The Diplomat | ديبلومات

Lebanon has been called a failed state, a fragile state, even a cautionary tale,  but none of these labels capture what’s really happening.
In this episode, Dania Arayssi, Senior Fellow at the New Lines Institute and a political scientist studying Lebanon’s public trust and remittance economy, joins Joe Kawly to unpack:
• Why Lebanon’s leadership can’t disarm Hezbollah without risking civil war
• How the U.S. and Israel’s pressure campaigns are reshaping Beirut’s politics
• What “sovereignty” actually means in a system run by multiple powers
• Why civil society may be the country’s only functioning institution
• How foreign remittances are quietly reshaping political behavior
This is not another segment about Lebanon’s collapse: it’s an explanation of why it hasn’t fallen apart completely.

What is The Diplomat | ديبلومات?

In the rooms where war, peace, and power are decided, words matter most. The Diplomat brings you raw conversations with ambassadors, envoys, and negotiators who shaped the hardest decisions in U.S. foreign policy and Middle East diplomacy. Hosted by Joe Kawly. Recorded from Washington. Produced by Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).

Joe Kawly brings extensive experience from conflict zones in the Middle East to the power corridors of Washington. As a journalist, he’s seen how words can escalate a crisis or open the door to peace. A Georgetown graduate and former CNN Journalism Fellow, he’s known for connecting the dots others miss, so people don’t just hear what happened, they understand why it matters. As producer and host of The Diplomat, Joe brings clarity to diplomacy and politics, one conversation at a time.

[00:00:02.640] - Joe Kawly
What happens when a country is not at war, but its government or its state is slowly falling apart? Lebanon has been called a failed state, a fragile state, even a cautionary tale. But none of these labels quite explain what's really going on. Today, on this episode of The Diplomate, we are talking about how or what's really happening in Lebanon right now, and how, outside pressure, internal politics and public exhaustion have shaped a crisis that is harder to define than it is to ignore. My guest is Dania Aaraisi. She is a political scientist, a senior fellow at the New Lynes Institute, and someone who's been studying civil society and how Albanese leaders and citizens navigate a system built on ambiguity, compromise, and survival. We get to Hezbollah, US, and Israel pressure, and what the idea of sovereignty even means when your country's future is being shaped by actors inside and outside your borders. Thank you for being with us, Dania. Welcome. Let's talk about the Lebanese President, Joseph Aoun, and his position on Hezbollah. He gave quiet signals to the United States and also to Saudi Arabia that Hezbollah's reach will be contained specifically in the south of the Littani River.

[00:01:41.140] - Joe Kawly
But at the same time, he was giving reassurances to Hezbollah and Hezbollah's leaders in Lebanon that the weapons of Hezbollah would remain untouched elsewhere. How do you describe that? Is that double positioning or just politics being played in Lebanon Or did it mark a real shift of how Libanese politics, how Libanese presidents, how the Libyanese government would manage regional expectations?

[00:02:12.340] - Dania Arayssi
Yes. I think Aoun is trying to understand the challenges of this army, Hezbollah. Based on those challenges, he's trying to balance and be diplomatic in his approach. What I mean by diplomatic, he's trying to meet the Americans' demands and interests and requirements in terms of disarming Hezbollah, but at the same time trying to avoid a civil war in Lebanon. Because we do understand that disarming Hezbollah is not an easy, simple, straightforward operation. It requires balancing a lot of demographic characteristics in Lebanon, but also the Levanese armed forces. I think he's trying to balance both. Right now, it looks like the Americans are extremely frustrated and mad with how the situation is going, given that we have recent report that Hezbollah is arming itself itself again, building its capabilities again. The Albanese government is definitely aware about this. This is information that is published online. It's accessible. The Libanese armed forces has also information about the capacity of Hezbollah and how many fighters there are. But what can they do?

[00:03:15.870] - Joe Kawly
Many would see that that positioning, the positioning of the Libanese President, is that he's playing both sides. How do you see that? Or is this just survival in in a system, in the Libanese system that is already fragmented?

[00:03:35.660] - Dania Arayssi
Definitely the Libanese system is fragmented. I think this is putting the Libanese government in a very risky situation from the Americans and the way they are dealing from the Americans and how the Albanian government is taking it seriously. I don't think he's playing both sides. I think Aoun and the Prime ministers are very clear towards disarming Hezbollah, but they know the challenges that comes with this. We know that Hezbollah currently still control a large portion of the parliament, still have a very strong control over mass populations. Any decisions by the government to disarm or send the military troops will really be faced with serious unrest. They have the guns, they have the powers that really exceed the capability and the capacity of the Libanese armed forces. Given those challenges, we need to be more realistic with our expectations and what can and we cannot achieve. I think something that we need to talk about it here when it comes to what the government is doing and what it really is trying to do is the Americans have capacity and have resources to leverage the Israelis to stop their military operations given the ceasefire agreement. The Israelis are still bombing Libanese cities.

[00:04:47.960] - Dania Arayssi
I understand that some of these operations targeting Hezbollah officials and sites, but some of them are also targeting civilians. I think if the Israelis can a little bit step back and Maybe take us on break on those attacks. Maybe the UN will have more capacity to pressure Hezbollah to disarm itself and just give up its guns. Something also I think it's important to mention here is UN discussed plan to integrate Hezbollah within the Libanese armed forces and to put its guns within the Libanese armed forces. I personally do not think this is a good idea. We have examples from other countries where this failed for different reasons, putting I'm putting Hezbollah with a very military and ideology that is very different of the Libanese armed forces within the libanese arm forces is definitely going to lead to a further fragmentation within the system. So this is definitely not a good idea. But I think we have to be realistic, what we cannot achieve.

[00:05:44.090] - Joe Kawly
Between the continuous bombing, as you mentioned in the south, and this strategy that Haun is using between giving both sides reassurances, is this strategy would give Is the Albanese President, Joseph Aoun, or does it give Lebanon some breathing room, or it will just delay a harder decision that Lebanon has to take in the current situation, in the current atmosphere in the region?

[00:06:13.180] - Dania Arayssi
It's definitely not giving Lebanon any break. It's definitely leading to further frustrations from the Americans, and now the Israelis are threatening for another operations in Lebanon. So this is a short answer to the question. Why? For different reasons. I think the Israelis have options, have two policy options right They can respond to what's going on in Lebanon by, yes, declaring another military operations, or, which was Owen recently said, and I think it's a better option for the Israelis right now, maybe engage in a direct conversations with the Lebanese officials or governments. Maybe we need to have a conversation on the tables because constantly using guns and weapons to disarm Hezbollah is likely not producing a good result. So maybe we have primarily for the Israelis, and also the Libanis are absolutely not ready for another military operations. It's definitely not giving us a break, but maybe it's an opportunity for the Israelis to engage in different policy options. Maybe here, I'm going to go back and say what recently, I would have said, maybe we need to have a direct negotiations with them. This is something the Americans have welcomed that Very much.

[00:07:16.860] - Joe Kawly
Between no breathing rooms, as you mentioned, and the public statements that we've listened and heard and seen out of Washington, out of the US envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barak, calling Lebanon a failed state, It's a warning also about Hezbollah's presence. But there has not been real or direct escalation so far. This language about pressure, how is it seen, do you think? Is it just about pressure or is it about preparing the public for something else? Because we are hearing some stories and rumors about a second wave of a war.

[00:07:56.080] - Dania Arayssi
It's both. The short answer, it's both. I think Lebanon is a failed state for different reasons. But yes, economically, we are a failed state. We all have a fragmented system. I think this statement is primarily aimed to pressure the Libanese government to take serious actions to disarm Hezbollah. But also to threaten them, that another war is possible if you do not take a serious action. But something that Americans are missing in here, it's clear to highlight, is what we can and we cannot do as a Libanese government. When the government of Lebanon voted on the disarming of Hezbollah, we had unrest in the Libanese streets. People were on the streets holding guns, holding weapons. There is a serious civil war. What we cannot do, it does not mean we're not taking it seriously. It means the government has a limited capacity to actually do what they can do. Here, I think the Americans have to pressure the Israelis, again, if they're not willing to withdraw from these five territories in Lebanon, at least stop the constant bombing so then they can pressure Hezbollah to actually put its guns because Hezbollah is still using the same paper that they're attacking us.

[00:09:11.080] - Dania Arayssi
Why are you asking us to give up our weapons when they are attacking us nonstop? So maybe this requires another approach from the Americans and also the Israelis. Definitely, it's concerning right now what's going on in Lebanon.

[00:09:24.490] - Joe Kawly
So what you're trying to say is the continuous bombing of some of Southern Lebanon is being used as a strategy by Hezbollah?

[00:09:36.060] - Dania Arayssi
Yeah, it's being used as a justification by Hezbollah to keep its gun by really replying and saying, We are continuously attacking us, and the Libanese armed forces does not have the capability to protect us. So what are you expecting from us? To give up our weapons when we don't have any protections? And so we want to take off this paper from them. We want to be like, There's no any attacks. They're respecting the ceasefire plan. So why would you keep it? Let the Libanese government be in charge. I think this is something that the Americans have the power to do, to engage in those direct conversations with the Israelis. I think if the Americans are not willing to engage in those conversations, We understand now why UN have recently called for direct negotiations with the Israelis, because we want to be clear with them that we're trying to do this, and we're trying to disarm this, Hezbollah, but we have serious concerns in our country, in our community, but we also have serious concerns from This is a breakthrough for a Lebanese President to call for direct negotiations or conversations with the Israelis.

[00:10:37.930] - Joe Kawly
How is that seen in Lebanon, and how do you think that would be seen by foreign actors that a Lebanese President is actually willing to engage with the Israelis for the first time?

[00:10:55.220] - Dania Arayssi
I want to start answering the second portion. According to my US foreign sources, high-level sources. We know right now, we know how the Israelis are responding to these calls. I've received some information about that. Currently, the Israelis are divided. One portion of the Israelis welcome this call to have a direct negotiation with the Libanese community, especially the Ahwen is coming from a background that is very reformist, very liberal, very open-minded. On the other hand, we have another group of the Israelis are a little bit skeptical about these calls Because they still perceive the Libanese government as a failed state. There is a fragmented, as well as still control all the institutions. There is right now a debate on the Israelis, whether to engage in these conversations or not. I think it's important to highlight something here. He's calling for a direct negotiation is not normalization. I think right now when everybody heard our own talking about direct negotiations, they started calling him like, You're not really respecting our values, our norms, where we stand with Israel. I think direct negotiation is different in political science and foreign policy. We have data that shows we still have a high tension in Lebanon toward Israel.

[00:12:07.840] - Dania Arayssi
I don't think normalization with Israel right now is a good idea or good decision. I think we do need these negotiations, but these Direct negotiation does not mean normalizations. We need to stop the violence, we need to stop the war, and we need to create some stability in this country. I don't know about the future if normalization would be another option on the table. I don't think right now it's a good option, but I don't know about the future, how it look. Definitely the people did not welcome that in Lebanon, just to mention, because they confused the word of normalizations and direct negotiations.

[00:12:39.660] - Joe Kawly
Thank you for this clarification. It's a very important nuance to explain But these messages or these statements that Lebanon is a failed state, how much of it you think has shaped, for instance, the statement by the Lebanese President? How much are these statements aiming at shaping Lebanon's domestic conversation about what's going to happen rather than really changing the facts on the ground?

[00:13:09.000] - Dania Arayssi
I think it's definitely created the public alert in Lebanon that we need to do certain policies. We need to change how we are dealing. I think there's a public right now concerns, but I'm always concerned about Lebanon because we always hear these statements about Lebanon is a failed state. The public in Lebanon got mad, got frustrated, but we really continue into an actual policies. I'm hoping to see consistencies in how we react to this, in the financial and monetary policies and have serious reforms. Until right now, for example, we have not really engaged in a real conversation with the World Bank or the IMF to actually sign on a reform program for our banking system. We're still trying to manage the losses that we have in the Syrian banks and the losses that the Syrians have in our banks because of the financial crisis. I feel like these statements create a short term crisis alert in Lebanon. Why are you calling us a failed state? But it fails to produce really consistent actions and policies and reforms in Lebanon. I'm hoping I'm wrong. I'm hoping we can really engage. But until Well, now we are not really engaged in a serious reforms in the banking systems.

[00:14:19.440] - Dania Arayssi
Hence, the Americans and frankly, the international community perceived as a failed state, and we still do not have a serious investments from foreign actors or Gulf actors as well in Lebanon.

[00:14:31.120] - Joe Kawly
Between these terminologies or terms or messages that Lebanon is a failed state or these public statements about Lebanon, there's also this word that keeps coming up in Lebanese politics about sovereignty, but it's become also a loaded term. For some, it means independence or full independence from foreign actors. For others, it means choosing the right alliances. In your view and also in what you have gathered from your sources, what does sovereignty actually mean in Lebanon right now or what it would mean in Lebanon for Lebanon in the future? Who gets to define it?

[00:15:16.200] - Dania Arayssi
I think the Americans want the Albanese government to define sovereignty, the short answer to that question. I think our own and Nawaf Salam, their policies and their decisions signal that sovereignty is the control of the Albanese government and the Albanese institutions on its territories. The reason I'm saying this is because we have seen recent decisions to end the UNIFL power and actors in south of Lebanon. In a few years, they're leaving Lebanon, and I think this is a decision by the Americans, but also by the Vietnamese government. They welcome that to have the Vietnamese armed forces fully in charge of South Lebanon. So this is a first. Another signaling that this is really how we define sovereignty is the Americans recently invested in Lebanon $230 million just to build and to support the Lebanon's armed forces. This also means that we want one sole security actor in Lebanon that is the Lebanon's governments. I think the Americans and the current government in Lebanon really want to define on that approach. I think all the policies and the signals that we see looks like this is the approach of we define sovereignty. I think the old periods of having the Syrians defining it or having other actors defining it, it's gone.

[00:16:32.420] - Dania Arayssi
Especially with the fall of theAssad regime.

[00:16:35.840] - Joe Kawly
Between the sovereignty and between being neutral, are these two can coincide or coexist together? Can Lebanon realistically stay neutral, or is that idea already off the table?

[00:16:51.720] - Dania Arayssi
It's a very good question. I think it's difficult, and I think this requires really trying to make sure the decision is in the hand of the government. This requires, for example, the Palestinians that exist in Lebanon to disarm them and really have issues of Palestinian refugees have been resolved. This requires also the Syrian refugees have been resolved because the fact that we have a large number of Syrian refugees inside Lebanon really put pressures on what the government can and cannot say when it comes to the Syrian crisis. Same with the Palestinians. I know when October seventh happened, there was on the Albanese government to take position on the October seventh, we tried not to take positions. We tried to be neutral, not to engage, but it's difficult. Why? Well, because we have a large portion of those Palestinians inside our government. We have Hezbollah, who sometimes use, and many times actually, use the Albanese borders to position us. It's hard. It requires really ending all these nonstate actors inside the government, which I think, I mean, recently, there has been calls about disarming the Palestinians.

[00:18:00.680] - Joe Kawly
It's difficult. But what do you mean? You caught me off guard when you said there are some Palestinians in the government. What does that mean?

[00:18:09.800] - Dania Arayssi
Well, I meant to say the government, there has been some talks currently about ending and disarming and the Palestinians weapons, like the Palestinians' camps. The fact that we have representatives inside the government that still support the Palestinians' camps to exist in to have their guns and their weapons. This puts pressures on what can and cannot do the government.

[00:18:35.280] - Joe Kawly
There are so many ideas and factors that would be at play, either helping or being a hindrance to Lebanon being either neutral or sovereign or having even the platform to do more reforms. You mentioned the IMF and the World Bank are still waiting for some reforms to happen. With the elections approaching, is there still something space for actors or candidates who have the reform in mind, who are reform-minded actors, or has the window closed for that?

[00:19:11.200] - Dania Arayssi
I think that's a very good question. I think there are potentials. We have our hearing potentials for reformers and youth actors to actually join the election. I think one element I want to add to that question, I think the election is a very good opportunity to see if Hezbollah still has the popular support that he used to have long time ago, before the war. I think it's important not only to disarm Hezbollah military, but also to remove the popular support of Hezbollah. I think this is a good point to see if we can actually achieve that. Because currently, Hezbollah does not have the means to support Lebanon or to support the actual its community. If we can actually remove Hezbollah from the politics and from the elections, this open the opportunity for other Shia Shia's community who have this reform mindset and who want to be actually supporting their community instead of having Hezbollah. I think this is a very good question. If Hezbollah can be out of the election, then you have a vacuum for other reformers, particularly from the Shia community, who actually want to lead the Shia and support and represent their community.

[00:20:20.620] - Joe Kawly
To talk about the pressures, US policy, and is it a pressure or is it a partnership? Washington face a choice push too hard, as some would say that we're listening to these statements from invoices, if they push too hard, probably it could collapse what's left of Lebanon's state, but back it off or back off, and you will lose influence to other actors, to China, probably, or to Russia, or to Iran in the region, or let corruption, and how Lebanon is a failed state has been described, and also paralysis, deepen in the system. What do you think a smarter US approach looks like right now? What did you hear from your sources from US foreign policy or about US foreign policy that the best US approach should be or should look like right now?

[00:21:21.380] - Dania Arayssi
I think my current sources, as we know, we have high-level officials going to Lebanon next week. The current approach is United States is going to continue to pressure the Libyanese government to really disarm Hezbollah to take this seriously. My recommendation or my policy approach on this is I think the Americans should be realistic on what we can and what we can or what we can do. Continuing to pressure the Libyanese government without really addressing the challenges that we are facing is less likely to take us where we want to go. The pressure without really listening to us and to listen to what the government wants, it's very hard to take us where to go. I think it's important to know the challenges that we are facing. This requires sitting on the table and listening to us on what's going on.

[00:22:07.900] - Joe Kawly
One of my guests last week on the Diplomat on the show, Jonathan Katz, he's an expert in democracy decline and anticorruption. We talked about Lebanon, and he mentioned how the civil society in Lebanon is really strong despite how the state is collapsing. Should US support the shift from political elites that's been giving for years to civil society and technocrats. What do you think? What are your sources telling you about this?

[00:22:44.200] - Dania Arayssi
You probably know that all my research is about civil society. I am a big fan of civil society. I'm a very, very strong. Yes. I am a big, big fan of civil society organizations. Countries like Lebanon, when you have a failed state, and it is what it is, I call things as they are, you must support other existing actors, and in this case, civil society. Civil society organizations, Lebanon, tend to have a very high trust from foreign actors, from international actors. They trust us. When the poor explosion happened, most of the funds that we got to rebuild at least the cities and the people that lost were a sense of society. Nothing was sent to the government, and it's fine. We understand that people do not trust the government. We are a corrupt government. It is what it is. We have history of corruption. So maybe we should definitely engage with civil society actors to actually rebuild public trust. But I want to say something else here, and I want to refer to something recently I've heard about it. Hezbollah was able to gain support from the Shia because he was able to offer what the Libanese government did not offer.

[00:23:49.280] - Dania Arayssi
Services, goods, money, opportunities, and money. We got this. This is true. The civil society in Lebanon has an opportunity to really offer the Shia and support them and gain their support and father, undermine Hezbollah. Because the government is not trustful, because people do not trust the government, so I totally get it. Let's use another actor to actually gain support for them and father, disarm Hezbollah and How they really reduce the public support for Hezbollah. It's a civil society organizations.

[00:24:20.240] - Joe Kawly
You're mentioning something very important. If we give money to any actors or organizations, That is actually in parallel with the government. We've seen this happening before. That's why we've seen previous parties in the Civil War because they had built a parallel society with money and settlements and payments. When we want right now the foreign actors or partners to give to the civil society, how much are we recreating the same mistake over and over again?

[00:24:59.260] - Dania Arayssi
When we When I talk about civil society, I think we have to be very clear. Civil societies could be part of political parties operating, which is what Hezbollah really has. Here what I'm talking about, I'm talking about civil society that have proved and have received funding from the US administrations before and have proved a clear record. We have existing number of civil societies that have a very good record of really reporting back to the agencies on how they have spent the money and where the money have went. This is primarily what I'm talking about. I'm not talking about civil societies that operates under existing political parties that really try to distribute their agendas. Usaid, which right now it's ended, but previously USAID had a list of all the civil societies that have really good connections, have really distributed the money correctly, they have a transparency record. We're going to use these resources to actually build the south of Lebanon without using the Iran's money, without using the Hezbollah money, but they're creating popular support for the civil society and undermining the popular support for Hezbollah because we don't want Hezbollah to be in the government again.

[00:26:03.820] - Dania Arayssi
I think this is really important because what are we trying to achieve if Hezbollah again is in the government, again blocking the government's addition to this arm itself? You want to win the elections right now, and you don't want it to be in the election in the government. I think this is an opportunity for us.

[00:26:18.710] - Joe Kawly
I asked the question because you have done research on how money or payments or remittances shape political life. Do you see money and payments as acting as a stabilizing force or more of a pressure valve that prevents deeper change?

[00:26:39.390] - Dania Arayssi
This is actually in my PhD dissertation. Currently, I got data from Lebanon. People who receive money, so here's the data that says, and I'm happy to share the data from you. People who receive money from Western European countries, then to be liberal countries, but also who receive money from United States, they tend to be against Hezbollah. They're expressed to be against Hezbollah. Because I asked them, who did you vote for in the last elections? Where do you get money from? They tend to have a very liberal attitude, tend to have a very open-minded attitude because of where they receive the money from, which means they tend to connect to those people. They tend to share their ideas with them. In addition, I also found that people who receive money from abroad, they're more likely to engage in civil society organizations. They're more likely to engage in a protest. They're more likely to actually engage in It's anything not related to the government because they do not trust the government. They do not trust that their vote is really going to produce something. They want to use their political voice somewhere else. They're going to engage in other ways to really change what they're going through, which is civil society organizations, which is protesting, which is really being active on social media.

[00:27:49.720] - Dania Arayssi
What we can do is money can be used as a way to change the people's attitudes and the people values toward this terrorist organizations and to actually help the government really having a reform and having change in the government. This is very important because those remittances, 27% of Lebanon GDP relies on remittances. Syria economy right now relies on on romantism. So this has power. When we're talking about romantism, it's something that I really want to mention, people talk about money being transferred, but there's also the ideas and the values and the norms that are being sent from people. When I'm sending money to my mother, I'm I'm talking to her about what's going on here, how I'm living in the United States, and my values, and my liberal values and norms. So this is also transmitting my values. Hence, she's less likely to be supportive of Hezbollah because of how I'm influencing her. This is the power of money that people don't really understand, or discuss about it when we talk about remittances.

[00:28:49.520] - Joe Kawly
Final question. Lebanon has been through war, collapse, revolution, and now what looks like a very slow burning crisis. Is there a scenario, Dania, you still see where Lebanon regains its footing, or are we in a new normal?

[00:29:12.340] - Dania Arayssi
My short answer is really when we disarm Hezbollah, when we fully disarm Hezbollah, we are very likely to really have back Lebanon, have the trust of the international community and foreign investors back in Lebanon, to be very honest with you. This is not the normal. I think this is a transitional period for Lebanon. The disarming of Hezbollah and the actual... It's a transitional period. It might be a very long, sadly, a little bit to actually achieve it. It's difficult. Hezbollah has been in Lebanon for a very long time, but it's a transitional period to really build an actual government that people trust. Because recently, I've heard from a lot of US officials, golf investors, even they're willing to go to Lebanon right now to invest in Lebanon and put the money and build the economy once Hezbollah is no longer in charge of the government or the institutions. So everyone is waiting for this decision to happen. So hence, this is why I say this is a transitional period. This is not forever. This is not the normal.

[00:30:08.390] - Joe Kawly
Dania Raisi, thank you. That was clear, grounded, and exactly the depth that we need right now in a simplified way.

[00:30:17.160] - Dania Arayssi
Thank you. Thank you so much for having me.

[00:30:20.020] - Joe Kawly
Thank you. And until next time.