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The top secret slide that came out of the NSA at that time is realistic to think that they are

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intercepting millions of packages, routers, computers, and...

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Today I'm really excited to welcome on Michael Altfield, who's a software engineer, writer,

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security expert, and privacy advocate, who's mostly going to talk about bus kill.

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And I did that review quite a while ago, and yes, this review was recorded earlier this year.

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We're going to talk about what a dead man switch is in the situations in which,

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especially for high threat model people, it can come in handy.

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the reasons that he started Buskill, some real-world examples of where it's utilized,

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the Buskill community, open-source stuff, 3D printing, and of course, zooming out into more

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advocacy and why this stuff matters and why Michael cares a lot about security and different

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practical tips for all of you. Without further ado, let's get into the interview.

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Hello, everybody. I want to welcome Michael from Buskill. Do you want to introduce yourself a little

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bit? Sure. I'm Michael Altfield. I have a website, tech.michaelaltfield.net, where I've been writing

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about privacy and information security since about 2007, so almost 20 years now.

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Academically, I studied computer science with a focus on secure computing and networking,

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and professionally, I worked for many years as a Linux systems administrator,

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and most recently, I worked as a lead engineer for the cybersecurity team at a cryptocurrency bank in the EU,

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so pretty high-risk, highly-regulated environment.

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Currently, I'm the founder of an open-source hardware project called Buskill,

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which designs open-source software and open-source hardware for Deadman Switch,

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which is a USB kill cord with a magnetic breakaway in the middle that you tether from your body to

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your computer. Similar to kill cords on jet skis and treadmills. If you're separated from your

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computer then your computer will either lock, shut down or wipe its encryption keys. So right now I'm

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the owner of a company Allshake International that sells these Busco cables. Nice and then what kind of

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got you into the security space in the first place? How'd you get here? Computer science has always been

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pretty important to me. I always built websites as a kid just like the internet. I always kind of had

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had a passion for the internet as like a kind of egalitarian bi-directional communication system

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as opposed to like a unidirectional TV sort of cable system. And so, you know, I built websites

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and I guess I learned about HTTPS and I learned about how to protect those services and privacy,

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just security. They were always very important to me, especially when I realized that a lot of the

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early internet services just did not have security built in mind. And I know that I could send an email

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to my friends, my family, my lovers, and anybody else could read those emails, especially when I

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for doing those sorts of things to other people. I wanted to learn how to protect myself and

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how to teach others to protect themselves.

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Yeah. And then what timeline was that? Was that before encrypted email was a little bit

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more normalized?

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So PGP existed. I think I learned GPG when I was like 17 years old, probably sometime around

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2008. So I had this, there was this fun thing that I did when I was in the dorms where I set

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up like a computer monitor in a quarter of the room that just ran, you know, ran backtrack

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and it just watched in real time all the photos that everybody in the dorm was viewing on Facebook.

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This was pre-Snowden. After Snowden, they started doing HTTPS by default. So this is

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before Let's Encrypt even. So Facebook by default, if you typed in facebook.com in your browser,

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press enter, you would get on the HTTP website and then anybody else in that same network would

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be able to view your traffic. Yeah, no, it's kind of crazy how far things

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have come. And I know that attacks are still more sophisticated and it's always a cat and

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mouse game, but it's nice that those basic things aren't a problem anymore for most situations.

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What kind of led to the development of bus kill? And actually before we get into that,

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do you mind just giving a basic explanation to what a dead man switch is?

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Sure. A dead man switch is something that you connect usually to your body, to a machine.

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It has a fail-safe such that if you are disconnected in any way, then the machine will turn off.

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So this is a common thing, for example, for very high-powered, dangerous machinery.

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And again, like I mentioned, many people have encountered this at a gym when running on a treadmill.

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So if the speed is too fast and you fall off the back, then you have a little cable that you connect your body,

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and it will turn the motor off so that you don't get thrown off the back of the treadmill.

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Same thing for jet skis and boats.

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You have a dead man switch that you connect to your body, to the motor.

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And if you, for some reason, fall out of the boat, you don't want to be in the middle of the ocean with your boat.

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Just keep going. So it's the same thing. It turns off the motor.

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Yeah. And so this is the bus kill cable itself. It's very similar.

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Same idea. Just has a carabiner that you connect to a loop.

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And then this end connects to your computer.

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And again, the simplest action is it locks your screen, but it can also turn off the machine and as well wipe the encryption keys.

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As to answer the first question, why did I initially develop it?

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I was traveling. So I think a common use case is travelers. I've been a digital nomad for the

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majority of my life, majority of my career working as a Linux systems administrator, traveling around

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South America, Asia, North America. And I always felt super vulnerable whenever I was working. So

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I would frequently stay in just like cheap hostels with terrible Wi-Fi. And I would have to travel and

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commute to either a co-working space or a cafe or a library to get good internet enough to be able to

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do my job. And I found myself in those public spaces, logged into online banking or logged into

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the AWS console for a company that has, you know, as a systems administrator, I have root access to

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some systems. And if somebody stole my laptop after I had authenticated, of course, I used full

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disc encryption, I used two-factor authentication, but after I've authenticated, if somebody steals my

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laptop, then in that moment, especially with the help of a rubber ducky, they could cause an immense

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amount of financial harm to me or my employer. So I came back to the United States, I was living in

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York City and in 2017, that's when I built the first buskill prototype. It wasn't a product,

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it wasn't something I was intending to sell, and it was made with this. So it wasn't until a few

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years later I came up with the name Buskill, and I posted some links to Amazon for how people could

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buy this. This was literally the only USB-A magnetic breakaway cable adapter on the market.

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It went viral, which is surprising.

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Front page on Hacker News, all the journalists covered it.

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And then everybody bought these out.

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Like, literally, they went out of stock.

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Nobody could buy these anymore.

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People were asking me, how do I build these best-able cables?

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So that's when I realized that, because there was no other,

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well, actually, I contacted the manufacturer,

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and they told me that they were end of life,

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so I couldn't even resupply Amazon.

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So that's when I reached out to Crown Supply,

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and I started making these cables.

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When did you start making them?

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What was the first year?

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So I built the first prototype in 2017, and then I posted it out in 2020.

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And then in 2022 was when I raised $20,000 through crowdfunding, and shortly after that,

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started manufacturing them.

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Awesome.

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And are the ones that you're selling today the same version of the ones that you were

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selling originally, or have there been any developments?

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There's only been one development, that is from a prototype that was manufactured by some

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other manufacturer, where I was just like, buy this, buy this, buy this, and then build it

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yourself, to this, which is the one that I make.

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And we're doing a third production run. We just sold a bunch of cables to a really great company called Nova Custom. And that gave us the funds to be able to initiate our third production run. And we're sticking with the same design. We've gotten really good feedback. They're pretty durable. They use very durable magnets and people seem pretty happy with them. So we haven't felt a need to change the hardware design.

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Nice. And so it seems like I understand where this comes into play for somebody who might be a journalist or someone who's working with really sensitive information or even having to secure whatever information their employer might need to keep safe.

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I think that your examples of traveling around a lot make a ton of sense.

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But can you think of any other use cases for somebody who might just travel their coffee shop and get some work done?

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Do you think that there is a selling point for them to use a product like this?

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I think there is a limited niche market for this sort of thing. It is people who are more high risk

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or dealing with sensitive data. Obviously, everybody has sensitive data. You know that the whole

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the whole notion, I have nothing to hide, like, well, of course, you do your credit card number,

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don't you have that to hide? So if you're logged into Amazon, even, like, the amount of financial

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damage that they can do is not that significant compared to somebody who's doing cryptocurrency

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trading from a cafe or something. So the level of risk does vary. I think everybody could benefit

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because at some point, somebody has, well, I guess it's possible that some people are completely unbanked

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and they literally do not use any financial currencies online. And those people maybe,

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yeah, it's not so beneficial for, but I really do think most people could benefit somewhat. It's

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not the type of device I think that most people would use every day. But even me, I don't use my

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busco cable every day, but several times per year, specifically when I'm dealing with cryptocurrencies,

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or online banking or dealing with my taxes,

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when I have a ton of documents open with my social security number,

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that's usually when I pull out the buskill cable.

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Nice. And so let's dive into kind of the flexibility of the cable

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because you mentioned several times that you can change its behavior if it's triggered.

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So if you pick up your laptop and then the magnet breaks,

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you say you can either wipe the encryption keys, you can reboot the device, etc.

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So what are the different options that can be triggered when that's severed, essentially?

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Yeah, so if you use Linux, it's anything because it's scriptable.

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You can, the original design, I got some criticism when I first published about Buskill because it was a DIY guide for Linux hackers like myself.

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It was never intended to be easily accessible.

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And people said, oh, who actually runs Linux laptop?

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Maybe many of your viewers do.

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I understand everybody else doesn't.

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So I spent a lot of time between that when the press picked it up and I actually started manufacturing it to lower the barrier of entry significantly.

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I spent a large amount of time trying to make it more accessible.

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And now we have a GUI app that runs in Linux, Windows and Mac OS.

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And in that app, there's two options only.

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And this is very intentional.

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You can lock the screen or you can shut down.

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Sometimes people get very scared, rightfully so.

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When I say self-destruct wipe your encryption keys,

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there's a huge potential for data loss there.

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That is something that we intentionally raise the barrier of entry on.

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You cannot do that.

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Well, first of all, that only works for Linux.

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The self-destruct Lux header shredder trigger only works for Linux.

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It only works for Lux, and that will never be an option in the GUI.

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You have to edit on the command line to change that.

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And if you go down that route where you are setting up something on the command line using a UDev rule in Linux, you can run anything.

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You can write your own script and have trigger whatever you want.

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We've had some people, for example, interested in sending some sort of query to their server to wipe their server if their busful cable ever triggers.

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So that option is certainly, it's more flexible on Linux, but on Windows and macOS, there are currently only two options.

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Lock your screen and trigger a soft shutdown.

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Nice. Those all seem like very cool use cases.

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And the flexibility seems awesome.

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Has anyone out of curiosity set up some kind of false environment where if it's triggered, it might log into a different user account with false data?

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Is that possible?

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Just to kind of test the flexibility of it.

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Yeah, I mean, what comes to mind is Veracrypt hidden.

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I don't know how you could do that because you'd have to like reboot.

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I don't think you can do that live, right?

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You'd have to like reboot into a new environment.

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And I don't know how you could make it survive and remember that you want to go into the hidden

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volume after reboot.

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I think you would probably have to make some changes to Veracrypt software.

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I don't know if it's pluggable or expandable or something like that to make something like

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that work.

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That's an interesting idea, though.

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Could you maybe partition a drive and boot into a different partition?

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Is that something you could trigger?

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Well, I don't know if UEFI or BIOS works like that.

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Like, I don't know if you can say before you reboot, please reboot into this device.

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Got it.

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Got it.

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Interesting.

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I was just curious.

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It was an idea because I know there's like decoy login passcodes that you can use on some devices.

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Yeah, like a direct password.

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Yes.

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Yes.

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That's the word.

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I was just curious.

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It's really cool to offer that flexibility.

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Can you, I assume you can't have that on Windows and Mac OS, though, those unless, and I guess

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maybe this is good clarification, because you said there's only the two options on Windows

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and Mac OS, which is shut down and lock out of your user account.

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Can you still do the white one, or is it just not possible at all in those operating systems?

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It is not possible at all.

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The next one that I would like to do is Veracrypt, because once you get Veracrypt, I think that

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works in all platforms.

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So I would like to, it's on my backboard, it's on my to-do list. And if anybody would like to help with that, we did have a volunteer start to work on that. I think they got stuck on, you know, these operating systems sometimes don't like you to run sudo.

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You know, like if you want to overwrite the header and Veracrypt also has a footer, then you need to have root access.

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And that's a little bit tricky, especially like obviously you can escalate your program where it pops up a pop up and says, please type your password.

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But like if your door is being battered down by a battering ram and a bunch of bad people are coming with guns to take your computer away from you, you don't really have time to authenticate with your root password.

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So I haven't delved into that yet, but the code is halfway written, I think, for a vercript

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trigger.

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FileVault would be the next one on the list.

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And my experience developing on Apple's ecosystem is incredibly painful, to say the least.

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So, yeah, that is what would be required to make it available on those systems.

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Nice.

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And then on the Linux front, I assume that you just have a downloadable, executable or downloadable DMG for macOS or package.

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But on Linux, what's typically the main way that people install there?

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So we've got two options.

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If you have a Debian-based system, then you can simply do sudo apt-get install plus kill.

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It downloads fast.

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It's in the repos.

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It doesn't even have to download an executable.

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It's just Python directly executed with Python.

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So the source code is very safe, very secure.

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That's the best option if you have a Debian system.

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Otherwise, we have an app image which should work on everything else that's cryptographically verified.

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If you want to verify, if you want to know how you can verify that cryptographically,

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00:14:10,370 --> 00:14:14,300
go to our documentation, docs.buskill.in.

212
00:14:15,280 --> 00:14:15,400
Nice.

213
00:14:16,080 --> 00:14:19,640
And then was it a correct assumption with how macOS and Windows are done?

214
00:14:19,820 --> 00:14:21,620
Yeah, that's.dmgino.exe.

215
00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:22,400
Perfect.

216
00:14:23,940 --> 00:14:27,640
And then I assume there's really no easy way to do this on mobile devices.

217
00:14:28,170 --> 00:14:29,560
Do you mind explaining why?

218
00:14:29,900 --> 00:14:40,100
or maybe I'm wrong. It's actually more possible than you're suggesting. So Buskill originally

219
00:14:40,120 --> 00:14:46,680
was just a UDEF rule on Linux. From there, after I published that, some guy who was just

220
00:14:47,560 --> 00:14:51,760
anonymous on Twitter ported it over to Windows, which is awesome, within a few days or a couple

221
00:14:51,900 --> 00:14:58,599
weeks. But that wasn't very flexible. Somebody else made another version of Buskill. But then I kind

222
00:14:58,620 --> 00:15:02,980
of did a rewrite at some point, which is what we currently have with the KIVI framework in Python.

223
00:15:03,480 --> 00:15:09,820
And I specifically chose that because it supports Windows, Linux, Mac OS, iOS, Android, and Raspberry

224
00:15:09,940 --> 00:15:16,540
Pi. I don't know about the Raspberry Pi, but the point is that the GUI components, most of the code

225
00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:21,700
should already be fairly straightforward or over. The next part, which is my biggest concern,

226
00:15:22,320 --> 00:15:27,860
is how do you then actually implement a lock screen

227
00:15:28,080 --> 00:15:32,220
or a disk wipe or a shutdown?

228
00:15:33,900 --> 00:15:37,380
It's been my experience that Google and Apple

229
00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:39,900
doesn't let people own their devices, right?

230
00:15:40,180 --> 00:15:41,980
They don't like users doing these advanced functions.

231
00:15:42,520 --> 00:15:44,260
So I haven't looked into it too much.

232
00:15:44,340 --> 00:15:45,720
If any of your viewers are experts

233
00:15:46,260 --> 00:15:48,360
in developing for mobile platforms and you know better,

234
00:15:49,000 --> 00:15:49,880
please let me know.

235
00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:52,980
but I'm afraid that I would end up playing a cat and mouse game.

236
00:15:53,500 --> 00:15:57,720
And my biggest fear is giving an assurance to users that is not valid,

237
00:15:58,200 --> 00:16:00,120
such that they rely on it.

238
00:16:00,780 --> 00:16:04,900
Some people, if you're a whistleblower or a journalist or an activist,

239
00:16:05,050 --> 00:16:09,140
human rights defender, your life may literally depend on this technology working for you.

240
00:16:09,660 --> 00:16:13,900
And if Google pushes down an update that prevents apps from being able to lock their screen

241
00:16:14,250 --> 00:16:15,880
or wipe the encryption keys or something like that,

242
00:16:16,050 --> 00:16:19,320
and you're expecting it to work, but suddenly your phone updates and it no longer works,

243
00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:21,000
that could cause real serious harm.

244
00:16:21,580 --> 00:16:24,020
I don't see that being as much of a problem on desktops.

245
00:16:24,840 --> 00:16:27,280
But with mobile, I foresee that as a possibility.

246
00:16:27,420 --> 00:16:28,560
Again, if I'm wrong, please correct me.

247
00:16:29,020 --> 00:16:30,460
But anyway, it's possible.

248
00:16:31,220 --> 00:16:32,800
It's not our highest priority though right now.

249
00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:35,100
Yeah, do you mind?

250
00:16:35,940 --> 00:16:37,340
There's a lot of questions that stem from that,

251
00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:39,020
but maybe the first starting point is,

252
00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:42,300
do you have any, I guess, real world stories

253
00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:43,820
or situations that you're able to cover

254
00:16:44,120 --> 00:16:46,120
about journalists that you know who've used Buzzkill?

255
00:16:48,700 --> 00:16:49,560
You don't have to use names either.

256
00:16:49,640 --> 00:16:50,480
if you're not able to.

257
00:16:51,100 --> 00:16:53,000
Well, I mean, I make an intentional effort

258
00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:54,440
not to find out who my customers are.

259
00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:57,420
We have a website that's on the QueerNet.

260
00:16:57,470 --> 00:16:58,720
We also have a website on the DarkNet.

261
00:16:58,720 --> 00:16:59,680
You can go to our.onion site.

262
00:16:59,690 --> 00:17:00,420
You can pay with Monero.

263
00:17:00,820 --> 00:17:02,520
We make it a very intentional, strong effort

264
00:17:02,820 --> 00:17:04,160
to let people purchase it anonymously.

265
00:17:04,270 --> 00:17:05,760
And a lot of our customers take advantage of that.

266
00:17:06,620 --> 00:17:08,800
I can tell you that when I,

267
00:17:09,360 --> 00:17:11,579
the most visibility I had into my customers

268
00:17:11,920 --> 00:17:13,560
was when I did the crowdfunding.

269
00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:14,920
And in that case,

270
00:17:15,160 --> 00:17:16,420
some people had accounts with crowd supply

271
00:17:16,839 --> 00:17:18,759
and I could see the business names

272
00:17:18,839 --> 00:17:20,380
and some of them were penetration testing companies.

273
00:17:21,100 --> 00:17:24,540
So I don't know too many of that.

274
00:17:24,790 --> 00:17:26,480
I have heard from some activists.

275
00:17:26,770 --> 00:17:27,740
I think in the early days,

276
00:17:27,920 --> 00:17:29,020
back when I originally published it,

277
00:17:29,500 --> 00:17:30,880
some of the people who bought these out on Amazon,

278
00:17:31,460 --> 00:17:32,400
they were activists.

279
00:17:33,820 --> 00:17:37,180
But yeah, that is a question.

280
00:17:37,300 --> 00:17:38,060
It's a very good question.

281
00:17:38,090 --> 00:17:38,960
It's something I get a lot,

282
00:17:39,290 --> 00:17:41,740
but it's something I will probably never try to figure out

283
00:17:42,230 --> 00:17:43,840
because it's just best for my customers.

284
00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:47,499
Yeah, I guess maybe what I was maybe wondering about

285
00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:52,000
is not you getting insight into what they're using, but more so them going on.

286
00:17:52,380 --> 00:17:55,900
And I know it's probably not good OPSEC, but I have seen some journalists and activists

287
00:17:56,160 --> 00:17:57,800
maybe cover one or two tools they use.

288
00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:02,700
And maybe if they just went on socials and said, oh, like we use bus kits for our journalists.

289
00:18:03,300 --> 00:18:04,980
But they probably also don't want to announce that either.

290
00:18:05,620 --> 00:18:09,540
So I was just curious if you've seen any kind of publicity around that.

291
00:18:09,920 --> 00:18:13,240
Now to the community, it seems like there's been a lot of community involvement.

292
00:18:14,140 --> 00:18:16,300
What are some of the, did that surprise you at all?

293
00:18:16,580 --> 00:18:19,660
and what were some of the most, I guess, noteworthy community contributions?

294
00:18:21,680 --> 00:18:24,620
Yeah, I mean, like I said, after I published, of course I was surprised.

295
00:18:25,100 --> 00:18:28,300
When at FrontPage, I had journalists from all over the world in like 10 different languages

296
00:18:28,780 --> 00:18:31,160
messaging me and interviewing me, asking me about this thing.

297
00:18:31,160 --> 00:18:32,040
That was a huge surprise.

298
00:18:32,940 --> 00:18:37,040
And then, of course, with that going viral, a lot of people started contributing.

299
00:18:37,520 --> 00:18:38,740
Like I said, somebody poured it over to Windows.

300
00:18:38,900 --> 00:18:39,780
They didn't even contact me.

301
00:18:39,920 --> 00:18:42,280
I just saw on Twitter that somebody had made a Windows version of it.

302
00:18:42,320 --> 00:18:42,780
That was cool.

303
00:18:44,080 --> 00:18:50,400
Certainly surprising. One of the greatest contributions we have is a, I mean, so this is

304
00:18:51,010 --> 00:18:55,940
an injection molded version. You'd have to cut it open to verify the integrity of it. I'm not

305
00:18:56,240 --> 00:19:00,280
incredibly happy about that, but it is the lowest barrier of entry. Again, like making this thing

306
00:19:00,480 --> 00:19:06,200
accessible to journalists who are not tech savvy was very, very important to me. But from the very

307
00:19:06,360 --> 00:19:09,659
get-go, I wanted a 3D printed version so that people can make it themselves, wouldn't have to

308
00:19:09,680 --> 00:19:10,620
worry about the risk of interdiction.

309
00:19:11,670 --> 00:19:13,740
And Melanie Allen has done a great work there.

310
00:19:13,900 --> 00:19:15,920
She has been a wonderful contributor to Buskill.

311
00:19:17,240 --> 00:19:19,600
- Nice, and so both the hardware and software

312
00:19:19,610 --> 00:19:20,440
are open source, correct?

313
00:19:21,460 --> 00:19:21,940
- That's correct.

314
00:19:22,220 --> 00:19:25,540
Yeah, you can go on to, so github.com/buskill.

315
00:19:25,820 --> 00:19:27,100
You can find all our repos.

316
00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:29,280
The most important one is buskill-app,

317
00:19:29,500 --> 00:19:31,260
which is the application, the KV application

318
00:19:31,410 --> 00:19:32,200
I mentioned with the GUI.

319
00:19:32,890 --> 00:19:34,020
And then there's another one for,

320
00:19:34,800 --> 00:19:37,800
with both the STL files you need to print it,

321
00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:44,280
if you want to make your own or also this as well, the CAD file, the STL files for this is also on that repo.

322
00:19:45,000 --> 00:19:47,740
So do you mind explaining STL files as someone who doesn't do 3D printing?

323
00:19:47,870 --> 00:19:50,980
I assume that's just a common file format that you can use to print at home.

324
00:19:51,960 --> 00:19:56,080
Yeah, it's a file format that describes 3D objects.

325
00:19:56,790 --> 00:19:59,040
So that's the type of thing that you would throw into.

326
00:19:59,470 --> 00:20:04,460
So the sources for that are OpenSCAD, and I think I might have used FreeCAD.

327
00:20:04,860 --> 00:20:08,620
So the 3D printed version sources are OpenSCAD,

328
00:20:09,020 --> 00:20:11,580
and this version I used FreeCAD.

329
00:20:12,090 --> 00:20:14,000
So those are two different pieces of open source software

330
00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:15,680
that you can download to the objects.

331
00:20:16,250 --> 00:20:18,880
And then you can export from there,

332
00:20:19,480 --> 00:20:22,680
which I guess is somewhat lossy, an STL file.

333
00:20:22,820 --> 00:20:25,000
And then the STL file is what you would use.

334
00:20:26,200 --> 00:20:27,040
It's cross-platform.

335
00:20:27,660 --> 00:20:28,780
That's what you would use to import

336
00:20:28,850 --> 00:20:30,320
into your 3D printing software.

337
00:20:31,040 --> 00:20:33,159
- Okay, so let's say I'm...

338
00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:39,640
I'm an enthusiast. I want to build it myself. And perhaps even, would you argue, that's a good

339
00:20:40,160 --> 00:20:43,940
supply chain attack mitigation to create it yourself at home, perhaps?

340
00:20:44,750 --> 00:20:51,160
Yeah, absolutely. That's exactly why we do that. So for your listeners who aren't familiar with

341
00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:57,460
interdiction, this is a technique that is used commonly. The best insight I had into interdiction

342
00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:04,140
was some years ago when the CIA had a cyber warfare arsenal of zero days that they held.

343
00:21:04,340 --> 00:21:08,780
Rather than communicating them to the manufacturers like Cisco, which would have kept us all safer, they kept them secretly.

344
00:21:09,360 --> 00:21:10,920
And then they got hacked and they got leaked.

345
00:21:11,320 --> 00:21:12,920
And one of them was called the Angel.

346
00:21:13,760 --> 00:21:20,160
This was a hack on a Samsung TV that got a lot of press because it allowed them to remotely turn on your camera and watch you from your TV.

347
00:21:20,680 --> 00:21:21,640
So people didn't like that.

348
00:21:22,680 --> 00:21:31,320
But a lot of the news coverage talked about the way in which the CIA was able to infect these devices required them to first one time insert a USB drive into the device.

349
00:21:31,940 --> 00:21:34,860
So people said, oh, well, like the CIA isn't going to come into my home.

350
00:21:36,260 --> 00:21:36,900
And that was true.

351
00:21:38,120 --> 00:21:42,680
And there's a really good there's a really good interview that Jeremy Scal did with Edward Snowden on this.

352
00:21:43,060 --> 00:21:46,060
And people go, oh, well, the CIA is not going to be breaking into my house.

353
00:21:46,250 --> 00:21:48,400
Right. And that's actually true.

354
00:21:48,740 --> 00:21:54,000
What they do is they wait for when these devices are being shipped to you, when you order them on Amazon or whatever.

355
00:21:54,560 --> 00:21:56,340
They go to them at the airports.

356
00:21:56,810 --> 00:21:57,720
They get the box.

357
00:21:58,250 --> 00:22:00,460
They use a little hairdryer to soften the adhesive.

358
00:22:00,700 --> 00:22:01,700
They open up the box.

359
00:22:02,360 --> 00:22:03,940
Then they put the USB stick in it.

360
00:22:04,330 --> 00:22:06,280
They seal the box back all nice and perfect.

361
00:22:06,960 --> 00:22:08,060
And then they ship it on to you.

362
00:22:08,110 --> 00:22:11,940
And now your router, your computer, your TV is hacked.

363
00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:13,960
This is a very routine thing that happens.

364
00:22:14,090 --> 00:22:15,800
They don't actually go into your home.

365
00:22:16,160 --> 00:22:21,000
These people will instead install these special rooms in airports.

366
00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:24,880
And when we order from Amazon, that's when they install the implants.

367
00:22:25,260 --> 00:22:26,540
So this is called prediction.

368
00:22:27,740 --> 00:22:36,220
And I believe the slides, the top secret slides that came out of the NSA at that time, I think it was from 2003, the slides were, they were released in 2013.

369
00:22:37,380 --> 00:22:45,840
They were boasting about them doing, I think it was a little shy of a million of these interdiction attacks per year on people globally.

370
00:22:46,660 --> 00:22:49,960
And they were boasting about how they wanted to increase it beyond a million.

371
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:59,680
So now, a decade later, two decades later, it's realistic to think that they are intercepting millions of packages, routers, computers, and interdicting them.

372
00:22:59,690 --> 00:23:06,580
And of course, it would be a tasty target for them to go after people, human rights defenders, journalists who are buying busco cables.

373
00:23:06,780 --> 00:23:10,440
So for us, it was very important to provide a way for people to be able to print their own.

374
00:23:12,280 --> 00:23:12,980
Does that answer your question?

375
00:23:13,320 --> 00:23:13,960
No, it does.

376
00:23:14,330 --> 00:23:17,280
And I think that's really important, I guess.

377
00:23:17,340 --> 00:23:22,720
So I'm guessing, and this is really hard to give personalized advice for different situations,

378
00:23:23,000 --> 00:23:26,940
but my assumption is that probably the least safe thing that someone in a situation can

379
00:23:27,120 --> 00:23:32,000
do is order online with their full name to their address, because that signals you're ordering

380
00:23:32,200 --> 00:23:36,820
something from, it doesn't matter if it's an iPad, a Linux laptop, or a buskill.

381
00:23:37,260 --> 00:23:41,858
If your name is attached to it, then there's probably a way for that to be targeted in some

382
00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:48,200
way. I assume the next best thing is to buy it yourself from a store, like going to an Apple store

383
00:23:48,230 --> 00:23:52,760
and paying cash for a device. I'm assuming it's less likely that anyone can be targeted via that

384
00:23:52,940 --> 00:23:56,500
avenue. But I'm sure the best case scenario, like you said, is just to build it from home. Are those

385
00:23:56,630 --> 00:24:00,440
all probably good assumptions? Those are the different levels. If you build it yourself,

386
00:24:00,810 --> 00:24:05,539
like God help you, that is hard. I haven't even done that. Melanie Allen is an expert. You can find

387
00:24:05,560 --> 00:24:12,420
stuff on that. But be aware that is very difficult. So we do try our best as we can. I mean, we have

388
00:24:12,510 --> 00:24:15,720
to ship Adams through the mail, right? There's no getting around that. We have to put a name and an

389
00:24:15,810 --> 00:24:19,600
address on a package. We need to get an email address. But I think we do as best as we can. So

390
00:24:19,630 --> 00:24:27,300
if you want to avoid interdiction, buy from our.onion site, use Tor, use Tails, use a fake name,

391
00:24:27,580 --> 00:24:32,158
use the name of a neighbor, of a friend, of a family member, ship it to them, use an anonymous

392
00:24:32,180 --> 00:24:36,640
email address. All of these things are fine as as long as you know in some countries if you use the

393
00:24:36,780 --> 00:24:39,740
wrong name that they won't deliver that's not an issue in the United States but in Germany for

394
00:24:39,880 --> 00:24:43,320
example if your name doesn't actually match what's written on the door they will not deliver it.

395
00:24:43,630 --> 00:24:50,120
So you know you have to be aware of those sorts of things but yeah we do our best using these tools

396
00:24:50,440 --> 00:24:56,560
Tor and Monero to be able to allow people to avoid interdiction but as you said yes you can buy it

397
00:24:56,560 --> 00:25:02,140
in store. I'm very happy that we now have I've yet to find a single brick and mortar in the entire

398
00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:05,360
States that sells privacy hardware. If anybody knows of one, please let me know. I'd love to

399
00:25:05,500 --> 00:25:10,900
reach out to them. But Europe is full of them. So we now sell out of brick and mortar at proxy

400
00:25:11,140 --> 00:25:17,540
store in Leipzig, Germany and in the Netherlands. Nova Custom also through a special collaboration.

401
00:25:17,950 --> 00:25:24,000
They now allow people to pay in cash, go to their office. It's not even a retail store. You have to

402
00:25:24,080 --> 00:25:27,380
make an appointment beforehand, but you can go to their office, pay with cash and pick up a bus

403
00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:31,980
cable there. And that obviously is the best way. Super cool. And we also are going to be interviewing

404
00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:36,900
the main person behind Nova Customs. So watch out for that. And I think they do mention the

405
00:25:37,000 --> 00:25:42,380
Buskill partnership as well there. So yeah, he's nice. He's really great. That's really good to

406
00:25:42,500 --> 00:25:47,100
hear. And I didn't I saw I sent you an email hoping saying that hopefully they send you a laptop. And

407
00:25:47,100 --> 00:25:50,660
I didn't realize I watched your video the other day seeing you hold it out. That was really cool

408
00:25:50,720 --> 00:25:54,700
to see. Yeah, yeah, no, it's been really fun to play with. And actually, what would be really

409
00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:58,200
awesome is to, and this is actually a good question to get on topic, because they sent

410
00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:04,220
me a laptop with Cubes. So what's the compatibility like with Buskill and maybe more niche operating

411
00:26:04,410 --> 00:26:10,580
systems like Cubes, Tails, Hoonix, etc.? Yeah, great question. So as I said, I first built

412
00:26:10,580 --> 00:26:16,680
a Buskill cable with this thing back in 2017. I was using Cubes at the time. So from the

413
00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:20,420
ground up, the first day running, before I even started making these things to sell to

414
00:26:20,420 --> 00:26:24,680
other people, yeah, Cubes was supported. That's what I was using. It is, of course, a little

415
00:26:24,700 --> 00:26:28,560
complicated. I think if you're using cubes, you're probably okay using the command line. You do have

416
00:26:28,560 --> 00:26:33,440
to use the command line because the way it works with sys.usb, you have to then use some other cube

417
00:26:33,540 --> 00:26:40,060
to copy the files into DOM zero because you do need some files to live in DOM zero. And you can

418
00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:46,480
read very easily the files you have to install. It's like less than 50 lines. You can very easily read

419
00:26:46,480 --> 00:26:50,520
them and understand them. For people who aren't familiar with cubes, I'd say that, and correct me

420
00:26:50,540 --> 00:26:55,120
me if I'm wrong. The best way to describe DOM zero is kind of like the manager of everything

421
00:26:55,230 --> 00:26:59,420
else that you do on cubes. It's kind of, I'm still trying to figure out the best way to describe

422
00:26:59,580 --> 00:27:04,340
DOM zero to people who haven't used cubes. Maybe you're better at this. Yeah, I write for a pretty

423
00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:09,480
technical audience. Sorry. The hypervisor is the appropriate term. But yeah, you're right. The

424
00:27:09,710 --> 00:27:14,800
manager, it's the thing that has the most privilege. So like, if you gain access to this thing,

425
00:27:15,230 --> 00:27:20,500
then it can have access to all of your other VMs, which are supposed to be isolated, right? So you

426
00:27:20,520 --> 00:27:25,820
sure you don't install software in DOM zero. You don't give internet access to DOM zero.

427
00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:31,300
Actually, that's not true. But you try to minimize as much the surface area for attack with DOM zero.

428
00:27:32,700 --> 00:27:37,220
Yeah, hopefully that makes sense. It's kind of like a super, it's the equivalent in my end,

429
00:27:37,220 --> 00:27:40,520
if you use Windows, and you have an administrative account, and then a standard user account,

430
00:27:40,940 --> 00:27:45,860
you want to do as much as you can in a standard user account to maybe prevent admin access being

431
00:27:45,880 --> 00:27:50,400
abused and the admin account kind of manages the guest account the way cubes is run is all through

432
00:27:50,520 --> 00:27:56,160
virtual machines and dom zero is kind of controlling the virtual machines so hopefully that's yeah i'd

433
00:27:56,160 --> 00:27:59,840
say that's that's right and that's kind of on steroids too because like you still have to use

434
00:27:59,840 --> 00:28:03,580
the administrator account fairly commonly like on windows like if you want to install software but

435
00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:08,000
like you can come administrator inside the vms and then you don't have that much power like you're

436
00:28:08,060 --> 00:28:11,940
able to do administrator action in cubes such that you don't actually need to become administrator on

437
00:28:11,960 --> 00:28:17,680
DOM zero. So you have to use even less than you would on Windows. But that's generally good way to

438
00:28:17,700 --> 00:28:22,340
put it. Sorry to cut you off. If you don't mind. Continue. I just wanted to make sure people weren't

439
00:28:22,460 --> 00:28:28,060
lost. Compatibility for cubes and tails and all these devices. Yeah. So cubes was from the get-go

440
00:28:28,760 --> 00:28:34,640
what was originally Buskill was designed for and then ported. Actually, so I kind of lied. In the

441
00:28:34,760 --> 00:28:40,899
original article that I published, I published it for an audience of Ubuntu. So I ported it to Ubuntu

442
00:28:40,920 --> 00:28:44,960
for the general audience because I knew that not that many people use cubesOS, but that was originally

443
00:28:45,140 --> 00:28:51,240
what it was designed for. And then with Tails, that was pretty easy. So like if you, so Tails has a

444
00:28:51,340 --> 00:28:56,120
built-in, you don't have to use the app, the bus field app in Tails at all. Tails has a built-in

445
00:28:57,400 --> 00:29:02,300
emergency shutdown sequence such that if you just yank the drive out of your computer really fast,

446
00:29:02,560 --> 00:29:09,060
it wipes its RAM and powers off super fast. This is a really great feature, but it's, you know, if

447
00:29:09,080 --> 00:29:11,720
If somebody batters your door down with a battery ram,

448
00:29:13,020 --> 00:29:14,620
can you actually yank this thing out?

449
00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:17,240
Will you have the presence of mind to yank this thing out

450
00:29:17,320 --> 00:29:19,960
before they grab at you and steal your laptop away?

451
00:29:20,620 --> 00:29:22,460
So that's where Buskill actually comes in handy.

452
00:29:22,540 --> 00:29:24,900
You're able to connect your Tails USB,

453
00:29:25,520 --> 00:29:26,900
not a specific Buskill USB,

454
00:29:26,980 --> 00:29:28,620
the same USB drive that you're using with Tails,

455
00:29:28,840 --> 00:29:31,880
because again, Tails is the amnesic incognito live system.

456
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,220
It's a live system that runs from your USB drive.

457
00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:35,300
So if you're using Tails,

458
00:29:35,340 --> 00:29:36,900
you're necessarily using a USB drive already.

459
00:29:37,560 --> 00:29:43,720
If you instead of plugging into your computer directly, you plug it into your buskill cable and connect that to your body.

460
00:29:44,210 --> 00:29:51,580
Then if somebody snatches your Tails computer away from you, then it executes that emergency shutdown fairly effectively.

461
00:29:51,690 --> 00:29:54,940
So you don't have to worry about whether or not you'll be able to yank it out at time.

462
00:29:56,560 --> 00:30:01,220
Tails, Cubes, and then yeah, Windows and macOS Linux are all supported with the GUI.

463
00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:02,680
Super random.

464
00:30:03,670 --> 00:30:04,680
Does it support Chromebooks?

465
00:30:05,940 --> 00:30:11,240
I haven't touched Chromebooks because they seem pretty locked down, not very useful.

466
00:30:12,560 --> 00:30:13,200
Good question.

467
00:30:14,780 --> 00:30:16,080
Can you run Python on a Chromebook?

468
00:30:17,280 --> 00:30:17,560
I don't know.

469
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:19,540
There's probably a way to do it.

470
00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:20,860
There's a way to do a lot of things.

471
00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:23,580
People even install Linux on Chromebooks, depending on the model.

472
00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:28,540
But it's okay if we don't know.

473
00:30:30,140 --> 00:30:38,740
If you can run Python interpreter and if you can install, if you can download the Python libraries, then you should be able to use.

474
00:30:39,640 --> 00:30:40,700
Then the question is the triggers.

475
00:30:41,500 --> 00:30:42,680
You should definitely be able to open the app.

476
00:30:43,980 --> 00:30:48,260
I don't know if Chromebooks use X screensaver or some of the other locked screens.

477
00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:49,380
It should support shutdown.

478
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:55,100
But yeah, anyway, if there's any watchers who have a Chromebook, please try it.

479
00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:55,580
Let me know.

480
00:30:55,800 --> 00:30:59,060
And if it doesn't work, open a ticket on our GitHub, and I'd be happy to look into that.

481
00:30:59,780 --> 00:31:01,200
Well, I need your help, though, because I don't have a Chromebook.

482
00:31:02,740 --> 00:31:05,000
Yeah, just a quick search.

483
00:31:05,260 --> 00:31:06,680
I don't see anyone who's looked for this.

484
00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:12,480
So I don't think it's going to be a super popular search term, but I was just curious.

485
00:31:13,100 --> 00:31:19,080
Yeah, I guess just to zoom out a little bit in terms of like overall privacy and maybe tailoring this more to the average person.

486
00:31:19,960 --> 00:31:22,600
What got you involved into privacy and advocacy in general?

487
00:31:24,660 --> 00:31:26,980
Again, I mean, I was I was super passionate about the Internet.

488
00:31:27,860 --> 00:31:34,320
This egalitarian method of bidirectional communication and a lot of the early protocols did not have security in place.

489
00:31:34,800 --> 00:31:40,800
You know, like I would like to be able to send my credit card to my lover and like say, hey, you can pay with dinner for this.

490
00:31:41,010 --> 00:31:42,060
You can pay for dinner with this.

491
00:31:42,900 --> 00:31:43,600
Something like that.

492
00:31:43,750 --> 00:31:50,880
It shouldn't be, we shouldn't have to think especially about what PII and what is not PII.

493
00:31:51,160 --> 00:31:54,560
Like we should just be able to use tools that we can send whatever we want because we know they're secure.

494
00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:58,680
And I don't know, for some reason, that was just always very inherently important to me.

495
00:31:59,520 --> 00:32:03,560
Yeah. And then how do you think the space has kind of evolved since you felt that way?

496
00:32:03,820 --> 00:32:07,400
Are you happy with how things are going now in 2024, almost 2025?

497
00:32:08,340 --> 00:32:09,180
Or are you?

498
00:32:09,420 --> 00:32:14,460
Well, there's, you know, there's some legislation anti-encryption that I'm certainly concerned about.

499
00:32:14,740 --> 00:32:18,860
I would love to see like constitutional protection for encryption.

500
00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:21,080
Like we have, you know, we have like a Bill of Rights.

501
00:32:21,260 --> 00:32:27,740
It would be nice if we would add to the Bill of Rights that it's not allowed to block encrypted apps.

502
00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:35,300
But, you know, at the same time, pre-Snowden, when I was ringing on the bell saying,

503
00:32:36,100 --> 00:32:41,400
people can watch your Facebook, people can read your emails, I was the tinfoil hat paranoid person.

504
00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:46,240
But after Snowden, we realized that, yeah, this is normal and Let's Encrypt came out.

505
00:32:46,420 --> 00:32:49,500
Facebook started turning HTTPS on by default.

506
00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:53,040
So yeah, certainly things have changed a lot.

507
00:32:53,500 --> 00:32:54,660
I'm very happy about that.

508
00:32:55,570 --> 00:33:01,520
But we can't let our guard down because it's always a risk that we'll lose the freedoms that we have.

509
00:33:02,600 --> 00:33:05,000
Yeah, out of curiosity, because it sounds like you've done a lot of traveling.

510
00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:13,580
What's been your opinion of how people view privacy and digital rights between different regions that you've been in?

511
00:33:14,140 --> 00:33:14,960
It varies a lot.

512
00:33:15,450 --> 00:33:17,800
I would say that a lot of people just do not care.

513
00:33:17,980 --> 00:33:22,940
A lot of countries have a lot of requirements for you to give your PII in very insecure ways.

514
00:33:24,380 --> 00:33:26,260
And most people just don't care.

515
00:33:26,700 --> 00:33:27,440
It's pretty sad.

516
00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:32,560
But has there been any place where you felt it was better?

517
00:33:33,840 --> 00:33:33,960
Yeah.

518
00:33:34,920 --> 00:33:36,400
Surprisingly, the U.S. isn't that bad.

519
00:33:39,500 --> 00:33:43,280
There certainly are problems in the United States, but also Germany.

520
00:33:44,780 --> 00:33:46,680
Germany has some very good laws.

521
00:33:47,160 --> 00:33:50,500
For example, if you do Google Street View,

522
00:33:50,770 --> 00:33:53,800
like maybe your listeners can do this as an experiment,

523
00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:55,680
just like drop a pin somewhere in Berlin

524
00:33:55,890 --> 00:33:57,520
and like drive around with Google Street View,

525
00:33:57,580 --> 00:33:59,240
you'll see whole blocks are just blurred out.

526
00:33:59,700 --> 00:34:02,080
Like whole buildings, not like somebody's faces

527
00:34:02,300 --> 00:34:04,240
and a license plate, the whole thing just blurred out

528
00:34:04,660 --> 00:34:06,580
because they have some very strict laws

529
00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:08,000
about cameras and public spaces there.

530
00:34:08,520 --> 00:34:09,280
I didn't know that was why.

531
00:34:09,460 --> 00:34:10,159
When I was in Berlin,

532
00:34:10,429 --> 00:34:13,540
I was actually trying to locate some areas

533
00:34:13,879 --> 00:34:16,080
and that was a massive issue of mine.

534
00:34:16,360 --> 00:34:18,139
So I can actually speak to this.

535
00:34:19,790 --> 00:34:21,860
But definitely experiment on your own and see what it's like.

536
00:34:21,870 --> 00:34:29,320
Are there any other locations you've seen like Germany that seem to have a few more, I guess, forward-thinking privacy views?

537
00:34:29,370 --> 00:34:35,639
I'm sorry to say that the majority of my experiences have been on the other side of the spectrum where I was just surprised that the culture did not value privacy.

538
00:34:36,460 --> 00:34:36,600
Yeah.

539
00:34:36,909 --> 00:34:37,899
Why do you think Germany is like that?

540
00:34:38,010 --> 00:34:45,540
I've seen a lot of, I know, I interviewed Hannah from Tudor, who's a German company, and she definitely cited a lot of history in Germany that would result in that.

541
00:34:45,679 --> 00:34:46,200
But do you?

542
00:34:46,379 --> 00:34:46,840
Yeah, exactly.

543
00:34:47,179 --> 00:34:47,540
It's the Stasi.

544
00:34:48,419 --> 00:34:48,540
Yeah.

545
00:34:49,320 --> 00:34:49,700
That makes sense.

546
00:34:50,000 --> 00:34:53,740
Regarding privacy, I feel like something that a lot of people don't consider.

547
00:34:55,700 --> 00:35:00,900
So people, usually the people who say, I have nothing to hide, are also being extremely inconsiderate.

548
00:35:01,040 --> 00:35:07,820
For example, when they hand over their device to authorities, because it's not just your device, it's not just your information on your device.

549
00:35:08,340 --> 00:35:10,800
It's also the information of other people on your device.

550
00:35:11,320 --> 00:35:11,940
All your communications.

551
00:35:12,380 --> 00:35:24,140
But in order for me, I think ethically, for me to hand over my device with my own PII, a device that I own, I would need to get consent from every single other person I've ever communicated with.

552
00:35:24,540 --> 00:35:25,960
Because you don't know what their situation is.

553
00:35:26,300 --> 00:35:30,920
Even if you're just sending a message casually to somebody or even a missed call, that could be a refugee.

554
00:35:31,020 --> 00:35:32,340
That could be a domestic abuse survivor.

555
00:35:32,760 --> 00:35:34,400
And you could be literally putting their life on the line.

556
00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:51,340
And I feel like we have a common defense where we describe how, of course, everybody has something to hide, but we don't focus a lot on other people's data and how you are responsible for them and how irreprehensible it is to give up their data as well.

557
00:35:52,240 --> 00:35:55,760
Have you heard of Kerry Parker from Firewalls Don't Stop Dragons?

558
00:35:56,440 --> 00:35:57,180
Oh, I have not.

559
00:35:57,780 --> 00:36:01,360
He runs a podcast and he also writes a book called Firewalls Don't Stop Dragons.

560
00:36:01,640 --> 00:36:06,380
And I'd say the target demographic is just very beginner people.

561
00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:10,280
The book is meant for someone who's never touched privacy or security and just wants to learn the basics.

562
00:36:10,560 --> 00:36:16,140
And I think the first, the book starts with this concept of privacy isn't about you, it's about we.

563
00:36:16,860 --> 00:36:24,700
And I think it's a really important topic because it really shows the interconnectedness of if you're not communicating securely, it doesn't just impact you, it impacts everybody else around you.

564
00:36:25,300 --> 00:36:35,940
If you're enabling iCloud backups without end-to-end encryption, even if you're using end-to-end encryption, you might still be, you know, exposing someone else's messages to Apple, even if they're not even doing backups.

565
00:36:36,220 --> 00:36:44,920
So it's a very widespread problem. And I think a lot of people in our community, even, it's very common for people to only see what they can do.

566
00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:52,100
And I think that's super important because most people don't even do that, but they always forget the more network effect of it, too.

567
00:36:52,180 --> 00:36:53,500
So I'm really glad that you brought that up.

568
00:36:55,280 --> 00:36:57,520
How's it been with, I guess, people in your life?

569
00:36:57,590 --> 00:37:01,320
Are they receptive to advice or the things you want to do?

570
00:37:01,500 --> 00:37:03,540
Is there any challenges that you commonly stumble on?

571
00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:09,520
Yeah, a lot of, I have mixed, right?

572
00:37:09,580 --> 00:37:14,280
I do lead operations security training courses, and a lot of people are very receptive.

573
00:37:14,410 --> 00:37:19,860
If somebody tells me that they want to attend one of my, like, one hour long operations security

574
00:37:20,020 --> 00:37:22,020
training courses, then things are pretty good.

575
00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:27,980
but there are other people that just don't care at all and they think i'm paranoid and you know like

576
00:37:28,500 --> 00:37:34,380
i i can cite the same thing like that we we have it's it's not wearing a tinfoil hat when you're

577
00:37:34,400 --> 00:37:38,220
reading the top secret documents that the nsa released which they don't refute like if you

578
00:37:38,460 --> 00:37:44,000
read what happened with in the church committee like it's not tinfoil hat to be aware of these

579
00:37:44,020 --> 00:37:47,819
sorts of things but some people i don't know for some reason they just close off their ears

580
00:37:48,240 --> 00:37:51,020
and it's not even that they don't care,

581
00:37:51,300 --> 00:37:52,720
but yes, I do have some people that think

582
00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:53,580
that I'm just completely insane.

583
00:37:54,680 --> 00:37:55,720
Yeah, it's going to happen.

584
00:37:57,180 --> 00:38:00,260
I haven't stumbled on it as much as I thought I would,

585
00:38:00,460 --> 00:38:04,480
but I think it's one of the most difficult things on my end.

586
00:38:04,680 --> 00:38:07,160
People almost think I'm different than them

587
00:38:07,460 --> 00:38:09,540
because of the channel, right?

588
00:38:09,700 --> 00:38:12,040
Because it's something that we do

589
00:38:12,100 --> 00:38:13,120
and it has popularity.

590
00:38:13,460 --> 00:38:15,279
For some reason, that makes it more legitimate

591
00:38:15,300 --> 00:38:21,040
in their view, which I think is really malicious in a lot of ways. Because ultimately, like what

592
00:38:21,080 --> 00:38:25,140
I'm talking about, I think if a lot of other people said it, they would, and not even in the

593
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:29,000
context of you, but like if my friends share what I say, but it comes from their mouth,

594
00:38:29,060 --> 00:38:32,960
it comes across as differently as if something is a little bit more established. And in that case,

595
00:38:33,020 --> 00:38:37,560
I think that what you do with buskill is very legitimizing for your points and what you're doing.

596
00:38:39,200 --> 00:38:43,339
And that might actually help you in some ways, but it shouldn't make a difference. Because like

597
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:47,380
you said, the information is out there. It exists and tuning it out doesn't really help anybody.

598
00:38:48,620 --> 00:38:55,240
Well, I do want to say that I do appreciate skepticism. And it also speaks to your credibility

599
00:38:55,760 --> 00:39:01,800
that people take what you say more truthfully. I guess to kind of start entering the final stages

600
00:39:02,140 --> 00:39:06,400
of the interview, I kind of wanted to just get some of your thoughts about maybe people listening.

601
00:39:07,500 --> 00:39:11,079
I always kind of like to ask people, or I guess not always, it's a new thing that I'm trying to

602
00:39:11,100 --> 00:39:15,940
ask people, like, what are some of your go-to privacy tips and security tips for people who

603
00:39:15,970 --> 00:39:19,860
might be listening to this for the first time? Maybe they just read about Buskill and they

604
00:39:20,180 --> 00:39:23,160
entered this interview. What do you normally suggest to those people?

605
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:30,720
Usually, so in my operations security training course, it takes about an hour. It's pretty long,

606
00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:34,360
but I always tell people that if they get nothing else out of it, if their eyes are going to roll

607
00:39:34,440 --> 00:39:38,180
back in their heads, I always snap at the password section and try to get their attention to say,

608
00:39:38,320 --> 00:39:41,100
If you get nothing else, use a password that's longer than 20 characters.

609
00:39:42,520 --> 00:39:44,420
Use a unique password for every account.

610
00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:52,540
And then, of course, I follow that up with, yeah, that's insane for me to say that you have 100 accounts and you have a unique password that's 20 characters long for each account.

611
00:39:54,280 --> 00:39:57,260
That necessitates KeePass or some password manager.

612
00:39:57,620 --> 00:40:04,020
So I would say the most important thing is, yeah, to protect your accounts with strong passwords, random passwords generated in KeePass.

613
00:40:04,560 --> 00:40:06,380
And then the thing after that, of course, is do factor authentication.

614
00:40:07,500 --> 00:40:13,780
Really cool. Actually, this is super random. Speaking of keypath, I just remembered that some keypath clients integrate with security keys.

615
00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:23,020
Has there ever been a consideration to add some kind of FIDO integration with Buskill so that when you plug it in, it also functions as a security key?

616
00:40:25,380 --> 00:40:26,860
You mean to unlock your computer?

617
00:40:29,140 --> 00:40:33,180
To unlock or actually function as like how a YubiKey would on websites.

618
00:40:34,820 --> 00:40:38,460
Well, so there is people who have already done that.

619
00:40:38,500 --> 00:40:41,060
There are people who use UB keys for buskill

620
00:40:41,280 --> 00:40:43,680
because what the device that,

621
00:40:43,860 --> 00:40:45,800
what the USB device that enumerates in buskill is

622
00:40:46,120 --> 00:40:46,600
does not matter.

623
00:40:46,980 --> 00:40:48,060
I mean, you can buy a cheaper,

624
00:40:48,680 --> 00:40:50,700
this cable costs $100, sorry,

625
00:40:50,760 --> 00:40:52,800
this cable costs $50,

626
00:40:53,560 --> 00:40:55,040
and then the whole kit,

627
00:40:55,120 --> 00:40:57,440
which includes the rest of this, is $100.

628
00:40:57,960 --> 00:40:59,600
But if you want, you can just use your own device.

629
00:40:59,840 --> 00:41:00,700
And some people do that,

630
00:41:00,820 --> 00:41:02,859
and I have seen some blogs on the internet

631
00:41:03,240 --> 00:41:05,380
of people using YubiKeys.

632
00:41:05,940 --> 00:41:07,580
As for unlocking the machine,

633
00:41:08,240 --> 00:41:10,040
I wouldn't condone that.

634
00:41:10,140 --> 00:41:11,140
I don't know if it's possible.

635
00:41:11,300 --> 00:41:12,860
I think it might be.

636
00:41:14,620 --> 00:41:15,140
But in general,

637
00:41:16,180 --> 00:41:18,800
I think it's an abuse of hardware security keys

638
00:41:18,880 --> 00:41:19,640
to go passwordless.

639
00:41:21,320 --> 00:41:24,100
I think hardware security keys should be used

640
00:41:24,480 --> 00:41:25,520
for two-factor authentication.

641
00:41:25,720 --> 00:41:27,360
And unfortunately, I do see a lot of rollout

642
00:41:27,380 --> 00:41:29,120
where people just use it as one factor.

643
00:41:31,200 --> 00:41:35,780
of so buskill isn't the first thing in the world that can lock your computer when you step away

644
00:41:36,300 --> 00:41:40,240
before buskill there's a lot of radio based solutions there's a lot of apps you can download

645
00:41:40,700 --> 00:41:45,520
such that uh when you're when bluetooth from your device to your phone uh is disconnected it

646
00:41:45,660 --> 00:41:50,960
automatically locks unfortunately that's extremely insecure because most of them are designed to

647
00:41:51,130 --> 00:41:55,639
unlock a computer when you return that's just terrible that doesn't i mean okay everybody has

648
00:41:55,660 --> 00:42:01,960
their own risk models. Everybody has their own cases that they need to protect against. But

649
00:42:02,080 --> 00:42:08,540
buskill is not designed for those sorts of people. Also, like radio, Bluetooth is notoriously

650
00:42:09,180 --> 00:42:16,120
flappy. So there's a very long delay to cover false positives. So it's going to be delayed.

651
00:42:16,280 --> 00:42:19,680
If somebody steals your phone, they'll be able to unlock a computer. If somebody gets your Yubi

652
00:42:19,680 --> 00:42:25,620
key, like they could just steal your Yubi key once they steal your computer and plug it in. That

653
00:42:25,640 --> 00:42:30,920
appropriate for buskill. Right. Okay. But as a 2FA method, it is possible because that's how I use

654
00:42:30,920 --> 00:42:38,000
my YubiKey is as a 2FA method. So theoretically, someone can use the YubiKey to use it as MFA

655
00:42:38,380 --> 00:42:41,400
when they're logging into a website and it's still integrated with buskill at the same time.

656
00:42:42,040 --> 00:42:46,020
Absolutely. Yeah. If you're asking about unlocking your computer, that's different. But just for

657
00:42:46,260 --> 00:42:50,100
logging into a website as you normally use it, of course, yeah, this buskill cable is basically just

658
00:42:50,120 --> 00:42:55,680
a USB extension cord with a magnetic breakaway in the middle. So you can use it like if you wanted

659
00:42:55,820 --> 00:42:59,780
to, you could use a webcam with this. And then when the webcam is disconnected, bus kill will

660
00:42:59,800 --> 00:43:05,820
still trigger and the webcam will function normally. A UV key as well. What's the balance of, I think

661
00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:12,200
this is a situation where security through obscurity might be somewhat important. Do you think that it

662
00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:17,880
might jeopardize someone if you see someone in a cafe with a bus kill that they might be more of a

663
00:43:17,900 --> 00:43:20,700
person of interest than if you're just a regular person at a cafe.

664
00:43:21,660 --> 00:43:27,240
For the person that recently commented on slash R slash netsec, somebody said that like buskill is

665
00:43:27,290 --> 00:43:33,500
no longer a useful tool because everybody knows about it. I disagree quickly. I mean, this thing is

666
00:43:33,620 --> 00:43:39,640
like, it's not obvious at all. It looks like a power cable or any other USB cable. It's just a

667
00:43:39,760 --> 00:43:43,720
black cable that runs down. This is connected to your body. So like in your pants, it just looks

668
00:43:43,740 --> 00:43:50,020
like a key ring. No, I don't think that Buskill is obvious that you're using it. I mean, the only

669
00:43:50,180 --> 00:43:57,340
thing, if you look very, very closely, you can see that it says Buskill in the injection mold print,

670
00:43:57,380 --> 00:44:01,520
but like, you would not be able to see that. You could put stickers on it. There's ways to

671
00:44:01,780 --> 00:44:07,640
obfuscate it. But I guess, aside from just, let's say it was obvious, let's say you went with a clown

672
00:44:07,660 --> 00:44:14,400
design, it was all rainbow and it, you know, Pennywise was on the end of it. Would that still

673
00:44:14,820 --> 00:44:19,520
pose any like additional risk? Do you think? Because in my view, I could see it go either way.

674
00:44:19,570 --> 00:44:25,000
I think that the device itself is almost legitimate enough where what's someone going to do,

675
00:44:25,090 --> 00:44:28,640
even if they know you have it, if they take your laptop, it's still going to trigger some kind of

676
00:44:28,940 --> 00:44:34,100
shutdown. Yeah. The first question on our FAQ is like, what if somebody else buys a buskill cable

677
00:44:34,120 --> 00:44:36,060
and they insert it, it doesn't matter.

678
00:44:36,320 --> 00:44:37,920
It's going to trigger even if there's two,

679
00:44:38,130 --> 00:44:40,160
if it's like a second bus cable

680
00:44:40,330 --> 00:44:41,240
and one of them gets disconnected,

681
00:44:41,710 --> 00:44:42,280
it's going to trigger.

682
00:44:43,140 --> 00:44:46,080
Any USB removal event is going to cause bus call to trigger.

683
00:44:47,019 --> 00:44:49,420
So again, this is why we go with a cable

684
00:44:49,590 --> 00:44:51,280
instead of these radio or Bluetooth-based solutions

685
00:44:51,470 --> 00:44:53,660
because, of course, you can do radio jamming attacks,

686
00:44:53,690 --> 00:44:54,640
you can do a replay attack

687
00:44:54,970 --> 00:44:56,240
if you're using a wireless solution.

688
00:44:56,640 --> 00:44:57,580
This is a wired cable.

689
00:44:57,990 --> 00:45:00,480
Even if they get a knife out and they cut the cable,

690
00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:02,240
that's going to cause a USB removal

691
00:45:02,420 --> 00:45:03,220
because the connection is set.

692
00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:10,880
So, no, it's really hard to imagine a way in which they would be able to take advantage of the fact

693
00:45:10,880 --> 00:45:16,440
that they know you're using a bus code cable. Got it. And then, sorry, to go back a little bit more

694
00:45:16,640 --> 00:45:23,120
to advocacy. So, you recommended password management as kind of a go-to step for a lot of people. So,

695
00:45:23,240 --> 00:45:28,360
it sounds like you recommend KeePass. Are there any more, like, cloud-based password managers,

696
00:45:28,520 --> 00:45:30,760
like more traditional ones that you like?

697
00:45:35,480 --> 00:45:37,660
I'm not an expert in cloud-based password managers.

698
00:45:39,220 --> 00:45:41,280
I think that using a password manager

699
00:45:42,630 --> 00:45:44,080
is better than using a password manager.

700
00:45:45,100 --> 00:45:48,300
Certainly, if you're using a good open source one,

701
00:45:48,740 --> 00:45:50,360
but I would caution people against it.

702
00:45:50,450 --> 00:45:52,840
I mean, again, better to use something than nothing.

703
00:45:53,480 --> 00:45:57,120
But if you can get away with just an offline key pass manager,

704
00:45:57,230 --> 00:45:57,940
I would recommend that.

705
00:45:58,140 --> 00:46:01,660
And then if you have issues with syncing, you can use a third-party tool like SyncThing

706
00:46:02,140 --> 00:46:06,220
to make sure that your password manager is in sync on your multiple devices.

707
00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:07,400
Nice.

708
00:46:08,140 --> 00:46:11,140
When we hopped on this interview, you mentioned you don't have a phone.

709
00:46:11,300 --> 00:46:12,860
Do you mind diving into that a little bit?

710
00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:13,960
Yeah.

711
00:46:14,540 --> 00:46:20,220
So this is actually, if you check on Nova Customs forms, I recently asked the founder there

712
00:46:20,720 --> 00:46:24,980
if they would be interested in the future of designing a phone-like device.

713
00:46:25,200 --> 00:46:27,920
I think I phrased it as a tablet but the size of a phone.

714
00:46:28,600 --> 00:46:53,860
So my biggest fear, my biggest concern with the surface area of modern day phones is the broadband processor. This is a, like, by FCC laws, right, like if you, and BESCLE as well, like, we had to put this USB drive inside of a special test room and make sure that it wasn't emitting radio frequencies that were in violation of the FCC laws and UK regulations and all of that.

715
00:46:57,160 --> 00:47:01,560
These things are expensive. Broadband processors typically must comply with these requirements,

716
00:47:02,100 --> 00:47:07,440
and as a result, they're closed hardware and closed software. These processors are similar to

717
00:47:07,620 --> 00:47:12,840
the Intel management engine in that they're a separate processor, but it's worse than IME in that

718
00:47:13,240 --> 00:47:16,680
they can communicate to cell towers, and cell towers are everywhere, unless you're living inside of a

719
00:47:16,860 --> 00:47:24,700
Faraday cage. They can receive commands wirelessly from, you know, from cell towers that are ubiquitous

720
00:47:25,200 --> 00:47:27,020
and exfiltrate data from your device

721
00:47:27,300 --> 00:47:29,280
or download malware's on your device.

722
00:47:29,900 --> 00:47:34,220
So there's a really great...

723
00:47:35,250 --> 00:47:36,900
I don't know, can I recommend another podcast?

724
00:47:38,260 --> 00:47:41,760
If your listeners are not familiar with Darknet Diaries,

725
00:47:41,770 --> 00:47:42,220
check that out.

726
00:47:42,580 --> 00:47:43,640
There's some really great episodes

727
00:47:43,850 --> 00:47:45,140
in which they interviewed Citizen Lab.

728
00:47:45,600 --> 00:47:48,820
Citizen Lab is a Canadian NGO

729
00:47:48,910 --> 00:47:51,280
that has done some amazing security research

730
00:47:51,340 --> 00:47:56,800
into one of the most ubiquitous pieces of malware on phones called Pegasus,

731
00:47:56,980 --> 00:47:58,820
sold by an Israeli cyber mercenary company.

732
00:47:59,660 --> 00:48:03,220
And almost, so like they can hack your phone often through WhatsApp

733
00:48:04,040 --> 00:48:05,020
using zero click vulnerabilities.

734
00:48:05,380 --> 00:48:07,060
So obviously like don't open attachments,

735
00:48:07,580 --> 00:48:12,180
but like they have vulnerabilities where they sell to some very gnarly,

736
00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:15,740
not so nice people that can be zero click, right?

737
00:48:15,840 --> 00:48:19,220
So they just have to find you on WhatsApp and you don't have to click anything.

738
00:48:19,260 --> 00:48:20,960
They don't even have to send you a message and they can own your device.

739
00:48:21,200 --> 00:48:24,800
Historically, I have not found any,

740
00:48:26,040 --> 00:48:26,820
a lot, let me say,

741
00:48:27,300 --> 00:48:29,100
the majority of those that I have heard about

742
00:48:29,360 --> 00:48:30,480
these vulnerabilities on mobile devices

743
00:48:31,440 --> 00:48:33,400
require a phone number or a SIM card.

744
00:48:34,120 --> 00:48:36,520
So you've significantly reduced

745
00:48:36,540 --> 00:48:38,440
the surface area of attack from your adversaries

746
00:48:39,040 --> 00:48:40,660
if you have a device

747
00:48:40,940 --> 00:48:42,600
that doesn't have a broadband processor in it.

748
00:48:42,920 --> 00:48:44,480
So I actually, I do have a cell phone,

749
00:48:45,040 --> 00:48:46,740
but I do not put my SIM card in it.

750
00:48:46,740 --> 00:48:47,380
And I recommend others,

751
00:48:47,540 --> 00:48:48,560
if you can get away with it,

752
00:48:48,860 --> 00:48:49,600
if you can, so like,

753
00:48:49,700 --> 00:48:50,560
this is a problem with Signal, right?

754
00:48:50,660 --> 00:48:51,520
Signal requires a phone number.

755
00:48:51,870 --> 00:48:55,080
But if you can get away with using Google Voice somehow to set up a signal,

756
00:48:55,880 --> 00:48:58,560
if you can get away with somehow not putting a SIM card in your phone,

757
00:48:59,020 --> 00:49:02,580
I feel like it's the same level of jump in security and OPSEC from, like,

758
00:49:02,800 --> 00:49:07,360
Linux to go from Android to Android without a SIM card.

759
00:49:08,420 --> 00:49:08,600
Yeah.

760
00:49:09,180 --> 00:49:10,820
No, it's a really tough thing to do.

761
00:49:11,220 --> 00:49:17,700
Luckily, at least Signal is super non-discriminate towards VOIP numbers.

762
00:49:17,940 --> 00:49:23,040
So you can use even pretty crappy VOIP numbers that are even reused and stuff with Signal.

763
00:49:23,100 --> 00:49:24,140
They don't seem to really care.

764
00:49:25,020 --> 00:49:26,840
But that's not the same for other accounts.

765
00:49:27,040 --> 00:49:29,940
I mean, if you have a bank account and they require a phone number, I think that's where

766
00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:31,560
a lot of people are going to stumble on issues.

767
00:49:33,520 --> 00:49:36,400
I am kind of in a hybrid situation right now.

768
00:49:37,240 --> 00:49:39,480
I still need a cell plan on my phone.

769
00:49:39,540 --> 00:49:42,860
I haven't figured out a good enough workflow where I can go without a cellular plan.

770
00:49:43,480 --> 00:49:46,240
But I don't use the number for anything anymore.

771
00:49:46,580 --> 00:49:51,660
and it took a long time to get there. So that number is pretty well hidden. And even the phone

772
00:49:51,860 --> 00:49:57,160
plan is registered to a different name. But I'm sure if someone really wants to figure it out,

773
00:49:57,210 --> 00:50:02,660
they could. So it's not like a foolproof thing, but I'm getting close, but it's a really hard thing

774
00:50:02,780 --> 00:50:06,480
to do. So I think that fact that you did it's pretty impressive to some extent. Yeah. Well,

775
00:50:06,780 --> 00:50:10,500
yeah. So two things in response to that. One, the first thing about Signal, like VIP,

776
00:50:11,100 --> 00:50:15,700
it's great that that's possible, but then what happens if it's a reused number? And if you don't,

777
00:50:16,400 --> 00:50:21,680
You have to pay a lot of money unless you're lucky enough to live in the US and be able to have a Google Voice account for free.

778
00:50:22,210 --> 00:50:26,000
You have to pay a lot of money. And then if it's a reuse number, somebody else can just steal your account from you.

779
00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:29,980
I think it was something like three days. There's like a really small window.

780
00:50:30,100 --> 00:50:34,180
Like if I could get it and be sure that it's going to be mine for like a year, that would be better.

781
00:50:34,290 --> 00:50:39,320
And then with the banks, so my biggest concern about giving a phone number to the banks.

782
00:50:39,580 --> 00:50:45,940
So when I worked for a bank, I would prevent people from putting their phone numbers into

783
00:50:46,220 --> 00:50:49,320
accounts because we were just being phished like crazy, man.

784
00:50:51,400 --> 00:50:55,220
My fear is that once you give a phone number to a bank, even if they're not using two-factor

785
00:50:55,400 --> 00:50:59,000
authentication through SMS, at some point in the future, they might start using your phone

786
00:50:59,080 --> 00:51:00,100
number for two-factor authentication.

787
00:51:00,820 --> 00:51:03,520
And then somebody could steal your account through a SIN swap attack.

788
00:51:03,920 --> 00:51:06,200
So I just have a policy where I don't...

789
00:51:06,340 --> 00:51:07,140
I mean, it sucks, though.

790
00:51:07,480 --> 00:51:11,140
I'm running into so many problems with banks who are just refusing to give me a bank account. Or

791
00:51:11,620 --> 00:51:17,740
now it's a thing where they have a phone number is required and they use these third-party

792
00:51:18,640 --> 00:51:23,640
credit checks. But it's not like these common, it's like these new AI machine learning systems,

793
00:51:23,940 --> 00:51:28,520
and they see that I'm using a bullshit phone number and they immediately ban me as if I have

794
00:51:28,600 --> 00:51:33,220
bad credit. I'm really struggling to be able to even open a bank account without a phone number.

795
00:51:34,080 --> 00:51:40,860
Yeah, I've had issues with similar things, but also with addresses, getting rejected for credit applications and stuff.

796
00:51:41,180 --> 00:51:44,140
Literally cited reasons are being we couldn't verify your identity.

797
00:51:45,330 --> 00:51:53,280
And so that's been a common issue that I have heard from multiple people now, not just you, just across the board trying to open bank accounts and stuff.

798
00:51:53,460 --> 00:51:57,580
So I don't know if it's going to get better.

799
00:51:57,760 --> 00:52:02,440
I'm hoping that it can't get worse because it seems like it can't get much worse than this.

800
00:52:02,620 --> 00:52:05,760
I mean, yeah, I don't know.

801
00:52:06,100 --> 00:52:06,860
I'm not too optimistic.

802
00:52:07,480 --> 00:52:10,880
But it feels a bit like Nosedive, you know, that episode of Black Mirror.

803
00:52:11,200 --> 00:52:12,520
Yes, that was one of my favorites.

804
00:52:12,630 --> 00:52:13,240
It was a good one.

805
00:52:13,600 --> 00:52:14,660
Yeah, that was the first one I saw.

806
00:52:14,750 --> 00:52:15,080
So good.

807
00:52:15,660 --> 00:52:16,180
Yeah, yeah.

808
00:52:16,420 --> 00:52:17,920
I actually had to stop watching Black Mirror.

809
00:52:18,090 --> 00:52:19,960
I got through the first, I think, three seasons.

810
00:52:20,640 --> 00:52:25,260
And then the last one I watched was the horror game one,

811
00:52:25,700 --> 00:52:29,480
where the traveler guy does the horror game and he goes in the house.

812
00:52:29,860 --> 00:52:31,680
And I was done.

813
00:52:31,920 --> 00:52:34,480
It was just too much. It was just exhausting.

814
00:52:34,740 --> 00:52:37,840
And I think I watched them too quickly back to back is really what I did wrong.

815
00:52:38,540 --> 00:52:41,560
Yeah, it's really like it's impressive.

816
00:52:41,760 --> 00:52:44,440
And my partner also would struggle in watching them, my ex.

817
00:52:44,860 --> 00:52:48,340
It's like it's so effective at pulling your strings.

818
00:52:48,530 --> 00:52:55,140
Like how their depiction of dystopia is so real that it's very hard for many people to watch.

819
00:52:56,120 --> 00:53:01,840
And I'll warn you, the last season is more horror than it is like the same sort of dystopian techie thing.

820
00:53:02,020 --> 00:53:03,320
So maybe it's not for you.

821
00:53:04,640 --> 00:53:05,860
Yeah, I don't know which one did it.

822
00:53:05,860 --> 00:53:10,840
I think honestly, it was just the horror is probably easier for me than a dystopian tech thing.

823
00:53:11,000 --> 00:53:15,820
But after just watching back to back episodes, that just that just ended it for me.

824
00:53:17,540 --> 00:53:24,300
Now, one quick thing you mentioned, the proprietary cell stuff, I think even this is a misconception.

825
00:53:26,180 --> 00:53:33,440
I do not condone the device because I've actually had a lot of issues with the company and even getting a device and the whole reservation process.

826
00:53:33,590 --> 00:53:45,660
But even things that are advertised as like open source hardware, like the Purism, Librem 5, even they use proprietary chips in their devices with like the, I believe it's still the cellular chip.

827
00:53:45,840 --> 00:53:47,320
It's really hard to do that stuff open source.

828
00:53:47,650 --> 00:53:48,780
I don't think that it exists.

829
00:53:49,030 --> 00:53:51,360
I mean, it's theoretically possible.

830
00:53:51,840 --> 00:53:53,120
And the same thing for like HSMs.

831
00:53:53,840 --> 00:53:55,540
You know, are you familiar with HSMs?

832
00:53:55,980 --> 00:53:56,200
No.

833
00:53:56,600 --> 00:53:57,960
So it's a hardware security module.

834
00:53:58,070 --> 00:54:07,380
If you want to store, like, let's say you happen to be a cryptocurrency bank and you have billions of dollars worth of crypto assets from your customers, and you want to store that securely, you're not going to store it on a disk on a server.

835
00:54:07,450 --> 00:54:09,640
You're going to store it inside of a hardware security module.

836
00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:13,700
This is a device that is extremely secure, very highly regulated.

837
00:54:15,060 --> 00:54:18,780
Some of them have, like, so they're also frequently used in ATMs.

838
00:54:18,990 --> 00:54:21,240
So, like, they have private keys on them.

839
00:54:21,430 --> 00:54:23,500
They need to be able to sign transactions and such.

840
00:54:23,780 --> 00:54:26,120
and they have tamper detection.

841
00:54:26,310 --> 00:54:28,520
So like if they notice too much vibrating,

842
00:54:28,690 --> 00:54:29,800
like somebody is dealing the ATM,

843
00:54:29,890 --> 00:54:31,200
they will wipe their private keys

844
00:54:31,230 --> 00:54:31,980
that are stored secretly.

845
00:54:32,280 --> 00:54:33,840
So like a YubiKey in the sense

846
00:54:34,000 --> 00:54:35,760
that you cannot extract the private keys,

847
00:54:36,180 --> 00:54:37,520
but also like just way more hardcore

848
00:54:37,670 --> 00:54:38,260
with all these sensors

849
00:54:38,330 --> 00:54:39,180
that will like cause themselves

850
00:54:39,270 --> 00:54:39,820
to wipe themselves

851
00:54:39,970 --> 00:54:41,200
if they think that they're being fucked with.

852
00:54:41,400 --> 00:54:42,620
So open source HSMs

853
00:54:43,100 --> 00:54:44,640
is one of my favorite questions

854
00:54:44,730 --> 00:54:46,800
on Stack Exchange is asking like,

855
00:54:46,920 --> 00:54:48,260
where are the open source HSMs?

856
00:54:49,000 --> 00:54:50,140
And then some people like respond

857
00:54:50,520 --> 00:54:52,660
saying like there are no open source HSMs

858
00:54:52,720 --> 00:54:55,660
and like regulations would never allow for people to be able to make something like that

859
00:54:55,760 --> 00:54:57,400
because it costs too many truckloads of cash.

860
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:02,600
Then I did some research and I found a great presentation at Shukon

861
00:55:02,880 --> 00:55:04,740
of something presenting a bunch of open source HSMs.

862
00:55:05,060 --> 00:55:08,960
So like, yes, these highly regulated devices absolutely can be made open source.

863
00:55:09,580 --> 00:55:10,820
It does cost a lot of money.

864
00:55:10,940 --> 00:55:12,200
Open source hardware is expensive.

865
00:55:12,780 --> 00:55:13,200
That sucks.

866
00:55:13,560 --> 00:55:16,820
I hope one day we have an open source BP, a broadband processor.

867
00:55:17,420 --> 00:55:21,280
We don't, as far as I know, currently have one, but it's absolutely theoretically possible.

868
00:55:22,500 --> 00:55:27,940
Nice. Yeah. And then I just wanted to clarify that it was either the main chip of the device

869
00:55:28,280 --> 00:55:32,380
or the broadband processor that wasn't. But there was something that back when I was researching it.

870
00:55:32,500 --> 00:55:36,500
I'm sure it's the DP. I do not think that there is an open source DP on the market. And you can't

871
00:55:37,000 --> 00:55:42,940
blame Purism for that. That's just a market problem. Yeah. I hope that I have other things

872
00:55:42,970 --> 00:55:47,680
that I am directly critical of Purism for just based on my experience. But that is not,

873
00:55:48,660 --> 00:55:51,360
I hope that wasn't the criticism that I was laying out there.

874
00:55:51,360 --> 00:55:54,420
I was just saying that even devices that try to be as open source as possible,

875
00:55:54,560 --> 00:55:58,020
which they do try to do, and that's something that I really do admire about them,

876
00:55:58,920 --> 00:56:01,900
they still couldn't do that because that's really hard to pull off.

877
00:56:02,140 --> 00:56:05,540
Your listeners may not be aware, but I have an article.

878
00:56:06,280 --> 00:56:06,920
You can check it out.

879
00:56:07,540 --> 00:56:08,540
It's called Trusted Boot.

880
00:56:09,120 --> 00:56:11,780
And it goes into the, if you're worried about anti-evil made,

881
00:56:13,040 --> 00:56:15,820
and you want to understand better how TPMs work and how heads works.

882
00:56:16,100 --> 00:56:16,600
What's evil made?

883
00:56:17,420 --> 00:56:29,540
So an evil maid is a, I'm not going to try to pronounce her name, the founder of QuesOS coined the term evil maid and anti-evil maid.

884
00:56:29,740 --> 00:56:37,740
So the idea is that you're traveling to a conference, you have your work laptop with you, you go out to get drinks and you leave your laptop in your room, maybe even put it in a safe.

885
00:56:38,180 --> 00:56:40,080
But a maid obviously can get into your room.

886
00:56:40,300 --> 00:56:44,200
And what damage could that maid do to your laptop if it's off?

887
00:56:45,240 --> 00:56:49,220
And obviously, of course, if it's off, it's encrypted, they can't access the contents.

888
00:56:49,330 --> 00:56:53,580
But what if they like swath the machine with a totally different machine and they could do a relay attack or something like that?

889
00:56:54,380 --> 00:57:03,260
So so anti evil made is a concept in cubes that tries to prevent evil maids from being able to do harm in this sort of situation.

890
00:57:04,720 --> 00:57:11,560
So heads is a really cool is a really cool tool that you can use to try to protect your laptop from anti evil made.

891
00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:20,880
and it's bundled with a bunch of other things with purism laptops called pure boot and i did

892
00:57:20,930 --> 00:57:27,540
buy a purism laptop also i returned it i was not very happy with it but um you know i got this thing

893
00:57:27,590 --> 00:57:31,760
in a box i was sitting there in a box for like two weeks because i was like i i don't want to just

894
00:57:31,860 --> 00:57:36,100
like guess on how to verify this thing because i wanted to make sure i was trying to defend against

895
00:57:36,400 --> 00:57:40,380
interdiction right and i ordered it with monero they didn't have a dot onion site but i did my

896
00:57:40,400 --> 00:57:43,880
best to try to order anonymously. I'm pretty sure I succeeded with that. But it arrived,

897
00:57:43,950 --> 00:57:47,620
and I just wanted to make sure that there was no tampering that took place between the time they

898
00:57:47,720 --> 00:57:52,600
shifted from me in California to arriving at my doorstep. So it sat there for like two weeks with

899
00:57:52,600 --> 00:57:59,200
it unopened, just me researching TPMs and heads and the whole technology stack for the past 10 years

900
00:57:59,620 --> 00:58:06,420
that brought us to heads. And I published a very comprehensive article called Trusted Boot,

901
00:58:06,600 --> 00:58:08,140
anti-evil made heads and pure boot.

902
00:58:08,170 --> 00:58:09,860
If you just Google pure boot,

903
00:58:10,320 --> 00:58:12,180
alt field, my last name, ALT, F-I-E-L-D,

904
00:58:12,540 --> 00:58:13,600
trusted boot, you'll find it.

905
00:58:13,660 --> 00:58:14,540
It's going to be number one.

906
00:58:15,680 --> 00:58:17,560
I'm very happy to say that like the heads project,

907
00:58:17,720 --> 00:58:20,020
if you join the matrix channel for the heads project,

908
00:58:20,510 --> 00:58:22,100
they have like their authoritative,

909
00:58:22,380 --> 00:58:23,480
but his heads is my article.

910
00:58:23,820 --> 00:58:25,720
So I'm glad I managed to get something right there.

911
00:58:26,240 --> 00:58:28,120
It's a really good overview, but anyway,

912
00:58:28,280 --> 00:58:31,280
I actually changed, it goes into detail with purism,

913
00:58:31,410 --> 00:58:34,540
but I recently changed all of my affiliate marketing

914
00:58:34,560 --> 00:58:39,340
from Curism to Nova Custom because I was just not very satisfied with that purchase.

915
00:58:40,520 --> 00:58:47,280
Yeah. And how do you feel? And I know maybe it's a bit biased because you've partnered with Nova

916
00:58:47,570 --> 00:58:52,780
Custom, but what do you like more about Nova Custom than maybe other Linux laptops that are

917
00:58:52,780 --> 00:58:57,860
out there? Is there something to do in particular or is it just like more of a value overlap between

918
00:58:57,990 --> 00:59:04,520
your two organizations? So I can't, so like, yeah, full disclosure, I do sell bus pull cables to

919
00:59:04,540 --> 00:59:09,180
Nova Custom. I first read out to them some months ago,

920
00:59:09,570 --> 00:59:12,880
somebody, some random person on the Matrix

921
00:59:14,339 --> 00:59:17,000
Fediverse messaged me and he told me first about Nova

922
00:59:17,010 --> 00:59:18,960
Custom because he was mentioning it as a cube

923
00:59:19,240 --> 00:59:22,620
certified laptop. I use cubes. I have had so many

924
00:59:22,720 --> 00:59:25,000
hardware issues. I had so many hardware acceleration

925
00:59:25,740 --> 00:59:29,360
issues with the purism laptop that I received. It was

926
00:59:29,590 --> 00:59:34,500
almost unusable. And

927
00:59:37,020 --> 00:59:43,220
And when I went to the Nova Custom website, I saw that they had a Qubes OS to support laptop,

928
00:59:43,380 --> 00:59:44,400
which was a great thing.

929
00:59:44,500 --> 00:59:45,480
That was the first time I heard of them.

930
00:59:45,940 --> 00:59:51,840
And so I reached out to them about possibly changing my affiliate links from Purism to Nova

931
00:59:51,980 --> 00:59:52,120
Custom.

932
00:59:52,760 --> 00:59:57,040
And he told me he already knew who I was, which is really cool, because he read that article.

933
00:59:57,260 --> 01:00:01,880
And at the very bottom of that article, I described a process of anti-interdiction that

934
01:00:01,900 --> 01:00:07,480
that Purism uses where they paint glitter fingernail polish onto the screws of your laptop.

935
01:00:08,220 --> 01:00:13,200
So Wessel saw this, the founder of Nova Custom saw this, and then after that he created anti-introduction

936
01:00:13,480 --> 01:00:14,600
services for Purism.

937
01:00:15,080 --> 01:00:16,360
So that obviously warmed my heart.

938
01:00:16,430 --> 01:00:16,820
That was great.

939
01:00:17,100 --> 01:00:18,440
Their communication has been great.

940
01:00:18,810 --> 01:00:19,400
Sorry, what did I say?

941
01:00:19,540 --> 01:00:20,460
Yeah, for Purism.

942
01:00:20,950 --> 01:00:23,500
But I think my people got it, not to interrupt, but sorry, go ahead.

943
01:00:24,319 --> 01:00:27,520
Yeah, and also the communication has been great, but I should say that I have never touched

944
01:00:27,640 --> 01:00:28,980
a Nova Custom laptop in my life.

945
01:00:30,280 --> 01:00:33,100
I hope, I mean, I ended up returning that purism.

946
01:00:33,260 --> 01:00:35,000
I bought just a ThinkPad, unfortunately.

947
01:00:35,840 --> 01:00:37,640
And then maybe one day when this thing dies

948
01:00:37,740 --> 01:00:39,360
and I need more than 32 gigs of RAM,

949
01:00:40,540 --> 01:00:41,800
I'll look into Nova Custom.

950
01:00:42,080 --> 01:00:43,800
But I don't know, you tell me, how does it feel?

951
01:00:44,640 --> 01:00:45,200
It feels really nice.

952
01:00:45,220 --> 01:00:46,660
I've been really impressed with the hardware.

953
01:00:47,380 --> 01:00:48,800
And first, he actually, Russell,

954
01:00:49,400 --> 01:00:50,800
this interview is still going to come soon,

955
01:00:50,940 --> 01:00:55,080
but Russell actually touches on this glitter method

956
01:00:55,320 --> 01:00:56,840
because it came up in our interview a little bit.

957
01:00:56,980 --> 01:00:58,800
But yeah, the Nova Custom laptop

958
01:00:59,000 --> 01:01:00,040
has actually been really awesome.

959
01:01:00,280 --> 01:01:02,080
and I've been really enjoying it.

960
01:01:02,310 --> 01:01:03,140
The hardware was awesome.

961
01:01:03,620 --> 01:01:04,960
Really impressed out of the box.

962
01:01:05,200 --> 01:01:06,420
I'm for better or for worse.

963
01:01:06,480 --> 01:01:07,620
There's a lot of issues I have with Apple,

964
01:01:07,860 --> 01:01:10,660
but I generally really like the way Apple approaches hardware.

965
01:01:10,890 --> 01:01:11,960
And I think it's really well built

966
01:01:12,750 --> 01:01:15,060
in terms of just the way it feels in the hand

967
01:01:15,300 --> 01:01:16,700
and kind of the keyboard and stuff like that.

968
01:01:16,880 --> 01:01:18,660
And I've been able to like cycle back and forth

969
01:01:18,810 --> 01:01:22,540
between the Nova Custom and also the Apple situation.

970
01:01:22,940 --> 01:01:24,200
And actually it's really good.

971
01:01:24,250 --> 01:01:25,820
So really love the Nova Custom setup.

972
01:01:26,120 --> 01:01:28,780
So Michael, where can people find you online

973
01:01:28,800 --> 01:01:30,860
if they want to connect with you or Buskill.

974
01:01:31,420 --> 01:01:32,580
Yeah, so if you want to follow Buskill,

975
01:01:32,980 --> 01:01:35,380
the best place to go is our website, buskill.in.

976
01:01:36,060 --> 01:01:36,800
And then at the bottom there,

977
01:01:36,800 --> 01:01:37,940
you can find all our social media.

978
01:01:38,340 --> 01:01:39,680
If you want to subscribe on Mastodon,

979
01:01:39,740 --> 01:01:41,240
you can find us there, again, on our website.

980
01:01:41,680 --> 01:01:44,120
We're on GitHub, we're on Facebook, we're on X,

981
01:01:44,280 --> 01:01:44,920
we're on all the things.

982
01:01:45,040 --> 01:01:46,660
If you're on Reddit, slash r slash buskill.

983
01:01:47,600 --> 01:01:48,940
But again, yeah, the best place is just to go

984
01:01:48,940 --> 01:01:50,360
to our website, buskill.in.

985
01:01:50,960 --> 01:01:51,580
And if you want to follow me,

986
01:01:51,800 --> 01:01:52,740
specifically Michael Altfield,

987
01:01:52,960 --> 01:01:55,260
my name is the same on all those platforms.

988
01:01:55,480 --> 01:01:57,220
Go to my website, michaelaltfield.net,

989
01:01:57,480 --> 01:01:59,520
and you can find all my social media there.

990
01:01:59,630 --> 01:02:01,140
Again, I'm on Mastodon Twitter, whatever.

991
01:02:01,620 --> 01:02:03,720
Well, I want to thank you, Michael, for tuning in today.

992
01:02:03,960 --> 01:02:04,720
This was really awesome,

993
01:02:05,400 --> 01:02:07,800
and I can't wait to hopefully have you on in the future.

994
01:02:08,060 --> 01:02:09,960
It was a real pleasure to have you here,

995
01:02:10,030 --> 01:02:12,220
and I hope that people got value from everything you said.

996
01:02:12,900 --> 01:02:13,820
Thanks, Henry, so much for your time.

997
01:02:14,580 --> 01:02:15,980
And with all of that said,

998
01:02:16,110 --> 01:02:17,880
I want to thank Michael for his time,

999
01:02:18,160 --> 01:02:20,020
and I'll leave links to everything he works on

1000
01:02:20,240 --> 01:02:21,080
down in the description.

1001
01:02:21,440 --> 01:02:22,740
If you learned anything from this

1002
01:02:22,790 --> 01:02:24,880
and you want to support these independent interviews

1003
01:02:24,900 --> 01:02:27,560
where I invite cool people on who work on cool things,

1004
01:02:28,160 --> 01:02:30,240
you can become a Techlorian down in the description.

1005
01:02:30,540 --> 01:02:31,240
We are on Patreon.

1006
01:02:31,360 --> 01:02:33,920
You can do it directly via us and Stripe on the forum.

1007
01:02:34,120 --> 01:02:36,660
We also support Monero tips and many other things

1008
01:02:36,780 --> 01:02:38,100
that you can do to support what we're doing.

1009
01:02:38,260 --> 01:02:40,340
If you have anyone in particular that you want to see interviewed,

1010
01:02:40,380 --> 01:02:42,580
you can always leave that down in the comments as well

1011
01:02:42,740 --> 01:02:43,800
as we do check those out.

1012
01:02:44,140 --> 01:02:46,320
And of course, leave some love if you learned anything new

1013
01:02:46,780 --> 01:02:48,940
or want to just share this around with somebody you know.

1014
01:02:49,560 --> 01:02:50,320
Thank you all for listening,

1015
01:02:50,480 --> 01:02:52,440
and we'll see you next time on Techlor.