
00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:02,840
you put that in the router, you're giving everybody in the home some protection against malicious

273
00:16:03,200 --> 00:16:06,960
activity. It's not perfect, but you know what? It's free. So it's actually pretty good. The return

274
00:16:07,100 --> 00:16:12,099
on investment is extremely high. And it actually is quite effective at blocking some of the more

275
00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:18,620
common malware or phishing kind of activities. Do you guys have insight into like how much you

276
00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:23,860
block on a daily basis? Yeah. What do you prevent? We have volumetric and geographic information

277
00:16:24,180 --> 00:16:29,940
about where things are happening. And we've got a really cool map that shows that in real time on a

278
00:16:29,940 --> 00:16:35,160
big globe. We call it the globe of wonder. We do around 600 million blocks a day. Now, what do they

279
00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:39,479
mean? This is a problem that we've been struggling with for 10 years. What is the value of a particular

280
00:16:39,500 --> 00:16:46,480
block event. Like how much can you assign a dollar value or euro value to a prevention of someone

281
00:16:46,620 --> 00:16:50,480
going to a site? It's really hard, but I know there's value there, right? And it's probably

282
00:16:50,510 --> 00:16:54,540
in the hundreds of millions of dollars a year where we're preventing people from being, again,

283
00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:59,440
ransomware and phishing. We're preventing people from getting those sites, but you can't prove the

284
00:16:59,560 --> 00:17:05,520
negative. Prove to me the money you're saving by having antivirus software on your laptop. Well,

285
00:17:05,620 --> 00:17:06,100
that's hard to do.

286
00:17:06,640 --> 00:17:07,560
Ty, you know, you guys are a nonprofit.

287
00:17:07,890 --> 00:17:10,160
If you were like trying to get investors,

288
00:17:10,439 --> 00:17:11,540
you're like, yeah, billions.

289
00:17:11,959 --> 00:17:12,959
We've saved billions of dollars.

290
00:17:13,780 --> 00:17:15,280
We'd make up some really fantastic numbers.

291
00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:17,720
And the good news is we don't actually have to make it up

292
00:17:17,839 --> 00:17:18,760
because the numbers are there,

293
00:17:18,990 --> 00:17:22,199
but we don't, like Quad9 does not do threat analysis

294
00:17:22,680 --> 00:17:24,000
in the kind of in-depth way.

295
00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:25,260
We do a quarterly report.

296
00:17:25,380 --> 00:17:26,280
Our director of threat intelligence

297
00:17:26,470 --> 00:17:29,180
produces a great quarterly or triannual report

298
00:17:29,640 --> 00:17:31,700
where we look at, we kind of take a sample and say,

299
00:17:31,840 --> 00:17:34,000
what are the things we're protecting people against?

300
00:17:34,340 --> 00:17:38,340
But we have an agreement with our threat intelligence providers that we're not trying to compete with them.

301
00:17:38,580 --> 00:17:45,280
We're creating a parallel universe where people who couldn't ordinarily pay for this kind of protection get the protection.

302
00:17:45,940 --> 00:17:49,120
So we don't really dig into their data.

303
00:17:49,290 --> 00:17:50,960
We just take it as it is and we say, you know what?

304
00:17:51,110 --> 00:17:54,060
If you're giving us data, we probably believe that it's going to be very effective.

305
00:17:54,380 --> 00:17:58,660
We don't want to try to create a comparison where one threat provider is better than the other.

306
00:17:58,830 --> 00:18:02,180
Because if we started to assign values to things, we'd get in that mode.

307
00:18:02,620 --> 00:18:03,020
And we don't.

308
00:18:03,120 --> 00:18:04,540
We love all of our threat intelligence provider.

309
00:18:04,630 --> 00:18:07,380
They all give us great information and insight to protect our users.

310
00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:12,400
So we don't do the kind of analysis that you would see in a for-profit company where they're

311
00:18:12,540 --> 00:18:16,240
looking into each and every block and trying to figure out what the value is.

312
00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:19,720
Or even in some cases, we don't even know what the classification is.

313
00:18:19,870 --> 00:18:22,860
Although we can look at things and say, right, that's a phishing domain, clearly, because

314
00:18:22,980 --> 00:18:23,740
it looks like a bank.

315
00:18:24,590 --> 00:18:29,580
Or this is a command and control system because we can observe how it's being accessed or

316
00:18:29,900 --> 00:18:31,520
attempted to being accessed worldwide.

317
00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:36,100
So we can make some guesses, but we don't spend a lot of time doing that.

318
00:18:36,400 --> 00:18:37,540
There's no payoff for that.

319
00:18:37,700 --> 00:18:38,980
There's no one who cares.

320
00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:44,000
I mean, we care, but there's no one who's giving us money based on the outcomes of that.

321
00:18:44,220 --> 00:18:46,400
I'd love to take some of his funding who would.

322
00:18:46,780 --> 00:18:50,160
That'd be great, but we only have a limited amount of funds to do things, and we're really

323
00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,100
focused on protection rather than on analysis.

324
00:18:53,280 --> 00:18:54,600
Yeah, I think it's a fair trade-off.

325
00:18:55,440 --> 00:18:56,540
Just one quick question.

326
00:18:56,690 --> 00:18:58,740
You mentioned setting up DNS on a router.

327
00:18:59,440 --> 00:19:03,040
I know a very common issue nowadays is people have routers that don't let them change their DNS.

328
00:19:03,220 --> 00:19:05,480
Do you have any quick alternatives for those people?

329
00:19:05,600 --> 00:19:06,980
Or you just have to do it per device?

330
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:08,260
Get a different router.

331
00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:09,940
That's true.

332
00:19:10,700 --> 00:19:12,340
That's not an unreasonable thing to say.

333
00:19:13,020 --> 00:19:19,360
If you have devices that do not let you configure basic things like setting your DNS server, you are the product.

334
00:19:20,200 --> 00:19:21,160
That's your first key.

335
00:19:21,340 --> 00:19:23,100
You are being treated as cattle.

336
00:19:23,600 --> 00:19:24,160
Stop it.

337
00:19:24,740 --> 00:19:27,460
Replace that device with something else that lets you have control.

338
00:19:28,040 --> 00:19:31,460
Because the person who's running that device is treating you as a product.

339
00:19:31,880 --> 00:19:35,940
And this is common, again, in large telcos where they harvest all of your data.

340
00:19:36,180 --> 00:19:45,700
They want to get all that DNS data going to their service because they're building a profile on not necessarily maybe you as an individual, but they're certainly building it on your household.

341
00:19:46,340 --> 00:19:51,780
And they're selling that data, and you're seeing customized ads, and you're seeing other things starting to be built on top of that.

342
00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:55,740
Don't let yourself get locked into equipment that doesn't let you change it.

343
00:19:56,840 --> 00:19:57,640
Yeah, good advice.

344
00:19:57,920 --> 00:20:10,740
Before I dive into four more technical questions that I think summarize all the technical questions that most people listening will have before we zoom out on more of the broader fights you guys are fighting and then also a little bit more about you all as a business.

345
00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:13,960
What's just some common misconceptions that you'd like to clear up?

346
00:20:13,960 --> 00:20:19,360
I'm sure that you guys have to deal with a lot of education because this is not something that most people think about by default.

347
00:20:19,680 --> 00:20:24,560
So is there something that you would just point to as an easy thing to clear up that you want people to know?

348
00:20:24,780 --> 00:20:26,500
The biggest one is that DNS actually matters.

349
00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:32,600
It's one of the most fundamental things on the internet, and most people have no idea that it exists or how it works.

350
00:20:32,900 --> 00:20:36,820
And so explaining how it works, I've sort of done a little bit of that here, but not enough probably.

351
00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:44,340
Understanding where things are and that they exist is an incredibly important component of any knowledge transfer.

352
00:20:44,600 --> 00:20:48,780
Just like a card catalog in a library, without it, the library is kind of useless.

353
00:20:49,120 --> 00:20:50,000
Same thing with the DNS.

354
00:20:50,480 --> 00:20:57,120
If the naming system doesn't work or it's imperiled, then the knowledge itself is at risk.

355
00:20:57,580 --> 00:21:22,500
And that's really, really important. And we'll talk about this more in the policy side of the conversation. But the impression is that DNS is just a wonky technical thing. Well, it is, but it's also core to keeping the promise of the internet running and the actual data transfer, whether that's economic benefits, human rights benefits, individual productivity benefits. Those are all contingent on an operating DNS.

356
00:21:22,660 --> 00:21:31,220
That's not necessarily the question you're looking to answer or have me answer, but that's one that I struggle with the most, like how important it is that this works.

357
00:21:31,590 --> 00:21:35,740
Because most people just think that it'll always keep working and there's nothing that really can stop it.

358
00:21:36,220 --> 00:21:38,460
Your library analogy is, I think, kind of perfect.

359
00:21:38,840 --> 00:21:50,700
Especially, you know, let's not get into it now, but the fact that you can block malicious things opens up the opportunity for blocking other things that other people of different interests have.

360
00:21:50,940 --> 00:21:53,560
HTTPS versus TLS versus now Quick.

361
00:21:54,920 --> 00:21:55,120
Yes.

362
00:21:55,900 --> 00:21:57,880
We don't need to go like crazy deep into this,

363
00:21:58,080 --> 00:22:00,740
but if you could just kind of summarize the main options,

364
00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:02,680
the differences between them

365
00:22:03,020 --> 00:22:05,840
and what you kind of are pushing people towards now in 2026.

366
00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:12,080
DNS until roughly 2017 was an unencrypted protocol using UDP.

367
00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:13,380
No encryption whatsoever.

368
00:22:13,590 --> 00:22:14,940
It's super easy to read on the wire.

369
00:22:15,030 --> 00:22:19,420
In 2017, we were the first standards-based encrypted resolver,

370
00:22:19,600 --> 00:22:24,120
meaning that you could actually encrypt the connections now between your client and our system

371
00:22:24,320 --> 00:22:26,020
so that no one could observe them in the path.

372
00:22:26,540 --> 00:22:28,580
That was with DOT, DNS over TLS.

373
00:22:28,950 --> 00:22:31,760
That was the first standards-based protocol that we adopted.

374
00:22:32,060 --> 00:22:36,200
Then quick on its heels came DOH, DNS over HTTPS.

375
00:22:36,680 --> 00:22:38,200
And this was something that browsers understood.

376
00:22:38,670 --> 00:22:43,540
So instead of using your operating system, the browser started to actually do DNS lookups.

377
00:22:43,940 --> 00:22:46,400
And there's still some contention of whether that's a good idea or not.

378
00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:52,780
But DNS over HTTPS was TCP-based and looked like a standard HTTPS connection.

379
00:22:53,200 --> 00:22:53,880
Fast forward a little bit.

380
00:22:54,100 --> 00:22:58,780
Now, in the last few years, we've seen a growing adoption of QUIC protocols, QUIC.

381
00:22:59,500 --> 00:23:00,600
And these are over UDP.

382
00:23:01,260 --> 00:23:05,220
And they have some significant advantages as far as speed, like starting up a connection

383
00:23:05,270 --> 00:23:09,020
is faster, sometimes multiplexing things over the same connection is faster.

384
00:23:09,700 --> 00:23:11,900
And so we've seen an emergence.

385
00:23:12,040 --> 00:23:20,420
DOT used to operate, or still operates, sorry, on TCP port 853. DOH operates on TCP 443. So the

386
00:23:20,420 --> 00:23:25,240
same port as regular HTTPS. But now we're seeing the conversion of both of those protocols to use

387
00:23:25,360 --> 00:23:32,240
a QUIC underpinning, which is UDP based. And so now we see DOT becoming DOQ, DNS over QUIC.

388
00:23:32,860 --> 00:23:39,260
That operates over UDP on port 853. So same port as DOT. So DOT and DOQ are very, very similar.

389
00:23:39,340 --> 00:23:42,080
They use the same port except one's TCP and one's UDP.

390
00:23:43,020 --> 00:23:47,340
And then DOH and DOH3, technically DOH2 and DOH3.

391
00:23:47,500 --> 00:23:53,180
DOH2 is TCP on 443 and then DOH3 is UDP over quick over 443.

392
00:23:53,500 --> 00:23:59,960
So those are now sort of the emerging standards for how end clients communicate with recursive resolvers.

393
00:24:00,280 --> 00:24:05,200
Although that said, we're barely in some places breaking 20% of our traffic being encrypted.

394
00:24:05,270 --> 00:24:09,040
And that's in the most aggressive areas where people are really pro encryption.

395
00:24:09,320 --> 00:24:13,740
So we're not seeing a landslide of people moving to encryption.

396
00:24:14,090 --> 00:24:15,740
We should be, but we're not.

397
00:24:16,100 --> 00:24:17,880
And we've really got to work on that.

398
00:24:18,220 --> 00:24:19,520
Again, this is actually an area that's interesting.

399
00:24:19,820 --> 00:24:21,680
Apple actually really does a good job at this.

400
00:24:22,340 --> 00:24:30,120
If you give an Apple device a recursive resolver answer like 9999, the Apple devices will actually

401
00:24:30,480 --> 00:24:33,320
automatically upgrade to encryption without having to do anything.

402
00:24:33,490 --> 00:24:37,360
And in fact, they'll not just upgrade to encryption, they'll upgrade to DOQ encryption.

403
00:24:37,640 --> 00:24:39,420
So performance is really great.

404
00:24:40,040 --> 00:24:42,120
We're trying to see what we can do to encourage

405
00:24:42,540 --> 00:24:46,060
and provide some examples to other operating system vendors

406
00:24:46,480 --> 00:24:47,820
and then also browser operators

407
00:24:47,980 --> 00:24:50,280
so that they will automatically shift over.

408
00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:54,440
Because what happens is people put in 9999 into their DHCP server

409
00:24:54,580 --> 00:24:55,840
and then they never think about it again.

410
00:24:56,540 --> 00:25:00,800
Going back and trying to type in an encrypted URL into your browser,

411
00:25:01,580 --> 00:25:03,280
honestly, most people aren't going to do that.

412
00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:12,180
So what we really need to do is push for automatic upgrade using what's called DDR, the stepping stone where your device says, well, can you support encryption?

413
00:25:12,380 --> 00:25:13,340
Oh, I can support encryption.

414
00:25:13,920 --> 00:25:14,840
Let's convert to encryption.

415
00:25:15,360 --> 00:25:19,400
Everybody should be doing encrypted recursive resolution if they can.

416
00:25:20,110 --> 00:25:26,840
Again, for their own privacy, but also for things like integrity so that no one can modify or block your connections in the path.

417
00:25:27,000 --> 00:25:30,860
There's just a whole bunch of other reasons why it's a good idea, but we're not there yet, but we're getting there.

418
00:25:31,060 --> 00:25:36,660
Quad9 supports all encrypted protocols, including some non-standards-based ones as well.

419
00:25:37,420 --> 00:25:40,240
Yeah, I remember I had Carl on from Obscura on this podcast,

420
00:25:40,540 --> 00:25:45,820
and he did a lot of chatting about Quick, especially because Obscura uses Quick.

421
00:25:46,980 --> 00:25:49,960
And it was actually inspired by Apple using it for private relay

422
00:25:50,440 --> 00:25:54,520
as kind of like a really novel thing that no one had really done before with a VPN, I don't think.

423
00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:56,440
Well, it's a relay. It's confusing.

424
00:25:56,680 --> 00:25:59,920
But just for someone listening, you gave out a lot of technical information.

425
00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:02,120
Do you want to just give like bullet list,

426
00:26:02,390 --> 00:26:04,860
max two things, pros and cons of each of these protocols

427
00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:06,900
so people can kind of understand them

428
00:26:06,990 --> 00:26:07,820
and what it means for them?

429
00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:11,380
And also, what's your kind of your go-to recommendation

430
00:26:11,380 --> 00:26:12,900
if somebody has to pick,

431
00:26:12,950 --> 00:26:14,420
like they have something really customizable

432
00:26:14,470 --> 00:26:15,640
that lets them use any of these?

433
00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:17,680
Let's start backwards then.

434
00:26:17,820 --> 00:26:18,920
I'd say if you have to pick,

435
00:26:20,360 --> 00:26:22,800
I would go DOQ first, DNS over quick.

436
00:26:23,120 --> 00:26:25,520
Then I would fall back to DNS over HTTP3,

437
00:26:25,610 --> 00:26:26,680
which is also quick-based.

438
00:26:26,850 --> 00:26:28,379
And the reason I'm saying those in that order

439
00:26:28,420 --> 00:26:30,280
is because DOQ is probably slightly faster.

440
00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:31,640
It doesn't have the overhead of HTTP,

441
00:26:32,600 --> 00:26:34,580
which is a few more bytes in that packet.

442
00:26:35,160 --> 00:26:38,140
Then HTTP3 is over UDP, so that's faster.

443
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:40,240
Again, it has those restart capabilities.

444
00:26:40,540 --> 00:26:43,340
Then I would move down to DOT, DNS over TLS,

445
00:26:44,180 --> 00:26:45,140
because again, it's lighter weight.

446
00:26:45,540 --> 00:26:48,400
And then finally at the bottom of the list, DOH, DOH2,

447
00:26:48,820 --> 00:26:51,880
meaning the old TCP-based DNS over HTTPS

448
00:26:51,930 --> 00:26:53,460
would be my last choice.

449
00:26:53,830 --> 00:26:56,020
And again, these are all for speed and complexity.

450
00:26:56,680 --> 00:26:58,360
I'll also say that I'm somewhat selfish

451
00:26:58,680 --> 00:27:03,900
Those are also, from our perspective, those are the ones that have the least amount of CPU load on our side.

452
00:27:04,460 --> 00:27:09,240
And that's a question that we have to be aware of when you're looking at 120 million plus users on the system.

453
00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:15,060
You've got a design for large numbers of these encrypted sockets coming in.

454
00:27:16,580 --> 00:27:19,920
Yeah, another thing I've heard, it's something that Carl talked about and I've seen online.

455
00:27:20,660 --> 00:27:26,460
People say that because DOH or DNS over HTTPS goes over the same port, it's a little bit harder to block.

456
00:27:26,700 --> 00:27:30,480
So can you speak to the censorship circumvention of these technologies and if it matters?

457
00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:33,180
Now we're getting to layer eight politics.

458
00:27:33,580 --> 00:27:41,200
We took a fairly public stance in saying that DOH was not a great architectural design because it uses the same port as HTTPS.

459
00:27:41,420 --> 00:27:49,520
It does make it harder to block because you can't simply say block all port 443 outbound because that's not going to work because all of your HTTPS connections will fail.

460
00:27:49,660 --> 00:27:56,140
On the good side, we do, of course, we're not fans of people censoring the DNS, but there are some environments where it is actually a legitimate thing to do.

461
00:27:56,900 --> 00:28:07,560
You know, if you're in a business and you want to prevent your infected workstations from exfiltrating data, then, yeah, you should have some ability to prevent them from doing DNS lookups and also doing outbound connections.

462
00:28:07,820 --> 00:28:15,220
It makes security people's job a lot harder to have both the DNS and the content transmitted over the same port.

463
00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:20,060
So yes, it is harder to filter. And our bigger concern was not necessarily even the enterprise

464
00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:24,820
world, but it's the fact that if you make the people with guns very angry, they will shut off

465
00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:29,200
the internet. And they have done that, right? There are many places now in the world where

466
00:28:29,330 --> 00:28:33,800
internet interruptions or fragmentation is happening with a much more rapid pace because

467
00:28:34,420 --> 00:28:38,040
the governments of those places have determined that they can't actually filter content.

468
00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:43,280
And that's a really tough one to say what the results should be, because of course,

469
00:28:43,340 --> 00:28:47,740
you want to have people get information, access to information that they wish. At the same time,

470
00:28:47,800 --> 00:28:51,800
if you're accelerating the destruction of the internet by making it impossible to manage,

471
00:28:52,200 --> 00:28:57,020
that's also a negative. So essentially by embedding both of these things in the same port,

472
00:28:57,300 --> 00:29:02,460
you've created an inextricable linkage between the content and the metadata that makes it both

473
00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:07,700
difficult to censor and it makes it difficult to censor. And so we have a slight preference

474
00:29:08,160 --> 00:29:13,300
for DOT and DOQ because they operate on a different port. So you can stop the metadata

475
00:29:13,320 --> 00:29:35,860
It's still encrypted. No one can see what you're doing, but they can basically stop you from getting to the DNS, which I don't like. But I also have to recognize, we as an organization have to recognize that there is the right for a nation to impose their own laws and regulations inside their borders. We might not like it. We might not like it, but that's not our choice. That's an internal problem that that country has to deal with.

476
00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:44,740
And by pitting the citizens of those countries against their government by essentially conflating these two things together, I'm not sure we do them a service.

477
00:29:45,260 --> 00:29:46,780
But it doesn't matter what we think, right?

478
00:29:46,940 --> 00:29:50,320
The DOH is sort of the standard that everyone is moving to, DOH3 as well.

479
00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:52,460
So that ship has sailed.

480
00:29:52,790 --> 00:29:55,640
And we'll see the repercussions of that in the coming years.

481
00:29:55,970 --> 00:29:57,480
And we already are seeing it in some places.

482
00:29:58,920 --> 00:29:59,200
Got it.

483
00:29:59,860 --> 00:30:00,940
Another technical thing.

484
00:30:01,020 --> 00:30:07,100
You know, this to me has been presented as like, here's why DNS doesn't matter and you should never change it anyway.

485
00:30:07,280 --> 00:30:09,860
And it's this whole concept of SNI and ECH.

486
00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:10,800
Oh, yeah.

487
00:30:11,540 --> 00:30:14,020
We don't need to spend a huge amount of time on this.

488
00:30:14,100 --> 00:30:20,840
But if you can just as quickly as you can kind of break down what's going on and if that's actually something people should be thinking about.

489
00:30:21,440 --> 00:30:26,960
Well, the pro-censorship crowd has said, well, it doesn't matter what you do for DNS because we're going to be looking at SNI.

490
00:30:27,220 --> 00:30:44,180
And so SNI, just a quick recap, is that every time you make a connection to an encrypted site, a site that has HTTPS encryption, even though they can't observe what you're downloading, they can observe the very first message that goes out, which includes the host name of the server to which you're connecting.

491
00:30:44,290 --> 00:30:50,240
So even though they might not be able to see the DNS, they can still block you based on where they see you're trying to connect.

492
00:30:50,900 --> 00:30:52,740
Well, ECH is turning that around as well.

493
00:30:53,640 --> 00:30:55,320
And ECH is encrypted client hello.

494
00:30:56,100 --> 00:31:00,100
And what that does is it encrypts the actual connection to the website.

495
00:31:00,210 --> 00:31:02,020
So now everything is encrypted.

496
00:31:02,090 --> 00:31:05,080
The DNS connection is encrypted because you're using DNS encryption.

497
00:31:05,330 --> 00:31:08,760
The connection to the server itself is now encrypted because you're using ECH.

498
00:31:09,420 --> 00:31:12,560
And now the content is encrypted because you're using HTTPS on top of that.

499
00:31:12,590 --> 00:31:16,900
So there is no part of the transaction that is visible to an observer.

500
00:31:17,540 --> 00:31:20,420
And there are some people who are getting pretty upset about that.

501
00:31:20,660 --> 00:31:22,120
Yeah, I've actually seen the inverse.

502
00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:24,280
there's been some videos that are like,

503
00:31:25,680 --> 00:31:28,040
because of this situation,

504
00:31:29,080 --> 00:31:31,540
then all your queries are getting exposed anyway,

505
00:31:31,930 --> 00:31:34,400
so changing your DNS doesn't do anything,

506
00:31:34,550 --> 00:31:36,780
which is kind of a take I've been seeing a lot so far this year.

507
00:31:37,520 --> 00:31:39,620
Tell me, I'm not clear on that argument.

508
00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:41,040
Explain that one in a little bit more detail.

509
00:31:42,570 --> 00:31:44,560
I think the overall argument is,

510
00:31:44,690 --> 00:31:47,580
even if you change your DNS provider to something like Quad9,

511
00:31:47,850 --> 00:31:50,220
it doesn't really matter because you can't guarantee

512
00:31:50,220 --> 00:31:54,540
that your SNI is actually using ECH.

513
00:31:54,760 --> 00:31:56,580
Therefore, your queries are getting exposed anyway,

514
00:31:56,740 --> 00:31:57,940
so it's useless. Don't bother.

515
00:31:58,200 --> 00:31:59,120
That sounds like somebody

516
00:32:01,640 --> 00:32:03,300
who's got an ulterior agenda.

517
00:32:03,480 --> 00:32:06,380
But anyway, saying that you shouldn't encrypt anything

518
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:07,960
because at least one thing is unencrypted,

519
00:32:08,100 --> 00:32:09,320
that seems pretty bogus.

520
00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:11,340
I see it. It's people online,

521
00:32:11,720 --> 00:32:13,780
so everyone will take things to extremes.

522
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:16,660
I don't know how many people actually have that kind of view on it,

523
00:32:16,860 --> 00:32:19,560
but the internet can be a bit polarizing.

524
00:32:19,580 --> 00:32:39,900
I can. So no, I would definitely say that anything you can encrypt, you should. Everything that you can prevent someone else from seeing or blocking should be done. There are second level questions with that, like as an example, DOT and DOQ versus DOH. But no, everything you should do with encrypted. I'm very much hoping that ECH actually continues to gain adoption. I'm hopeful there. We'll see how it goes.

525
00:32:39,940 --> 00:32:42,880
We don't actually implement ECH, interestingly enough, not yet.

526
00:32:43,260 --> 00:32:45,800
The reason for that is that it's obvious what you're doing when you're connecting.

527
00:32:46,820 --> 00:32:49,160
There's two signals you can look at when you're looking at a packet.

528
00:32:49,440 --> 00:32:51,200
You can look at the IP address of the destination,

529
00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:54,720
and then you can look at the SNI to kind of figure out what's going on.

530
00:32:54,840 --> 00:32:58,480
Even if we hit the SNI, you're connecting to 9.9.9.9.

531
00:32:59,280 --> 00:33:02,400
Okay, there's only one thing that that IP address does, and that's DNS.

532
00:33:02,660 --> 00:33:04,840
So SNI for us is not as meaningful.

533
00:33:05,020 --> 00:33:06,580
We will probably implement it eventually,

534
00:33:06,780 --> 00:33:14,280
But it's not as meaningful because the people who are trying to block those connections or observe them, they know exactly what you're doing when you're connecting to our well-known IP addresses.

535
00:33:14,700 --> 00:33:16,100
That's a bug and a feature at the same time.

536
00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:17,660
Got it.

537
00:33:18,220 --> 00:33:27,300
Yeah, and I mean, in terms of adoption, what I've read, and maybe you can confirm this, is that it's actually helped a lot that some CDNs have adopted it.

538
00:33:27,420 --> 00:33:32,120
So any site that uses Cloudflare automatically is accepting SNI encrypted.

539
00:33:32,540 --> 00:33:33,140
Is that true?

540
00:33:33,760 --> 00:33:34,520
I believe that's true.

541
00:33:34,620 --> 00:33:37,740
I can't speak for Cloudflare, but I think that that's what's going on there.

542
00:33:38,260 --> 00:33:40,860
They've been very strongly in favor of ECH.

543
00:33:41,650 --> 00:33:41,900
Got it.

544
00:33:42,310 --> 00:33:42,500
All right.

545
00:33:42,850 --> 00:33:46,560
Now, I think we kind of have covered a lot of the basics, some of the technical things

546
00:33:46,660 --> 00:33:48,860
that I know our audience is also going to want to hear as well.

547
00:33:49,900 --> 00:33:51,380
Let's hear about what you guys have been up to.

548
00:33:51,390 --> 00:33:53,480
I know we've kind of teased some things going on around the world.

549
00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:56,300
So I'll let you kind of open this up with whatever's going on.

550
00:33:56,760 --> 00:34:00,360
So in 2021, we actually moved to Switzerland in 2021.

551
00:34:00,450 --> 00:34:01,820
We were previously a U.S. organization.

552
00:34:01,850 --> 00:34:03,160
We moved to Switzerland in 2021.

553
00:34:03,400 --> 00:34:16,540
Within weeks of our movement to Switzerland, we got pinged by Sony Entertainment Germany, who came after us because we were resolving names for hosts which they claimed housed pirated songs.

554
00:34:16,980 --> 00:34:20,700
And so basically they were trying to force us to block those names.

555
00:34:21,100 --> 00:34:29,080
They claimed just for Germany, but really they were effectively trying to block those names worldwide by going after us in German courts.

556
00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:33,840
Long story short, but it's possible for someone in Europe to lodge civil cases against us in

557
00:34:33,980 --> 00:34:39,740
Switzerland because of treaties with those nations. So it took two years and three appeals,

558
00:34:40,560 --> 00:34:43,820
and we did actually win that case. It took a lot of money and a lot of our focus,

559
00:34:44,240 --> 00:34:47,780
which we were very unhappy about because it really stopped a lot of things that we would

560
00:34:47,780 --> 00:34:51,260
have liked to have been doing with that funding in that time. But we did win that case in Germany.

561
00:34:51,639 --> 00:34:56,399
Basically, the courts eventually ruled that, no, this is an absurd thing, that blocking the DNS is

562
00:34:56,419 --> 00:35:02,560
not going to actually stop the pirated site to begin with, because the DNS is an open book,

563
00:35:02,800 --> 00:35:06,500
right? It's an open, you know, anybody can set up their own DNS server if they wish. They don't

564
00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:09,640
need to use Quad9. Yeah, the precedent that that would set would be really bad.

565
00:35:10,540 --> 00:35:16,020
And so the German courts ruled in our favor. So that's great. However, the same copyright cartel

566
00:35:16,660 --> 00:35:20,839
of, you know, mostly the same people, but some new ones, they circled the wagons and they're now

567
00:35:20,860 --> 00:35:26,040
going after us in France. So a number of organizations in France have lodged cases against

568
00:35:26,300 --> 00:35:33,180
us where they're demanding that we block a variety, hundreds actually, of sites that they claim are

569
00:35:33,340 --> 00:35:39,380
infringing on their copyrights. And we're sympathetic to the concept that copyright infringement is not

570
00:35:39,540 --> 00:35:43,300
something that we encourage. It's absolutely not. We are in the business of making the internet a

571
00:35:43,300 --> 00:35:48,600
more lawful place for individuals to prevent them from being defrauded or having crimes occur,

572
00:35:49,080 --> 00:35:54,060
protecting both the network and the individuals. However, we also are in the mode of giving people

573
00:35:54,220 --> 00:35:58,960
choice of what they do with their recursive resolution. Our goals are aligned with the end

574
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:04,940
user. And these organizations in France want to create basically a pipeline into our platform and

575
00:36:05,140 --> 00:36:09,820
others. So it's not just us that's on this docket. It's a number of other DNS providers. They want

576
00:36:09,820 --> 00:36:12,680
to create a pipeline that basically they can say, all right, we're going to block any site

577
00:36:13,100 --> 00:36:16,420
that we feel like. We're going to tell you about it. And within a few minutes, you need to turn it

578
00:36:16,440 --> 00:36:20,500
off from a recursive resolving perspective. This is really weird because it doesn't actually

579
00:36:20,690 --> 00:36:24,640
prevent the site from existing. Anybody can set up a recursive resolver on their own. There's

580
00:36:24,870 --> 00:36:29,140
free software. There are dozens of packages that you can download and run and let you run your own

581
00:36:29,180 --> 00:36:33,640
recursive resolver. You don't need Quad9. It's just we're convenient and we're easy, but you don't

582
00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:39,700
need us. So why are they going after us? Our typical thinking on this is because we're small,

583
00:36:39,850 --> 00:36:44,200
we're a nonprofit, it's easy to go after us. The other companies they're going after are big US

584
00:36:44,220 --> 00:36:49,480
tech companies, which in a lot of Europe are persona non grata. You know, there's definitely

585
00:36:49,670 --> 00:36:55,140
a negative feeling towards large tech companies, which might be exfiltrating data about end users

586
00:36:55,290 --> 00:36:58,760
to the United States. So we're getting lumped in with them because we're not big enough to really

587
00:36:59,300 --> 00:37:03,020
hit them back as hard as we could, even though from a moral perspective, we're doing the right

588
00:37:03,200 --> 00:37:07,820
thing. We're protecting the users of France, as an example, millions of them a day. Our goals are

589
00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:14,180
aligned in some ways, trying to make a more lawful and safe internet, a more private internet. And

590
00:37:14,200 --> 00:37:17,420
this doesn't make any sense. This is not going after the problem. This is going after

591
00:37:18,000 --> 00:37:22,640
kind of a shadow. You're fighting the shadow on the wall of the actual events, which are that,

592
00:37:22,810 --> 00:37:27,240
you know, there might be these copyright infringing sites, but don't, you can't get to them through us.

593
00:37:27,610 --> 00:37:30,800
We have no relationship with them. We have no zero. We don't even know who they are.

594
00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:35,060
Is a fair comparison, like if they were to go after browser vendors for letting you access these sites?

595
00:37:35,500 --> 00:37:41,240
Yes. And, but, you know, careful there. That is actually exactly where I expect them to go next.

596
00:37:42,480 --> 00:37:44,220
Yeah, I don't want to give them any good ideas.

597
00:37:45,120 --> 00:37:45,200
Yeah.

598
00:37:45,460 --> 00:37:47,240
Safe browsing does the same thing, right?

599
00:37:47,380 --> 00:37:48,600
There's a block list in safe browsing.

600
00:37:48,820 --> 00:37:52,800
Your Chromium and Firefox and a bunch of others have safe browsing built in.

601
00:37:52,860 --> 00:37:54,660
And why would that be excluded?

602
00:37:54,920 --> 00:37:55,500
It's going to be.

603
00:37:55,700 --> 00:38:00,300
That's the fear here is that you're letting commercial entities decide what sites can

604
00:38:00,320 --> 00:38:02,280
be seen and what sites cannot be seen.

605
00:38:03,160 --> 00:38:04,340
That's a really bad precedent.

606
00:38:04,680 --> 00:38:06,160
And so we're fighting these cases in France.

607
00:38:06,340 --> 00:38:10,080
But again, we're not well positioned to do that except from a moral perspective.

608
00:38:10,100 --> 00:38:15,300
But we certainly don't have the deep pockets that can be reached into for funding this.

609
00:38:15,540 --> 00:38:16,400
We're looking for allies.

610
00:38:16,500 --> 00:38:17,340
We're looking for sponsors.

611
00:38:18,140 --> 00:38:22,040
You know, go to quad9.net and donate a few bucks to us if you'd like, because that's all

612
00:38:22,140 --> 00:38:27,840
going towards helping us stay operational and do some basic defense in some of these

613
00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:28,180
nations.

614
00:38:28,360 --> 00:38:32,940
And we don't expect these problems to go away until there's a definitive ruling in Europe,

615
00:38:33,160 --> 00:38:39,260
at least, that says the DNS is not an effective or useful place to do content filtering against

616
00:38:39,280 --> 00:38:40,220
the wishes of the end user.

617
00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:43,160
That was going to be my next question, so you beat me to it.

618
00:38:43,240 --> 00:38:47,460
It's like, what's the upstream thing that you could tackle to make it so someone can't sue

619
00:38:47,580 --> 00:38:48,660
over this kind of situation?

620
00:38:48,880 --> 00:38:50,360
But you just kind of covered that there.

621
00:38:50,420 --> 00:38:52,140
Has there been any progress on that?

622
00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:57,060
Well, there was actually an interesting case earlier this, or I guess late last week that

623
00:38:57,080 --> 00:39:00,320
I saw that I've not really digested entirely, which was interesting.

624
00:39:00,480 --> 00:39:07,540
There's a VPN provider who was being sued because they were not blocking access to the

625
00:39:07,860 --> 00:39:08,640
diary of Anne Frank.

626
00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:11,400
Oh yes, I read this one. Yeah.

627
00:39:11,700 --> 00:39:15,860
This is actually an interesting case and I really need to look at it more and talk to our legal team about it

628
00:39:16,040 --> 00:39:21,100
because it does touch on some of the same aspects as DNS does, even though it doesn't sound like it.

629
00:39:21,280 --> 00:39:26,640
So I have some hope that we will be able to get this decided at a higher level.

630
00:39:26,910 --> 00:39:30,740
The DSA in Europe, which is kind of the overarching legislation,

631
00:39:31,060 --> 00:39:37,280
my reading of it does actually explicitly say that DNS service providers are exempt from this.

632
00:39:37,600 --> 00:39:40,120
However, you have to get to the European courts.

633
00:39:40,400 --> 00:39:41,400
Right now we're in the courts in France.

634
00:39:41,680 --> 00:39:42,780
We were in the courts in Germany.

635
00:39:43,060 --> 00:39:45,700
And it may have been the case that we actually won that case.

636
00:39:46,000 --> 00:39:47,080
And that was a strategic failure.

637
00:39:47,660 --> 00:39:50,840
Like if we had been able to actually argue out of Germany and go up to the European courts,

638
00:39:51,000 --> 00:39:55,500
maybe we could have had a result that would have been effective across all of the EU.

639
00:39:55,900 --> 00:39:56,240
But we didn't.

640
00:39:56,280 --> 00:39:57,440
We won the case in Germany.

641
00:39:57,540 --> 00:39:59,240
I'm not saying I'm not, I'll take the win, right?

642
00:39:59,400 --> 00:40:02,880
But like being able to get this up to the courts in the EU might be a useful thing.

643
00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:03,700
I don't know.

644
00:40:03,940 --> 00:40:05,980
We'll also take a win in France if we can get it.

645
00:40:06,160 --> 00:40:17,900
But if there isn't a win in France at the national level, then I think there's enough merit in this case to take it up to the EU and get a ruling so that we don't have to fight this fight in various nations that want to apply this kind of filtering.

646
00:40:18,250 --> 00:40:27,260
Because we have a specific weakness because we are in what's called the Lugano Convention Nation, which is that treaty that governs these kind of civil lawsuits.

647
00:40:27,630 --> 00:40:29,580
We really do need to have this happen at the EU level.

648
00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:38,380
And I'm not sure that we will ever be able to impress upon legislatures or courts that this is a bad idea.

649
00:40:38,630 --> 00:40:40,500
It needs to have some legal teeth in it somehow.

650
00:40:40,880 --> 00:40:43,880
Like just the court of public opinion is not enough here.

651
00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:45,120
Right.

652
00:40:45,620 --> 00:40:58,580
If someone's listening to this and they're going, okay, so why is blocking malicious traffic acceptable but not blocking this other kind of traffic, which I guess some would argue is malicious in a different way.

653
00:40:58,760 --> 00:41:02,300
But what's actually the nuance here and why some things are blocked and not others?

654
00:41:02,920 --> 00:41:04,900
The nuance is that Quad9 provides choice.

655
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:09,880
We provide malware blocking as an optional setting.

656
00:41:10,760 --> 00:41:13,900
You can decide that you want malware blocking or not.

657
00:41:14,500 --> 00:41:22,180
We provide 99910, which has no blocking of any kind for users who want to experience the whole internet, malware and all.

658
00:41:22,420 --> 00:41:26,080
When you're working in opposition to the end user, that's the problem.

659
00:41:26,740 --> 00:41:31,300
When you are doing something that the end user does not want, what they're going to do is

660
00:41:31,400 --> 00:41:34,400
they're going to simply say, you know what, quad nine doesn't do the thing I want.

661
00:41:34,500 --> 00:41:35,780
I'm going to change to my own resolver.

662
00:41:36,200 --> 00:41:41,060
Whatever minor effect you thought you were going to have by applying a block to quad nine,

663
00:41:41,780 --> 00:41:45,960
that is going to be instantly lost as soon as it happens because the user can choose

664
00:41:46,180 --> 00:41:47,360
other ways to do it.

665
00:41:47,600 --> 00:41:51,640
So we try to work with the best wishes of the end user.

666
00:41:51,720 --> 00:41:55,180
We try to work with their expectations and to their benefit.

667
00:41:55,280 --> 00:41:58,980
I've not met anybody who said, I want to get ransomware on my computer. But there are people

668
00:41:58,980 --> 00:42:02,620
who said, you know, I don't want your blocking service. And that's fine. 99910 is your choice.

669
00:42:02,820 --> 00:42:07,940
Go ahead and make the decision. Giving the end user the ability to make the decision on their

670
00:42:08,100 --> 00:42:14,760
own is where we create that distinction. When we have mandatory actions on a per nation basis,

671
00:42:15,020 --> 00:42:19,900
which are incredibly expensive and difficult for us to apply, that becomes a real problem

672
00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:22,740
where our mission does not, we're not achieving our mission.

673
00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:26,640
And if people want to follow that fight, where would you send them to keep up with it?

674
00:42:28,160 --> 00:42:31,480
Take a look at our blog. We're going to post things every once in a while. There are a number

675
00:42:31,490 --> 00:42:37,840
of other plaintiffs in that case. Cloudflare and Google and Whalebone, I think, are typically

676
00:42:38,080 --> 00:42:42,600
named in those. So all of us are trying to figure out how we're going to do this independently.

677
00:42:43,470 --> 00:42:46,460
So no, I don't have a central source for that. There's been some discussion about how do we

678
00:42:46,590 --> 00:42:52,640
create a centralized clearinghouse of information or public appeal, but none of that's in place yet.

679
00:42:52,980 --> 00:42:56,560
Yeah, so in terms of you guys, you mentioned that you're a small organization.

680
00:42:56,870 --> 00:42:58,680
How small? How many people are back there?

681
00:42:59,290 --> 00:42:59,920
Less than 10.

682
00:43:01,620 --> 00:43:04,140
And quite a few of those are contractors, so part-time.

683
00:43:05,120 --> 00:43:07,400
Nice. And what's the setup there?

684
00:43:07,520 --> 00:43:10,280
Is it mostly engineers? I assume some customer support?

685
00:43:10,620 --> 00:43:12,100
Full-time, there's only one customer support.

686
00:43:12,480 --> 00:43:15,040
Mostly, we've got, including myself, four engineers.

687
00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:18,840
We've got GM. I'm the CTO officially now, which is great.

688
00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:24,160
I have a general manager that's one of our foundation council members is acting as a general manager for a while.

689
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:30,400
We've got some really great people who are doing kind of general catch-all business operations work, but it's a fairly small group.

690
00:43:30,820 --> 00:43:34,660
We've got some folks doing grants and fundraising as well, kind of paperwork on that side.

691
00:43:34,860 --> 00:43:38,580
Yeah, you know, there's another, and I want to ask a little bit more about the business model here.

692
00:43:39,040 --> 00:43:44,960
But this question is inspired by the free Firefox VPN they released that came with 50 gigabytes of free bandwidth.

693
00:43:45,000 --> 00:43:50,720
And I had them on and I'm like, okay, so if more and more people are using this, is that cheaper for you guys?

694
00:43:50,920 --> 00:43:51,700
Is it more expensive?

695
00:43:51,920 --> 00:43:53,740
And I figured I'd kind of throw you the same question.

696
00:43:53,920 --> 00:43:58,540
You probably want as many people to be using Quad9, but does that increase costs for you guys?

697
00:43:59,320 --> 00:43:59,900
It does.

698
00:44:00,220 --> 00:44:03,900
My saying is, we lose money on every user, but we make it up in volume.

699
00:44:04,420 --> 00:44:06,140
Yes, it does increase our costs.

700
00:44:06,760 --> 00:44:10,440
But the incremental costs of new users coming onto the network is relatively low.

701
00:44:10,960 --> 00:44:11,400
Here's why.

702
00:44:11,460 --> 00:44:15,820
Quad 9 is a nonprofit, which gives us some really interesting magic powers.

703
00:44:16,580 --> 00:44:18,280
And the magic powers are that people like what we do.

704
00:44:18,560 --> 00:44:24,800
And so we have now roughly 200 locations worldwide where we actually have physical equipment installed or servers running.

705
00:44:25,620 --> 00:44:26,860
And we don't pay for any of those.

706
00:44:27,220 --> 00:44:32,540
So the space, the power, the internet bandwidth, that all gets to us at no cost.

707
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:36,420
That's because we bring protections both to the end user, but also to the network.

708
00:44:37,000 --> 00:44:41,460
And so people are anxious to have Quad9 in their facilities where their end users can use us.

709
00:44:41,620 --> 00:44:44,660
So what we have to pay for, though, is servers and people.

710
00:44:45,660 --> 00:44:48,060
Those are the big costs from an operational perspective.

711
00:44:48,290 --> 00:44:51,460
You know, how do we deploy more and more servers to more and more locations?

712
00:44:51,890 --> 00:44:54,140
And then how do we pay for the people to maintain those?

713
00:44:54,620 --> 00:44:56,360
And that's where our costs come in.

714
00:44:56,640 --> 00:44:59,560
But the ongoing costs for the network are relatively small.

715
00:45:00,060 --> 00:45:03,300
DNS, even over these new protocols, is relatively small.

716
00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:13,680
Bandwidth wise, if we look really just at the core of the bandwidth of like what actually people are using, it's measured in probably the low tens of gigabits per second of DNS traffic.

717
00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:16,540
And so that's not in the relative scope of things today.

718
00:45:16,720 --> 00:45:18,320
That's not much across 200 sites.

719
00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:25,940
So the cost of bandwidth, unlike the VPN products where the bandwidth itself is the product, that's a different story.

720
00:45:26,340 --> 00:45:28,080
But we don't, bandwidth is not our product.

721
00:45:28,340 --> 00:45:31,400
It's really it's CPU and memory and staffing.

722
00:45:32,420 --> 00:45:33,080
That's kind of it.

723
00:45:34,019 --> 00:45:46,000
Yeah, you know, earlier in the podcast, you mentioned that you guys are kind of looking at ways that you can monetize aggregate data. So what does that look like? Because again, to a person listening to this, it's like, oh, you're a privacy.

724
00:45:46,599 --> 00:45:47,960
Aggregate data, no, bad.

725
00:45:48,110 --> 00:45:54,480
And then all these things don't seem compatible. Obviously, I know you guys and I trust you guys. So I'd love to hear kind of what's going on there.

726
00:45:54,560 --> 00:46:00,540
Let me actually reference people to our privacy policy. We have one of the most extensive and

727
00:46:00,680 --> 00:46:04,960
fully explained privacy policies that I've ever seen, and because we spend a lot of time on it.

728
00:46:04,990 --> 00:46:09,760
So take a look at that. It explains what we cannot do. Now, let me give you some of the

729
00:46:09,900 --> 00:46:13,220
things that we're trying to actually figure out how we'd monetize some of this. Because again,

730
00:46:13,350 --> 00:46:18,300
we have massive user population now. We've got a lot of queries every day. Is there some way that

731
00:46:18,300 --> 00:46:22,360
we can create a sustainable model that people are interested in some of the data outcomes,

732
00:46:22,500 --> 00:46:27,360
some of the exhaust from this massive DNS network? And the answer is yes, and I don't think any of

733
00:46:27,360 --> 00:46:31,480
them are objectionable. Let me give you the most obvious one that we talk about, and that's newly

734
00:46:31,660 --> 00:46:36,040
observed domains. This is something that cybersecurity folks find really, really interesting.

735
00:46:36,670 --> 00:46:41,580
When a new domain name starts to get used, basically when it first is registered,

736
00:46:42,080 --> 00:46:46,020
somebody somewhere in our network is going to look it up, whether that's part of a threat campaign or

737
00:46:46,600 --> 00:46:51,959
accidentally or whatever, there's going to be some event where we've never seen this domain name ever

738
00:46:51,980 --> 00:46:58,260
before, you know, foo.com has just been registered and it's just admitted. That data, we don't think

739
00:46:58,680 --> 00:47:03,060
is, it's really difficult to argue that that somehow is personally associatable with some

740
00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:07,560
person. But what threat intelligence providers are interested in is when that exact moment happens,

741
00:47:07,760 --> 00:47:12,040
like as soon as you see the new domain, they want to go out and look at it to make sure that it's

742
00:47:12,420 --> 00:47:16,519
not malicious. Or does it even fit it? They don't even need to look at it. Just does it fit a pattern

743
00:47:17,100 --> 00:47:22,040
of something? Does it have another, is it a brand impersonation? Is it somebody trying to

744
00:47:22,300 --> 00:47:25,520
create a phishing domain with embedded host names somewhere in there?

745
00:47:26,260 --> 00:47:33,920
Just to interrupt for a second, is what you're implying here that new domains are riskier than

746
00:47:34,000 --> 00:47:38,100
maybe more established domains? Yes, they are definitely more risky. Definitely more risky.

747
00:47:38,580 --> 00:47:42,539
Many, many, many domains, I don't know what the percentage is, but they'll appear and disappear

748
00:47:42,540 --> 00:47:47,140
within a day or two. They get registered, they get used for phishing, or they get registered for

749
00:47:47,380 --> 00:47:51,140
some other purpose, command and control systems, and then they're deregistered.

750
00:47:51,680 --> 00:47:58,420
So having very, very rapid knowledge of new domain names as they come online is something

751
00:47:58,460 --> 00:48:01,980
that threat intelligence providers are really interested in because they're going to then use

752
00:48:02,160 --> 00:48:06,840
that to protect their customers. In many cases, they feed that back to quad nine. Basically,

753
00:48:07,380 --> 00:48:11,959
as soon as they notice a new domain, they feed it back to us and we block it. So that we're trying

754
00:48:11,960 --> 00:48:17,800
to monetize. That's basically, that's an aggregate data set that we have that people are interested

755
00:48:17,980 --> 00:48:23,520
in that gives not just benefit to the companies that are buying it, but indirectly, and in some

756
00:48:23,680 --> 00:48:27,460
cases directly, gives benefit back to our end users because new threats are identified much

757
00:48:27,540 --> 00:48:33,180
more quickly. Yeah, my DNS resolver that I use, I want to ask about kind of the differences later.

758
00:48:33,520 --> 00:48:37,780
But the way they deal with this problem is they just have an option like block all NRDs. So it

759
00:48:37,860 --> 00:48:41,280
actually happens a lot on my end where someone sends me something that's brand new. They're like,

760
00:48:41,400 --> 00:48:44,840
look how cool this is. And then I have to go see why it was blocked. And it's normally the NRD

761
00:48:45,020 --> 00:48:48,780
filter that does it. The newly registered domains are newly observed domains is what we call them.

762
00:48:49,120 --> 00:48:52,960
You're probably getting that list from a 24 hour filter. There's a, you can actually download some

763
00:48:52,960 --> 00:48:58,260
of those things from some of the people that operate TLDs. And those are available in a 24

764
00:48:58,400 --> 00:49:03,220
hour cycle. Some of these domains don't even make it to the 24 hour cycle. They get registered and

765
00:49:03,300 --> 00:49:08,000
they get pulled within three hours because they get noticed as doing malicious activity. However,

766
00:49:08,340 --> 00:49:16,180
Due to the way the DNS works, you can have that name then in your cache for sometimes up to 24 hours, usually 12 hours is the most.

767
00:49:16,540 --> 00:49:22,120
So names get registered, a bunch of people look them up, they get put into caches, the name gets deregistered,

768
00:49:22,300 --> 00:49:28,300
but it still gets to be used as spam or as phishing for as long as those recursive resolvers keep it in their cache.

769
00:49:28,640 --> 00:49:30,640
I thought they did it the inverted way.

770
00:49:30,660 --> 00:49:34,560
I thought that they would look, oh, is this domain already in our systems?

771
00:49:34,980 --> 00:49:36,940
Oh, it's not, therefore it is an NRD.

772
00:49:37,100 --> 00:49:40,600
but you're saying they actually have to verify if it's an NRD on a different list?

773
00:49:40,920 --> 00:49:42,940
There's a CZDS, I think.

774
00:49:42,970 --> 00:49:44,420
I'm sorry, I'm not going to remember the acronym well.

775
00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:52,700
But basically, you can get the newly registered domains delivered to you as a downloadable file every day if you qualify.

776
00:49:53,120 --> 00:49:54,420
Basically, if you have a reason to get that.

777
00:49:54,490 --> 00:49:57,000
And so a lot of threat providers get that data, but it's every day.

778
00:49:57,190 --> 00:50:00,540
Then they look at those names, and then they decide whether they're going to block on them or not.

779
00:50:00,830 --> 00:50:05,520
And probably the lists you're getting are, I'm going to guess, an outcome of those daily lists.

780
00:50:05,960 --> 00:50:12,180
When a newly observed domain happens on our network, we can transmit that to our threat intelligence partners within about 15 seconds.

781
00:50:12,540 --> 00:50:13,920
So the loop is really, really tight.

782
00:50:14,420 --> 00:50:16,680
And you have to have that because these guys are getting much better.

783
00:50:16,760 --> 00:50:18,960
The threats are getting much, much, much shorter in cycle.

784
00:50:19,400 --> 00:50:20,380
So the faster, the better.

785
00:50:21,100 --> 00:50:24,600
Yeah, sorry, I didn't mean to go on kind of a side trail there.

786
00:50:24,660 --> 00:50:25,060
I was curious.

787
00:50:25,400 --> 00:50:28,520
You mentioned a couple other revenue models that you might be exploring.

788
00:50:29,640 --> 00:50:31,980
Yeah, so there's newly observed domains.

789
00:50:32,400 --> 00:50:38,600
We basically can also provide to threat intelligence providers an idea of how bad something is going to be if they block it.

790
00:50:38,820 --> 00:50:49,300
So one of our big things that we have at Quad9 is we really, really try hard not to have false positives, meaning that if someone gives us a domain name that isn't malicious, that's a false positive.

791
00:50:49,640 --> 00:51:00,280
And we have done a great job in the last 10 years of keeping that number to a very, very low minimum, despite the fact that we have roughly 4 million names in this list every day.

792
00:51:00,770 --> 00:51:01,940
And a lot of that cycles through.

793
00:51:01,980 --> 00:51:03,000
There's a lot of churn there.

794
00:51:03,360 --> 00:51:06,100
You know, we've worked really hard with our threat intelligence providers trying to figure

795
00:51:06,110 --> 00:51:09,840
out ways that they can improve the data that they give us.

796
00:51:10,150 --> 00:51:13,780
Instead of just giving us a list without testing it, like, can they figure out, you know, are

797
00:51:13,780 --> 00:51:14,980
there any false positives in here?

798
00:51:15,620 --> 00:51:18,740
False positives are usually indicated by a couple of different metrics.

799
00:51:19,040 --> 00:51:21,320
One is volume, like something gets a lot of queries.

800
00:51:21,560 --> 00:51:21,960
It's okay.

801
00:51:21,990 --> 00:51:23,200
You should probably look at that first.

802
00:51:23,450 --> 00:51:27,080
But then also there are things like geographic distribution, host name distribution.

803
00:51:27,540 --> 00:51:32,480
There are ways that you can look at a block and say, oh, whoops, we've blocked the wrong thing.

804
00:51:32,900 --> 00:51:33,980
But it's too late at that point.

805
00:51:34,040 --> 00:51:37,060
If you block it, we actually give insight to the threat intelligence provider.

806
00:51:37,220 --> 00:51:41,580
When they give us a name to block, we actually give them telemetry back on every blocking event.

807
00:51:41,920 --> 00:51:42,740
It's very rough data.

808
00:51:42,960 --> 00:51:46,540
It's metropolitan area and then the FQDN.

809
00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:49,960
And so this helps them improve their feeds, right?

810
00:51:50,080 --> 00:51:52,580
So that's a sort of a virtuous loop here.

811
00:51:53,240 --> 00:51:55,600
But the problem is that when they give us a block, it's too late.

812
00:51:55,740 --> 00:51:59,000
The false positives are already in the system and we're already causing people pain.

813
00:51:59,900 --> 00:52:03,500
And what we said, is there any way we can do this, which doesn't cause pain?

814
00:52:04,660 --> 00:52:08,700
And so we have a model which allows threat intelligence providers to kind of do a virtual

815
00:52:08,930 --> 00:52:13,800
block for a very short period of time, which allows them to see what would happen if they

816
00:52:14,180 --> 00:52:17,140
committed this block to us or they submitted this to us as a block.

817
00:52:18,020 --> 00:52:20,820
And so that's a product basically that we, that we offer.

818
00:52:20,870 --> 00:52:24,080
And that's a, that's a four fee because it's actually improving their threat feed.

819
00:52:24,500 --> 00:52:28,600
They're in turn reselling that threat feed to their downstream customers.

820
00:52:28,880 --> 00:52:29,280
And that's great.

821
00:52:29,460 --> 00:52:30,060
That's what we want.

822
00:52:30,140 --> 00:52:33,280
We're actually fully encouraging that because it helps everybody's security.

823
00:52:33,720 --> 00:52:38,040
But what we're trying to do is decrease the false positive rates and give them better insights.

824
00:52:39,200 --> 00:52:39,400
Got it.

825
00:52:39,620 --> 00:52:42,120
Are there any other things you're exploring or is it mostly those two?

826
00:52:42,460 --> 00:52:45,520
The one last one that we have is the most powerful one.

827
00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:47,320
And it's the most difficult one to describe.

828
00:52:47,740 --> 00:52:52,740
We've had a lot of interest in people who are looking for brand protection kind of issues.

829
00:52:53,120 --> 00:52:57,460
And this was the sort of the core of when we started to think about this.

830
00:52:57,570 --> 00:53:02,500
They said, well, you know, I see in all the way in the left-hand side, we've got these

831
00:53:02,700 --> 00:53:05,260
like domain names with 10 different zone cuts.

832
00:53:05,420 --> 00:53:09,540
You know, it's foo.blah.bankofamerica.blah, blah, blah, blah.

833
00:53:09,700 --> 00:53:11,620
Like there's a whole bunch of different zone cuts in here.

834
00:53:11,880 --> 00:53:15,580
They want to know what's happening in the far left-hand side of the zone.

835
00:53:16,560 --> 00:53:20,600
And they want to see when there's brand impersonation there, because that's the thing that catches

836
00:53:20,800 --> 00:53:21,120
people, right?

837
00:53:21,200 --> 00:53:25,660
They see a long host name that basically they only see the first part of it and it looks

838
00:53:25,740 --> 00:53:29,600
like a legitimate site and they click on it and too late, you're trapped.

839
00:53:30,040 --> 00:53:35,680
And so we have a model which allows people to put in strings that they're interested

840
00:53:35,880 --> 00:53:42,260
in anywhere in the zone to be able to get back host names that look like brand impersonation

841
00:53:42,290 --> 00:53:43,460
or domain impersonation.

842
00:53:44,300 --> 00:53:48,120
And we've got actually a fairly powerful set of open source software we developed to do

843
00:53:48,240 --> 00:53:48,760
just that.

844
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:52,960
If you go to our GitHub page, we have a platform called String Simile.

845
00:53:53,760 --> 00:53:57,200
And what that is, is it's a combination of a whole bunch of different string matching

846
00:53:57,660 --> 00:54:00,400
algorithms all combined into one big code base.

847
00:54:00,940 --> 00:54:07,480
So you can say, I want to look for the string Netflix, but instead of eyes, let's say the

848
00:54:07,580 --> 00:54:08,060
number one.

849
00:54:08,420 --> 00:54:09,920
So in other words, it has confusables.

850
00:54:10,280 --> 00:54:15,440
It has Cyrillic and IDN lettering so that if someone tries to make a name that looks

851
00:54:15,540 --> 00:54:17,340
like something else, it catches that.

852
00:54:17,340 --> 00:54:21,120
we have phonetic matching there's all kinds of different matching you can do

853
00:54:21,770 --> 00:54:27,940
so that you can see when a new host name appears if it matches your brand and again this is in the

854
00:54:28,100 --> 00:54:32,920
same model as the newly observed domains except that you're matching for a very specific set of

855
00:54:33,080 --> 00:54:36,300
strings and you're doing it for all host names you're not just doing it for the domain name

856
00:54:36,310 --> 00:54:42,340
you're actually matching anything in the dns that we see on a new basis we have like a 10 10 second

857
00:54:42,340 --> 00:54:48,140
latency on that. So when a new name appears, or when a name changes, we can run that through the

858
00:54:48,340 --> 00:54:52,540
filter and get a result within a few seconds. So to summarize that is what you're saying,

859
00:54:52,740 --> 00:54:57,060
if I am a well-equipped organization, I care a lot about like, let's say I'm Apple, I'm Google,

860
00:54:57,280 --> 00:55:05,540
and I don't want people to end up on G-O-O-G-L-E, or I don't know, Apple with a three instead of an

861
00:55:05,540 --> 00:55:10,200
E. These are the most basic versions of these. I know these get very sophisticated. They would

862
00:55:10,220 --> 00:55:16,100
pretty much become your clients. And then you would pretty much have individualized brand protection

863
00:55:16,300 --> 00:55:21,120
for them. Right. They tell us what the strings are that they're looking for, you know, roughly.

864
00:55:21,660 --> 00:55:26,880
And then we can match on that against this giant fire hose of changes that we see and give them

865
00:55:26,880 --> 00:55:30,760
the insights when those domains are matched or when those strings are matched. This allows them

866
00:55:30,900 --> 00:55:36,640
to understand what's happening in a brand lookalike. In this same vein, there's another interesting

867
00:55:36,920 --> 00:55:41,620
product that we've been kicking around that we actually haven't named yet. I'll pull the veil

868
00:55:41,780 --> 00:55:45,880
back a little bit. But there's another one that we've actually found is quite interesting. And

869
00:55:45,880 --> 00:55:49,140
that is that most big domain name operators don't actually know what's in their zone.

870
00:55:49,470 --> 00:55:54,980
They have no idea. Big Fortune 500 companies subdelegate out everything inside their zone

871
00:55:55,420 --> 00:55:59,400
down to regional offices. And then that regional office dedicates some out to a lab.

872
00:55:59,830 --> 00:56:04,840
And then the lab might use a commercial provider to do a CDN test. And so the people at the very

873
00:56:04,860 --> 00:56:10,400
bottom of the network of the namespace, they actually don't know all the things that's in

874
00:56:10,440 --> 00:56:16,760
their own zone, especially if you're allocating out to CDNs or third parties. We do. We can actually

875
00:56:17,000 --> 00:56:22,180
tell you what's in your zone because chances are high that almost everything in your zone has been

876
00:56:22,320 --> 00:56:25,580
looked up on quad nine somewhere. So that's a product we've been kicking around in the same

877
00:56:25,780 --> 00:56:29,840
space, but it's actually basically telling you what's in your own zone. It sounds like a ludicrous

878
00:56:29,840 --> 00:56:35,720
thing, but it actually is quite interesting because the larger you get, the less, you know,

879
00:56:35,740 --> 00:56:41,560
DNS is a decentralized protocol and you don't know what's going on. And so there are really

880
00:56:41,760 --> 00:56:47,040
interesting compliance issues there, cybersecurity issues there that we can help those zone operators

881
00:56:47,600 --> 00:56:52,400
answer, especially in the bigger zones. You know, all of these so far that you shared,

882
00:56:52,860 --> 00:56:57,400
like the first three, to me, again, correct this if I'm wrong, they all seemed like technology that

883
00:56:57,420 --> 00:57:01,600
you guys have developed to fix a problem. But that fourth one almost sounds like it could be a scale

884
00:57:02,220 --> 00:57:05,940
because you've gotten large enough, you can then supply that service? Or am I misunderstanding?

885
00:57:06,340 --> 00:57:11,760
No, no. Well, you're right on both counts. The NOD is definitely a scale question because you need

886
00:57:11,760 --> 00:57:15,660
to have fast response. You need to have a lot of people on the network to get those newly observed

887
00:57:15,760 --> 00:57:20,880
domains quickly resolved. Same thing. You have to have scale and you have to have the technology for

888
00:57:21,100 --> 00:57:25,560
being able to test for false positives. And this last one is both, again, scale and technology.

889
00:57:25,640 --> 00:57:32,000
You need to have lots and lots of users on the network to churn through all the names in the namespace.

890
00:57:32,620 --> 00:57:37,100
And then you have to have the ability to be able to process that at scale is also quite significant.

891
00:57:37,340 --> 00:57:42,700
You know, it's tens of billions of names in a very short period of time that you've got to be able to scan through.

892
00:57:42,940 --> 00:57:47,960
And we've actually developed some code for that that we've, again, contributed back to various open source repositories.

893
00:57:48,160 --> 00:57:52,180
So we think we're doing the right thing with both the data and the methods that we're collecting it.

894
00:57:53,060 --> 00:57:53,320
Very cool.

895
00:57:53,440 --> 00:57:56,600
I feel like the way that I see DNS talked about a lot,

896
00:57:56,600 --> 00:57:58,080
and even I sometimes say this too,

897
00:57:58,840 --> 00:58:00,780
is it's in a way kind of like a VPN

898
00:58:00,940 --> 00:58:02,220
in the sense that you're shifting trust.

899
00:58:02,980 --> 00:58:04,780
Instead of trusting your ISP's DNS,

900
00:58:04,990 --> 00:58:07,660
you now trust Quag9 or whatever other DNS provider.

901
00:58:08,110 --> 00:58:10,080
So what do you normally say when people ask,

902
00:58:10,180 --> 00:58:11,480
why should I trust you?

903
00:58:11,510 --> 00:58:13,980
I know we've kind of covered a lot of the reasons why in the interview,

904
00:58:14,260 --> 00:58:16,060
but how do you signal trust to people?

905
00:58:16,220 --> 00:58:17,380
Totally reasonable question.

906
00:58:17,580 --> 00:58:18,780
First one is kind of a non-event.

907
00:58:18,960 --> 00:58:20,120
Why would you trust us?

908
00:58:20,580 --> 00:58:21,620
We don't actually know who you are.

909
00:58:22,580 --> 00:58:26,340
Meaning that there's no signup, there's no association that we have with you as a person

910
00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:30,700
with the lookups you're doing. Even if we didn't do anything we said we were going to do,

911
00:58:31,300 --> 00:58:37,220
there's no mapping of your IP address to you. And we don't collect the IP address either.

912
00:58:38,020 --> 00:58:42,140
So, but that's the second reason you should trust us. Reason number two to trust us is again,

913
00:58:42,520 --> 00:58:46,960
because of the constraints that we have put upon ourselves. The legal constraints by being in

914
00:58:47,100 --> 00:58:51,840
Switzerland, really the ironclad guarantee of privacy that we have that's not backed up

915
00:58:51,900 --> 00:58:55,900
just by fines. It's backed up by going to jail if we don't do what we say we're going to do.

916
00:58:56,580 --> 00:58:59,700
And that was the whole reason that we chose Switzerland as a destination to move to,

917
00:58:59,830 --> 00:59:03,660
because we had to put our money where our mouth was. The third reason you should trust us is that

918
00:59:03,710 --> 00:59:08,640
we have no incentive for you not to trust us. There is nothing that we have other than your trust.

919
00:59:09,180 --> 00:59:13,620
There is no, I mean, we have cybersecurity, right? We do give away that really nice service,

920
00:59:14,180 --> 00:59:17,100
but that would be nothing if people thought that we were collecting their data.

921
00:59:17,760 --> 00:59:25,080
So really, we have to have people's trust because the friction of leaving Quad9 is the same as coming in.

922
00:59:25,460 --> 00:59:25,560
Zero.

923
00:59:26,120 --> 00:59:29,460
If you don't like what you get, there is nothing keeping you here.

924
00:59:29,830 --> 00:59:36,500
And if you don't believe you're going to be treated in a way that's private and equitable, then there's no reason for you to stay.

925
00:59:36,800 --> 00:59:37,360
We're a nonprofit.

926
00:59:37,850 --> 00:59:38,660
We're not a CDN.

927
00:59:38,660 --> 00:59:39,620
We're not a marketing company.

928
00:59:40,020 --> 00:59:41,420
We don't do any of those things.

929
00:59:42,140 --> 00:59:48,520
So the only thing we have to barter with is your trust and the safety we give to our end users.

930
00:59:49,340 --> 00:59:53,700
So we're very, very concerned that people understand that we do value privacy.

931
00:59:53,940 --> 00:59:57,780
Like I can't speak for the rest of my staff, but most of us are privacy zealots here.

932
00:59:58,080 --> 00:59:59,400
We're not doing this for money.

933
00:59:59,700 --> 01:00:01,260
We're not getting paid particularly well.

934
01:00:01,660 --> 01:00:05,360
Working for a nonprofit, it pays the bills, but there's no stock options.

935
01:00:05,740 --> 01:00:07,720
There are no Ferraris and driveways here.

936
01:00:08,260 --> 01:00:11,120
We're doing this because we believe in what it is that we do.

937
01:00:11,680 --> 01:00:13,800
Everybody in the team believes in what we do.

938
01:00:14,580 --> 01:00:17,460
And we think we're making the world a slightly better place.

939
01:00:18,600 --> 01:00:19,660
Yeah, period.

940
01:00:20,940 --> 01:00:24,380
I'm going to call this the for Henry's interest only section

941
01:00:24,540 --> 01:00:26,740
just because I had a few questions come up

942
01:00:26,840 --> 01:00:29,040
that I think are very much for me.

943
01:00:29,200 --> 01:00:31,260
But I know that other people listening are going to have them too.

944
01:00:31,380 --> 01:00:32,360
So I know it's helping others.

945
01:00:32,580 --> 01:00:34,080
But this is a very bare bones question.

946
01:00:34,460 --> 01:00:36,480
I think I've actually heard the answer before,

947
01:00:36,780 --> 01:00:38,220
but maybe it's different how you guys do it

948
01:00:38,220 --> 01:00:39,480
or maybe my understanding is wrong.

949
01:00:39,820 --> 01:00:47,460
Let's say someone's deciding between getting malware blocking or 9.9.9.10 without the malware protection.

950
01:00:47,940 --> 01:00:48,880
Is there a speed difference there?

951
01:00:49,820 --> 01:00:52,880
Does the filtering itself have a difference on latency and speed?

952
01:00:53,400 --> 01:00:55,460
Weirdly enough, well, no, I'm sorry.

953
01:00:56,170 --> 01:00:56,860
No, there is no difference.

954
01:00:57,060 --> 01:00:58,320
There is no noticeable difference.

955
01:00:58,440 --> 01:01:00,400
There is a noticeable difference with 9.9.9.11.

956
01:01:01,120 --> 01:01:02,660
I almost got the wrong question there.

957
01:01:03,060 --> 01:01:11,340
So 9999 and 99910, you will not notice a difference because it's relatively short.

958
01:01:11,740 --> 01:01:15,780
We actually notice a difference because there's less CPU usage and less memory usage.

959
01:01:16,190 --> 01:01:17,920
But from the end user's perspective, no.

960
01:01:18,940 --> 01:01:26,560
For 99910, there's a slightly lower memory and CPU use, but there is no easily measurable difference between the two of them.

961
01:01:28,039 --> 01:01:32,000
99911 is a different service, which does have blocking.

962
01:01:33,040 --> 01:01:38,380
but it also includes what's called ECS, which is EDNS client subnet. And that is a slightly

963
01:01:38,490 --> 01:01:43,200
different service because there are, do you know about ECS? Do you want to do the whole? Okay.

964
01:01:43,820 --> 01:01:49,680
Excellent. So 9999 is exceptionally private. We pass no information about the end user

965
01:01:50,240 --> 01:01:55,060
to the authoritative server that we're asking the questions to. So if you look up amazon.com,

966
01:01:55,660 --> 01:02:01,280
we ask Amazon servers for the IP address that they're giving and you get it back.

967
01:02:01,560 --> 01:02:03,620
Now, we have 200 locations around the world.

968
01:02:03,740 --> 01:02:07,580
That means that relatively close to you, there's a Quad 9 location.

969
01:02:08,240 --> 01:02:11,860
And you're going to connect to that and you're going to ask it for www.amazon.com.

970
01:02:12,300 --> 01:02:17,240
Amazon is going to give you back a different answer based on where they think you are.

971
01:02:17,480 --> 01:02:24,240
So if you're in San Diego, you're going to get back probably on a Los Angeles-based cluster of Amazon servers.

972
01:02:24,420 --> 01:02:29,480
In other words, the IP address that Amazon gives back to you or gives back to Quad9 that we then

973
01:02:29,680 --> 01:02:35,980
give back to you is going to be an LA-based cluster of systems. Let's say for some reason,

974
01:02:36,290 --> 01:02:40,680
and this does happen on occasion, you're in an island nation where Quad9 does not have a server.

975
01:02:40,860 --> 01:02:46,320
You're coming from Kiribati. So the closest Quad9 known to Kiribati, let's say that's Los Angeles,

976
01:02:46,690 --> 01:02:51,340
even though from a distance perspective, Sydney would be much closer to you to get an Amazon node.

977
01:02:51,500 --> 01:02:56,900
there's a problem here. So you're going to be in Kiribati. You're asking for amazon.com from a

978
01:02:57,440 --> 01:03:03,120
Quad9 cluster in LA. You're going to get back the LA number, IP address. But in fact, that's going

979
01:03:03,120 --> 01:03:07,640
to give you a really terrible performance based on what you could be getting otherwise. So Amazon

980
01:03:08,220 --> 01:03:15,080
would prefer it if Quad9 sent information about you, the individual, to Amazon when we make the

981
01:03:15,240 --> 01:03:20,100
question to them. We, however, would prefer not to send you that information or send them the

982
01:03:20,120 --> 01:03:24,740
information. So in other words, Quad9 is extremely private. We don't send anything about the end user

983
01:03:24,980 --> 01:03:32,500
to the authoritative server. That's our default service, 9999 and 99910. In some cases, it does

984
01:03:32,640 --> 01:03:39,160
make sense for us to leak information about the end user to the authoritative server in order to get a

985
01:03:39,320 --> 01:03:45,820
more performant end result. This is what ECS does. So services like Google, even though you don't

986
01:03:45,840 --> 01:03:50,300
know it, every time, if you're to use Google's recursive resolver, 8888, when you make queries

987
01:03:50,480 --> 01:03:55,660
to it, they send the first three octets of your IP address to the authoritative server.

988
01:03:56,120 --> 01:04:01,160
We don't think that's a good idea. And so we don't do that, but Google does. And so to their credit,

989
01:04:01,250 --> 01:04:06,440
they get back probably more geographically accurate results more of the time than we do,

990
01:04:06,660 --> 01:04:12,420
but they also have a privacy leak. We provide 99911 to provide that exact service.

991
01:04:13,480 --> 01:04:23,080
So in other words, if you choose to leak those first three octets of your IP address, or in IPv6, I think it's the first slash 48 or 56, I don't remember.

992
01:04:23,190 --> 01:04:31,360
But you can choose to get more geographically proximate addresses by giving up some of that privacy to the authoritative server.

993
01:04:31,840 --> 01:04:32,680
That is slightly slower.

994
01:04:33,070 --> 01:04:38,120
The reason for that is that every slash 24 has to keep its own little version of the cache.

995
01:04:38,600 --> 01:04:44,520
Like you in San Diego are going to have, you're going to get answers back for the same Amazon

996
01:04:44,860 --> 01:04:48,040
network, but everyone in your slash 24 is going to get the same answer.

997
01:04:48,070 --> 01:04:51,740
So that means we have to fragment our cache into a million different little tiny shards.

998
01:04:52,060 --> 01:04:56,200
So just by kind of by default, the answers are going to be slower because there are lower

999
01:04:56,440 --> 01:04:57,740
chances of those being cached.

1000
01:04:58,060 --> 01:05:02,920
The chances of someone asking for amazon.com in your same slash 24 are much, much lower

1001
01:05:03,520 --> 01:05:06,580
than on a citywide basis, which is what we have with 9999.

1002
01:05:07,900 --> 01:05:13,280
So you kind of mentioned the reason to do this is it could be faster for you, but then you mentioned it's slower.

1003
01:05:13,460 --> 01:05:15,380
So where is this slower?

1004
01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:16,160
Where is it faster?

1005
01:05:16,260 --> 01:05:24,280
And my understanding is the people incentivized to use this are people who are rural in the sense of they're not near any major server locations.

1006
01:05:24,900 --> 01:05:25,060
Correct.

1007
01:05:25,360 --> 01:05:25,920
That's right.

1008
01:05:26,400 --> 01:05:34,520
So people at the end of very thin pipes, like, again, island nations, they will often have their own CDN distribution in the island nation.

1009
01:05:35,260 --> 01:05:39,760
But if they're using Quad9 and we don't have a node in that nation, they're basically going to be mismatched.

1010
01:05:39,880 --> 01:05:42,780
They're going to be querying a location that doesn't have the CDN facilities.

1011
01:05:43,340 --> 01:05:44,700
So this is kind of our push.

1012
01:05:44,840 --> 01:05:52,040
This is why we have 200 sites, because the closer that our systems are to the end user, we're going to get a better answer from the CDN distribution point.

1013
01:05:52,320 --> 01:05:58,760
We're not big fans of ECS because, again, we're more privacy focused than we are performance focused, quite honestly.

1014
01:05:59,060 --> 01:06:03,180
I mean, there are places you can make lots of tradeoffs if you're willing to give up privacy.

1015
01:06:03,440 --> 01:06:10,040
we're not but we give the users the option in that the dns query might be slightly slower but the

1016
01:06:10,600 --> 01:06:14,440
streaming video or the download of the website might be a lot faster so that trade-off might

1017
01:06:14,440 --> 01:06:19,380
be okay to them and we let them make that decision themselves makes sense yeah i think that's that's

1018
01:06:19,380 --> 01:06:23,060
a good way to put it i didn't know any of this so that was all very new to me so thank you for

1019
01:06:23,180 --> 01:06:28,040
sharing uh i guess something about me so i'm still like doing filtering with next dns i really like

1020
01:06:28,600 --> 01:06:31,000
customizing things in my own portal a lot.

1021
01:06:31,030 --> 01:06:32,160
And that's what I use personally.

1022
01:06:32,960 --> 01:06:34,480
How does that DIY,

1023
01:06:35,060 --> 01:06:36,140
I want to filter everything,

1024
01:06:37,220 --> 01:06:38,040
get down and dirty,

1025
01:06:38,360 --> 01:06:39,760
how does that compare to maybe,

1026
01:06:40,110 --> 01:06:40,960
I know obviously you guys,

1027
01:06:40,960 --> 01:06:42,220
I don't think do any kind of

1028
01:06:42,740 --> 01:06:44,420
privacy-based blocking on Quad9,

1029
01:06:45,400 --> 01:06:48,220
but how would you compare those approaches?

1030
01:06:48,560 --> 01:06:50,160
What's actually going on behind the scenes?

1031
01:06:50,310 --> 01:06:52,020
What do you normally recommend to most people?

1032
01:06:52,110 --> 01:06:54,260
And why do you guys not have a service like that?

1033
01:06:54,440 --> 01:06:56,120
Well, let me ask the last question first.

1034
01:06:56,660 --> 01:06:58,020
We don't have a service like that

1035
01:06:58,020 --> 01:07:03,040
it's very expensive to do that. There's a lot of user interface. There's a lot of construction of

1036
01:07:04,300 --> 01:07:09,580
a tooling set that would allow people to get that flexibility. And again, we focused primarily on,

1037
01:07:09,720 --> 01:07:14,720
again, privacy and baseline cybersecurity. For people who want more advanced services,

1038
01:07:15,080 --> 01:07:19,160
there are other things in the market. Our goal is not to take over the DNS world. That's not our

1039
01:07:19,320 --> 01:07:23,540
goal at all. We don't want to be all things to all people. We might do further expansions in the

1040
01:07:23,700 --> 01:07:28,000
future with different things that we're going to do, meaning that there might be some slow and

1041
01:07:28,020 --> 01:07:34,620
steady advances in our feature set. But our mission is not to own the DNS market space. That's

1042
01:07:34,900 --> 01:07:38,500
totally not what we're interested in. But the DIY set that are interested in doing that,

1043
01:07:38,680 --> 01:07:45,300
there are things like NextDNS that do this as a service. How they treat privacy and security is

1044
01:07:46,120 --> 01:07:49,980
between you and them. What we would really recommend people do is set up your own server,

1045
01:07:50,340 --> 01:07:55,840
piehole, right? If you don't like what you see and you want to have even more advanced filtering

1046
01:07:55,840 --> 01:07:59,760
with ad blocking and notifications and statistics,

1047
01:08:00,460 --> 01:08:02,060
set up your own forwarding cache,

1048
01:08:02,640 --> 01:08:03,940
embed all those rules into that,

1049
01:08:04,100 --> 01:08:06,200
run it in your home or run it in the cloud even,

1050
01:08:06,360 --> 01:08:08,200
run it somewhere else and point to it,

1051
01:08:08,540 --> 01:08:10,680
and then forward the queries from that to Quad9.

1052
01:08:11,060 --> 01:08:13,300
So in other words, you can still get all the benefits of Quad9,

1053
01:08:13,460 --> 01:08:17,160
but you can put another layer in between your clients,

1054
01:08:17,420 --> 01:08:20,020
your web browser or your computer and Quad9

1055
01:08:20,160 --> 01:08:21,660
that does a whole bunch of other stuff

1056
01:08:22,140 --> 01:08:23,720
that will get you more or less what you're getting

1057
01:08:23,720 --> 01:08:28,920
with a commercial provider, but at no cost and with complete confidentiality, meaning you run

1058
01:08:28,960 --> 01:08:35,400
that service yourself. That's the DIY answer. Most people can't or won't do that. And so we

1059
01:08:35,759 --> 01:08:40,580
understand that. To date, that's not been where we've targeted our efforts.

1060
01:08:41,779 --> 01:08:45,060
Got it. Thanks for sharing. Something I hear a lot about is VPN versus DNS.

1061
01:08:45,700 --> 01:08:51,040
And I think the most common safe advice to give is just use your VPN's DNS resolver.

1062
01:08:51,660 --> 01:08:53,120
If you trust them with your web traffic,

1063
01:08:53,220 --> 01:08:55,920
it probably makes sense to trust them with your DNS traffic.

1064
01:08:56,220 --> 01:08:57,839
I, for one, don't like doing that

1065
01:08:57,960 --> 01:09:00,680
because I like my NextDNS filters that I've set up.

1066
01:09:00,779 --> 01:09:03,540
I normally always try to find a way to combine both of them.

1067
01:09:04,060 --> 01:09:05,720
But my understanding is that can add latency.

1068
01:09:06,100 --> 01:09:07,240
That part I don't quite understand.

1069
01:09:07,660 --> 01:09:11,000
I think somehow you have to contact a DNS server resolver

1070
01:09:11,160 --> 01:09:13,279
and it's different from the VPN server.

1071
01:09:13,520 --> 01:09:14,640
Anyway, this is all to say,

1072
01:09:15,400 --> 01:09:18,380
do you ever recommend using Quad9 for VPN users?

1073
01:09:18,520 --> 01:09:20,319
Or do you think they should use their DNS resolver?

1074
01:09:20,880 --> 01:09:22,400
Or how do you look at this situation?

1075
01:09:22,720 --> 01:09:23,759
There's two arguments, right?

1076
01:09:24,040 --> 01:09:25,920
There's diversifying your trust,

1077
01:09:26,580 --> 01:09:28,740
meaning if you trust Quad9 with your DNS

1078
01:09:29,440 --> 01:09:31,299
and you trust your VPN with your transit data,

1079
01:09:31,540 --> 01:09:32,640
you're basically separating

1080
01:09:33,279 --> 01:09:34,660
two different streams of information.

1081
01:09:34,819 --> 01:09:36,080
You're separating them apart from each other.

1082
01:09:36,580 --> 01:09:37,520
You increase your risk

1083
01:09:37,580 --> 01:09:40,140
that one of them might try to collect some of it.

1084
01:09:40,540 --> 01:09:41,140
But as an example,

1085
01:09:41,359 --> 01:09:42,920
if you're coming out of a VPN

1086
01:09:43,940 --> 01:09:44,980
and using Quad9,

1087
01:09:45,460 --> 01:09:47,200
we're not going to even see your home IP address.

1088
01:09:47,420 --> 01:09:50,839
So even in the most spectacularly

1089
01:09:50,859 --> 01:09:54,900
corrupted world where we're trying to collect information on people, we wouldn't be able to do

1090
01:09:54,900 --> 01:09:59,680
it anyway out of a VPN. So I think that the model's broken there. I don't think there's any way that we

1091
01:09:59,840 --> 01:10:04,460
could not, it would be really difficult for me to imagine how we would not be able to be trusted

1092
01:10:05,180 --> 01:10:10,020
with data coming out of a VPN. However, I can see how the VPN would actually collect both

1093
01:10:10,500 --> 01:10:14,980
data sets from you. And you have to really pick your VPN provider carefully because there are a

1094
01:10:14,980 --> 01:10:19,480
lot of VPNs out there that are not what they seem to be. The free ones are especially concerning,

1095
01:10:19,680 --> 01:10:27,120
But if you're paying for a reputable VPN provider, you can trust them the same way that you would trust Quad9 to some degree from a privacy perspective.

1096
01:10:27,740 --> 01:10:29,980
But are you getting the additional benefits of the cybersecurity?

1097
01:10:30,500 --> 01:10:31,300
Probably not.

1098
01:10:31,490 --> 01:10:32,700
And are there latency issues?

1099
01:10:33,000 --> 01:10:42,500
Also probably not, because wherever your VPN exit point is, I'm going to bet you that Quad9 is within two milliseconds of that exit point.

1100
01:10:43,140 --> 01:10:47,260
We all share the same big inter-exchange locations.

1101
01:10:47,440 --> 01:10:54,660
We're all within a few milliseconds of a big IX somewhere, whether that's Frankfurt or United States or Singapore or whatever.

1102
01:10:55,220 --> 01:11:06,080
So even if you were to use Quad9 with your VPN, you're probably not sacrificing much from a performance perspective versus the DNS provider for your VPN.

1103
01:11:06,500 --> 01:11:14,440
The best way to do this is actually to have a local cache sitting there in your office, even before you go into the VPN, because then you get the results instantly.

1104
01:11:14,640 --> 01:11:18,860
Meaning you don't have to send the traffic all the way through the VPN and then all the way back.

1105
01:11:19,260 --> 01:11:23,740
If you're getting them right there from a box that's sitting in your home network, that's faster.

1106
01:11:24,060 --> 01:11:30,100
So I guess it's kind of a wash from a trust perspective between the two.

1107
01:11:30,270 --> 01:11:33,660
The reason that I tell people to use Quad9 is because you're not always using your VPN.

1108
01:11:34,560 --> 01:11:37,220
Sometimes you turn it off and you're using your native ISP.

1109
01:11:37,840 --> 01:11:44,180
But if you've got Quad9 configured there, you're just going to connect to the closest node there where your house is versus going through the VPN tunnel.

1110
01:11:44,400 --> 01:11:48,040
9.9.9.9 works anywhere in the world and it's really fast.

1111
01:11:48,860 --> 01:11:53,380
Your VPN provider's DNS server, you might not even be able to get to it if you're not on the VPN.

1112
01:11:53,520 --> 01:11:56,740
So then you have to go through and fix it or they have to have software that goes through and, you know,

1113
01:11:57,080 --> 01:11:59,780
adds it or removes it to your DNS server list.

1114
01:11:59,980 --> 01:12:01,100
It just adds complexity.

1115
01:12:01,400 --> 01:12:01,980
But it's a wash.

1116
01:12:02,260 --> 01:12:04,220
It's going to depend on your level of technical competence.

1117
01:12:04,800 --> 01:12:09,080
But from a privacy perspective, as long as you have a trustworthy VPN provider, not a big deal.

1118
01:12:10,040 --> 01:12:12,600
Yeah, the two VPNs I think of that are doing some interesting stuff.

1119
01:12:13,040 --> 01:12:14,260
I know that IVPN has a feature,

1120
01:12:14,440 --> 01:12:15,680
and I'm not saying they're the only one.

1121
01:12:16,080 --> 01:12:19,820
I know IVPN has a feature where you can keep your DNS

1122
01:12:19,980 --> 01:12:21,720
that you set in IVPN enabled,

1123
01:12:21,900 --> 01:12:23,940
even if you're disconnected from IVPN.

1124
01:12:24,000 --> 01:12:25,920
So let's say you set Quad9 in IVPN,

1125
01:12:25,960 --> 01:12:27,140
but it's like, oh, I want to turn it off.

1126
01:12:27,420 --> 01:12:29,080
Quad9 is still set as the DNS resolver,

1127
01:12:29,240 --> 01:12:30,780
which I think is a really good fallback.

1128
01:12:31,040 --> 01:12:34,100
And then Mulvad, they do host their own filters,

1129
01:12:34,400 --> 01:12:36,420
kind of like what you guys do for 9.9.9.9.

1130
01:12:36,920 --> 01:12:38,980
So I don't know if you have any opinions on those

1131
01:12:39,100 --> 01:12:40,360
for people who like Mulvad.

1132
01:12:40,700 --> 01:12:41,620
I don't know if you've played with those.

1133
01:12:41,760 --> 01:12:44,820
They have more of privacy-based filters as well.

1134
01:12:45,020 --> 01:12:46,340
I've seen Molvad's filters.

1135
01:12:46,460 --> 01:12:48,140
They actually post them on, I think it's GitHub.

1136
01:12:48,500 --> 01:12:51,600
And so, yeah, they're giving some added benefit.

1137
01:12:51,920 --> 01:12:53,400
Is it as extensive as Quad9?

1138
01:12:53,560 --> 01:12:54,500
No, it definitely is not.

1139
01:12:54,620 --> 01:12:56,200
But it's still, from a privacy perspective,

1140
01:12:56,400 --> 01:12:57,600
I'm sure that they're doing the right thing.

1141
01:12:58,600 --> 01:13:01,800
In general, I've heard good things about Molvad's dedication to privacy.

1142
01:13:01,960 --> 01:13:04,400
So I really have not a lot of insight there,

1143
01:13:04,640 --> 01:13:07,840
but I'm sure it's useful for whatever context you are looking for.

1144
01:13:08,200 --> 01:13:09,100
Have you looked at PyHole?

1145
01:13:09,320 --> 01:13:09,740
I have.

1146
01:13:09,840 --> 01:13:11,320
And it's one of those things that it's like,

1147
01:13:11,400 --> 01:13:12,700
is it worth the complexity for me?

1148
01:13:12,740 --> 01:13:13,620
And I just haven't done it yet.

1149
01:13:13,820 --> 01:13:16,220
But honestly, even for content and for an experiment,

1150
01:13:16,290 --> 01:13:17,500
I really should have done it by now.

1151
01:13:17,740 --> 01:13:20,260
I mean, so many people in my life have recommended it to me.

1152
01:13:20,540 --> 01:13:22,040
Yeah, it's pretty nice.

1153
01:13:22,220 --> 01:13:23,840
There's some extensions that they've got in there

1154
01:13:24,000 --> 01:13:25,740
that actually are custom for Quad9.

1155
01:13:25,850 --> 01:13:28,680
So if there's a block event that we hand back to you,

1156
01:13:29,220 --> 01:13:32,700
they actually tag it as a malicious activity in their logs.

1157
01:13:32,920 --> 01:13:34,840
Whereas if we block something for you

1158
01:13:35,060 --> 01:13:36,300
and you're just looking at it in your browser,

1159
01:13:36,350 --> 01:13:39,200
you're just going to see a 404 not found.

1160
01:13:39,490 --> 01:13:40,620
Or actually, that's not even true.

1161
01:13:40,760 --> 01:13:47,000
It'll just say host not found, whereas the pie hole actually, you know, a little red box will appear and say, hey, this was a block by quad nine.

1162
01:13:47,860 --> 01:13:50,660
Nice. Does it have to intercept the SSL cert to do that?

1163
01:13:51,140 --> 01:13:53,680
Nope. No, it's actually looking at the DNS response.

1164
01:13:53,820 --> 01:14:02,340
We actually tag the DNS response with a flag so that if you really know what you're looking at, like there's a bit set in the DNS response that says this is a not natural response.

1165
01:14:03,280 --> 01:14:05,460
And so pie hole has the ability to look at that.

1166
01:14:05,600 --> 01:14:07,820
We don't actually ever hand back an IP address.

1167
01:14:08,460 --> 01:14:10,060
That's what you're talking about when you're talking about SSL.

1168
01:14:10,480 --> 01:14:15,720
Like some blocking DNS providers will actually hand back an IP address when it's a block.

1169
01:14:16,290 --> 01:14:19,160
And that means your browser has to go to some other site.

1170
01:14:19,270 --> 01:14:20,940
And of course, the cert is never going to match.

1171
01:14:21,040 --> 01:14:23,560
So you're going to get a pop up that says your connection is being intercepted.

1172
01:14:23,600 --> 01:14:24,620
And that's terrible.

1173
01:14:24,920 --> 01:14:26,120
That's a terrible, terrible model.

1174
01:14:26,540 --> 01:14:27,040
Don't do that.

1175
01:14:27,210 --> 01:14:30,840
Because it teaches people to click through the warnings, which is a bad idea.

1176
01:14:31,090 --> 01:14:36,000
The other way around that is that you load a root certificate on your laptop or your device

1177
01:14:36,320 --> 01:14:39,560
that has every certificate known or every possible certificate.

1178
01:14:39,740 --> 01:14:43,360
So when you click on the link, it takes you there and it shows you the warning page.

1179
01:14:43,390 --> 01:14:47,260
But now you've created a condition where if anybody has that certificate, they can spoof

1180
01:14:47,580 --> 01:14:49,140
any website to you.

1181
01:14:49,830 --> 01:14:52,280
So that seems like an additional security nightmare.

1182
01:14:52,490 --> 01:14:53,940
So we've done neither of those two things.

1183
01:14:53,990 --> 01:14:55,080
We just don't answer the question.

1184
01:14:55,200 --> 01:14:58,540
We're like, nope, there's no response if something is bogus.

1185
01:14:58,670 --> 01:15:02,040
But we do tag the response so that if you really know what you're doing, you can see it.

1186
01:15:03,020 --> 01:15:03,240
Got it.

1187
01:15:03,500 --> 01:15:04,720
Yeah, that's the end of all my questions.

1188
01:15:05,000 --> 01:15:06,220
Thanks for entertaining me.

1189
01:15:06,420 --> 01:15:07,400
You're brilliant to have on.

1190
01:15:07,560 --> 01:15:11,120
And it's great to hear someone who just works in this and lives and breathes this.

1191
01:15:11,290 --> 01:15:14,260
Is there anything you're excited about for the future that you'd like to share with people

1192
01:15:14,440 --> 01:15:15,320
that you're following closely?

1193
01:15:15,640 --> 01:15:16,880
I'm, again, sort of selfish.

1194
01:15:17,080 --> 01:15:18,860
I'm looking at like our cases in France, right?

1195
01:15:19,020 --> 01:15:22,160
Like we're really trying to figure out like what's the end goal?

1196
01:15:22,280 --> 01:15:23,380
What's going to happen with the DNS?

1197
01:15:23,640 --> 01:15:26,240
Is it going to be a controlled environment or is it not?

1198
01:15:26,580 --> 01:15:28,980
And how do we make contingency plans?

1199
01:15:29,070 --> 01:15:29,940
What if the answer is no?

1200
01:15:30,560 --> 01:15:31,960
What if it becomes a controlled environment?

1201
01:15:32,030 --> 01:15:32,940
How do we get around that?

1202
01:15:33,000 --> 01:15:39,020
I went to a conference, I guess, two weeks or three weeks ago called D-Web Camp, the distributed web.

1203
01:15:39,420 --> 01:15:47,200
And that is a really interesting group of people who are dedicated to figuring out ways of decentralizing the Internet again and making it more open.

1204
01:15:47,540 --> 01:15:49,100
And so that gives me some hope.

1205
01:15:49,320 --> 01:15:54,620
I think that there are some things that we can do in the DNS that create a more decentralized model.

1206
01:15:55,100 --> 01:16:00,480
And I speak with a guilty look on my face because Quad9 is becoming a more centralized service, right?

1207
01:16:00,550 --> 01:16:01,760
More people are using Quad9.

1208
01:16:01,840 --> 01:16:28,580
It used to be that everybody ran their own recursive resolver. That's becoming really hard to do with encryption and some of the new relatively sophisticated things that DNS recursive resolvers should do or that they can do. It's harder to ask people around, like, you don't want to run a pie hole. People are becoming more resistant to that and they just want to outsource it. And with that, there are some risks. And so I'm really hoping that we can, again, there are ways that we can decentralize this and there are ways that hopefully we can remove the threat.

1209
01:16:28,760 --> 01:16:33,460
I mean, what am I excited about from a technology perspective? I'm pretty hardcore nerd on the stuff

1210
01:16:33,580 --> 01:16:38,380
that I get interested in. So I'm not, probably not a good, a good sample set, but, um, you know,

1211
01:16:38,400 --> 01:16:43,440
I'm, I'm really into the, you know, how we're doing our backend telemetry. And like, for me,

1212
01:16:43,520 --> 01:16:47,900
it's exciting to look at this massive network that quad nine has built and being able to,

1213
01:16:48,020 --> 01:16:53,240
to see and use that data, like, you know, hundreds and hundreds of billions of messages a day,

1214
01:16:53,720 --> 01:16:57,619
being able to process all of it and be able to get meaningful results out of it. That's actually

1215
01:16:57,640 --> 01:17:01,520
what really excites me because that's sort of where we've gone. The fact that we can make money

1216
01:17:01,640 --> 01:17:05,200
on it is kind of like a side benefit. Like, is that, Ooh, you mean we can, someone will pay us

1217
01:17:05,200 --> 01:17:10,420
for this? This is interesting data, but I'm spending more time with policy and politics,

1218
01:17:11,240 --> 01:17:16,320
which is not where I wanted to be. But it turns out that, you know, being the last unencrypted

1219
01:17:17,640 --> 01:17:24,840
place where people can try to control content puts you in a vulnerable position. And so we need to

1220
01:17:24,860 --> 01:17:29,840
make the protocol and the network more invulnerable to that kind of interception. We're working on it.

1221
01:17:30,820 --> 01:17:34,080
Yeah. And I know it's a tough fight and I know a lot of people appreciate it, even if

1222
01:17:34,560 --> 01:17:38,200
they're not always there to say so. I know a lot of people support you guys.

1223
01:17:38,500 --> 01:17:42,700
We're desperately cash strapped as always. Donations are welcome. We're really looking

1224
01:17:42,730 --> 01:17:48,160
for companies to step up and nations to step up who have belief in what we're doing because we

1225
01:17:48,340 --> 01:17:53,400
can't keep doing this on, you know, I love everybody's individual donations. Donate what

1226
01:17:53,420 --> 01:17:58,700
you can, but we really need to have large donors who believe in what this is and what it represents

1227
01:17:59,360 --> 01:18:04,880
step up and help us fight to keep the internet open. Yeah. Well, thank you so much, John. You're

1228
01:18:04,920 --> 01:18:08,340
always welcome back and it's great to have you back. I know we probably waited a little too long

1229
01:18:08,380 --> 01:18:12,980
to bring you back, but if anyone has any questions, leave them down below. And how would you recommend

1230
01:18:13,200 --> 01:18:19,260
people connect with Quad9? So I'll try to keep a look out on the comments and answer what I can for

1231
01:18:19,320 --> 01:18:24,460
a bit. I would say take a look at our blog, quad9.net. We'll be revamping the website here

1232
01:18:24,600 --> 01:18:28,820
shortly, but we'll be keeping things up to date on the blog. Great. Thank you so much, John.

1233
01:18:29,160 --> 01:18:36,120
Thank you. And that is the interview with John Todd from Quad9. Again, this was a really good one,

1234
01:18:36,120 --> 01:18:39,820
and I had a lot of fun getting into the little details there, if you guys couldn't tell.

1235
01:18:40,160 --> 01:18:44,240
And so if you also enjoyed this, definitely make sure to give this podcast a rating.

1236
01:18:44,720 --> 01:18:49,240
Try to leave a review if you can. Those really do help Discovery, as well as sharing it with

1237
01:18:49,260 --> 01:18:53,940
people you know. And if you want to keep up with the latest threats and news without needing to

1238
01:18:54,120 --> 01:18:57,920
create your own RSS feeds and keep up with all the stuff and making it a part-time job,

1239
01:18:58,420 --> 01:19:02,740
that's my job to give to you. I'm supposed to be curating this stuff and keeping you all in the

1240
01:19:02,800 --> 01:19:07,000
loop. And so if you want to follow what that looks like, you can just follow our newsletter,

1241
01:19:07,360 --> 01:19:11,480
Surveillance Support, down in the description. And that's how you get just a weekly five-minute

1242
01:19:11,680 --> 01:19:15,640
read of everything you need to know about around the world. And that also has an accompanying

1243
01:19:16,020 --> 01:19:18,920
podcast if you want to just listen to our sister podcast, Surveillance Support.

1244
01:19:19,360 --> 01:19:22,200
Thank you all for listening and I'll see you next time on TechCore.