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Corey I was talking about when you weren't

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on the news, how, like, I listened to

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the news for the first time.

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Yeah. It was our ice cream show when

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we talked about ice cream, and I was

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like, why does anybody listen to this? Like,

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we're absolute mad men. Like,

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wait. I don't remember. Oh, you mean the

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ice cream machines?

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Ice the ice cream the I made machines.

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No Mcdonald's thing. No. We're talking about, like,

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how I went to an ice cream,

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convention. Convention. Right? And then, like, the first

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we were talking about midnight blizzard. And then,

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like, it was like, what would we... Like,

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that sounds like a good ice cream game.

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And I'm like Wouldn't listen to this, and

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I turned the podcast off and my alright.

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I'm out here.

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That was the first time Ever listened to

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us. But well, at least 1 that I

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was on to tell the truth.

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So I guess. I I think some of

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us listen... Some people listen to us because

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we are so wack off the wall.

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Let's just hope let's just hope it. Most

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of the people I will say, like, to

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get serious for a second, most of the

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people I talk to that watch or listen,

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do it while they're doing something else.

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And they have it on in on their

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commute or they have it on on their

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in the background, while they're working or they're,

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you know, doing something else. So it's not

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like people are just sitting here being, like,

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What are they gonna say next?

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Tell us about the ice east cream. Like,

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you know, is fine. Plus, I mean it's

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a podcast. Just hit that, 30 second skip

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if we start wandering into a topic you'd

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rather not hear about just Hi. Who doesn't

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1 hear about it? Or you can do,

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like, I don't know if anyone's ever done

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this.

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You can listen to books and podcasts at

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like 2 x. Knew your... I hate that.

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My wife does it? I'm like, how do

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you, like, enjoy the book like this? Like

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this is not. It depends on the reader.

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Some some of the readers, some of the

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people they speak, so. Slowly.

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That you bump it up to a minute

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and a half, at your 1.5 speed, and

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now it's a reasonable amount of... Totally.

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Don't throughput, you know?

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Also

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overcast, which is the podcast app that I

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use. It has this thing called smart speed

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where it doesn't change the speed, but it

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cuts out gap.

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So, like... It cuts out pauses and, like,

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timing and, like, so everything is quick. That's

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what I mean... That's impressive. Let's Braun wins.

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Everybody needs to talk like Walter Cro kite.

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I miss Walter. How the cookie crumble.

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I miss Walter.

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I remember, you know, when when reporters did

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actual real journalism

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and they recorded the news.

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But I'm old. Too bad. We don't report

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this this.

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Hello, and welcome to Black Hills information securities

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talking about news. It's 07/15/2024.

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Today, we're gonna talk about At and T.

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Being breached. We're gonna talk about Sis doing

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a red team roughly in a year and

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a half ago and now just getting the

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report out. We're gonna talk about a heritage

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in foundations hack. There's all kinds of hacks.

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We got hacks on hacks,

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and we're gonna submit fraudulent,

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identifying documents using Ai.

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As part of the show.

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So let's go.

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Very cool.

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Alright.

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So feel like we gotta go At and

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T first. Right. Well I john right tire.

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I thought we're gonna talk about the class.

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There's something. We wanna talk about the free

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cool shit real quick? Oh, yeah. Pretty good.

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Cool. Yeah. I those words. So

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I think Ryan's got it up.

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So this is a project that

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Ben and Joe to whoever interns this summer.

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Just got working.

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You can get the link. We're gonna post

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it out there, but it's it's basically a

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Github repository to or tool called Wi forge.

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So if you wanna learn wireless hacking and

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wireless hacker type things

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1 of the big problems about trying to

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learn it is it requires you to have

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gear, like you have to have an access

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point, you can do enterprise stuff. You have

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to have the right wireless card, you have

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to set up all these different things.

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And this

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allows you to completely emulate.

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A full wireless setup,

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and run all of your hacking tools directly

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from Ka on this wireless network,

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it's project called mini net that we had

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to update... Actually, we fork Mini that completely,

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which is wireless simulation suite, and then we

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had to update a bunch of the headers

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and everything. But it allows you to completely

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emulate an entire wireless lab where you can

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learn all of the wireless lab hack type

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things,

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that you would ever want to do, and

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we have... I have a list of all

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the labs that are part of it right

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now,

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Wifi F forge is set up so you

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can do better cap attacks. You can do

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Wifi authentication.

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Capture,

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you can do packet capture to Hcc P

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x conversion and hashtag cracking,

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Air suite tools where you can get pre

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shared. Key recovery, cracking Wpa

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handshakes

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with crack and g,

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Eric Get, denial of service attacks,

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capture active directory credentials with evil twin, cracking

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at net Nt credentials with John The ripper,

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and then Rogue with Wifi Fisher and then

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Wps exploitation and web key cracking

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as well. So this is all 3,

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like I said, Ben and Joe are the

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main people behind it. But this is just

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the kind of thing that we're trying to

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do at anti sip and security training. To

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release as many resources out there to the

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public as we possibly can.

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And

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full step by step instructions get the docker

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instance set up and get it running quickly

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in your environment. You don't have to have

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any specialized hardware just set to a system

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that can run the docker container. And you're

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off to the race is learning about wireless

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attacks. So,

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check it out. Pretty excited about that. There

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will be a full webcast. Doing a walk

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through. We will eventually probably have... This many

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labs probably is gonna be able which you

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can't class out there as well. So take

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a look at it. Y'all?

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I wanted to start actually with some good

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news. It's been kind of a past few

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days. So

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I figured we'd start with that. Just some

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shit you guys can play with.

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Trees like, Wifi f training was always a

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tough thing, like, for a company that has

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pen testing. It's like, okay. We need to

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train you up on Wi f stuff. I

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guess you're gonna fly somewhere and just watch

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someone else do it. Like, it's out of

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the wall. No. It's kind of a long

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process. How do We can send you a

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kit. With all of the attack stuff in

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it. And that's

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it's a tough thing to learn to get

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the right gear to be able to learn

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it. But does should make it a lot

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easier for people

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Remember having to buy the

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like, you actually issuing out k. Like, here's

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the exact Wi f adapter to buy it.

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And then I wouldn't bought it. Serial number?

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Yeah. And then I bought it, and then

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they they shipped it to me, and it

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was the wrong 1, and I'm like, well,

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it looks like I'm just gonna watch the

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Wifi F stuff. So Yeah. This is perfect.

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Yeah. Well, that was 1 of those things

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I like about some of the classes like

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at Black hat and at the previous organization

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I used to teach at. They used to

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have stores where you could go and buy

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all of that gear.

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And there were people that weren't even taking

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the wireless classes and they would go and

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buy as many of the many of the

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different beer sets that they could possibly get

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because that was the only place you could

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get some of them.

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Yeah. Like I said, this makes it all

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a lot easier. You don't need to have

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a specific alpha adapter

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and set up your own infrastructure to do

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the hacking. It's all there. So yeah on

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the lookout, it'll be a webcast. And by

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the way, we have more cool stuff that

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we're working on we're gonna to be releasing

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the public as well.

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Cool.

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Now let's get all doom and gloom and

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talk about breaches for, like, half an hour.

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Oh.

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Okay. We could also start with the Sis

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thing. No. I mean, this is kind of

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uplifting. Let's start with Sis. Let's do. The.

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Okay. Sis report review process takes roughly a

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year and a half.

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What we've learned? What recommend for what the

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red team will sell Basically, Cis posted,

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the title of the blog is a little

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bit of a mouthful.

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Ci Red Team's

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operations against a federal civilian executive branch organization

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highlights the necessity of Defense and Depth. Oh,

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which got homes. And

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their own... They're kinda toot their own horn

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and saying, we do red teaming,

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calling it silent shield in all caps, which

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I still think anti suck is core than

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silent shield but is biased.

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Yeah. Basically, they're talking about a Pen test.

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In early 20 23,

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it's kind of a cool little read if

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you're into pen testing, which if you aren't

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into independent testing, I'm very confused as to

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why you're here, but

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Yeah.

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You know, they have some lessons learned. They

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have a little bit of an executive summary,

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you know,

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They actually didn't get in. That was kind

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of interesting. They kind of said that. They

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were like, we tried to get in from

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the outside. We didn't get in,

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but then we started from the inside and

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we kind of...

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Connected back to where we had established access.

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So,

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overall, it's a pretty good read. You know,

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I don't really know. Does anyone know what

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the

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the villain executive branch

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is...

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I have no idea what that is. Does

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is anyone know what? It would be underneath

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the presidency,

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the executive branch.

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00:09:05,609 --> 00:09:08,422
Right. But but it's 1 to really exist

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agencies is so fast. Though that's the... Yeah.

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Like, think about it as, like Department of

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Interior, Department of Transport,

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okay.

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Could be the Epa or something like that.

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Yeah. Yes. I have a little gotcha. I

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have a list. Do you want it? No.

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God. No. Please don't.

268
00:09:23,598 --> 00:09:25,426
Is it just a random list of every

269
00:09:25,426 --> 00:09:28,048
3 letter algorithm There's some 4 letters in

270
00:09:28,048 --> 00:09:31,702
here We're fours? Maybe some fives. AACUS.

271
00:09:32,274 --> 00:09:34,019
Okay. There's actually not that many. There's actually

272
00:09:34,019 --> 00:09:35,922
not that. Oh, there's there's some long ones.

273
00:09:36,160 --> 00:09:38,778
There's ones that d the DFB.

274
00:09:38,936 --> 00:09:40,126
You don't know who that is. You know

275
00:09:40,126 --> 00:09:42,127
that. The... Do you think this a fancy

276
00:09:42,127 --> 00:09:45,701
color facility safe that's right. Everyone in chat

277
00:09:45,701 --> 00:09:47,924
goes look at the list and see what

278
00:09:47,924 --> 00:09:49,532
who you think were targeting with the Pen

279
00:09:49,532 --> 00:09:51,049
test because there's some pretty funny ones in

280
00:09:51,049 --> 00:09:51,208
here.

281
00:09:52,406 --> 00:09:52,964
Fine art.

282
00:09:54,082 --> 00:09:55,779
I hope it was them. I hope there's

283
00:09:56,237 --> 00:09:58,406
just stellar. They What is that? It's like,

284
00:09:58,566 --> 00:10:00,001
oh, yeah. We have a is it fresh?

285
00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:01,995
Like, the what's the goal of the Pent

286
00:10:01,995 --> 00:10:03,670
test? The steal the mona Lisa Like I

287
00:10:03,670 --> 00:10:05,505
don't know. Anyway. Is definitely the marine mammal.

288
00:10:05,744 --> 00:10:07,100
We don't have the mona lisa.

289
00:10:07,832 --> 00:10:09,664
Is not... Visits every once in a while,

290
00:10:09,744 --> 00:10:11,974
bro. Yes. That's why it's it... That's that's

291
00:10:11,974 --> 00:10:12,213
why.

292
00:10:13,329 --> 00:10:14,285
Yeah yeah anyway.

293
00:10:15,019 --> 00:10:16,537
So... But this brings up a couple of

294
00:10:16,537 --> 00:10:18,215
different things that are kind of frustrating for

295
00:10:18,215 --> 00:10:19,414
me, and I'm gonna try not to get

296
00:10:19,414 --> 00:10:20,713
too rant, but

297
00:10:21,172 --> 00:10:23,010
why is just a doing pen testing of

298
00:10:23,010 --> 00:10:25,654
any kind? Like... And we we see this

299
00:10:25,654 --> 00:10:27,563
from time to time. There's organizations that we

300
00:10:27,563 --> 00:10:29,233
work with where Sis comes in, whether it's

301
00:10:29,233 --> 00:10:30,665
on the soccer on the Pent test side.

302
00:10:31,158 --> 00:10:32,512
Where are we hear it's like, well Sis

303
00:10:32,512 --> 00:10:33,786
was hear a month ago and they did

304
00:10:33,786 --> 00:10:35,936
our pen test? Why is a government agency

305
00:10:35,936 --> 00:10:37,767
doing pen testing? I don't know. I like

306
00:10:37,767 --> 00:10:39,280
it. I like it. You don't like it?

307
00:10:39,772 --> 00:10:41,758
No. I don't. I because I I like

308
00:10:41,758 --> 00:10:43,688
it because it's like, it's just the baseline

309
00:10:43,823 --> 00:10:45,491
pen test. Yeah. But they still call it

310
00:10:45,491 --> 00:10:47,159
a pen test, and a lot of times

311
00:10:47,159 --> 00:10:49,404
well, wait. I've seen some Ci pen tests

312
00:10:49,404 --> 00:10:50,201
that are pretty solid.

313
00:10:50,839 --> 00:10:52,115
But I've also seen a bunch of them

314
00:10:52,115 --> 00:10:54,268
that are literally ness results. And No No.

315
00:10:54,507 --> 00:10:56,660
That's. Whoa. Whoa. No. You're you're talking about.

316
00:10:56,914 --> 00:10:59,149
Showdown results there. That's this to be way

317
00:10:59,149 --> 00:11:01,783
too india. Yeah. I'm not even joking. Ci

318
00:11:01,783 --> 00:11:03,779
has that is the standard Ci test. It

319
00:11:03,779 --> 00:11:05,295
is we looked at Showdown and you are

320
00:11:05,295 --> 00:11:08,362
screwed. Which is genuinely, like, I would argue

321
00:11:08,500 --> 00:11:10,653
like, I tell Pen or just like, if

322
00:11:10,653 --> 00:11:12,088
you're not doing that, you weren't doing a

323
00:11:12,088 --> 00:11:13,842
good job. Like, you need to... Your first

324
00:11:13,842 --> 00:11:14,400
thing should be,

325
00:11:15,214 --> 00:11:17,691
obvious stuff. Right? Like, I I think they're

326
00:11:17,691 --> 00:11:19,848
actually kind of... I don't know. I'm... Maybe

327
00:11:20,008 --> 00:11:21,287
I'm biased. I don't know why I'm coming

328
00:11:21,287 --> 00:11:22,805
out in support of Si, but I am

329
00:11:22,805 --> 00:11:25,607
because I think, like, Right doing a baseline

330
00:11:25,607 --> 00:11:28,473
pen test, and also from my perspective, gives

331
00:11:28,473 --> 00:11:30,144
us a chance to say, oh, you had

332
00:11:30,144 --> 00:11:31,993
a cis pen test. We're about to blow

333
00:11:31,993 --> 00:11:34,548
your mind. Right? Like, we're about to 02:10,

334
00:11:34,707 --> 00:11:36,005
like, you know what I needed

335
00:11:37,342 --> 00:11:40,136
expectation. Yeah. So you're there it's free the

336
00:11:40,136 --> 00:11:42,539
market free. I got it. Yeah. They they

337
00:11:42,539 --> 00:11:44,767
are free. So I'm I'm... I definitely support

338
00:11:44,767 --> 00:11:46,357
the government giving out free Pent tests. Of

339
00:11:46,357 --> 00:11:47,764
all the things they could give out. And

340
00:11:48,044 --> 00:11:49,718
Like, to the people who can't afford vent

341
00:11:49,718 --> 00:11:51,234
test or don't know how or whatever.

342
00:11:51,792 --> 00:11:53,227
I'm here for it. I need a Test.

343
00:11:53,387 --> 00:11:54,822
I'm gonna go ask them. I will say

344
00:11:54,822 --> 00:11:56,816
they're defense. It's a pretty nice report they

345
00:11:56,816 --> 00:11:58,901
published. Like, the actual blog post. It's got,

346
00:11:58,981 --> 00:12:00,653
like, something a good rundown of what they

347
00:12:00,653 --> 00:12:02,802
did. I... And and all of my testers

348
00:12:02,802 --> 00:12:04,314
at phi I are, like, hey, could we

349
00:12:04,314 --> 00:12:06,080
have a year and a half? Submit our

350
00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:06,239
reports.

351
00:12:08,785 --> 00:12:11,730
I'll I'll I'll give them anytime someone actually

352
00:12:11,730 --> 00:12:13,560
has a attack T in there and then

353
00:12:13,560 --> 00:12:15,570
links off to them. For some reason, that's

354
00:12:15,570 --> 00:12:17,730
just not common knowledge, but that's literally my

355
00:12:17,730 --> 00:12:19,570
favorite thing. Like, I 1 time got a

356
00:12:19,570 --> 00:12:20,309
text message

357
00:12:20,690 --> 00:12:22,129
from a red team, and they had the

358
00:12:22,129 --> 00:12:24,049
attack. Like, the the miter codes and I

359
00:12:24,049 --> 00:12:25,660
was like, I love you so much. This

360
00:12:25,660 --> 00:12:28,372
is the best. Yeah. No. I mean, it's

361
00:12:28,452 --> 00:12:30,127
Ci. So you... You know, the... I guess,

362
00:12:30,526 --> 00:12:32,201
how I see it is, I actually kind

363
00:12:32,201 --> 00:12:35,087
of like having a government level standard for,

364
00:12:35,167 --> 00:12:37,160
like, what is a Pen test? What is

365
00:12:37,160 --> 00:12:39,313
a Pen test report? Like, I think it's,

366
00:12:39,472 --> 00:12:40,509
you know, I don't want it to be,

367
00:12:40,589 --> 00:12:41,705
like, we have to do it this way,

368
00:12:41,785 --> 00:12:43,061
but I think it's cool to see, like,

369
00:12:43,554 --> 00:12:46,511
to base to benchmark yourself. Arguably, like, the

370
00:12:46,511 --> 00:12:48,210
government is... Should be the most transparent

371
00:12:49,068 --> 00:12:50,986
organization. Right? So, like, yeah We're not we're

372
00:12:50,986 --> 00:12:53,000
not gonna see Pen test reports from you

373
00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:55,559
know, trusted sec or black hills or other

374
00:12:55,559 --> 00:12:57,480
industry leaders, but no, we'll probably see it

375
00:12:57,480 --> 00:13:00,691
from Z. There was a, a website a

376
00:13:00,771 --> 00:13:02,944
Github repository that had a whole bunch

377
00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:04,059
of

378
00:13:04,674 --> 00:13:06,666
Pen test reports from different companies. Now a

379
00:13:06,666 --> 00:13:08,418
lot of more sample reports. I can't remember

380
00:13:08,418 --> 00:13:09,056
what was that?

381
00:13:10,187 --> 00:13:12,261
I remember. But those are all super old.

382
00:13:12,500 --> 00:13:14,095
Like, that's a Github repo, and those are

383
00:13:14,095 --> 00:13:14,653
all... They're...

384
00:13:15,451 --> 00:13:17,126
I don't know... I'm not a huge fan

385
00:13:17,126 --> 00:13:18,801
of those. I think this is actually more

386
00:13:18,801 --> 00:13:20,966
realistic. Of, like, what... Where things are at

387
00:13:20,966 --> 00:13:22,955
now. Yeah. Here we go. I don't know.

388
00:13:23,274 --> 00:13:24,092
Cool. And,

389
00:13:24,785 --> 00:13:26,059
Scott it. I've got it right here. I

390
00:13:26,059 --> 00:13:27,906
can share that there are some sources out

391
00:13:27,906 --> 00:13:30,219
there and updated in a while. You're. It's

392
00:13:30,219 --> 00:13:31,175
not holy moly.

393
00:13:32,132 --> 00:13:33,568
This is 1 of those things. There isn't

394
00:13:33,568 --> 00:13:35,800
anything that I would recommend someone actually look

395
00:13:35,800 --> 00:13:37,406
at. I mean, there... We actually do, by

396
00:13:37,406 --> 00:13:37,724
the way.

397
00:13:38,519 --> 00:13:41,223
We have a published sample report from Fernando.

398
00:13:41,382 --> 00:13:43,131
Right? That we've... That we share out, which

399
00:13:43,131 --> 00:13:43,926
is really awesome.

400
00:13:44,499 --> 00:13:44,999
But

401
00:13:45,776 --> 00:13:47,373
it's based on the cyber range. It's not

402
00:13:47,373 --> 00:13:49,549
based on a real op. It's not a

403
00:13:49,687 --> 00:13:52,322
6 months ago. Okay. It's not that. There's

404
00:13:52,322 --> 00:13:54,567
still stuff out there. These are... Yeah. These

405
00:13:54,567 --> 00:13:54,726
are...

406
00:13:55,681 --> 00:13:56,897
I guess, yeah. There's some

407
00:13:57,590 --> 00:14:00,317
more is better. When we're talking about reference

408
00:14:00,374 --> 00:14:01,646
material for a pen test.

409
00:14:02,379 --> 00:14:05,252
More is better. I mean, we'll leave shit.

410
00:14:05,492 --> 00:14:06,050
We're not here.

411
00:14:06,769 --> 00:14:08,365
Oh, man. No We're not.

412
00:14:09,722 --> 00:14:10,361
Fuck the?

413
00:14:11,653 --> 00:14:13,248
Get what no We're not because we don't

414
00:14:13,248 --> 00:14:15,401
publish our pen test reports because people paid

415
00:14:15,401 --> 00:14:17,656
good money for... Oh, we do have stamps

416
00:14:17,794 --> 00:14:18,613
samples. I

417
00:14:19,150 --> 00:14:21,796
I've redacted a bunch of samples reports. Oh,

418
00:14:21,955 --> 00:14:23,229
well, then we try out.

419
00:14:23,707 --> 00:14:25,538
Alright. I'll make a pull request after this.

420
00:14:27,210 --> 00:14:29,693
But... Yeah. I mean... Basically, I think First

421
00:14:29,693 --> 00:14:31,602
of all, I support the government red teaming

422
00:14:31,602 --> 00:14:33,511
agencies that probably otherwise are never gonna pay

423
00:14:33,511 --> 00:14:34,148
for a Bend test.

424
00:14:34,864 --> 00:14:36,136
Like the commission of Fine arts.

425
00:14:36,710 --> 00:14:39,350
I also support them publishing their results, not

426
00:14:39,350 --> 00:14:41,590
like the Test results, but the overall, like,

427
00:14:41,830 --> 00:14:43,610
here's how it says a red teams because

428
00:14:43,925 --> 00:14:45,524
While, we might read this and say, well,

429
00:14:45,684 --> 00:14:46,965
we already do all this stuff and more.

430
00:14:47,285 --> 00:14:49,045
A lot of Test shops are gonna say

431
00:14:49,045 --> 00:14:50,245
this is a lot of good ideas that

432
00:14:50,245 --> 00:14:51,858
we aren't doing. This is a lot of

433
00:14:51,858 --> 00:14:53,294
stuff that we aren't doing and they have

434
00:14:53,294 --> 00:14:55,050
now... They can go to their bosses and

435
00:14:55,050 --> 00:14:56,566
say, we need to do better at pen

436
00:14:56,566 --> 00:14:59,040
testing, Scissors is doing better pen tests than

437
00:14:59,040 --> 00:15:02,007
us. Alright. Like that is... So. I'd like

438
00:15:02,007 --> 00:15:03,522
a little bit more information like, how you

439
00:15:03,522 --> 00:15:05,516
said on who they actually tested. So then

440
00:15:05,516 --> 00:15:07,191
we can use this as, like the end

441
00:15:07,191 --> 00:15:08,866
of the year report for Ci. Be like,

442
00:15:08,946 --> 00:15:10,951
hey, here's all the pen testing we did.

443
00:15:11,110 --> 00:15:13,337
There's this number of people. Not... They don't

444
00:15:13,337 --> 00:15:15,008
have to give us the exact names. And

445
00:15:15,008 --> 00:15:17,410
here's the most common like, a tax we

446
00:15:17,410 --> 00:15:20,756
see. Like governor... Dvr. Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. Exactly.

447
00:15:20,915 --> 00:15:23,145
A Dvr from. I agree. I would love

448
00:15:23,145 --> 00:15:24,340
to move away from

449
00:15:24,738 --> 00:15:27,318
private company. Doing the Db. Db,

450
00:15:28,166 --> 00:15:30,331
it's good, but they gotta just

451
00:15:31,179 --> 00:15:33,081
swallow the pill and start using minor attack.

452
00:15:33,494 --> 00:15:35,246
Alright. Like, no more of this versus stuff.

453
00:15:35,406 --> 00:15:37,795
Like, we... Everyone else is switched. That's that's

454
00:15:37,795 --> 00:15:39,946
my 2. But the problem with the Dvr

455
00:15:39,946 --> 00:15:42,353
is... Well, there's many problems. The biggest about

456
00:15:42,353 --> 00:15:44,209
my thing is they just make up categories

457
00:15:44,267 --> 00:15:46,101
and then they build graphs in those categories.

458
00:15:46,341 --> 00:15:47,776
It's almost as bad as wearing a Mca

459
00:15:47,776 --> 00:15:49,371
t shirt. You know? Like, it's just right

460
00:15:49,371 --> 00:15:49,531
there.

461
00:15:50,342 --> 00:15:52,728
I don't really talking about. No No god.

462
00:15:53,047 --> 00:15:54,558
I'm not gonna go full back and be.

463
00:15:54,717 --> 00:15:55,910
It's fine. It's fine.

464
00:15:57,199 --> 00:15:58,953
Yeah. I think 1 1 notable item that

465
00:15:59,112 --> 00:16:01,824
I saw from this, Cis is the... You

466
00:16:01,824 --> 00:16:03,737
know, they they called out that they found,

467
00:16:03,817 --> 00:16:06,622
like, these cross organizational tag paths. So they

468
00:16:06,622 --> 00:16:09,165
found all these different partner organizations. And normally,

469
00:16:09,562 --> 00:16:11,390
on Pan test, you would go, oh, that's

470
00:16:11,390 --> 00:16:14,188
a... That's a partner organization like Stop. Like

471
00:16:14,188 --> 00:16:16,023
that is bet his time out do not

472
00:16:16,023 --> 00:16:18,336
attack the partner organization. And so it was

473
00:16:18,336 --> 00:16:19,293
like, well, actually,

474
00:16:19,851 --> 00:16:22,085
like, we have the authorization to, like, go

475
00:16:22,085 --> 00:16:24,992
after them too. So they did pivot into,

476
00:16:25,608 --> 00:16:26,427
these other,

477
00:16:27,362 --> 00:16:28,398
cross organizational,

478
00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:31,347
yeah, you know, partners. And I think that

479
00:16:31,347 --> 00:16:31,847
yielded

480
00:16:32,319 --> 00:16:34,629
a bit more insight because that's something that's

481
00:16:34,629 --> 00:16:37,121
unique that you don't go, hey, I compromised

482
00:16:37,258 --> 00:16:37,896
1 host,

483
00:16:38,931 --> 00:16:40,684
and, hey, there's a... It it has a

484
00:16:40,684 --> 00:16:43,434
trusted relationship with this partner. Let's let's compromise

485
00:16:43,495 --> 00:16:45,654
them. And then okay, from there, let's comp...

486
00:16:46,055 --> 00:16:48,535
You know, start chaining these partners because that's

487
00:16:48,535 --> 00:16:50,704
what attackers do. Partner is they're not going

488
00:16:50,704 --> 00:16:51,975
to sit there and go, Oh. Wait a

489
00:16:51,975 --> 00:16:54,040
minute. I got into 1 domain. This is

490
00:16:54,040 --> 00:16:56,741
some entirely different target altogether. No. No. No.

491
00:16:56,900 --> 00:16:57,933
We're gonna... We're we're...

492
00:16:59,059 --> 00:17:00,727
Threat actors, we have morals. We're not going

493
00:17:00,727 --> 00:17:02,236
to go after this other partner no matter

494
00:17:02,236 --> 00:17:03,586
how you so they are. No they're going

495
00:17:03,586 --> 00:17:04,697
to go after that other partner.

496
00:17:05,333 --> 00:17:07,318
Totally. Yeah. I mean, I I think that,

497
00:17:07,477 --> 00:17:08,930
like, I guess the way I I see

498
00:17:08,930 --> 00:17:10,369
it is in the industry a lot. I

499
00:17:10,369 --> 00:17:11,970
struggle with what what is a red team?

500
00:17:12,529 --> 00:17:14,529
I mean, like, you could ask 10 different

501
00:17:14,529 --> 00:17:15,890
people, what a red team is, and they

502
00:17:15,890 --> 00:17:17,663
would have 10 different definitions, but in my

503
00:17:17,663 --> 00:17:17,982
mind,

504
00:17:18,540 --> 00:17:19,816
this is what red team is.

505
00:17:20,534 --> 00:17:23,645
No scope or broad scope, including, like, just

506
00:17:23,645 --> 00:17:25,080
asking the company if you can hack 1

507
00:17:25,080 --> 00:17:27,049
of their vendors or their partners like, in

508
00:17:27,170 --> 00:17:29,490
them being like, yeah, sure. They're like, that

509
00:17:29,490 --> 00:17:30,850
is what a bread team should be. It

510
00:17:30,850 --> 00:17:31,509
should be

511
00:17:31,809 --> 00:17:34,610
broad scope. It should be opportunistic, and it

512
00:17:34,610 --> 00:17:36,458
should be long running. Right? Like that is...

513
00:17:36,696 --> 00:17:38,442
I I think it's... Well, it's not like

514
00:17:38,442 --> 00:17:40,822
a red team which is, oh, well, you

515
00:17:40,822 --> 00:17:42,410
know, we fished, and then we just didn't

516
00:17:42,410 --> 00:17:45,127
assume compromise. Like, it's actually. So you're saying

517
00:17:45,206 --> 00:17:47,279
Have no more 2 week engagements or a

518
00:17:47,279 --> 00:17:48,953
red. Yeah. That's kind of what we're trying

519
00:17:48,953 --> 00:17:51,504
to get away from. Right? Yeah They're, you

520
00:17:51,504 --> 00:17:53,193
know, red to the red tape books. Supposed

521
00:17:53,193 --> 00:17:55,267
to emulate what the attackers are doing, and

522
00:17:55,267 --> 00:17:57,043
this goes back to Corey coming to me

523
00:17:57,102 --> 00:17:58,458
couple what is a year and a half

524
00:17:58,458 --> 00:17:58,617
ago.

525
00:17:59,335 --> 00:18:00,691
And, like, you look at all the problems

526
00:18:00,691 --> 00:18:02,286
of red teaming. Like, you get a very

527
00:18:02,286 --> 00:18:04,608
tight scope and time. And that's the biggest

528
00:18:04,608 --> 00:18:05,585
limiting factor

529
00:18:06,038 --> 00:18:07,708
is the time is so tight. Like, 2

530
00:18:07,708 --> 00:18:09,559
weeks or 1 month, Like, an... And that

531
00:18:09,615 --> 00:18:11,761
adversary is not going to do that. Right?

532
00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:13,602
Scope They're gonna come in low and slow.

533
00:18:14,078 --> 00:18:15,904
It's like a customer says, hey, we want

534
00:18:15,904 --> 00:18:17,412
you guys to hack us like a real

535
00:18:17,412 --> 00:18:18,523
adversary wouldn't and we want you to do

536
00:18:18,523 --> 00:18:19,237
it in 1 week.

537
00:18:19,889 --> 00:18:21,967
And immediately, they pick up your password spray.

538
00:18:22,127 --> 00:18:24,124
Whenever an attacker will run the password spray

539
00:18:24,124 --> 00:18:26,122
over a month. You know, those are the

540
00:18:26,122 --> 00:18:27,800
types of things that you should be doing.

541
00:18:27,960 --> 00:18:30,124
Or The 1 that we talked about, Corey

542
00:18:30,124 --> 00:18:31,795
was a lot of times an attacker will

543
00:18:31,795 --> 00:18:35,056
sit and wait on a network, like, until

544
00:18:35,056 --> 00:18:37,223
an ect exploit comes available and then immediately

545
00:18:37,223 --> 00:18:38,737
they take advantage of that exploit.

546
00:18:39,375 --> 00:18:42,404
So totally, it's kinda you because I think

547
00:18:42,404 --> 00:18:44,093
it all started Corey with wix were all

548
00:18:44,093 --> 00:18:46,007
walking around and like, hey, red teaming sucks.

549
00:18:46,167 --> 00:18:47,363
We're not doing it the way it should

550
00:18:47,363 --> 00:18:49,357
be done in the industry, and we wanted

551
00:18:49,357 --> 00:18:51,829
to do something different, Continuous pump testing. Absolutely.

552
00:18:52,467 --> 00:18:54,238
I mean, I'm biased. But, like, you know,

553
00:18:54,477 --> 00:18:55,834
as an example right now, I'm just in

554
00:18:55,834 --> 00:18:57,989
1 of my customers ticketing systems just waiting

555
00:18:57,989 --> 00:18:59,825
for a good ticket. I'm just waiting for

556
00:18:59,825 --> 00:19:02,035
a ticket, I can. I... With either with

557
00:19:02,233 --> 00:19:03,902
either with credentials in it that I could

558
00:19:03,902 --> 00:19:05,491
just piggyback straight on or I'll just, like,

559
00:19:05,968 --> 00:19:07,716
inject a document where it really shouldn't be.

560
00:19:07,875 --> 00:19:10,417
Like that's that's Apt thinking. Right? I'm just,

561
00:19:10,497 --> 00:19:10,576
like,

562
00:19:11,389 --> 00:19:13,227
eventually, there be a ticket with Juicy info,

563
00:19:13,387 --> 00:19:15,624
and I will strike when the opportunity. But

564
00:19:15,624 --> 00:19:16,663
if you're doing a pen test, like, what

565
00:19:16,663 --> 00:19:17,862
do you do? You can't wait for a

566
00:19:17,862 --> 00:19:19,300
good jira a ticket to roll in. You

567
00:19:19,300 --> 00:19:21,385
gotta, like, know, you gotta you gotta get

568
00:19:21,385 --> 00:19:22,977
out. I wanna Wanna play a little bit

569
00:19:22,977 --> 00:19:24,886
of devil's advocate here if From the blue

570
00:19:24,886 --> 00:19:27,989
team side. Most red teams that we do

571
00:19:27,989 --> 00:19:29,618
go through. You know aren't

572
00:19:30,154 --> 00:19:33,102
very good at reporting or confirming that that

573
00:19:33,102 --> 00:19:33,841
is them

574
00:19:34,217 --> 00:19:36,859
when we find it. So we have to

575
00:19:36,859 --> 00:19:38,922
go in full instant response. Like, no 1...

576
00:19:39,161 --> 00:19:41,462
Like, no one's good. No one's good as

577
00:19:41,462 --> 00:19:43,446
you guys at, like, actually writing a report

578
00:19:43,446 --> 00:19:45,686
or giving that information. So when I'm out

579
00:19:45,686 --> 00:19:48,556
there building detection, and I come across some

580
00:19:48,556 --> 00:19:50,628
obviously blatant bad stuff, and I press the

581
00:19:50,628 --> 00:19:52,700
shit alarm. And then, like, oh, no, that's

582
00:19:52,700 --> 00:19:54,385
like, the actual red team that we're having,

583
00:19:54,544 --> 00:19:55,895
but we forgot to tell you about and

584
00:19:55,895 --> 00:19:57,722
forgot to report it because like, the team

585
00:19:57,722 --> 00:19:59,709
x y and z. Like, for the those...

586
00:19:59,868 --> 00:20:00,606
Those larger

587
00:20:00,981 --> 00:20:02,987
organizations, the communicate... That the red team is

588
00:20:02,987 --> 00:20:05,542
continuous. Like, I... I'm sure you guys have

589
00:20:05,542 --> 00:20:07,618
it down, but I haven't found anyone else

590
00:20:07,618 --> 00:20:09,773
who's communication. Is that great? Better for a

591
00:20:09,773 --> 00:20:12,124
days. So that all funny it's mentioned That'll...

592
00:20:12,741 --> 00:20:14,017
1 of the... Yeah, That's a feature of

593
00:20:14,017 --> 00:20:16,250
the continuous right team. Right? Like, we aren't

594
00:20:16,250 --> 00:20:18,005
showing up W Bam. Thank you, ma'am. We'll

595
00:20:18,005 --> 00:20:19,201
see you next year maybe.

596
00:20:20,158 --> 00:20:21,217
It... It's literally

597
00:20:21,769 --> 00:20:24,961
Corey can't run. Like, you know, we're doing

598
00:20:24,961 --> 00:20:26,957
those types of things. It's a year long

599
00:20:26,957 --> 00:20:28,973
contract. He can't just smoke bomb and.

600
00:20:30,722 --> 00:20:31,620
It's suit

601
00:20:32,314 --> 00:20:34,145
a literally. And then also the way that...

602
00:20:34,384 --> 00:20:36,056
And I've seen some other firms that kinda

603
00:20:36,056 --> 00:20:37,569
do this too? Like, I know I'm working

604
00:20:37,569 --> 00:20:40,295
with red siege. On a continuous red team

605
00:20:40,295 --> 00:20:41,652
and that's something that they're doing as well,

606
00:20:41,971 --> 00:20:43,727
wanna do shout out for other firms that

607
00:20:43,727 --> 00:20:46,734
are doing this. But when we're doing it

608
00:20:46,934 --> 00:20:49,568
the integration with the ticketing system. So if

609
00:20:49,568 --> 00:20:52,283
somebody like, hey, is Phi running an attack

610
00:20:52,283 --> 00:20:54,358
at the moment, there's somebody in that environment

611
00:20:54,358 --> 00:20:56,089
that can go into the ticketing system and

612
00:20:56,209 --> 00:20:58,367
see what our team is doing. Like. Yes.

613
00:20:58,607 --> 00:21:00,445
This is the other side of that, which

614
00:21:00,445 --> 00:21:02,123
brings back to kind of the big thing,

615
00:21:02,683 --> 00:21:04,201
Why the hell are we still reporting this

616
00:21:04,201 --> 00:21:06,530
crap in word team Like,

617
00:21:07,324 --> 00:21:08,990
III love the way that we do reporting

618
00:21:08,990 --> 00:21:11,529
at B. I think it's great. I... It's

619
00:21:11,529 --> 00:21:12,029
wonderful,

620
00:21:12,401 --> 00:21:14,306
but it all goes back to years ago.

621
00:21:14,639 --> 00:21:16,553
When we first started doing pen testing, when

622
00:21:16,633 --> 00:21:18,547
I first started doing it in, like, 2002,

623
00:21:18,707 --> 00:21:19,504
2003,

624
00:21:20,222 --> 00:21:21,817
it was literally if we hacked you, we

625
00:21:21,817 --> 00:21:23,731
got Shell, we were done. We're, like Got

626
00:21:23,731 --> 00:21:25,822
shell out you know, that was kind of

627
00:21:25,822 --> 00:21:26,561
the sole

628
00:21:27,259 --> 00:21:28,776
determination of whether or not we were successful.

629
00:21:29,334 --> 00:21:32,128
And when Ed kind of developed the new

630
00:21:32,128 --> 00:21:33,565
kind of way of doing reporting,

631
00:21:34,299 --> 00:21:36,220
wanna say 2006, 2007,

632
00:21:36,619 --> 00:21:37,740
a lot of it was to try to

633
00:21:37,740 --> 00:21:39,660
show value, but also to show that the

634
00:21:39,660 --> 00:21:41,259
people were putting in a good 40 hours

635
00:21:41,259 --> 00:21:43,273
of work in a week. So it's almost

636
00:21:43,273 --> 00:21:45,269
like that Gilbert cartoon. It's like, we wanna

637
00:21:45,269 --> 00:21:47,105
make sure that you're miserable in what you're

638
00:21:47,105 --> 00:21:49,580
doing and producing this workout, but hence the

639
00:21:49,580 --> 00:21:52,547
word document Pen test report was born. So

640
00:21:52,547 --> 00:21:54,055
now a customer can get this and be

641
00:21:54,055 --> 00:21:56,437
like, yes. This looks like 80 hours of

642
00:21:56,437 --> 00:21:56,913
work here.

643
00:21:58,183 --> 00:22:00,327
But it almost always had to be chopped

644
00:22:00,327 --> 00:22:02,335
up in the little bite. And then converted

645
00:22:02,335 --> 00:22:05,214
over into tickets for actual work items to

646
00:22:05,214 --> 00:22:06,974
get done. So it's kind of like at

647
00:22:06,974 --> 00:22:08,974
some point, the industry has gotta start skipping

648
00:22:08,974 --> 00:22:10,982
that step. It's and just start integrating with

649
00:22:10,982 --> 00:22:13,051
customers ticketing systems so that the work... The

650
00:22:13,051 --> 00:22:14,722
work items can get done faster.

651
00:22:15,199 --> 00:22:16,472
I I thought you're gonna go full blown.

652
00:22:16,631 --> 00:22:19,193
We're going as a an ad for. City

653
00:22:19,193 --> 00:22:20,969
or or. No. No.

654
00:22:21,665 --> 00:22:23,899
No. We're not using word. We're using notion

655
00:22:23,899 --> 00:22:26,291
from here out. No. No. I mean. Full

656
00:22:26,291 --> 00:22:28,365
disclosure. I, like, I we... I kinda derail

657
00:22:28,365 --> 00:22:30,631
the whole podcast, but pull disclosure did. And

658
00:22:30,689 --> 00:22:33,179
continuous spend testing uses Jira. We do not

659
00:22:33,236 --> 00:22:34,907
do a word doc. The word doc just

660
00:22:34,907 --> 00:22:36,992
says you got a Pen test. Whole Congrats.

661
00:22:37,311 --> 00:22:39,064
Now here's all the findings are in Jira.

662
00:22:39,542 --> 00:22:41,614
Yeah. Anyway, let's talk about At and T.

663
00:22:41,853 --> 00:22:43,686
Let's talk about breach. Yeah. Let's move on

664
00:22:43,686 --> 00:22:46,008
that. Let's let's let's talk about. So At

665
00:22:46,008 --> 00:22:47,677
and T, people might have heard of it.

666
00:22:47,995 --> 00:22:50,699
Large telecom company, a hundred and 10000000 customers

667
00:22:50,699 --> 00:22:51,891
had their records disclosed.

668
00:22:53,021 --> 00:22:54,535
I guess does anyone know is this tied

669
00:22:54,535 --> 00:22:56,288
to snowflake? I feel like yeah got it.

670
00:22:56,447 --> 00:22:58,996
You know, sounds like it is. Got it.

671
00:22:59,235 --> 00:23:01,466
What what what Keeps saying about it is

672
00:23:01,466 --> 00:23:03,705
that. Is that this is At and T,

673
00:23:03,943 --> 00:23:05,768
and if it's the same way that all

674
00:23:05,768 --> 00:23:07,990
these other snowflakes were they didn't have multi

675
00:23:07,990 --> 00:23:09,102
factor on their data lake.

676
00:23:09,991 --> 00:23:12,139
Absolutely. Yeah. What is At and T doing?

677
00:23:12,298 --> 00:23:14,685
I mean, this is At and T that

678
00:23:14,685 --> 00:23:17,868
spout security that spout, we are the best

679
00:23:17,868 --> 00:23:18,368
and

680
00:23:18,998 --> 00:23:21,793
No security on their back end data at

681
00:23:21,793 --> 00:23:24,268
all. Well, it's the third party risk management.

682
00:23:24,427 --> 00:23:25,625
Right? We talked about it at the beginning

683
00:23:25,625 --> 00:23:27,301
of the year as being the Cis is

684
00:23:27,301 --> 00:23:29,707
worst nightmare and it's totally expanding on that.

685
00:23:29,945 --> 00:23:32,332
Like, it's all about third party, and I

686
00:23:32,332 --> 00:23:34,161
will say, I've been talking about this to

687
00:23:34,161 --> 00:23:35,593
a few different people. And I think it's

688
00:23:35,593 --> 00:23:38,073
1 of those cases where, like, the business

689
00:23:38,073 --> 00:23:40,060
teams at a lot of these companies have

690
00:23:40,060 --> 00:23:42,841
huge sway. Right? Of like, Yeah. We we

691
00:23:42,841 --> 00:23:45,163
are the ones who get paid. So give

692
00:23:45,163 --> 00:23:46,917
us the tools we need to get paid.

693
00:23:47,236 --> 00:23:48,375
And I think snowflake

694
00:23:48,752 --> 00:23:50,905
oftentimes was the solution to that problem of,

695
00:23:51,384 --> 00:23:52,899
we need to have better... You know, I

696
00:23:52,899 --> 00:23:55,148
don't know, whatever pick your business thing. Better

697
00:23:55,148 --> 00:23:58,341
turnover, better, you know, marketing, better whatever. I

698
00:23:58,341 --> 00:24:00,656
think Snowflake was the solution to a business

699
00:24:00,656 --> 00:24:02,892
problem, and it the security team might have

700
00:24:02,892 --> 00:24:05,614
been cut out of that gus altogether. I'm

701
00:24:05,614 --> 00:24:07,442
just speculating here. I don't know specifically about

702
00:24:07,522 --> 00:24:09,270
At and T, but I think when the

703
00:24:09,270 --> 00:24:11,417
business team goes asking, a lot of the

704
00:24:11,417 --> 00:24:13,897
time the answer is yes, and it doesn't

705
00:24:13,897 --> 00:24:16,044
go through security. It's just... Oh, you guys

706
00:24:16,044 --> 00:24:17,635
need a data lake. Well Snowflakes gonna work.

707
00:24:17,953 --> 00:24:20,260
Okay. Cool. Like the thing you get with...

708
00:24:22,191 --> 00:24:23,947
There's the front doesn't go through security. The

709
00:24:23,947 --> 00:24:25,224
other thing that it kind of just screams

710
00:24:25,224 --> 00:24:26,661
to me is, like, what is the ongoing

711
00:24:26,661 --> 00:24:28,758
process for managing third party risk in those

712
00:24:28,817 --> 00:24:31,066
organizations? Because things are gonna get messed upfront,

713
00:24:31,225 --> 00:24:32,980
whether it's third party or whether it's something

714
00:24:32,980 --> 00:24:34,894
internally developed. And so, like, you've gotta have

715
00:24:34,894 --> 00:24:36,250
the 2 pieces of that. You've gotta have

716
00:24:36,250 --> 00:24:38,085
that initial piece, you know, early in your

717
00:24:38,085 --> 00:24:40,252
your deployment cycle. You've also gotta have some

718
00:24:40,252 --> 00:24:41,071
kind of a

719
00:24:41,608 --> 00:24:43,601
review process an audit process or whatever.

720
00:24:44,398 --> 00:24:45,354
You know, if he gets miss the front,

721
00:24:45,593 --> 00:24:47,427
hopefully within a year, somebody like, hey, we've

722
00:24:47,427 --> 00:24:48,039
got this

723
00:24:48,399 --> 00:24:51,355
data... This provider we're using for our our

724
00:24:51,355 --> 00:24:53,512
our cloud storage. How how do we connect

725
00:24:53,512 --> 00:24:55,131
to them? And like that

726
00:24:55,761 --> 00:24:58,248
actually come up somewhere for any of you

727
00:24:58,781 --> 00:25:00,076
more it's getting something

728
00:25:00,529 --> 00:25:00,768
worth.

729
00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:03,166
I don't think it's getting swept under the

730
00:25:03,166 --> 00:25:05,072
rug. I just think that the It infrastructures

731
00:25:05,072 --> 00:25:07,454
with all these Saas services, past services, Nas

732
00:25:07,454 --> 00:25:10,313
services, das services, whatever Ass server might be

733
00:25:10,313 --> 00:25:12,565
using swept I tell you about ad services?

734
00:25:12,805 --> 00:25:14,644
Saas services. That's what they are now for

735
00:25:14,644 --> 00:25:16,565
me. That's what they mean to me. I

736
00:25:16,565 --> 00:25:18,325
don't think that a lot of people...

737
00:25:18,818 --> 00:25:20,883
Like, whenever we're working with organizations, they had

738
00:25:20,883 --> 00:25:23,108
no idea, like, security teams or like, we're

739
00:25:23,108 --> 00:25:25,332
using snowflake, what the hell is snowflake.

740
00:25:25,888 --> 00:25:27,318
And it's not that it's getting swept under

741
00:25:27,318 --> 00:25:28,453
the rug, it's just

742
00:25:28,843 --> 00:25:30,513
somebody at some part of the company needed

743
00:25:30,513 --> 00:25:33,081
a thing, and they bop that thing, and

744
00:25:33,138 --> 00:25:35,604
dot It. A shadow It, and there's not

745
00:25:35,604 --> 00:25:37,845
a lot. Oh god. Help me. There needs

746
00:25:37,845 --> 00:25:40,618
to be more correlation between the accounts payable

747
00:25:40,618 --> 00:25:44,027
departments at organizations and the security where accounts

748
00:25:44,027 --> 00:25:46,035
payable away. Here's all the shit we're paying

749
00:25:46,035 --> 00:25:48,434
for and insecurities like, oh, snowflake? What the

750
00:25:48,434 --> 00:25:48,914
hell is that?

751
00:25:50,434 --> 00:25:52,355
I mean, honestly, that's funny because from the

752
00:25:52,355 --> 00:25:54,528
owner's perspective of a company that makes... Perfect

753
00:25:54,528 --> 00:25:55,804
sense. Like I never would think of like,

754
00:25:55,963 --> 00:25:57,478
oh, just look at accounts payable, like, who

755
00:25:57,478 --> 00:25:58,036
are we?

756
00:25:58,753 --> 00:26:00,587
I I do it all the time. I

757
00:26:00,587 --> 00:26:02,420
do it monthly. Erica sits down with me.

758
00:26:02,833 --> 00:26:04,920
It's my least favorite part of the month

759
00:26:04,976 --> 00:26:07,039
where Erica is just like, John, we need

760
00:26:07,039 --> 00:26:08,547
to talk about this and my god. It's

761
00:26:08,547 --> 00:26:10,872
the time the month again. And it's down.

762
00:26:11,419 --> 00:26:13,254
And she did start going through. She's like,

763
00:26:13,653 --> 00:26:15,168
do you know what this is? And I'm

764
00:26:15,168 --> 00:26:17,641
like, no. I don't 70000 dollars worth of

765
00:26:17,641 --> 00:26:19,475
stickers. Know what this rate. And it's like,

766
00:26:19,794 --> 00:26:20,990
I knew know what thought is.

767
00:26:21,803 --> 00:26:23,799
Why did we spend 75000

768
00:26:23,799 --> 00:26:26,513
dollars on, like, you know, inflatable monkeys? I'm

769
00:26:26,513 --> 00:26:29,088
like, I don't know Go ask Jason. I

770
00:26:29,546 --> 00:26:30,185
plan for that.

771
00:26:31,238 --> 00:26:33,792
But we do that and it's important because

772
00:26:33,792 --> 00:26:36,288
we have literally found those types of services

773
00:26:36,586 --> 00:26:39,300
where some random person at Black Hills information

774
00:26:39,300 --> 00:26:41,553
security. Paid for a service with their own

775
00:26:41,553 --> 00:26:44,589
credit card, it's registered under their personal email

776
00:26:44,589 --> 00:26:45,409
or their B

777
00:26:45,788 --> 00:26:48,265
email. Systems has no awareness of what it

778
00:26:48,265 --> 00:26:50,594
is, and literally, there's a whole bunch of

779
00:26:50,594 --> 00:26:53,088
data in there that's like super sensitive. And

780
00:26:53,306 --> 00:26:54,821
we're a small company of like a hundred

781
00:26:54,821 --> 00:26:57,214
and 50 people. I can only imagine how

782
00:26:57,214 --> 00:26:59,143
bad that is at At and T. Yeah.

783
00:26:59,303 --> 00:27:00,978
Well, the other thing, I would say from

784
00:27:00,978 --> 00:27:02,892
a security Team's perspective, I'm so sick of

785
00:27:02,892 --> 00:27:04,407
talking about sierra logs, but I'm gonna do

786
00:27:04,407 --> 00:27:06,401
it again. Oh, go. Oh, my god. It's

787
00:27:06,401 --> 00:27:09,605
not hard. It's not that hard. Like, okay.

788
00:27:10,242 --> 00:27:12,812
It's not that hard to just monitor the

789
00:27:12,870 --> 00:27:15,338
credentials that come over the wire. Like, you

790
00:27:15,338 --> 00:27:16,930
might not know you have snowflake, but if

791
00:27:16,930 --> 00:27:19,581
a... At at t t dot com email

792
00:27:19,581 --> 00:27:21,978
pops in a s log. You gotta go

793
00:27:21,978 --> 00:27:24,548
remediate it. Like, it's not... It's just not

794
00:27:24,548 --> 00:27:26,060
not horrible. I I was gonna say 1

795
00:27:26,060 --> 00:27:28,926
of my worst fears. Right? Is not, like,

796
00:27:29,404 --> 00:27:31,974
go going dark web stuff. Right? Seeing your

797
00:27:32,031 --> 00:27:34,273
credentials. Are from your company on the Dark

798
00:27:34,273 --> 00:27:36,898
web, but it's nobody who works at your

799
00:27:36,898 --> 00:27:39,442
site. So it's that third party person. So

800
00:27:39,442 --> 00:27:41,845
you got a new credentials Well, dude, I've

801
00:27:42,004 --> 00:27:43,142
I've seen it at different

802
00:27:43,678 --> 00:27:45,988
organizations, and sometimes they're like just nuke nuke

803
00:27:45,988 --> 00:27:47,661
their credentials right away? Like, okay, what did

804
00:27:47,661 --> 00:27:49,493
they have access to? And then they realize

805
00:27:49,493 --> 00:27:51,182
we have no clue. We don't even know,

806
00:27:51,421 --> 00:27:52,855
like, we know the login portal, but we

807
00:27:52,855 --> 00:27:54,609
don't know how Deep it goes. And now

808
00:27:54,609 --> 00:27:56,203
we have to, like, do a full investigation

809
00:27:56,203 --> 00:27:57,877
has someone already logged in. Where do they

810
00:27:57,877 --> 00:27:59,888
log in? We have to figure out that

811
00:27:59,888 --> 00:28:01,965
whole third party vendor, tell them to nuke

812
00:28:01,965 --> 00:28:04,361
everything they got. It's... Oh, that's the part.

813
00:28:04,601 --> 00:28:06,372
Right? If you're not. Let's say you're not

814
00:28:06,372 --> 00:28:07,647
gonna a new call the credentials you get

815
00:28:07,647 --> 00:28:09,800
in steal logs, which you should. You should

816
00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:11,018
at least have immediately.

817
00:28:13,228 --> 00:28:13,627
Monitor.

818
00:28:14,759 --> 00:28:17,156
I'm dying. You'll be okay with you okay.

819
00:28:19,554 --> 00:28:22,351
So what do you think about the 370000

820
00:28:22,351 --> 00:28:24,681
dollars that they paid to have it what

821
00:28:24,681 --> 00:28:26,453
supposedly deleted. What

822
00:28:26,987 --> 00:28:30,328
supposedly. Yeah. Cheap... We've deleted this copy.

823
00:28:31,218 --> 00:28:32,170
Yeah. We deleted this.

824
00:28:33,678 --> 00:28:35,820
My my my my my thinking on it

825
00:28:35,820 --> 00:28:38,121
is, what a dumb criminal if they're only

826
00:28:38,121 --> 00:28:39,644
asking 370000.

827
00:28:39,882 --> 00:28:42,660
That's what I on Twitter and stuff. It's

828
00:28:42,660 --> 00:28:45,439
just like, how was it that cheap? Unless

829
00:28:45,439 --> 00:28:46,947
have been, like, someone ill.

830
00:28:47,439 --> 00:28:49,434
An inexperienced who got lucky with the Cr

831
00:28:49,434 --> 00:28:51,690
and they're like, alright. I'll just take just

832
00:28:51,908 --> 00:28:54,462
instant payout. Just real quick getting out.

833
00:28:55,340 --> 00:28:56,795
Like Well, they did get paid. Right?

834
00:28:58,234 --> 00:28:58,734
Apparently,

835
00:28:59,355 --> 00:28:59,855
that

836
00:29:00,234 --> 00:29:02,075
hey, and even in that that bio line

837
00:29:02,075 --> 00:29:04,075
that has touch wiggle room in there that...

838
00:29:04,409 --> 00:29:05,387
The researcher

839
00:29:06,243 --> 00:29:09,035
says he believes the only copy. Like, that

840
00:29:09,035 --> 00:29:09,194
is...

841
00:29:09,912 --> 00:29:12,066
That is complete legally Wiggle room there. Like,

842
00:29:12,146 --> 00:29:14,060
well, I believe is the only copy. Like,

843
00:29:14,948 --> 00:29:17,010
being only hobby. We could be back here

844
00:29:17,010 --> 00:29:18,516
in like, you know, 3 bunk being like,

845
00:29:18,754 --> 00:29:20,975
hey. Guess what? Like, the... Here's all the

846
00:29:20,975 --> 00:29:21,609
information that was...

847
00:29:22,658 --> 00:29:24,731
Supposedly deleted. That's not out there. The security

848
00:29:24,731 --> 00:29:25,768
research you can be like, wow, you know

849
00:29:25,847 --> 00:29:27,942
I said, I believe the only copy

850
00:29:28,319 --> 00:29:28,819
was

851
00:29:29,356 --> 00:29:32,635
deleted. Yeah. IIII

852
00:29:32,635 --> 00:29:34,540
think that that's funny, but, I don't know.

853
00:29:34,699 --> 00:29:35,652
Honestly, like...

854
00:29:36,446 --> 00:29:38,589
So do we trust what At and T

855
00:29:38,589 --> 00:29:40,257
is saying was stolen? Like,

856
00:29:40,828 --> 00:29:43,137
it was just call history, text history,

857
00:29:43,535 --> 00:29:45,229
not actual contents,

858
00:29:45,923 --> 00:29:47,196
or do we think that there might be

859
00:29:47,196 --> 00:29:50,179
more in this. Like, I don't get nervous

860
00:29:50,714 --> 00:29:50,794
more.

861
00:29:51,829 --> 00:29:52,068
It is.

862
00:29:53,023 --> 00:29:54,775
Even if it is just what they say,

863
00:29:55,014 --> 00:29:56,606
it's still plenty enough data.

864
00:29:57,178 --> 00:29:57,678
Or

865
00:29:58,448 --> 00:30:00,274
anybody to go and do bad with it?

866
00:30:00,989 --> 00:30:02,918
Come on. I mean, how many years

867
00:30:03,688 --> 00:30:06,326
years ago All I needed was your last

868
00:30:06,326 --> 00:30:09,030
name and your Zip code. Yep. And I

869
00:30:09,030 --> 00:30:11,178
can go in and get everything else. Come

870
00:30:11,178 --> 00:30:13,760
on. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I think they

871
00:30:13,816 --> 00:30:16,120
argue like, why even have the data lake

872
00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:18,107
at this... Like, what is the... III don't

873
00:30:18,107 --> 00:30:18,663
know. I mean...

874
00:30:19,473 --> 00:30:20,988
1 of the... I feel like data lakes

875
00:30:20,988 --> 00:30:22,900
are kind of just like the graveyard of

876
00:30:22,900 --> 00:30:25,530
bit data? Like, they're... How many companies are

877
00:30:25,530 --> 00:30:27,774
actually doing something with it. I just think

878
00:30:27,774 --> 00:30:29,681
they like collecting data. I think it sounds

879
00:30:29,681 --> 00:30:32,620
badass whenever you're like, whoa, or data lake

880
00:30:32,620 --> 00:30:35,241
has 64 pet of logs in it. It

881
00:30:35,241 --> 00:30:38,204
just... Sounds cool. It it's not really useful.

882
00:30:39,479 --> 00:30:42,347
Auditor It's it's... Audits. All the... It's say

883
00:30:42,347 --> 00:30:44,578
it's huge of. Right? In a huge matter

884
00:30:44,578 --> 00:30:47,061
of. But it's badass ass. It's like those

885
00:30:47,061 --> 00:30:48,414
cars that they try to get as low

886
00:30:48,414 --> 00:30:50,642
to the ground as they possibly end. No.

887
00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:53,444
Think it sound... They think it's cool. It's

888
00:30:53,444 --> 00:30:56,721
really not, and it's absolutely not useful. That's

889
00:30:56,721 --> 00:30:58,798
what a data lake is. And I also

890
00:30:58,798 --> 00:31:00,477
think that we're moving away from data lakes.

891
00:31:00,717 --> 00:31:02,395
I'm still waiting for someone that comes up

892
00:31:02,395 --> 00:31:04,589
with a data ocean. We're late.

893
00:31:06,890 --> 00:31:10,089
It's way salty. It is so. So salty.

894
00:31:10,344 --> 00:31:12,659
So so. Years ago, years ago, John, I

895
00:31:12,659 --> 00:31:14,814
worked with a guy. I worked for a

896
00:31:14,814 --> 00:31:17,048
company, and the owner of the company was

897
00:31:17,048 --> 00:31:20,037
so proud of the fact. That our data

898
00:31:20,095 --> 00:31:21,632
retention policy would save

899
00:31:22,009 --> 00:31:22,509
everything.

900
00:31:22,966 --> 00:31:24,025
So we had

901
00:31:24,801 --> 00:31:28,151
millions of records in in the main production

902
00:31:28,151 --> 00:31:31,861
database and probably 3 quarters of those records

903
00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:34,897
had not been touched or accessed in

904
00:31:35,356 --> 00:31:35,856
years.

905
00:31:36,568 --> 00:31:38,715
Yeah. Years and years. And and lawyers are

906
00:31:38,715 --> 00:31:41,021
like, I'm sorry. What? You have what?

907
00:31:42,135 --> 00:31:43,964
Just post it out. I just went through

908
00:31:43,964 --> 00:31:46,325
real fast. It said hoard. The the It

909
00:31:47,002 --> 00:31:49,154
that show. Yeah. Where, like, why are you...

910
00:31:49,553 --> 00:31:51,306
Why are you... The... And that you could

911
00:31:51,306 --> 00:31:53,298
just see these people get excited about Microsoft

912
00:31:53,538 --> 00:31:55,229
Recall. They're, like, This is what I've been

913
00:31:55,229 --> 00:31:55,948
waiting for my whole line.

914
00:31:57,466 --> 00:31:59,544
Yeah. I mean, it's like, it's the whole

915
00:31:59,544 --> 00:32:01,382
data science thing, like, okay. Let's say you're

916
00:32:01,382 --> 00:32:02,661
handed this dataset.

917
00:32:03,060 --> 00:32:05,306
Like... What are you gonna do? Like, did

918
00:32:05,306 --> 00:32:07,694
you know that 14 percent of people call

919
00:32:07,694 --> 00:32:10,479
everyone after 9PM. It's like, great. I don't

920
00:32:10,479 --> 00:32:11,298
care. Hey

921
00:32:12,151 --> 00:32:15,274
Okay. Like, thank you. They never my how?

922
00:32:15,912 --> 00:32:18,145
Yeah. Yeah. I don't know. I mean, I

923
00:32:18,145 --> 00:32:19,204
but 1 of the

924
00:32:19,740 --> 00:32:21,814
Here's the. Here's the thought with that sort

925
00:32:21,814 --> 00:32:22,771
of data though.

926
00:32:23,743 --> 00:32:26,453
This number got texted by this number and

927
00:32:26,453 --> 00:32:29,084
replied back to it. This number texted this

928
00:32:29,084 --> 00:32:30,837
number got a call from this number and

929
00:32:30,837 --> 00:32:31,156
answered it.

930
00:32:31,969 --> 00:32:34,361
If that data is out there with how

931
00:32:34,361 --> 00:32:36,036
easy it is to spoof numbers.

932
00:32:36,914 --> 00:32:38,929
Wouldn't that allow for easier

933
00:32:40,184 --> 00:32:40,822
whatever is

934
00:32:41,380 --> 00:32:43,715
Doing out there. Yeah. III think you're absolutely

935
00:32:43,715 --> 00:32:46,355
right, but also think about, like, every divorce

936
00:32:46,355 --> 00:32:48,755
or almost every divorce that's being processed right

937
00:32:48,755 --> 00:32:50,599
now. Where all of a sudden you have

938
00:32:50,599 --> 00:32:53,134
that, like, the records of text numbers and,

939
00:32:53,293 --> 00:32:53,451
like,

940
00:32:54,481 --> 00:32:56,383
Yeah. Yeah. Or you're a reporter.

941
00:32:57,114 --> 00:32:59,189
And you're trying to figure out which political

942
00:32:59,189 --> 00:33:01,504
person talking with another political person. I mean,

943
00:33:01,664 --> 00:33:04,000
there is a yeah. The privacy the privacy

944
00:33:04,378 --> 00:33:05,575
implications here are really bad.

945
00:33:06,469 --> 00:33:07,907
Believe were you gonna say something about that?

946
00:33:08,307 --> 00:33:10,225
Gonna say, basically the same. Like, you could

947
00:33:10,225 --> 00:33:11,823
look up with those cold records, and you

948
00:33:11,823 --> 00:33:13,981
could find, like, z phone number that John

949
00:33:14,141 --> 00:33:16,233
Str will answer that will take a call

950
00:33:16,233 --> 00:33:17,911
from. When he's on the air. Like, there

951
00:33:17,911 --> 00:33:20,148
are some phone numbers that John will go...

952
00:33:20,468 --> 00:33:21,826
He'll he'll drop from the call and go,

953
00:33:21,986 --> 00:33:23,838
I gotta take this call right now, And

954
00:33:23,838 --> 00:33:25,031
then it it turns out to be a,

955
00:33:25,111 --> 00:33:26,145
hey hate we've been trying to reach you

956
00:33:26,145 --> 00:33:28,849
about your card extended warranty. And that would

957
00:33:28,849 --> 00:33:29,247
be good.

958
00:33:30,932 --> 00:33:32,360
But but you could. You could look up

959
00:33:32,360 --> 00:33:35,003
that dataset and be able to get through.

960
00:33:35,931 --> 00:33:38,391
Yeah. So Ryan just linked to a super

961
00:33:38,391 --> 00:33:40,952
relevant, I think, article, which is the whole

962
00:33:40,952 --> 00:33:42,387
concept of dark patterns.

963
00:33:42,944 --> 00:33:44,697
This is actually what we're talking about. We

964
00:33:44,697 --> 00:33:46,291
just don't know what we're talking about. It's

965
00:33:46,291 --> 00:33:49,090
like the concept of dark patterns ryan a

966
00:33:49,090 --> 00:33:52,215
link the article, but essentially, it's like behavior

967
00:33:52,272 --> 00:33:52,590
mining,

968
00:33:53,625 --> 00:33:56,025
and kind of like trying to know, the

969
00:33:56,025 --> 00:33:57,612
the... I think the example that gives in

970
00:33:57,612 --> 00:33:59,278
the thing is, like, how hard it is

971
00:33:59,278 --> 00:34:01,182
to cancel Amazon Prime, Like, I don't know

972
00:34:01,182 --> 00:34:02,214
if it's a meme or if it's true,

973
00:34:02,373 --> 00:34:04,137
but you I've heard that at 1 point

974
00:34:04,137 --> 00:34:06,046
the code name for canceling prime was

975
00:34:06,682 --> 00:34:07,477
operation labyrinth.

976
00:34:08,830 --> 00:34:09,546
Oh, wow.

977
00:34:10,679 --> 00:34:12,280
About all you gotta say to get him

978
00:34:12,280 --> 00:34:14,780
to cancel. No. No. They was that their

979
00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:18,232
code name. Yeah. Internal code name was... Labyrinth

980
00:34:18,446 --> 00:34:20,931
because it was very difficult to cancel

981
00:34:21,860 --> 00:34:24,242
Puts you the customer in the labyrinth. Yes.

982
00:34:24,559 --> 00:34:27,038
You are going through the Labyrinth. So Basically,

983
00:34:27,198 --> 00:34:30,072
this is about pattern mining of, like... And

984
00:34:30,231 --> 00:34:32,865
I think we see this transparent with things

985
00:34:32,865 --> 00:34:35,181
like subscription services. Right? Like, Yeah.

986
00:34:35,992 --> 00:34:37,047
Most companies

987
00:34:37,419 --> 00:34:39,244
would rather take, you know,

988
00:34:40,037 --> 00:34:42,416
7 99 a month in a 30 days

989
00:34:42,416 --> 00:34:43,606
versus 7 99,

990
00:34:43,939 --> 00:34:45,932
or a month now with no renewal. Right?

991
00:34:46,092 --> 00:34:48,564
Like, everyone would rather give you a trial

992
00:34:48,564 --> 00:34:50,477
and give you a permanent subscription that you

993
00:34:50,477 --> 00:34:52,232
then forget about because that's 1 of the

994
00:34:52,232 --> 00:34:52,732
behaviors

995
00:34:53,203 --> 00:34:54,956
forgetting about subscriptions that we have.

996
00:34:56,231 --> 00:34:58,144
And, you know, or just, like, that's a

997
00:34:58,144 --> 00:34:59,738
great example of, like... But I think there's

998
00:34:59,738 --> 00:35:01,821
a lot more Right? And maybe At and

999
00:35:01,980 --> 00:35:03,568
T was going after some of that data

1000
00:35:03,568 --> 00:35:05,394
of, like, well, what, you know,

1001
00:35:06,268 --> 00:35:08,570
things get people to engage more or use

1002
00:35:08,570 --> 00:35:10,653
their phones more with things... Like, how can

1003
00:35:10,653 --> 00:35:13,686
we prevent people from switching providers or I

1004
00:35:13,686 --> 00:35:14,963
don't know, like, what, I don't know what

1005
00:35:14,963 --> 00:35:17,039
their, like, business goals would be, but... If

1006
00:35:17,039 --> 00:35:19,049
we just sponsoring my rocket money? That's... Be

1007
00:35:19,049 --> 00:35:19,608
the perfect time.

1008
00:35:20,564 --> 00:35:22,478
I mean, I can see someone doing some

1009
00:35:22,478 --> 00:35:24,711
serious analysis and being able to get that,

1010
00:35:24,871 --> 00:35:27,183
but but in terms of dark patterns, I

1011
00:35:27,183 --> 00:35:29,592
really think it's just. Be people being greedy

1012
00:35:29,592 --> 00:35:31,188
and wanting to make sure that it's as

1013
00:35:31,188 --> 00:35:33,900
hard as possible. I mean, I've I've had

1014
00:35:33,900 --> 00:35:34,400
to

1015
00:35:35,257 --> 00:35:35,996
go through

1016
00:35:36,470 --> 00:35:38,150
make a phone call,

1017
00:35:38,789 --> 00:35:41,369
go through the voicemail mail

1018
00:35:42,150 --> 00:35:44,550
navigation thing in order to finally get to

1019
00:35:44,550 --> 00:35:47,284
a human to cancel something that was a

1020
00:35:47,284 --> 00:35:49,065
200 dollars a year

1021
00:35:49,605 --> 00:35:50,105
subscription

1022
00:35:50,565 --> 00:35:53,465
that I could not cancel any other way

1023
00:35:53,778 --> 00:35:55,211
That sounds easy though. They didn't even make

1024
00:35:55,211 --> 00:35:57,839
you send an sole an envelope in written

1025
00:35:57,839 --> 00:36:00,307
in a written communication via snail mail or

1026
00:36:00,307 --> 00:36:02,954
something. No. I mean. I will say I

1027
00:36:02,954 --> 00:36:04,715
know for a fact. My life, I will

1028
00:36:04,715 --> 00:36:05,675
never get bad.

1029
00:36:06,315 --> 00:36:08,255
Well, I know for a fact that California

1030
00:36:08,555 --> 00:36:11,250
passed consumer protection laws that basically make it

1031
00:36:11,369 --> 00:36:12,327
so you have to be able to, like,

1032
00:36:12,487 --> 00:36:15,121
1 click cancel most services. That I don't

1033
00:36:15,121 --> 00:36:16,340
know if there were making

1034
00:36:16,798 --> 00:36:19,672
that the vendor is going to comply with

1035
00:36:19,672 --> 00:36:22,899
those laws. It's True. And Sure a car.

1036
00:36:23,515 --> 00:36:25,668
You gotta start Somewhere. Right? I mean, true.

1037
00:36:26,066 --> 00:36:28,219
You you gotta start somewhere. I I agree

1038
00:36:28,219 --> 00:36:29,907
with both of. I like that. Know, being

1039
00:36:29,907 --> 00:36:31,418
able to cancel things out quickly and easily.

1040
00:36:31,577 --> 00:36:33,009
And I also agree that the vendor gonna

1041
00:36:33,009 --> 00:36:34,520
be like, f that. We're gonna do that

1042
00:36:34,520 --> 00:36:36,405
until we get sued by the Ftc. You

1043
00:36:36,762 --> 00:36:37,001
Yes.

1044
00:36:37,637 --> 00:36:39,387
Because that's the way things work now. Like

1045
00:36:39,387 --> 00:36:41,933
like the bigger 1? This new story? I'm

1046
00:36:41,933 --> 00:36:43,699
lost. Where do we start? Was this still

1047
00:36:43,699 --> 00:36:44,199
like.

1048
00:36:46,260 --> 00:36:48,179
It's tech crunch. After c study really good.

1049
00:36:48,339 --> 00:36:49,480
They did the Ftc

1050
00:36:49,780 --> 00:36:52,753
published a study that talks about dark patterns,

1051
00:36:53,152 --> 00:36:56,109
manipulative design techniques. Oh, that put users privacy

1052
00:36:56,109 --> 00:36:58,846
at risk. So they analyze 600 websites offering

1053
00:36:59,065 --> 00:36:59,725
subscription services

1054
00:37:01,077 --> 00:37:02,913
So... Yeah, Like, basically, that... There is an

1055
00:37:02,913 --> 00:37:03,152
article.

1056
00:37:03,791 --> 00:37:05,865
Check out the Ftc report if you're interested.

1057
00:37:06,105 --> 00:37:08,100
But, essentially, it's just basically...

1058
00:37:08,593 --> 00:37:10,838
Saying, hey, this is rampant. This is used

1059
00:37:11,369 --> 00:37:12,662
widely, and

1060
00:37:13,114 --> 00:37:13,352
you know,

1061
00:37:14,066 --> 00:37:14,566
it's

1062
00:37:14,938 --> 00:37:16,549
potentially impacting not only people's

1063
00:37:17,018 --> 00:37:18,932
consumer, you know, like, I can't cancel my...

1064
00:37:19,172 --> 00:37:21,166
Like, Ron 1 said, that experience is horrible,

1065
00:37:21,485 --> 00:37:24,037
but also there's privacy implications as well of,

1066
00:37:24,117 --> 00:37:25,712
like, hey, you know,

1067
00:37:27,082 --> 00:37:28,673
sneaking or they they they have these fun

1068
00:37:28,673 --> 00:37:29,708
little names for all of them,

1069
00:37:30,822 --> 00:37:33,368
which are, like, remind me of, like, gas

1070
00:37:33,368 --> 00:37:35,675
light, gatekeeper, you know, girl boss or whatever,

1071
00:37:36,327 --> 00:37:37,782
you know, they have obstruction

1072
00:37:38,157 --> 00:37:39,271
sneaking. Nagging.

1073
00:37:39,669 --> 00:37:40,863
Like it's really funny.

1074
00:37:41,818 --> 00:37:42,693
Yeah. I mean, like,

1075
00:37:43,504 --> 00:37:45,899
As an example, they call about obstruction is,

1076
00:37:46,857 --> 00:37:48,613
making it more difficult or tedious to take

1077
00:37:48,613 --> 00:37:51,109
a certain action like canceling a subscription or

1078
00:37:51,168 --> 00:37:53,098
bypassing the sign up for free trial. Or

1079
00:37:53,098 --> 00:37:55,013
the x to close is grayed out and

1080
00:37:55,013 --> 00:37:56,927
hidden from view. So it's like all those

1081
00:37:56,927 --> 00:37:57,246
tactics.

1082
00:37:57,804 --> 00:37:59,639
We're all used to them because the Internet

1083
00:37:59,639 --> 00:38:01,713
sucks, but the Ftc is actually giving them

1084
00:38:01,713 --> 00:38:04,521
names and saying, Hey. Let's not do this

1085
00:38:04,521 --> 00:38:06,437
or let's at least expose what people are

1086
00:38:06,437 --> 00:38:08,932
doing to make it more transparent. So

1087
00:38:09,710 --> 00:38:12,025
can they do this, like, 04:01 providers?

1088
00:38:12,519 --> 00:38:14,114
You know, like, they they... Oh, god. They

1089
00:38:14,114 --> 00:38:16,188
don't they don't transfer that you... They have

1090
00:38:16,188 --> 00:38:17,783
to mail you a check, and then you

1091
00:38:17,783 --> 00:38:19,378
have to send it to the next 04:01

1092
00:38:19,378 --> 00:38:20,974
k people. Like, I was like, what kind

1093
00:38:20,974 --> 00:38:23,302
of madness is this? Please do not send

1094
00:38:23,302 --> 00:38:24,658
me a check for that large amount of

1095
00:38:24,658 --> 00:38:27,072
money, like, you can't just move it, but

1096
00:38:27,131 --> 00:38:28,886
so I think that would definitely fall under

1097
00:38:28,886 --> 00:38:30,253
this. And I mean,

1098
00:38:31,046 --> 00:38:33,187
yeah. It's not technical. Right, but it's definitely,

1099
00:38:33,266 --> 00:38:35,170
like, they have they have the ability. That's...

1100
00:38:35,407 --> 00:38:36,914
Probably on the other side though where they

1101
00:38:36,914 --> 00:38:38,920
do it that... Way because they either have

1102
00:38:38,920 --> 00:38:40,196
to or they're not willing to take on

1103
00:38:40,196 --> 00:38:41,393
the risk to just send it to your

1104
00:38:41,393 --> 00:38:43,626
bank account? That's a good. They probably would

1105
00:38:43,626 --> 00:38:45,221
be, like, sorry. Whose bank account are we

1106
00:38:45,221 --> 00:38:46,817
sending this to? Or, you know, I don't

1107
00:38:46,817 --> 00:38:46,896
know.

1108
00:38:49,062 --> 00:38:51,132
Alright. He guys another article. There's so many

1109
00:38:51,132 --> 00:38:53,043
hacks. I would definitely keep talking about hacks.

1110
00:38:53,361 --> 00:38:54,874
Do the first. Yeah. We need to keep

1111
00:38:54,874 --> 00:38:56,965
on that. I loved. Siege sec. I'm so

1112
00:38:56,965 --> 00:38:58,085
sad that they dis banned.

1113
00:38:59,284 --> 00:39:00,724
Hey. What about club penguin?

1114
00:39:01,844 --> 00:39:03,605
Club penguin is pretty good too though.

1115
00:39:04,244 --> 00:39:06,734
So... Okay. So basically,

1116
00:39:07,132 --> 00:39:08,567
yeah. Which 1 are we talking about? Both?

1117
00:39:09,523 --> 00:39:11,514
But, do we the stripe club penguin 1

1118
00:39:11,514 --> 00:39:13,915
at the the was? Story. Okay. Let's talk

1119
00:39:13,915 --> 00:39:16,398
about club. That's where people are going. So

1120
00:39:16,930 --> 00:39:19,016
does anyone... It's a picture of the?

1121
00:39:19,389 --> 00:39:21,866
It's further down. It's in bigger the the

1122
00:39:21,866 --> 00:39:23,377
good way. When is... I feel like John's

1123
00:39:23,377 --> 00:39:24,889
at the age were, like, he were doing

1124
00:39:24,889 --> 00:39:27,195
club for someone is, like Mickey Mouse club

1125
00:39:27,195 --> 00:39:29,741
for, like, kids of really geek parents.

1126
00:39:30,473 --> 00:39:32,306
No. No No. Club penguin is like,

1127
00:39:33,262 --> 00:39:33,762
firefly.

1128
00:39:34,298 --> 00:39:36,051
It got... It like, it was cut down

1129
00:39:36,051 --> 00:39:37,860
and it's Prime. It was too soon or

1130
00:39:39,897 --> 00:39:40,397
basically...

1131
00:39:40,856 --> 00:39:41,356
So

1132
00:39:42,054 --> 00:39:43,732
who's like a club penguin fan? I am

1133
00:39:43,732 --> 00:39:46,560
not. But from my understanding, Club Penguin

1134
00:39:46,932 --> 00:39:49,627
was acquired or was it originally Disney or

1135
00:39:49,627 --> 00:39:50,340
was it acquired?

1136
00:39:51,688 --> 00:39:53,923
I I don't... I never got. Down. I

1137
00:39:54,082 --> 00:39:55,909
I remember playing... Yeah. See It was originally

1138
00:39:55,909 --> 00:39:58,371
created by new Horizon Interactive, which disney later

1139
00:39:58,371 --> 00:40:00,992
like, virtual world. It's like world aircraft, but

1140
00:40:00,992 --> 00:40:03,085
not or but you're a lot about childhood.

1141
00:40:03,324 --> 00:40:05,085
Sure with people's... Yeah. Yeah. It was people's

1142
00:40:05,085 --> 00:40:07,244
word a warcraft or People's ruins scape or

1143
00:40:07,244 --> 00:40:09,804
whatever. Like, it was an Mmo from 2005

1144
00:40:09,804 --> 00:40:10,864
2018

1145
00:40:11,972 --> 00:40:14,436
you know, it I never was super it,

1146
00:40:14,595 --> 00:40:16,422
But the people who are into it as

1147
00:40:16,422 --> 00:40:18,807
you'd imagine, just like my little pony or

1148
00:40:18,807 --> 00:40:19,863
whatever, were

1149
00:40:20,175 --> 00:40:21,135
extremely into it.

1150
00:40:22,094 --> 00:40:24,414
To the point where they decided to...

1151
00:40:25,135 --> 00:40:27,295
They, you know, they have posted them to

1152
00:40:27,295 --> 00:40:29,701
4 and said, I no longer need these

1153
00:40:29,701 --> 00:40:32,985
smiley face, linking to a bunch of internal

1154
00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:36,781
documents that they packed from Disney's confluence server.

1155
00:40:38,151 --> 00:40:40,065
Oh, they got into Disney's confluence server. I

1156
00:40:40,065 --> 00:40:41,523
don't know, but I'm gonna go for

1157
00:40:42,219 --> 00:40:45,090
logs? Because it... What everything is. Is this

1158
00:40:45,090 --> 00:40:46,468
directly linked to the Disney

1159
00:40:47,179 --> 00:40:47,498
Slack.

1160
00:40:48,853 --> 00:40:51,643
Breach? Did You see that? Disney had their

1161
00:40:51,643 --> 00:40:54,113
tires black breach was huge. Disney had their

1162
00:40:54,113 --> 00:40:54,831
entire Slack,

1163
00:40:55,882 --> 00:40:57,398
A little bit. All of it all of.

1164
00:40:57,557 --> 00:41:00,189
Yeah. It doesn't say what... It just says

1165
00:41:00,189 --> 00:41:02,343
according to an anonymous source disease compliments were

1166
00:41:02,343 --> 00:41:04,416
breach using previously exposed credentials, which to me

1167
00:41:04,416 --> 00:41:05,110
means steele.

1168
00:41:05,469 --> 00:41:06,984
But it could also be related to the

1169
00:41:06,984 --> 00:41:07,702
previous breach.

1170
00:41:08,500 --> 00:41:10,813
And, yeah, it's basically internal documents about, you

1171
00:41:10,813 --> 00:41:13,205
know, how they... Where their at 3 buckets

1172
00:41:13,205 --> 00:41:15,061
are, all that good stuff. So

1173
00:41:15,373 --> 00:41:15,611
I mean,

1174
00:41:16,564 --> 00:41:18,868
honestly, the penguin. The real thing here is

1175
00:41:18,868 --> 00:41:21,092
that the Mmo lasted for 13 years. Like,

1176
00:41:21,251 --> 00:41:22,760
if you know Mmo, that's a long time

1177
00:41:22,760 --> 00:41:23,078
for an.

1178
00:41:23,729 --> 00:41:25,795
Oh, yeah. This a big deal. I mean,

1179
00:41:26,193 --> 00:41:28,418
I don't know. I mean justifies everything. Alright.

1180
00:41:28,657 --> 00:41:29,054
Thanks. Wade.

1181
00:41:30,008 --> 00:41:31,677
It's too much of a meme not to

1182
00:41:31,677 --> 00:41:33,362
talk about it, but, I mean, honestly, it's

1183
00:41:33,362 --> 00:41:34,794
kind of a non story. Like, basically, they

1184
00:41:34,794 --> 00:41:36,863
just leaked a bunch of documents and, like,

1185
00:41:37,261 --> 00:41:39,091
it's been shut down for, like, 5 years

1186
00:41:39,091 --> 00:41:40,340
so whatever. But honestly

1187
00:41:41,019 --> 00:41:42,700
I don't know. It's kinda funny. Just people...

1188
00:41:42,940 --> 00:41:43,920
Basically fans

1189
00:41:44,860 --> 00:41:45,660
fans are gonna fan.

1190
00:41:48,071 --> 00:41:50,298
Talk about for fan, you realize.

1191
00:41:51,412 --> 00:41:53,401
Yeah. Well, let's talk about

1192
00:41:53,958 --> 00:41:56,433
Fe. You know, dangerous topic, but it's been

1193
00:41:56,433 --> 00:41:58,258
a while. It's Ben a while since we

1194
00:41:58,258 --> 00:42:01,193
talked about fur here. So the heritage Foundation,

1195
00:42:01,590 --> 00:42:02,463
kind of a big deal.

1196
00:42:03,034 --> 00:42:05,734
I I mean, oh, they're they're kind of

1197
00:42:05,734 --> 00:42:07,084
well known. I mean, I don't wanna get

1198
00:42:07,084 --> 00:42:09,943
too political, but they are... The heritage Foundation

1199
00:42:09,943 --> 00:42:10,976
is a significant...

1200
00:42:11,388 --> 00:42:14,431
And notable right wing think tank that does

1201
00:42:14,647 --> 00:42:14,885
stuff.

1202
00:42:16,634 --> 00:42:17,110
Essentially,

1203
00:42:18,065 --> 00:42:18,565
hackers

1204
00:42:19,592 --> 00:42:22,461
specifically Gay furry hackers. Self described. I didn't

1205
00:42:22,461 --> 00:42:22,940
make that up.

1206
00:42:25,331 --> 00:42:26,846
Kind... They released some data,

1207
00:42:27,739 --> 00:42:28,719
and then they also

1208
00:42:29,099 --> 00:42:31,099
kind of... There was an exchange back and

1209
00:42:31,099 --> 00:42:33,179
forth between a couple of the high profile

1210
00:42:33,179 --> 00:42:34,139
people on both sides.

1211
00:42:35,755 --> 00:42:36,255
And

1212
00:42:36,954 --> 00:42:37,514
I guess, like,

1213
00:42:38,714 --> 00:42:40,474
this... They've hit... They were also... Cg tech

1214
00:42:40,474 --> 00:42:42,234
was the same that was going after,

1215
00:42:43,289 --> 00:42:45,068
they're they were going after the

1216
00:42:46,007 --> 00:42:48,324
Idaho National lab to get to convince them

1217
00:42:48,324 --> 00:42:50,642
to make cat human hybrids or... Yeah. That

1218
00:42:50,642 --> 00:42:53,793
was a lab demanding app demanding didn't really

1219
00:42:54,169 --> 00:42:57,057
the credibility too well now. As as the.

1220
00:42:57,513 --> 00:42:59,765
Yeah. That's just stop seeker. They didn't tell

1221
00:42:59,902 --> 00:43:02,309
the that ability was the goal. No. The

1222
00:43:02,309 --> 00:43:03,530
it this is totally.

1223
00:43:03,909 --> 00:43:05,609
This is the definition of chaotic

1224
00:43:06,389 --> 00:43:07,609
neutral. It is just

1225
00:43:07,909 --> 00:43:10,389
we have our specific thing that we care

1226
00:43:10,389 --> 00:43:12,722
about. We're gonna push that agenda forward in

1227
00:43:12,722 --> 00:43:14,001
the public eye through hacking,

1228
00:43:14,640 --> 00:43:17,037
activism. Right? They don't like the heritage foundation.

1229
00:43:17,357 --> 00:43:19,195
They don't like the whole project 20 25

1230
00:43:19,195 --> 00:43:22,791
thing. Man So they're not on board. You're

1231
00:43:22,791 --> 00:43:25,018
saying gay furry hackers are not on board

1232
00:43:25,018 --> 00:43:27,562
with the heritage Foundation. Who would have thought?

1233
00:43:28,039 --> 00:43:29,073
Who would thought? Not?

1234
00:43:29,884 --> 00:43:32,118
Who would have thought. But so they hacked

1235
00:43:32,118 --> 00:43:33,177
them and

1236
00:43:33,634 --> 00:43:34,134
they

1237
00:43:34,512 --> 00:43:36,506
disclosed a bunch of data, And then they,

1238
00:43:36,666 --> 00:43:39,302
I guess really I thought it was all

1239
00:43:39,302 --> 00:43:42,159
the data. Like, IIII think they they they

1240
00:43:42,159 --> 00:43:43,667
got a yeah lots of data from their

1241
00:43:43,667 --> 00:43:45,571
heritage to correct. Well the data heritage?

1242
00:43:46,384 --> 00:43:48,860
Foundation claim that it was old data that

1243
00:43:48,860 --> 00:43:50,937
it wasn't current that it was something thrown.

1244
00:43:51,257 --> 00:43:53,749
Was relative. It's all. Yes. You're not sure

1245
00:43:53,749 --> 00:43:55,267
they claimed a lot of things. The question

1246
00:43:55,267 --> 00:43:57,984
is do you believe it? Yeah. Correct. I

1247
00:43:57,984 --> 00:43:59,742
mean, both sides in this case. 1 of

1248
00:43:59,742 --> 00:44:01,660
them is wearing a kangaroo costume and the

1249
00:44:01,660 --> 00:44:03,742
other 1 is... A right wing think tank.

1250
00:44:03,979 --> 00:44:06,675
So I mean, like, you choose who you

1251
00:44:06,675 --> 00:44:08,975
believe. I love. I'll love these types of

1252
00:44:08,975 --> 00:44:09,213
pipe,

1253
00:44:09,927 --> 00:44:11,775
just I I'm something reminded of the meme

1254
00:44:11,775 --> 00:44:13,609
of the guy with the 2 buttons. And

1255
00:44:13,609 --> 00:44:16,401
it's like, you know, during know wing think

1256
00:44:16,401 --> 00:44:18,474
tank, gay furry hackers, and it's you the

1257
00:44:18,474 --> 00:44:19,432
which 1. Yeah. Like,

1258
00:44:20,404 --> 00:44:21,920
pick you pick this.

1259
00:44:23,036 --> 00:44:24,631
You pick the side you support.

1260
00:44:25,668 --> 00:44:27,742
But I mean, I... All I gotta say

1261
00:44:27,742 --> 00:44:29,975
is, I wanna... From my Romeo and Juliet,

1262
00:44:30,308 --> 00:44:32,606
I'm gonna go to, like, Kat G, and

1263
00:44:32,685 --> 00:44:34,507
I wanna a Romeo on Juliet story. I

1264
00:44:34,507 --> 00:44:36,275
have a gay hacker, Mary

1265
00:44:36,726 --> 00:44:37,202
from harry.

1266
00:44:37,854 --> 00:44:38,014
Foundation.

1267
00:44:38,892 --> 00:44:42,567
That was great. Family it's support that's... And

1268
00:44:42,567 --> 00:44:44,325
no. What what would their family names be?

1269
00:44:44,659 --> 00:44:46,500
I don't know, but we've need this to

1270
00:44:46,500 --> 00:44:48,920
happen. This needs to be an Ai generated

1271
00:44:49,059 --> 00:44:51,239
script today. There are no winners

1272
00:44:51,619 --> 00:44:53,059
everyone's a winner in this article. I would

1273
00:44:53,059 --> 00:44:54,914
say everyone's a winner in this case. You

1274
00:44:54,914 --> 00:44:55,713
have not.

1275
00:44:56,672 --> 00:44:58,589
I will say the 1 the 1 kind

1276
00:44:58,589 --> 00:45:00,347
of, like thing, a little bit of sub

1277
00:45:00,347 --> 00:45:02,025
that I'm gonna point out without trying to

1278
00:45:02,025 --> 00:45:02,505
get political.

1279
00:45:03,079 --> 00:45:06,032
So on the the main guy of the

1280
00:45:06,032 --> 00:45:08,665
heritage foundation was he like Mike Howell or

1281
00:45:08,665 --> 00:45:11,392
something. If you go to... He which There

1282
00:45:11,392 --> 00:45:13,956
was a very public and very nasty exchange

1283
00:45:14,012 --> 00:45:16,972
between siege second Him posted to Twitter. But

1284
00:45:17,028 --> 00:45:18,139
the funny thing is if you go to

1285
00:45:18,139 --> 00:45:21,017
his page on the Heritage Foundation, the article,

1286
00:45:21,575 --> 00:45:23,410
the the last article he wrote for the

1287
00:45:23,410 --> 00:45:26,282
heritage foundation was how do we d disarm

1288
00:45:26,282 --> 00:45:27,000
the Fbi?

1289
00:45:27,493 --> 00:45:28,845
And now he's gonna have to go to

1290
00:45:28,845 --> 00:45:30,993
the Fbi say, Could you catch these day

1291
00:45:30,993 --> 00:45:31,630
furry hackers?

1292
00:45:32,345 --> 00:45:34,667
I... That's gonna be an awkward meeting. Guys,

1293
00:45:34,827 --> 00:45:36,498
we really need your help with this. Ball.

1294
00:45:36,657 --> 00:45:38,010
The the guy that wants to def fund

1295
00:45:38,010 --> 00:45:38,726
us right?

1296
00:45:41,273 --> 00:45:43,343
Yeah. So go with your pro. Coming to

1297
00:45:43,422 --> 00:45:45,983
Netflix. Soon. I yeah. I I don't know.

1298
00:45:46,222 --> 00:45:48,052
I'm just throwing that kind of subject out

1299
00:45:48,052 --> 00:45:49,802
at least. Laugh at the absurdity of this,

1300
00:45:49,881 --> 00:45:51,648
like, all of the horrible shifts that's happened

1301
00:45:51,648 --> 00:45:53,482
over the past 48 hours. Like, can we

1302
00:45:53,482 --> 00:45:55,636
all, like, come together and be, like, this

1303
00:45:55,636 --> 00:45:57,651
is funny. Yeah. I'm so

1304
00:45:58,667 --> 00:46:01,391
political sides? Like, all the way. Correct. Yes.

1305
00:46:01,788 --> 00:46:02,526
I mean, hack...

1306
00:46:03,851 --> 00:46:05,596
Why does the story just put a vision

1307
00:46:05,596 --> 00:46:07,341
of, like a Benny Hill skit?

1308
00:46:08,470 --> 00:46:10,550
Can seconds running and you see the fur

1309
00:46:10,550 --> 00:46:12,710
running 1 way leonard its foundation running the

1310
00:46:12,710 --> 00:46:12,950
other?

1311
00:46:13,910 --> 00:46:15,829
All I gotta say is berries are clearly

1312
00:46:15,829 --> 00:46:17,997
up. There with, like, Apt t's for being

1313
00:46:17,997 --> 00:46:20,648
insanely good hackers because they've taken down some

1314
00:46:20,866 --> 00:46:22,699
big targets. Do you think they hack in

1315
00:46:22,699 --> 00:46:25,263
in full gear? I hope they do, like,

1316
00:46:25,343 --> 00:46:27,971
big keyboards too Big If if they don't,

1317
00:46:28,210 --> 00:46:30,122
I would be so disappointed. I want them

1318
00:46:30,122 --> 00:46:32,273
to have furry suits for their computers as

1319
00:46:32,273 --> 00:46:32,512
well.

1320
00:46:33,325 --> 00:46:35,244
Like, yeah. This... I've been... I've been trying

1321
00:46:35,244 --> 00:46:37,485
to think about commercials for Black Hills information

1322
00:46:37,485 --> 00:46:39,085
security, and this might be 1 that we've

1323
00:46:39,085 --> 00:46:41,500
got a workshop where It's like, we just

1324
00:46:41,500 --> 00:46:43,420
have a furry hacker hacking away with a

1325
00:46:43,420 --> 00:46:46,219
hoodie and he's, like, AAAAA

1326
00:46:46,219 --> 00:46:47,099
box or something.

1327
00:46:47,579 --> 00:46:49,420
And we already have that with Beverages? Was

1328
00:46:49,420 --> 00:46:51,989
the fries say? I own your data. Bro

1329
00:46:51,989 --> 00:46:53,583
so, I don't know. I'm just workshop and

1330
00:46:53,663 --> 00:46:56,054
Folks work with me here. The ironic part

1331
00:46:56,054 --> 00:46:57,967
is though that, like, I would never pitch

1332
00:46:57,967 --> 00:46:58,605
this to our customer.

1333
00:46:59,259 --> 00:47:01,677
Because our customers would never get targeted by

1334
00:47:02,535 --> 00:47:03,035
activists.

1335
00:47:04,133 --> 00:47:06,371
Oh, I think but some of them would.

1336
00:47:06,690 --> 00:47:08,061
I don't know. I guess it's It is...

1337
00:47:08,220 --> 00:47:09,570
It's easy to end up on the other

1338
00:47:09,570 --> 00:47:11,000
side of the 8 ball. Right? It's easy

1339
00:47:11,000 --> 00:47:13,621
to be... Yeah. Like, if someone gets upset

1340
00:47:13,621 --> 00:47:15,686
about some on state files Nixon and you

1341
00:47:15,686 --> 00:47:17,449
know, furry hackers are coming off. To you.

1342
00:47:17,688 --> 00:47:19,997
Right? Like 1 bird. Oh, white cyber duck,

1343
00:47:20,157 --> 00:47:21,670
I think has the best comment right now.

1344
00:47:21,988 --> 00:47:23,820
They talked to the Fbi agent who agrees

1345
00:47:23,820 --> 00:47:25,572
to help them as the Fbi agent walks

1346
00:47:25,572 --> 00:47:27,501
away the heritage foundation Man sees the tail

1347
00:47:27,501 --> 00:47:28,160
of the.

1348
00:47:33,642 --> 00:47:35,955
Oh, like, what of those... If you know.

1349
00:47:36,685 --> 00:47:39,302
You know, commercial. Right? I then there's just

1350
00:47:39,302 --> 00:47:42,949
this sinking feeling of, like, UUI

1351
00:47:42,949 --> 00:47:44,952
think we're in trouble in this 1. I

1352
00:47:44,952 --> 00:47:46,547
don't think we're gonna get top notch federal

1353
00:47:46,547 --> 00:47:49,260
government assistance in this breach. Yeah. First it's

1354
00:47:49,260 --> 00:47:51,095
do give you plus 5 hacking, but... Okay.

1355
00:47:51,255 --> 00:47:53,017
It's Go ahead, 1. So we wanna go

1356
00:47:53,017 --> 00:47:54,128
to the the next,

1357
00:47:55,399 --> 00:47:57,328
hard to believe thing where we've got

1358
00:47:57,702 --> 00:48:00,163
Japan finally giving up floppy disks.

1359
00:48:00,894 --> 00:48:02,335
And Germany, Japan?

1360
00:48:02,974 --> 00:48:04,994
Was Germany. Yeah. And

1361
00:48:05,375 --> 00:48:05,775
Germany...

1362
00:48:07,934 --> 00:48:08,494
As well.

1363
00:48:09,629 --> 00:48:11,146
Well, I know for a fact that, like,

1364
00:48:11,306 --> 00:48:13,380
the, I I know that also all the

1365
00:48:13,380 --> 00:48:15,057
bunker and John strands and neck of the

1366
00:48:15,057 --> 00:48:16,972
woods are all running on flop. We gotta

1367
00:48:16,972 --> 00:48:17,770
call something.

1368
00:48:18,424 --> 00:48:20,579
Yeah. Minute men are all run on floppy

1369
00:48:20,579 --> 00:48:22,894
discs. I mean, what's wrong with... What's wrong

1370
00:48:22,894 --> 00:48:25,050
with the floppy disc? So this shows you

1371
00:48:25,050 --> 00:48:27,285
just how far behind these tech like,

1372
00:48:27,935 --> 00:48:30,154
I remember, like, whenever I first went into

1373
00:48:30,154 --> 00:48:32,452
a, like, cleared space, and they're like, yeah,

1374
00:48:32,610 --> 00:48:34,353
Those were a bunch of Spark 8 systems.

1375
00:48:34,923 --> 00:48:36,673
And I was like, good god. And they're

1376
00:48:36,673 --> 00:48:38,662
like, oh, no. We have way older shit

1377
00:48:38,662 --> 00:48:40,810
than that. And I'm like, what. And that

1378
00:48:40,810 --> 00:48:44,009
isn't just Dod, like banks and like, The

1379
00:48:44,009 --> 00:48:46,806
amount of, like, legacy crazy technology that's out

1380
00:48:46,806 --> 00:48:49,283
there is pretty frightening, But I will tell

1381
00:48:49,283 --> 00:48:50,641
you if you have a bunch of your

1382
00:48:50,641 --> 00:48:52,240
systems are running on floppy disks,

1383
00:48:52,891 --> 00:48:55,114
I can guarantee you that the gay furry

1384
00:48:55,114 --> 00:48:57,202
hackers will be horribly confused

1385
00:48:57,814 --> 00:49:00,298
about how that's things breach off

1386
00:49:00,689 --> 00:49:03,004
It's a genuine problem they have when they

1387
00:49:03,004 --> 00:49:04,920
replace this kind of old stuff is, like,

1388
00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:06,995
you have to replace it with modern tech

1389
00:49:06,995 --> 00:49:08,672
and modern tech is a lot easier to

1390
00:49:08,672 --> 00:49:09,310
hack. Like,

1391
00:49:10,285 --> 00:49:11,644
or are not easier to hack but at

1392
00:49:11,644 --> 00:49:13,565
least. Yeah. Well, it's well known.

1393
00:49:14,364 --> 00:49:16,684
Like, this, you know, talking about something like

1394
00:49:16,684 --> 00:49:18,451
this. Right? Now they have to build an

1395
00:49:18,451 --> 00:49:19,960
emulator that emulate a floppy disk.

1396
00:49:21,152 --> 00:49:23,296
Now there's could be vulnerabilities in the emulator

1397
00:49:23,296 --> 00:49:25,520
whereas, like, a piece of spinning magnet, like,

1398
00:49:26,170 --> 00:49:28,787
doesn't really have any vulnerabilities. So Mh. I

1399
00:49:28,787 --> 00:49:30,929
don't know. It's kind of interesting to think

1400
00:49:30,929 --> 00:49:32,302
about all the different

1401
00:49:32,929 --> 00:49:35,349
you know, flop What's? What's more sensitive?

1402
00:49:35,969 --> 00:49:38,529
A Cd or Dvd or a Usb drive

1403
00:49:38,529 --> 00:49:40,769
versus a floppy disc. Like, I'm thinking physical

1404
00:49:40,769 --> 00:49:42,862
media, what Oh, the floppy disc, it would

1405
00:49:42,862 --> 00:49:45,019
take people a week or 2 to get

1406
00:49:45,019 --> 00:49:47,097
a drive that could read it. Right? Like,

1407
00:49:47,336 --> 00:49:49,908
so Mh. Cases security through security at least.

1408
00:49:50,148 --> 00:49:52,704
In this. Yeah. Yeah. They probably have rotary

1409
00:49:52,704 --> 00:49:55,181
phones too. Oh, was out years ago. A

1410
00:49:55,181 --> 00:49:57,112
couple years ago I was at... Con and

1411
00:49:57,112 --> 00:49:59,209
1 of the vendors was giving out

1412
00:49:59,666 --> 00:50:02,162
3 and a half inch floppy disks as

1413
00:50:02,540 --> 00:50:04,535
something for for people to go in in

1414
00:50:04,535 --> 00:50:07,182
half. Was there area real life save buttons?

1415
00:50:07,661 --> 00:50:08,538
That would be awesome.

1416
00:50:09,016 --> 00:50:11,329
That would be awesome because nearly it's been

1417
00:50:11,329 --> 00:50:12,286
the commander team.

1418
00:50:13,402 --> 00:50:13,641
So...

1419
00:50:14,612 --> 00:50:16,443
Man. Yeah. I mean,

1420
00:50:17,000 --> 00:50:18,751
I don't know. I I guess, while we're

1421
00:50:18,751 --> 00:50:21,219
talking government stuff, should we talk about Nsa

1422
00:50:21,219 --> 00:50:21,697
data leak?

1423
00:50:22,269 --> 00:50:24,607
The Disney the Disney 1 is cold. The

1424
00:50:24,666 --> 00:50:25,385
is good. I want...

1425
00:50:26,104 --> 00:50:28,181
Did you look that up at all? What's

1426
00:50:28,181 --> 00:50:30,584
not just slack? No. Yeah. This... You want

1427
00:50:30,584 --> 00:50:33,601
you're prioritizing that over Nsa. We talk about

1428
00:50:33,601 --> 00:50:36,221
nsa every other week. It says massive though.

1429
00:50:36,617 --> 00:50:38,705
It's... It it is funny it says. I

1430
00:50:38,705 --> 00:50:41,178
through the. Through the. Well, it says massive,

1431
00:50:41,338 --> 00:50:43,172
but it says 1.4 gigs. Like I'm like,

1432
00:50:43,411 --> 00:50:45,497
massive in the floppy disk now. That's yeah.

1433
00:50:45,735 --> 00:50:48,599
Not a lot floppy. That's like massive as

1434
00:50:48,599 --> 00:50:50,292
in what? Like, is it really heavy

1435
00:50:50,826 --> 00:50:52,576
6 200 and press enter to continue.

1436
00:50:53,385 --> 00:50:53,624
Yeah.

1437
00:50:54,418 --> 00:50:56,563
Yeah. I mean, I guess my... The reason

1438
00:50:56,643 --> 00:50:58,175
I bring it up because I'm curious

1439
00:50:59,106 --> 00:51:01,903
is, like... Is this another in regard? Is

1440
00:51:01,903 --> 00:51:03,039
this actual

1441
00:51:03,812 --> 00:51:06,039
Nsa data? Is this a third party? I

1442
00:51:06,198 --> 00:51:08,107
I mean, does anyone know anything else about

1443
00:51:08,107 --> 00:51:09,713
this? Because seems kind of like a bold

1444
00:51:09,713 --> 00:51:11,224
claim, but then it turns out it's just

1445
00:51:11,224 --> 00:51:13,054
a Csv with, like, nothing in it. So...

1446
00:51:13,371 --> 00:51:15,440
Yeah. I don't know. So what it seems

1447
00:51:15,440 --> 00:51:17,683
like. Looks like a database. Seems It also

1448
00:51:17,683 --> 00:51:19,437
looks like it's third a third party breach.

1449
00:51:19,676 --> 00:51:20,415
Full the,

1450
00:51:21,589 --> 00:51:23,423
numbers, There's like, a lot of things that

1451
00:51:23,423 --> 00:51:25,257
come out with the Nsa stuff. It's like...

1452
00:51:26,068 --> 00:51:28,608
It says on it. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It

1453
00:51:28,608 --> 00:51:30,353
just says Nsa on it. And it's like,

1454
00:51:30,829 --> 00:51:30,987
okay.

1455
00:51:31,781 --> 00:51:33,550
It's the first thing that all the Gay

1456
00:51:33,685 --> 00:51:36,409
control f. When they get in. Yeah. Nsa.

1457
00:51:38,085 --> 00:51:39,203
Secret top secret.

1458
00:51:40,081 --> 00:51:42,530
Let's Google what Acuity Inc does. Let's let's

1459
00:51:42,728 --> 00:51:43,862
let's see. They probably

1460
00:51:44,947 --> 00:51:45,447
technology

1461
00:51:45,899 --> 00:51:48,515
consulting. So I mean, this... Rough poof.

1462
00:51:49,308 --> 00:51:51,469
Not anymore. Yeah know. I I do... They

1463
00:51:51,469 --> 00:51:53,780
probably set up a snowflake cluster for the

1464
00:51:53,780 --> 00:51:53,939
nsa.

1465
00:51:55,931 --> 00:51:57,525
It does seem like a lot of operation

1466
00:51:57,525 --> 00:51:59,516
names are being red redacted in this too

1467
00:51:59,516 --> 00:52:01,598
because if you look at the the the

1468
00:52:01,598 --> 00:52:03,346
data set. What 1 of the things they

1469
00:52:03,346 --> 00:52:05,514
have un redacted is this like

1470
00:52:05,888 --> 00:52:09,400
tick mark Doj slash opt at And then

1471
00:52:09,400 --> 00:52:11,070
the next thing that's red redacted is an

1472
00:52:11,070 --> 00:52:14,093
n tick mark and then red redacted itself.

1473
00:52:14,570 --> 00:52:16,081
So Yeah. There are probably a lot of,

1474
00:52:16,161 --> 00:52:19,223
you know, operational names, some names that are

1475
00:52:19,281 --> 00:52:21,113
being... That are in here. So when they

1476
00:52:21,113 --> 00:52:22,171
say, you know, classified

1477
00:52:23,184 --> 00:52:25,972
data, and it's a Csv, they may have.

1478
00:52:26,610 --> 00:52:29,411
Names you know, information on there for. Yeah.

1479
00:52:29,808 --> 00:52:31,718
It could definitely be in the part that

1480
00:52:31,718 --> 00:52:33,867
for social engineering. Like, you know, you just

1481
00:52:33,867 --> 00:52:35,398
call up although, I feel like calling up

1482
00:52:35,398 --> 00:52:37,395
an Agent being, like, hi. This is The

1483
00:52:37,635 --> 00:52:39,813
Nsa It help desk, I would need to

1484
00:52:39,871 --> 00:52:40,830
reset your password.

1485
00:52:41,883 --> 00:52:43,635
I can tell by all those by all

1486
00:52:43,635 --> 00:52:45,569
those domains. Those are all executive branches

1487
00:52:46,184 --> 00:52:48,335
under the civil executive brand that's outside. True.

1488
00:52:51,469 --> 00:52:52,349
It's getting scary.

1489
00:52:53,070 --> 00:52:54,590
Getting scared. The other fun did to the

1490
00:52:54,590 --> 00:52:55,550
data there. If you take a look. You

1491
00:52:55,550 --> 00:52:57,070
know, just that that those are all copy

1492
00:52:57,070 --> 00:52:57,869
record from Dev.

1493
00:52:58,682 --> 00:53:00,378
Was it o 08:30 16

1494
00:53:00,915 --> 00:53:02,988
dot sql? That that just tells me there's

1495
00:53:02,988 --> 00:53:05,300
some very interesting practices going on there, if

1496
00:53:05,300 --> 00:53:06,416
that's the name of the script file.

1497
00:53:07,466 --> 00:53:09,453
Yeah. That this actually is a build file.

1498
00:53:09,612 --> 00:53:11,519
Isn't it? Like, it's got insert

1499
00:53:11,996 --> 00:53:12,632
into statements?

1500
00:53:13,268 --> 00:53:14,063
Looks like a like...

1501
00:53:14,873 --> 00:53:17,425
Like, know record or a transaction log actually.

1502
00:53:18,542 --> 00:53:19,978
Yeah. It could be a transaction line

1503
00:53:20,775 --> 00:53:22,689
Insert. Yeah. Role. Looks like it's all it's

1504
00:53:22,689 --> 00:53:24,539
a series of 1 line inserts that coming

1505
00:53:24,539 --> 00:53:26,617
off of this sequel file they're referencing there,

1506
00:53:26,777 --> 00:53:28,055
which it looks like it's a dated instance.

1507
00:53:28,215 --> 00:53:29,973
So this looks like the sort I I've

1508
00:53:29,973 --> 00:53:32,211
seen this on on in professionally before where

1509
00:53:32,211 --> 00:53:33,583
you've got the thing that was coming pack

1510
00:53:33,583 --> 00:53:35,655
together to deal with the incident on XYZ

1511
00:53:35,655 --> 00:53:35,814
date.

1512
00:53:36,531 --> 00:53:38,603
And like, that then somehow becomes your main

1513
00:53:38,603 --> 00:53:40,356
production thing. Which it. This looks like that.

1514
00:53:40,689 --> 00:53:42,434
Is this this reminds me just how much

1515
00:53:42,593 --> 00:53:43,466
I hate, like,

1516
00:53:44,101 --> 00:53:46,878
sequel build statements that do, like, we're gonna

1517
00:53:46,878 --> 00:53:50,072
insert into, which table name, column column column,

1518
00:53:50,231 --> 00:53:52,061
column values, and you gotta get them lined

1519
00:53:52,061 --> 00:53:53,970
up just right? Oh, I hate that so

1520
00:53:53,970 --> 00:53:54,129
much.

1521
00:53:55,259 --> 00:53:55,418
So...

1522
00:53:57,015 --> 00:53:59,330
Alright. Yeah. Wait action long. Take us into

1523
00:53:59,490 --> 00:54:01,485
Disney. Take. Take us... Are we going straight.

1524
00:54:01,725 --> 00:54:03,641
Let's get sued by a mouse. Let's get

1525
00:54:03,641 --> 00:54:04,280
sued by a mouse.

1526
00:54:04,931 --> 00:54:07,653
Okay. So, group called No budge

1527
00:54:08,265 --> 00:54:11,463
published on Friday that they got 1.1 terabytes.

1528
00:54:12,329 --> 00:54:14,966
Of Disney Slack, internal archive of Disney.

1529
00:54:15,605 --> 00:54:17,682
Floppy disks. Oh my god. You use this.

1530
00:54:18,402 --> 00:54:20,572
They actually had to buy every floppy in

1531
00:54:20,572 --> 00:54:21,367
the United States.

1532
00:54:22,481 --> 00:54:24,390
Us fall and Canada. Yeah.

1533
00:54:25,345 --> 00:54:26,164
Head Canada.

1534
00:54:26,539 --> 00:54:29,413
So so 10000 messages Right? The normal stuff,

1535
00:54:29,572 --> 00:54:32,271
it has images, login credentials, links to internal

1536
00:54:32,271 --> 00:54:33,541
websites. So would have to be more than

1537
00:54:33,541 --> 00:54:34,890
10001

1538
00:54:34,890 --> 00:54:35,842
sure. I'm sure it was.

1539
00:54:36,414 --> 00:54:37,927
Right? I the... There's a couple of things

1540
00:54:37,927 --> 00:54:39,202
if you scroll all the way to the

1541
00:54:39,202 --> 00:54:41,592
bottom, the second paragraph, which I find pretty

1542
00:54:41,592 --> 00:54:43,344
funny that you don't see a lot of

1543
00:54:43,344 --> 00:54:45,256
people doing is No no bulge.

1544
00:54:45,909 --> 00:54:48,329
Also posted what appears to be a detailed

1545
00:54:48,549 --> 00:54:51,349
information about the individual who is seemingly providing

1546
00:54:51,349 --> 00:54:51,849
the

1547
00:54:52,710 --> 00:54:53,670
identity of that person.

1548
00:54:54,962 --> 00:54:57,775
The they also leaked medical records, personal

1549
00:54:58,392 --> 00:55:02,319
identification, and 1 pass passwords manager. Yeah. They

1550
00:55:02,319 --> 00:55:03,940
completely docs the completely

1551
00:55:04,239 --> 00:55:06,559
did everything. Yeah. So they had an internal

1552
00:55:06,559 --> 00:55:08,880
source, then the internal store stopped listening to

1553
00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:10,239
them. Got. And then they just...

1554
00:55:10,973 --> 00:55:13,447
Completely docs them? So so what what do

1555
00:55:13,447 --> 00:55:15,282
they have on that internal source? Right? What

1556
00:55:15,282 --> 00:55:16,957
did they get paid it off? Did they

1557
00:55:16,957 --> 00:55:18,963
get blackmail or ever is my first. They

1558
00:55:18,963 --> 00:55:21,111
literally just did this in retaliation from front

1559
00:55:21,111 --> 00:55:23,259
them off. The the second thing I'm thinking

1560
00:55:23,259 --> 00:55:25,896
about is why like, ever I forget who

1561
00:55:25,896 --> 00:55:27,349
it was. I think it was either Uber

1562
00:55:27,404 --> 00:55:29,888
or is it was someone that lapses hacked

1563
00:55:30,261 --> 00:55:32,007
that they got into Slack and then they

1564
00:55:32,007 --> 00:55:34,169
just searched Slack for password. And then boom

1565
00:55:34,249 --> 00:55:36,965
Yeah. Passwords. Right? This is 1 reason why

1566
00:55:36,965 --> 00:55:39,282
any dev... Any type of dev tickets or

1567
00:55:39,282 --> 00:55:41,453
stuff like that super super regular that if

1568
00:55:41,453 --> 00:55:43,447
something incident or some type of dev ticket

1569
00:55:43,447 --> 00:55:46,478
happens, a Slack channel gets automatically made, and

1570
00:55:46,478 --> 00:55:48,393
then the right people get added. Right? And

1571
00:55:48,393 --> 00:55:50,546
then it's open for anyone to join and

1572
00:55:50,546 --> 00:55:53,025
search. So this is why you make those

1573
00:55:53,025 --> 00:55:55,407
channels completely private to only the people who

1574
00:55:55,407 --> 00:55:56,201
are in that channel.

1575
00:55:56,915 --> 00:55:58,900
Or in that lockdown down, like, no 1

1576
00:55:58,900 --> 00:56:01,460
should be hard exchange. Credential. Don't exchange. Yeah.

1577
00:56:01,698 --> 00:56:03,371
But that's not gonna not happen. Right? You

1578
00:56:03,371 --> 00:56:05,203
gotta you gotta just predict to, like, the

1579
00:56:05,203 --> 00:56:08,629
lowest. You're saying just app. Just to right.

1580
00:56:08,788 --> 00:56:10,075
I don't wanna hear that Right.

1581
00:56:11,184 --> 00:56:12,848
The... What I'm kind of interested in to

1582
00:56:12,848 --> 00:56:14,275
tell you the truth is I'm sure there's

1583
00:56:14,275 --> 00:56:15,329
some, like juicy

1584
00:56:15,780 --> 00:56:18,585
executive talk. Or like movie talk and stuff

1585
00:56:18,585 --> 00:56:20,264
like that because if you remember when Sony

1586
00:56:20,264 --> 00:56:20,664
got hacked.

1587
00:56:21,224 --> 00:56:21,784
Right? Like,

1588
00:56:22,505 --> 00:56:24,359
they... And they released the emails of all

1589
00:56:24,359 --> 00:56:27,076
the executives just talking crap about certain movie

1590
00:56:27,076 --> 00:56:29,174
stars and stuff like that. That would pretty.

1591
00:56:29,473 --> 00:56:31,391
Right. Right. So I'm sure there's some of

1592
00:56:31,391 --> 00:56:33,562
that in here. Like, at or at least,

1593
00:56:33,721 --> 00:56:35,475
maybe the executives learned and have moved to

1594
00:56:35,475 --> 00:56:36,432
signal. But

1595
00:56:37,230 --> 00:56:38,904
do you think they have, like, a mouse

1596
00:56:38,904 --> 00:56:40,977
counteract team? Do they do they have, like,

1597
00:56:41,057 --> 00:56:43,858
a counteract? Team, Like, with Disney... Like, of

1598
00:56:43,858 --> 00:56:45,925
capital crew I would tell you... I I

1599
00:56:45,925 --> 00:56:47,119
don't know if it's like that today, but

1600
00:56:47,278 --> 00:56:49,042
I've had friends that have worked there. And

1601
00:56:49,042 --> 00:56:51,742
those conversations have come up like cyber deception

1602
00:56:51,742 --> 00:56:53,806
and all of this stuff. But I don't

1603
00:56:53,806 --> 00:56:55,473
know if anything ever came of it. It's

1604
00:56:55,473 --> 00:56:57,617
like a lot of things like, when doing

1605
00:56:57,617 --> 00:56:59,459
stuff... Communicating with Disney over the years. There's

1606
00:56:59,459 --> 00:57:00,572
a lot of hurry up and wait.

1607
00:57:01,207 --> 00:57:01,605
And

1608
00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:04,068
I have no idea if they've actually stand

1609
00:57:04,068 --> 00:57:06,158
up. It stood up, like, a deception counter

1610
00:57:06,214 --> 00:57:08,381
team at all. I'd imagine like Disney teams

1611
00:57:08,381 --> 00:57:10,616
have really cool code names. Right. Oh they

1612
00:57:10,616 --> 00:57:12,133
do. They do it. Like, that's some the

1613
00:57:12,133 --> 00:57:13,590
best. Yeah. And

1614
00:57:14,447 --> 00:57:17,577
for. Yeah. Whatever. The the industrial as as

1615
00:57:17,577 --> 00:57:18,077
fan

1616
00:57:18,456 --> 00:57:20,773
that industrial is aspect.

1617
00:57:21,732 --> 00:57:21,972
Yeah.

1618
00:57:22,691 --> 00:57:22,931
That's...

1619
00:57:24,382 --> 00:57:24,701
Yeah.

1620
00:57:25,657 --> 00:57:27,809
Anyway. I mean, you're not wrong, But I

1621
00:57:27,809 --> 00:57:29,484
guess... Is it... It... Like, the question... Yeah.

1622
00:57:29,643 --> 00:57:31,317
Honestly, that's the biggest question I have is

1623
00:57:31,317 --> 00:57:31,715
why?

1624
00:57:32,447 --> 00:57:33,797
Why even go after all this?

1625
00:57:34,909 --> 00:57:36,338
Like, what is it... What is the angle?

1626
00:57:36,498 --> 00:57:38,086
Are they trying to get money for people

1627
00:57:38,086 --> 00:57:40,707
to buy like, oh, toy story 5 spoilers.

1628
00:57:40,945 --> 00:57:42,945
Oh, that's worth 10 bit bitcoin like... Alright.

1629
00:57:43,105 --> 00:57:44,614
So 1 of the the... 1 of the

1630
00:57:44,614 --> 00:57:46,202
paragraphs that Noel said,

1631
00:57:46,838 --> 00:57:49,879
site says that it is a active hack

1632
00:57:50,014 --> 00:57:53,952
group protecting artist. Right? Rights and ensuring fair

1633
00:57:54,169 --> 00:57:55,922
compensation for their work. The group claims it

1634
00:57:55,922 --> 00:57:58,233
only hacks targets that violate 1 of the

1635
00:57:58,233 --> 00:57:58,791
3 sins.

1636
00:57:59,364 --> 00:58:02,386
First, we do not condone any form of

1637
00:58:02,386 --> 00:58:05,409
promotion of cryptocurrencies or crypto related products or

1638
00:58:05,409 --> 00:58:05,807
services.

1639
00:58:06,459 --> 00:58:08,854
Second, we believe an Ai gender artwork harms

1640
00:58:08,854 --> 00:58:11,968
the creative industry and should be discouraged and

1641
00:58:11,968 --> 00:58:15,081
third, any set theft from patrons, other supportive

1642
00:58:15,081 --> 00:58:17,901
artist platforms, or artist in general. That's also

1643
00:58:18,035 --> 00:58:19,010
the weird hacker.

1644
00:58:19,461 --> 00:58:21,838
Right. Right like the art the arts are

1645
00:58:21,838 --> 00:58:24,235
getting in on this stuff. There's definitely some

1646
00:58:24,235 --> 00:58:26,090
overlap with the fur in here. I'm I'm.

1647
00:58:26,307 --> 00:58:27,980
They have a very good job.

1648
00:58:28,538 --> 00:58:31,180
Let's join Is a hacking group. These are

1649
00:58:31,180 --> 00:58:33,110
the people who are gonna hack the culinary

1650
00:58:33,246 --> 00:58:36,423
arts executive group, the the executive team from

1651
00:58:36,423 --> 00:58:38,194
that without you covered first

1652
00:58:41,448 --> 00:58:42,487
That's why It says I had to give

1653
00:58:42,487 --> 00:58:44,485
a pen test to the commission of fine

1654
00:58:44,485 --> 00:58:46,642
ben... I know No bulge is coming for

1655
00:58:46,642 --> 00:58:48,001
them. They're like, we gotta get on this.

1656
00:58:49,373 --> 00:58:51,123
I mean, this is crazy that this actually

1657
00:58:51,123 --> 00:58:52,077
does. You know how it's was saying, like,

1658
00:58:52,156 --> 00:58:53,508
not a lot of our customers could be

1659
00:58:53,508 --> 00:58:54,780
targeted by that kind of activist,

1660
00:58:55,257 --> 00:58:57,086
but this is, like, perfect proof that, like...

1661
00:58:57,500 --> 00:58:59,840
Activists. They can come up with some weird

1662
00:59:00,300 --> 00:59:02,780
justification for why they would, you know, go

1663
00:59:02,780 --> 00:59:04,860
after some. Yeah. Well, I think they can

1664
00:59:04,860 --> 00:59:06,953
always find that justification. I think you know,

1665
00:59:07,113 --> 00:59:08,628
and a lot of the hack groups that,

1666
00:59:08,708 --> 00:59:10,383
you know, worked with law enforcement over the

1667
00:59:10,383 --> 00:59:12,377
years to actually bring down. A lot of

1668
00:59:12,377 --> 00:59:15,328
them have these manifesto and these belief systems.

1669
00:59:15,488 --> 00:59:16,365
But at the end of the day, they're

1670
00:59:16,365 --> 00:59:18,688
just from the mole. And they're trying to

1671
00:59:18,688 --> 00:59:20,540
show at the end of the day. And

1672
00:59:20,597 --> 00:59:22,744
that's... Of not all of them, Not all

1673
00:59:22,744 --> 00:59:25,304
of them from the furry hackers. They're pretty

1674
00:59:25,304 --> 00:59:25,622
awesome.

1675
00:59:26,259 --> 00:59:26,759
But

1676
00:59:27,292 --> 00:59:28,883
but no, seriously, a lot of times they

1677
00:59:28,883 --> 00:59:30,394
come up with these big manifesto and they

1678
00:59:30,394 --> 00:59:32,317
come up with these big ideals, but they're

1679
00:59:32,317 --> 00:59:35,095
just trying to steal personally identifiable information for

1680
00:59:35,095 --> 00:59:37,953
fraud or trying to steal financial information, And

1681
00:59:37,953 --> 00:59:40,373
that's that's how most of them are. Some

1682
00:59:40,983 --> 00:59:42,726
just for fun, come work at a real

1683
00:59:42,726 --> 00:59:44,233
company. You can do the same thing and

1684
00:59:44,233 --> 00:59:44,733
not

1685
00:59:45,104 --> 00:59:47,418
understand. Like there's so many legit outlets. For

1686
00:59:47,418 --> 00:59:49,165
you to do this and get paid to

1687
00:59:49,165 --> 00:59:52,048
do it. Like, yeah. Like, I don't understand

1688
00:59:52,263 --> 00:59:54,328
being an Apt. We can protect... Like, you

1689
00:59:54,328 --> 00:59:55,598
can be on my team and I'll let

1690
00:59:55,598 --> 00:59:57,281
you be the guy who's super for focused

1691
00:59:57,281 --> 00:59:59,186
on trying to compromise companies who use Ai,

1692
00:59:59,345 --> 01:00:02,282
like, as what? That's every company. So... Yeah

1693
01:00:02,282 --> 01:00:03,076
goes. Yeah.

1694
01:00:03,631 --> 01:00:04,981
But not now. I mean, after you do

1695
01:00:04,981 --> 01:00:06,903
something like that. You're preclude from working at

1696
01:00:06,903 --> 01:00:08,596
people. Yeah. Have to be here on

1697
01:00:09,051 --> 01:00:11,460
they can't be convicted. Okay? You gotta be

1698
01:00:11,517 --> 01:00:14,594
notice John wanna, like, anchor the bur. Kinda

1699
01:00:14,793 --> 01:00:16,622
How no I don't wanna anger the fur?

1700
01:00:16,781 --> 01:00:18,371
Why would I want to do that by

1701
01:00:18,371 --> 01:00:20,677
is Okay. What what I'm worried about is?

1702
01:00:20,915 --> 01:00:22,824
Okay. So if all the fur in seed

1703
01:00:22,824 --> 01:00:24,749
second up getting caught? Do they... Does that

1704
01:00:24,749 --> 01:00:26,108
just mean the Internet? I down in the

1705
01:00:26,347 --> 01:00:28,105
Us? I was gonna say, look at speech

1706
01:00:28,105 --> 01:00:30,582
sex T and overlap them with an old

1707
01:00:30,582 --> 01:00:32,660
bulge T of Might be surprised?

1708
01:00:33,785 --> 01:00:36,321
Some Cci. Go better. You can go to

1709
01:00:36,321 --> 01:00:38,382
all those pen test reports from those legit

1710
01:00:38,382 --> 01:00:39,412
pen come... Testing.

1711
01:00:40,459 --> 01:00:42,537
And we can find out which firm at

1712
01:00:42,537 --> 01:00:46,693
that github repository is actually the the gay

1713
01:00:46,693 --> 01:00:49,190
or the K bottle. You imagine being contacted

1714
01:00:49,250 --> 01:00:51,025
by someone that says we ran an Ai

1715
01:00:51,025 --> 01:00:53,265
analysis on your report and you write reports

1716
01:00:53,265 --> 01:00:55,585
similar to seed sack. Well,

1717
01:00:56,224 --> 01:00:58,385
I'm gonna tell you. So years ago when

1718
01:00:58,385 --> 01:01:01,271
the... 1HB Gary hat happened, and it was

1719
01:01:01,271 --> 01:01:03,422
all released like, the step by step by

1720
01:01:03,422 --> 01:01:03,661
step.

1721
01:01:04,857 --> 01:01:06,530
I remember Had Scott has called me up,

1722
01:01:07,023 --> 01:01:08,775
And he's looking at the port numbers and

1723
01:01:08,775 --> 01:01:10,606
the commands that they used, and he's like,

1724
01:01:12,278 --> 01:01:14,826
these people clearly went through San 05:04 and

1725
01:01:14,826 --> 01:01:17,153
5. 6. Like... Yeah. Like, they're using port

1726
01:01:17,153 --> 01:01:18,110
2222.

1727
01:01:18,429 --> 01:01:20,663
They're doing... Like, it's literally step by step,

1728
01:01:20,822 --> 01:01:22,736
like, straight from the labs and we're like,

1729
01:01:22,816 --> 01:01:24,012
oh, jeez. Okay.

1730
01:01:24,731 --> 01:01:26,416
Yeah. That was that was a that was

1731
01:01:26,416 --> 01:01:26,973
a fun day.

1732
01:01:27,689 --> 01:01:29,757
Yeah. No. I mean, I've... Now that we

1733
01:01:29,757 --> 01:01:31,587
have, you know, doing some dark web stuff,

1734
01:01:31,746 --> 01:01:33,835
like, I search for V all the time.

1735
01:01:34,154 --> 01:01:35,590
And there's people all the time in chat

1736
01:01:35,590 --> 01:01:37,745
rooms being, like, you know, it's like, you

1737
01:01:37,745 --> 01:01:38,724
know, some

1738
01:01:39,181 --> 01:01:39,581
Apt,

1739
01:01:40,153 --> 01:01:41,981
fake Apt chat room and they're like, oh,

1740
01:01:42,140 --> 01:01:43,412
check out this training for how to do

1741
01:01:43,412 --> 01:01:45,161
this or like, 1 person was even like,

1742
01:01:45,399 --> 01:01:46,829
I think this ransom from our group took

1743
01:01:46,909 --> 01:01:48,598
Phi is trading for this. And

1744
01:01:50,276 --> 01:01:51,096
That's some.

1745
01:01:51,554 --> 01:01:51,714
Go.

1746
01:01:53,072 --> 01:01:55,883
Is that good?? Like is it's hey. What

1747
01:01:55,883 --> 01:01:57,798
you can. I mean, yeah. You know you've

1748
01:01:57,798 --> 01:01:59,554
made it when your when your training gets

1749
01:01:59,554 --> 01:02:01,548
leaked onto the dark web and people are

1750
01:02:01,548 --> 01:02:03,317
looking for it Right? That is fun. That

1751
01:02:03,317 --> 01:02:04,664
is fun. I had that happen to 1

1752
01:02:04,664 --> 01:02:06,250
of my classes and somebody called me out

1753
01:02:06,250 --> 01:02:07,835
on it. They were like, yeah. I totally

1754
01:02:07,835 --> 01:02:09,499
got your trading. It's all out here. All

1755
01:02:09,499 --> 01:02:11,582
the video. I'm like dude it's pay what

1756
01:02:11,582 --> 01:02:12,460
you can. Like,

1757
01:02:14,057 --> 01:02:17,090
official asshole are you till I think that,

1758
01:02:17,170 --> 01:02:18,527
you know, got John.

1759
01:02:19,819 --> 01:02:22,134
It's all free, man, like, you went through

1760
01:02:22,134 --> 01:02:23,970
way too many steps to actually make that

1761
01:02:23,970 --> 01:02:26,764
happen, But it did go it. Wade. It

1762
01:02:26,764 --> 01:02:28,600
did. Right. I've arrived.

1763
01:02:29,094 --> 01:02:31,732
So IIII recently found an article that clearly

1764
01:02:31,732 --> 01:02:33,570
pla 1 of my talks, and Like, I'm

1765
01:02:33,570 --> 01:02:34,469
not, like, this.

1766
01:02:34,849 --> 01:02:37,166
Right? On my finally. Not even mad finally.

1767
01:02:37,406 --> 01:02:38,445
Yep. Exactly.

1768
01:02:39,018 --> 01:02:41,007
I still feel bad, like, well, 1 last

1769
01:02:41,007 --> 01:02:42,678
thing before we, like, bring the Crooked finger

1770
01:02:42,678 --> 01:02:42,757
in.

1771
01:02:43,553 --> 01:02:45,861
There was a guy in San reading room

1772
01:02:45,861 --> 01:02:47,293
that did a full write up of the

1773
01:02:47,373 --> 01:02:50,416
Dan convince. Dns attack, and he did a

1774
01:02:50,416 --> 01:02:52,671
full write up in his entire gold paper

1775
01:02:52,809 --> 01:02:55,121
was how to exactly do the Dan Ka,

1776
01:02:55,360 --> 01:02:58,399
Dns cash poisoning attack, step by step by

1777
01:02:58,399 --> 01:03:00,645
step, and he was, like, 2 years

1778
01:03:01,018 --> 01:03:03,399
before Dan Ka ever released it. And I

1779
01:03:03,399 --> 01:03:04,987
felt bad for that guy because, like, Dan

1780
01:03:05,066 --> 01:03:07,388
Ka got, like, crazy Matt props,

1781
01:03:08,185 --> 01:03:10,177
you know, black hat talks. It was a

1782
01:03:10,177 --> 01:03:11,451
national news. Like this just guy, you can

1783
01:03:11,451 --> 01:03:13,522
take over the internet. And some poor guy

1784
01:03:13,522 --> 01:03:15,688
for his, like, g gold paper came up

1785
01:03:15,688 --> 01:03:16,960
with. Was like I'll just sit over here

1786
01:03:16,960 --> 01:03:19,505
and my dying hole. No 1 recognizes me

1787
01:03:19,505 --> 01:03:21,972
as a security researcher, but that was pretty

1788
01:03:21,972 --> 01:03:22,051
cool.

1789
01:03:22,860 --> 01:03:24,527
Alright. So with that, let's bring out the

1790
01:03:24,606 --> 01:03:25,797
Crooked finger everybody.

1791
01:03:26,590 --> 01:03:27,725
Bye haven't