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Who thinks that they can subdue Leviathan? Strength resides in its neck; dismay goes before it. It is without fear. It looks down on all who are haughty; it is king over all who are proud. These words inspired PJ Wehry to create Chasing Leviathan. Chasing Leviathan was born out of two ideals: that truth is worth pursuing but will never be subjugated, and the discipline of listening is one of the most important habits anyone can develop. Every episode is a dialogue, a journey into the depths of a meaningful question explored through the lens of personal experience or professional expertise.
PJ Wehry (00:03.568)
Hello and welcome to Chasing the Viathan. I'm your host, PJ Weary, and I'm here today with Dr. Emma Sullivan-Bissett, reader in philosophy at University of Birmingham. And we're talking about her book Irrationality. Dr. Sullivan-Bissett, wonderful to see you today.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (00:19.17)
Thank you, thanks for inviting me.
PJ Wehry (00:25.52)
tell me why this book? I mean, it's not like a rationality ever really goes out of style. So I mean, there's some immediate application, but what led you to this? And why do you think that even like these Cambridge Elements series, makes it short, it's to the point. What is kind of your goal with the book and why this book?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (00:47.574)
Yeah, well, the quick and honest answer, and I'll give you a slightly longer and more interesting answer, is that I didn't choose the book, the book kind of chose me, right? So the Cambridge elements are split into sub-disciplines. And I was asked by the commissioning editor in the Philosophy of Mind series to write the element on irrationality. But I think that he was right that there needed to be a book of that kind in the Philosophy of Mind series, right? So that the idea of irrationality turns up in
lots of philosophical debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. But I think more broadly, and maybe more importantly, non philosophers and non academics have something like the concept of irrationality already, right, and use it in their everyday lives. It's not the kind of concept locked away in the ivory tower. We reach for this all the time, it's quite important to understand what it is that we're doing. And in light of that, like, there's two ways that I could have approached it. So
I could have really interrogated the very idea of irrationality or a perfectly rational being or how we might do better as rational agents. But I didn't do that. Instead, I wanted to say, like, here's a bunch of stuff which is standardly taken to be irrational. What's going on in these cases? Are they irrational? If so, why? What more might we say about these cases? And I just hope that
As a goal of the book, hope that readers might be encouraged to like a fuller understanding of some of those seemingly irrational parts of our minds and lives which might otherwise just be kind of dismissed. I think there's a lot of rich and interesting ground there.
PJ Wehry (02:28.321)
So talk to me about, let's go in that direction. What are some of that rich and interesting grounds where, in regards to irrationality?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (02:37.068)
Yeah, I mean, so that's the kind of question that I interrogate when I'm talking about all the different kinds of irrationality. But you you might just think if I have a partner who is clearly unfaithful, right, everybody in the world can see that he's unfaithful. But I nevertheless find myself believing that he's faithful, right? Now, you might just say you're irrational, you might just dismiss me as somebody worth having a conversation with.
But once we dig in and think about what's going on, right, we can see that actually I've formed a belief which is not properly responsive to the evidence. The evidence is very clear. All my friends are telling me that he's enjoying himself elsewhere. But nevertheless, there's something interesting going on because, my desire that he be faithful is kind of directing my attention to the sliver of evidence that he is in fact faithful and things like that. And I think that once we dig deeper into
the mechanics of states of mind or behaviors that we judge to be irrational. There's some really interesting things to learn about how human beings actually work.
PJ Wehry (03:43.408)
Can you talk more like how human like how do human beings actually work and you know, and I'm sure that'll bring us around to debates about like the goal of saying things like rational but
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (03:57.494)
Yeah, right. So, you know, it's really standard in philosophy to think of beliefs as the kind of things which, you know, are related to truth in some way, they're about accurately representing the world, they should respond to evidence and counter evidence. But when you look at cases of irrationality, what you learn is on the surface, you learn that not all cases are like that. And that's interesting, right? So the case of self-deception is like that. But what you also learn is
the ways in which that's achieved, right? So the self-deception case is one where it's typically thought that what's going on is someone has a very strong desire for something to be true. I just really want it to be the case that my partner is faithful to me, right? And that strong desire and the stories will differ in the details, but that somehow changes my relationship to evidence and the way in which I form beliefs about that subject.
And I think that's really interesting to learn that although we think beliefs are the kinds of things which kind of help us get around our environment, they represent the world as it really is, sometimes other stuff can be going on such that that's not the whole story, right? Sometimes your emotions can kind of get in the way. Your desire for something to be true changes the way that you interact with the world and the evidence and support of your beliefs. And you can say other sorts of things about other kinds of cases, but
I think once you dig into the details of the cases, you see kind of that the human mind is pretty messy and doesn't really bend to the idea that, you know, beliefs are rational and respond to the world and so on. once you kind of open the hood on all of these cases, you see the kind of thing that we're capable of.
PJ Wehry (05:45.678)
Yeah, I let me ask you this. This is a little bit of an.
Maybe a rabbit trail. it's not a good question, feel free to ignore it. But when we talk about our desires shaping our beliefs, is there almost a conflict of human kind of mental powers? Because we do use our desires to shape the world. And sometimes that works, right? Like through our desires, they can shape the world. it's almost like you have two powers.
interacting, conflicting with each other in some cases. Is that a little bit what's happening here?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (06:26.486)
Yeah, think so. What's interesting about cases where your desires look to be having an influence is that they kind of have to do it undercover. Right. So most people think that beliefs are not the kinds of things that can respond to your desires. So I want to believe that I'm the best philosopher in the world. I'd love to believe that. That would make me super happy. Right. And I'd love it for it to be true. But I can't form that belief on the basis.
of that desire, right? Beliefs just not the kinds of things which can be formed in response to your desires. But you might think that doesn't sit very well with what I just said about self-deception, right? I really want it to be the case that my partner is faithful. But what's going on there is I don't recognise that I have the desire and then directly form the belief on its basis. Rather, that desire is kind of working undercover to make me attend to particular kinds of evidence, ignore other kinds of evidence. So all this is
is because most people think at least that belief is not the kind of thing that is under our control in that way. It's not the kind of thing that can respond to how we desire the world to be. It can only respond to how we take the world to be.
PJ Wehry (07:34.384)
Hmm.
PJ Wehry (07:40.432)
So when I say desire shaping, not desire shaping beliefs, or I'm talking about desire shaping states of the world, right? for instance, when you talk about first starting a business, you kind of have to believe that you can be a businessman or business woman in order to like, if you don't believe, then you carry yourself differently and you often think your business will fail.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (07:49.89)
Mm-hmm.
PJ Wehry (08:05.912)
On the other hand, you don't know whether it's going to work out or not. the belief comes after or rather the states, the knowledge states come after we find out from the states, like things are changing, right? Like when you're first starting out a business, are you successful or not? We don't know, but you have to act like you're going to succeed. Whereas with some of these, seems like you're looking backwards, like it's and you're not responding to things that have already happened.
Does that make sense? Like, I mean, we talk about the faithfulness thing. It's like, it's like, no, no, he is faithful. It's like, well, okay. You can get into a relationship with someone and be like, he's going to be faithful. And that is like, you're looking towards the future. But when you have like all this evidence behind you, it's like, that doesn't work anymore. Like, you know, like it's, it's already happened. Right. It's like, I'm a successful businessman. have five failed businesses. You're like, that's, that's not how that works. Right. Like,
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (09:06.314)
Yeah, well, you'd be surprised actually, so think you're absolutely right.
PJ Wehry (09:12.33)
Yeah, right, right. Well, I mean, that's the irrational part, right? Yeah, but yeah.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (09:15.758)
So yeah, I mean, think you're definitely onto something that, you know, in order to pursue particular kinds of desires, you have to have the right kind of background beliefs, right? I would never pursue the desire to run 10K in 30 minutes. I know I can't do that, right? I'm never going to have the desire to do that. I'm not going to try to do that. But I might pursue the desire to write a book this year because, you know, I do believe that that's something that I'm capable of. So think that's right.
But what you said about somebody couldn't possibly believe that they're a successful businessman when they've got five businesses, I'm afraid you've overestimated people there, right?
PJ Wehry (09:54.981)
I rationally believe. Yes, yeah, excuse me. Yeah, rationally. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, I know people do. Yeah, yeah.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (10:02.56)
Yeah, because there's all sorts of stories you can tell, right? The world is against me. I was too early. This product is kind of beyond its time or something. There are all sorts of stories that people can tell and that people do tell, right? There's almost no amount of evidence that would persuade everybody about particular kind of thing. And I think that's fascinating, the power of the human mind to believe stuff, which is clearly and obviously not true, right?
That's fun.
PJ Wehry (10:34.032)
And we're not laughing, I feel like the truth is we're not really even just laughing at everybody else. It's such a human thing to do. we have caught ourselves all, everybody has caught themselves doing these things. Like it's a very human thing.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (10:48.288)
Absolutely. it would it would really and I hope this is kind of clear in the book that it would be really be a mistake for anybody to read it and think not me though. Like I'm the exception. Right. Yeah. I would never be self deceived. I would never believe a conspiracy theory because actually once you look at the mechanics of how these things might be working, I think we're all really vulnerable to making these kinds of mistakes. Right. So yeah, this is about
PJ Wehry (10:57.986)
Right. That would be irrational. Yes.
PJ Wehry (11:15.994)
Yeah, absolutely.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (11:17.282)
human, not a particular kind of human. It's all of us.
PJ Wehry (11:25.466)
there's couple different ways we can go, but I'm going to so and I should have asked beforehand how to pronounce this. So my apologies. And this is such a weird time to do it, but I should have asked before. And did I say your name right? Yeah, how do you say your name? My apologies. I should have I was like, as soon as I said it, so how do you say your name? My apologies.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (11:37.686)
None.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (11:46.09)
It's Bissett not Bisse.
PJ Wehry (11:49.252)
Dr. Sullivan Bissett, my apologies. So they just slipped my mind. I normally ask that before I get on and record myself. So speaking, I'm glad.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (11:51.03)
There you go.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (11:57.582)
Sorry, my family will enjoy that.
That's the kind of posher version of my name, I'd
PJ Wehry (12:07.961)
Yeah, that's...
Yeah, it's like Deleuze instead of De-loo-zee. you know, like if you want to... Yeah. So how do you pronounce... Is it Acrasia? How do you... of course I got that one right. Okay, that's sure. That one I could have gotten wrong. Okay. That's a fascinating one to me. I mean, this idea and...
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (12:14.922)
Exactly, yeah. I am the Delusy, for sure.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (12:25.122)
Yeah, that'll do. Yeah, a crazier.
PJ Wehry (12:38.734)
You also say that in the literature there is a lot of work done to keep the notions separate, but you start out by saying weakness of will. Can you tell us a little bit about what eukrasia is and maybe give us a everyday example? I immediately thought of just staying in all day on my phone, but that might just be a little too much leaning into the weakness of will. I don't know. So what is eukrasia?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (13:00.174)
No, think your example is probably a good one, depending on the details. But this was a real learning curve for me because when I was asked to write the book, I knew basically nothing about a crazy, I thought I had to actually go and learn it. And I was very pleased to make the main character of that material, a businessman called Fred, obsessed with his new suit. That amused me because I had a toddler called Fred now, I had a baby at the time and I rather enjoyed imagining him in that role.
But a crazier is typically understood as acting against one's method judgement. And that might sound a bit technical. And actually, when you look at the philosophical accounts of a crazier, like what makes an actionocratic, things do get technical quite quickly. But I also think that it's a really easily recognisable phenomenon, right? So I think your example is a good one, but my go-to example is
You're watching TV, know full well it's 11 p.m. You judge that you should really go to bed, right? It's best for you to go to bed. You've got work in the morning. Your toddler will be up at 6 a.m. I'm not at all speaking from experience.
PJ Wehry (14:15.2)
No, not at all. Yeah. I will be honest, this actually is making me uncomfortable because it's putting me in a state of mind where I'm like, I start feeling guilty because I'm like, this is so stupid, but I'm just sitting here. I don't want to get up.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (14:28.398)
Right, exactly, right. you know, the information about your situation is not hidden from you. You clear sightedly judge, really, really should go to bed. But you don't. You just stay on the sofa, watching the next episode of that box set, you just fail to move. And so those are the kinds of cases that people have in mind when they think about a crazier. And I think those are interesting, because before you really think about it, you might just think, look,
PJ Wehry (14:39.311)
Hmm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (14:58.606)
If it's really the case that you have judged that the best thing for you to do is to go to bed, how is it even possible that you don't? How does that even come about? If you really think that's the best thing for you to do, how do you fail to do it? And that's really the interesting question.
PJ Wehry (15:17.936)
Yeah. Is there a communal side to that too? Again, definitely not talking from experience where my wife and I are sitting there and one of the kids starts crying and we look at each other like we should get up. One of us should get up and do, you know, like I should get up and deal with that. Right. I should get up and deal with that. like, like, like, and then my wife looks, she's like, I don't want to. And I look at her and I go, I don't want to either.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (15:32.768)
You
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (15:41.096)
Yeah, that's a really interesting question.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (15:48.93)
That's interesting. I've not thought about those cases. wonder. Yeah, I think one thing that you might say about those cases is that whatever it is that's making you ignore your better judgment is kind of made easier when your partner is also ignoring it too. There's a kind of sense of, like there's a bit of camaraderie about it.
PJ Wehry (16:07.536)
It's so true!
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (16:15.822)
Should I open a bottle of wine? I don't want any, or I won't bother then. But if he's having some too, like, wow, you know, that's really a thing. So I think that, yeah, whatever it is that's making you ignore your better judgment, I can imagine that that kind of stands up and puffs its chest out much more easily when you've got a bad influence on your shoulder doing the same thing. Yeah.
PJ Wehry (16:22.564)
Yes. Yeah.
PJ Wehry (16:37.434)
Yeah.
PJ Wehry (16:42.32)
So we have this example. When they talk about keeping the two notions separate, the weakness of will and the acrasia, why do they feel the need to do that? Not that it's necessarily the right call. It seems like there's some debate about that. But what would be more specific about acrasia that would make it slightly different from that?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (17:06.734)
yeah, that's a really different.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (17:23.042)
Yeah, I'm wondering if that's one of the other ones that we edit out.
PJ Wehry (17:26.296)
Yeah, that's totally fine. Yeah, totally fine. Yeah, I was like, I was just about to say all good.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (17:30.094)
I'm the details and they are failing me.
PJ Wehry (17:35.148)
Yeah, that was pretty, that was specific. is totally, that's all good. No worries.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (17:39.342)
Thanks.
PJ Wehry (17:44.122)
So as we approach a rationality, what are some common misconceptions that people have about a rationality?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (17:53.88)
Yeah, good. I think it's actually quite hard to say how people think in general about irrationality. And maybe that's because of something I said earlier, that it's a concept with quite wide currency, right? So it's not something that's just talked about in philosophy classrooms or universities. It's something that I think most people quite easily reach for and kind of have a sense of what is meant. But maybe one thing that people
might be tempted to is the thought that like irrationality, whatever it is, is not something I want in my life, right? It's a bad thing. And they might think that mental states or actions which exhibit it are in some sense like bad mental states or actions and the kinds of things that we should just want less of. And I guess I'm not sure I'd go as far as to say that's a misconception, but I think it's a bit
uncharitable, it's a bit quick, it kind of fails to really pay attention to the complexity of irrationality. Like, yeah, so if we really want to understand more about human cognition and agency, I just I don't think it helps us to identify something as irrational and just think that's the end of the story, right? So sometimes we get that judgment wrong. But even if we don't, and even if we're right, there's something irrational, I think
PJ Wehry (18:53.136)
Mm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (19:20.366)
paying attention to the wider context of cases can be much more illuminating than simply thinking these things are bad, be gone with them. Irrationality is not something I want, right? yeah, I guess something I said earlier, just sort of, slightly more nuanced approach to understand that it can be much more complicated than the concept of irrationality can tell the story of.
PJ Wehry (19:47.28)
Yeah, I love it. You kind of hinted at it there that you talked about being uncharitable and
because it's such a snap judgment, it's an end of discussion type term. It's like, well, that's irrational. And you you stop the discussion. It encourages uncharitable and ungracious behavior when we recognize that it is a very human thing to be irrational and to, to listen more, to get that wider, but also just to in general have a more gracious and charitable approach. I think it's just a great application, right?
I think, you know, there's a rationality, there's a rational. And then I think and I could be wrong here, but when you talk about that wider currency, I think another word that pops up a lot is unreasonable. Right. And that's a conversation ending word, too. It's like there's some maybe some gendered things there going on to where it's like, she's just unreasonable. And you can say, you know, it's like that's
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (20:34.702)
Mmm.
PJ Wehry (20:50.468)
that's something that people do to end the conversation and make a judgment and kind of move on. And not to see the other person. Is that fair?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (21:01.814)
Yeah, absolutely. think unreasonable, particularly more than irrational. Maybe that's just a kind of like an aspect of the culture. But saying that really just means you're not a worthy interlocutor. You're not credible. You're not somebody with whom it is worth me engaging because you cannot engage in rational ways. And people will say that about, you know, conspiracy theorists, for example. And
I I do think that there's a rationality here, but dismissal is not the way to change minds. And I don't think that the assumption that minds cannot be changed is a good one. Right?
PJ Wehry (21:48.144)
But there's a contextual thing here too, even as I was saying it, in certain contexts sometimes unreasonable, you're like, okay, you're being unreasonable, can be useful, right? Especially at a more personal level. As children, I'm parenting my kids, it's like, you can't, that's unreasonable. children don't need a long explanation. They're not there for a long explanation.
without saying like, that's bad, right? It's like, that's unreasonable, right? When they're like, for instance, know, and we can get into ideas of property and that that gets really, you in our cultures, it's a very touchy subject. But like a child has a ball and it's their ball and they refuse to play with the other kids with it. And it's like, well, you have in our culture, you have that right. But it's unreasonable, you know, and I think that
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (22:42.102)
You've met, yeah, okay, you've met my son, I think.
PJ Wehry (22:44.802)
Yeah, like every kid ever, right? It's like you're like, and that's that. So there are good uses for this term, especially when it's it's not deep seated, right? And there's a there's a pedagogical use for it. Like when you talk about you're talking about dismissal, dismissing something pretty light or where there is some social pressure to like they just need to be like, that doesn't make sense.
I think that can work. then you have, I mean, you're talking about conspiracy theorists, dismissal in that sense, it just entrenches it, right? And so, hmm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (23:13.393)
Hmm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (23:21.494)
Absolutely. Yeah, but I think you're right. Yeah, it can be a kind of cool call to action, right? So if my partner says to me, you know, when we're watching politics or something and I kind of, I don't know, dismiss what the right wing pundit says out of hand and he says, come on, you've been unreasonable, right? That could be a call for me to say, okay, quite right. Let's take this slightly more seriously. So yeah, I can see how that can be a call for action and particularly with children too. Like you're not playing the rules of the game here.
you're not contributing in the way that I expect you to.
PJ Wehry (23:52.848)
Yes.
PJ Wehry (23:58.768)
So we talked a little bit about a crazier and then we what is a strange belief since you mentioned, you mentioned conspiracy theories. I thought that'd be the appropriate place to go next. So, yeah, so and I kind of love that idea because it does. Conspiracy theory, one can sometimes be true, whereas strange belief
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (24:10.414)
Yeah, that's a perfect segue.
PJ Wehry (24:25.07)
general, by definition, is it allowed to be true at all? Like is it or is it seems to be that it's we're talking about when someone has a belief that is untrue and holding to it. Is that the right way to think about that? Or I get that wrong.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (24:37.878)
No, so firstly, if you're picking up there on one of the, the title of the one of the subsections in the book, but I don't take strange belief to be a technical term. I'm just using it to capture cases, which kind of might be of interest, which might be irrational. But I understand that in terms of like rationality constraints that they're breaking. And actually all of the cases that I discuss are usually false, but they don't have to be.
So that doesn't have to be part and parcel of the picture. So I do self-deception, delusion, and conspiracy theories. But you're quite right. Sometimes conspiracy theories are true. It's slightly more difficult to tell a story about self-deception and delusional cases being true, but they're possible. So that wouldn't be part of the package.
PJ Wehry (25:29.402)
Yeah, is this the part of the program where you come out as a flat earther? that the...
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (25:35.31)
I'll save that for the end.
PJ Wehry (25:36.312)
That's like actually, yeah, I saved for the big reveal. So
And then you also have implicit bias. I think this one is, can be a little bit of a hot potato as well. mean, nobody likes being called unreasonable. Well, again, maybe most people don't like being called unreasonable. But I feel like implicit bias, because it's this idea of hidden, that really frustrates people when it's pointed out.
So what is implicit bias and what are some common misconceptions about it?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (26:16.354)
Yeah, absolutely.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (26:22.05)
Yeah, okay. There are lots of misconceptions. So you just stop me if I go on too long. This is a bit...
PJ Wehry (26:25.904)
no, please, please. Yeah, I'm excited.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (26:30.958)
slight hobby horse of mine. So the what is implicit bias question is actually a much, much more difficult question than it sounds. And I don't even try and answer that in the book, because there's a whole philosophical literature on what this thing is. So I tried to stay reasonably non-committal about it. And I think you can have a discussion of implicit bias and rationality without really figuring out what the thing actually is. But
When researchers talk about implicit bias, they're talking about like, whatever it is in the head that has a distorting influence on the way in which you behave and the judgments that you make, right? So the most commonly discussed cases are ones of people who like sincerely express egalitarian beliefs, but they judge or they behave in ways that like, don't look consistent with those beliefs.
Right. So I might believe that men and women are equally good at philosophy, but when I'm teaching and a woman in my class makes a really sophisticated philosophical point, I find myself a bit surprised by that. Whereas I wouldn't be if a man made the point. Right. And the idea is that you can't explain why I'm surprised by appeal to any belief that I have. Right. Because I've just
told you that I believe that men and women are equally good at philosophy, right? So what's going on? And one story you might tell instead is that I have an implicit bias regarding philosophy and which individuals are good at it. So that's the kind of thing that we're thinking about. And there's lots of cases, there are hotter potatoes in this area. So, you know, I might be more likely to interpret the behavior, the kind of benign behavior of a black man as quite aggressive.
But I would think no such thing of a white man engaged in that behavior, right? And again, you're not going to figure out what's going on there by appeal to my beliefs. I don't think black men are more aggressive than white men. And yet something's going on here. Or I might walk into a science lecture and assume that the woman on the stage is a waiter, or is there to introduce the scientist rather than the scientist herself, right? So these kinds of snap judgments that I'm making can't be explained by my beliefs because I have
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (28:57.286)
egalitarian beliefs. So what do we do? And the idea is that there's an implicit bias which is kind of guiding these judgments. So that's kind of roughly what it is. I can talk about misconceptions if you would like.
PJ Wehry (29:11.664)
Yeah, well, before we get to the misconceptions, more about the misconceptions part, particularly, and you know, there's, there's so many different contexts where this conversation happens. And I think we've kind of already touched on this in regards to irrationality. How can we have more gracious and charitable? What are some ways to talk to people about implicit bias that encourages charitable and
gracious conversations.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (29:44.462)
sort of wish I knew.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (29:49.868)
Because people do get upset and I completely understand that, right? So, and this was one of the misconceptions that I was gonna mention, like, you know, the most obvious one is the idea that if you've got my kind of right kind of beliefs, if you don't have beliefs, which are sexist and racist and ableist, then you're in the clear, right? And that's a really tempting and comforting thought, right? That's gonna keep you warm at night thinking about yourself.
PJ Wehry (29:59.396)
Yes, please.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (30:19.766)
especially if you think of yourself and pride yourself on kind of caring about fairness and equality. But like, I'm really sorry to tell you it's false, right? So basically all of us have biases of this kind. And I mean, maybe that's the way in, right? So when we talk about bias, it's not accusatory. I'm not calling you kind of cognitively lazy for not having sorted this problem out that you've got in the head. I actually think that
If you think about the causes of bias, which is kind of the environment that we all live in, then it's a shared problem. It's a problem we all have, regardless of our best intentions and our explicit beliefs. that's the kind of only way in, I think, to just make it a problem that is shared, not a problem that is just a problem for white men, for example.
PJ Wehry (31:12.936)
I love that you said that because I just had Dr. Shumita Dasgupta on and she talked about the biological side of bias. And one of the ways she opened up the introduction to her book was talking about her taking, she's a woman of color in a STEM field. She teaches and does practices medicine. And she took the implicit bias test.
Yeah, association. Yes. And, and she found that she had a bias against women of color in STEM. And she said it was mortifying for her, but the fact that she shared that story first really kind of opens the way. Right. And I think that's, yeah, I love that you, that you said that, but like, cause when I, when I read that, was, it really helped me like lower my guard. Right. And I, you know, I want to come with my guard lowered, but you still, you're like,
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (31:57.24)
Yeah, absolutely.
PJ Wehry (32:11.426)
I like, you're just waiting for like, am I going to get called racist or ableist in the middle of this conversation? And it's like, it doesn't feel good, right?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (32:20.782)
No, exactly. Actually, I had a similar experience. I took an implicit association test to do with women and careers. And apparently, I find it very difficult to imagine that women could have careers, like, you know, as a woman with a career. So it's quite humbling. Yeah, those kinds of cases are good ones to start with, because it just really demonstrates that this is a shared problem.
PJ Wehry (32:46.638)
Hmm. Which means we can have a shared solution too, right? And I think that's like, yeah, which is kind of what we need. Like it's not like putting all the onus on just like one person, you know, it's like, you know, even, even the idea that like, we should have, I think, state kind of, kind of interventions at certain points, but be like, if we have this one state intervention,
then this problem will go away. And it's like, no, doesn't work that way. We have to, this is something that we work on together and cooperation in general is, yeah.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (33:22.158)
Absolutely.
Yeah, and not just work on together, but work on systematically. It's a kind of, it's not the kind of thing you can train yourselves out of in half an hour, which is kind of another one of the misconceptions, right? So you will often see people talk of implicit bias training, and that word really rather gives the impression that one can train away one's biases, right? If you go to a corporate 45 minute session on implicit bias and voila, you're cured, it's fine.
And, know, I think there's a place for training, although I wouldn't use that word loosely conceived, but I also worry that when we talk about training and we market it in that way, it can lead to a bit of complacency, but like tick that box, problem solved.
PJ Wehry (34:10.636)
It kind of gives this idea of like almost going to the gym like you get implicit bias reps, you know, it's like that's not Doesn't work that way
If you don't mind, I'd love to ask a little bit more about kind of the structures that you talk about, not the structures, you have a couple of these, like the difference between epistemic and practical rationality. Do you mind talking through that a little bit? Because I think too, that helps us see there's the ivory tower, which should exist discussions. And then there's like on the ground kind of discussions. Can you talk a little about epistemic and rationality?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (34:35.799)
Yeah.
PJ Wehry (34:51.886)
sorry, epistemic and practical rationality.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (34:54.678)
Yeah, it's funny you heard it in the way that you heard it because actually both sides of that distinction are kind of ivory tower. yeah, the distinction is really about what the thing that is being judged as rational or irrational is. So epistemic rationality has to do with our mental lives, most obviously beliefs. So it will track things like...
PJ Wehry (35:02.288)
You
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (35:21.378)
whether your beliefs are consistent, whether they're responsive to evidence and so on. But practical rationality is not about, you know, not being in a university setting, it's just about action in general, right? So maybe whether your actions align with your goals and so on. So the book caters for both. So rationality and so, epistemic rationality, the strange belief stuff and practical rationality is the crazier stuff.
PJ Wehry (35:45.264)
Mm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (35:49.058)
Right, because a crazy is about acting in ways that are against your better judgment.
PJ Wehry (35:58.8)
And how would you go about applying the two different kinds? seems like, instance, people can believe in a flat earth and still live relatively normal lives, right? Until it sort of pops up, generally. so whereas if you have a crazy, it seems like that would. How does that flesh itself out on a day to day basis?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (36:24.792)
Yeah, that's interesting. I suppose, yeah, the practical rationality is kind of much more noticeable to an observer, right? Whereas I can have all sorts of strange beliefs and as long as I don't express them, so I don't tell anybody, you wouldn't know. I hadn't thought about it like that, but epistemic rationality is typically thought to be like something that...
PJ Wehry (36:39.546)
haha
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (36:50.51)
You know, it doesn't matter how you behave. If you believe that seven plus three is 12, it doesn't matter that you never express it. It doesn't matter that it doesn't affect any of your actions. Something has gone wrong here, right? You've failed to properly respond to the evidence or you've failed to be coherent or something. Whereas I guess practical rationality is much more holistic in that it's looking at the way in which your mental lives, like your judgment about what you should do,
interacts with your physical life, how you move around in the world. So the epistemic stuff is kind of much more contained, like in the head. The practical stuff is really about the relationship between what's in the head and what you go on to do.
PJ Wehry (37:36.763)
Would it be fair? And this is a strange example. So maybe this doesn't work, but it kind of feels like in some ways, epistemic rationality is like a warning light in your car that something could go wrong. whereas like practical rationality is like you have a leak, right? Like this is something that, yeah. Cause what like, you're like, if you do have, it's not necessarily that anything is going to go wrong, but it is a warning sign that there might be something going on in your thought processes. If you have.
For instance, a strange belief.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (38:10.754)
Yeah, that's true. Especially if you like, like I do think that beliefs are at base, the kinds of things which help you navigate the environment, they guide you around the world, right? So, you know, maybe I've got a really kind of innocuous false belief that Pluto is purple, like, that's fine. It's never really going to matter. But some of my beliefs might not be so innocuous. So you might think of them as kind of a warning light, like, you know, don't act on that one, right? Don't don't place any bets on
on this one being true, right? So that can be really problematic for you as you're kind of trying to navigate the world. So that's a quite nice way of thinking about it. Whereas the practical rationality, it's already too late. You've already failed to go to bed, right? So the car's already leaking.
PJ Wehry (38:53.648)
Yeah, yeah. And then what is the difference between you talk about structural and substantive rationality? Where does that break down?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (39:06.368)
Yeah, this is quite a technical distinction that I hadn't really thought about in those terms before I came across it. So bear with me. But the headline is that structural rationality relates to the combination of your attitudes. And it's something that somebody could diagnose without knowing the contents of those attitudes, whereas substantive rationality has to do with the broader picture. Right. So
PJ Wehry (39:15.962)
Yeah.
PJ Wehry (39:31.088)
Hmm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (39:35.288)
Philosophers like to denote propositions or the contents of beliefs, right? So I might label your belief that grass is green as the belief that pea. I might also label your belief that dogs are made of cucumber as the belief that pea. So if I'm told that you believe that pea, I don't really have anything to go on with respect to whether your belief is irrational. need to know what that pea stands for. But if I'm told that
you believe that P and you believe that not P, I don't need to know what P stands for, right? I already know you've made a mistake, you're in an irrational state of mind because P and not P are not consistent, whatever P stands for, right? It could be dogs and cucumbers, it could be grass being green. So one of the rationality constraints on belief is that one's beliefs are consistent. So that would be a case of structural rationality. Doesn't matter what it stands for, you've made an error. But substantive rationality requires more information, right? So
PJ Wehry (40:27.844)
Yes.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (40:34.21)
Pea might be grass is green or dogs are made of cucumber. And if I'm asked to say whether your belief that pea is rational or not, I don't know, right? Because if it is, it doesn't arise from the structure of your attitudes, it arises from the contents. Right, exactly.
PJ Wehry (40:47.536)
the substance. Okay. Yes. That's very helpful. Thank you. I want to be respectful of your time and I really appreciate you walking through this with me today. As we come to a conclusion here, what is some everyday common advice you can give about our own irrationality? Not necessarily. It sounds like
Trying to avoid the the reps on irrationality, right? Like, but what is it? What is some everyday advice you'd give about rationality?
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (41:22.7)
Yeah. Yeah.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (41:30.626)
I guess something we said at the beginning, which is that it's really worth guarding against ever thinking of yourself as an exception. It's really tempting to think, I would never believe that, I would always respond to the evidence. So it's really tempting to think that you'd never be as careless as kind of Fred the businessman in the book.
PJ Wehry (41:39.12)
Mm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (41:53.024)
or you'd never believe a conspiracy theory, or you'd never talk yourself into believing that your partner's faithful when she clearly isn't, or you'd never become delusional, or you'd never have a visit by us and so on. Because, you know, once you look under the hood and look at the mechanics of these, I just think that we're all vulnerable to having these kinds of attitudes depending on the circumstances. And I guess more generally, I would really just express
PJ Wehry (42:11.45)
Mm-hmm.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (42:20.27)
some slightly earnest comments that I had at the end of the book. So, you know, this is slightly cringe, but, you know, I think we should recognize that things are just really complicated. And you just shouldn't think that once you judge something as irrational, you just put it in a bin. Like, because it's really difficult to be sure that something's irrational. And even if we are sure, it's quite difficult to say why it's irrational, what's going on, what we should do about it. So
We're much more complicated creatures than the language or the rationality can properly do justice to.
PJ Wehry (42:56.762)
Hmm. Yeah, that's a beautiful and gracious answer. Dr. Sullivan Bissett, it's been an absolute joy having you on today. Thank you.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (43:08.344)
Thank you, thank you for having me.