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Preliminary remarks on methodology.
The Structural-Systematic Philosophy (SSP) is a systematic philosophy in progress. Books developing it so far are (in English) STRUCTURE AND BEING (2008), BEING AND GOD (2011), and TOWARD A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF EVERYTHING (TAPTOE; 2014). Podcasts describe the project and present details.
1.3 Preliminary Remarks on Methadology
The philosophical theory of everything of which this book is a partial presentation is a linguistic account that is true. At this point, "true" can be understood in the everyday sense in which, roughly, a given sentence is true if it says that such and such is the case and such and such is indeed or in actuality the case. The sense of "true" specific to the structural-systematic philosophy is explained below; see 2.5 and chapter 3.
The development and to some extent the presentation of this theory are guided by a method that is further clarified in 2.2, 2.5 and 2.6, as well as in STRUCTURE AND BEING 1.4, but some preliminary methodological remarks are appropriate at this point. The chief reason for this is that TAPTOE aims at maximal clarity, and that includes clarity concerning the status of its own sentences. To be clarified at this point in a general manner are the criteria that the sentences presented in this account must satisfy if they are to qualify as true. Negatively, the account's method does not require and indeed does not allow for it to begin with or to include any sentences that qualify as foundational by satisfying both of the following two conditions: (a) being self-evidently or indubitably or in some way non-problematically true, and (b) providing premises from which all true sentences not satisfying condition (a) would have to be derived. Positively, the method requires instead from the outset (1) that its sentences be adequately intelligible, loosely, that they not be nonsensical or meaningless; (2) that they not be defective in ways that would preclude the possibility of their being true, thus, most clearly, that they not be self-contradictory; and (3), that they be mutually consistent, that is, that they do not contradict one another. As additional sentences are added, the method comes to require that in addition to satisfying the three criteria just identified, these sentences also serve in some cases to increase the intelligibility of previously introduced sentences or groups of sentences -- arguments, sub-theories, and so forth -- and in all cases, ultimately to increase its intelligibility, coherence, and comprehensiveness with respect to the subject matter of the account as whole.
Differently put, this account is structured as a holistic network of sentences, collectively constituting a partial presentation of a philosophical theory of everything or, technically, of being. Nodes within the network -- individual theses and later sub-theories -- are stabilized by means of inferential interlinkings of various sorts, including deduction, induction, and especially inferences to the best explanation, theorization, or systematization (see STRUCTUE AND BEING 1.4.2). Obviously, the sentences in this account must be presented sequentially. For this reason, sentences articulated as the account begins cannot, when initially presented, be tightly inferentially linked to many if indeed any other sentences. To the extent that the account is successful, linkages both multiply and strengthen as the account proceeds. Thus, for example, the intelligibility and coherence within the book as a whole of this section's description of its method should increase as the density of the presented network increases, as should that of the SSP's reliance on the network. The increasing density of the network is also accompanied by increasing refinement. The reason for this is that clarity and intelligibility are often served by and in many cases indeed require initial reliance on formulations that prove in light of subsequently introduced terms, theses, and arguments to be less than fully intelligible. Thus, for example, when such technical terms as "philosophical theory of everything," "unrestricted universe of discourse," and "being as such and as a whole" are initially introduced, they are, of necessity, relatively vague. Their vagueness decreases as the account develops. This holds as well, of course, for the terms "intelligibility" and "incoherence." The terms are drawn from ordinary English and the meanings of these terms that are specific to the structural-systematic philosophy are made increasingly clear as the account progresses.
To put the central point of the two preceding paragraphs more directly and colloquially the reader should be guided implicitly upon encountering a given sentence or group of sentences in this book, not in the overwhelming majority of. By such questions as is this true? Has this been proved or do I agree, but instead by the questions, does this make sense?
Is it possible that this is true? And how does this fit together with what has come before as the account develops? It becomes increasingly appropriate for the reader to keep in mind the additional question, in what ways, and to what degree is, does this sentence or group of sentences increase the intelligibility and coherence of the theory or theories within which a decision.
Ultimately assuming that as it develops it adequately satisfies the criteria identified in the questions, just introduced the SSP as a whole must be assessed towards theoretical adequacy and indeed for its truth, but because of its network structure, it can be assessed only ultimately, and not as in the case with foundationally structured theories, see 2.2 below, starting from the beginning and continuing with every additional step.
Just how the theory is best. Is the question addressed by the theory itself, how this is accomplished and why its accomplishment involves no problematic circularity is explained in detail and structure and being sections 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 to 2.3 and 6.3 0.2 0.1, a cleric clarificatory footnote. Um, the question, does it make sense is not the pragmatic that is subject or read a related question.
Does this make sense to. But instead the semantic that is language or meaning related question, does this make sense in the language, in which it is expressed to clarify the sentence the sequence is or tomato anxiously presented simply as such makes no sense in ordinary English, although it could make sense in some other words, For example, in a code or even an ordinary English if presented, not simply as such, but instead say, as a response to the instruction, produce a list consisting of a verb, a conjunction announ, and.
In contrast the sentence, the structural systematic philosophy is the theory of being as such and as a whole might, will at least initially make relatively little sense to many readers who are quite competent in English, but it can not be identified as nonsensical in English. It's sustaining adequate system semantic intelligibility within this book requires the introduction of other sequences, other sentences, explaining it and linking it to other sentences.
And it's adequate, pragmatic, intelligent. It's making adequate sense to readers depends in part, of course, on the reader's own efforts. 1.4, a philosophically consequent, stylistic peculiarity. A stylistic feature that tempo shares with structure and being, and generally with being in God. And one that is unusual in philosophical and other literature is that it speaks of itself rather than of its author, particularly tiptoe instructor and being relied minimally, if at all on formulations, like I hold that or as the author notes in chapter one, there are two basic reasons for this.
The first is that according to one of the. Structural systematic philosophy, central thesis. The theoretician is not centrally relevant to theorization or to theories. See structure being 2.3 0.2 0.5 among the consequences of this, the thesis, or that whether structure in being. And being in God, author Lawrence, B punctal or Tapco author, Alan White, or any other theoretician believes or argues or contend something or other is not of central philosophical importance.
And then what is, is central philosophical importance is the status of that something or other as a component of a theory of the theory presented in structure, in being a theory percented instructor in being, being in God or tapped out or. The second reason for avoiding speaking of the author of this book is a reason for avoiding speaking of authors at all, this reason is that authors often change their minds.
It doesn't makes no sense. For example, to write without qualification about Hillary Putnam's beliefs about philosophical issues, because theses contained in his later works often, explicitly contradict one contained in his earlier works. The kinds of qualifications required are present in the following.
In time and physical geometry written in 1967, Putnam presupposes, a metaphysical realism, but incense nonsense in the senses published in 1994. He rejects metaphysical reads. Sentences containing such qualifications can be important in philosophical accounts, but it is not important that they attribute beliefs or positions to authors instead of attributing, theses or positions to text tap toe.
Does the ladder relying on formulations like Putnam 1967, presupposes metaphysical realism, but Putnam 1994, rechecks metaphysical realism to put this second point somewhat differently, no matter what Lawrence B punctal or Alan White may believe. Indeed or indeed may ever have believed structuring being, and tapped.
We'll continue to present that theories that they present as long as copies of them exist. And it is those theories and that Lawrence B punctal or Alan White that are the proper focus of philosophical. In order accurately to reflect is centrally important fact, tap toe speaks for itself and allows structure in being another text to speak for themselves as well.
Hence, the following sentence is true. Structuring being often attribute to these, these in theories to philosophers. For example, Quine presents Quine maintains Quine designates, whereas tiptoe, other than section 1.2 attributes to them only to text, for example, Quine 1992, argues 1.5, the structure of this book.
Following the preliminaries covered in chapter one, chapter two introduces the abstract theoretical framework of the structural systematic philosophy and the process of explaining what abstract theoretical frameworks are and how they are concretized. Chapter two is a concise alternative to chapters, one through three of structure and being, and just presupposed by chapters three through eight chapters, three through eight are sufficiently independent of one another that they may be read in any order, although they're probably most intelligible.
Okay. In numerical order, chapter three greatly expands the brief. Of the structure. Structural systematic philosophy is true theory. Given in 2.5, chapter four explains the structural systematic philosophy is definition of knowledge, chapter five, sketches to the structural systematic philosophies value theory on its most general level, chapter 6%, an account of human freedom that supplements the relatively brief passages on that topic included Instructure and being chapter seven sketches.
The theory of beauty that is an alternative to theory introduced instructor in being section four points. Chapter eight, finally present some S some aspects of the theory of being presented in structure and being 5.3 and chapter three of being in God, introducing, and then relying on a refined language in order to ATAR, articulate, being more coherently and intelligently then does either structure in being, or being, and God.