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Heartland’s Tim Benson is joined by Anthony Eames, director of scholarly initiatives at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, non-resident fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and professorial lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, to discuss his new book, A Voice in Their Own Destiny: Reagan, Thatcher, and Public Diplomacy in the Nuclear 1980s. They chat about how the administrations of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher used innovations in public diplomacy to build back support for their foreign policy agendas at a moment of widespread popular dissent. They also discuss how ow competition between the governments of Reagan and Thatcher, the Anglo-American antinuclear movement, and the Soviet peace offensive sparked a revolution in public diplomacy.
Get the book here: https://www.umasspress.com/9781625347107/a-voice-in-their-own-destiny/
Creators & Guests
Host
Tim Benson
Ill Literacy, the newest podcast from The Heartland Institute, is helmed by Tim Benson, Senior Policy Analyst for Heartland’s Government Relations team. Benson brings on authors of new book releases on topics including politics, culture, and history on the Ill Literacy podcast. Every episode offers listeners the author’s unique analysis of their own book release. Discussions often shift into debate between authors and Benson when ideological differences arise, creating unique commentary that can’t be found anywhere else.
What is Ill Literacy: Books with Benson?
The Heartland Institute's podcast discussing notable new works with their authors. Hosted by Tim Benson.
Hello, everybody, and welcome to the Illiteracy podcast. I'm your host, Tim Benson, a senior policy analyst at the Heartland Institute, a national free market think tank. This is episode a 160 something of the podcast. So we've been around for quite a bit now, surprisingly. But for those of you just tuning in for the podcast for the first time, basically, what we do here on the podcast is I invite an author on to discuss a book of theirs that's been newly published or recently published on, you know, someone, something, some idea, some event, etcetera, etcetera that we think you guys would like to hear a conversation about.
Tim Benson:And then, hopefully, at the end of the podcast, you can go ahead and, give the book a purchase and give it a read. So if you like this podcast, please consider giving Illiteracy a 5 star review at Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to this show and also by sharing with your friends because that's the, best way to support programming like this. And my guest today is doctor Anthony Eames, and doctor Eames is the director of scholarly initiatives at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, where he oversees the development of academic alliances and is responsible for fellowships and programs to support scholarship on the Reagan presidency, legacy, and era. He is also a lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. And you may have seen his work in the Journal of Military History, Technology and Culture, and War on the Rocks among many others.
Tim Benson:And he is the coauthor along with John Bayless of Sharing Nuclear Secrets, Trust, and Ambiguity in Anglo American Nuclear Relations since 1939. And lastly, he is the author of A Voice in Their Own Destiny, Reagan, Thatcher, and Public Diplomacy in the Nuclear 19 eighties, which was published back in May by the University of Massachusetts Press, and is the book we will be discussing today. So, doctor Eames, thanks so so much for coming on the prod, podcast. I do appreciate it.
Anthony Eames:Hey, Tim. Thanks for having me on. Looking forward to having a good conversation. Hopefully, your listeners are welcome to it.
Tim Benson:Great. Yeah. So, actually, before we get to the book itself, why don't you, if you don't mind, tell everybody about the, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. What, what do you guys do there? What, you know, what's the what's the the mission, I guess, of the, of the, Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation?
Anthony Eames:Well, you you know, the Reagan Foundation and Institute, we're the sole nonprofit, entrusted with, advancing and promoting Ronald Reagan's legacy, and we're bicoastal. So we have our kind of a main campus in Simi Valley and our, smaller but still a really exciting place to be campus in Washington, DC, about a block away from the White House. Surely, a lot of your listeners have probably heard about or visited any number of presidential libraries. We're the private side of that. We operate the museum, we host all sorts of events and forums, on things that are really meaningful to President Reagan.
Anthony Eames:And where I come in is I kind of engage scholars who are trying to to find ways to recover Reagan's legacy, to learn a little bit more about about what he meant to America, what he meant to the world. And sometimes I get to write a book or 2. And, so that's what brings me here today. Right?
Tim Benson:Yeah. Absolutely. And I forgot to mention in your, little intro that, besides the Reagan Foundation, besides, GW, you're also a nonresident fellow at the, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Right?
Anthony Eames:That's right. Thank and thanks for thanks for adding that on.
Tim Benson:Yeah. No problem. I just wanted to, you know, make sure, you know, we got all your all your, your long list of titles and, everything in there. So, you're you're practically like a like a Habsburg monarch, with all these things. So, anyway, so the book itself, you know, what, you know, normal entry question that, everyone sorta gets on the podcast?
Tim Benson:What the, you know, what made you wanna write this book? What was the what was the, genesis of the project?
Anthony Eames:You know, for for a while now, I've struggled to find that Tiffany, that moment that's really good to share on a podcast or in a conversation. You know, like, oh, I discovered I was Ronald Reagan's nephew, and, of course, I had to write a book about Ronald Reagan. No. You know, it's really sort of a slow realization. I did some some graduate work in London.
Anthony Eames:I finished my graduate work in Washington DC, became very interested in that special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. And as I got deeper into that relationship, became quite clear to me that the nuclear dimension of that relationship is is perhaps the most significant element. I mean, you can make some arguments about other things, language, culture, shared interest, what have you. But the nuclear element was was really, attractive to me as a as something to study. And it just so happens that all those other things we talked about, language, culture, shared interest, flow into that nuclear dimension.
Anthony Eames:And well, if you're studying nuclear weapons and you're studying Anglo American relations, you run into these 2 people, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, because they had a lot to say and a lot to do with with how those weapons were were kind of positioned and and used politically at the end of the Cold War and, as a matter of fact, to to end the Cold War. And so that's kind of how I came to it. Right? It was just a slow process of of diving down that rabbit hole and getting more interested in in a topic. And sooner than later, it becomes your whole life as you as you write a book on the on the topic.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Sure.
Tim Benson:So, you write, early in the book that, you know, nuclear weapons were a symbol of the broader fissures in the Anglo American world in the 19 eighties. Can you explain, to people a little bit what you what you mean by that? How they were that symbol?
Anthony Eames:When I first started writing the book, or I should say one of the earlier titles for the book was morally assured destruction, you know, and then subtitle there. And the reason I wanted to call it morally assured destruction was because it came pretty apparent to me early on that pro nuclear advocates or we'll say more hawkish advocates for a peace through strength program and kind of anti nuclear activists weren't just arguing about nuclear weapons. They were arguing about kind of the underlying moral precepts of what those represent. And when we talk about morality politics, you know, they they generally center on issues of life and death. That's, you know, generally how kind of political and moral philosophers think about these things.
Anthony Eames:And they become, pronounced, in public debate on things like abortion, on things like capital punishment, things like euthanasia. And there have been fair amount of scholarship on morality politics surrounding those issues, but there had been almost no scholarship on the morality politics of nuclear weapons. It shocked me. And so as I got into this a little bit more, it became pretty apparent to me, that one way to kind of read the the the growing, the widening kind of moral divergence underlying the political polarization of American British society was through these really intense nuclear debates in the 1980s. And this manifests in so many different ways, right?
Anthony Eames:I opened the book with this, this kind of episode of Casper Weinberger debating EP Thompson. Casper Weinberger, US Secretary of Defense. EP Thompson, one of the the leading anti nuclear activists of the 19 eighties and a very famous historian of, Marxist history. And they're, they're kind of duking it out, in the Oxford Union. And the central question is there is no moral difference between the Soviet Union and United States, which sounds outrageous to even propose.
Anthony Eames:And to Reagan supporters and Thatcher supporters, it was outrageous, I suppose, fair to propose. It
Tim Benson:was like the the William f Buckley line about the pushing old ladies, you know. Yeah. You know, one person pushes old ladies out out of the way of the bus, and the other one pushes the old lady in front of the bus and, you know, basically saying that, you know, both sides are, you know, people that push old ladies around. You know?
Anthony Eames:That's exactly right. Yeah. I wish I wish I had brought that quote somehow into the into the title of the book. Right? But, yeah, this this on its face became, you know, just kind of like remarkable episode for me to to zero in on and then expand on.
Anthony Eames:And so, that's kind of, in some ways what the book is about. It's about how nuclear weapons, nuclear politics, yeah, they don't just result in the end of the Cold War, but they also result in kind of a wider political gap between left and right. And, as I said, you see it manifest in massive protests. You see it manifest in the emergence of new types of political advocacy organizations. Heritage Foundation had been around, for example, but it's not until the early 1980s where they really start to tangle in the area of foreign policy and dance in the area of foreign policy, you know, in the seventies it did more economics.
Anthony Eames:So, yeah, it just, it becomes like, you know, the subtitle of the book includes the line nuclear 19 eighties. And to me, the 19 eighties, as a child of the 19 eighties, I started to read nuclear things into everything that happened in the 19 eighties.
Tim Benson:Mhmm. Yeah. I was actually speaking of heritage. I was a little surprised at how much, impact they had on this. You know, just I mean, it's been a rough year for heritage.
Tim Benson:They've been sort of taking it on the chin every other week, it seems like, from, from Donald Trump. But self inflicted moon, I guess, on their part. But, yeah. So or I guess let's, well, let's just talk about the the term public diplomacy, I guess, to start with, or or just I guess explain, you know, what is how, you know, how do we define public diplomacy, and is it, you know, what is the difference between it and say, you know, propaganda, which and it has a negative connotation now, but it's not necessarily a, you know, a dirty thing. And, so, yeah, what what is public diplomacy?
Tim Benson:You know, how different is it from or is it not different at all from propaganda? Is it just propaganda by a different, you know, term? And, and how was public diplomacy sort of fundamental to the growth of the American national security state?
Anthony Eames:Sure. So, you know, if I'm gonna be tongue in cheek, I'll say the good guys do public diplomacy and the bad guys do propaganda. Right? Right. Yeah.
Anthony Eames:But but through the lens of public diplomacy, we can see why they're the good guys and why the bad guys do propaganda. Right? The big difference between public diplomacy and propaganda is the act of listening. When you're doing good public diplomacy, you're listening to the audiences that you're spreading your message to. And you're listening to the audience that you're spreading your message to, not just so you become can kind of become more effective at manipulating them and controlling their lives.
Anthony Eames:I mean, sure, you want to be a better, you know, marketer of your message. But you're also listening to the audience so that you're spreading your message to to see if they have anything insightful to say about, you know, the policy or the program you're trying to sell. And let me bring this more fully into the context of of the nuclear debates of the 1980s that ended the Cold War. And when you think about those debates, you can think about deterrence. Right?
Anthony Eames:We can use a very simple definition of deterrence and that is making sure you're strong enough, so strong that your enemy is afraid to attack you. Right? We'll use this kind of very baseline definition of deterrence. But if you get into the asymmetries between deterrence between the Soviet Union and the West, the United States and its allies, chief among them the United Kingdom, You you can look at it 4 ways. Right?
Anthony Eames:You can look at it through the psychological lens. Will the president of the United States actually fire a nuclear weapon, on Russia or the Soviet Union if if the situation or the crisis calls for it. K. You can look at it technologically. Are these things actually gonna work?
Anthony Eames:You know, it's a live question today as we've gone into an era of computerized testing and digital testing. You can look at it geographically. Okay. Where do we have our weapons positioned? How effective can they counter, you know, threats from adversaries?
Anthony Eames:In In the case of the Cold War, we had the geographic advantage. Right? We could position weapons in Europe. The Soviets couldn't really position weapons in, Canada or Mexico, and the one time they tried to get real close in Cuba, you know, we all know how that ended.
Tim Benson:Yeah. No bueno.
Anthony Eames:No bueno. And, of course, there's submarine launched missiles, and that raises a different issue. But still, geographically, we had the advantage. The last thing is social, and this is where the Soviets thought they had the advantage. Right?
Anthony Eames:Can you be certain that the society in which nuclear weapons exist to protect will have popular support. Ultimately, the American taxpayer has to decide that these things are worth it. That we're actually going to fund nuclear weapons for our security and for the security of our allies. And so the Soviets thought they had an advantage there. They thought they could get inside the anti nuclear movement, they thought they could appeal to the anti nuclear movement to undermine the investment necessary for Reagan's and Thatcher's kind of peace through strength program.
Anthony Eames:And then another thing though, to pull back on public diplomacy and propaganda, and what's, what's the difference and what's the history? And I said, you know, the good guys do it and they listen, and the bad guys don't listen. Well, in those nuclear debates, Reagan and Patrick did listen and became more effective messengers, not just to the kind of middle and to the moderates and to the conservatives, but also to to the anti nuclear crowd and abolitionists.
Tim Benson:So which one of those areas those 4 areas did Reagan have the biggest impact on? And, you know, how did his how did public diplomacy, you know, change over the Reagan years?
Anthony Eames:So it's definitely in the social. I I suppose the social and the technological, but let's let's talk about how public diplomacy during the Reagan years changed. It changed in 4 ways. Okay. Four big ways.
Anthony Eames:It changed, thematically. End of the 1970s, we've heard this story before. America's kind of the morale both amongst its military and, you know, its people.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Malaise, all that stuff.
Anthony Eames:Malaise, crisis of confidence, you know. Reagan comes back with a strong moral message, right? And whether or not you agree with the kind of moral principles that Reagan was, was putting forward in the 1980s, He was certainly consistent. And that consistency alone, was a was a transformation of public diplomacy. 2, technologically.
Anthony Eames:Alright. So we're sitting here recording, on a nice kind of live stream, podcast software. Obviously, those capabilities didn't exist in the eighties, but what
Tim Benson:Could possibly be interrupted by Comcast sucking, but, you know, just to but anyway I mean,
Anthony Eames:you know, telecom companies have always been problematic. I guess that Yeah. Right. Yeah. But the the first satellite broadcasting services were from the US government.
Anthony Eames:World Net, right, in the 19 eighties, was a public diplomacy innovation. Right? So now the US could could broadcast via satellite around the world. And in many ways, it kind of beat Soviet jamming operations, things that had kind of prevented the message from getting through to their general public east of the iron curtain. And that went hand in hand with kind of upgrades to voice of America infrastructure and and satellites and radio stations.
Anthony Eames:3rd is the, you know, more full cooperation with the private sector. And this is where you really start to see the growth of think tanks and kind of nonprofit advocacy organizations. Heartland Institute, of course, would fall under that. Right?
Tim Benson:Yep. Yep.
Anthony Eames:But at the end of seventies, there there weren't too many games in town. In the late seventies and the early eighties, specifically, because of their willingness to kinda join in this this message, about peace through strength, about the need for peace through strength. We see a proliferation of think tanks and a proliferation of persuasion and advocacy organizations. And, you know, 4th so we we talked about the technological. We talked about the thematic.
Anthony Eames:We talked about the the engagement with the, with the private sector. You know, 4th, public diplomacy kind of went truly, transnational in that, both in private dimensions and in official dimensions, they became more cooperative with with their British counterparts and with their native counterparts. And with that kind of transnationalization of public diplomacy comes a bureaucratic overhaul. And 1, budgets for public diplomacy double under the Reagan years. 2, the kind of reforms that had been half half hearted reforms that came out in the late 19 seventies, were ditched.
Anthony Eames:And 3, you got a guy named Charlie Wick, who's one of Ronald Reagan's best friends to head the public diplomacy Agency, the US Information Agency.
Tim Benson:Interesting cat, this dude.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Charlie wick, you know, he, was a big band leader. He was Winston Churchill's literary agent. You know, Reagan's oldest son lived with him for a year, when he was governor of California. Yeah.
Anthony Eames:This guy kind of knew everyone, slick operator, had a bit of a temper. A Lot of public diplomats weren't exactly, you know, excited when he first walked in the door. But I'll tell you what, when someone doubles your budget, you generally start to like them. Yeah. Sure.
Tim Benson:I guess well, let's, go to Reagan himself then. Sort of, well, you know, sort of the I don't know. Wanna call it legend, but sort of the wrapped up in the Reagan mystique is this, you know, vision of this guy as, you know, in his his complete and total abhorrence of nuclear weapons. And someone who would like to see a nuclear weapon free world. But was that always the case with him?
Tim Benson:Did he shift his view on nuclear weapons after he became president? And, you know, just the importance of nuclear security and military superiority to Reagan's, you know, sort of idealized vision Sure. Of America?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Let me I'll say it this way. I cut across the grain a little bit on this one. A lot of colleagues, a lot of friends kind of accept the idea that Reagan was a lifelong nuclear abolitionist. But before he became president, the closest time you know, the closest he ever came to saying I wanna abolish nuclear weapons was his near attendance of an anti nuclear rally in the in the years immediately following World War 2.
Anthony Eames:Right? When he's still a New Deal Democrat, when he's still kind of a Hollywood liberal. And, and he doesn't end up attending that rally. He drops out of that rally for for a variety of reasons. In the next few decades, over this course of this really remarkable political transformation and this remarkable journey into kind of ideas about national security and defense, Reagan doesn't talk about abolishing nuclear weapons.
Anthony Eames:When he gets to office, he has a study of peace through strength. I mean, it's been talked about a lot, right? But, it's about investing in a major way in America's national security capabilities, nuclear weapons, conventional arms, alliances, so that we can set the conditions, favorable conditions for negotiating, with the Soviet Union to them to end the Cold War and to win the Cold War on, on transfigurable to the US. Right? So it's trading the conditions for diplomacy.
Anthony Eames:Too many of too many of my colleagues kind of focus on one or the other. Right? But as Reagan understood it, the best diplomacy comes under the shadow of of a strong military. Yeah. I I I think it's he gets to office.
Anthony Eames:He gets to office. He has his first briefings. Right? He has his first briefings about casualty rates of the nuclear war. The EE is almost assassinated.
Anthony Eames:Right? That near miss. He he Reagan's a a guy who has a lively imagination, who's really informed by not just the kind of charts and graphs and presidential daily briefings, but also the kind of cultural discourse around him. Movies like The Day After kind of show nuclear war and how dramatic it is. These all things these things all start to affect him.
Anthony Eames:It's my sense that Reagan's first priority was always the security of the American people. And secondarily, when he came to realizing that abolishing nuclear weapons would actually enhance that security, that's when he embraced the abolitionist track.
Tim Benson:Gotcha. Alright. So, the anti nuclear movement in the United States in and in the United Kingdom, who is making up, you know, primarily making up this movement? And how does it, you know, how does it start to get going in both countries? How does it start to snowball?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. You know, there there have been a there have been a long tradition of kind of an, anti nuclear activity in in both the US and the UK dating back to, you know, the dates immediately following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bloody gun only largely dormant in the 19 seventies in part because some some not so good, but nonetheless real efforts of arms control, between Soviet Union and the United States and, frankly, because, new weapons weren't being deployed in May, in the 19 seventies at the same rate as they were expected to be deployed and made in in the 19 eighties. But there's some other things at hand. What does the nuclear move anti nuclear movement look like in the United States?
Anthony Eames:Well, one let me first dispel the myth. It's it's not, I mean, I've researched this extensively. It's not comprised of, you know, Soviet spies and Russian dupes and whatnot. It's comprised of essentially a reconstructed liberal order that was left searching for causes after the class left searching for a unit a foundation for unity after the collapse of the New Deal Order, right, which we really see in the late sixties early seventies, especially after Johnson's Great Society programs kind of falter. Right?
Anthony Eames:And you start to see these kind of interesting coalitions, for example, the the kind of feminist movements that, you know, kind of started to move past the second wave found themselves in alliance with the Catholic Church, you know, where they, you know, previously been opposed to each other on on on the abortion issue. You start to see kind of labor join forces, with, kind of anti militaristic aims, whereas AFL CIOO at one point had been a huge supporter of kind of cold war militarism because of, you know, jobs for welders, and jobs for machinists, and whatnot.
Tim Benson:Very intersectional in the new phrase.
Anthony Eames:Yeah, it becomes, anti nuclear cause becomes the new point of intersection. And added to all that, you start to see mainstream professionals join the fray as well. Doctors, lawyers, and most importantly, kind of scientists and technical professionals who hadn't really broken with the ranks of the US National Security Establishment before. So you see the emergence of a new coalition, and it's it's it's pretty significant. It has some real political power.
Anthony Eames:It's something that we forget about in the story of the 19 eighties. Because in the story of the 19 eighties, we largely look back at those 2 election landslides in 84 and 80. Mhmm. But it's not you know, those are snapshots in time, as any pollster will tell you. Right?
Anthony Eames:It doesn't mean that the steady state of a political drama was always Reagan landslide. Right? You look in early 1982, you look at even early 1983 after the midterm elections. There's some real concern about, you know, what Reagan's peace to strength message and platform is gonna do to his chances of winning the presidency in 84.
Tim Benson:Yeah. You think you put on the book, there's a poll in January of 1984 that shows over basically, over 50% disapprove of Reagan's handling of, you know, foreign policy issues, which is kinda crazy to think about, especially, you know, from, you know, Reagan's reputation today and just the fact that he went on to, you know, kick ass and take names in November and, yeah, in the 49 state landslide. But the, the new I mean, but even beyond America, I mean, you know, the nuclear movement never succeeded in, you know, ousting the con the the Tories, the conservatives out of, out of their material. Yeah. It it
Anthony Eames:it comes a little closer than than people realize, and it should also just to to clarify too, the anti nuclear movement isn't just a force in the US and UK. It's a major force throughout European politics, throughout throughout the global south. But in the UK specifically, you start to see its reemergence, in the late seventies over something called the neutron bomb, enhanced radiation weapon about, you know, when will the US deploy this to NATO countries?
Tim Benson:That's the one that basically leaves all the infrastructure intact, which just kills Yeah.
Anthony Eames:They called it the capitalist bomb. Kill all the people, leave all the material. Yeah.
Tim Benson:I'm sorry. That
Anthony Eames:that's my idea. You know, and then we start to deploy, we reach a deal to deploy cruise and and Persian ballistic missiles to counter Soviet deployments of SS 20. We are medium range, short range, medium range, theater nuclear forces that really are meant for kind of a European theater of war. Mhmm. And right.
Anthony Eames:So so this really does kind of stir up some real passion, on the left wing of the political spectrum in the UK. And what happens is it splits the Labour Party. Right? You know, you we kinda see a fracturing, you know, on the right wing of the political political spectrum in the UK today. Right?
Anthony Eames:Mhmm. Part because of Brexit and part because of some other things. But in the early 19 eighties, it's the nuclear thing that splits labor up and, you know, leads several leading labor figures to form the SDP, which becomes the SDP Liberal Party Alliance, which then, you know, just becomes libs. But that, you know, that that puts labor at a serious disadvantage in competing for any kind of shot at an electoral majority, a parliamentary majority, I should say. At one point though, the CND campaign for nuclear disarmament becomes the 2nd largest political organization in the in the UK behind the Tories.
Tim Benson:Mhmm.
Anthony Eames:And their aims start to get a little, crisscrossed with labor. You know, they start to essentially become a stand in political party from an organized from an organizer's perspective. You know? Who's ordering who's organizing party politics in all these small localities? A lot of times it's CND, not labor.
Anthony Eames:And so when their goals don't perfectly align, when labor essentially kind of stabs CND from the back, and rejects kind of a stronger anti nuclear message in its 1983 platform, well, then, you know, nothing really works from there. Tory's win again. Big majority. Thatcher can kind of continue to mobilize British public support and Britain's capabilities and support of, of Reagan. And that that duo, that alliance between the 2 of them really cements NATO's commitment.
Anthony Eames:Because the big concern is if the Brits go, then the Germans, oh, they're definitely not letting the US put nuclear weapons on German soil because they have a they have an even bigger anti nuclear problem. But they survived that test. Right? They survived that test. The Soviets kinda threw everything they had at them in the public diplomacy game and the propaganda game, and, and they lose.
Anthony Eames:Right? And so that social dimension of deterrence we talked about remains intact.
Tim Benson:Yes. Speaking of the Soviets, when you brought them up a little bit earlier too, but how much of an influence were these sort of active measures that the Soviets were undertaking? How much of an influence did they have on the anti nuclear movement?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. I mean, it's it's it's a little hard to tell. I'd actually suggest that they had a greater influence on the Soviets, and they they did on the anti nuclear movement. I'll and I'll share why. Ultimately, the that kind of anti nuclear the, arms control positions that Gorbachev takes at the end of the Cold War read like something almost verbatim that Pugwash the the kind of, anti nuclear scientific movement put together in their creed.
Anthony Eames:But, no, the the big the big front for the Soviets in the 19 eighties and even before then, was the World Peace Council. That was in the global south less distinct between, kind of indigenous or, you know, organically grown, anti nuclear descent. But by the 19 eighties, most of these folks were extremely weary of kind of Soviet active measures, right, about Soviet influence and the intrusion into their anti nuclear campaigns because they knew that would delegitimize them so effectively. And I'll say this. You know, what active measures seeks to do and, you know, you see the misinformation warfare or information warfare the Russians use today.
Anthony Eames:It's, the same playbook as the 19 eighties. Right? You you don't try to create a new issue of of dissent or a new issue of of disagreement in in, in a country's politics. You try to advance an existing area of disagreement and push that a few more degrees. Right?
Anthony Eames:And so Soviets would try to push that a few more degrees, and they eventually, you know, they start tailoring their their arms control proposals to kind of more accurately reflect the calls of the anti nuclear movements in the west. And they really started to try to create all these nuggets and tokens and carrots that western publics would eat up. And it was a smart strategy on their part, but they made some big mistakes. And if you want, we can talk about those mistakes, especially on SDI Star Wars.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Well well, let's get to Star Wars in a sec. But just one thing I think we could talk about. You make a point in the book for, you know, talking about for for public diplomacy to have to or to be a successful, part of nuclear policy making that, you know, Reagan, really had to concede with the public in transnational rather than in national terms. Like, he had to, he couldn't be, you know, provincial on the issue.
Tim Benson:He had to sort of, you know, look beyond the horizon, so to speak, and how they were gonna, you know, craft their policy was you know, they had to pay attention as much so or maybe even more so, to what was going on to, you know, to public opinion in the UK, to public opinion in Western Europe, as much as they did in the United States itself.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Look. I mean, I I made the tongue in cheek comment earlier that public diplomacy is done by the good guys and propaganda is done by the bad guys, but I also made the point that public good public diplomacy listens to its audience. So how did Reagan listen to his audience? Right?
Anthony Eames:And there's a few ways. Charlie, Rick, early on, Reagan's giving some kind of, let's say, rah rah speeches to the American public, kind of building on that kind of cowboy western image. And Charlie looks like, hey. You know, cowboys work in American locker rooms, but not to the European public, not to the European audience. We gotta take a different tact with them.
Anthony Eames:But we also have to be mindful, you know, that's whatever said in, you know, in the United States ends up being heard in Europe. Right? So we have to craft this message at all times to reflect both European sensible sensibilities and American sensibilities. So a few ways. 1, when we actually deploy weapons, we avoid kind of high seasons of anti nuclear activity.
Anthony Eames:Right? We avoid deploying them before major elections. We're kind of very smart about that. 2, when Reagan gives some addresses rather than going prime time in the US, he goes prime time in Europe when it's an when it's, you know, a piece through strength message that he knows Europe's Europeans need to hear. And and 3, he does moderate his position a little bit.
Anthony Eames:That doesn't mean he moderates his goals. Right? There's a big conversation when people study Reagan. Is he principled or is he pragmatic? And the answer is kind of both.
Anthony Eames:You know, the goal, the principle of of reducing nuclear arms, reducing the possibility of nuclear war, making sure nuclear wars never fought. Well, that remains the same, but how you get there can be a little, you know, smart tactically. And so, yeah, he creates these, these kind of traps in the negotiations with the Soviets, that lead to the Soviets walking out of arms control negotiations. Well, that's fine, because at the end of the day, his big concern is making sure the general public stays on his side. Right.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. And continue to invest in nuclear weapons, to maintain Western security. Not to make the Soviets feel good about themselves. Right? And so moderating negotiating positions, knowing where it'll lead to, or having a sense that it kind of creates a trap for the Soviets, well, that's, that's key.
Tim Benson:Yeah. And I thought it was interesting too, you know, how they use, say, for example, the BBC, how important, the BBC's network was for them in, you know, relaying this message, and how much time they took to, members of the administration, you know, the the inner circle, whatever you wanna call it, how much time they took cultivating, foreign, correspondents and foreign journalists and, you know, giving them a lot more time, you know, FaceTime on on this issue than, you know, than they were with, you know, domestic, you know, papers that, you know, there was more Oh,
Anthony Eames:yeah. Absolutely.
Tim Benson:You know, that it was more important for them to talk to the BBC, than it was to talk to the New York Times and the Washington Post, you know, about these things. So
Anthony Eames:Yeah. That's, you know, that's one of the important kind of dimensions there is kind of the reforms, the Reagan era public diplomacy. You know, traditionally, those foreign media outlets would just pick up whatever was printed in the AP or the New York Times or Washington Post. And Reagan's team is kinda like, no. We gotta bring the news.
Anthony Eames:Gotta bring the ideas that we're talking about directly to those people to
Tim Benson:Yeah. We don't wanna go to go through the the filter of the liberal New York Times. Or
Anthony Eames:Right. Right. Exactly right. Yeah. So that's an important innovation.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Alright. Now on to, STI, Star Wars, whatever you wanna call it. I've always been sort of fond of the the Star Wars name even though it's, you know, sort of was meant as a, you know, sort of a sort of an insult. But, yeah.
Tim Benson:But, so SDI, this idea of strategic defense, the idea of it as a as a sort of a rebuttal to the anti nuclear movement, because it it, you know, shifts the terms of the deterrent the deterrent's debate. And then, you know, so, but what was I found this interesting, you know, the the, the response to SDI, from Thatcher's government and, you know, from the UK. And, you know, the, you know, the UK, the Thatcher's government, you know, came around to support SDI, but there were some conditions involved with it. Can you talk a little bit about that, that part of the the story there?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. So, you know, let's talk about first really quickly what what SDI what SDI is, to make sure that that your listeners, which I'm sure is a smart group, but to make sure they actually know what it is. And
Tim Benson:Sort of like nuclear iron dome, basically.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. I I guess. Right? But it's it's, you know, it's a SDI isn't a single technology. It's a umbrella for a whole host of technologies and missile defense that had been actually in truth under development for decades.
Anthony Eames:But it's a huge new reprioritization of that. Some concepts include lasers and mirrors in space. Some concepts include kind of more traditional hit to kill kinetic weapons, anchored on Earth. Some contact, concepts like Excalibur, have a kind of a nuclear dimension, but, but they all, you know, they all fall under this kind of aim to to make sure the Soviets couldn't strike the American homeland with nuclear missiles. So that's that's the general idea.
Anthony Eames:Now there's some problems with it. 1, the kind of opponents of FCI say, well, hey. You can never have 99% or a 100% certainty that that these systems will work a 100% of the time. And so even if they're only, say, 95% effective or 90% effective, an all out nuclear strike would still leave millions dead. And it's easier and cheaper to produce offensive nuclear weapons than it is to produce defensive technologies.
Anthony Eames:So this will encourage the Soviets to to build up, which will then encourage the US to build up. Right? So so opponents of SDI say, you know, this represents a new spiral in the arms control or in, in the arms race. In Britain, the UK, they're a little nervous because they just signed this big new deal for us to provide them Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles. In fact, the the same kind of nuclear weapons that continue to be the UK nuclear deterrent today.
Anthony Eames:And they're thinking to themselves, man, is this system gonna make these weapons obsolete? Right? Like, if we start investing in defensive technologies to such a degree, are these systems gonna be obsolete and therefore, deterrence as we know are gonna be obsolete? So that's the big concern. But to the peace movement, you know, what Reagan's approach was here is, hey.
Anthony Eames:You're complaining about us investing in offensive arms. Well, now we're gonna do something a little different. Try to invest heavily in defensive technologies. What about that? You know, the UK, basically, the foreign office and the defend Ministry of Defense think this is they think it's techno technologically unfeasible.
Anthony Eames:They think it kind of upends deterrence doctrines. They think it's kind of, hey. We were, you know, we were all swimming in the same direction, pedaling in the same direction. Now all of a sudden, the US took a right turn. What are we gonna do?
Anthony Eames:But Thatcher but Thatcher kind of overrides the MOD in in the foreign office and says, no, we have to stay on the same page here. There's some other concerns. Right? SDI is really high technology. Really advanced computing power is needed.
Anthony Eames:Britain's struggling economically. They're hoping that, you know, hey. Maybe we can invest invest heavily in kind of next generation of computing technology and start to compete with the Japanese on electronics. And, hey, we can revitalize our economy through kind of high-tech investments. But if we have to join in on SDI, we simply just don't have the the human capital, the people power, the brain power, the facilities to do both.
Anthony Eames:So there's some concern about that. Ultimately, Thatcher and Reagan come together at Camp David late in 1984, December 1984, And they reached a kind of a 4 point agreement on how SDI should be kind of purposed and styled and sold to the American public. And it needs to remain kinda consistent with arms control objectives and enhanced deterrence, and the British are supposed to get kind of a cut of the research activity. What's significant about this is actually this four point plan becomes, you know, something that kind of originates from the mind of the British to satisfy the own their own kind of public outcries over, hey. We've just gotten bored on board with this idea of peace through strength, and now there's a whole new ripple.
Anthony Eames:What the hell? To kind of so to kinda defang that, they come up with this 4 point agreement and all of a sudden, this becomes the basis for US public diplomacy in Europe, period, on the issue of SDI. And that becomes really important because the Soviets lost on, the kind of cruise missile controversy, on the Euro missile controversy. Right? We talked about those theater nuclear weapons.
Anthony Eames:US was able to deploy them. Okay. So now they're kind of at equal levels of strength in, arms control negotiations. But but the Soviets under they've got named Gorbachev think they can test the US again on SDI. And, and they do, and and they don't succeed.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Well, sorry, everybody. I gotta I'm here in South Florida. You can have our normal midafternoon thunderstorms coming through. So, if you hear any sky booms or anything like that, that's what's going on.
Tim Benson:But, that's also why my camera has sky, like, incredibly dark in the last 5 minutes in case you were wondering. Anyway yeah. So, yeah, I guess, a little bit about how does this sort of I mean, obviously, the issue sort of fizzles with, you know, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. But how do we get to that point with, you know, the in Reagan's second term with all the summit diplomacy, you know, the INF Treaty. How does this all wind its way down?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. The Soviets are
Tim Benson:you know, from such a big issue to something that, you know I mean, people really don't I mean, for the most part I mean, even today, sorry to cut you off, you know, how many people really spend a lot of time thinking about, you know, nuclear issues or or just, you know, nuclear war between, you know, us and the Chinese or us and the Russians. I mean, outside of, like, the national security Sure. You know, infrastructure, I mean, or the military, whoever. You know, it's not something that's in really in people's minds anymore. It's something that is that could plausibly happen.
Tim Benson:You know? So, anyway, so how did that all, you know, wind down?
Anthony Eames:Yeah. You're right. It's not really in people's minds anymore. Right? In the 19 eighties, it was in everything.
Anthony Eames:It was in movies. It was in music. It was in fashion. It was in theater. It was everything.
Anthony Eames:Everywhere. You know, now it's it's, you know, it's not even like a a main feature of a of an action thriller. Now it's like cyber war or the release of the epidemic or something like that. But how to solve right now? Yeah.
Anthony Eames:The Soviets are in a bad sort of way in the late 19 eighties. Right? Their economy is on its last legs. Their leadership is ancient, keeps on dying. And, a new guy comes up, a guy named Gorbachev, and he he's a by Soviet politician standards, a younger, kind of more amiable
Tim Benson:Just a whippersnapper.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly.
Anthony Eames:But, you know, he he he he he has some serious bona fates, right, to to make it through some some really tough, political circumstances. But but he's he wants to reform the Soviet Union. And to be really clear here, he wants to reform the Soviet Union. He doesn't wanna end the Soviet Union. He doesn't wanna kill off the Soviet Union.
Anthony Eames:He wants to reform the Soviet Union. So he becomes more engaged, on arms control. Reagan's willing to engage. Gorbachev thinks he can start to win the public diplomacy battle because he's younger, because he's media savvy, because the West will love him. And so Reagan says, okay.
Anthony Eames:If you wanna do this public diplomacy game, you know, I have a few decades of experience, in front of a camera, smiling, holding babies. Yeah. Like, let let let's do this. Let's dance. They both do come to mind, especially after Chernobyl, that reduce the possibility of nuclear war, that kind of a nuclear act.
Anthony Eames:The possibility of even accidental nuclear war, right, is is really serious. There's some interesting points though. You know, a lot of people say Gorbachev became more inclined to negotiate, to reduce nuclear weapons after Chernobyl. No. He was already inclined to do so before Chernobyl.
Anthony Eames:What happened though is the Americans thought that Gorbachev became more inclined to negotiate to reduce nuclear weapons after Chernobyl. So we started to kind of engage more systematically, and we engaged more systematically in the in the pivot point, or I should say, the the, the linchpin was SDI. And Gorbachev thought, man, if I can get the American public and the western public again to rally around SDI an opposition to SDI can maybe kill this whole kind of Reagan peace through strength agenda. And so what Gorbachev says is, hey. We'll abolish nuclear weapons, full stop, if you get best SDI.
Anthony Eames:And Reagan says no. Walks away from deal. This is a lot of stuff on this Reagan at Reykjavik. But Reagan kinda does is he counters a little bit, and he says, we'll share SDI with you because we need to worry about, you know, rogue nuclear states, what have you. Right?
Anthony Eames:Alright. So so here's the thing. Could Reagan have actually shared SDI with the Soviets? Man, you'd have a tough time convincing Congress. Right?
Anthony Eames:But Gorbachev doesn't cause block. Doesn't cause block. And so Reagan kind of continues on that path, and and again, carries the day on on kind of the peace track. Like, who's in it for peace? Mhmm.
Anthony Eames:Right? But he doesn't have to really give up anything position wise in terms of strategic advantage vis a vis the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the Soviets come through with just this avalanche of concessions. And, you know, it's almost too good to be true. Reagan's advisor.
Anthony Eames:Hey. This is actually, we're not sure this is a good thing. There's so much they're giving up. Maybe this isn't a good thing. But it is a good thing.
Anthony Eames:And, you know, it's it's kind of that just commitment to a consistent approach, on arms control that works out.
Tim Benson:Yeah. The Reykjavik summit, I mean, I was born in August of 82, and I like, probably, like, my first, like, remembrance of any sort of, like, your worldly things. You know, as, like, a kid, I I remember I mean, I don't remember much, but I mean but I remember, like, the the image of, you know, Reagan, you know, walking outside from, like, the summit and, you know, just being, like, pissed off and, like, we were this close and
Anthony Eames:Yep. You know,
Tim Benson:and that sort of thing. And, you know,
Anthony Eames:I remember, like, my parents trying to explain to me,
Tim Benson:you know, to a
Anthony Eames:whatever it was at
Tim Benson:the time, 4 and a half, 5 years old, you know, what had gone on. But that's why yeah. I think, like, that Reykjavik summit is actually, like, my first, like, really, like, political memory of, like, my my life.
Anthony Eames:That's a pretty good political member first political memory. Which I have. Yeah. I mean, a pretty powerful one.
Tim Benson:Yeah. It was a good one. Like, you know, my, like, my baseball one is, you know, like, Kirk Gibson's well, running was there. Anyway, but, so but, I mean, that's, like these
Anthony Eames:political memories. Yeah.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Yeah. That that's what I am in age range. But, alright. So, yeah, just, well, then wrapping up then because we are I've already kept you about an hour, which is what I told you I'd keep you, and just in the interest of whether it might potentially being, you know, blown up here by the that storm.
Tim Benson:So, today question, I guess, you know, how do we, you know, how do we really revive public diplomacy?
Anthony Eames:There it is. Close.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Yeah. Because it seems like it's something we don't, do very well anymore.
Anthony Eames:Yeah.
Tim Benson:We haven't And haven't for a while.
Anthony Eames:Kinda getting our asses kicked. Public diplomacy is a bit more of a look. Right now, first of all, the you know, we're in this information warfare space with some real serious competitors, the Russians, the Chinese. We've probably a bunch of your listeners have heard concerns about TikTok. Right?
Anthony Eames:And, in fact, the Chinese are using that as a as a platform to advance their kind of national interest. But the the kind of the simplest thing you can do from a public diplomacy standpoint is have a clear message of American national interest and security at the top, like, flat out. Right?
Tim Benson:Consistent,
Anthony Eames:powerful message. Consistent, powerful message. 2nd, I mean, you do need to invest in the technological capabilities. Right? And it does need to be a whole of government approach.
Anthony Eames:I don't know if you need to revive the USIA, but public diplomacy needs to be a part of basically every agency that is involved in, you know, US engagement with the world, but it can't be uncoordinated. Right? So it could be it's kind of an interagency thing you have to do. Right? These agencies have to talk about it, and they have to be technically sophisticated.
Anthony Eames:You know, we used to broadcast in a lot more languages than we broadcast now. The pace of innovation on social media outpaces the pace of innovation in public diplomacy, And that means that you need to kind of enlist the private sector. Right? You have to get the private sector involved. I mean, one of the one of the things we thought we would do is that kind of America's commercial dominance and everyone loves Coca Cola and everyone loves McDonald's and whatnot and everyone loves Hollywood would mean that the the the, you know, the US government could cut its public diplomacy budgets and operations.
Anthony Eames:Well, we know, but that doesn't mean they're still not important. They're important for a couple of ways. Coca Cola and McDonald's and, I don't know what the most popular American brands I could tell you, Tesla or whatever. Air Jordans. Yeah.
Anthony Eames:Air Jordans. Yeah. Good. I'm a Chicago boy, so that speaks to me. Those are important for kind of creating a cultivating a long term favorable favorable impression of American society.
Anthony Eames:But the government's important for the kind of short term. Right? Like, for the short term policy operations that need support both at home and abroad. Right? For the short term messages that shore up, you know, a position of US leadership around the world, that's where government interagency activity really, really needs to to to kick in the ear.
Anthony Eames:And, and then, you know, basic kind of information literacy, You know, like, you gotta interrogate your sources. Like, you just, you know, just, like, if you see it on TikTok, maybe do a double check. Right? Yeah. That's and I don't see the US government preaching information literacy.
Anthony Eames:What they do, and what US politicians often do is they they debunk or they, you know, under you know, attack statements from the opposing party Mhmm. Or a a political opponent. They don't follow that up with basic information literacy. Like, that that needs to be the focus. Information literacy.
Anthony Eames:Yeah.
Tim Benson:Yeah. No. I mean, I was just thinking about, like, just say, for example, Ukraine and the war that's been going on, and, you know, there's a big portion of the right that's opposed to any sort of, you know, support for Ukraine. And, I'm sure there's a significant portion of the left too. But, you know, I to me, I I don't feel like well, maybe he just can't do this because he's older than dirt, and his brain is just apple sauce or whatever.
Tim Benson:So, like, he doesn't have the stamina or the, you know, wattage left to do it. But, like, it seems to me that, like, you know, like, Biden has never really gone out and made, like, a sustained serious, like, effort to, like, make the case for why we should, you know, be funding Ukraine and making sure that, you know, Russia loses this war of aggression and that the Ukrainians win it and why it's in our national, you know, national security interest and international interest and, you know, and the global interest and all these other things that is, that all these that this, you know, naked act of aggression, you know, cannot stand. And, you know, if you I mean, if you go out and make the case, you know, and just make the case and make the case and make the case, like, the American people, for the most part, will be like, alright. Yeah. Like, I'm with you.
Tim Benson:You know, it doesn't matter. I mean, on international stuff, normally, on foreign policy, you know, normally, like, for the most part, both sides are you know, can get behind something like that.
Anthony Eames:Yeah. Right.
Tim Benson:Like like like like George w Bush was fairly successful, I would say, in, like, making a case, a sustained case for, you know, the the war on terror. You know? Like, that was, like, here's why we gotta do it. Here's why it's in our interest. You know, here's what we're gonna do, etcetera, etcetera.
Tim Benson:And he really went out and made a sustained effort to do that. And just, like, for example, you know, this Ukrainian thing, You know? I mean, like, he's done it, like, a couple times, but never, like He
Anthony Eames:doesn't have the stamp. He doesn't have the stamp.
Tim Benson:Convincingly, you know? And, so
Anthony Eames:It's it's it's the consistency we talked. And the last 2 presidents, we haven't seen the stamina or the consistency of message Right. About US engagement and leadership around the world. And and that's those things are important, stamina and consistency. Right?
Anthony Eames:So, you know, hopefully, we can we can fix that. I believe very deeply in US engagement and leadership around the world, you know, and, with you know, unequivocally believe that it's a good thing for the US to support Ukrainians in their kind of fight against Russian aggression and invasion. I can, you know, state it, pretty certainly in my estimation that Ronald Reagan would be against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and would would be left in full force.
Tim Benson:Yeah. I think I think that's a pretty safe assumption on your part.
Anthony Eames:But, yeah, you know, we need we need we need leaders with real stand up, with real consistency. You know, charisma is a a plus, certainly a plus, but those first two things are what matter, and then I'll add a third. You know, one of the things about Ronald Reagan, other great, kind of American leaders or transitions American foreign policy, they all had a bit of imagination. Like, they all were had a had ability to see the world in a different and better way. Mhmm.
Anthony Eames:President Biden has a lot of foreign policy experience. Lot of foreign policy, but he's been in Washington forever.
Tim Benson:Yeah. But, I mean, he sucks at it.
Anthony Eames:I'm not yeah. I'm not sure he he has the imagination to see a better end state, right, for America around the world. And that's, I think, more generally kind of a crisis in our foreign policy is the lack of imagination in seeing a a better end state or a different set of conditions for American engagement around the world. Like, I I can't tell you. I hate when people say we're in a new cold war with China because competition with China looks nothing like competition with the Soviet Union.
Anthony Eames:I don't like when people say we gotta return to the world's based international order. You know why? Because the global south hates when we talk about the rules based international order because they felt left out.
Tim Benson:Sure.
Anthony Eames:Right? We slap sanctions on everyone left and right. We have an increasingly small slice of the world economy. They're less effective. Sanctions work both ways.
Anthony Eames:They hurt the other party, they also hurt us. Yeah. There's no imagination there in foreign policy anymore, and part of that imagination always stems from your ability to engage with your audience. To to to not, like, have that interactive and that iterative, engagement is is what public diplomacy is, but it's also a good way to stimulate the imagination, and how America could better lead the world.
Tim Benson:Yeah. Absolutely. Alright. Well, like I said, kept you long enough. Just one more question, the normal exit question for everybody that comes on the podcast in that.
Tim Benson:So, you know, what would what would you like the audience to get out of this book, or, You know, what's the what's the one thing you'd want a reader to take away from it having read it?
Anthony Eames:I think the, you know, the the one thing for the general reader, I'd say it's different if, if I have a college professor reading the post, but one thing for the general readers that US leadership around the world is important and that the general public has a role to play. You know, you're sitting at home and storms in Florida or, you know, you're eating tacos in, you know, let's say Southwest or you're having deep dish in
Tim Benson:Simi Valley.
Anthony Eames:Chicago. Yeah. Or you're hanging out in Simi Valley, you know, participating in, contributing your voice to the kind of way US thinks about the world around it, the way your US thinks about the international community, the way US foreign policy is made, but that matters. Right? That really does have an effect.
Anthony Eames:So find a way to engage not just on foreign policy and national security, but engage the world. You know? Because I guarantee you, it'll lead to a better outcome, for an American citizen.
Tim Benson:Alright. Very well said. Well, once again, the name of the book is A Voice in Their Own Destiny, Reagan, Thatcher, and Public Diplomacy in the Nuclear 19 eighties. Really, really cool little book on this issue of public diplomacy and how the Reagan administration, how the Thatcher government went about, you know, pursuing, you know, the cause of deterrence and all that. It really, fascinating look at that, at that subject.
Tim Benson:So, yeah, it's a great little book. I highly recommend it. To everybody out there, once again, the name of the book, A Voice and Their Own Destiny, Reagan Thatcher and Public Diplomacy in the New Year 19 eighties. And my guest today, the author of the book, doctor Anthony Eames. So, doctor Eames, thank you so so much for coming on the podcast, and, you know, thank you for taking the time out of your day to do it and for sitting through all this, thunderstorm nonsense with me.
Tim Benson:And, yeah, thank you for, you know, taking the time out of your life to actually, you know, write the write the book so that we could all enjoy the, the fruits of your labors.
Anthony Eames:Tim, thanks for having me on. It was a lot of fun.
Tim Benson:Yeah. No problem. Thank you. And, again, if you like this podcast, please consider leaving us a 5 star review and sharing with your friends. And if you have any, questions or comments or if there's any, you know, you know, if you have any suggestions for books, you think would be a good fit for the podcast, you can always, email me at, tbenson@heartland.org.
Tim Benson:That's t b e n s o n at heartland.org. And, you know, for more information about the Heartland Institute, you can just go to heartland.org. And we do have our little, or not so little anymore, but, we do have our Twitter slash x, account for the podcast. You can always reach out to us there too, at illbooks@illbooks. So make sure you check that out.
Tim Benson:Oh, yeah. Doctor Eames, is there anything, before we go, anything else you wanna plug? Any social media, any websites, or anything like that that people should, look at? Anything or any appearances or anything like that coming
Anthony Eames:up? I mean, look. You you gotta check out the Reagan Institute and the Reagan Foundation websites. See all sorts of cool things we're doing, both public programming and and and things for scholars and students and, and, policymakers and whatnot. So go check out the Reagan Institute website, and, always happy to be in touch with any any engaged readers of of this book or anything else I've read.
Tim Benson:Alright. Great. Yeah. So, yeah, I I think that's pretty much it. So thanks for listening, everyone.
Tim Benson:We'll see you guys next time. Take care. Love you, Robbie. Love you, mom. Bye bye.