WEBVTT

NOTE
This file was generated by Descript 

00:00:05.870 --> 00:00:09.030
Susannah de Jager: Welcome to Oxford+,
the podcast series that takes you

00:00:09.030 --> 00:00:12.450
deep into the myths and truths of
the Oxford investing landscape.

00:00:13.060 --> 00:00:16.179
I'm your host, Susannah de
Jager and I've spent over 16

00:00:16.179 --> 00:00:17.590
years in UK asset management.

00:00:18.395 --> 00:00:20.015
My guest today is George Robinson.

00:00:20.195 --> 00:00:23.935
George is the founding partner of Oxford
Investment Consultants, which advises

00:00:23.935 --> 00:00:27.725
on investments in spin out companies
from Oxford and other UK universities.

00:00:27.785 --> 00:00:31.204
Since its founding in 2015, it
has invested over 70 million

00:00:31.205 --> 00:00:33.115
pounds in 35 companies.

00:00:33.144 --> 00:00:36.864
He is an active investor in early
stage technology and biotech companies

00:00:36.865 --> 00:00:40.185
with a particular focus on Oxford
and was a founding investor and

00:00:40.185 --> 00:00:43.775
former board member of Adaptive
Immune Therapeutics and Immunocore.

00:00:43.965 --> 00:00:47.005
He's also a founding partner
of Technicos, a private equity

00:00:47.005 --> 00:00:50.225
partnership, which invests in
spin out companies from the Oxford

00:00:50.225 --> 00:00:52.255
Institute of Biomedical Engineering.

00:00:52.735 --> 00:00:56.884
In 1993, he founded Sloan Robinson,
an investment management business,

00:00:56.884 --> 00:01:00.605
which invests in listed equities
globally with a particular focus

00:01:00.605 --> 00:01:02.424
on Asia and emerging markets.

00:01:02.980 --> 00:01:06.880
Prior to this, he worked for 15 years in
Asia, initially for John Swire and Sons

00:01:06.899 --> 00:01:08.869
and then for Asian based stockbroker W.

00:01:08.899 --> 00:01:09.090
I.

00:01:09.090 --> 00:01:12.360
Carr in Korea, Thailand, and Hong
Kong, where he was Director of

00:01:12.390 --> 00:01:14.140
Regional Research for the Far East.

00:01:14.760 --> 00:01:17.219
George is an Honorary Fellow
of Keble College, Oxford,

00:01:17.220 --> 00:01:18.579
where he graduated with a B.

00:01:18.579 --> 00:01:18.739
A.

00:01:18.739 --> 00:01:21.980
in Engineering Science and is a
former member of the Oxford University

00:01:21.989 --> 00:01:23.734
Endowment Investment Committee.

00:01:23.825 --> 00:01:26.535
Our partner Mishcon de Reya, have
had a long standing relationship

00:01:26.535 --> 00:01:30.653
with George, as he has supported and
invested in a wide variety of spin outs.

00:01:31.005 --> 00:01:33.405
George is an excellent guest
to have on Oxford+ because

00:01:33.405 --> 00:01:34.935
he's such an active investor.

00:01:35.065 --> 00:01:39.195
He has a wealth of successes, partial
successes and failures to draw upon, and

00:01:39.195 --> 00:01:40.795
I look forward to hearing all about them.

00:01:41.455 --> 00:01:43.765
George, thank you so
much for joining today.

00:01:44.085 --> 00:01:46.725
You didn't start your career
looking at spinouts, you started

00:01:46.725 --> 00:01:48.625
your career in listed equities.

00:01:48.795 --> 00:01:52.785
Can you just give me a little bit
of context, what made you switch to

00:01:52.885 --> 00:01:54.845
now focusing so much on this area?

00:01:55.180 --> 00:01:58.880
George Robinson: Well, I've always
been interested in investing in

00:01:58.957 --> 00:02:03.877
unlisted companies, and it became a
habit that I developed some time ago

00:02:04.667 --> 00:02:11.557
and I realised after a while that
it's very difficult to invest in small

00:02:11.577 --> 00:02:16.457
companies because there's so little
information available and you need to

00:02:16.457 --> 00:02:18.177
do a lot of work to understand them.

00:02:18.937 --> 00:02:25.667
So I originally got interested in
investing in companies in Oxford through

00:02:25.667 --> 00:02:31.307
the Institute of Biomedical Engineering
and a friend of mine, Lionel Tarasenko,

00:02:31.937 --> 00:02:36.563
was working there as the director and
he got me interested in what they were

00:02:36.563 --> 00:02:43.593
doing and a little later we helped to
set up an SPV called Technicos, which

00:02:43.603 --> 00:02:47.933
invested in spin outs from the Biomedical
Engineering Institute and that's really

00:02:47.933 --> 00:02:52.013
how I got started in Oxford and then
over the years I've invested in a

00:02:52.013 --> 00:02:56.647
variety of companies, some engineering,
some in the medical sciences area, some

00:02:56.647 --> 00:03:02.727
in drug discovery and then in 2015,
I decided to set it up as a business.

00:03:02.807 --> 00:03:07.987
So that I had other people who could
help doing the due diligence and

00:03:08.037 --> 00:03:11.117
understand more about what we're
doing and hopefully make fewer

00:03:11.117 --> 00:03:13.567
mistakes and make better investments.

00:03:13.652 --> 00:03:16.222
Susannah de Jager: So you talk a little
bit in some of the notes you sent

00:03:16.222 --> 00:03:21.472
across about how interesting this space
is and that you can really feel and

00:03:21.472 --> 00:03:25.209
sense the mission and the potential
impact of a lot of the technology.

00:03:25.466 --> 00:03:29.018
You also speak about the fact that
many investors just, do not have an

00:03:29.018 --> 00:03:31.708
appetite for the risk and the complexity.

00:03:31.928 --> 00:03:36.012
Do you think that there needs to be more
done to educate other investors or do you

00:03:36.012 --> 00:03:37.982
think that that natural gap is what it is?

00:03:38.067 --> 00:03:41.167
George Robinson: Well, when you're
dealing with university spin outs,

00:03:41.167 --> 00:03:48.247
they're usually a new technology that has
been invented by a group of scientists

00:03:48.247 --> 00:03:51.817
who've been working on a problem that
nobody else has been able to solve.

00:03:51.817 --> 00:03:55.687
So it's very hard for anybody to really
understand what it is that they're doing.

00:03:56.093 --> 00:03:59.503
So that's the starting point, you're
dealing with incredibly sophisticated

00:03:59.503 --> 00:04:03.553
new technologies that nobody understands
very well, even the people in the field

00:04:04.093 --> 00:04:07.033
and so for people outside, it will
be particularly difficult and I think

00:04:07.043 --> 00:04:10.243
that's the big challenge for trying
to invest in these companies is that

00:04:10.253 --> 00:04:13.713
nobody really understands what they're
doing and what the opportunity is.

00:04:13.863 --> 00:04:17.903
So the challenge for us, I think,
is to educate people and I've always

00:04:17.903 --> 00:04:20.603
taken a view, I'm very happy to
share whatever we're doing, whatever

00:04:20.603 --> 00:04:24.313
knowledge we've acquired with others
to help get them up the learning curve.

00:04:24.573 --> 00:04:25.153
Susannah de Jager: Amazing.

00:04:25.767 --> 00:04:29.707
So you spoke about building out the team
in order to be able to do more scientific

00:04:29.717 --> 00:04:34.407
due diligence and make sure that you have
kind of higher hit rate on them and to

00:04:34.617 --> 00:04:38.140
deal with some of the difficulties of
the space that you just illuminated upon.

00:04:38.330 --> 00:04:39.880
What is the structure of the team now?

00:04:39.880 --> 00:04:41.300
How many people do you have?

00:04:41.300 --> 00:04:42.470
What kind of specialisations?

00:04:42.490 --> 00:04:46.290
Because even if you have very specialist
people, as we know, these silos are

00:04:46.290 --> 00:04:51.800
very specific and deep, so what's
the structure of your team currently?

00:04:52.040 --> 00:04:55.190
George Robinson: So we have a
team of eight people altogether.

00:04:55.230 --> 00:05:00.363
We have four people who are analysts who
help with getting to know the companies.

00:05:00.897 --> 00:05:06.947
We have one person who's a CFO, one
who manages the business and myself.

00:05:07.002 --> 00:05:09.892
Susannah de Jager: And in one of the
examples that you spoke about, Oxford

00:05:09.892 --> 00:05:13.382
Quantum Circuits, you talk about it
literally being a research project.

00:05:13.432 --> 00:05:18.962
As you just said, many of these concepts
are really just that, an academic concept.

00:05:19.662 --> 00:05:23.762
With a team of eight, do you have
people going in all the time to the

00:05:23.812 --> 00:05:27.341
physics department, as in that case,
or how do you build your pipeline?

00:05:27.516 --> 00:05:30.266
George Robinson: We get to hear
about most of the companies

00:05:30.376 --> 00:05:31.446
that are being formed in Oxford.

00:05:31.986 --> 00:05:33.146
OUI are incredibly helpful.

00:05:33.556 --> 00:05:37.886
They create the companies, they check the
IP, make sure there's nobody else in the

00:05:37.886 --> 00:05:41.896
world doing the same thing, or at least if
there is that they have freedom to operate

00:05:42.186 --> 00:05:48.076
and it's fairly easy to find out from them
what's coming in the pipeline and we also

00:05:48.086 --> 00:05:53.346
have a network throughout the university,
we're good friends with OUI and various

00:05:53.346 --> 00:05:54.966
other investors in the community.

00:05:55.296 --> 00:05:58.186
So you get to hear about things
and sometimes you hear about

00:05:58.186 --> 00:06:00.146
them before they're founded.

00:06:00.196 --> 00:06:03.656
So in the case of the Biomedical
Engineering Institute, we meet with

00:06:03.656 --> 00:06:06.716
them from time to time and we hear
about what's coming down the pipeline.

00:06:07.011 --> 00:06:07.657
Susannah de Jager: Amazing.

00:06:07.835 --> 00:06:11.565
So one of the things that you really
stress is when you're talking about

00:06:11.575 --> 00:06:15.215
the company and the concept and the
market fit, and you spoke a little

00:06:15.215 --> 00:06:19.715
bit there about contextualising
the market fit and the competitors.

00:06:20.515 --> 00:06:25.325
How quickly do you feel that you have a
sense that something's really exciting?

00:06:25.680 --> 00:06:28.880
Given that you can't necessarily
understand the science always

00:06:28.920 --> 00:06:30.460
in the depth that it is at.

00:06:30.510 --> 00:06:33.480
George Robinson: Well, most new inventions
sound incredibly exciting when you first

00:06:33.480 --> 00:06:38.960
hear about them, but you then have to do
a sense check and a reality check and try

00:06:38.960 --> 00:06:44.280
and work out whether they will actually
succeed commercially, because it takes

00:06:44.280 --> 00:06:49.286
years for a new idea that's been developed
in the lab to turn into something that

00:06:49.286 --> 00:06:54.451
works commercially and actually on day
one, you just don't know and there are

00:06:54.701 --> 00:06:59.121
companies that we've invested in where
I was quite skeptical on day one that

00:06:59.121 --> 00:07:02.211
they would go anywhere because I thought
this is a wonderful idea, but it's really

00:07:02.241 --> 00:07:03.871
early, it's like a research project.

00:07:03.891 --> 00:07:08.215
We shouldn't be seeking outside capital
to invest in this and then five years

00:07:08.215 --> 00:07:12.835
later, they're doing a Series A valued
at 80 million pounds and your little

00:07:12.835 --> 00:07:16.035
seed investment has turned out to be
quite valuable, at least on paper.

00:07:16.080 --> 00:07:19.088
Susannah de Jager: And it's so interesting
to hear you say that actually, if I

00:07:19.088 --> 00:07:23.608
were to recast that, it's pretty hard
to know sometimes what will do really

00:07:23.608 --> 00:07:27.178
well and what will not and that's just
part of the risk profile of this space.

00:07:27.493 --> 00:07:31.453
George Robinson: Exactly and the first
challenge is just a technical challenge.

00:07:31.493 --> 00:07:36.083
Can you turn what appears to be
something that works in the lab into

00:07:36.103 --> 00:07:38.083
something that works when it's scaled?

00:07:38.343 --> 00:07:40.133
Can it be manufactured cheaply enough?

00:07:40.173 --> 00:07:43.256
And can you get over all the
technical hurdles along the way?

00:07:43.366 --> 00:07:48.576
Because to manufacture something, at
scale means you have to do a huge amount

00:07:48.576 --> 00:07:52.346
of development work along the way and
sometimes it actually just doesn't work

00:07:52.756 --> 00:07:58.786
and that does occasionally happen and also
we sometimes find that things that appear

00:07:58.786 --> 00:08:03.043
to work, don't work when you put them
into trials in people for medical devices.

00:08:03.053 --> 00:08:07.413
So there's lots of things that can
go wrong along the way, but on day

00:08:07.413 --> 00:08:10.513
one, you can't really anticipate
that, you just have to hope for the

00:08:10.513 --> 00:08:13.823
best and accept that not everything
you invest in is going to work.

00:08:14.193 --> 00:08:17.793
Susannah de Jager: So one of your
companies, Organox, which is focused

00:08:17.793 --> 00:08:22.501
on preserving and assessing organs
for transplant, you talk about, that

00:08:22.501 --> 00:08:26.001
you had a certain level of cynicism
about whether clinicians would adopt

00:08:26.001 --> 00:08:30.311
it, and then they did and in other
cases, non adoption is the main

00:08:30.311 --> 00:08:32.201
issue that you've come up against.

00:08:32.674 --> 00:08:36.494
It's a really interesting point around,
sort of, is there a market or are you

00:08:36.494 --> 00:08:38.394
going to have to educate the market?

00:08:39.064 --> 00:08:43.109
And you seem to have a preference,
understandably, for there's

00:08:43.109 --> 00:08:44.789
a market and people want it.

00:08:45.419 --> 00:08:49.109
But there is a gap that I hear about
quite often where something might serve

00:08:49.149 --> 00:08:54.899
very well the end user, but to do with
the structural peculiarities of, to

00:08:54.899 --> 00:08:59.699
give an example, the US healthcare
market, clinicians may not want to

00:08:59.699 --> 00:09:03.229
adopt it either from a practical or
from a commercial perspective and

00:09:03.229 --> 00:09:05.412
what serves their interests best.

00:09:05.625 --> 00:09:10.795
In that scenario, have you seen people be
able to push through that or as a business

00:09:10.795 --> 00:09:14.095
venture, would you say that's going
to just be so exceptionally difficult?

00:09:14.310 --> 00:09:19.380
George Robinson: So after your technical
risk and you've got your product working

00:09:19.450 --> 00:09:24.367
and hopefully certified and approved,
you then have the challenge of, getting

00:09:24.367 --> 00:09:28.944
people to use it and pay for it and
it's the payment that's the real problem

00:09:29.705 --> 00:09:34.405
because these new drugs or devices are
not free, somebody has to pay for them,

00:09:34.465 --> 00:09:40.345
and there's an inbuilt resistance in
the payment system to taking on new

00:09:40.345 --> 00:09:44.872
devices and reimbursing new things, and
it's a particular problem in the UK.

00:09:45.522 --> 00:09:50.132
So we have all these start up companies
in the UK producing devices, drugs,

00:09:50.132 --> 00:09:54.427
and whatever, but once you've got your
approval to use them and give them to

00:09:54.427 --> 00:09:58.697
patients, you've then got to get approval
to have them reimbursed by the NHS.

00:09:58.697 --> 00:10:02.547
So getting reimbursement from NICE is
particularly difficult because they

00:10:03.117 --> 00:10:06.487
are understandably very careful about
the way they spend government money

00:10:06.537 --> 00:10:09.547
and they like to see health economic
studies and these can take years.

00:10:09.890 --> 00:10:13.855
It's a very good example that Organox,
the company we were talking about which

00:10:13.975 --> 00:10:18.505
produces an amazing device that preserves
livers when they're being transplanted,

00:10:18.515 --> 00:10:23.025
extends their lives, enables them to be
assessed so that they have a much higher

00:10:23.245 --> 00:10:24.855
transplant rate than they had before.

00:10:24.855 --> 00:10:27.615
They don't have to discard livers
that previously they didn't think

00:10:27.625 --> 00:10:29.848
would necessarily work because
they can check that they work.

00:10:29.912 --> 00:10:33.112
When they got approval in the US, it
actually took off very quickly, much

00:10:33.112 --> 00:10:36.432
faster than we thought it would because
in the US, the whole system is much more

00:10:36.432 --> 00:10:41.372
entrepreneurial, doctors are keen to
try out new things and also, the system

00:10:41.392 --> 00:10:44.172
is open to reimbursing new devices.

00:10:44.182 --> 00:10:48.952
Whereas in the UK, Organox is a
significant player in the market,

00:10:48.962 --> 00:10:52.122
they probably have a 30 percent share
of liver transplants, but they're

00:10:52.122 --> 00:10:53.672
still not being reimbursed by NICE.

00:10:54.222 --> 00:10:57.642
Whereas in the US, there's full
reimbursement, the price is higher,

00:10:57.752 --> 00:10:59.892
and everybody wants to try it out.

00:11:00.202 --> 00:11:03.982
So, they were extremely fortunate
that they were doing something

00:11:03.982 --> 00:11:05.312
that was actually badly needed.

00:11:05.312 --> 00:11:10.518
Everybody, was happy to use this device
because it meant that more livers could

00:11:10.528 --> 00:11:14.838
be transplanted, but it also meant that
surgeons and their teams didn't have to

00:11:14.838 --> 00:11:16.358
work through the night doing transplants.

00:11:16.358 --> 00:11:19.948
They could just come in the morning
and do it as a planned procedure

00:11:20.438 --> 00:11:25.498
and this challenge of being accepted
commercially is a huge sort of hurdle

00:11:25.498 --> 00:11:26.798
to overcome for most companies.

00:11:26.798 --> 00:11:29.398
I mean, that was an example
of one that works very well.

00:11:29.738 --> 00:11:34.088
There are others where the product goes
into the market and nobody wants to buy

00:11:34.088 --> 00:11:39.208
it and then you've got to try and sell
it and that, again, depends a lot on the

00:11:39.218 --> 00:11:44.448
people and the teams that are built and
one of the things that most companies go

00:11:44.508 --> 00:11:49.468
through, is having developed their product
and they're looking to sell in the market,

00:11:49.478 --> 00:11:54.048
they have to go into the US market because
it's a much bigger market and they pay.

00:11:54.468 --> 00:11:54.588
Susannah de Jager: Yeah.

00:11:54.828 --> 00:11:57.398
George Robinson: And so then the big
challenge is setting up an operation

00:11:57.398 --> 00:12:00.528
in the US to sell and distribute,
and that's not an easy thing to do.

00:12:00.698 --> 00:12:04.298
Susannah de Jager: Before we move on to
the team and location side of things.

00:12:04.567 --> 00:12:07.537
Another thing that I hear quite
a lot from entrepreneurs is that

00:12:07.547 --> 00:12:11.377
there's a lot of momentum sometimes
in particular sectors and areas.

00:12:11.617 --> 00:12:16.407
When you're evaluating an idea,
how much importance do you put

00:12:16.407 --> 00:12:18.533
on the popularity of a sector?

00:12:18.913 --> 00:12:21.903
George Robinson: So there's certain
things that Oxford is particularly good

00:12:21.903 --> 00:12:25.343
at, and, one of them is medical sciences.

00:12:25.343 --> 00:12:30.928
Probably 70% of the research budget
here of 800 million pounds a year is

00:12:31.248 --> 00:12:34.888
going into medical science and within
that area there'll be clusters of

00:12:34.888 --> 00:12:37.888
excellence and it just happens that
one of the things that Oxford has

00:12:37.888 --> 00:12:42.528
always been very good at is anything
to do with T cell engineering peptides.

00:12:43.958 --> 00:12:49.945
Cambridge were the first people to
discover and commercialise antibodies and

00:12:49.945 --> 00:12:51.665
that became a huge industry in Cambridge.

00:12:51.665 --> 00:12:53.945
But T cells is more something
that happens in Oxford.

00:12:53.945 --> 00:12:57.320
So that's an example of where
Oxford is the center of a cluster.

00:12:57.490 --> 00:13:02.510
We have a robotics institute, there's lots
of interesting things coming out of that.

00:13:02.910 --> 00:13:07.645
The engineering department has always
produced some interesting, spin outs.

00:13:07.885 --> 00:13:11.545
So it really depends on the group
of scientists and what they're

00:13:11.545 --> 00:13:15.593
doing and you'll find groups of
scientists in Oxford who have been

00:13:15.593 --> 00:13:17.373
working in Cambridge and vice versa.

00:13:17.543 --> 00:13:20.993
It depends on where they happen to
be and the people that they're with.

00:13:21.353 --> 00:13:24.663
So hopefully that explains a little
bit of what we're looking for.

00:13:25.088 --> 00:13:25.788
Susannah de Jager: Absolutely.

00:13:26.368 --> 00:13:31.488
So going back to what you were discussing
earlier around team and location and

00:13:31.608 --> 00:13:34.048
primary market that you might focus on.

00:13:34.214 --> 00:13:38.744
For ONI, your company that
produces low cost super resolution

00:13:38.814 --> 00:13:42.594
microscopes, you speak about the
fact that your headquarters for

00:13:42.594 --> 00:13:46.934
that company are now in California,
but with the R&D still in the UK.

00:13:47.124 --> 00:13:50.474
Can you talk a little bit around
that decision making process?

00:13:50.634 --> 00:13:51.534
What drives that?

00:13:51.569 --> 00:13:54.679
George Robinson: People often worry
about companies that are founded in the

00:13:54.679 --> 00:13:57.134
UK being bought and taken elsewhere.

00:13:57.604 --> 00:14:02.864
But of course, the ideal thing is that
the center of gravity stays here, at least

00:14:02.874 --> 00:14:07.544
the bit that matters for the UK, which is
the research and development function and

00:14:07.544 --> 00:14:11.354
the sales function will probably move to
the US because that's where the market is.

00:14:11.724 --> 00:14:15.464
So ONI is a very good example of that,
they started in Oxford, they produce

00:14:15.464 --> 00:14:22.274
these amazing super resolution microscopes
that are the size of a Mac mini and they

00:14:22.274 --> 00:14:28.324
replace or complement or an alternative
to much larger optical microscopes which

00:14:28.494 --> 00:14:32.214
take up half a room and need a full
time lab technician to look after them.

00:14:32.514 --> 00:14:37.354
So in a sense they're democratising the
world of microscopy and doing to the world

00:14:37.354 --> 00:14:43.054
of super microscopes what Bill Gates and
Steve Jobs did to the world of computing

00:14:43.244 --> 00:14:48.644
by democratising PCs instead of large
mainframes and they started it in Oxford.

00:14:48.644 --> 00:14:51.971
They have fantastic product, but they
have to sell all over the world and in the

00:14:51.971 --> 00:14:56.511
end, your biggest market is in the US and
you can't easily tackle that from here.

00:14:56.521 --> 00:15:01.724
So they moved their headquarters to
California and all the people that

00:15:01.724 --> 00:15:06.104
are selling and marketing the product
will be based there and will have been

00:15:06.144 --> 00:15:07.884
recruited from large US companies.

00:15:07.894 --> 00:15:10.954
So that's a very good example
of what good looks like.

00:15:11.099 --> 00:15:13.519
Susannah de Jager: Yeah and it makes
a lot of sense and you spoke about

00:15:13.519 --> 00:15:17.419
the clustering around the R&D being
very important and that retention

00:15:17.419 --> 00:15:21.009
in the UK, allowing them to feed
off the academic excellence here.

00:15:21.379 --> 00:15:25.489
But your point around domestic
market in the US is one that we

00:15:25.489 --> 00:15:27.849
hear a lot and so that makes sense.

00:15:28.319 --> 00:15:32.903
I mean, stating the obvious, of
course, reform in the NHS and NICE

00:15:32.903 --> 00:15:35.033
would probably be nice to have.

00:15:35.278 --> 00:15:38.638
George Robinson: Yes, it would
be very nice, but it's a very

00:15:38.658 --> 00:15:43.018
complicated issue and I'm sure lots
of people are much better qualified

00:15:43.018 --> 00:15:44.068
than me have thought about it.

00:15:44.768 --> 00:15:48.478
But if I was running the government,
I would try to find a way of

00:15:48.518 --> 00:15:54.468
encouraging the NHS to fast track
the approval of the reimbursement

00:15:54.518 --> 00:15:58.888
of new technologies, particularly
to help UK companies, but it should

00:15:58.898 --> 00:16:00.488
be good technologies from somewhere.

00:16:00.989 --> 00:16:01.469
Susannah de Jager: Indeed.

00:16:01.586 --> 00:16:06.346
Going back to the team focus and when
you see particular kind of areas of

00:16:06.346 --> 00:16:10.096
excellence, the US are very good at
both commercialising marketing and

00:16:10.096 --> 00:16:11.446
they have their domestic market.

00:16:12.046 --> 00:16:15.196
You have reinvested in a number
of the teams that came outta

00:16:15.406 --> 00:16:18.256
Adaptimmune and Immunocore how.

00:16:19.716 --> 00:16:21.346
How important do you
think track record is?

00:16:21.356 --> 00:16:24.116
How much weight do you put on
that versus the technology?

00:16:24.461 --> 00:16:27.941
George Robinson: Well, every startup is
a journey for the people who are working

00:16:27.941 --> 00:16:32.701
there, and almost by definition, they
haven't done it before and so if they

00:16:32.701 --> 00:16:36.681
have done it before, it makes life a lot
easier and you can certainly have a lot

00:16:36.681 --> 00:16:40.451
more confidence that the product that
they're developing or the idea that they

00:16:40.451 --> 00:16:46.111
have might at least work and that they
know what they're trying to do, because

00:16:46.121 --> 00:16:51.458
they'll be solving a problem they've been
thinking about for a long time and most

00:16:51.458 --> 00:16:54.868
of the companies that we hear about in
Oxford are spin outs from the university.

00:16:54.868 --> 00:16:58.878
What that means is that the work
was developed by somebody who was

00:16:58.878 --> 00:17:02.948
being paid by the university who
was working the labs, the research

00:17:02.948 --> 00:17:04.868
grants came through the university.

00:17:05.458 --> 00:17:09.579
So when the company is spun out,
it's partly owned by the university.

00:17:09.669 --> 00:17:14.119
But of course, there are other companies
that are formed here, which weren't the

00:17:14.119 --> 00:17:18.333
results of a particular project that
was done in the university labs, but by

00:17:18.333 --> 00:17:22.823
people who are part of the cluster who
once were researchers at university,

00:17:23.273 --> 00:17:27.633
they may even have created spin outs and
those companies are just as interesting

00:17:27.713 --> 00:17:30.923
as some of the spin outs themselves.

00:17:31.033 --> 00:17:31.836
Susannah de Jager: Absolutely.

00:17:32.049 --> 00:17:35.029
You're talking about people you've got
experience of there, which is obviously

00:17:35.029 --> 00:17:37.629
the best way to know how they're going
to operate, the experience they've

00:17:37.629 --> 00:17:41.913
got and what their best qualities and
potentially their worst qualities are.

00:17:42.153 --> 00:17:44.913
I liked in one of the notes that
you sent across that you spoke

00:17:44.913 --> 00:17:48.469
about the qualities that you look
for in good leadership teams.

00:17:48.689 --> 00:17:51.846
I wonder if you could talk us through
some of those because obviously beyond

00:17:51.846 --> 00:17:57.351
just being excellent, some of them aren't
necessarily that obvious to people.

00:17:57.526 --> 00:18:00.636
George Robinson: So the most important
thing with the leaders of these

00:18:00.636 --> 00:18:05.656
companies is that they are open and
honest about what they're trying to

00:18:05.696 --> 00:18:10.026
do, what are the risks that they face,
what are the things they worry about.

00:18:10.246 --> 00:18:15.566
and not just try and convince you that
the new invention is the best thing

00:18:15.886 --> 00:18:19.626
that's ever happened is going to be
a massive success, because inevitably

00:18:19.626 --> 00:18:23.706
they have to get you excited in order
to get you to invest in the first place.

00:18:23.746 --> 00:18:28.661
But once you have invested, you just want
to have an open relationship with them and

00:18:28.661 --> 00:18:32.651
the great thing about private companies
is there's no issues of fair disclosure

00:18:32.651 --> 00:18:35.971
which you'd have in public companies
so they can tell you everything and you

00:18:35.971 --> 00:18:38.821
can see their monthly accounts and they
can tell you what's going well, what's

00:18:38.821 --> 00:18:43.031
not going well and the most important
thing is to work with people who are just

00:18:43.051 --> 00:18:47.759
completely straightforward and honest
about it, and tell you what their highs

00:18:47.759 --> 00:18:52.259
and lows are, what they worry about,
what might go wrong, as well as all the

00:18:52.259 --> 00:18:57.099
good things that are happening because
inevitably, the journey is not an easy

00:18:57.099 --> 00:19:02.959
one, and they don't know what's going
to happen as they go along and they will

00:19:03.009 --> 00:19:06.959
face difficulties and challenges along
the way, they have to make decisions and

00:19:07.129 --> 00:19:10.809
that's what their investors are there for
really, is to listen to them and to help

00:19:10.809 --> 00:19:15.539
them to make the right decisions and also
to anticipate when they need their help

00:19:15.769 --> 00:19:20.649
and when they're going to need more money
and the other thing that's very important

00:19:20.659 --> 00:19:25.829
is to evolve the team as you go along
and if they feel that a member of the

00:19:25.829 --> 00:19:30.339
team isn't working, then it's nice that
they should share that with you and so

00:19:30.339 --> 00:19:32.569
you all understand what needs to be done.

00:19:33.034 --> 00:19:35.984
Susannah de Jager: So it's really a
marriage, it's a collaboration at this

00:19:35.984 --> 00:19:39.234
stage where you're investing between the
investors and the team and you talk about

00:19:39.234 --> 00:19:44.224
board composition too in the early stages
being very much investors and main execs.

00:19:44.516 --> 00:19:48.146
I think it's really such an interesting
thing talking about the evolution of a

00:19:48.146 --> 00:19:51.926
team because one hears this quite often
that there's a moment where perhaps the

00:19:51.936 --> 00:19:56.026
incumbent CEO is no longer appropriate
for the next stage of growth, that they

00:19:56.026 --> 00:20:00.676
need to have self awareness to perhaps see
what their own skills or limitations are.

00:20:01.176 --> 00:20:07.163
How often are you in these stages
having to replace the core team

00:20:07.173 --> 00:20:10.303
or at least supplement them
with other very senior hires?

00:20:10.333 --> 00:20:12.133
Or do you think that tends to come later?

00:20:12.333 --> 00:20:15.193
George Robinson: The team
will evolve over time.

00:20:15.543 --> 00:20:21.028
The most difficult thing is when
you have a company with one dominant

00:20:21.028 --> 00:20:25.098
shareholder because they sort of feel
they're in charge and they never want

00:20:25.098 --> 00:20:29.568
to go, and they'll listen to you and
then not necessarily do the right thing.

00:20:30.118 --> 00:20:33.178
One of the great things about the
companies that we have in Oxford

00:20:33.178 --> 00:20:36.178
is they normally have three or four
shareholders on day one, they have

00:20:36.178 --> 00:20:40.498
the university, the founders and
then two or three other investors.

00:20:40.498 --> 00:20:44.628
They could be individuals or they
could be small venture funds, but it

00:20:44.628 --> 00:20:47.988
means right from the get go there's
not one person who's in charge.

00:20:48.138 --> 00:20:53.178
So everybody has to be listened to
and everybody has an opportunity to

00:20:53.528 --> 00:20:59.292
contribute and in that situation it
becomes reasonably obvious when somebody

00:20:59.292 --> 00:21:02.612
is struggling or they're out of their
depth or they need a bit more support

00:21:02.992 --> 00:21:09.065
and it's done in a very nice way over a
period of time you work out that things

00:21:09.065 --> 00:21:12.775
have to change and then you have a word
with the CEO or the management team and

00:21:12.855 --> 00:21:17.660
work out what needs to be done and things
can happen, but it's incredibly important

00:21:18.170 --> 00:21:23.600
to be able to do that, because it's the
person who takes the company forward

00:21:23.600 --> 00:21:27.760
for the first two or three years isn't
necessarily the person who's best suited

00:21:28.340 --> 00:21:32.063
when the business changes from, let's
say, being a company that's developing

00:21:32.063 --> 00:21:36.803
a product to a company that's selling
a product and then when the company

00:21:36.803 --> 00:21:40.831
goes to the next stage and takes in
larger amounts of money in its series

00:21:40.841 --> 00:21:45.776
B and C and its perhaps preparing to go
into the US market or thinking about a

00:21:45.776 --> 00:21:49.366
trade sale or a listing in the future,
that person is going to be a completely

00:21:49.366 --> 00:21:53.726
different person leading the company
from the person who is there on day one.

00:21:53.886 --> 00:21:58.661
So, one just has to adapt as one goes
along and sometimes the person who starts

00:21:58.661 --> 00:22:03.707
on day one can lead it through that entire
process, but that's relatively rare.

00:22:04.217 --> 00:22:07.427
Susannah de Jager: Yeah, I always
like the analogy of peacetime and

00:22:07.427 --> 00:22:10.777
wartime prime ministers, which
I think sort of serves the same.

00:22:10.917 --> 00:22:15.267
George Robinson: And then you have the
d'entrepreneurs who are academics who want

00:22:15.267 --> 00:22:20.957
to become entrepreneurs and academics,
understandably, always think that they can

00:22:20.997 --> 00:22:24.507
learn about new subjects and that means
that they can learn about business and how

00:22:24.507 --> 00:22:29.107
to do it and they can be very good for a
bit, but it's relatively unusual to find

00:22:29.167 --> 00:22:34.277
an academic who is really successful as
a CEO of a company, but sometimes they're

00:22:34.337 --> 00:22:38.437
just needed for the first year or two
because they know how everything works and

00:22:38.467 --> 00:22:42.662
they can teach everybody, but they have
to know how to back out, and it doesn't

00:22:42.662 --> 00:22:45.942
mean they have to remove themselves
completely, but they have to step back and

00:22:45.942 --> 00:22:47.872
let a full time CEO come in and run it.

00:22:47.892 --> 00:22:49.896
They can stay on as a CTO.

00:22:50.386 --> 00:22:53.276
they can be on the board and so
on, and then that works very well.

00:22:53.684 --> 00:22:54.174
Susannah de Jager: Thank you.

00:22:54.984 --> 00:22:58.081
So you as an investor, you've spoken
a bit there about how you interact

00:22:58.081 --> 00:22:59.831
on the evolution of the team.

00:23:00.391 --> 00:23:04.751
In terms of your team of eight people,
how involved are you in other ways?

00:23:04.761 --> 00:23:08.631
Do you get involved in the operational,
obviously on the strategic side,

00:23:08.631 --> 00:23:09.771
but do you give connections?

00:23:09.771 --> 00:23:11.011
Do you bring other investors?

00:23:11.011 --> 00:23:11.781
JVs?

00:23:12.261 --> 00:23:16.721
Are you sort of networking for them in
other ways, or is it quite hands off?

00:23:16.876 --> 00:23:19.476
George Robinson: Well, the first thing
we can do is just turn up at board

00:23:19.476 --> 00:23:24.367
meetings, and that's an opportunity
for the management of the company to

00:23:24.367 --> 00:23:27.937
talk to a group of people and tell
them what they're doing on a regular

00:23:27.937 --> 00:23:33.117
basis and in that forum, you can hear
about their progress, you can see how

00:23:33.147 --> 00:23:37.137
they're spending the money, and you
can discuss what they're going to do,

00:23:37.147 --> 00:23:40.357
what are the challenges facing them,
how are they going to allocate capital,

00:23:40.697 --> 00:23:42.407
what are they going to focus on?

00:23:42.807 --> 00:23:47.287
And I think just being there and
being able to offer common sense and

00:23:47.287 --> 00:23:49.837
good advice is incredibly helpful.

00:23:50.157 --> 00:23:54.527
Now, of course, inevitably, You go to the
next stage, which is that they need to

00:23:54.527 --> 00:24:00.097
do their next funding round, and we can
try to help with that, we can introduce

00:24:00.097 --> 00:24:03.307
them to other investors potentially,
we can point them in the direction of

00:24:03.367 --> 00:24:07.827
people that they should go and talk to,
we can give them feedback on the way

00:24:07.827 --> 00:24:14.557
they're presenting themselves and we
can help them to chart their path in

00:24:14.567 --> 00:24:18.677
lots of different ways, but in terms
of day to day operational management,

00:24:18.687 --> 00:24:22.167
we generally leave them to get on with
it and do their own thing, they ought

00:24:22.167 --> 00:24:23.577
to be able to do that themselves.

00:24:23.997 --> 00:24:29.467
But where they need help, we can help them
to recruit people to come in and that's

00:24:29.737 --> 00:24:33.867
quite important really because if you sit
on the board of a company, the one thing

00:24:33.867 --> 00:24:39.647
that you can do is to choose or help to
choose the people who are going to run

00:24:39.647 --> 00:24:41.327
the company and be a part of that process.

00:24:41.327 --> 00:24:45.637
So we will always participate or
often participate in the process

00:24:45.637 --> 00:24:48.467
where we're looking for a new
marketing person, looking for a

00:24:48.467 --> 00:24:51.477
new CEO, looking for a new CFO.

00:24:51.497 --> 00:24:51.797
Susannah de Jager: Perfect.

00:24:51.807 --> 00:24:55.667
So you talk a bit about funding risk
and in the UK, it's quite a well

00:24:55.667 --> 00:24:59.837
acknowledged problem that early stage
capital is relatively readily available,

00:24:59.857 --> 00:25:02.007
but scale up capital is less so.

00:25:02.307 --> 00:25:04.367
What do you see in your companies?

00:25:04.757 --> 00:25:07.387
George Robinson: To start with,
nearly all spin out companies are

00:25:07.447 --> 00:25:09.097
supported by private investors.

00:25:09.537 --> 00:25:13.097
They're the only people who are prepared
to take the risk and they'll do it

00:25:13.097 --> 00:25:18.157
because they know the founders, or
because they are happy to invest in a

00:25:18.157 --> 00:25:21.607
portfolio of early stage companies in
the expectation that some of them are

00:25:21.607 --> 00:25:27.587
going to work and the UK government
offers really good tax incentives with

00:25:27.587 --> 00:25:33.562
the EIS scheme, which enables people
to effectively claim back some of the

00:25:33.752 --> 00:25:39.412
tax that they would pay if they invest
in listed companies and that's a very

00:25:39.422 --> 00:25:41.592
good incentive to get people to invest.

00:25:41.602 --> 00:25:46.032
It's relatively difficult to
find people to invest their

00:25:46.092 --> 00:25:48.482
money without those incentives.

00:25:48.582 --> 00:25:53.969
So that's the starting point is they have
to be funded privately and then we get

00:25:53.969 --> 00:25:56.139
to a point where you can interest some.

00:25:56.374 --> 00:26:01.874
venture funds, but it's still largely the
case that these early stage companies have

00:26:01.884 --> 00:26:05.204
to depend on individuals to fund them.

00:26:06.294 --> 00:26:07.694
Susannah de Jager: And
higher up the scale?

00:26:07.704 --> 00:26:12.479
I mean, it's interesting in your notes
around Immunicor, you refer to how

00:26:12.539 --> 00:26:17.669
not having institution investors early
enabled independence and then went on to

00:26:17.669 --> 00:26:22.689
a hugely successful series A, a record
breaking series A at $320 million.

00:26:22.909 --> 00:26:27.379
It's interesting that the inference
there is that institution investors

00:26:27.379 --> 00:26:29.209
would've forged a different path.

00:26:29.299 --> 00:26:33.199
How do you see those different
investor groups defining outcomes?

00:26:33.784 --> 00:26:35.334
George Robinson: Yes, well,
it's a very good example.

00:26:35.574 --> 00:26:39.161
So, Immunocore has been one of the most
successful companies to come out of

00:26:39.161 --> 00:26:43.434
Oxford, but in its early days, because
it was tried and untested science,

00:26:43.464 --> 00:26:47.814
and because they hadn't put cancer
immunotherapy drugs into humans, it

00:26:47.814 --> 00:26:51.904
was very hard to find investors and
we were fortunate that there was a

00:26:51.904 --> 00:26:57.027
group of us based in Oxford, and it
included one of the colleges, St.

00:26:57.027 --> 00:27:02.607
Cat's, who were prepared to fund that
company for the first seven years in

00:27:02.607 --> 00:27:06.297
the event that we couldn't find other
investors and we did try quite hard.

00:27:06.297 --> 00:27:09.847
We talked to lots of venture capital
companies, we talked to lots of people

00:27:09.847 --> 00:27:12.917
who might have been interested, but they
all said, this is really interesting

00:27:12.917 --> 00:27:15.847
what you're doing, but why don't you
come back to us when you have done

00:27:15.847 --> 00:27:19.377
your phase one trials or when you've
got a bit further and you've got some

00:27:19.377 --> 00:27:23.787
hard evidence that it actually works
and this is the problem with all these

00:27:23.787 --> 00:27:28.387
companies is nobody who is a fiduciary
who's responsible for other people's

00:27:28.387 --> 00:27:32.967
money, wants to invest in companies that
have unproven technology, even though

00:27:32.977 --> 00:27:40.157
it looks very good and what tends to
happen is that the first round of funding

00:27:40.157 --> 00:27:43.217
that's raised is raised in expectation
that it'll make enough progress that

00:27:43.227 --> 00:27:44.852
new investors will want to come in.

00:27:45.462 --> 00:27:46.702
But it doesn't always happen.

00:27:47.542 --> 00:27:50.122
So, many companies find themselves
in a position where they're

00:27:50.122 --> 00:27:53.082
doing their Series A and it's a
real struggle finding investors.

00:27:53.642 --> 00:27:56.842
So, in the case of Immunocore, we were
very fortunate there was a group of

00:27:56.842 --> 00:28:01.532
investors who signed up to supporting it,
if they had to and in the end they had to.

00:28:01.542 --> 00:28:06.542
But, they got it to the point, well,
it had phase one results where the data

00:28:06.542 --> 00:28:09.932
looked very good, where suddenly it
was a much more interesting company and

00:28:09.952 --> 00:28:14.052
then they went out and they did a series
A where they raised over 300 million

00:28:14.052 --> 00:28:18.062
dollars, which was an extraordinary amount
of money at the time and the company sort

00:28:18.062 --> 00:28:21.102
of went from there and, and did very well.

00:28:21.682 --> 00:28:28.042
Although even later on when that money
was all spent, it was quite hard to raise

00:28:28.092 --> 00:28:33.082
the pre IPO money and it was only when
they got some really good phase two data

00:28:33.082 --> 00:28:37.442
that showed that their first drug was
almost certainly going to be approved that

00:28:37.452 --> 00:28:41.082
suddenly there was a lot of interest and
they were able to raise several hundred

00:28:41.082 --> 00:28:42.672
million dollars and list it on Nasdaq.

00:28:43.032 --> 00:28:47.212
So you're always facing this problem
that the next lot of investors don't

00:28:47.292 --> 00:28:50.652
actually want to invest until you have
de-risked it to the point where they

00:28:50.652 --> 00:28:52.302
feel they're not taking very much risk.

00:28:52.363 --> 00:28:54.523
Susannah de Jager: So it's really
interesting to hear you describe

00:28:54.523 --> 00:28:57.393
that because one sees this time
and time again that it's hard,

00:28:57.423 --> 00:28:58.509
right, to raise this money.

00:28:58.786 --> 00:29:03.636
You describe there a kind of benign
group of very supportive investors,

00:29:03.636 --> 00:29:04.676
which is obviously wonderful.

00:29:05.336 --> 00:29:09.316
Thinking about the evolution within
the Oxford landscape, we've got the

00:29:09.336 --> 00:29:14.046
Ellison Institute of Technology coming
in who have their sort of four pillars

00:29:14.066 --> 00:29:15.276
that they're going to be focused on.

00:29:15.646 --> 00:29:20.506
How do you think that funding model
is going to change some of these

00:29:20.536 --> 00:29:21.756
effects that you're describing?

00:29:22.121 --> 00:29:27.321
George Robinson: Well, if you have a pool
of capital that's earmarked to investing

00:29:27.411 --> 00:29:32.741
in interesting technologies within the
university environment, there's a much

00:29:32.741 --> 00:29:35.701
higher chance that that money will find
its way to the companies and they'll

00:29:35.701 --> 00:29:40.571
be prepared to take the risk and so
it's fantastic that they are there and

00:29:40.571 --> 00:29:44.861
that they have that intention because
it will be hugely helpful because up

00:29:44.861 --> 00:29:50.571
until now, the only big pool of capital
that we have in Oxford is OSI, who

00:29:50.571 --> 00:29:52.321
have been a terrific force for good.

00:29:52.471 --> 00:29:58.051
They've invested close to a billion
pounds into Oxford companies and if

00:29:58.051 --> 00:30:01.961
they hadn't done that, many companies
wouldn't have evolved to the point

00:30:01.971 --> 00:30:07.911
where they have got to and every year,
there's probably twenty five to thirty

00:30:07.931 --> 00:30:09.701
new companies being created in Oxford.

00:30:10.301 --> 00:30:13.811
But if you add up all the companies
that have been created over the last

00:30:13.821 --> 00:30:18.191
ten years, it's probably more like
a hundred and fifty companies and

00:30:18.191 --> 00:30:21.851
they're all growing and most of them
are being successful, but that means

00:30:21.941 --> 00:30:24.761
that they still need to raise money
because they haven't got any revenue.

00:30:25.461 --> 00:30:29.891
So, the amount of money that they
need, for just pure venture funding

00:30:29.891 --> 00:30:32.551
is probably in the order of five
hundred million pounds a year.

00:30:32.591 --> 00:30:37.041
There's no one institution in Oxford
that has pockets deep enough to fund

00:30:37.041 --> 00:30:38.511
that, nor would it be desirable.

00:30:38.511 --> 00:30:43.561
We need lots of investors, which is
why it's fantastic to have new funders

00:30:43.611 --> 00:30:47.531
like the Ellison Institute come in and
look for the opportunity to invest.

00:30:47.671 --> 00:30:50.091
Susannah de Jager: You spoke
earlier about qualities of a

00:30:50.171 --> 00:30:52.761
good founder and co founders.

00:30:53.311 --> 00:30:57.121
Something else that you bring in, which
speaks to this humility and listening

00:30:57.121 --> 00:30:58.681
to the market is around valuation.

00:30:58.961 --> 00:31:03.511
I'd love you just to talk through a little
bit how you think people at this stage,

00:31:03.541 --> 00:31:07.701
anyone listening that's an entrepreneur
ought to think about how they present a

00:31:07.784 --> 00:31:10.737
initial funding round and the valuation.

00:31:10.877 --> 00:31:13.647
George Robinson: So we often find
entrepreneurs who just think their

00:31:13.847 --> 00:31:16.667
company is worth five million
pounds or ten million pounds.

00:31:17.097 --> 00:31:20.647
They have no basis for saying
that, but they're just hoping that

00:31:20.837 --> 00:31:25.647
somebody will be so excited about the
technology and what they're doing that

00:31:25.647 --> 00:31:27.047
they won't question the valuation.

00:31:27.107 --> 00:31:30.647
Well that obviously doesn't work out
very well because if they've overvalued

00:31:30.667 --> 00:31:33.297
the company and they're trying to
raise more money down the line, the

00:31:33.297 --> 00:31:36.507
new investors coming in aren't going
to pay the same price as the old

00:31:36.507 --> 00:31:40.461
investors and you have a down run and
that's not a good result for anybody.

00:31:40.741 --> 00:31:43.771
So the methodology which we
use is quite straightforward.

00:31:43.771 --> 00:31:48.181
You look at how much money has been
raised by the company through equity, how

00:31:48.181 --> 00:31:53.601
much money they have been able to get in
grants from Innovate UK or other grant

00:31:53.631 --> 00:31:59.661
giving bodies and then you add that all up
cumulatively and it's reasonable to treat

00:31:59.671 --> 00:32:01.141
that as the book value of the company.

00:32:01.141 --> 00:32:03.941
It's not a hard book value because
all the money gets spent, but they've

00:32:03.941 --> 00:32:08.446
spent the money developing intellectual
property, so there should be, all

00:32:08.486 --> 00:32:12.516
converted into goodwill, and then you
pay a multiple of that and if you look

00:32:12.516 --> 00:32:17.086
at the capital history of successful
spin out companies in Oxford, you'll

00:32:17.086 --> 00:32:22.756
find that typically, when they're raising
new money, the valuation of the company

00:32:22.806 --> 00:32:26.576
after the new money has been taken in,
which includes the cash, is somewhere

00:32:26.576 --> 00:32:32.141
between one and a half and three and
a half times the invested capital.

00:32:32.691 --> 00:32:38.241
So it's, if you're raising new money at
the same price of all the money that's

00:32:38.251 --> 00:32:41.581
gone in already, in other words, at
book value, that's not a good result.

00:32:41.971 --> 00:32:45.081
But if the company is doing
well, they will be able to

00:32:45.081 --> 00:32:46.721
raise at a much higher multiple.

00:32:46.731 --> 00:32:49.121
So Oxford Nanopore is a very good example.

00:32:49.721 --> 00:32:54.761
Gordon Sanger did a brilliant job
raising money over many years before

00:32:54.761 --> 00:32:58.611
the company started generating revenues
and he always managed to raise money

00:32:58.611 --> 00:33:00.501
at about three times invested capital.

00:33:01.011 --> 00:33:05.431
There are other companies which will
raise money at one and a half to two times

00:33:05.451 --> 00:33:09.941
and it slightly depends on the nature of
the business and what they're doing and

00:33:10.311 --> 00:33:14.996
the more asset heavy the company is, the
more fixed assets they need, the lower

00:33:14.996 --> 00:33:19.266
the multiple generally, but for asset
light businesses, particularly software

00:33:19.266 --> 00:33:20.996
businesses, the multiple can be higher.

00:33:21.366 --> 00:33:24.266
But we always look at that, we go
to companies house, we look at the

00:33:24.266 --> 00:33:27.536
cap table, we put it together, and
we just work out how much money has

00:33:27.536 --> 00:33:31.116
been invested and then take a view on
whether that money has been well spent.

00:33:31.216 --> 00:33:33.576
You can't just take
everything that's been spent.

00:33:33.586 --> 00:33:36.826
If you've had to write off some of that
investment or they've changed tack,

00:33:36.856 --> 00:33:38.146
you might want to reduce it a bit.

00:33:38.736 --> 00:33:39.636
Susannah de Jager: That
makes a lot of sense.

00:33:39.636 --> 00:33:42.546
I think that's very helpful to
have a sort of benchmark for how

00:33:42.546 --> 00:33:43.816
people should think about that.

00:33:44.079 --> 00:33:47.799
You also talk about when people are in
this stage, it might take a year to raise

00:33:47.829 --> 00:33:50.529
initial funding, they're going to have
to expect to get lots of knockbacks and

00:33:50.529 --> 00:33:52.629
no's, it won't be a good fit for everyone.

00:33:52.629 --> 00:33:56.299
You've spoken about that the pool for
these kinds of investments is just quite

00:33:56.299 --> 00:34:01.219
small and you talk about maybe taking
50 meetings and if I'm honest, that even

00:34:01.219 --> 00:34:06.494
sounded maybe a little bit conservative,
but I did wonder and I often wonder

00:34:06.494 --> 00:34:09.564
this, what's the difference between
sort of persistence and obstinance?

00:34:09.574 --> 00:34:13.364
You know, there's lots of things
that you talk about being needed

00:34:13.374 --> 00:34:15.104
for a company to be viable.

00:34:15.404 --> 00:34:19.544
If you're a founder, how should
you filter that feedback?

00:34:19.614 --> 00:34:23.134
Because some will be just not a good
fit and some will be, you really

00:34:23.204 --> 00:34:25.094
don't have a good venture here.

00:34:25.369 --> 00:34:27.649
George Robinson: I think the most
important thing for founders when

00:34:27.649 --> 00:34:31.302
they're trying to raise money is
to show that they have thought

00:34:31.572 --> 00:34:34.192
quite carefully about what they're
doing and what the market might be.

00:34:34.582 --> 00:34:39.092
I always say to people, if you're trying
to create a new company, don't do it

00:34:39.272 --> 00:34:44.102
unless you think you have some idea of
who your customers might be and preferably

00:34:44.102 --> 00:34:47.702
you've actually talked to them and found
out whether they might be interested.

00:34:47.732 --> 00:34:51.302
So I think that's the first thing,
if you find a founder who's just...

00:34:51.654 --> 00:34:52.964
Susannah de Jager: In
love with their own idea.

00:34:53.039 --> 00:34:56.889
George Robinson: Yeah, they've created
the company and they just assume

00:34:56.889 --> 00:35:00.329
that everybody's going to want it,
you've got to slightly question what

00:35:00.369 --> 00:35:03.999
they're doing because they haven't
thought through to that next stage.

00:35:04.669 --> 00:35:09.389
So, the more they can think about it, the
better and we often see presentations,

00:35:09.516 --> 00:35:14.026
where the company has just getting
started, it's got no revenue at all and

00:35:14.026 --> 00:35:19.696
they talk about being in a market that's
worth tens of billions of dollars for

00:35:19.706 --> 00:35:21.876
diagnostics or antibodies or whatever.

00:35:22.236 --> 00:35:26.076
But they don't make any effort to tell
you what the tiny little subsection of

00:35:26.076 --> 00:35:29.856
that market is and how much of it they
think they could potentially occupy.

00:35:29.866 --> 00:35:33.066
So I think being realistic about the
market's really important because as

00:35:33.066 --> 00:35:36.906
an investor, your first risk is the
technical risk, is it going to work?

00:35:36.906 --> 00:35:38.726
Are they going to get
regulatory approval and so on?

00:35:38.726 --> 00:35:40.996
But your second risk
is, is it going to sell?

00:35:40.996 --> 00:35:42.236
Is anybody going to buy it?

00:35:42.446 --> 00:35:46.362
And the more the founders or the
CEO can demonstrate that he actually

00:35:46.362 --> 00:35:50.222
understands that market, that he's not
just assuming there's a massive market

00:35:50.222 --> 00:35:54.162
out there for what he's doing, the more
reassurance he can give to his investors

00:35:54.622 --> 00:35:59.062
and of course, later on, when you're
trying to raise money, a series sort

00:35:59.296 --> 00:36:01.186
of B-C, the company's got revenues.

00:36:01.286 --> 00:36:04.926
The investors are going to want to
see purchase orders, know who the

00:36:04.926 --> 00:36:06.676
customers are going to be and so on.

00:36:07.226 --> 00:36:09.669
So you may as well start
thinking about that on day one.

00:36:09.809 --> 00:36:11.899
Susannah de Jager: Yeah and I liked
again, in the notes you sent across,

00:36:11.899 --> 00:36:15.389
you had almost a sort of checklist for
creating a company that speaks to a

00:36:15.389 --> 00:36:16.979
lot of the things you just articulated.

00:36:16.979 --> 00:36:19.729
So IP and if they don't have IP, why not?

00:36:19.749 --> 00:36:24.519
Technical risk, regulatory pathway,
market knowledge, and fit competitors

00:36:24.939 --> 00:36:28.449
and I liked in particular that you
drew out if there are large competitors

00:36:28.449 --> 00:36:34.072
in the space, how to think about that
and I wanted to just focus on that one

00:36:34.202 --> 00:36:37.769
point for a moment, because you can
have a brilliant idea, but if you're

00:36:37.769 --> 00:36:43.429
up against Samsung or AstraZeneca, it
may be that it never sees the light of

00:36:43.429 --> 00:36:45.919
day, unless they want to buy you out.

00:36:46.129 --> 00:36:50.419
How do you work out between those
two, whether it's worth pursuing

00:36:50.419 --> 00:36:51.709
if they're up against a big player?

00:36:51.919 --> 00:36:52.879
George Robinson: It's not easy.

00:36:53.609 --> 00:36:56.049
Susannah de Jager: I think your
phrase was run for the hills!

00:36:57.319 --> 00:36:59.909
George Robinson: Well, there are certain
industries which are just very hard.

00:36:59.909 --> 00:37:01.529
So one is the display industry.

00:37:01.632 --> 00:37:05.492
So we come across companies occasionally
which are operating in that space,

00:37:05.492 --> 00:37:10.272
they want to create a new product which
might be part of the supply chain of the

00:37:10.822 --> 00:37:13.032
display industry, or might complement it.

00:37:13.692 --> 00:37:18.522
So we had a company which made reflective
displays using phase change materials,

00:37:18.522 --> 00:37:22.749
which didn't require any light to
illuminate them and it was a wonderful

00:37:22.749 --> 00:37:26.072
product, but the problem was the only
people who were going to be interested

00:37:26.072 --> 00:37:32.892
in it were Samsung, AU Optronics in
Taiwan, E Ink in Taiwan and the more we

00:37:32.892 --> 00:37:35.832
went along, the more clear it was that
there were only about five companies in

00:37:35.832 --> 00:37:41.222
the world that might be interested and
as they were sort of contacted, it just

00:37:41.222 --> 00:37:46.092
became clear over time that they regarded
this as a sort of interesting adjunct

00:37:46.112 --> 00:37:49.162
to what they were doing, but it wasn't
something they needed to have and so that

00:37:49.172 --> 00:37:54.672
none of them were interested in supporting
it and very difficult to forge your own

00:37:54.672 --> 00:37:59.812
path in an oligopoly, where there's just
a few companies who dominate everything

00:37:59.979 --> 00:38:04.639
And it's often the case that the new
technologies either got to be licensed

00:38:04.799 --> 00:38:08.439
or bought by existing big player,
or you've got to find somebody else

00:38:08.439 --> 00:38:13.204
who's not in that market who wants
to come in and be in that space.

00:38:13.584 --> 00:38:16.224
But if they're going to come in
at a later stage, they're going to

00:38:16.224 --> 00:38:18.844
want to see a business that's got
revenues and is going somewhere.

00:38:18.844 --> 00:38:20.981
So they don't want to take
on an idea, they want to take

00:38:20.981 --> 00:38:22.091
on a business that works.

00:38:22.911 --> 00:38:28.531
So these, it can be really difficult,
this commercial risk and you have to, in

00:38:28.531 --> 00:38:32.519
the end, take a view on, will there be
companies out there that would see this

00:38:32.529 --> 00:38:34.299
as a nice addition to their portfolio?

00:38:34.969 --> 00:38:36.519
Susannah de Jager: But it's
quite a binary outcome.

00:38:36.674 --> 00:38:40.374
George Robinson: It's quite a binary
outcome and again, it helps if the

00:38:40.374 --> 00:38:44.114
management of the company has done
some work on this and can give you some

00:38:44.534 --> 00:38:46.924
reassurance that somebody might want it.

00:38:47.004 --> 00:38:52.224
Now, of course, in the drug discovery
space, the big pharma companies, on

00:38:52.254 --> 00:38:57.379
balance, are happy to outsource most of
the early stage R&D to people who are

00:38:57.379 --> 00:39:01.104
hoping to produce a drug that works and
when it gets to its phase one trials

00:39:01.124 --> 00:39:05.244
and it's starting to look interesting,
they might well come in then and share

00:39:05.244 --> 00:39:10.004
the risk by co-investing or even buy
it, but before that you're on your

00:39:10.384 --> 00:39:14.544
own and it's a very risky space and
I think something like five percent

00:39:14.554 --> 00:39:18.854
of all new drugs that's developed end
up getting approved, so you have to

00:39:18.854 --> 00:39:20.754
be quite brave to play in that space.

00:39:20.859 --> 00:39:23.499
Susannah de Jager: Just to wrap up,
I would love to hear if you have a

00:39:23.499 --> 00:39:27.229
sort of pet favorite company at the
moment or a pet favorite sector that

00:39:27.229 --> 00:39:29.419
you are particularly excited by.

00:39:29.594 --> 00:39:32.134
George Robinson: So probably the
most exciting company we have in our

00:39:32.134 --> 00:39:40.984
portfolio at the moment is Oxford PV
and Oxford PV makes very high powered

00:39:41.064 --> 00:39:45.804
solar cells, which produce about 20
percent more power then the underlying

00:39:45.804 --> 00:39:50.574
silicon because they put a layer of a
perovskite on top, which absorbs light in

00:39:50.574 --> 00:39:56.654
the blue end of the spectrum and Oxford
PV was the first company in this space.

00:39:56.654 --> 00:40:00.374
There's lots of people around the world
researching it and lots of companies

00:40:00.374 --> 00:40:05.054
around the world who want to produce
silicon perovskite tandem cells, but

00:40:05.144 --> 00:40:08.754
all of the important IP actually belongs
here in Oxford and belongs to Oxford

00:40:08.754 --> 00:40:11.934
PV, so it's very hard for anybody
else to manufacture this and sell it

00:40:11.944 --> 00:40:17.056
globally without getting a license
from them and they are developing their

00:40:17.056 --> 00:40:22.256
own product and in the first instance
they're targeting specialty products

00:40:22.316 --> 00:40:25.856
which are very high value added and
in particular the space industry.

00:40:26.022 --> 00:40:29.702
So it's not yet a done deal and it's
not certain but there's a reasonable

00:40:29.702 --> 00:40:34.385
chance that we'll find Oxford PV solar
panels orbiting the earth over the next

00:40:34.455 --> 00:40:38.335
year or two and becoming a big part of
the supply chain to the space industry.

00:40:38.665 --> 00:40:39.665
But that's just the start.

00:40:39.675 --> 00:40:44.145
They can also produce solar panels
that look and feel exactly the same

00:40:44.145 --> 00:40:49.545
like any existing solar panel, they
just produce 20 percent more power and

00:40:49.565 --> 00:40:52.755
within a few years, hopefully, they
will be a big part of the industry.

00:40:52.875 --> 00:40:53.515
Susannah de Jager: Amazing.

00:40:53.865 --> 00:40:54.985
That sounds very exciting.

00:40:55.465 --> 00:40:58.185
Well, George, thank you so much,
I could have gone on and asked you

00:40:58.185 --> 00:41:01.685
about every company, but I think this
has been a really good whistle stop

00:41:01.685 --> 00:41:07.735
tour of what you look for and how you
identify really interesting ideas.

00:41:07.745 --> 00:41:08.505
So thank you.

00:41:08.605 --> 00:41:09.235
George Robinson: It's a pleasure.

00:41:09.235 --> 00:41:10.665
Thank you very much for having me.

00:41:11.055 --> 00:41:13.075
Susannah de Jager: Thanks for
listening to this episode of Oxford+,

00:41:13.575 --> 00:41:15.185
presented by me, Susannah de Jager.

00:41:15.465 --> 00:41:18.755
If you want to stay up to date
with all things Oxford+, Please

00:41:18.755 --> 00:41:20.760
visit our website oxfordplus.

00:41:20.760 --> 00:41:20.850
co.

00:41:20.850 --> 00:41:24.500
uk and sign up for our newsletter
so you never miss an update.

00:41:24.910 --> 00:41:28.170
Oxford+ was made in partnership
with Mishcon de Reya and is produced

00:41:28.170 --> 00:41:30.070
and edited by Story Ninety-Four.