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In the rooms where war, peace, and power are decided, words matter most. The Diplomat brings you raw conversations with ambassadors, envoys, and negotiators who shaped the hardest decisions in U.S. foreign policy and Middle East diplomacy. Hosted by Joe Kawly. Recorded from Washington. Produced by Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).
Joe Kawly brings extensive experience from conflict zones in the Middle East to the power corridors of Washington. As a journalist, he’s seen how words can escalate a crisis or open the door to peace. A Georgetown graduate and former CNN Journalism Fellow, he’s known for connecting the dots others miss, so people don’t just hear what happened, they understand why it matters. As producer and host of The Diplomat, Joe brings clarity to diplomacy and politics, one conversation at a time.
You can feel it.
Something in the Middle East is shifting.
You can't see a map reshaping in
real-time, but you can feel the pressure
build in the silence after an airstrike,
in the pauses between negotiations.
In the moment a country signs a pact with
one power to signal it's
pulling away from another.
This isn't just about borders.
It's about what nations are becoming
and what the United States still
has the power to prevent or provoke.
I'm Joe Khawley.
I've sat down with diplomats, walked
through war zones, and watched how the
Middle East rearranges itself, sometimes
overnight, sometimes over decades.
In this episode of the Diplomat, my guest
is Eliott Abrams, a veteran of three US
administrations,
a central player in shaping democracy
policy under Bush, and the Trump
appointed envoy for Iran and Venezuela.
Abraham says, We are
looking at a rare moment.
Iran's grip has slipped, its proxies have
taken hits, and for once, the United
States has strategic space to act.
But is that space real
or just wishful thinking?
And is post-war Gaza headed toward
recovery, or or engineered displacement.
In this conversation, we talk about the
future of Hezbollah's weapons,
the illusion of the Iran-China-Russia
axis, whether Iran's network is truly
crumbling and whether the US
is still listening to the people caught
between policies, because
the Middle East doesn't just shift when
bombs fall, it reshapes when
no one's paying attention.
This is the diplomat inside the room where
power speaks, and this is a conversation
you won't hear anywhere else.
Mr. Abrams, thank you for being with us.
Let's start with what you have
called a rare opportunity.
Iran looks strategically weaker.
Hamas, Hezbollah, even Syria's regime
have all taken major hits.
You have written that this could be a
moment for the United
States to shift the map.
If Iran is genuinely weaker,
what are the strategic openings for the
United States and its allies, particularly
in Gaza and the broader region?
There are two parts to this.
One is keeping Iran weak,
and the other relates to Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq, the individual cases.
With respect to Iran, I believe the United
States should keep the pressure on
This means mostly economic pressure.
I did not believe that it's sanctions.
I believe that
the Europeans should impose snapback,
which would happen presumably in September
or
sober, snapping back all the UN sanctions
that disappeared after 2015
in the Iran nuclear deal.
So keep the pressure on Iran economically
so that they don't have billions of
dollars to spend on their proxy
in other countries, that's first.
Then the individual cases.
I mean, we need to keep the pressure and
the incentives on
the government of Lebanon.
The President and Prime Minister
have said, Hezbollah must disarm.
Hezbollah, obviously, is resisting.
Well, the United States and the Europeans
and the Gulf donors
to make it clear that this is the moment
when Lebanon can achieve
full sovereignty again.
The same thing I would say in
Iraq, keep the pressure on.
Iraqis, except for those who really work
for Iran, but Iraqis, including
Shia-irafies, want more
national independence.
You could go down the list, but I
think I would just mention Syria also.
I think the United States and Again, the
Gulf donors, Europeans,
are right to give Shahra a chance.
It may fail.
It may well fail.
But to see if this opportunity can be
use, again, to achieve Syrian
national independent from Iran.
This is the moment.
Some of these things will work better than
others, but we've never
had a better moment.
When you say keeping the pressure on.
I have two things to
double-check with you.
That economic pressure, but we've seen
before, Iran survived so many
sanctions, so many pressures.
There the resilience of the
regime, the survival of the war.
Are we underestimating Iran's
capabilities to survive these pressures?
No, I don't think so.
Look, the purpose of doing these things is
to bring to an end Iran's
proxy network in the region
and its control of Arab capitals.
The purpose in the short run, medium
run, is not to overthrow the regime.
So when we say Well, the regime
survived all these pressures.
That's true.
But if we think back to the days when the
heaviest pressure was on,
it had less money available.
The regime had less money that it
could give to Hezbollah, for example.
We know that one of the reasons
that Hezbollah is not able to recover now
is that money is short.
We don't want to give billions of dollars
to Iran so that they can give a
decent part of that to Hezbollah.
I think we have seen in the past
that this economic pressure, financial
pressure on the regime,
does translate into less money
for its proxies around the region.
Why?
Because of what you said, that is, they
are afraid for their own regime survival,
and therefore, they keep a lot of whatever
money they have left because they need to
keep the Iranian people
from rising up against the regime.
Also, you said to keep the pressure on
the EU, to impose also sanctions,
the Gulf countries to also put some
pressure on the government of Lebanon.
You mentioned something that this is the
moment for Lebanon to
retrieve the sovereignty.
But so many in Lebanon,
not only the environment of Hezbollah or
the Hezbollah supporters,
they do think, some of them are a
Christian parties, they do think that this
is not a sovereignty for Lebanon when
Israel still is occupying
parts of south of Lebanon.
So how can we ask
Hezbollah to give up all the arms
We know that the Lebanese army is weak,
cannot sustain a war by itself,
whether from Israel or another country.
Some others would disagree that this is a
sovereignty moment for
the Lebanese government.
How can we say that?
You said, We know the Lebanese army
cannot really resist Israeli power.
I think we saw in just a few weeks
last year, either can Hezbollah.
The notion that Hezbollah has some
great resistance is simply false.
The way to bring back sovereignty for
Lebanon is precisely
to get rid of any arms
outside the government, outside the
army and the internal security forces.
This is not only Hezbollah, they're there,
obviously, the most powerful abuse group.
There are Palestinian groups as well that
have long been well-armed in
Palestinian camps.
All of that should come into an enton.
Hezbollah can exist as a political
party representing some portion.
But what is the definition
of a government?
It is to have a monopoly on force,
on weaponry inside the country.
Once Lebanon begins to achieve that, then
you'll find the United States and other
countries, the Europeans, the Gulf Arabs,
saying to Israel, this has to go together.
As the Lebanon army takes control of the
borders, as Hezbollah
is disarmed, you leave.
These two things, I think, mesh together.
If we would like to
think that this is a decline?
Is this a decline or recalibration for
Iran, specifically with China and
Russia, both standing close by?
What people last year found out was this
axis,
this axis that people have talked about,
Russia, China, Iran, North
Korea, was not an alliance.
Because when the United States
and when Israel attacks Iran,
who came to Iran's help from this Axis?
Nobody.
They did nothing.
So I don't think we have to be
so concerned about that.
I think the Iranians of the regime
has learned a lesson, which is
the Russians and Chinese are not
going to go very far in helping them.
This is a very important point.
There is this consensus in Arab media and
even on the street,
In so many different Arab countries, you
would hear that
China and Russia are with us.
They see it maybe because there's not a
lot of war waged by Russia and China, but
the fact that they think China and Russia
are standing with them against Israel or
the United States, to what extent
that is not accurate at all?
So far, we have seen Russia and
China do almost nothing or Iran.
China is buying Iranian oil.
95% of Iranian oil goes to China.
But let's remember, at a big discount.
I mean, the Chinese are doing this
good part because it's good for China.
They don't have to buy oil at the
market spot price around the world.
Yet because of the sanctions,
they had a discount from Iraq.
What has Russia done?
Russia has sold Iran.
Sold, not given, sold Iran.
The S-300 air defense system Which it took
about six hours for Israel to destroy.
So what have they really done?
They make money from Iraq.
They take money from Iran.
Yes, Russia sells weapons.
So are you saying, Mr. Abrams, that Russia
just uses Iran to sell weapons
as a merchandise to make money.
But what exactly Russia is
sending is weak weapons?
No, they're not selling
their best weapons.
That would the
S-400, another generation of air defense.
But I think what the Iranians have learned
is this, there's no real
alliance with Russia or China.
Russia and China
are supporting Iran for only one reason,
which is they thought strengthening Iran
was a good way to reduce American power
and the power of America's
partners and allies in the region.
That was their main goal.
There was a period, I don't know, 10 years
ago, when China was getting
a lot closer to Israel.
More recently, they moved away because
Israel was choosing the
United States, not China.
What was China's interest
in hurting Israel?
They don't care about Israel.
It's just nine million people.
They care about hurting
American power in the region.
Okay, that was not a bad
theory a few years ago.
But now look at it from the summer of
2025, what do we fire.
They have not reduced
American power in the region.
They've actually created a situation where
the United States bombed Iran after 25
years of President
saying, We might, we may.
It actually happened.
So what they have done is create a
situation in which Iran
today is weaker in the region
than I would say it has been
probably for about 25 years.
They're not interested in Iran.
They're interested in
reducing American power.
What I'm gathering from what you're
saying, China and Russia both
do not care about Iran or the Iranian
people and what happens specifically also
in human rights and how the Iranians are
protesting the brutality and the violence
sometimes of this current regime in Iran.
Does Washington still see human rights and
democratic reform in Iran as core
strategic interest, or has that
priority faded into background again?
The priority is certainly reduced,
and I think it's a big mistake because
I think
Iranians are the greatest friends, not
only, of course, of their own country,
their own freedom, but of the United
States and others in the West.
People in the
Trump administration think of this as
being realists,
real politique, and it's unrealistic.
That's the problem.
It's unrealistic because Iran is not some
black box, and there's
the Ayatollah on top.
And we don't know what's inside.
We know it's inside.
About 95 million Iranians who hate the
regime, the vast majority hate the regime.
They are the best allies of the West.
They are the hope for a different Iran, a
better Iran, a democratic Iran, a
peaceful Iran, which is what they want.
So I think the Trump administration is
making a mistake by reducing, as I see it,
reducing the importance
of human rights issues.
Why do you think they're
making that mistake?
There's something
else that interests the administration
other than the human rights, because we
are also seeing seeing that reduction
of human rights interests domestically?
Well, I think that's a different question,
but I would say that when it comes to
foreign policy,
the President and many of those around him
seem to believe that human
rights policy is a luxury.
You use it to hurt your enemies.
You use it against
countries you don't like.
When that seems to be a useful bill,
But when you're dealing with another
government, you have to be very
tough-minded, whether it's Xi Jinping, or
it's Putin, or it's Iran, and you don't
let human rights issues,
which are not the central issues.
What are the central issues?
Money, finance, guns.
And I just think that's a
mistaking view on their part.
It's a view that has been
around for a long time.
We associate it with Henry
Kissinger and Rael Polikip.
But again, I just don't
think it's realistic.
But to what extent right now,
what I'm hearing from you is you aligning
with China's point of view of how they are
criticizing
the United States today by saying that
the United States cannot
speak or preach about human rights because
you just said the human rights issue is a
luxury in this policy today
for this administration.
I think this mistake is one that is
being made by the Trump administration.
I think the United States has plenty it
should be saying, and
some of it is being said.
If you look at the annual human rights
reports that came out roughly August
'15, there's plenty in there about human
rights abuses around the world, including,
by the way, in some friendly
countries in the Middle East.
But
it's true that there's a lot of Chinese
propaganda about how the United
States is not a real democracy.
I think this should all be regarded as
pure propaganda.
We don't have political
prisoners in the United States.
We don't jail newspaper editors right now.
You're saying right now, as if you are
predicting that this would change in
the near future in the United States?
Well, it rises and fall.
I mean, if you go back, let's
say, to, oh, my God, to Nixon.
We're talking about 50 years ago.
Down, up, down, up.
And there is a tendency on the part of
some Republicans to view human rights
policy as a Democratic Party thing.
So you see, for example, in the Trump
administration now,
basically eliminating the Human
Rights Bureau in the stage apartment.
It seems to be a great mistake because
what is the alliance system that the
United States has around the world.
The heart of it is other democracies.
That's the heart of it, particularly
in NATO, but also in Asia.
So I think it's a mistake.
And I think the notion that, oh, well,
there are so many human rights
abuses in the United States.
The United States cannot talk
about human rights as outward.
This was the Soviet line
during the Cold War.
And It's false.
It was false then, it's false now.
If you compare the human rights situation
in the United States to that of Russia
or China, my God, you're talking about
Black and white.
How will that
harm and hurt the United States
domestically, its citizens, and also its
image as the leading
country in human rights in the West,
as we've seen it in the past
at least 20 years or 30 years?
Well, I think that a weaker, less powerful
human rights policy is always a mistake.
For one thing, it hurts the foreign policy
of the United States because when people
affiliate or associate
with the United States, this is most often
because of the free society in the
United States, because of the democracy.
That's why people want to
come to the United States.
That's why immigrants want
to move to United States.
It's not just, Oh, you have the
standard of living in Spire.
It's freedom.
People around the world,
now, particularly, that people can get
information from the Internet, not
just from their own governments.
People understand the situation
of citizens in Russia or China.
They understand the abuses.
They understand the repression
in those countries.
I think this is always a strength of the
United States and a weakness for those
adversaries of the United States.
As a testimony to what you're saying, that
is why me as a Libanese-American, I moved.
I decided to make the United States as my
second home for the exact same
points that you just mentioned.
Let's talk about post-war Gaza,
governance or abandonment.
You have helped shape one of the most
controversial post-war ideas, Don't
rebuild Gaza, resettle Gaza elsewhere.
Critics say that's displacement.
You've called it a humanitarian reset.
This is where theory
meets real world pain.
Given the
continued humanitarian crisis and
political challenges, do you believe this
international trust model
remains a viable path forward?
Let's talk about two things.
It was the first movement
of Gazans out of Gaza.
This was not my idea.
It was done, yes.
But in a way, you've seen the
positive points of that idea.
I want to repeat that and explain why.
Syria went through a murderous civil war,
and millions of Syriums
got out of the way.
They went to Turkey, they went to Jordan,
they left the country.
Ukraine.
Millions of Ukrainians
have fled the fighting.
They will go home.
Millions of Afghans during the Afghan war
moved out and are now going
home with this career.
Why is it that only dozen than the whole
world are not allowed to
get out of the way of war?
Maybe, Mr. Abrams, because they are not
allowed to go back, we know that Israel
does not allow many Palestinians
to go back home, to return home.
This is a policy.
Well, you know- In a way, isn't Isn't it
unfair to compare Gazans
to Afghanis or Ukrainians?
I don't think it's unfair.
Sinai is a big empty place.
When Syriums fled Syria,
the UA Eritre, for example, built a
very good refugee camp for the Satari
in northern Jordi, 80,000 in one camp.
Whoa, that didn't happen in Sinai.
Why didn't it happen in Sinai?
Because Egypt would not
permit this to happen.
Egypt.
No one asked the Gazem,
Would you like to go to get out of the war
and then come home when the war is over?
No one asked them.
I think that Gazem has true have been
given that opportunity to get out of the
way of the fighting, and
yes, then to go home.
Now, what should be done now?
I do think that there should be some…
These ideas are circulating.
I think they're basically right.
Some international body,
committee, commission.
The leaders would consist of
Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, Emiratis,
United States, EU,
and maybe what are two Palestinians at the
top, and then a mostly Palestinian staff
that would, in a sense,
administer Gaza's recovery.
Schools, hospital, road,
water, electricity, and construction of
homes, temporary homes, permanent homes.
It's a huge multi-year job.
I think there is no real
reason why that can't happen.
Here, I must say,
I'm critical of everybody.
It is we've had more than almost three
years of war, more than a year and a half.
There's no real serious plan from Israel.
There's no serious plan from
the Palestinian Authority.
Most important, maybe there's
no serious plan from Washington.
I mean, the President had his
plan, everyone should move out.
That's not going to happen.
No practical plan from Washington.
I think this should happen.
I actually think it will happen.
No practical plan
from all these important parties, the
Palestinians, the
Israelis from Washington.
But you support When you started using
private security contractors,
not peacekeepers.
Esra Klein, the American journalist with
Jewish background, he said that those
security contractors, private
contractors, are inexperienced.
It made the situation worse.
Has the worsening security
environment changed your view on that?
No.
Private security contractors
are not the solution.
They're It's part of a
much bigger solution.
Here's another criticism.
Palestinian police are going to be
absolutely critical to keeping
the peace to police in Gaza
and then police in Jordan.
Why have we not been training
twice as many, three times
as many over the last year?
Egypt has announced recently
they're going to train 5,000.
Great.
But why did we not get that announcement a
year and a half ago so that
those people are are ready.
A key part of it, Palestinian police.
Another part of it, if people will do it,
is foreign security forces, meaning Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi, Emiratish,
who will contribute.
Any country that the Palestinians accept,
I don't mean Hamas, I mean the Palestinian
Authority, will accept as
making a positive contravision.
I can see a role from private security
forces, not
being the does of police, But for example,
guard this food warehouse,
guard this hospital, guard this
school hospital, whatever.
They can do those things.
They're not really so inexperienced.
I mean, these people have been used
sometimes well, sometimes badly.
Australian, New Zealanders, Colombians,
Americans for 20, 30, 40 years.
It's going It's not going to be a mess.
Let's be honest about it.
It's not going to be
a beautiful Swiss clock,
but these, I think, are pieces
of what will have to happen.
Critics call the plan to
give Gazan's a way out for many reasons,
whether it's a medical reason or anything,
a form of engineered displacement.
Instead of letting journalists in to cover
stories like any other parts of the world
or even letting humanitarian aids in, how
do you respond to those who say
resettlement right now under international
cover is morally untenable and
politically toxic in the region?
I think we need to listen more to Gazans.
I mean, it's very nice for
the government of Egypt, or Jordan, or
Saudi Arabia, to say not
one Bosm should leave.
Let's ask the Bosms.
First, health issues, obviously.
In any population that large, there are
always tens of thousands of
people who need medical care.
Children, he need to go to school, not
only get out of the war, but
to go to school.
Others who simply want life.
Again, like Ascans, like Ukrainians, like
Syrians, just want to get
out of the way of war.
Now, I can understand
Egypt or others saying, But these are not
Egyptians, and they will have to go home.
I think that's the answer to those
who talk about forced displacement.
No, they should have the
absolute right to go home.
What it really is striking to me that when
so many people are able to see war war.
Only Gazims are told,
You may not free the war.
I see that point, and
many would see that point.
How can we respond to the fear that
there's a policy in Israel that does
not allow Palestinians to return home?
Well, if there were in Egypt, for example,
you could be sure that the Egyptians don't
want them to stay there,
however many it was, 100,000, 200,000.
And the Egyptians would make it a point in
their bilateral relations with Israel
that these gossams must go home.
The other thing is you could get some
agreement from Israel between, let's say,
Israel and the United States, that those
who left voluntarily could go home.
By the way, let's
acknowledge something else.
Not 100% of them will go
home or want to go home.
Not 100% of Syrians who went to Germany
want to go home.
So should they be all
deported from Germany?
I don't think so.
So again, I think what people are doing,
frankly, is they are more worried about
the political question here
than about what Gazans want and need.
Then we should listen to what Gazans
want, the freedom of movement then.
Well, I think that is getting really
completely excised from this
formula, and that's a mistake.
You mentioned that we need to listen more
to Gazans and not to what Arab countries
stories would say about the Gazans, right?
And if they should leave or not leave.
The Arab League
has put forward a more traditional plan
for governance, if we're going
to talk about the day after.
Are we listening to regional
partners or sidelining them?
Does the Arab League still exist?
Does it have any power?
It certainly doesn't have the influence
it used to, I don't know, or 20 years ago.
The problem with the The Arab League plan,
as I saw it, was that it didn't say
anything about Hamas and security.
I think there are really two
big, big issues about Gaza.
There's the, let's call it the
civilian or administrative side.
There, I think there in the Arab plan
and in what many other people have said, I
think there's a significant
amount of overlap.
We can begin to imagine a committee
for the reconstruction of Gaza.
The security side is much, much tougher,
and the Arab plan really
didn't say anything about it.
And the Trump plan to move
everybody out said nothing about it.
There is, again, some discussion.
Jibta just said it
would train more police.
That's critical.
That should happen.
It would be good if some Arab governments,
as part of their contribution,
would say, Okay,
we're building a housing development.
We're building a new university,
and we will police it.
In the same topic, the day after
Hamas, what does victory look like?
You have said no day after
until Hamas is destroyed.
But nearly a year in, or now two years,
Israel is still fighting in Raqqa.
The humanitarian cost is immense.
The diplomatic cost is rising.
The report's central premise is that there
can be no day after unless Hamas military
governing authority, are
completely destroyed.
In the months since the report was
released, what specific developments would
you point to as evidence that Israel is on
track to achieve this objective when
so many Israelis, thousands, are
in the streets protesting because they
feel that Netanyahu's government
does not have that objective?
I wouldn't say that.
I'd say that they have
a different objective.
Which is?
That is getting the hostages home,
whatever the price is.
That's a very deep split
in Israeli society now.
I
think that as time goes by, even, let's
say, this year, which is after
14 months of war, you get to this year and
another eight months,
Hamas continues to get weaker.
They get weaker because
they cannot resupply themselves with
weaponry, except that's a summary
of the unexploded Israeli ordnance.
But basically, they
can't bring anything in.
The fighters they have are younger
and much more poorly trained.
They're not real soldiers.
So Hamas, I think, does get weaker.
I think the tragic thing is that
it's the Hamas military of leadership in
Gaza that is making decisions for all...
It's not the Hamas civilians sitting Doha,
and it's not the average Gaza.
We don't know what they
would actually say.
There's no way to find out, really.
But it's the people in the tunnels who are
making the decisions
to keep the war going.
You mentioned- It's unacceptable from the
Israeli point of view and
the US government point of view,
is that there can never be a home boss
come back, either militarily or
politically.
Let's circle back to you saying
Netanyahu's government probably
has a different objective.
But is there a risk that Netanyahu's
government's pursuit
of security to bring back the hostages, as
you said, since you mentioned
that this is the objective.
However, is this justified?
Could lead to long-term
diplomatic isolation?
Can that risk be mitigated?
Mitigated through deeper normalization?
That, first of all, that's a decision,
obviously, that Israeli is having to make.
I was struck by the fact that
some of the leaders in the last few weeks
who have said that at the UN Security
Council meeting in late September, sorry,
UN General Assembly meeting in late
September, they will recognize Palestine.
I have not said
they will recognize Palestine as soon as
the hostages come out,
which I think they should have said.
What they said was, We'll recognize
them no matter what happened.
That's a mistake, I think.
But I think the decision, this question
of, Should Israel stop the war right now?
Hamas, right now, in exchange for the
relief to Malhust,
whatever that means for Hamas, or
should it keep fighting until it
gets a better deal from Hamas?
That's a decision for Israelis
who We talked about the
Arab countries, the Arab League.
We talked about Israeli government,
the Galzans, what they want, Hamas.
What about the Palestinian Authority?
Is this a debt structure or
is it in a way salvageable?
Your report said the PA, the Palestinian
Authority, was unworkable,
but some Arab states still see it as the
only legitimate
Palestinian representative.
Have you observed any changes or your
reforms within the Palestinian Authority
since February that would
alter this conclusion?
I have not seen any real reforms.
More importantly than what I think, what a
Palestinian has paid.
Poll after poll after poll.
If you look at probably the best pollster,
Habib Al-Shikaki, people,
Palestinians, have no faith in the PA.
They say their lives were
better before the PA.
And the PA has made them worse.
Something like 15% want President
Abbas to remain in office as President.
So Palestinians are telling you, they
don't see reforms, they don't see changes.
Personally, I don't either.
I mean, we've heard this
from Abbas for 20 years.
But where are the reforms?
There are no real changes financially.
There are no real changes.
There are no elections.
There's He's basically sitting still,
and I believe he's 89 now,
and he's just going to stay there
until he dies or until he's kicked out.
I believe you use the word revitalization
for the Palestinian Authority.
Is that correct?
But this term is in a way vague.
What concrete steps or political or
financial would make the PA, or the
Palestinian Authority, a
functional governing body again?
Can we talk about a two-state solution
without a functioning
Palestinian Authority?
You really can't talk about anything
without a functioning Palestinian
government of some kind.
Whether it's Palestinian authority
or a new body that's set up.
People talk about reform.
In the Biden administration, there was the
term RPA, Reformed Palestinian Authority.
People talk about to revitalize
Palestinian Authority.
This is going to be very hard
to do because
there is a class of politicians at the top
of it who have been at the top of it now
for 30 years, and they
don't want a change.
They're very happy with where they are.
When you talk about change, a new
generation, we see, a boss is 89.
What's the new generation?
They're only 65.
Again, what you or I
think it's not important.
What's important is
what Palestinians want.
I hope they want, and they do seem
in these polls, to want change.
Now, many of them seem to love the
idea of the two-state solution.
This is another issue, a separate issue.
We're going to discuss this right
now, the two-state solution.
Is it still a goal or a myth?
The two-state framework
remains officially as policy.
But it has stalled for years.
Is a Two-State solution a viable long-term
outcome, or has that framework collapsed
under current realities and current wars?
I think the Two-State solution
has essentially collapsed.
There were moments when it had strong
support in Israel and mock Palestinians.
It doesn't anymore on either side.
The numbers rise and fall, but it
doesn't have very strong support.
From who?
From whom exactly does not have support?
From whom?
For what parties?
Well, if we're talking about Palestinians,
public opinion polls show that most
Palestinians today don't think
it's ever going to happen.
And there's a very large body of
Palestinians, sometimes 40%, sometimes
more, who don't think it
answers what they want.
What they fundamentally want is
to eliminate the state of Israel.
I don't personally think
that the long-term solution is a fully
independent, sovereign Palestinian state.
Why do you think some Palestinians
still think that there's no viable path
for two-state solution and
they want Israel to collapse?
To what extent do you think some extremist
views that we watch on
some Israeli channels, like channel 14,
with Israeli settlers saying that we want
to take over the West Bank, we want to
take over Gaza,
To what extent this extremism
fuels the other side of extremism?
Well, it certainly fuels a
disbelief on the part of Palestinians
that Israel will ever permit
the creation of a Palestinian state.
But if I were advising the Palestinians,
I would say, That's not your main worry.
Your main worry is not the right wing
extreme view, it's the centrist view.
The centrist view today is that a
Palestinian sovereign state
is simply too dangerous.
More and more attacks
of the October seventh.
To go back to
having the two-state solution as a
policy sit in the United States, also some
European allies are now backing
recognition of the Palestinian state.
Is Washington out of step or just
more cautious when it comes to this?
Well, it's certainly out of step, I would
say, fortunately, because what I
deeply dislike about what the Europeans,
among others, the Canadians, Australians
are doing is, they're
setting no conditions.
That is, they're not saying,
We want a Palestinian state.
And as soon as one, two, three happen,
we're there.
The hostages are released.
There's a better Palestinian.
No, nothing, nothing.
We're going to do it now.
So the message, I think, to
Palestinians, including Palestinian
politicians, is no
reforms are really needed.
We're getting what we want anyway.
They're all recognizing a Palo
Quiney state in exchange for nothing.
But even before October seventh,
there were no steps taken.
It felt like the two states,
solution was off the table.
If two states are off the
table, what comes next?
Is anyone offering a credible alternative,
or are we drifting into
a permanent vacuum?
I think there is a
There are several alternatives.
Some are realistic, some are unrealistic.
One state's solution, I think, is
unrealistic, and neither
Israeli nor Fawzia wanted it.
I think if you go back to the idea of
partition, a Jewish entity, Arab entity.
If you look at the West Bank,
a small landblock entity, I think that
place is much, much better off in the long
run being in a confederation
with an existing state.
And there are only two
candidates, Israel and Jordan.
And the logical candidate, the one that's
Muslim and Arab and Arabic-speaking
and half-Palestinian, is Jordan.
I think that as we
go into the future years, 5 years, 10
years from now, that idea of some
attachment or confederation between
the Palestinian entity, let's call it, and
Jordan becomes more and more normal.
You want to see?
Let's link everything back to
what's happening in the region.
We're watching a regional shakeup.
Iraq just signed a security pact with Iran
Hezbollah might face pressure to disarm,
as we mentioned earlier on this episode,
from the current government
right now in Lebanon.
The Abraham Accords were once the
centerpiece of normalization,
but are they still?
If Hamas's goal was to slow down the
Abraham Accords, the attack
and the Israeli response have certainly
done that, but they are still alive.
It's very interesting that none of the
countries that recognize Israel
have withdrawn that recognition.
Those relationships have not broken down.
But I think it's going
to go much slower now.
I know the Trump administration
takes you know the...
You'll have a ceasefire at some point in
the war or an end to the war in Gaza,
and then, boom, A bunch of Muslim
countries will rape and drive Israel.
I don't think that's right.
I think it would take more time.
I think you'll see much slower steps,
athletic competitions,
visits of one official or another
other trade agreements.
I don't think this is going to happen
very quickly when the war- How will the
whole thing reshape the balance of power
in the Middle East
with the Abraham Accord, Iraq's Iran Pact,
and Hezbollah's potential disarmment?
The main effect will be to undermine
Iran's regional power.
It looked a few years ago that Iran was
building a system of proxies that was
going to give it fantastic amounts of
influence throughout the Arab world
and surrounding Israel.
It doesn't look like that today, and I
don't think that Iran will be able
to recover the influence it has lost.
With this entire
idea of the regional shaping of the Middle
East, Iraq describes this as
a move to assert sovereignty.
Washington sees it differently.
Who has the more accurate
read to this situation today?
I think the United
States, Washington does.
I think that in Syria, Lebanon, and
Europe, above all,
there is a move to regain
sovereignty that was lost due to the
tremendous influence Iran, through
the Revolutionary Guard, had.
What role Syria do you see happening?
What role do you see for Syria now?
Is it a partner in this reshape for the
Middle East, in reconstruction in some
sort, or the next crisis point,
specifically with what we're seeing in
Sueda between the Druze and the whole
fracture in the in the Syrian society?
I don't have an answer to that, and
I don't think we know the answer yet.
It is plausible to think that
Syria will hold together and that
incidents like that will not occur.
It is plausible to think
it will get worse, and there will be more
internal violence in Syria, and Shah will
not be able to build a decent government.
I think the outcome in Syria
is simply not knowable.
Who benefits from the
chaos in Syria today?
Who benefits today?
To a certain degree, Iran,
because it gives it an option.
You might even say to a
certain degree, Turkey.
Let's end this conversation,
Mr. Abrams, with a perspective.
You have worked across administrations
in moments of both hope and collapse.
What worries you more?
What our adversaries might
do or what we might miss.
I'm much less worried today about what our
adversaries will do in the Middle East.
I'm worried about missing opportunities.
I'm worrying about the United States
government Getting it wrong,
investing in the wrong places, thinking
about some of the wrong
things, and missing what I think
is really a historic opportunity.
On American interest in the Middle East,
is Is there one thing or threat
that keeps you awake at night?
No.
The only thing that kept me awake at night
was that United States was actually going
to permit Iran to get a nuclear weapon.
Now, I think it's clear
we will not do that.
Historically, the United States has been
blindsided more by underestimation
than by overreaction.
Are we repeating that pattern?
Not so far.
Policies change from year to year.
We are three years away from having
another American presidential election.
We're not much more than a year
away from a congressional election.
So the government can change.
Policies can change.
This is one advantage that Xi Jinping and
Putin have, that as long as
they're alive, they're there.
But we cannot really predict what American
policy that will be, for example,
three years from now.
If you could tell this administration or
the next administration one sentence of
advice for the Middle
East, what would it be?
It would be to promote the sovereignty
of each state
in the region and the cooperation among
independent sovereign states and prevent
Iran from reestablishing its network
of properties of its nuclear program.
Thank you for your time, and thank you for
this conversation that I think many of our
listeners and viewers
would find so many answers to
so many questions on their mind.
Thank you for being with us.
You're very welcome.
It's easy to talk about the Middle East
like a chess board, harder when the pieces
are real people,
and harder still when the game keeps
resetting every time in your
administration walks in with a theory and
walks out with a war that
looks a lot like the last one.
But what happens when strategy collides
with streets full of
anger, trauma, and memory?
That's the question
we'll keep asking on this show, because
language isn't just how power
communicates, it's how power calculates.
If this conversation made you stop and
reframe what you thought you knew about
Gaza, Iran, and the Middle East, good.
That means it did its job.
You can follow the show on YouTube,
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Thank you for listening to this episode of
The Diplomat, Inside the Room,
where Power speaks.
Until next time.