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Even if your Android is fully compromised,
your device is still secure because
there is this independent second world
that is in charge of security.
I just wanted to start
by asking what's new,
especially when it comes to consumers.
So yes, today we are at Ledger Op3n
in Paris and we announced
our new product is Ledger Atom.
We wanted to fix the following problem.
We wanted to have the user experience
that you have on the Android-based device
with the security of the Ledger device.
And we merged those two things
in the same device.
So if I, you know, a lot of people
might hear this and they already have
a Pixel or they have a Samsung device.
What is the difference between
the security that's typically found
in a Ledger device and what's
not in their device?
Yeah.
So if you want to have
a very high level of security,
such as a use case, such as crypto,
you need several different properties.
The first one is to have a secure enclave
where you will be able to generate secrets
with a very high entropy and so on.
The second one also is that the secrets
must stay inside the enclave
when you are doing cryptography.
That means that you need to implement the
cryptography within the secure enclave.
And the last one is the display.
You need to have a way
to trust what is displayed on your screen.
When you are using a Google Pixel,
there are secure elements inside,
but there is a first problem.
The first problem is that we
are not allowed to load our own
operating system and cryptography
inside the secure element.
You can use a StrongBox,
for instance, on Android.
What it will do is simply wrapping
your keys, but as soon as you need
to sign a transaction, you will need
to ask StrongBox to give you your keys
and then compute the signature
in the rich OS side of things.
So that means that your keys are exposed
to any software attacks.
And there was another issue,
which is the display.
Because, for instance, you might think
about this kind of attack where you think
you are about to sign a transaction
that is like sending 0.1 Bitcoin
to your friend, while under the hood, this
is another transaction that is signed.
As you don't have a strong
link between what is displayed
and what is actually happening,
then you cannot trust your display.
So this is the two main things
that are missing today
on the current Android-based architecture,
and this is what we are solving
with Ledger Atom.
So with the screen,
kind of just to summarize that,
what you're saying is that there's pieces
of malware, so if someone gets infected,
the malware can essentially trick.
It'll still show the send transaction,
don't send transaction,
or install this software, don't install
this software, but it pretty much changes
what it looks like someone is doing.
Exactly.
Got it.
And so when that happens,
when I looked at the demo device,
there was a bar on the top.
It's like this little ledger bar
that says it's secure.
Is that when that feature is activated?
Yeah, exactly.
So you have these two worlds
that are running in parallel.
You have Android that is displaying
the Android application, and you have
the secure zone that is displaying
the secure world, as if it would
be like an individual independent device.
And then you have this secure bar
at the top of the screen
that indicates what is displayed.
Is it the secure world
or is it the Android world?
Otherwise, you might imagine a malware
that makes you think
that you are in the secure zone.
So that's why there was this secure bar
that indicates if it's Android
that is actually displayed
or if it's the secure zone.
Got it.
And so something on stage that you were
talking about and many other people
as well that we're presenting
this device is that there seems
to be kind of two issues, right?
There's convenience and the typical
smartphone device that a lot
of people carry in their pockets.
It does a million things.
It has access to their whole life.
And then you have things
that are very focused on high security,
like a hardware wallet, like many of the
previous devices you guys have launched.
And the goal with this device
is to bring those a bit closer together.
Now, a lot of our audience I know is more
on the, like they want a smartphone that's
more private and secure and or open source
and that's kind of what they're targeting.
So it was very clear though,
and you even said to set expectations,
that this is coming more from
that security perspective first and then
you're trying to build that in later.
Is that kind of a correct way
to phrase how you guys are handling this?
No, this is a correct way to present it.
However, privacy is also something
that is very important for us.
On the Android porting,
we are putting a specific attention
to privacy, for instance.
We won't go as far as GrapheneOS,
for instance, but we are taking plenty
of ideas from Graphene that will
be inside the porting of Android.
On top of this, we also
have a privacy switch.
This switch is able to cut directly
the access of the microphone
and the camera to the power line.
That means that when you switch it off,
like in hardware, it's switched off.
And we have this kind
of small privacy features.
Nice.
And so let's say I use, like I love
to use Signal, ProtonMail, a VPN.
It sounded like there's almost a new
platform or a new way, potentially
in the future, for apps to be able
to use that secure element of the phone.
By default, they probably don't or won't,
but apps can choose to use that.
Is that correct?
Yeah, exactly.
This is totally correct.
On the secure element,
we have our operating system that provides
plenty of cryptographic primitives.
And it's possible to anyone to load
its own application on the secure element.
On the Android side, so if you think
about Signal, so Signal is great.
It does like end-to-end encryption
from you to me so that if anyone is trying
to spy the communication,
like everything is encrypted,
it cannot deduce any information.
However, if I have a malware on my phone,
whenever I read my Signal message,
the malware is able
to read my conversation.
And by the way, that's
not science fiction.
There are Pegasus and all the software
that are doing this.
And unfortunately,
those attacks cost even less now with AI.
So what we could do is to do a porting
of the Signal so that the message is
actually decrypted within the secure zone.
So as soon as you receive a message,
you could click on the message, it would
switch automatically to the secure zone,
and then the message would be decrypted
and displayed by the secure world.
So this is a part of the primitives.
We don't do the porting of signal,
but technically it's possible.
Yeah, that's very cool.
I mean, I think the way
that it was presented on stage
was end-to-end encrypted to the element.
So like theoretically,
if two people have like a ledger phone,
they're both using Signal.
And theoretically, if there's a Signal
that goes down to the secure element,
even malware installed on both people's
devices wouldn't be able to access,
which is a pretty impressive thing.
Because even Meredith is very public
about the fact that Signal doesn't
really target endpoint security.
It's something that users kind
of have to handle.
Exactly.
Very cool.
So in the future,
do you hope to prioritize
more of that like consumer market?
or is this always something
that you guys see as a niche product
for high security individuals?
I think security
and privacy shouldn't be a niche.
I think everyone is becoming
very aware that, especially with AI,
that the stakes become really higher
when it comes to security.
So the retail market is our first market
and I think it's not a niche
and I think the needs
for security are growing over time.
So I think that there
will be a big success for this product.
Crypto is definitely an important use case
because this is a use case where security
is so paramount, but security is important
for many different use cases.
Messaging is one of them.
At the end, we are creating
like a security platform.
It's a technology platform.
So targeting a go-to-market
that would be more enterprise-focused
or government-focused is totally possible.
It's more about creating the go-to-market
and getting the certification,
for instance, if you target government
and this kind of thing.
This is a part of the thing that we have
in mind, but we are definitely starting
with the retail.
Very nice.
And I know it's really bad timing with all
these things because in the last few days,
there's been that implant attack where
people were reading the screens and kind
of getting around the secure enclave.
But you guys mentioned on stage
that you're planning to pretty much extend
the protections of the device so that even
if someone tries to tamper with the screen
or get into the device at all,
it would still trigger.
What does that look like?
Let's say I'm an attacker.
I intercept this phone
as it's being shipped out.
I try to get in and let's say
I somehow got in and changed something
and then I got it to the person's door.
What would actually happen
to that person now?
So for this kind of attack,
there are like two main ways.
Either you make your device
so simple that anyone can verify
that it's the one that is expected.
So our current devices can be opened
and so on, so you can inspect.
And the second solution is to create
a solution that is robust enough
so that if someone is trying to probe,
modify or anything, it would be detected.
And for Atom, we went through
that route and we worked
for months because the problem
of this solution, of this path,
is that it's much more difficult.
Creating a solution that is robust enough
so that a very motivated attacker,
that like a large criminal organization,
wouldn't be able to break,
that's something that is not easy.
So we worked during months with the Donjon
team that is doing offensive security
and the the hardware team
that was designing this shield in order
to make it robust and resistant.
So we also filed patent
because we did plenty of innovation.
And the idea is to create an active shield
so that if ever you are trying
to move the shield, it would be detected
directly and send a bit directly
to the secure element explaining
that the shield was removed.
And also there was a mesh
circuit that is active.
And if you're trying to drill
into this shield, the circuit is sending
a signal every few microseconds.
And you have like a monitor
that are verifying that the signal arrives
at the right time and so on.
So if you drill into this, like you
would break the circuit and it
would be detected directly.
So that means there is also like a small
cell in order to have battery,
even if the big battery is drained.
So this is all that we have built.
It's much more complicated than this, but
in the main line, this is how it works.
Very cool.
And you teased very briefly
that you're going to retroactively apply
that to your current products as well.
What does that process look like?
That won't be the exact same mechanism
because it completely depends
on the design and so on.
And we won't take the millions of devices
that we created to put this inside
and that wouldn't fit, by the way.
So that won't be the same techniques.
So what we are doing is mostly two things.
So first of all,
strengthening the supply chain security.
So on the manufacturing,
on our supply facility, everything
is very well controlled and so on.
When it comes to our authorized reseller,
we will strengthen the requirements
and audits and so on.
So this is the first part
that we are doing.
So it's ongoing and we will continue.
And on the device side, we will add
an additional countermeasure in order
to give higher guarantee to the user
that the device that he receives
was not tampered during the transport.
I won't explain how it works yet
because we are accelerating on this.
We have several different tracks,
and it's not completely settled
which one will be chosen,
but something will happen, yes.
Got it.
Just a couple more questions here.
Post-quantum, I feel like it's shared
a lot, and there's been a few algorithms
now that have been advertised
as post-quantum, and then we found some
pretty severe vulnerabilities in those,
and NIST actually had to roll them back.
So how can we right now
in 2026 confidently say that a device
is post-quantum for the next...
because we don't know when Q-Day happens.
So what kind of confidence do we have
in the post-quantum right now?
So what you refer to is the attack
that happened on Hawk and others,
and they are part of the second wave
of standardization.
We have the first wave of standardization
that have standardized ML-DSA, FN-DSA,
and hash-based cryptography.
And on these three, we have strong
confidence that they are secure.
At the end, you never know because this
is how our asymmetric cryptography works.
It's just a matter of putting all
the cryptographers working on those trying
to break them doing cryptanalysis.
And if after like 30 years,
this is what we are talking
about for lattices,
if after 30 years, like nothing progressed
and the best attack still requires several
times the age of the universe to break it,
then we think it's secure.
So this is how like cryptography works.
And for the ones that are already
standardized, this is where we are.
We never know, especially
with LLM where like mathematical
like research is going so fast.
So we never know, but we think confidently
that these three at least are secure.
For the second wave, it will take a few
more years where cryptographers are trying
to attack each other.
And we need a second wave because
the first wave was very conservative
and we ended up with quantum algorithms
that are producing very large
signatures and so on.
So there are plenty of engineering
trade-offs that are not so good.
So that's why we are trying
to do lightweight, more lightweight
post-quantum cryptography.
This is the second wave.
And at the end, maybe the solution
is crypto agility, meaning that when you
build the system, your system must be able
to be upgraded to another quantum
signature algorithm just in case
the previous one would be broken.
And on our side, we have an operating
system that can be upgraded.
So when we say we are quantum-ready,
that means that we are integrating
the current standardized
post-quantum signature algorithm.
But if they are new to be added,
we can also upgrade our system.
Very cool.
And the last question I have
is just on usability.
I feel like if someone's interested
in the phone, I feel like the main thing
for the regular person to decide,
is this a phone I should buy at all?
Is it a secondary phone
or is it a primary phone?
Is app compatibility?
So I kind of heard that it might be GMS
compatible, but I know a lot of people
might not like the privacy implications
of going with just regular Google
Play services on the device.
So I know it's a bit early
and the device isn't fully decided yet,
but what are your guys' thoughts
on kind of app compatibility
and the different approaches to doing
that with, is it Ledger OS or Atlas OS?
We have a Ledger operating system
on the secure zone, and for the Android
Zone, this is a regular Android,
and we target to obtain GMS.
So for now, we don't have it.
So we cannot say that we are GMS
compatible because we primarily target
the support of every single Android
application rather than the privacy
feature that you have without GMS,
which are more like the tracking provided
by Google that would be removed.
So the trade-off that we've chosen
was more to have like more compatibility
with more apps and so on because
more and more, like the apps,
for instance, like banking apps
and other apps do not run on Graphene
because of the requirements and so on.
So we prefer going to GMS for this reason.
Makes a lot of sense.
Do you have any,
I know it's tough because you want
to make this a high security phone.
Is there any thought or like maybe down
the road you'll allow like unlocking
a bootloader to flash something else
and then relock the bootloader?
Or is that, I know these questions
are very speculative, and just wondering.
So we don't really plan
to unlock the bootloader, but at the end,
the device architecture is such that even
if your Android is fully compromised,
your device is still secure because there
is this independent, autonomous second
world that is in charge of security.
So even in our model,
like your Android is fully compromised.
As long as you verify
that you are on the secure mode
and what you do on your secure mode
is exactly what you want, all the assets
that are in the secure world stay secure.
So this is really the power
of this architecture.
And I won't ever say that the Android
part won't have vulnerabilities.
Plenty of vulnerabilities,
plenty of maybe exploits.
We will do the secure
updates all the time.
But at the end, it doesn't really matter
because the security is on the other side.
Yeah, I mean, I think the way
to put it is if someone doesn't have
that secure side of the operating system,
if malware gets on your phone
and you unlock your password manager,
sometimes you don't have
to unlock your password manager.
All that data is gone, all your messages.
But if someone theoretically
has that element,
they'll never get the actual hard things.
They're not going to get your seeds
from your cryptocurrency wallet.
They're not going to get your password.
So it's a cool system.
I hope it gets adopted
by other phone companies as well.
So I think it's pretty
revolutionary stuff.
So thank you guys for everything.
And thank you, of course, for your time.
I know you guys are crazy busy right now.
Thank you.
Yeah.