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This week's Surveillance Report covers Apple quietly downgrading a key privacy feature with

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Google not so far behind, Chrome killing popular ad blockers for good, sweeping new surveillance

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bills in Canada and the UK, the Arch Linux R spam saga, and the usual defense bulletin

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of data breaches, threats, and FOSS updates.

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Welcome everybody to the Techlore Surveillance Report, your essential weekly tech news, delivering

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deep analysis on the latest threats to security, privacy, and digital freedom, empowering you

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to reclaim control and defend your rights. Let's get into it. So we're going to start with

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Apple doing something that is very unfortunate. So Apple has a feature called Hide My Email. This

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is the most mainstream version of something like Simple Login or Ad EIO. The concept is that when

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you're signing up for something, it's literally just going to forward the email to whatever you're

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using on your Apple account. So the nice thing thus far about this feature is that it actually

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the iCloud.com domain. So let's say that, you know, it's Henry at iCloud.com is your Apple

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account and you're using hide my email and you're generating random stuff. It's going to do like

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these random numbers at iCloud.com and Apple will automatically take those emails and forward them.

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So that way you can hide your email from all these random accounts out there that want to

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harvest it for naughty things. The problem though, is that they left a note to developers that in the

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coming weeks, they're going to move those generated email addresses to a new domain. It's a sub

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main, which is private.icloud.com, making it easier for apps and websites to know that an email address

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is private and block users from signing up. I want to be clear, this doesn't change the privacy or

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security of the service per se. What this does is something that is historically something that all

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of you know is a problem. When you start using some privacy and security tools, you realize that

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websites have proactively tried to block you from existence for just trying to be more private

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online. This is most egregiously seen with something like phone numbers. You don't want to

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have all of your accounts tied to a central identity that potentially is even tied to your

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social security number and your everything else just because of a phone number. So you go ahead

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and purchase a service like MySudo or Google Voice or really anything out there. And you realize all

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these accounts are like, we don't want that. We don't trust you. And it's like, well, I don't trust

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you with my phone number either. In fact, I haven't seen any legislation like this, but I think one of

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the most important things that we need to be fighting for, which is upstream of privacy, is the

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right to be able to use accounts using any other provider. This ties most into something like the

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DMA and the concept of interoperability. But if you use something different than iCloud or Gmail,

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you should have equal amount of rights to the service as somebody using those other platforms.

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When you're registering for an account that doesn't like your simple login address, if they

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are allowing a Gmail address but not a simple login one, I would argue that's like discriminatory

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practices against people who don't use big tech providers. It's penalizing people for not using

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big tech company, which I think is inherently unfair. I'd love to see some digital rights push

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where it doesn't matter which service you're using. They're not allowed to say, we're not going to

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accept you because you're not using the service we want you to be using, which I think is quite

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unfair. Now, people are speculating and TechCrunch even says that Apple did turn over the real

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account information of a user who generated an anonymized email address. It's important to

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remember these things aren't like end-to-end encrypted. You're trusting Apple when you do

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this. That is how all aliasing services are going to work. You are pretty much shifting trust

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away from having to upload your real information to hundreds of websites to instead having one

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person essentially take over. Ultimately, though, I will expect to see more sites start to block

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this subdomain, which means that if you are using Hide My Email, this could be a big hit to your

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usability in the coming future. So if you are concerned about this, lots of the other open

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source alternatives that I talk about on this channel not only have different domains that you

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can try, which sometimes aren't blocked, but also you can combine them with a custom domain. And when

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you use it with a custom domain, then it's going to be really hard to block those services. So

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that's where I would push a lot of you out there who are caught by this. Now on the topic of Apple,

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this is just a quick signal boost and there wasn't a better place to put this, but there is a new

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unpatchable flaw in Apple chips, older chips that opened the door for maybe an iPhone jailbreak,

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which also means that they are just vulnerabilities. So it's kind of this catch 22,

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but it's for older A12, A13 chips released in 2018, 2019. It's in older phones like the XS,

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XR and up to the iPhone 11. I don't think this is the kind of thing that's like, if you have these

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phones, you need to throw them in the trash. But I think it's a good reminder that if they're

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starting to find these things in your old devices, you're probably starting to look at an end of life

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device. And you're probably going to start to find much better security improvements by upgrading to

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a newer phone. So you don't have to get the newest phone. I still recommend getting secondhand if you

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can to avoid e-waste. But either way, just keep this in the back of your mind. It's more of a

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reminder that these older devices are starting to show their age. And don't worry if you're in the

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Google side of things laughing. Google also did something not so great this week because they are

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notifying advertisers that they will start using IP addresses for ad measurement and personalization

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across the European Economic Area, the UK and Switzerland on or shortly after August 3rd,

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2026. Really, the concern here is things like fingerprinting. And they put this so well on

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Bleeping Computer, actually, because Google literally has taken the view that this is wrong.

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In 2019, this is a direct quote, Chrome engineer director Justin Xu,

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wrote that fingerprinting subverts user choice and is wrong

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because users cannot clear it the way that they can clear cookies.

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Google has reversed that stance in December 2024,

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dropping its prohibition on fingerprinting for advertisers.

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So that should tell you everything you need to know.

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It tells you why Google Chrome doesn't really have great fingerprinting resistance.

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It tells you why Google's open to using your IP address

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for tracking you across advertisers.

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and it's just a sad update.

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I wish that Google had some kind of,

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I guess, floor to how low they would go,

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but they will continue to push

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how much they collect about users

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because ultimately their main business model

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is advertising.

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I think the most actionable thing,

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they do say that you can like

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decline non-essential cookies,

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you can do the consent prompts,

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review ad personalization settings

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in your Google account.

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Of course, you can always hide your IP address

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by using something like a VPN

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or even using things like Tor,

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which is more advanced.

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It's weird, but I guess not so surprising

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that Google is starting to go this direction.

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And so I hope to see a little bit more pushback.

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And if you know friends or family,

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this is a good story to share with them

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to get them to maybe think a little bit more

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about the privacy implications.

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Coming next, though, there is Google Chrome,

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which is going to end popular ad blockers.

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And we also have Canada and UK

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with sweeping new surveillance laws

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that we're going to talk about,

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as well as some weird stuff happening

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on the Arch Linux side of things.

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and our typical defense bulletin and all that stuff.

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All right, so this requires a bit of context.

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So there is an underlying technology behind every extension you use inside of your browsers,

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and it's called Manifest.

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Now, V2 is what a lot of people are familiar with, even if they're not familiar with it,

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because a lot of people don't think about this when they're installing an extension.

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But anytime you've used an ad blocker up until the last couple years, things just work, right?

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But what Google has put forward is Manifest V3, which is the newer update to this,

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but it's a lot more limiting and it restricts what extensions can do inside of your browser.

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Now, Google says it's for better security and for better permissions, etc.

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But a lot of people think that a lot of these decisions were made to make it harder to do ad blocking.

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Keep in mind, this is Google, who is mostly an advertising company,

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who owns a browser, who owns YouTube, who has a lot of incentive to not make ad blockers work.

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And so when they make this kind of decision,

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and they're also deciding the technologies of the extensions in every Chromium-based browser,

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that's a bit of a conflict of interest in my mind.

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The main ad blocker that a lot of people are upset about,

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which speaks to this whole phenomenon, is uBlock Origin, right?

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So uBlock Origin is always very powerful,

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but they've had to retire the old extension on Google Chrome for uBlock Origin Lite,

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which is compatible with MV3, but it's nowhere near as powerful.

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Now, Chromium up until now still has had some way, shape, or form to run these older extensions.

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the most latest thing was that you can have this flag, which is the K extension manifest V2 disabled

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flag, which you can essentially still enable. But now there is a Chromium commit that you can see

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in the show notes that actually gets rid of that flag entirely. The Googler confirmed that they

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intend to let that go. 9to5 rightfully says this will impact other Chromium-based browsers

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like Edge and Opera as well. Now, what I'm very curious about is wonder because Brave Browser

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and I think Vivaldi as well have committed to supporting MV2 for as long as they can.

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So that's why you can still install some of these older extensions in those browsers.

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But I'm curious what their way of doing that was.

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If they were just pretty much using this flag workaround and then Chrome's going to remove that,

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they're going to have to put in a lot more work to maintain it.

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But if they already found a way to maintain it in a easy path forward kind of way that's sustainable,

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then maybe we'll still get that feature.

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So I guess we'll see what happens.

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I think really the way that Brave gets around it, at least,

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is they just build in the ad blocking straight into the browser

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so you don't need an extension.

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So we'll see what happens.

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This is still new.

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It's unfolding.

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And once it happens, we're going to learn more about it.

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So stay subscribed and I'll cover it on the podcast.

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Coming soon, we have Canada and the UK pushing sweeping new surveillance laws,

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as well as some crazy stuff happening in the R for Arch Linux users.

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But before then, we have the sponsor of this episode, Easy Optouts.

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Now, Easy Optouts is what I still personally use for my data removal.

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If you've ever looked up your name, your address, or information about your friends or family online in a search engine or a people-searching website and you found invasive stuff about them, that's because of the data broker industry and these people-searching websites sharing data all without your consent and without really much control.

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Typically, taking control of it means going to all of these sites manually and opting out yourself.

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It is a pain in the butt.

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While it does work, it's something that's quite unsustainable as you can opt out today.

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But if your information keeps appearing, you have to keep doing it over and over.

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These data removal sites are great because they automate that process for you.

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But historically, they are a bit mixed on how well they work or they're too expensive.

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But Easy Opt Out solves all of those problems.

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It's literally $20 a year.

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That's right, a year, not a month, a year.

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They've also been verified by Consumer Reports to be tied for the most effective data removal

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service alongside Optory.

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When people ask me for a tool to remove their information from the sites, Easy Opt Outs is pretty much always what I recommend.

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So that is my genuine recommendation.

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Check them out down in the description.

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Thank you, Easy Opt Outs, for sponsoring the podcast.

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And now let's get into the juicy stuff.

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This is a very, very lightweight update from the EFF, but Canada has put forward this surveillance bill called BC-22.

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It has a lot of concerns.

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It pushes for requirements for metadata retention.

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It expands information sharing with foreign governments.

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It establishes a mechanism that allows them to demand that companies create backdoors, effectively breaking encryption.

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The downstream consequences of this are pretty crazy.

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It's rare to actually get lots of people to agree on something.

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We have Citizen Lab.

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We have the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

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We have the EFF.

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We literally have Signal and big tech companies like Apple and Google and VPN providers who all oppose this bill.

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This is like everybody coming together and going, this is actually just a bad idea, period.

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We don't want to do this.

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It is awful.

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Now, this is just a very quick update that's saying that they are still moving on with this.

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It hasn't passed yet, but they are still considering it.

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They're still forging ahead with the concept without any kind of serious debate.

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If you are in Canada, this is something to really follow and make sure you're contacting

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your representatives, not just for yourself, but also because every domino that falls in

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this battle is really bad for the global situation.

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And we're going to talk about this as well, because the next story is literally the UK.

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Everybody's inspired from Australia's failed ban.

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You know, Australia came forward and said, we're going to ban social media from children.

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But the results have been catastrophic.

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Children are getting around it.

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They haven't actually demonstrated any kind of effectiveness and all at the cost of this

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weird kind of gatekeeping of the internet of who can access what information, all while

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ignoring the root issues of these exploitive companies at the root of all of it.

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But the UK looked at it and went, this sounds like a wonderful idea.

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Let's try it as well.

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It'll probably go a lot better for us.

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So, all right, I'll calm down a little bit here.

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So pretty much they plan to also ban social media for under 16s.

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I think this quote here is so fascinating from Starmer.

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It says, this is not something I do lightly, and I will not present it as cost-free,

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as if social media has brought no benefits to young people, because clearly that is wrong.

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But government is always about choices, and it's clear to me that a total ban is the right choice.

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I just, that last sentence really pisses me off because it's, the government is about choices,

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and it's clear to me that a total ban is the right choice.

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I would say that the right choice is allowing parents to decide whether or not they want

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their own children on these platforms.

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And I think that people should have the choice to be able to use a social media platform that

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doesn't exploit them.

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What these governments are doing right now is saying your choice is either we ban these

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platforms and require age verification across the whole internet, which is its own privacy

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nightmare for both children and adults.

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And then we just have people access the platforms anyway or go to even worse platforms that aren't going to regulate whatsoever.

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Or the other alternative is let's actually hold these freaking companies accountable and make them safer spaces so that kids can actually go there.

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00:13:25,060 --> 00:13:30,980
Social media, as little as I like to use it, is ultimately a very important part of socialization and the Internet today.

220
00:13:31,220 --> 00:13:32,400
It's how humans connect.

221
00:13:33,040 --> 00:13:36,320
I don't like it, but I think it is kind of how the world works right now.

222
00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:38,220
I'm not going to try to get around that.

223
00:13:38,800 --> 00:13:42,900
And I think that this is kind of the equivalent of saying, oh my God, the parks are dangerous.

224
00:13:43,090 --> 00:13:46,960
So let's just ban the kids from going to parks altogether and have them just stay at home.

225
00:13:47,480 --> 00:13:53,180
It's like, no, why don't you actually go to the freaking parks, make them safer, and that way kids can go to the parks.

226
00:13:53,560 --> 00:13:55,320
I think that it's not the same.

227
00:13:55,940 --> 00:13:57,040
Parks are public property.

228
00:13:57,220 --> 00:13:58,320
Social media companies are private.

229
00:13:58,430 --> 00:13:58,840
I know.

230
00:13:58,910 --> 00:14:06,620
But I think this overall concept of we need to ban kids from this technology that actually can be completely mundane, safe technology.

231
00:14:06,960 --> 00:14:10,440
I think that's what I'm hung up on is that there's absolutely nothing that's inherently

232
00:14:10,700 --> 00:14:12,880
actually bad about, you know, sharing videos.

233
00:14:13,220 --> 00:14:17,480
If you went to Techlore.tv, our Peertube server, which we host, there is nothing there that's

234
00:14:17,740 --> 00:14:20,360
exploitive, you know, that's, you can access it via RSS.

235
00:14:20,420 --> 00:14:21,800
It doesn't require an account.

236
00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:23,060
It's open source.

237
00:14:23,140 --> 00:14:24,120
We self-host it.

238
00:14:24,200 --> 00:14:28,000
There's no weird advertising surveillance economy industry behind it.

239
00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:32,740
Like sharing videos and publishing videos has nothing that's inherently bad about it.

240
00:14:32,740 --> 00:14:34,080
And it's the same thing with social media.

241
00:14:34,260 --> 00:14:39,560
There's nothing inherently bad about just sharing something that happened about your day with other people who want to hear about it.

242
00:14:39,830 --> 00:14:48,500
The problem is these companies at the root of all of it are doing everything possible to exploit children and adults as much as they can because that's what they're incentivized to do.

243
00:14:48,810 --> 00:14:52,860
Through algorithms, through data collection, through surveillance stuff, that is what they're incentivized to do.

244
00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:58,360
They should be going to these companies directly, making them behave because they're the one causing problems, not children,

245
00:14:58,920 --> 00:15:01,680
and make them actually create safe environments for children,

246
00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:03,540
and hold them liable,

247
00:15:03,820 --> 00:15:05,180
and have a freaking backbone,

248
00:15:05,740 --> 00:15:08,480
so that when children inevitably access these platforms anyway,

249
00:15:08,580 --> 00:15:10,120
they're actually using a safe platform.

250
00:15:10,660 --> 00:15:11,640
That is a lot to say about it.

251
00:15:11,820 --> 00:15:12,480
This pisses me off.

252
00:15:12,680 --> 00:15:13,900
Check out the show notes to learn more.

253
00:15:14,320 --> 00:15:17,700
And the third article is kind of just a little bit more information

254
00:15:18,060 --> 00:15:19,560
about what this actually looks like,

255
00:15:19,560 --> 00:15:21,740
and how they're going to require ID or face scans

256
00:15:22,220 --> 00:15:23,700
before you can access social media accounts

257
00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:25,380
as a result of all of this nonsense.

258
00:15:25,680 --> 00:15:26,680
It makes me so mad.

259
00:15:26,820 --> 00:15:29,460
I will 100% be keeping you guys all updated on this.

260
00:15:29,680 --> 00:15:31,280
So make sure to stay subscribed to the podcast.

261
00:15:31,880 --> 00:15:33,020
There will be updates on this.

262
00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:36,120
So it's only a matter of time before we learn more.

263
00:15:36,340 --> 00:15:37,220
And if you're in the UK,

264
00:15:37,680 --> 00:15:39,420
please demonstrate your disapproval with this

265
00:15:39,820 --> 00:15:41,580
and why you don't think it's a good idea.

266
00:15:42,040 --> 00:15:43,640
You guys, we need to speak up for this.

267
00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:44,580
This is a global fight.

268
00:15:50,440 --> 00:15:51,760
Pretty soon we have the defense bulletin

269
00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:52,440
with a lot of stories.

270
00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:54,220
But right before then,

271
00:15:54,220 --> 00:15:55,920
I have a quick one about Arch Linux.

272
00:15:56,280 --> 00:15:57,900
So Arch Linux is a Linux distribution.

273
00:15:58,320 --> 00:16:00,820
If any of you use Arch, by the way, you know, by the way.

274
00:16:01,440 --> 00:16:06,600
Now, there is one of the most powerful things about Arch, which is the R, the A-U-R.

275
00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:08,940
And it's a user-contributed repository.

276
00:16:09,460 --> 00:16:12,200
It's like the Apple App Store, but completely open.

277
00:16:12,360 --> 00:16:14,940
And it lets anybody kind of publish whatever the hell they want.

278
00:16:15,080 --> 00:16:16,740
Now, it's not that lawless.

279
00:16:16,900 --> 00:16:19,320
They do kind of go in and make sure that nothing's wrong.

280
00:16:19,520 --> 00:16:24,100
They thought it was actually 400 packages that were compromised with malware in the R,

281
00:16:24,400 --> 00:16:27,280
but it ended up being more than 1,500 packages.

282
00:16:27,620 --> 00:16:29,760
Now, that's what happened on June 12th,

283
00:16:29,960 --> 00:16:31,140
but on June 14th,

284
00:16:31,200 --> 00:16:34,620
there was literally another sophisticated malware attack,

285
00:16:34,800 --> 00:16:37,560
just as meant to be more obfuscated than the original one.

286
00:16:37,740 --> 00:16:39,480
Guys, this honestly freaks me out,

287
00:16:39,620 --> 00:16:40,600
and it should freak you out.

288
00:16:40,720 --> 00:16:43,480
I think that anybody who is using Arch or the R

289
00:16:43,660 --> 00:16:45,040
and glosses over this

290
00:16:45,260 --> 00:16:47,920
doesn't really appreciate the real risks they're taking

291
00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:49,380
when you're downloading this.

292
00:16:49,660 --> 00:16:51,679
It is very clear at this point in time

293
00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:55,180
that as amazing as the Arch and the R maintainers are,

294
00:16:55,740 --> 00:16:57,240
this is a genuine problem.

295
00:16:57,620 --> 00:17:00,640
This isn't inherently even an issue with R or Arch,

296
00:17:01,220 --> 00:17:01,840
you know, specifically.

297
00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:03,360
This could happen with a lot of different things,

298
00:17:03,520 --> 00:17:04,660
but this is the trade-off

299
00:17:05,079 --> 00:17:07,660
when you don't have a well-resourced gatekeeper

300
00:17:07,819 --> 00:17:09,880
that's in your court that cares about the fact

301
00:17:10,060 --> 00:17:12,120
that you're not going to have malware on your device.

302
00:17:12,439 --> 00:17:13,740
And I think that's where, you know,

303
00:17:14,060 --> 00:17:15,880
options like FDroid on the Android side of things

304
00:17:15,900 --> 00:17:17,860
are actually a really good middle ground, right?

305
00:17:18,260 --> 00:17:19,660
Like FDroid is on your team,

306
00:17:19,959 --> 00:17:21,699
But they also are in some ways a gatekeeper.

307
00:17:21,920 --> 00:17:24,800
They verify every app actually does what it's supposed to do.

308
00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:25,819
They verify it's open source.

309
00:17:25,980 --> 00:17:29,080
They verify there's no weird stuff happening and contacting weird domains.

310
00:17:29,640 --> 00:17:33,720
And ideally, part of that, they're able to flag if there's anything crazy suspicious inside of the application.

311
00:17:34,060 --> 00:17:40,660
If it was me and I was using the R, I would seriously be reconsidering using something that's strictly community-based.

312
00:17:40,740 --> 00:17:45,820
And I would try to look for ways to get more of my software from the official developer as much as I can.

313
00:17:46,080 --> 00:17:47,880
But that's always the way I've felt about it.

314
00:17:48,020 --> 00:17:50,800
And I think that's something that more people should think about when they're thinking about

315
00:17:51,230 --> 00:17:52,500
where they're getting their software from.

316
00:17:52,710 --> 00:17:56,060
If you do use the R for anything out there, please look into this to see what the packages

317
00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:56,360
were.

318
00:17:56,390 --> 00:17:57,760
Make sure you didn't install them.

319
00:17:58,010 --> 00:18:01,780
And a lot of these resources in the show notes will actually tell you what to do if you did

320
00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:03,920
install that infected software.

321
00:18:04,100 --> 00:18:06,540
But please, don't just latch on to the R.

322
00:18:06,860 --> 00:18:11,700
This is something that you need to think about when it comes to any kind of community crowdsourced

323
00:18:12,720 --> 00:18:13,440
software installation.

324
00:18:13,830 --> 00:18:16,920
You always need to trust the other person on the other side.

325
00:18:17,220 --> 00:18:27,980
It's the same reason I say I don't consider the Flatpak an actual way to use Signal on desktop for Linux, because I'm not going to trust some random community maintainer to be pushing out the next update for Signal for me.

326
00:18:28,300 --> 00:18:32,040
It's the same philosophy, same concern, just different way of expressing itself.

327
00:18:32,420 --> 00:18:34,020
So just think about software installation.

328
00:18:34,360 --> 00:18:35,320
It's a really important thing.

329
00:18:40,940 --> 00:18:47,120
All right, and now we're going to get into the Defense Bulletin, starting with our first subsection, the data breaches.

330
00:18:47,560 --> 00:18:54,380
So we have the first data breach, which is that the Texas government allowed hackers to steal 3 million driver's licenses and passports.

331
00:18:54,580 --> 00:19:01,860
So if you are in Texas, make sure to look into this to see if you were in any way impacted and what the kind of mitigations are in the show notes.

332
00:19:02,190 --> 00:19:03,200
We also have LastPass.

333
00:19:03,610 --> 00:19:06,720
Fortunately, nowhere near as crazy as their last data breach in 2022.

334
00:19:07,580 --> 00:19:10,480
But they did confirm a new data breach in a Clue supply chain attack.

335
00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:12,520
Now, there's good and bad news here.

336
00:19:12,560 --> 00:19:24,680
The good news is that there is no kind of password vault kind of data breach here, but it did leak a lot of customer names, phone numbers, email addresses, physical addresses, and support case information.

337
00:19:25,160 --> 00:19:28,320
And I think the real concern here is downstream impacts of that.

338
00:19:28,320 --> 00:19:35,020
So now those people can be phished, so they can get emails pretending to be last pass to access their vault, social engineering attacks.

339
00:19:35,460 --> 00:19:40,440
And hey, one of these names and phone numbers could be for somebody who is really well-known,

340
00:19:40,500 --> 00:19:43,180
a public figure, and then you have their phone number attached to them.

341
00:19:43,360 --> 00:19:47,220
Please proceed with caution if you are still in any way for whatever reason considering

342
00:19:47,440 --> 00:19:47,860
LastPass.

343
00:19:48,380 --> 00:19:50,320
Their history at this point is not the strongest.

344
00:19:50,560 --> 00:19:55,480
And I'm also going to include the actual hack of the clue side of things in the show notes

345
00:19:55,660 --> 00:20:01,380
as well, so you can actually see how that upstream hack worked and who else they targeted and

346
00:20:01,960 --> 00:20:03,060
everything related to that.

347
00:20:03,180 --> 00:20:06,440
So check that out in the show notes if you want to learn more about the supply chain aspect of things.

348
00:20:06,960 --> 00:20:09,360
And then we also had iRhythm that's disclosed a data breach.

349
00:20:09,800 --> 00:20:11,020
It's a cardiac monitoring service.

350
00:20:11,110 --> 00:20:15,940
It's been used to analyze like it says 2 billion hours of curated heartbeat data from 12 million patients.

351
00:20:16,210 --> 00:20:17,900
So check this out if you want to learn more.

352
00:20:18,150 --> 00:20:22,900
We also had Kodak that's confirmed a data breach claimed by Shiny Hunter's extortion gang.

353
00:20:23,180 --> 00:20:25,860
They said they only accessed limited amount of data in the incident.

354
00:20:25,990 --> 00:20:29,480
And so if you want to learn more and you're a customer of Kodak, definitely check that one out.

355
00:20:29,880 --> 00:20:33,040
We also had 404 that did some coverage over Madison Square Garden.

356
00:20:33,460 --> 00:20:35,040
who apparently had a data breach.

357
00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:36,000
Based on what I can see,

358
00:20:36,100 --> 00:20:37,780
this is less of a customer data breach

359
00:20:37,900 --> 00:20:39,720
and more of like the business data breach

360
00:20:39,860 --> 00:20:41,660
and their kind of internal secrets.

361
00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:43,100
So I don't think this is going to impact

362
00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:44,000
many of you out there,

363
00:20:44,100 --> 00:20:46,360
but I still wanted to flag it as a story.

364
00:20:46,740 --> 00:20:48,280
And this one was, I think,

365
00:20:48,420 --> 00:20:49,920
one of my favorite stories, actually.

366
00:20:50,300 --> 00:20:51,660
This is a whole blog post

367
00:20:51,780 --> 00:20:53,460
that I highly recommend you all read.

368
00:20:53,740 --> 00:20:55,080
This is one of those just like,

369
00:20:55,380 --> 00:20:56,900
if it was the old surveillance report,

370
00:20:57,020 --> 00:20:57,900
this would have been a misfit.

371
00:20:58,280 --> 00:20:59,320
It was just crazy.

372
00:20:59,720 --> 00:21:01,039
Pretty much this guy accessed

373
00:21:01,060 --> 00:21:05,620
literally everything inside of FIFA's World Cup portal.

374
00:21:05,960 --> 00:21:08,300
So they could see all the streams going on.

375
00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:10,400
They could literally do their own stream.

376
00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:12,300
They could have played whatever they wanted

377
00:21:12,400 --> 00:21:14,140
that would have ended up on live television.

378
00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:16,920
They got in and it was super easy to get in

379
00:21:17,160 --> 00:21:18,580
and they fixed it very secretly

380
00:21:18,900 --> 00:21:20,640
after they contacted them over the problem.

381
00:21:20,940 --> 00:21:23,840
But they documented everything in a wonderful blog post.

382
00:21:24,200 --> 00:21:25,340
They could have stopped the streams.

383
00:21:25,780 --> 00:21:27,040
It is so crazy.

384
00:21:27,080 --> 00:21:28,840
It also has all the stats, analytics.

385
00:21:29,760 --> 00:21:33,820
Guys, if you're watching the video, you can see all the stuff this person was able to access.

386
00:21:34,000 --> 00:21:36,280
It's like all the internal workings of the World Cup.

387
00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:38,260
So check it out to learn more.

388
00:21:38,350 --> 00:21:40,320
This is a really entertaining one to read.

389
00:21:40,410 --> 00:21:41,780
I think it's a really shareable one too.

390
00:21:41,920 --> 00:21:43,240
All right, now we're going to go into the threat section.

391
00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:47,180
This is essentially just things you should know that could impact your safety.

392
00:21:47,580 --> 00:21:52,240
So the first thing is that there was a 40 sandbox flaw that's now being exploited and attacks.

393
00:21:52,390 --> 00:21:53,600
This has to do with Fortinet.

394
00:21:53,810 --> 00:21:56,400
And so if you're using Fortinet, that's something that you should look into.

395
00:21:56,980 --> 00:22:02,080
And then up next, we also have some WordPress plugin attacks, which are also a weekly occurrence

396
00:22:02,170 --> 00:22:02,660
at this point.

397
00:22:02,730 --> 00:22:04,460
And this one is Gravity SMTP.

398
00:22:05,120 --> 00:22:06,400
It's a flaw that impacts it.

399
00:22:06,870 --> 00:22:08,360
And it's been addressed in the newest version.

400
00:22:08,410 --> 00:22:09,660
So make sure you update that.

401
00:22:09,880 --> 00:22:13,260
Don't worry, though, because there was another one called Shared Plugin, which is actually

402
00:22:13,380 --> 00:22:14,460
a supply chain attack.

403
00:22:14,530 --> 00:22:18,940
So if you updated to the newest version of Shaped Plugin, it also affected other plugins

404
00:22:19,280 --> 00:22:24,040
like Product Slider Pro, WooCommerce, Real Testimonials, and Smart Post Show Pro.

405
00:22:24,840 --> 00:22:28,580
God, every week we're covering so much of these WordPress plugin attacks.

406
00:22:28,730 --> 00:22:31,500
And so if you use WordPress, I hope you're keeping up with this podcast.

407
00:22:31,780 --> 00:22:35,600
Now, next up, we have Microsoft working on the Defender patch for Rogue Planet Zero Day.

408
00:22:36,080 --> 00:22:37,720
This was also from Nightmare Clips.

409
00:22:37,820 --> 00:22:42,400
We've been covering Nightmare Clips also on a weekly basis, but they are apparently working on this.

410
00:22:42,550 --> 00:22:46,460
This was a vulnerability disclosed last week, and apparently they're working on a fix, which should come out soon.

411
00:22:46,680 --> 00:22:51,160
This is a really important one to flag for you, your friends, your family, anybody who it could impact.

412
00:22:51,340 --> 00:22:55,060
For Windows and Linux users, the deadline to update secure boot keys is coming.

413
00:22:55,520 --> 00:22:59,860
This is for June 24th, which is, I guess, probably about the time you're all listening to this.

414
00:23:00,060 --> 00:23:05,560
Three certificates that cryptographically verify that each piece of firmware and software that loads during system boot are going to expire.

415
00:23:05,980 --> 00:23:11,800
Machines that fail to update these keys will continue to function, but they no longer are protected against new threats.

416
00:23:12,080 --> 00:23:13,720
You can check the status on Windows machines.

417
00:23:13,980 --> 00:23:16,980
You can open Windows security settings, device security, and secure boot.

418
00:23:17,060 --> 00:23:19,240
And a green checkmark means the update has been completed.

419
00:23:19,760 --> 00:23:23,660
Most Windows machines automatically update the keys during regular monthly patch distributions,

420
00:23:24,220 --> 00:23:26,020
but older machines may require manual attention.

421
00:23:26,500 --> 00:23:29,060
Linux users have to watch for release of the new shims.

422
00:23:29,440 --> 00:23:31,660
Microsoft recommends people stay current with all firmware updates.

423
00:23:31,780 --> 00:23:35,660
So this is mostly something that impacts people if they're not keeping their systems up to date.

424
00:23:35,780 --> 00:23:37,020
Check out the show notes to learn more.

425
00:23:37,120 --> 00:23:41,940
And we also have a critical co-pilot vulnerability that allowed hackers to steal 2FA code from users.

426
00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:45,360
This is one of countless issues with co-pilot over the years.

427
00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:46,820
So this is just the newest one.

428
00:23:46,920 --> 00:23:49,180
If you want to learn more, we don't have a huge amount of time today,

429
00:23:49,400 --> 00:23:52,740
But that is something that you should check out, especially if you're using Copilot.

430
00:23:52,840 --> 00:23:53,800
This is a must read.

431
00:23:54,260 --> 00:23:56,060
Otherwise, I'm sure most of you aren't using it.

432
00:23:56,320 --> 00:24:01,440
Apple has fixed a Beat Studio Buds flaw that let hackers spy on conversations using it.

433
00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:04,840
This is already patched, and it apparently is automatically delivered to vulnerable headphones

434
00:24:05,400 --> 00:24:08,380
when they are paired and within Bluetooth range of your iPhone, iPad, or Mac.

435
00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:11,400
So that should be taken care of, and you can definitely learn more in the show notes.

436
00:24:11,580 --> 00:24:16,700
This is also a very quick flag, but apparently last week AMD, the chip company, was going

437
00:24:16,700 --> 00:24:22,900
to strip some protections when it came to encryption on their chips against physical attacks. It's known

438
00:24:22,910 --> 00:24:28,060
as TSME. There was a lot of backlash, and so they have now reinstated memory encryption in consumer

439
00:24:28,260 --> 00:24:33,400
CPUs. Check out the show notes to learn more. Overall, it seems like it's been handled, but

440
00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:37,060
it's weird that it had to get that far. All right, now we're going to get into the open source

441
00:24:37,400 --> 00:24:44,559
section. FOSS Plus. I think genuinely everything this week is open source, I believe. So we have

442
00:24:44,540 --> 00:24:50,660
Tor Browser 15.0.16. This is pretty much just some security updates. I don't see anything that is

443
00:24:50,860 --> 00:24:54,240
like a massive update here. But if you do use Tor Browser, make sure you're running the latest

444
00:24:54,700 --> 00:24:59,420
version. We also have Mozilla that launched Firefox 152 with the revamped settings, JPEG,

445
00:24:59,610 --> 00:25:04,620
Excel support, and easier tab muting. Overall, very welcome changes. I've seen the UI overhaul,

446
00:25:04,650 --> 00:25:07,840
and I think it looks pretty good. Now, they've also introduced something called the Firefox

447
00:25:08,220 --> 00:25:12,419
Roadmap, which is actually really cool. If you're watching the video, they actually detail what

448
00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:16,900
they're working on for the future, which I think is really nice. It's transparent and people can

449
00:25:17,050 --> 00:25:20,620
follow along to see what features they really want to see or if they're going to come to fruition.

450
00:25:21,220 --> 00:25:25,920
So things like tab groups on mobile, PDF editor improvements, VPN on mobile, private window

451
00:25:26,130 --> 00:25:31,480
update, containers, ad blocking, AI done differently. Like they pretty much detail all the things they're

452
00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:35,540
doing and what they're going to be working on. I think it's a good move. So that's really awesome

453
00:25:35,680 --> 00:25:40,119
to see. We also have Tails 7.9, which everybody should update as well, especially if you're using

454
00:25:40,140 --> 00:25:44,420
Tails, you will always be on the latest version. And it also includes that earlier Tor browser

455
00:25:44,670 --> 00:25:47,700
update, which includes its own security improvements. Graphene, the Android ROM,

456
00:25:47,750 --> 00:25:52,260
has said they have fully ported to Android 17. The article says it's going to be available soon.

457
00:25:52,460 --> 00:25:58,780
It includes the Pixel 6a, 7, 7, 8, 8, 10a, and 10 Pro Fold. We also have another mobile OS,

458
00:25:59,130 --> 00:26:04,700
post-market OS, which is version 26.06, launching with GNOME 50, KDE Plasma 6.6,

459
00:26:05,320 --> 00:26:09,200
Foch.55 and improved booting.

460
00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:10,900
And there's lots of other changes as well

461
00:26:10,900 --> 00:26:12,940
if you use post-market OS and you want to learn more.

462
00:26:13,360 --> 00:26:16,100
Now, KDE Plasma 6.7, the desktop environment,

463
00:26:16,180 --> 00:26:19,120
has also released and it adds per-screen virtual desktops,

464
00:26:19,220 --> 00:26:21,240
union theming system, and Wayland updates.

465
00:26:21,420 --> 00:26:23,320
So definitely check it out if you want to learn more.

466
00:26:23,740 --> 00:26:26,020
And then Alt Store POW is now available in Brazil

467
00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:28,500
as Apple enables alternative app marketplaces.

468
00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:31,700
So now you're going to get access to the same third-party app store

469
00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:33,220
as Europeans have had access to.

470
00:26:33,380 --> 00:26:35,920
So congrats to Brazil for following along.

471
00:26:36,050 --> 00:26:38,880
And hopefully we can see more countries embrace third-party app stores.

472
00:26:38,950 --> 00:26:41,660
And we can see Alt Store Pal end up on those as well.

473
00:26:42,180 --> 00:26:44,520
The last news for the week is Proton,

474
00:26:44,640 --> 00:26:48,280
who's released an easy switch for business to help companies move away from Google.

475
00:26:48,720 --> 00:26:49,920
It's exactly what it sounds like.

476
00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:51,860
They just released a similar feature for individuals.

477
00:26:52,130 --> 00:26:55,920
And so it's just an easier way if you have a small business to migrate to Proton.

478
00:26:56,100 --> 00:26:59,800
All right, everybody, that is going to conclude this week's Techlore Surveillance Report.

479
00:27:00,140 --> 00:27:02,280
If this analysis helped you reclaim control,

480
00:27:02,480 --> 00:27:05,280
you can become a Techlorian by visiting the link in the show notes.

481
00:27:05,400 --> 00:27:08,380
That's how you gain access to our exclusive community on Signal.

482
00:27:08,690 --> 00:27:11,140
You also get other fun perks like my private RSS feed,

483
00:27:11,170 --> 00:27:13,520
which I update throughout the week, even while I'm traveling.

484
00:27:13,720 --> 00:27:16,140
If you are in the RSS feed, you probably saw those updates.

485
00:27:16,500 --> 00:27:19,300
So you do get all of the things that I'm tracking throughout the week.

486
00:27:19,530 --> 00:27:22,320
So you don't have to wait for every episode to see what's going on in the world.

487
00:27:22,370 --> 00:27:25,240
And you just track one RSS feed to keep it simple for you.

488
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:27,220
If you don't want to help the podcast grow that way,

489
00:27:27,220 --> 00:27:29,040
you can still help it grow by just leaving a rating.

490
00:27:29,110 --> 00:27:31,720
You can share the episode with people you know, leave a comment,

491
00:27:32,020 --> 00:27:36,980
engage how you can, whether it's Spotify, YouTube, wherever. Just help out however you feel is

492
00:27:37,340 --> 00:27:40,860
helpful. Otherwise, thank you all for listening and I'll see you in the next episode of Surveillance

493
00:27:41,020 --> 00:27:44,500
Support. It's always a pleasure to be here and it's good to be back and I'll see you all next week.