1
00:00:02,876 --> 00:00:04,586
Welcome to the Cyber Traps podcast.

2
00:00:04,586 --> 00:00:08,486
Today I'm excited to have Ryan Nelson with me from IBM's X-Force.

3
00:00:08,486 --> 00:00:12,386
So first, Ryan, tell us a little bit about yourself and what is this X-Force?

4
00:00:12,386 --> 00:00:12,896
Sure thing.

5
00:00:12,896 --> 00:00:14,426
And appreciate you having me here today.

6
00:00:14,476 --> 00:00:20,446
So IBM X-Force we're comprised of four different pillars of cybersecurity consulting services.

7
00:00:21,056 --> 00:00:29,436
I'm personally incident response division, but also work closely with our threat intelligence red teaming, then cyber range, which specializes in more immersive tabletop

8
00:00:29,961 --> 00:00:30,381
Okay.

9
00:00:30,456 --> 00:00:30,666
Yeah.

10
00:00:31,096 --> 00:00:42,146
So yeah, so personally on the incident response side of things, we do some proactive and reactive consulting, so helping our clients for cyber incidents, but then on the reactive side, when it actually does happen.

11
00:00:42,526 --> 00:00:49,336
We'll be brought in to assist with the digital forensics and also consulting side of how contain it, how do we eradication, all that

12
00:00:49,536 --> 00:00:49,776
stuff.

13
00:00:50,131 --> 00:00:54,751
Yeah, that sounds super intense and I bet that people you work with are.

14
00:00:55,351 --> 00:00:56,971
Very high stress at that point.

15
00:00:57,151 --> 00:01:02,196
I mean, at this point, if you're in this sort of role long enough, you can't really let those emotions get to you very long.

16
00:01:02,196 --> 00:01:02,316
Yeah.

17
00:01:02,316 --> 00:01:03,001
You can't for sure.

18
00:01:03,751 --> 00:01:03,991
Yeah,

19
00:01:04,051 --> 00:01:04,261
No.

20
00:01:04,261 --> 00:01:10,241
So, I think for the most part, when we deal with we work with our clients in response to these investigations we get a mixed group, right?

21
00:01:10,241 --> 00:01:12,851
Some are really used to this sort of thing, and then some.

22
00:01:13,166 --> 00:01:14,366
It's the worst day their lives.

23
00:01:14,616 --> 00:01:20,246
And sort of navigating the emotions is just as important as navigating the technical response processes.

24
00:01:20,351 --> 00:01:20,741
Yeah.

25
00:01:21,041 --> 00:01:27,371
So, walk me through what you do when, 'cause somebody gets hacked, they call you and say, come help us out.

26
00:01:27,371 --> 00:01:27,671
Right?

27
00:01:28,241 --> 00:01:30,251
So, so what do you do in that situation?

28
00:01:30,311 --> 00:01:34,571
I mean, there's a lot of different versions of somebody gets hacked, so take that however

29
00:01:34,706 --> 00:01:34,946
Yeah.

30
00:01:35,156 --> 00:01:37,256
so in our situation, we're often coming in cold.

31
00:01:37,306 --> 00:01:46,426
Sometimes had previous relationships clients, so we have some familiarity with their environment, but for the most part, it's a brand new scenario, Even we've had that existing relationship.

32
00:01:46,726 --> 00:01:51,736
So we'll hop on a triage call is the terminology we use to really just get an understanding of.

33
00:01:51,801 --> 00:01:53,241
What they know so far.

34
00:01:53,491 --> 00:01:57,556
And try to really synthesize the truth from the theory at that point in time.

35
00:01:57,556 --> 00:02:00,736
And then what are the parameters of the investigation gonna be ensuing.

36
00:02:01,151 --> 00:02:02,651
So, yeah, what do we know?

37
00:02:02,651 --> 00:02:03,461
What's the indicator?

38
00:02:03,461 --> 00:02:04,781
What are the indicators compromise?

39
00:02:04,781 --> 00:02:06,821
What we, what led us to this position?

40
00:02:07,171 --> 00:02:10,981
And then understanding, again, the scope of systems Accounts involved.

41
00:02:11,131 --> 00:02:14,871
Who were the necessary application teams or the server owners, right?

42
00:02:14,871 --> 00:02:16,731
Understanding, are they Windows hosts?

43
00:02:16,731 --> 00:02:17,511
Are they Linux hosts?

44
00:02:17,511 --> 00:02:17,661
Right?

45
00:02:17,661 --> 00:02:23,451
Trying to get the grasp of understanding what was the, what was were the components of that were involved in the impact.

46
00:02:23,871 --> 00:02:28,321
And then following that, what kind of visibility access do we have into that, right?

47
00:02:28,321 --> 00:02:34,831
So then we start that conversation around, okay, can we get into the existing EDR technology the SIM solution?

48
00:02:35,221 --> 00:02:38,131
We to do live response from forensics component?

49
00:02:38,131 --> 00:02:45,791
Are we doing full image captures or can we do some things that are a little bit more efficient as people to get to the data that maybe not be captured in those security tools?

50
00:02:46,006 --> 00:02:46,366
Yeah.

51
00:02:46,366 --> 00:02:47,326
So fascinating.

52
00:02:47,836 --> 00:02:54,766
And I'm sure with every situation, every, all those variables are different for everybody right?

53
00:02:54,796 --> 00:03:01,496
Yeah we do our best to try to synthesize a process of regular dance steps that we tend to run it over again.

54
00:03:01,766 --> 00:03:04,976
But it certainly takes a lot of flexibility and adaptability.

55
00:03:05,476 --> 00:03:11,616
you know, every so often we'll get thrown into a situation where it's a random software vendor that we've never had to deal with before.

56
00:03:11,766 --> 00:03:16,756
We have to get smart really fast third party service that maybe is a new right?

57
00:03:16,906 --> 00:03:19,906
So we have to understand how does fit into the ecosystem?

58
00:03:19,906 --> 00:03:21,166
Where does the evidence lie?

59
00:03:21,166 --> 00:03:25,906
Do we even have the ability collect evidence because it might be proprietary, Every time it's different.

60
00:03:25,966 --> 00:03:32,116
So again, we do our best to control what we can control but then have flexibility to adapt to uncharted waters.

61
00:03:32,641 --> 00:03:32,971
/
 Yeah.

62
00:03:33,361 --> 00:03:36,171
And so I'm sure that you have a process that you do follow.

63
00:03:36,521 --> 00:03:37,931
And you explained some of that.

64
00:03:38,241 --> 00:03:47,291
When you get into these situations and the tensions are high and people are stressed how important is, I mean, you mentioned that you can't be affected by those.

65
00:03:47,561 --> 00:03:53,771
How important is your calmness in and your levelheadedness when it comes to solving the problem

66
00:03:53,821 --> 00:03:54,511
it's imperative.

67
00:03:54,861 --> 00:03:55,471
It's imperative.

68
00:03:55,766 --> 00:03:56,666
I think what.

69
00:03:57,146 --> 00:04:23,616
At least from a personal perspective, and I think a lot of other folks that are in this field do this, is finding a foundation of confidence and understanding of, again, yes, we might not understand full breadth or scope of what we're dealing with, but we know
some critical truths that we want, that we can fall back on to say, okay, maybe this is uncharted water for us, but we've had a sort of similar situation and this is what we found be successful in that was a challenging, let's try to avoid those going forward.

70
00:04:24,501 --> 00:04:40,661
So I, one of the adages we like to use is the four truths of malware, Where it either has to run, persist, hide, and communicate, And so depend depending on the we'll say like ferral ground of where that malware is, running, right?

71
00:04:40,721 --> 00:04:45,731
That might ne might change how we get to the information, but we know that one of those things has true.

72
00:04:46,151 --> 00:04:46,361
Right?

73
00:04:46,361 --> 00:04:46,421
Yeah.

74
00:04:46,976 --> 00:04:47,276
Yeah.

75
00:04:47,276 --> 00:04:48,206
That's so interesting.

76
00:04:48,206 --> 00:05:04,146
And it, it seems like in these situations you, there's so much that like the people on the ground may not have access to, and so you may not even be able to do anything with a specific piece of software or a server or whatever.

77
00:05:04,636 --> 00:05:06,676
So what is your background?

78
00:05:06,676 --> 00:05:08,356
What got you to this

79
00:05:08,656 --> 00:05:08,836
Yeah.

80
00:05:08,836 --> 00:05:12,456
So I was a computer science major was a software engineer guy.

81
00:05:12,456 --> 00:05:18,016
But when I initially joined IBMI was brought into the cyber range actually.

82
00:05:18,406 --> 00:05:21,856
And we were, I was working on building out some of the simulated threat scenarios.

83
00:05:22,206 --> 00:05:29,616
So creating sandbox environments and then attack automations and how to create those signals and them visible within various security.

84
00:05:30,576 --> 00:05:45,126
So then clients would come in with, bring their security teams, bring their executive teams in the best scenarios had both, So, then can have
the security folks the technical individuals practicing those muscle movements and then feeding their findings over to the leadership teams.

85
00:05:45,406 --> 00:05:48,556
So then they can then make intelligent decisions on their follow on actions.

86
00:05:48,656 --> 00:05:48,746
So

87
00:05:48,746 --> 00:05:51,746
multiple pillars required for an effective response, not just

88
00:05:51,746 --> 00:05:52,526
the technical side.

89
00:05:52,526 --> 00:05:52,766
Yeah.

90
00:05:53,276 --> 00:05:54,116
But pretty quickly.

91
00:05:54,409 --> 00:06:06,289
I realized that while the simulation component was fun and interesting I kept finding myself rubbing elbows with the incident response folks that were doing the real stuff actually combating threat actors inclined environments.

92
00:06:06,289 --> 00:06:07,609
And I just thought that sounded so cool.

93
00:06:07,764 --> 00:06:13,224
So I quickly realized that's where I wanted to align and was fortunate enough to get opportunity to move to that team.

94
00:06:13,224 --> 00:06:13,434
Yeah.

95
00:06:13,854 --> 00:06:18,309
And then since then, started out as an analyst and now I'm, managing one of our North America teams, X-Force.

96
00:06:18,594 --> 00:06:19,164
Very cool.

97
00:06:19,624 --> 00:06:28,564
So when you go into a situation, part of your job is to get things functional, right?

98
00:06:28,934 --> 00:06:33,044
But then there's also some mitigation for future issues, I'm sure.

99
00:06:33,344 --> 00:06:38,234
And then there's also probably some work with law enforcement or coordinating there.

100
00:06:38,504 --> 00:06:40,274
What does that look like from your perspective?

101
00:06:40,274 --> 00:06:40,454
Sure,

102
00:06:40,529 --> 00:06:40,709
Yeah.

103
00:06:40,709 --> 00:06:46,594
So from the law enforcement component we definitely work with the clients on engagement with law enforcement.

104
00:06:46,984 --> 00:06:50,224
Best situations is when they already have their local FBI contact

105
00:06:50,254 --> 00:06:50,784
on speed-dail.

106
00:06:50,904 --> 00:06:51,104
Right?

107
00:06:51,164 --> 00:06:51,824
That's been great.

108
00:06:51,974 --> 00:06:55,664
And they can really assist when it comes to the subpoena route things.

109
00:06:55,914 --> 00:07:00,544
They'll have a little more reach into take down requests or maybe they're leveraging.

110
00:07:00,949 --> 00:07:10,989
A VPN provider that we can't get identification into where the source came from, but maybe they can issue a subpoena to get some of that lower level detail that maybe we just don't have a direct visibility into.

111
00:07:11,519 --> 00:07:15,204
And then the component of we're talking about insider threat investigations right?

112
00:07:15,234 --> 00:07:18,189
where they might pursue a legal action following that, right?

113
00:07:18,189 --> 00:07:25,439
So we help with sort of identifying what the avenues possibility are and then we can provide some of that past experience to help them navigate that.

114
00:07:25,794 --> 00:07:26,124
Yeah.

115
00:07:26,214 --> 00:07:29,979
And then it seems like to me there would be also some.

116
00:07:30,879 --> 00:07:36,819
Coordination of identifying common patterns and things that you've seen and it's like, these look like they might be the same.

117
00:07:37,269 --> 00:07:38,169
Initial group.

118
00:07:38,169 --> 00:07:40,199
And is there anything you want to add about that

119
00:07:40,344 --> 00:07:48,604
Threat vets I would categorize that under the threat intelligence component of what we do, and it's an absolutely essential pillar for an effective response.

120
00:07:48,914 --> 00:07:51,014
Because again, context information is key.

121
00:07:51,424 --> 00:07:53,374
When responding, especially to active threats.

122
00:07:53,434 --> 00:08:11,359
So if we can identify or attribute with a certain level of confidence that threat actor that we're dealing been known to execute X, Y, and Z behavioral patterns, or these
they have X, Y, and Z indicators, we can then do broader threat hunt throughout the environment to hopefully identify things that maybe the initial team wasn't aware of.

123
00:08:11,359 --> 00:08:12,079
Mm-hmm.

124
00:08:12,149 --> 00:08:18,379
And then furthermore provide some confidence and context to more the leadership side of things, saying, Hey, this is a known threat group.

125
00:08:18,899 --> 00:08:25,464
They have been known to execute ransomware and then maybe they have been paid in past and honored their agreement, right?

126
00:08:25,464 --> 00:08:28,134
Having context when making like risk-based decisions.

127
00:08:28,164 --> 00:08:28,464
Yeah.

128
00:08:28,464 --> 00:08:29,334
Extremely helpful.

129
00:08:29,484 --> 00:08:29,844
Yeah.

130
00:08:29,934 --> 00:08:30,924
That's so fascinating.

131
00:08:30,924 --> 00:08:36,064
Well, looking forward to your session on what what we learned from a breach later today.

132
00:08:36,064 --> 00:08:41,044
And thank you again for being part of the Inch 360 Conference and part of the Cyber Trapps podcast.

133
00:08:41,044 --> 00:08:42,724
Absolutely, happy to be here and thank you.