Welcome to The Boardroom Path, the essential podcast for aspiring and newly appointed Non-Executive Directors navigating the journey from executive leadership to the boardroom. Hosted by Ralph Grayson, partner at Sainty Hird & Partners, each episode offers insightful conversations with industry leaders, seasoned board directors, and governance experts. Our guests share practical strategies, valuable perspectives, and actionable advice on how to effectively transition into board roles, maximise your impact, and build a rewarding NED career.
Duncan Mavin: My sort of rule of thumb is once about five people know a secret, it's no longer a secret.
Kate Brader: There is no scenario in which something remains uncovered forever. Things will come out in the wash some way.
Ralph Grayson: Welcome to The Boardroom Path by Sainty Hird & Partners. I'm your host, Ralph Grayson, a partner in the board practice. In this series, we'll offer practical steps and useful perspectives for aspiring and newly appointed NEDs. Today, we're examining one of the most demanding tests of board leadership. What happens when an organisation's decisions, culture, and conduct come under intense public, regulatory, or political scrutiny?
I'm joined today by Duncan Mavin and Kate Brader of FTI Consulting. Duncan is an internationally recognised investigative journalist, author, and former chartered accountant. His books, The Pyramid of Lies and Meltdown, examine the failures surrounding Greensill Capital and Credit Suisse. Before joining FTI Consulting, Duncan worked with Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, having spent much of his career interrogating corporate narratives from the outside, he now advises organisations facing complex, high-stakes situations as a managing director in FTI's crisis and litigation communications team.
Kate is a senior managing director and leads FTI Consulting's UK crisis communications practice. She has extensive experience advising organisations through major incidents, including cyber attacks, discrimination cases, environmental activism, and health and safety failures. Kate is a strong and noted advocate of principles-based resilience, ensuring that organisations establish how they will make decisions before pressure, uncertainty, and competing stakeholder demands test them.
Together, Duncan and Kate offer two sides of the same boardroom challenge, how uncomfortable truths are discovered and how organisations respond when those truths can no longer be contained.
Duncan, Kate, welcome to The Boardroom Path.
Duncan, you began your career as a chartered accountant before becoming an investigative journalist. So how has that combination shaped the way you think about companies, executives, and their boards?
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, well, thanks, Ralph. In a purely practical sense, what it meant was that I had a career to fall back on if the journalism didn't work out. But what it also meant was I understood the lingo of finance and banking and companies and that's something that otherwise as a journalist you have to get used to and it can be impenetrable. So I understood what a balance sheet was. I understood what the profit and loss account was. But I also just understood how to talk to senior executives and board members and that was incredibly useful. I found that in fact, in one case, I went from working within a bank and sort of struggling to speak to the top guys at that bank as a sort of middle manager to within about six months of being a journalist and suddenly I was invited in to speak to the CFO whenever I wanted.
Having a bit of background as a journalist meant that I could talk to these people on their terms.
Ralph Grayson: Turn that on its head. How should a board member think about how to interact with a journalist?
Duncan Mavin: Well, I think the way you have to think about it is that this is a person who's a generalist. They don't necessarily have the specific knowledge that you have, you know, they have worked really hard at their beat, and so they attained a certain level of knowledge. And so you're not going to catch them out, but they're looking for language that will help them write a story for people who don't necessarily sit on the inside.
Ralph Grayson: And so now having sat on both sides of the fence, so to speak, I'm intrigued as to what made you decide to move into advising them rather than critiquing them?
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, I think it was a sort of, for me, it felt like a logical conclusion of everything I'd done. So having worked in finance and in accounting for about 10 years, and then being a journalist for 20-odd years at some of the best publications in the world, it felt like there was a sort of natural transition into putting those two things together and trying to be the most useful person I could be.
Ralph Grayson: So your critiques of Greensill and Credit Suisse, The Pyramid of Lies, Meltdown, read both books, loved them. What were the failures you uncovered? And why are they primarily failures of business models, culture, or most importantly, governance and leadership?
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, this is going to be unsatisfactory, but the answer is all of the above. I don't know whether you'd agree with me, but those things all go together really. Culture is a tone at the top kind of issue and so leadership therefore is also part of it. Business models are determined by the people at the top of organisations. So I think in both those cases, that's a sort of blend of a whole bunch of different things and I think probably the reality is that companies only really collapse when you get a whole sort of confluence of events that spark something really unusual. I think certainly though it would be true to say that leadership is critical in both those cases.
Greensill, it has the guy's name on the outside of the company. It's pretty hard to split what goes wrong there from the guy at the top of the organisation and I think it's a failure not only of his leadership but also the other leaders in the organisation to challenge that. Similarly at Credit Suisse, I think what you get is a series of CEOs who fail to grasp that they have a business model that doesn't really work, and then you have a board that essentially is switched off really at times.
Ralph Grayson: Let's drill into that a bit more. So there's a great book around governance called The Fish Rots from the Head, and we talk generally about boards setting the tone from the top. So in both of those cases, was that a failure of the tone at the top or did it start in the middle at the bottom? What was the catalyst?
Duncan Mavin: Greensill is a special case because a founder-led business, it grows really fast, and I think that what you get there is a business model that essentially doesn't work and a founder who is dead set on getting to an IPO and therefore unwilling to tolerate the fact that things don't go well all the time. And he just wants it to go on a certain trajectory the whole way and what that leads him to do is want to cover up when things go wrong and I think that's like a real kind of original sin in business is when things go wrong, when people don't want to admit it, often they go worse. And the challenge then is, if that's the nature of the guy at the top of the business, is anybody going to speak up? Is anybody going to say, "Hang on a minute, we need to do this differently." And in the case of Greensill, for the most part, nobody does. One or two do, and they end up kicked to the kerb pretty quickly.
At Credit Suisse, obviously you're talking about a different organisation altogether. This is 160-year-old business, been around forever, you know, sort of quasi-governmental, it's so big and sort of unwieldy. But what you get there is you have sort of problems with the business model that the senior leaders fail to grasp. It is rotting from the top, but it's also rotting from the middle. So the fish is dying in your metaphor in every way at once and I think what happens really there is it becomes self-fulfilling, really. The more you run into problems, the more the culture seeks out people who are also going to be problematic. And it just becomes a sort of snowball effect. You can't get away from it.
It's just going to get worse and worse.
Ralph Grayson: Just picking up on that. Two very different businesses, but similar outcomes. So at what point should the boards have recognised that a series of isolated incidents were actually much more systemic?
Duncan Mavin: Again, you know, just to sort of split them out a little bit, I think the problem at Greensill, one of the problems certainly is a real genuine lack of diversity in the board. So you have a bunch of people who've all done the same things with their lives. They all kind of know each other and they've all bought into the idea that this founder is a visionary who's going to change finance forever. And so nobody's willing to challenge him at any stage. At Credit Suisse, I think you sort of have many opportunities to fix things. But ultimately, again, I think it's a sort of passive board that can't envisage a time when Credit Suisse doesn't exist. There's a tendency to think that each one of these, as you said, is a one-off event because of course it's impossible. It's a Black Swan in their minds, but of course, like the true Black Swan it exists. I think what you get there definitely is a sort of passive approach to problems. That means they just kind of escalate.
Ralph Grayson: You and I have known Credit Suisse for a very long time, from very different perspectives. But what strikes me about Credit Suisse is when wasn't there a crisis and when wasn't there a scandal? And I just wonder whether the board just became complacent? I mean, you talked about Black Swans there being a rare event outside the bell curve, but these things just seem to be perpetual motion at Credit Suisse.
Do you think that made the board more complacent or did it just become immune to risk?
Duncan Mavin: I think you're getting at a really good point, Ralph. I think there is a kind of psychology that happens where if you survive a problem you think, "Well, okay, we'll survive the next one too." And certainly that was true at Greensill on a sort of extreme scale. So at Greensill, what you find is that every time the company gets into a scrape and Lex Greensill saves the company, there's a sense within the company that, wow, this guy really is a visionary, he really is special.
And I think you get a little bit of that as well at Credit Suisse, where you sort of reinforce the idea that it doesn't matter what sort of hit this company takes, it's always going to survive. It's the fact that it's this monolithic enormous heritage bank that is essentially too big to fail.
Ralph Grayson: And this implied cult of personality that you're alluding to, both those organisations had. How does a board, or how should those boards have prevented themselves from being seduced by the CEOs or the founder's version of reality?
Duncan Mavin: In my view, that's what the board's paid to do, right? So their job is to be a bit sceptical obviously to support the organisation, but supporting the organisation sometimes means challenging it, challenging the executives and not assuming that everything they're being told is exactly the way it should be. In both those cases, what you see is a board that isn't really up for the challenge and is more than happy to hear that everything's running smoothly.
Ralph Grayson: And having critiqued both of those so carefully how could a board member have tested whether bad news was being filtered to them in a certain way that masked the reality of the situation? And what are the lessons that a board member should take from those events?
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, I mean, I've said it previously to people, I think listening to journalists actually is often a good way to do it. You know, I don't think journalists are out to get companies for the most part. So if a journalist comes to you and says, "I think there's a problem with your company," then it's probably worth listening rather than just dismissing it.
Too often, I think, in both the cases when I was writing about those organisations, my questions to people in positions where they could influence things were just taken straight to the source of the problem and they were given the chance to sort of dismiss the questions.
But obviously there's more to it than just listening to journalists. I think, being sceptical, challenging, being the devil's advocate at times is probably what you're supposed to do as a board member.
Ralph Grayson: We'll come on in due course with Kate to talk about how an organisation can control that narrative. But how would you advise a board to interact with a journalist or a regulator? How do they frame their response of confidentiality and in particular, how do they think about how to deal with the executives whose knee-jerk reaction may be to defend themselves rather than defend the organisation?
Duncan Mavin: It's tough, right? But that's, again, what you're paid to do as a board member. A good board member should be able to talk to the senior executives, the CEO, and say, "Look, my job is not to defend you at all costs. My job is to defend the best interest of the company and shareholders and so I'm going to challenge you." Sometimes that means I'm going to be in contact with other outside parties, whether that's a journalist or a regulator or whoever it might be, because I want to hear from a wide range of views. You know, a good senior executive would be okay with that, right?
Ralph Grayson: And what lessons do we learn in so far as this was either a structural organogram weakness in the way corporate governance was structured, or did they just recruit the wrong people onto the boards?
Duncan Mavin: Well, I think it's a bit of both, right? So I think Greensill would probably have recruited the wrong people. The founder would've benefited from having people who challenge him, and maybe the organisation would still be around today if they had provided that sort of challenge. So at Credit Suisse, I think there was another thing going on, which is that because the organisation was so deeply troubled for so many years, I mean, we're talking decades, right? We go almost back to its very start. It's had problems, and certainly since kind of the Second World War, it's definitely had problems every decade or so. I think because of that, it then maybe meant that there was a certain sort of tendency among a group of board members to not offer the kind of challenge they should have done. And I think maybe you get a culture on boards, and probably Ralph, you know this better than I do, but I would guess that you get a culture that sets in even among the board members that says, "These are the sort of things we ask about, and these are the sort of things we don't." Ultimately that's not going to be good.
Ralph Grayson: So I'm going to turn to Kate now and start asking some practical questions and get hopefully practical responses as to how boards can avoid getting themselves into a Greensill or Credit Suisse situation. But maybe Kate, just to set the scene, do you want to just talk a little bit about FTI, your team's role, and maybe let's just start with how you entered this area of the game.
Kate Brader: Gosh, very boringly I started off working in straightforward PR, writing competitions and pieces for magazines and very, very dull promotional stuff and I got involved in a couple of cases where we had to plan for a really negative outcome on something, and it lit something in my brain alive. I managed to chase down a really small consultancy called Regester Larkin, really well known in the oil and gas industry. I hounded them until they gave me a job, and the rest is history.
It's seen me spend five years living and working in Houston, Texas. It's seen me travel all over the world to parts of Bolivia, Nigeria, China to work with assets and people on the ground. It's seen me sit in Swiss boardrooms and advise on high-profile incidents. So it's been a really, really interesting and exciting career that I'm grateful for.
Ralph Grayson: So just talk me through the terms of reference of a typical assignment or project you might get involved in.
Kate Brader: The team that we've built at FTI, and I'm thrilled to have Duncan as part of that, not as part of the opposition anymore, is a fantastic combination of crisis management. So helping to think through the structures, the processes for how you respond to something, and that really is about the people on the board, the people on the executive, and then about the communications that you need to make around a crisis as well.
If you haven't got the first part in place, you cannot hope to do the second part accurately at all. We then really mostly get involved in those live issues and incidents, so advising almost more often than not on situations where a company is some form of a polycrisis. So there are regulatory interests, there is something that's happening in the background, whether that's the cost of living crisis, the conflicts that we're seeing going on at the moment that are exacerbating their situation, there might be individual misconduct involved as part of this, and really those organisations are in quite a difficult spot.
And we're advising on everything from, one, what the board needs to do to structure itself, to approach and support those situations, two, the decisions the executives need to make, and then three, how the organisation as a whole is communicating about that. We take all of that hard-earned experience from sitting on those phone calls at 1:00 AM trying to convince boards why they need to make the right decision to do the right thing and we put it into preparedness work as well then.
So the plans, the exercises, the spokesperson training that helps to make people think about how to be ready for those things before they get to those difficult moments.
Ralph Grayson: So let's just stick with that preparing before the crisis, because I think most board members know there's going to be a crisis. It's just what you do when it happens and I've heard you talk about principles-based resilience planning. So let's just get into what resilience planning actually means and how it can be principles based.
Kate Brader: It's nothing more than ensuring that your approach to crisis planning is kept simple and high-level. You've just been talking about two cases that on the face of it seem pretty similar, but actually there are so many nuances, differences, challenges, context of those different organisations are completely different. There is no playbook, there is no crisis manual in the world that could have accounted for each of those situations.
So one principles-based approach means that you are giving yourself flexibility to approach any kind of situation. It means that you're properly thinking through not just turn off lever A, move to switch B, enter meeting room D, but you're thinking, what kind of an organisation do we want to be known as? Are we going to act truthfully and transparently? Which of our stakeholders are important to us? What do we want to be known for as a result of responding to something like this? And then really, it is about keeping it nice and short so that the most senior people in an organisation can have read and understood and bought into that particular approach.
I'll give you one example to bring it to life. We worked for a major global financial institution. They had an outage that affected all of their services across Europe for about six or seven hours, which doesn't seem huge in one way, but for financial services companies doing hundreds of thousands of transactions every hour, it was a big deal. When we did a post-incident review, looked into it, they were found to have 350 business continuity plans and seven staff that were servicing those business continuity plans and not one of them was invoked during that crisis response because it had become too detailed. It had become its own cottage industry, producing those plans, keeping them alive, but too in-depth and really very much an internal audit exercise that the most senior people in the organisation really actually didn't know anything about them or understand them.
Ralph Grayson: So should boards have this as a regular part of the board agenda? I mean, how often should they be formally thinking about this as part of their risk register? And how often should they be talking to FTI to say, "Okay, here's our scenario planning. What happens when? What happens if?"
Kate Brader: The risk register, I think, is a great link into it all. So if you are refreshing and updating your risk register, as you probably are once a year as part of anything that you're doing to around annual reports or other parts of your governance, that's probably then subsequently, the next moment is then to say, "Does our crisis framework fit our risk profile? Have we thought about what's new on there? Have we then adjusted our plans accordingly?" One of the jobs of governance is to ensure that you've got a framework in place for something and you've got the resources for that framework as well. So not just do we have the plan, but have our people trained against them? Have we thought really about how we'd go through these?
Cyber is the great example of that. The last four years of my career have been spent doing a lot of cybersecurity exercises for executives and boards so that they understand how they unfold, what they look like. So really probably once a year for that kind of interrogation of the framework and then taking some time, and it doesn't need to be all members of the board every single year, to rehearse with the rest of your organisation and step through what we would call an exercise or a simulation to have a bit of a go at what it is really like to be making decisions quite intensively for four or six hours.
Ralph Grayson: On a number of panels I've sat on that have talked about reputation within the boardroom that there does seem to be a bit of a paradox to me that everybody recognises it as a present and increasing threat, yet nobody really appears confident to me that they've got on top of the subject matter. Why do you think that is? What are you not getting over in terms of that importance to boards?
Kate Brader: I think people are scared of it because of its intangibility, because it is so hard to measure, and it takes an enormous amount of effort to change your reputation. And it is ethereal, it's very difficult to grasp, to get hold of, and I think as a result, a lot of people are quite wary and quite scared about reputation. Particularly in crisis scenarios, there is a concern about revealing too much, showing too much. So much of our work, 95% of our work is working alongside legal counsel. We absolutely understand that you have to apply the long lens to how you engage with people during a crisis, that you have to think about not saying the wrong thing now and the consequences and the causes two years down the line, but also sometimes the balance in all of that is that you are not thinking about the immediate impact on the reputation of the organisation right now.
So it's a scary thing. I think that that means people are hesitant to think about it. But genuinely, again, coming back to your point about how often you need to consider it. Taking that time once or twice a year to think, "If this situation happened to us, what do we want the tone of our communications to be?" is really important. There's some quite high-profile litigation going through the UK High Court at the moment. It's a class action being brought against Shell, Shell Nigeria in particular, and the tone of their communications has been quite interesting and certainly a lot of the boardrooms that I've been in over the last two weeks, energy and infrastructure businesses have been looking at that and thinking, would we play the same line or would we go with a different tone and approach? And that's a good exercise to do, not to be critical, but to just think, "Is this the right approach for us?"
Ralph Grayson: When the three of us last talked about this you impressed on me the importance of scenario planning and in fact rehearsals of boards and the executive team. And no doubt you've witnessed lots of these. So what have you learned about a board simply by watching people rehearse these scenarios?
Kate Brader: Boards are still struggling with what their role is within a crisis response, and I'm quite hardcore that the board really should be out of a response as much as possible. Yes, they should be involved in preparedness. They should know that a framework is there, that the resources should be there to fulfil it. But when it comes to an actual real-life response to something, and that includes the simulation as well, it should be really the chair that is being reported to as those situations are unfolding and then just as their normal governance job should be, that chairperson should be responsible for sharing information across the board and ensuring the rest of them are kept up to date.
The reason for that is twofold. It's number one, so that you're not putting an enormous amount of pressure on the crisis management team just to provide updates to lots of non-executives. The second part is really, again, to maintain that objectivity of judgement, to not be in the weeds and allow your executive to get on and do the job of actually responding to something.
So it's always great to have your chair or one of your non-execs appear in an exercise, play the part of coming in, interrogating the situation a little bit, but also to flex the muscle in that live response of thinking about what can I offer to this team in terms of my support? What do I have within my own stakeholder network that I could mobilise to help to support them right now? And how do I start, to your point, scenario plan against this? While these people are dealing with the most immediate consequences of the crisis, how can I begin to think about what the next six months will look like, how this will affect something in 12 to 18 months from now?
Ralph Grayson: And I get the sense, I may be wrong here, but I get the sense that the immediate knee-jerk reaction of a lot of board members is to close down and keep everything in-house. There's a fear that once you bring in an external comms adviser or any external people, that news will leak rather than keeping control. Why have those people got that wrong?
Kate Brader: We do a surprising amount of work direct to boards where they've brought us in actually because they want to keep something confidential, it's better to bring us on board to work directly to them than to engage their own in-house teams. It may be because we're talking about personnel changes or something else quite challenging and controversial, so actually not engaging your own employees on it can be a benefit to the boards for that reason. So we don't find the boards are that shy of bringing us in although Duncan's got a great adage on secrecy.
Duncan Mavin: My sort of rule of thumb is once about five people know a secret, it's no longer a secret. If one or two people know something, and I always felt like as a journalist, if one or two people know something then they don't want to spill that to you because it'll be obvious to the other person who told the secret. But if five people know, nobody knows who's told the secret. So at that point, the game is up and the secrets are out.
Ralph Grayson: Well, and if ever there was evidence of that, it was me waiting for you to arrive to tell you a secret that I thought would really resonate with you and you went, "Yeah, I know that."
Kate Brader: The last part actually is quite often we're engaged via legal counsel. So if we're engaged via legal counsel, it provides a mechanism to try and protect privilege if something could be in pursuit of litigation in the future. So it's an extra wrapper of that secrecy and security, but is it perfect? Absolutely not.
Ralph Grayson: So what questions should a NED be asking internally and indeed externally when they meet somebody from FTI so that they go away satisfied that they're crisis-ready? Can you be crisis-ready? I'm not sure you can, but anyway, if you want a better label.
Kate Brader: Have we got a plan? When was it last exercised? What was the subject of that exercise? I was speaking to the chairman of the board of an airport in North America last week. He was extremely proud that they run two big simulations every year as you would hope and expect an airport to do. But when we challenged him on what the subject matter was of these, he realised that they're only ever on health and safety events.
Now, of course, preservation of life is hugely important. Again, we should all expect that our airports are doing that for us. But there are issues like changes in regulation, governance failures, finance and accounting failures, cybersecurity incidents, all kinds of different challenges that they're really not considering and that actually from a pure reputation perspective can have much more of a dent in an organisation. So what was the subject of that exercise?
The second part of questioning, I would actually turn on that non-executive and say, "Consider yourself on what you're prepared to be exposed to and how much you're prepared to put your reputation on the line in defending any organisation that you're being brought into." The first part is, are you going to be ready to lead investigations? Do you have information out there about you, about your past, about your other activities that are going to be contradictory to this role that might be brought into question? And that absolutely is a go-to for journalists in the middle of a crisis. Who's on the board? Where have they made mistakes in the past? What are the challenging things about them that we can join the dots on about that crisis and this crisis?
And the last point I made is to what extent are you prepared then to step up and defend a company in crisis? Because absolutely, the executives need to be spokespeople. They need to be out there meeting politicians. But when these things get very, very serious, people want to know what the governance is of an organisation and I've had too many calls now with boards who don't want to step up and lend that support to a CEO. And it's a heartbreaking moment when you see the CEO sit there thinking they've got the full support of the board, but actually nobody's willing to come to a meeting with the Cabinet Secretary or to step up in front of the media spotlight alongside them.
Ralph Grayson: Sorry to interrupt. It's such an interesting point, isn't it? So the board's there to give oversight. It's not to interfere with the executive. So when the crisis happens, who leads? The executive team or the board? Where? Who knows where the boundaries are here?
Kate Brader: The executive team. Absolutely the executive team lead. In fact, we advocate that not even the CEO leads a crisis management team. Plenty of crises don't affect the whole of an organisation. They might affect a division of an organisation. The CEO has the rest of the company to run. The CEO is also the person that people are going to want to see at the site talking to people, walking the corridors of Whitehall, engaging with politicians, and if really serious and necessary, doing the interviews with the media. You can't do all of those things as a CEO and run the business and lead a crisis management team that might be meeting four, five times a day and working 18-hour days.
Ralph Grayson: There's a couple of follow-up questions there because I'm just ever-present Duncan in the room. So before the crisis breaks, Duncan's doing his investigative journalism and he's putting his story together and I presume he's more likely to ring the chair or the CEO than anybody else for a clarification.
Is there a standard operating procedure? Right, as soon as my alarm bell's gone because I've had a call from Duncan, does that all cascade down in the process or is it more contextual? And again, that's back to where's the boundary between the board and the executive.
Duncan Mavin: Yeah. I mean, I think Kate's drawing a distinction between the leadership of a crisis management team. So who's on the ground dealing with the crisis as it unfolds and the CEO who has to run the entire organisation. And so I think a journalist will rightly probably call the CEO. I mean, it depends, on the specifics of the crisis, but will probably call the CEO. And the CEO has to be informed of what's going on, but they can't also find the time to run the day-to-day business of dealing with a crisis and the business that they were already trying to run. I think that's the point that if you're running a crisis management team, that's a full-time job. So you can't abandon your existing full-time job to do that one.
Kate Brader: And take calls from people like Duncan.
Ralph Grayson: Let's really test this. So if the crisis is about the integrity or behaviour of the chair or the CEO, BP is a good example, right? At one, one moment it was the chair, then it was the CEO, then it was back to the chair again. You can't have a set play, can you? It's got to be contextual about who's under the spotlight and therefore who is investigating who internally and externally?
Duncan Mavin: Any good plan is going to have a lot of flexibility built into it and there's going to be a sort of a broad approach, but probably part of that plan is when to tear it up and build a new one.
Kate Brader: So I'll give you another example. I worked for an organisation where there had been misconduct by the chairperson. The board had decided they needed to do an investigation into this misconduct. The report came back and really the decision point was, right, the chair has to choose to leave or be asked to leave. This was all run by a subcommittee of the board. And it was an example of absolutely brilliant governance in properly setting up who was going to be leading that investigation, who it was going to have joining that discussion, and not only that, the board members between them were phenomenal at moving around the responsibility for being on calls, leading calls. They were very clear about when delegated authority needed to be applied to things, when people could make decisions without the full group of them there. And they just, they agreed it very quickly and very easily between them. But it was always clear. There was always someone on hand, and as a result really, really quick decision making. And that's honestly the best example that I've seen of how a board has managed something, set up its own governance, worked it really, really well and for loads of these people, still managed to pick up their grandkids from nursery at 3:00 PM and fly off to New York for that other board responsibility that they had. It was very elegant.
Ralph Grayson: And when might it be appropriate for a NED to speak to either of you privately and ask a question that they might feel uncomfortable asking in front of the full board or the peer group?
Kate Brader: Anytime, but I think noting that we will also work with them to draw a line about what is and isn't appropriate for us to discuss and agree without the rest of their colleagues knowing in concert. Again, we'll quite often be brought in by a NED that has worked with us previously. They will be giving us additional information, context on a situation or a scenario, and that's all to the good. But if we're starting to discuss material things without the full board in the room or the knowledge of the CEO who perhaps we may be contracted to then we have to start navigating with them the appropriateness of it. But again, it's just about being upfront, transparent, open about those kind of things in those conversations, so it's all manageable.
Ralph Grayson: When's the appropriate point at which you just say, "Everybody calm down and take a breath?" How do you gather all the information to start with to know what is the accusation? What are the facts? 'Cause you're never going to have perfect information before you've got to stop with a reply. How do you try and balance speed against accuracy?
Kate Brader: It's a really good question. We definitely err on the side of speed in our team because I think you will never have a perfect answer to something. You'll never have a perfect picture of information. We work quite hard with clients on how you document what was known at that particular moment and why a decision was made, because that again will become a defence for you two or three years down the line if needed, where you can say, "Yes, we did make this decision and it was the wrong call, but it was based on this information that we had at that particular time." And that is an infinitely more defensible position than doing nothing and saying nothing.
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, I think the media and by proxy, the readers or listeners or viewers will be quite forgiving of a quick answer that includes the possibility that you don't know everything at that point. They're not very forgiving of a head in the sand, no answer, and they're not very forgiving of confidently saying something is true only to find out later that it's not.
So I think the accuracy and speed thing is important. I think they go together but sometimes the most accurate thing you can say quickly is, "We don't yet know but we're working on it And I think that's generally an okay answer if that's the truth.
Ralph Grayson: How does a board react if it suddenly subsequently discovers something that counteracts what it said earlier in the process in good faith that may have been?
Kate Brader: Verification, first of all. Verification of those things and then quickly addressing it with a good amount of humility and apology. Also, when Duncan and I are talking about communicating things, the assumption by a lot of boards that we engage with is if we say we need to communicate X, Y, and Z, that we're going to call up the BBC and ask for an interview on the six o'clock news in order to communicate it. It's much more nuanced than that. We're really thinking about who the priority stakeholders are. That might be who are your 10 biggest customers? And can we get them on a one-to-one phone call over the next three hours to discuss this with them? So, communication doesn't always mean broadcast. It's quite often, and really should be, specific messages to the right people at the right time.
Duncan Mavin: I think that's a really good point, and I can give you a good example from Credit Suisse, which was towards the end of Credit Suisse. There was a rumour on Twitter that a big bank was going to collapse and it didn't even mention Credit Suisse initially but the sort of social media world escalated and all of a sudden it was Credit Suisse that was going to collapse and within hours, they were losing many millions of dollars, pulled out by clients, mostly in Asia, every hour to the tune that it was kind of going to drain the bank dry pretty quickly, within days if it had continued and in the comms department, there was utter shock. They didn't really know what to do. This had never happened before. Among the senior execs, there was total shock for a while. But the way they managed to stem the bleeding was to get on a plane the chairman, the CEO, fly to Asia and meet with clients, the biggest clients they had in Asia, and persuade them that this was a mistaken tweet and it was not about them and it worked. It stopped people pulling their money out. In that case, no particular press release, no sort of message to the regulator. It was one-to-one with some multimillionaires and that was an effective piece of communication, or at least the most effective piece of communication they had at their disposal.
Ralph Grayson: How can you be effective across so many different forms of media now? We've got conventional media, social media, and I presume it's a given that an affronted board member shouldn't reply on X or Twitter or Instagram or whatever. How do you make sure you control and police that information process?
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, I think it's a really good point, and I think it's so easy these days to respond in a kind of fit of anger or something like that on Twitter or X or whatever it's called. Generally, we've all done that kind of thing of typing out the email and do you hit send or do you pause and put it in your drafts and think about it a bit? And I think it's almost always the right answer to pause, take a breath.
I think we're generally telling organisations that it's best to have one point of communication and for things to be centralised. If you have multiple points of communication, then there's just more chance that things are going to go wrong, I think, more chance that different people are going to say different things, and that's going to send a signal of confusion or deliberately misleading people.
But I think, yeah, the chances of somebody posting the wrong thing on Twitter or wherever it happens to be, I think are really high now, and that's a new risk that all organisations have to be aware of.
Ralph Grayson: And the other bit, I just want to come back to the whole AI and cyber risk, because I think that's a very different issue than a reputational risk. So a chair of a company had a cyber attack. The attack happened on the Friday afternoon. Everybody had got off skiing or whatever they were doing. So the first battle was getting hold of everybody on the board and I guess that comes back down to your scenario planning and knowing there's going to be a crisis, what happens when? And then they called in the police and the instinct of the board was, we have to tell our customers and we have to tell our customers quickly and we need to be transparent. But the police said, "No, we're going to catch these people. We need some time." And I know the board had a real quandary of what do we say and how do we say it? And how that maybe acts against the national interest rather than the company interest. How do you balance those competing interests?
Kate Brader: Often when we're dealing with cyber incidents, and as a firm, we've worked on hundreds of these in the last five years, we're dealing with risk-based communications. So thinking what is the harm of communicating this versus the harm of not communicating that? I'll give you an example of that really, bit of a grim area, but we were dealing with some data that was leaked from a network of schools, not in the UK. In that data, there were about 30 files that were related to safeguarding. So contained information about really vulnerable individuals and issues related to them. And the decision was made not to let those individuals know that their safeguarding data had been leaked and this was made in conjunction with law enforcement, with guardians, with lots of other people as well, so it wasn't just comms people advising on that. I know where my wheelhouse starts and ends.
The idea was that really behind that, if you are letting people, vulnerable people, know that information is out there, that would cause more harm than continuing to assume it's safe. Of course, that's a given. But that really the motivation of the threat actor was not to expose that information. That information was just going to sit on a server somewhere until a ransom was extracted or not and then dumped. Nobody had any interest in doing anything particularly with that information, and therefore the decision, right or wrong, was to let that information that it was exposed, let that remain unknown by the individuals concerned. That's one of those really tricky ones. But the whole motivation around it was what will cause more or less harm to those people most affected by this situation? And if you're letting that be your guide, then you probably won't go wrong on things.
Cyber, it's usually whether, if there's an outage of some kind of a service, you don't have a choice. I think if you start telling people and trying to obscure that it's a technical malfunction versus a cyber issue, well, we've seen threat actors out people for lying. So you run an enormous risk with doing that, of you being exposed as, one, having had a cyber incident and two, lying about it. If it's purely a data incident, there are absolutely regulations that you need to follow around all of that. We're quite lucky in the UK, though. By and large, we have a pretty understanding regulator.
Ralph Grayson: So to be clear, which regulator are we talking?
Kate Brader: Information Commissioner's Office. One of the fun ones and they are pretty good to work with, they engage with you throughout you reporting an incident and handling it.
But also, European and British people's relationship with their personal data is pretty okay. It's pretty grown-up and mature. It's not like in the US where as soon as the data's been released or exposed, people expect compensation and a right for it to be kept secure. The point I would probably make about that is we've probably all received an email in the last month that says your data may have been exposed in a cyber incident, and we've probably not done anything about it in response.
So again, personal data, we have reporting, we should follow that. When it comes to sensitive company information, I think maybe that's a different rule. And certainly, I've dealt with healthcare companies where medical test data may have been exposed, and again, you want to think, there's an urgency probably around letting people know about that. But also if that data's stored and saved in the appropriate way, it should already be protected and not be traceable either. A lot of nuances.
Ralph Grayson: So it's contextual and it's a judgement call is what you're saying? And therefore there's a balance of duty of care, between somebody, some senior spook arriving from Cheltenham and saying "The national interest, please don't do that." and the company secretary is saying, "No, the information regulator says we need to do this." So there isn't an overarching legal precedent which a NED has to succumb to?
Kate Brader: No.
Ralph Grayson: Right. Okay, that's clear. So, we've dealt with the crisis. We've all moved on and we're trying to learn from it. How do people go about learning it and do better next time?
Kate Brader: So human instinct, when a major incident is over and they've all been doing those 18-hour days, seven days a week, is that they just want to get back to normality. They want to drop it. They want to walk away from it. They just want a bit of rhythm and routine in their life. But really, as soon as possible, you need to formally stand down the crisis. That, I do believe, should be the job of the board and to encourage the executive in making that decision. You need to quickly then think about the welfare needs of all those people involved, and very, very quickly think about compensation related to that as well. The quicker you compensate people or give them a thank you, the proportionally smaller it needs to be in really brutal terms.
One of the biggest incidents I ever worked on we managed to get, through the Big Four, a thank you through from the client that was a hamper. It wasn't a financial bonus. It wasn't anything enormous, but it was a little hamper that got delivered directly to my door just in time for Christmas and I still talk about it now because it meant so much. It was a thoughtful thank you, and I knew how hard it was to get it through all of the corporate red tape and approved and signed off. So debrief the team, think about thank yous and compensation, and then think about the formal investigation. And again, this is where the board comes in and how do you set the reporting of that investigation up so that it comes into the non-exec, potentially, so it's perceived as independent.
You can use a Big Four to do that post-incident review. You can use a law firm to do it. You can use FTI to do it. You can do it in-house, but you will face accusations about whether or not it was an independent review. So some element of external examination, if it's been a particularly major incident, is helpful. Critically, though, it's about ensuring whoever is doing that investigation, it reports back into the board, and again, the board can apply that objective examination of what happened.
Ralph Grayson: That's pretty clear. So I'm going to put the two of you on the spot now. We haven't rehearsed this. Duncan, you've spent much of your career uncovering what organisations don't want disclosed. Well, Kate, you've helped organisations respond when those difficult facts have become public. So, having spent some time working together now, where do your perspectives converge and where perhaps do they still differ?
Duncan Mavin: Essentially we're both. Where we converge is we're both trying to get to the truth, right? Whether that's an investigative journalist or whether you're working in crisis comms, you're essentially trying to establish the correct version of a story, right?
One of the things I think is really interesting in what I do now versus what I used to do is up to a point as a journalist, you're looking backwards always. You're always thinking, you delve into things and then you try and say, "This is how we got here." But actually what we're doing is saying, "Okay, well this is how we got here. Now how do we get to the next bit? Where do we go from here?" And that's a really interesting thing. I actually find it intellectually much more challenging to try and figure that out, to some degree, being a journalist, you get to write the story and walk away, although these stories as we're finding out, follow you around. In crisis communications, you don't get to walk away. You have to figure out what happens next and how do you prepare for what happens next and so I think there is a sort of, you know, we're doing much of the same work. We're reporting it in a slightly different way than I used to and then we're taking it even further.
Kate Brader: The brilliant thing about working alongside Duncan for the last six months has been being able to advocate to your clients that there is no scenario in which something remains uncovered forever. Things will come out in the wash some way. Even if it isn't reported on immediately, the journalist probably knows. They probably have the documents in front of them that you think are top secret. There are a myriad of motivations of why people in any organisation start to share information with journalists and we'll never be able to understand it. So rather than working on the assumption of let's hope it doesn't get out there, let's work on the assumption that it does and be a little bit bolder and a little bit braver about that.
Ralph Grayson: So I'm going to follow that up with Kate, you're trying to work out whether an account or an accusation will be believed and Duncan, as a journalist, you've been trying to test whether that account is true. Where's the distinction in your minds between truth, completeness and credibility?
Duncan Mavin: One thing I would say for sure is those two books I've written, Credit Suisse and Greensill, no amount of communications could have saved those two companies. The truth was not in their favour. They had no credibility. It didn't matter how much you talked about them, how complete the information was, they were finished. In cases like that, I think it's pretty clear-cut. I guess the less clear-cut cases are where it gets interesting. Already I've found in the last few months that we're also trying to get to understand all those things. We're trying to get a complete picture of every organisation we work with. I found actually the sort of investigative skills of my colleagues in FTI are really strong generally, and that we are trying to do the same thing. You know, we've been appointed by somebody because of a crisis in their organisation and the first thing we're trying to do is understand exactly how that came about. Understand exactly what the truth is and what might be obscured from us. Because it's only then that we can offer the right advice.
Kate Brader: One, unlike lawyers, we don't have protections around the information that we communicate to people. So it is, with external advisers, we need to look for and be seen to be conveying the truth and thank you, Duncan, for your flattery around our good investigative skills. But again, our own reputations and being credible at what we do is reliant upon that. And the second part is, Duncan, you referred to it earlier, that people will forgive you for something happening. They won't forgive you for acknowledging it and communicating potentially an apology and what you're going to do to resolve that particular issue. So we hope that gives our clients some comfort.
Ralph Grayson: My last question then, so Duncan what's the stupid question that every NED should be willing to ask that brings out the truth?
Duncan Mavin: One of the things you learn as a journalist is there's no question too stupid actually and I think you have to learn some humility and it's better to ask those stupid questions. Sitting with the CEO of the biggest banks in the world, it actually takes some nerve to ask something that is fairly obvious. You'd be amazed at how often that results in a good answer. I can't think of a specific question. Obviously depends on the specific situation, but when I was at the Wall Street Journal and myself and one of my colleagues would often go to sit down with CEOs, bank CEOs in particular at the time. We would go pretty hard, but our base case would be we don't really know your organisation, so you tell us about it. Your human instinct is to try and pretend that you do know things, but actually you get much more out of it if you acknowledge what you don't know and people tend to fill the space. So if you ask something pretty simple, you'll often get an answer eventually.
Ralph Grayson: And don't be frightened to ask the question.
Duncan Mavin: Yeah, exactly.
Ralph Grayson: And Kate finished us off with what's the one crisis assumption every board should test before it next meets?
Kate Brader: If this were to go wrong, if the worst were to happen, would I be prepared to stand behind the decisions I've made and the actions that this company has taken to defend them?
Ralph Grayson: So I hope everybody's got some really interesting takeaways from two very informed people in this space. Kate, if somebody wants to follow up and discuss some of the case studies or your thought leadership in this area, how do they find you and Duncan and how do they find out more about FTI?
Kate Brader: We're both on LinkedIn or the highly creative email address of crisis@fticonsulting.com.
Ralph Grayson: Today's conversation suggests that crisis leadership begins with two disciplines, the courage to ask the question others regard as naive, the preparedness to confront the answer before events remove the board's freedom to act.
Duncan's experience reminds us that apparently simple questions can expose weaknesses missed by sophisticated governance and risk systems. Kate's experience shows that credible communication cannot be added to decisions after they've been made. It depends upon early involvement, clear principles, tested relationships, and an honest understanding of how different stakeholders will interpret the organisation's conduct.
For non-executive directors, reputation is neither simply a communication asset nor an abstract risk. It is accumulated evidence of whether stakeholders believe the organisation and whether they believe its board deserves their confidence. The practical message for aspiring and serving directors is clear. Do not wait for a crisis to discover whether your board is capable of asking the right questions, hearing uncomfortable answers, and leading incredibly well under scrutiny.
Duncan and Kate, thank you so much.
I hope that you've enjoyed listening to this podcast and have found it helpful when thinking about how to approach your own path to the boardroom. If you would like to push this a little bit further, Sainty Hird runs a bespoke one-to-one programme designed specifically to this end. For more information, please visit our website saintyhird.com, follow us on LinkedIn, and subscribe to the Boardroom Path to receive new episodes. Thank you for listening.