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Signed, unsealed, undelivered? When is a claim ‘made’ under s.29A of the 1954 Act?
The Courts are awash with negligence claims concerning claims being issued out of time, . Every litigation solicitor and barrister must at some point have considered Practice Direction 7A where it says:
“Proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant… It goes on to say that when there is delay between the court receiving the claim and issuing it ”the claim is “brought” for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 and any other relevant statute on the date it was received”.
But what does this have to do with bringing claims under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954? According to the recent County Court decision in Shaikh and Hoque v Mohammad [2025] EWCC 77¸quite a lot.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 – the relevant provisions
Both landlords and tenants under 1954 Act leases can apply to the Court under s.24 for an order for the grant of a new tenancy, if the relevant notice has been given. A landlord can also apply under s.29(2) for an order terminating the tenancy if certain conditions are satisfied.
Section 29A provides the statutory period for these various applications to be made. There is no discretion for the court to extend the statutory period. If an application is made after that period expires, the Court shall not entertain it.
So, what does it mean for an application to be “made” for the purposes of the 1954 Act? The future of a 1954 Act tenancy may depend on the answer.
The Facts
In Shaikh and Hoque v Mohammad, a lease renewal claim was lodged within the relevant period but later returned by the Court to the Claimant after the expiry of the statutory period. The Court returned the claim form because it was defective in two ways: no court fee had been paid, and an insufficient number of claims form had been provided.
The chronology is pertinent:
• On 26 April 2024, the Defendant landlord served a s.25 notice seeking to terminate the tenancy and opposing renewal .
• Two weeks before the statutory period expired, the Claimants’ solicitors lodged a claim to renew the tenancy with the Court.
• The claim form was date-stamped as received a three days later. However, the claim form read “Court fee not payable”, no payment was tendered, and insufficient copies of the claim form had been filed.
• About a month and a half later the Court returned the claim form to the Claimants, “unactioned”, by way of letter. By this time, the statutory period had expired.
• The Claimants did not refile the papers or pay the correct fee For another two weeks. The claim was formally isses over a month later.
The Defendant applied for reverse summary judgment and strike out on the basis that the claim had been issued out of time.
The Decision
There were two issues for the Court to consider:
1. Were the proceedings validly “brought” within the statutory period?
2. If not, could the Court cure this defect via case management powers or CPR 3.10, which deals with errors of procedure?
Issue 1: Were the proceedings brought in time?
The court began by concisely summarising the relevant case law on what constitutes proceedings being “brought”. The judge referred to three cases:
• In Barnes v St Helens [2007] 1 W.L.R. 879,
• In Page v Hewitt (No 1) [2012] EWCA Civ 805,
• In Peterson v Howard [2023] 1 W.L.R. 3057, A claimant must do all that is required of them, including payment of the correct fee, for the valid issuing of a claim form or application. CPR 3.10 gives the court no such power to cure such a fundamental defect.
District Judge Rana dismissed the Claimant’s arguments that a 54 act claim, was “made” when the initial claim form had been lodged on 18 October 2024.
• Firstly, It would undermine certainty if defective, fee-less claim forms could suspend limitation indefinitely.
• Secondly, The Claimants had not done all that they reasonably could do to bring proceedings within the limitation period. They had filed the incorrect number of claim forms and had paid no fee.
• Thirdly, The Claimant’s solicitors “had assumed a considerable and ultimately fatal risk” by leaving the matter to a fortnight before the statutory deadline. The Court could not be criticised for failing to act upon documents that were not in proper form or accompanied by the appropriate fee
•
• Fourthly, A Court timestamp is an administrative act. It evidences receipt, It does not evidence proceedings being “brought”.
The Second Issue: Was CPR 3.10 applicable?
CPR 3.10 reads that “where there has been an error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a rule or practice direction (a) the error does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings unless the court so orders; and (b) the court may make an order to remedy the error”.
As to the order remedying the error, under CPR 3.2(a) the court can “extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order”.
The Court gave these arguments short shrift. Firstly, the 1954 Act is a statute, not a “rule, practice direction or court order”. Secondly, CPR 3.10 is subject to the hierarchy of legislative authority. It cannot be used to override an express prohibition set out by Parliament.
Conclusion
Shaikh is a County Court decision and not binding. But, it continues a long trend of decisions on the definition of ‘making’ or ‘bringing’ an application or claim under various statutes. It appears that proceedings under the 1954 Act are only “brought” if the Claimant has complied with all necessary procedural steps, not when the unsealed claim form is received by the Court.
What lessons can be learnt from this sorry tale?
• Pay the right court fee
• Provide the requisite number of claim forms, when issuing a claim.
Do not rely upon sympathy from the Court. CPR 3.10 cannot be used to override the express time limits for lease renewal claims.
• Comply with all procedural requirements for issue in ample time. There is no guarantee that the Court will flag such errors before it is too late. Delays on the Court’s part in both identifying and/or returning documents will not excuse any prior error by a claimant and/or their solicitors.
Nevertheless, court delays grow longer and more frequent. At what point can it fairly be said a claim was brought sufficiently far in advance of a limitation period, or that a court’s failure identify a procedural error can excuse the inevitable consequence of their claim being time-barred? A month before the deadline? Two months? Three?
One suspects the answer will be “never”, since it is incumbent on claimants to ensure that they comply with the procedural requirements of the CPR. The Court does not exist to ‘warn’ litigants of their procedural missteps in sufficient time to remedy them.
These are simple but easy mistakes to make, with dire consequences. The authorities suggest that Courts will have little sympathy. Don’t get caught out.
Signed, unsealed, undelivered? When is a claim ‘made’ under s.29A of the 1954 Act?