A new podcast focused on issues around technology and change in organisations, hosted by Public Digital.
Tom Loosemore (00:00)
Hello. You're listening to PD Cast, the podcast from Public Digital, where we talk about technology and change in organisations. I'm Tom Loosemore, one of PD's founders, and in this episode I'm joined by one of my colleagues and also fellow co-founders, Andrew Greenway, and the Digital Luminee Jen Palka, former Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the US and co-founder of the Recoding America Fund.
Together and separately, Jen and Andrew have written extensively on the topic of state capacity, including co-authoring a report called 'The How We Need Now in 2024'. This was a follow-up to a paper that Andrew and I wrote together called 'The Radical How' a few months before. And in this month's issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, which I'm holding in my hands, they wrote a fantastic article called 'Democracies Need.
Creative destruction, how to make government work again'. And in this piece, which I think will form the centerpiece of the conversation today, they make the argument that failing democracies around the world need to take radical action. And in particular, they need to learn how to set up, reinvigorate new institutions and potentially close some old ones, if public trust and state capacity is going to be restored and improved. I'm thrilled to have both of them, they could talk the hind legs of donkeys.
individually and collectively I'm sure they're gonna be fantastic. So Jen and Andrew, hello and thank you very much for joining us today.
Andrew Greenway (01:29)
Hello?
Jennifer Pahlka (01:29)
Great to
great to be here.
Tom Loosemore (01:31)
Cool. If if I might start with a question for you for you, Jen, which is around inspiration. Like what inspired you to start writing you know, what what inspired the article in in Foreign Affairs? I mean a great place to place great magazine to place an article. But where where did the genesis of this thinking come from?
Jennifer Pahlka (01:47)
It came from Andrew actually. we had we had done this paper together, the How We Need Now, as you say, inspired by the Radical How, sort of a a version of that for the US and trying to set for a burgeoning state capacity community, like what the agenda should be. If you want to do work on state capacity, what does that mean? And so that had had great impact. And Andrew said, okay, new year, what are we gonna do together this year? And
we had a lot of different options. And to me, it was his idea to work on new institutions. And by the way, it had a much better title for it. I mean, the title is fine, But but Andrew referred to this all the way from the beginning to almost the end when they changed it as the Department of Now, which is very evocative. and it just instantly for me when I looked at the list of stuff that he was proposing we do together, that was the one that I felt like
we needed to dig into. here I am in the US where you have, at that point we're just a year out of DOGE and the big sort of earthquake that happened in the federal government and everybody grappling with that. And it really felt like that was the thing we needed to talk about was there are
institutions that we have tried and tried and tried to reform and you come to the conclusion at some point that they are simply not reformable, is what you do just eliminate them or is there a better option? And it seems to me it needed to be part of the dialogue here in a very critical way.
Tom Loosemore (03:15)
Yeah, thank you. I think that the whole we'll come onto DOGE later and what they can teach us both positively and potentially negatively as well about how to approach a recognition that there are issues with the state's ability to get anything done. but Andrew, if I could just ask you the really hard question, which is like someone says to you, What on earth are you talking about when you're talking about state capacity? Can you answer that question? Like, what is it?
Andrew Greenway (03:36)
Yeah, it is a bit jargony
But it's simplest. It's I think the ability for the institutions of government to connect political promises to the reality that the public experience is that connection. And one of the reasons why we used democracy and to some extent sovereignty as devices in the in the paper that we wrote in Foreign Affairs was a lot of people feel that connection just isn't really there in their democracies. And a lot of the reactions that you're seeing
terms of populism and and cut a other other elements of people not seeing that connection anymore. So at its very simplest it is connecting what politicians promise and say when they kinda get elected to stuff that the public sees and and crucially feels like this stuff is about style and substance.
Tom Loosemore (04:19)
But to be a devil's advocate, politicians have always promised the impossible. what's the difference here?
Andrew Greenway (04:24)
I think there's a few things going on, but the the thing that's most obvious and most visceral in this moment in 2026 is people's expectations have changed. you more than anyone, Tom, have encapsulated this in various definitions of digital. But I think that's that's really germane and relevant here. I'm not saying that people were more patient necessarily 25, 30 years ago, but
the gap I think people experience in their interactions with the state versus those they experience in other parts of their lives has widened and widened. and inevitably we talk about AI in a bit in the paper and I'm sure we'll get onto it in this conversation too, but there's absolutely no sense that expectations gap and the speed at which those expectations can diverge is going to close any time soon.
Jennifer Pahlka (05:09)
I think that you were right that politicians promise what they cannot deliver a lot, but I think they just need a framework for thinking about the work they have been hugely neglecting, right? So that was
More maybe in the paper and Andrew and I did earlier, and certainly in the radical how for sure, is you know I think there's this moment in the US where we're explaining a better policy isn't gonna get you the outcome you intend if it is executed by an operating model that is left in the industrial era. And once you see that, you kind of can't unsee it. and I think that that's starting to happen here, but
they have to get that the promises will continue to be unfulfilled until you work on the operating model, the stuff that nobody cares about, the stuff that makes your eyes glaze over, you know, these these elements like civil service and the procedures and the incentives in the system that are not the things that the fancy people are gonna come to the table with.
Tom Loosemore (06:19)
Yeah, and I d I think could not agree more with that. it's politically unglamorous, but utterly essential to fix the capacity of the state to make change. But I just come back to sort of just a little bit on sort of the political theory of this, which is on one level there's lots of use of the word radical. Radical how, radicalism,
But you can also make an argument this is inherently conservative. This is about keeping institutions, public institutions, relevant, rather than throwing it all away and blowing it all up and, that kind of creative destruction. There's an interesting tension between the language of creative destruction from the sort of commercial Adam Smith world and the kind of Burke-ian and don't let our institutions rot. And Andrew, I wonder how do you how do you see it from a sort of political theory perspective, this this thinking?
Andrew Greenway (07:02)
Yeah, I'd love to get into the political philosophy. I shouldn't be indulged too much on this. But we use Burke at the end of the quote to tie up the piece at the end that a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. And Burke arguably was the sort of, you know, the founding figure of conservativism. So like there is clearly a facet about that. and I'm a fairly unabashed conservative when it comes to democracy. Like, I think it's quite a good thing. And I
I think Jen and I share that belief and share that kind of belief in institutions and the idea of institutions. and maybe we're sort of slightly odd characters in this debate because we're sort of we're skeptics about the state and its current form because we believe in government rather than despite that. and I think the radicalism doesn't come in the sort of the few sort of
Robespierre, let's start again, but applying some of that creative destruction theory, the kind of shumpeter stuff for the private sector but in government. I think we should be far more radical about that. and I remember as sort of as a civil servant, and Jen and I always take great pains and really mean it when we say we write with great sympathy with civil servants. This is not about bashing officials.
But when you are in the thick of it, I think it's incredibly hard to step out of that kind of context and really see that these things can be changed and quite quite significantly changed when you're really swimming in that soup. so yes, in the kind of in totality, there's an element of institutional conservatism. We believe in the state and we believe the state can be better and can do good things. But within those confines, I think there's a lot room for a lot more radicalism.
Tom Loosemore (08:37)
Yeah, and you alluded to DOGE earlier and you also talk in the piece about the breakdown in faith and democracy in the US. I mean, what's your take on how DOGE approached this, not so much at the headline level, but with your knowledge of what they actually did under the bonnet? Like how close were they to getting this right, or were they just completely in Robespierre and let's blow it all up and hope something better emerges.
Jennifer Pahlka (08:57)
There's really not one DOGE, I think is the issue. There are a lot of different people. There was a sort of a core group that came in that was essentially mostly young men who worshipped Elon Musk.
who had an idea of what they were gonna do and even those folks ended up a lot of them saying, wait, this is not what I thought I was gonna do, right? I thought I was gonna come in and write software that fixed government.
And instead we we came in and canceled contracts. I actually think that there is some value in some of the contracts that were canceled. I mean, anyone who's ever worked in government knows that there's often stuff going on that really should be rebooted just you know at that level. but you know, before DOGE started, there was actually going to be two leaders of it: Elon Musk and a guy named Vivek Ramaswamy. Elon talked about the chains.
You know, to the workforce essentially. And Vivek Ramaswamy talked more about reducing regulation. Now, that can mean reducing regulations that protect our environment, things that I might actually quite value, but it can also mean reducing the regulations that hold government back from doing what it needs to do. That we've really constrained government so much by
that set of regulations that it's hard as everyone knows, it's almost impossible to get anything done. Ramaswamy ended up not coming to DC and being part of DOGE. So we don't know what he would have done, but many folks have sort of pointed out that
The biggest impact that DOGE had was cutting the workforce. They did not bother to go to Congress and ask for changes in the rules that govern reductions enforced before they did it, which meant that the reductions enforced were um targeted in many cases the absolute wrong people, getting rid of people who had just joined, who had lots of new energy and new thoughts, and leaving in place folks.
who
the small percentage of public servants who really had not given up and was probably time for them to leave those people, just to keep their jobs. So you saw already this sort of unwillingness to do the hard work of changing policies and procedures. And they did not do a lot of the things that, you know, if I had had a magic wand, I would have had them waive. They really had a magic wand. They had a trifecta here. They could have waved.
It at some of the procedures we have, like the Paperwork Reduction Act, which, you know, luckily your folks don't have things like this. or maybe you have things like it, but you don't, you are not plagued by the comically misnamed Paperwork Reduction Act, which makes a public servant here go through a minimum nine-month procedure in order to get approval to do any kind of information collection, even really user res basic user research. This is the kind of thing they could have gone after.
That would have had, I think, enormous positive impact, and too often they didn't. I will say some of them have stuck around and have learned that in fact this is work that needs to be done. And should they decide to come aboard our coalition of folks that want to see that kind of procedural reform and they now have their battle scars, we will welcome them.
Tom Loosemore (12:22)
Thank you, thank you. That's a that's a depth of perspective on DOGE that we just don't tend to get in the UK. So thank you. That's really fascinating. And Andrew, just to sort of shift to the UK for a second. I mean, would you see reform of the political party as a sort of s symptom of the lack of state capacity? And you know, would do you do you harbour any any kind of hope that they may take some lessons from DOGE?
Andrew Greenway (12:46)
I think it's right to say that reforms certainly feel like they're best understood as a response to the same underlying issues that you're you're seeing in the US. And I think that is important to acknowledge here. Like the public, by definition, aren't wrong in the democracy, in the sense that they do feel frustrated by the machine not coming in and delivering. And can reform party make this this better? That's sort of
depends whether their rhetoric fits the reality of what they would bring if they were in government. So I think the rhetoric of reform is quite interesting in terms of their public position on this. They're sort of talking up the idea of the state as this corrupt entity. And, you know, well and are able to point out things like contracts being given to large outsourced companies who have
materially failed and visibly failed on several occasions. And if you're a member of the public, you look at that and you go, Well else these people are on the take. This is what people will say on Reddit. How how on earth can they be getting this gig? They're clearly terrible. now I personally don't believe that the state is corrupt in that sense, or if it is, it's only very bad at the margins. But it is corrupted in the sense of like an old tape. But those two things are slightly different and I think the remedies for them are different.
and I think if the reform party believes its own rhetoric that the state is corrupt, then it'll end up going at the wrong things and won't actually improve the delivery and we'll probably kind of go down a similar path to the one that Jen described in the early days of DOGE, where there's certain cuts that you can make that can be easy but won't actually make a great deal of difference. Uh state reform state reform's hard, right?
Tom Loosemore (14:27)
For me the smell of performative action would be imminent. that's kind of sadly where my amongst the possibly the least of our worries with reform, but there'll definitely be some performative chain store style dojacks and would be would be my would be my hunch.
Andrew Greenway (14:40)
Well,
let me try a really kind of like a really optimistic version, right? So like the sort of the bedrock of reform in that site set of politics in the UK, as indeed in the US, is this sense of control and like the people in power actually using their power to appear to do stuff. And that fits with sovereignty, which is obviously this big animating force in the Brexit conversation.
but as an organisation or a government having the agency and capacity to make decisions. And any party coming in that sort of takes a look at this and goes, well, the state doesn't have that agency and capacity and we need to build it is the one that stands the best chance
of delivering more effectively for its citizens. Which isn't a particularly partisan point. Do I think reform are gonna get there? I'm not sure. It'd be nice.
Tom Loosemore (15:25)
yeah, be a miracle. anyway, that's my nearly retired cynicism being displayed there. Although as someone who's nearly retired, it would be quite nice to be able to get my pension, which I currently can't do, because we've outsourced the provision of public pensions to Capita, who have manifestly failed, and I'm at least a year away from getting the pension of which I am due.
So Jen, let's imagine for a moment that you have been given the magic wand to transform state capacity in a country, let's say, the US. and you can do I don't know again, three things overnight that would
potentially start the journey of of transforming state capacity and s the state's ability to to deliver those political promises. What would those three magic wand things be?
Jennifer Pahlka (16:06)
good, I'm looking forward to this magic wand. Thanks for telling me it's coming. you know, Andrew and I talk at the end of this piece about the observation that in fact what you're doing when you restart an institution
Is you're getting it away from some of the defaults that that keep us from that keeps these institutions from being successful. So for instance, part of the reason you would start over is you can get exceptions to, for instance, the civil service rules. But every time we do that, we are just proving the point that the defaults don't work. Too often people say, well, the system kind of works because we can work around it instead of saying this is clear evidence that this
only works when it is subverted. And so ultimately all of that
instinct, I think, to start over, is it truly an instinct to work on those defaults at a much more fundamental and structural level. So if I had a magic wand, the first thing I would do would be to pass comprehensive civil service reform here in the US. Because everything else will derive from that. Until you can get and until you can get the right people in not just, it's it's not just about the hiring process. I think too many people think that.
I have a grudge against the hiring process, which I do, but like that is insufficient because you are actually hiring people into the wrong jobs, jobs that are defined very narrowly, jobs that are defined around procedure and process instead of about around outcomes. And all that starts with sort of the way we classify jobs. It goes, you know, it's it goes really deep. You can't just say we're going to tweak this hiring rule here and suddenly we're going to have a civil service.
service that is fit for the era that we are entering. You really have to go deep and say this whole thing needs a rethink from the ground up, which may take all three of my wishes, honestly. That's a pretty big ask, not that I don't have more wishes, but
This is just going to be even more critical as AI starts messing with our society. And I don't just mean that AI will make the jobs that we want people in government to do be different than they were. in order to get it take advantage of AI tools, yes, you may have to change people's jobs a bit, and that can be really hard in a system that's very rigid. I mean, we have people, you know.
all over government who are still operating on job descriptions that were written 35 years ago because nobody can update them. It's just too much work to update them, so you can't manage their performance because they're being held accountable to something that is just basically, you know,
horse-drawn carriages essentially in government. so we're gonna need to update it because AI is gonna change people's jobs, but more importantly because AI is going to change what we ask government to do. And we are going to have to respond more quickly. It may be workforce disruptions, it may be maybe it doesn't have anything to do with AI. Maybe it's that we are suddenly in a more of a global conflict.
Maybe there's another pandemic, but we're simply not set up to respond quickly enough with the civil service system that we have today. And it is within our power to change it. We just have to make the case and bring bring our elected leaders along.
Tom Loosemore (19:41)
Thank you. It's don't waste the crisis as part of that. And a quick follow-up on that. It's you can do anything if you change the people as in you can yes, you can bring new people in. There's definitely an element of that. You talk about that in the paper, that there are some skills that are entirely lacking. And finding ways to bring them in in the right role descriptions is is important. But it's also how do you change the incentives and change the behaviors of people who are already there.
And I wonder, th there's a bit of me that says, well, that's nice cakeism there. You want your cake and you want to eat it. we don't gonna wanna get rid of everyone, but we wanna bring some new skills in. And we don't wanna get rid of every institution. Some institutions need, need to be trans transformed. some of the existing institutions we can improve them radically. Others we need to begin again. And Andrew, I just wonder, you it's the first and only time I get to accuse you of being a bit like Boris Johnson, who wanting your cake and eat it. Uh
Jennifer Pahlka (20:23)
Ha ha ha ha.
Tom Loosemore (20:25)
and but which of them is it? Is it new people coming in? Is it new institutions?
Or is it actually we if we're really bold we can reform the people we've already got and the institutions we've already
Andrew Greenway (20:33)
Johnson barb i it's safely ignored. I mean I don't think it is cakeism. I think the thing that drives me wild about government and bureaucracies in general is that they're unable to kind of pat their heads and rub their tummies at the same time. Like, you need different types of institution in the mix, as kind of most functioning markets will have different kinds of companies in the mix. So what I'm what I don't think Jen and I are proposing here is like
Let's just burn it all down and start again. Because that would be wrong on on on many, many levels. Not least you need people who are good operators and runners and tweakers of things. Like Danny Werfel, the former kind of IRS commissioner, has written a few times about this idea of relentless incrementalism. Like
Big institutions that are big and hairy and aren't going away anytime soon, like the IRS, the kind of the executive's job is not to go, we're gonna create a brand new tax department over here and try and do that, because that's pretty difficult with tax. But it's to be, and the key word, relentless, about incrementing to a better version of that over time. And there are going to be governments and parts of governments, institutions where that's an entirely appropriate strategy. The problem that we've got, in both the US, UK and all sorts of democracies around the world is that
There's a tendency to build everything, including the kind of the people in the talent pipeline, but the technology and everything else as well, on the basis of one type of institution, which tends to be that big old, slow moving thing. So as Jen says, when you create a new institution, they manage to get enough space to subvert that orthodoxy, but that remains the orthodoxy. So I don't think it's cakeism to say we need to do
We need have multiple modes at once. That is what we need to have, because we need to have different kinds of institutions in their ecosystem at once.
Tom Loosemore (22:15)
And do you think that's possible, absent a crisis? it's instructive just how many of the institutions that you talk about were results of the end of the Second World War. And I mean some of the stories you talk about, they the vaccine
Task Force in the UK, obviously that was a crisis. Arguably universal credit that you mentioned in the article, there's a big crisis there that facilitated some different thinking about how you approach trying to deliver that service. So is it possible to do this without a crisis?
Andrew Greenway (22:40)
Are are really torn about that? on the one hand, one answer is government's always got crises. I mean, man has it got crises. So there's an element to which I think this is a political task in terms of doing the storytelling and positioning around it to to create that window of space. I mean another example that we talk about in the paper is the Infected Blood Compensation Authority, which sure is a crisis because people are
dying before they receive the compensation payments they're entitled to after several decades of state failure. But I repeat, several decades of state failure. Like that's that's quite a slow moving crisis in that sense, if it is one. but I actually think, I mean, and again, this is something we touched on the paper. When you look at these institu new institutions that work well, there's lots of different models in which they're created. Sometimes they're built on a green field, sometimes they're built within departments, so there's lots different ways. But they have some qualities that
Repeat and repeat. And one of them is this sense of a very clear prime directive. And the brilliant thing about crises is right, we've got to fix this one thing and we've got to fix it fast. And we know exactly when we'll have fixed it because X, Y, and Z will have happened. And I think that quality, that really intense clarity of outcome, which is a political thing. That's about prioritisation and clarity from the political leadership, I think, and then the ability of the public officials to take it and run with it.
That serves in my head as a what crises do and there's no reason why that can't be done in peacetime in averted commerce.
Tom Loosemore (24:10)
Well listen, I'm gonna give you one final question each as we wrap this up, I'll start with you, Jen, which is it's a fantastic article, the Foreign Affairs article. I commend it to everyone. you don't even have to get a subscription to read it, they'll give you a freebie of one article. So go and look it up. what's the one thing you'd want people to remember who are pos if from that article? What's the one single message?
Jennifer Pahlka (24:32)
I guess I'd go back to what I was just talking about, which is that this seems really bold and disruptive, but at the end of the day it's we're really suggesting that
or leaders start new institutions in order to give proof points for a much more fun fundamental reform. If you go start new institutions, left, right, and center, you know, all over the place, and ultimately, you know, they get a carve out from these hiring rules and that procedure, these oversight patterns in the beginning.
They will eventually lose those exceptions and they will become the thing that you had decided was unreformable again. So as much as this seems like we're being you know quite ballsy, this is actually us saying this is the the less ambitious thing to do, the real ambitious thing to do is.
update the operating model of government structurally through things like you know civil service procedural and oversight reforms that will stick and become the norm.
Tom Loosemore (25:43)
Thank you. I think we could quite easily translate those to the UK in terms of what they would be here. Be slightly different language, maybe slightly different emphasis, but completely agree with you. You need to change the whole weather, not just build an umbrella.
Andrew, final word to you,
Andrew Greenway (25:56)
Yeah, Jen's done the big thing, which is absolutely the right answer. So I'm gonna zoom right down to the smallest thing in the article, which I think is a bit of hidden gold in there. So as part of this, Jen and I talked to a bunch of people who've been in these kinds of teams. And the thing that kept coming out in terms of what made these new institutions successful is they had people, maybe even one person, maybe a couple, who sweated the small stuff. They found the office space.
They could hire people in days. They could find laptops that weren't embarrassing. They were the people who could kind of build the like the proper day-to-day necessities that high-performing teams have to have to perform at the top of their license. And like I think that stuff is utterly profound and usually missed, particularly missed by the kinds of folks in government who are super smart, super ambitious, brilliant at talking to ministers and writing policy. But
that intense practicality for how you get the magic to happen is being able to put everyone in one room which is relatively well, it doesn't even have to be pleasant to work in, but they need their tools and their space. and like from, you know, all the kind of the glorified acronyms that we've got in that paper, the NASAs and the Aryas and the DARPAs, like they've got people who sweat the small stuff. And people kinda laugh at that and go, Yeah, sure, whatever, we'll get around to that.
Do that because you ain't changing the world without it.
Tom Loosemore (27:24)
Fantastic. It's the cleaner in NASA whose job was to get people onto the moon. Exactly that. Lovely. Well, thank you both so much. Both for your time today and also for taking the time to write a paper such a readable article as well. So again, get your hands on a copy of this. It's on the Tinternet. Search for Andrew and Jennifer's name and
Jennifer Pahlka (27:41)
Mm-hmm.
Tom Loosemore (27:42)
you'll find it. And once again, thank you. And thank you everyone for listening to the PD cast. Come again soon for the next episode.