Show Me The Evidence

Show Me the Evidence, Episode 8

Guest: Dr Dwight Meglan Topic: Physics-Based Simulation, Surgical Robotics and Why Simulators Still Don't Measure What Matters

Episode Summary
In this episode, Professor Tony Gallagher is joined by Dr Dwight Meglan, the engineer who developed one of the first physics-based virtual reality simulators for endovascular procedures in the late 1990s, and who has spent the last two decades building surgical robots. Together they trace 30 years of simulation-based training and ask why so little has changed: simulators are still not verified against real-world physics, the field still measures process rather than skill, and device manufacturers, not educators, still set the agenda. The conversation ranges from haptics and instrumented torquers to Likert scales, credentialing committees, telesurgery risk, and why autonomous surgical robots are a regulatory and financial impossibility rather than a technical one. It closes with the evidence for Proficiency-Based Progression (PBP) and the leadership needed to adopt it.

Key Topics Covered
1. Building the first physics-based VR simulators | 0:00
  • Meeting at Medicine Meets Virtual Reality in the late 1990s
  • Real-time physics of tool and tissue interaction, fluoroscopy and haptic feedback
  • Why the goal was to replicate reality, not design a user experience
  • Physics tests to verify simulator correctness still do not exist, 25 years on
2. Who really drives simulation: the device manufacturers | 2:24
  • Manufacturers pay for simulation, so manufacturers shape it
  • Training to use the device versus training to perform the procedure
  • Simulators in exhibition booths: marketing tools first, training tools second
3. Haptics and the sensory threshold problem | 3:55
  • The instrumented torquer: measuring what cardiologists actually feel
  • Just noticeable difference thresholds vary between clinicians
  • Still no published datasets on the forces a cardiologist feels during catheterisation
  • Clinicians praising the haptics on simulators where the haptics were switched off
4. Using devices safely: the stapler and the defibrillator | 8:52
  • A stapling device with a 6 to 27 per cent leak rate, where one third of patients who develop a leak die
  • Training to the instructions for use is device safety training, not surgical skills training
  • Cardiac defibrillator implantation: clinicians departing from the instructions for use
  • Construct validity findings: some very senior clinicians perform worse than the worst trainee when assessed with objective, peer-derived metrics
5. What should a simulator measure? | 13:19
  • The original approach: record everything, then find the measures that matter
  • Metrics for mechanical thrombectomy for acute stroke, developed from the human procedure with Mentice
  • How clinician-led metrics forced a redesign of contrast injection, later patented
  • It works when you insist on it, but you must start with the metrics
6. The state of simulation metrics today | 17:35
  • At a recent conference, almost none of the exhibited simulators had any metrics at all
  • Some manufacturers avoid measurement deliberately: plausible deniability
  • Validated metrics as a purchasing condition: if you cannot build them in, we will not buy
7. From simulation to surgical robotics | 21:52
  • Why simulation felt like a capped market and robotics did not
  • The analogous DNA of simulators and robots as real-time information processing systems
  • Verification versus validation: robots are bench-tested against dozens of specifications, simulators almost never are
8. Measuring process, not skill | 26:49
  • Motion tracking and path length: lessons not learned from laparoscopic surgery
  • AI-driven pattern hunting as a fishing expedition without a hypothesis
  • Suturing as the test case: the physics of tissue apposition has never been published
  • Physical intelligence and humanoid robotics will improve simulation from the outside in
9. Likert scales are not measurement | 36:47
  • Binary, procedure-specific metrics require scoring the entire video, reliably, in pairs
  • One-to-five ratings after watching a few minutes of video are hand waving, not assessment
  • Ring exercises on robotic simulators have never been verified against real forces
10. Whose job is it? Credentialing and privileging | 39:27
  • Manufacturers certify device use; professional societies and hospitals grant privileges
  • Per-procedure privileging in the United States versus broad qualification in Europe
  • The credentialing committee problem: standards set by the least experienced member
  • Case volume, fellowship length and reputation are social proof, not evidence of competence
11. A jumbo jet a day: the human cost | 44:43
  • Deaths from surgical skills deficits estimated as equivalent to a full jumbo jet crashing every day, consistent with evidence that around 4.2 million people die within 30 days of surgery each year (Nepogodiev et al., The Lancet, 2019)
  • Why one death at a time never makes headlines the way one crash does
  • The Bristol Royal Infirmary case: peers knew for a decade before the front pages forced action (The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, Kennedy Report, 2001)
  • Telesurgery at scale: how one underperforming surgeon could soon harm many patients quickly
12. The PBP evidence and the leadership gap | 47:47
  • Systematic review and meta-analysis evidence: PBP-trained clinicians make approximately 60 per cent fewer objectively assessed intraoperative errors
  • Training to proficiency in one third of the time and at less than half the cost of conventional training
  • "A failure of leadership": adoption at ORSI Academy, AANA, ERUS under Alberto Breda, and increasingly Medtronic cardiovascular came from senior leaders making it non-negotiable
  • The aviation lesson: flight simulation was mandated by government before the evidence existed, while surgery has the evidence and no mandate
Publication: Mazzone, E., Puliatti, S., Amato, M., Bunting, B., Rocco, B., Montorsi, F., Mottrie, A. and Gallagher, A.G. (2021). A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis on the Impact of Proficiency-based Progression Simulation Training on Performance Outcomes. Annals of Surgery, 274(2), 281-289. DOI: 10.1097/SLA.0000000000004650
Publication: Puliatti, S., Rodriguez PeƱaranda, N., Amato, M., De Groote, R., Farinha, R., Bunting, B., van Cleynenbreugel, B., Mottrie, A. and Gallagher, A.G. (2026). Randomised trial on the economic impact of proficiency-based progression vs conventional robotic surgical training. BJU International, 137, 493-501. https://doi.org/10.1111/bju.70130
13. The next 10 years: AI, automation and the autonomy myth | 54:08
  • AI will lower the barrier to building simulators and add semi-automated instruction
  • Part-task automation, such as a supervised stapler, is plausible; autonomous procedures are not
  • The barrier is financial and regulatory: manufacturers will not accept liability for practising medicine
  • The self-driving analogy: millions of hours of verified synthetic data would be needed, which may be the only route to a properly verified surgical simulator

Connect & Follow
Show Me The Evidence Podcast: Tony Gallagher / KU Leuven: https://www.linkedin.com/in/anthony-g-gallagher/ Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=rNTScRMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate Dwight Meglan: [add LinkedIn or website link]

Timestamps
TopicTimeBuilding the first physics-based VR simulators | 0:00
Who really drives simulation: the device manufacturers | 2:24
Haptics and the sensory threshold problem | 3:55
Using devices safely: the stapler and the defibrillator | 8:52
What should a simulator measure? | 13:19
The state of simulation metrics today | 17:35
From simulation to surgical robotics | 21:52
Measuring process, not skill | 26:49
Likert scales are not measurement | 36:47
Whose job is it? Credentialing and privileging | 39:27
A jumbo jet a day: the human cost | 44:43
The PBP evidence and the leadership gap | 47:47
The next 10 years: AI, automation and the autonomy myth | 54:08

What is Show Me The Evidence?

Most training is sold on confidence. Show Me The Evidence is built on data.
In every episode we take a single study, clinical trial, or systematic review and work through what it found, how it was designed, and what it means for the way we teach and assess skill. We focus on metrics-based training and proficiency-based progression, the approach that asks learners to demonstrate measurable competence before moving on, and we trace its results across surgical, medical, and professional education.
This is a podcast for learning professionals and medical educators who want more than opinion. Expect plain-language breakdowns of the research, honest discussion of what the evidence does and does not support, and conversations with the people behind the studies.
If you make decisions about how people are trained, we think you deserve to see the evidence first.

In the late 1990s, Dr. Dwight
Meglan and I met at

Medicine Meets Virtual
Reality

somewhere in California,
I seem to recall.

Dwight's an engineer. Initially,
when I met him, he was

working on physics-based virtual
reality simulation.

He subsequently moved into
surgical robotics.

You're very welcome
this evening,

Dwight, and nice to
talk to you.

So you developed one
of the first

physics-based virtual reality
simulators.

I purchased one in 1999 at
some considerable cost.

So at that time, how did you
envision that the VR

simulation market would
develop?

And has it developed the way
that you thought it would?

I have to be honest, I really didn't
think about it a whole

lot about relative
to a market.

I was more thinking about it
as a technical problem.

I was just interested in the
idea of how do you do

real-time physics of
tool tissue

interaction and replicate the
real-time fluoroscopy

and give haptic feedback
in a way

that was natural to the
procedure itself.

And I was much more focused on
that than anything else.

And I really didn't give it a
lot of thought other than

there's a lot of catheterization.

So I figured it was
probably going

to be useful and people
would use it.

And do you think that the current
developers of virtual

reality simulation pays much attention
to the physics-based

virtual reality simulation

today, as you did back
in the 1990s?

I don't really think many of
the simulators pay much

attention to that, no matter
what it is.

I was kind of obsessed with
trying to mimic the actual

physics of the tool tissue
interaction.

And I figured if I could get
that right, then the

experience for the user would

reflect reality to
some degree.

So I kind of focused on that.
Whereas, as you well know, a

lot of the simulators kind of

focus on the user experience
itself.

I actually didn't really think
about the user experience.

I just figured if I did
the simulation

right, then the user experience
would be right.

So what do you think have been
the drivers of the current

state of virtual reality
simulation today?

Well, over the last 20 years,
20-odd years?

Basically, the device manufacturers.
I mean, I figured

early on, I didn't
really give

that a lot of thought,
to be honest.

I was just thinking about it
relative to build something

that's useful for the
clinicians.

And that would be something
that would be meaningful.

But as I spent more time working
in the area, because I

worked on other simulators
besides endovascular,

I came to understand that really
the only people that are

really paying for this and really
caring about it a whole

lot were the device
manufacturers.

And they kind of drive the way
things work. And that's kind

of what it seems like it
is today to me.

I mean, there's various professional
societies that have

set up standards for learning
and other things.

But as far as I know, like the
thing I was driving towards

years ago, like 20,
25 years ago,

was trying to figure out how to
come up with physics tests

that would allow you
to verify

the correctness of the
simulator.

And those still don't exist for
the most part, as far as I

know, which I'm kind of
surprised at.

Yeah, but one of the things that
always struck me about the

sensation that the or
the perceptions

are that the user actually had
from the simulation. People

have different sensory
thresholds.

Therefore, the sensory
thresholds are

going to impact on what
they perceive.

And one of the one of the interesting
things I find out

over the years was the plastic
surgeons or microsurgeons.

They won't go for a run. They
won't have coffee.

They try to get a good
night's sleep the

night before they operate
because they know

that they can, a slight
nudge can

impact their performance
the following day.

So it's very hard to actually
come up with, you know, what

are the sensory thresholds for
the clinicians to feel?

So how did you approach that
or try and solve it?

Well, so we did do a couple of
things early on because we

were kind of curious about
how would we

know if we were producing

things that the cardiologists
felt.

And what we ended up doing was
we built an instrumented

torquer that the cardiologists
would

hold to actually manipulate
the tools.

And we figured if we could
measure what

they were actually feeling
in real life,

then we could actually, and we
knew what we were feeding

back to them on the
simulator,

that if they were at least somewhat
correlated, that we

were actually doing at least
some level of a good job.

We never went far enough along
with that to actually try

and figure out if there's

different thresholds for
different people,

which of course there is. We
know from haptics that

different people have just

noticeable difference
thresholds.

But we never pursued
that. I mean,

this was never done
academically.

This was all done in the
auspices of a company.

And since I'm not super active
in the field anymore, like

you said earlier, I mostly work
on surgical robots now.

I'm not aware of anybody having
published extensive data

sets on what it is that a

cardiologist feels when they
do catheterisation.

So there's not minimal
data out there

to even test against,
quite frankly.

And we certainly don't know
much about the actual

interaction of the catheters
with the tissue,

which is what I was really headed
toward. I really wanted

to eventually be able
to say that

we're actually generating the
same forces, contact forces

and pressures and
motions that

you see in real life
quantitatively.

Yeah, I think that's still
a real problem today.

Sometimes I had four of the simulators
that you built when

I worked in University
College Cork.

And occasionally the haptics
weren't switched on and the

clinicians would be
telling me

only the haptics in this
are great.

And I'm not sure what's
going on

here. I mean, I know
about that.

I think over the years, I think
it's just a personal

conclusion that I've come to.

Is it the better the
clinician is, the

more attentional capacity
that they have,

the greater awareness
they have to the

subtle aspects of catheter
wire performance?

And I think it's the same in

robotics or actually
there's no.

Well, except for in the DV5
now does have it.

So, and I've never used it, so
I don't know what it's like.

So.

So you think one of the
biggest drivers

of the physics based virtual
reality simulation

was primarily the
manufacturers.

I mean, and the conclusion
or the observation

I've sort of made is they
seem to want it only

for mostly for marketing and
that education and training

seem to come well down the
track after that.

Would you agree with that?

I mean, everything's subservient
to a purpose

when it's a product, right?

I mean, they're trying
to sell stuff

and that's just the
way it is.

They'd like you to
use it well,

or at the very least
they'd like you

to not use it dangerously,

because if nothing else, it's
bad on their reputation

and maybe it can be more
than that,

depending on the situation.

Could get them into liability
issues or whatever.

So they want you to use
it in a way that

they consider you to be competent
at running the device.

But I mean, I honestly, having
worked on the simulators

and on the robots, I mean,
there's a threshold

at which they kind of
draw the line.

They just want you to be able
to use the tool

in the way that they had
designed it to be used,

at least to their best
understanding

of how it designed it
to be used,

but not, they don't,
as you know,

they don't claim any
responsibility

for the practice of medicine.

So they're not trying to teach
you how to do the procedure.

They're just trying to teach
you how to use the device.

So that's the cutoff.

I'm not entirely sure, but
I had a conversation

with a manufacturer
last week,

and it was about the use of
a stapling device.

Okay.

And the stapling device
has a six to 27%

leak and complication rate.

And one third of the patients that
develop a leak will die.

That's huge consequences
for a relatively--

And the conversation that we're
having now saying that

basically what you want to
be able to do is,

now, well, number one, we
have good evidence

that a lot of the very experienced
surgeons are,

I don't know that they're
not able to,

but they certainly don't know how
to use the device safely.

Okay?

And to what I said to the
manufacturer,

I said, you really want to be
able to train the surgeons

to use your device safely
according to the IFU.

And what they were concerned
about was

that what I was proposing was
that they were training

surgical skills and I wasn't.

I was just arguing that they
should be training

to use the device safely.

Yeah, I would agree
with that,

with what you just said on,

I mean, this is all just about
doing the stapling itself.

It's not about doing
the procedure.

And I mean, that's what the
stapler is, right?

So yeah, I can see that.

But I would have thought
that would be

that the manufacturer would
take that in

as that is their
responsibility,

is to train them how to use
the device effectively,

which basically means safely when
you can write down to it.

That's correct.

I mean, and a lot of the
problems that we see

with new devices or even
old devices,

the clinicians will blame
the device

but say that if something
was wrong,

it was the device fault.

And I mean, for the cardiovascular
devices,

the implanting, the cardiac
defibrillator.

See, clinicians, they don't follow
the instruction for use.

For example, when you're
suturing the device

into the packet that
you've created,

some clinicians don't use
any sutures at all.

They don't use the sleeve
that covers the leads.

They use the wrong type
of sutures.

They use to dispose or sorry,
sutures that melt away

rather than, you know,

For a minute.

Surely I would have thought
that the manufacturers

would be concerned
about that.

I would think so.

Yeah, but yes, they're
concerned about it.

And their trainers were
telling them

that maybe some of the
clinicians

that were training
the juniors

were not maybe as good as they
originally perceived.

You know, they had a senior
position.

They had a high volume of
procedures per year

according to their CV.

But when you looked at their
performance,

they really didn't
do that well.

And over the last decade, what
we've been publishing,

you know, for the concert
validity of the metrics

for the different devices,

what we've been observing is

that some very senior
clinicians

perform worse than the
worst trainee.

Now that's problematic.

Yeah, no, that's not good.

Yeah, it's, you know, the one
question there is,

you know, are they really
that bad

or is it because they're
not acclimated

to the device and the technology
never have been,

you never learned how
to use it well.

This wasn't on the device.

This was actually video recording
from actual patients.

Okay, just, okay.

Yeah, and the metrics
weren't made by,

us, they were made by
their peers

and for a straightforward
procedure,

not for a complex procedure.

Yeah, yeah, well, these,
as you know,

when you're doing things
like this,

we were talking about,

these are all gonna be observational
metrics, right?

Because it's surgeons watching
other surgeons

so they don't have any other
thing they can do

other than watch and say
what's going on.

Whereas, you know, like
in a simulator,

you could actually measure
the actual forces

and, you know, things
like that,

you know, like tool tissue
interactions and stuff

and turn those into metrics
if you wanted to,

but then nobody would know what
those metrics need to be

because we don't know what that
data is in real life.

So we're kind of stuck doing
the same thing,

just making it fancy and
quantitative

in terms of like tools moving
around and stuff.

You know, all the economy,
emotional,

the other stuff.

We'll get to that
one another.

So when you were building the
simulator in the 1990s,

what was your view on what the
simulator should measure?

And-

Basically everything.

There's only one thing worse
than having no data.

That's having too much data.

It's too much.

So measuring everything.

Well, no, no, no, no, there's
a reason for that.

So when I did the original
VIST,

I did try to do a harness
on it

that would record literally
everything,

like every force, every
torque, you know,

every contact point, like
everything,

because I figured eventually we
were gonna wanna go through

there and try and make
sense of it

in terms of what would
give us measures

that would be kind of
telling you

whether you did it right,
whatever it was.

And so the original intent
was literally to record

as many things as we could

and then go rifling
through it

and try and figure out what
the essential measurements

would be that would tell you

whether you had actually
learned how.

The, so the simulators were
originally supposed

to be designed around
learning goals.

And we wanna be able to have
a way to actually

a certain that you had learned
whatever the goal was.

And so our intent was that we
would have some kind

of measurement of that.

And since we didn't know
what that would be,

we were like, let's just do
built-in suspenders

and record everything and
then we'll figure out

how to pare it down to something
that makes sense.

Well, to some extent,
we did that

for the mechanical thrombectomy
for acute stroke.

I mean, we developed the metrics
from the human procedure

along with Mentice.

And then what we did was,

myself and the three interventional
neuro radiologists,

we imposed the metrics
well, Mentice did.

We told them what to do

and they imposed the metrics
on the system.

And one of the things that
the simulator didn't do

was when you inject contrast
into the brain

and into the brain neurovascular
structure

through a microcatheter, they
were using syringe with air.

And it just plunged straight
down and--

Wrong flow characteristics.

Absolutely.

And the interventional neuro radiologist
stood the ground.

They basically said, that's
not gonna do.

Yeah. And we're not standing
over this.

So Mentice had to develop and
subsequently patent

a new methodology where they
were injecting a fluid

into a small device that
actually was made

the whole training more
realistic.

And I mean, it works when
you insist on it,

but you have to start off
with the metrics.

So you were trying to measure
everything

in the late 1990s,
early 2000s.

What did you end up,

what sort of metrics did you
end up producing?

Or the simulator?

Well, so I really was not the
one that did that.

That was others that decided
what the metrics would be.

I just put the platform
together

so that the information would
be available.

And then other people made
decisions about

what the actual metrics
derived

from that information
would be.

These were clinicians or clinician
engineers or engineers?

Yeah, my experience was that

it was a little bit
of everything.

It was clinicians in concert
with the companies.

The companies usually worked
with some clinicians

and it was usually a
small number.

And whoever their subject
matter experts was

that they were paying to
consult with them.

And then they would basically
for the most part

do whatever their SMEs said.

And all we did was
implement it.

Which usually meant just
pulling out things

that were already there.

It wasn't that often we had
to do something new.

So it was a combination
of stuff

that was already getting
dumped out

or that was already available
in the simulator.

And then turning those into
some kind of metrics

which were typically,
as you know,

they're observational
metrics.

They're nothing exotic for
the most part.

And

I know that you keep an eye on
the simulation developments.

What's your view on the metrics
that currently exist?

Not just in endovascular
simulators or

interventional cardiology
simulators,

but robotics and so on.

They haven't changed a
lot, basically.

They're kind of the
same things

we came up at the very
beginning

when you come right
down to it.

I mean, I think it's
slightly worse.

Yeah, I'm sure there's...

Okay, you're much more in the

fray than I am these
days, frankly.

I was at the ERA conference
in Paris a few months ago,

and I walked around all the

booths to look at the
simulations.

And almost none of them, I
think only one of them,

had any form of metrics
whatsoever.

So it was...

I mean, I was...

To be honest with you, I was
kind of shocked.

And...

Well, were they just using
them as a marketing tool?

I mean, a lot of the early

simulators we did were just
marketing tools.

You know, you stuck them
in a booth

and it was a way to show
off the system,

you know, whatever the system
was you were trying to sell.

And they really didn't care if
there were metrics or not.

It was just to give people
an experience.

Yeah. Well, I also talked to
some of the manufacturers,

the device manufacturers,
and they

were complaining about
the simulators

and the fact that they
weren't able...

Well, some of the manufacturers,
device manufacturers,

didn't want to measure
things.

Because...

Because if they...

They don't want to know.

Correct. They don't
want to know.

Plausible deniability.

Plausible deniability.

And other manufacturers complained
that the simulation

companies weren't producing
the

metrics that they required. And
they said, where do you

expect them to get the
metrics from?

You really have to derive the
metrics from real clinicians

doing real procedures
in real life

situations. And a straightforward
procedure, not a complex

procedure. And when
they go to the

manufacturer, they say, these
are our metrics, our

validated metrics. If you
can build the

metrics into your simulator,
we'll purchase it. If you

can't, we're not. So
I mean, go on.

That would require people
to actually

say that, that that's what
they want to do.

You know, if people
still buy the

simulators, even if their
metrics aren't there,

you know, what am I supposed
to say? Yeah, well, I think

something's got to
give, because

what we're seeing is that the evidence
is fairly clear now.

The intraoperative performance
of the

clinician is going to impact
on the patient outcomes. I

mean, the data is there
now. And

with a new device, it's more likely
that a clinician who's

not trained, you know,
to a level of

proficiency, they're going to
perform less well than

somebody who's actually
been trained to

efficiency. And that's the data
on that's very clear. So I

don't understand why
there isn't,

you know, a drive by the manufacturer,
the device

manufacturers to insist
on metrics being

implemented in the simulator.
I don't know what to tell

you. I mean, maybe they
don't think that

it's going to doesn't make a
difference on selling their

gadgets in any form. It's
just a cost,

to do this. And so if it's not
going to make them sell

more, why do it? I
don't know.

Well, I mean, the other side
of that is there's devices

that have failed in the
marketplace.

And it wasn't an issue with the
device. It was the user of

the device. It's been
held back

and repeated the introduction
of that device into the

market. And I've been
told that it's

hundreds and hundreds of millions
in some cases. Yeah, I

think a lot of times people
don't think

ahead of like think ahead like
that. Or those or those

stories don't get around
well enough,

right to management at the medical
device companies to

realise, really, you know,
you could. Yeah.

Hmm. So in the early 2000s, she
appeared to move away from

simulation and more
into surgical

robotics. What were the major
drivers of that change for

you? So I basically
kind of felt

hemmed in with surgical
simulation.

You were always constrained
by,

there's not that many things
to be simulated,

at least at that point.

And it was always driven by
the device manufacturers,

whatever it was that we were
gonna be doing.

And quite frankly, I kind
of felt like

it was kind of a lousy
business

because you were inherently
capped

as to how many things you were
gonna be able to sell,

how much money you were gonna
be able to make.

Not that I really cared that
much about it,

but it just didn't seem like it
was a major growth field.

And surgical robotics had really
just started to get going.

And it was interesting,

and there was a whole bunch
of different things

to be done there.

So I just decided to move
over there.

And as it turns out that
surgical robotics

isn't all that different from
surgical simulation

in terms of sort of the systems
engineering stuff,

which is more where
I work at it.

So I like working at the
real-time sensing,

real-time computation,
real-time actuation,

and then potentially
real-time graphics,

whether it's stereo
or whatever.

And simulators are actually
very similar to robots

as far as that goes in terms
of all the different parts

having to go together and
work in real-time.

So I basically had a skillset
already done

because of the simulators that
moved over onto robots.

And so I just started working
on the robots

and kind of been going
ever since.

So you agree with Rick
Satavo then

that the VR simulators and
surgical robotics

have an analogous DNA,
if you like,

as they're both information
processing systems?

Yeah, they're both
interesting.

They're both systems where you're
doing real-time sensing

and computation and actuation

and typically graphics
generation.

The simulators don't nearly
have as high a bar to them

as the robots do.

I mean, the robot can actually
hurt somebody.

The simulator can't directly
hurt somebody.

It could indirectly hurt somebody
by teaching them wrong,

but it's not got a direct
immediate effect

of punching a hole
in someone.

So the robots have a much
higher standard

and there's much more that
has to be done

with verification.

In fact, robots do all kinds of
things with verification,

whereas the simulators
basically don't.

What do you mean they do
all sorts of things

with verification?

You mean within the system

or within the management
of the system

by the manufacturer?

When you're developing them,

they put together all kinds of
bench tests for the robots

to make sure that they have
the right forces,

the right velocities, the
right accelerations

that they hold up over time,
your reliability,

that they're stable, that the
control loops are stable,

all kinds of things
like that.

There's just dozens and
dozens of tests

that the device manufacturers
put together

to verify that the
specifications

that they've made for the robot
are what the robot does.

And I, at least in my
experience,

there's little to
none of that

that happens with the
surgical simulators.

It's, if anything, it's
validation,

which I basically don't
like validation.

Verification is like you did
the engineering correctly.

Validation is like, "I
think it's okay."

It's not precise for me.

That's like the end user
just saying,

"Okay, that worked,
I like it."

But they don't know why they
like it or don't like it.

I'm not sure I agree
with that.

I mean, validation-

This is from an engineering
point.

This has been an engineering
point of view.

Clinically, I mean, it's
not my methodology.

The methodology was agreed
in the 1970s

by all the education and
training establishments

in terms of how you validate,

whether something works or
it doesn't work.

Well, okay, so from an engineering
point of view,

validation is like, "Yeah, okay,
it does something useful.

They're actually learning
or whatever it is."

But I find that to
be imprecise.

From an engineering
point of view,

I'm much more interested
in verification.

I guess the way I look
at it from a,

like from a surgical robot
point of view,

verification and validation
is,

verification is I built what
I said I was gonna build,

and validation is I built
the right thing.

I consider that much
less precise

from an engineering
point of view.

Yeah, but it isn't
engineering.

And I mean, the ultimate test
of the validation

for a robot or a simulator
is,

does the robot do what it's
supposed to do clinically?

For somebody that can it
do the procedure,

can it do the procedure
safely?

And that's not the engineer's
realm, basically.

That's my point of view.

That's for the clinicians
and others,

but the engineer is
to verify.

Yeah, so in the 1990s, laparoscopic
surgery developed,

they extensively investigated
this whole surgical tracking

and path and path length and
motion and so on.

And it really didn't
go anywhere.

And surgical robotics seems
to be heading down

the same road as an approach
to the assessment

of operative performance.

Sure.

Oh, I think there's two
parts to this.

It's basically the only thing
people can think of

for the most part.

And it's gonna get
turbocharged

because of machine learning
in AI.

Yeah.

It's gonna be on steroids

because they're gonna be
looking for patterns

in everything with the data
they collect.

I have a feeling.

Yeah, but I mean,

I mean, it's like looking
for a target

and a very thick fog.

I mean, the whole thing
about science

is that you're supposed
to hypothesise

what it is that you're
looking.

I mean, the tracking stuff,

it seems to be like going on
a fishing expedition

without any--

It is, yep.

I mean, and do you think it's
gonna go anywhere?

I'm sure they'll find
some things.

I mean, this is the thing
with AI coming at it.

It's that it's able to
do so much more

than we could in the past.

But I mean, you really wanna
have a theory of operation

behind things of what is it
we're trying to achieve

and how is it you're
going about

making this thing attain
whatever it is

it's going to attain.

So I would think that you
basically wanna,

you have to have some
kind of concept

that drives why you do
what you do,

which is why you do the
things you do

where you break procedures
down

so you understand that there's
learning goals

and based on those learning
goals

that there's a scaffolding of
skills that support those.

And then from that,

you'd figure out how to
measure things

because those are the things
that support

your understanding of whether
you would obtain

those skills or not.

Yeah, so what strikes me is
that what laparoscopic did

and what robotic surgery
is doing now

and interventional cardiology and
the fluoroscopically,

they measure process and
they take that

as some sort of indication
of skills.

If somebody does lots
of procedures,

they're gonna be better than
somebody that does less.

If you're smooth with
the instrument

or you have a shorter
path length,

you're obviously more skilled

rather than you just jump
complete phases

or steps in the procedure.

And this process seems to be,

I mean, like they're
hanging on to,

this is a strategy for
measurement.

Yeah, well, so if it was
a perfect world,

I'll just use suturing
as an example,

because that's the thing
I tried years ago.

If it was a perfect world,

we'd actually know exactly how
much tissue apposition,

how much of the tissue faces
need to come be in contact

and how much pressure there
needs to be,

and how well distributed
it is.

And that would actually
be the measure

of how well you did suturing.

It wouldn't be an indirect
measure of like,

did you do it smoothly,
quickly, decisively,

all those things,

because that's not really the
measure of the outcome.

We know that the whole idea
with suturing

is you're trying to
get the tissue

to grow back together
and heal, right?

So you'd measure it based
on the metrics

that are reflective
of achieving

the ineffective environment
for tissue regrowth.

But we don't even know
what those are.

Back in the day, at least when
I was working on it,

that wasn't published
information.

Nobody had sat down and
built like a jig

and tried all kinds of different
amounts of pressure

and distribution of the
sutures along it

and the likes to see how well
living tissue would regrow.

So like, nobody knows as
far as I know.

Yeah, well, I mean, I've
worked quite a bit

with suturing as well,

and I haven't seen once
a milliter

that can reasonably, even
reasonably,

approximate the instrument
thread, needle, suture,

or tissue dynamics.

And so what I've reverted to

is actually getting individuals
to suture on tissue

and then a surrogate
measures,

like how well is the tissue
approximated,

did the surgeon drive
the needle

through the tissue
atraumatically,

do their knots hold when
they're supposed to?

Is the tissue pucker?

And those surrogate measures seem
to work reasonably well,

but why hasn't somebody
actually worked out

the actual physics of suturing
and thread dynamics?

Well, the suture and the
tissue, it's not easy.

It's a high computation
activity

and there frankly aren't
that many people

that work in this field.

If this is, so like look
at what's happening

with AI right now.

The entire planet has decided
that having physics,

what they're calling physical
intelligence now

is sort of one of the next
big things for AI.

So there's like thousands, tens
of thousands of people

doing physics models
now for robots,

for humanoid robots and
everything else.

And you're gonna see a tremendous
amount of improvement

in the physics simulation
abilities.

You just don't have that with
surgical simulation.

It's not like the whole
planet's decided

this is how you're gonna
become a billionaire

is by getting physical
intelligence

combined with humanoid
robots,

which is what a whole lot of
people have decided now.

So you're seeing a huge
amount of improvement.

You're just not gonna see
that in simulation,

in surgical simulation.

It's just not, like I said,

that's the reason I got out
of it a long time ago.

It's just not a big market.

So there's not a lot of
drive to do it.

What's gonna happen with
surgical simulation

is they're gonna get the
indirect benefits

of all the work that's happening
for robotics right now.

And you have all these things
that people are doing

where they're using AI combined
with physics models now,

so that you can use a reduced
accuracy physics model

and you use AI to fill
in the blanks.

I think you'll probably see
that showing up

in surgical simulation,

but it's gonna come from
other fields.

It's not gonna come
from surgical.

It's not gonna be developed
in surgical simulation.

It's gonna be developed
in other fields

and adopted in basically.

But if the measurements
of whatever task

you're at let's stick
with suturing,

if the measurements that you have
are measures of process

rather than actual measures
of skill,

I'm not too sure how the AI system's
gonna improve that.

No, yeah, no, no, yeah,
no, that doesn't,

that's such an indirect
measure.

I don't see how that really
is a good reflection

of mastery, if you will.

Yeah, I mean, so you're still
going to need

the performance metrics
which are derived

from experienced clinicians

and to actually teach an AI
system to how to assess.

And I don't see anybody doing
that in the surgical domain.

And I don't know whether they're
actually doing it

in other domains like famous
or infamous, whichever.

Car manufacturer said that
surgeons would be replaced

in what I can remember, was it
two years or three years?

Oh, him, yeah, right.

So what is happening now in
humanoid robotics

is they're trying to teach
all these humanoids.

So they're measuring all
kinds of things

about everyday activities.

So it'll be interesting to
see if some of that stuff

actually maybe becomes learning
points relative

to things that could
be moved over

into surgical simulation,
just the process

by which they're doing it,
not the details of it.

Yeah, but you see--

You are trying to quantify things
like crazy right now

in everyday activities, so.

Yeah, but what I see a lot
of the AI people do

is they're loading data into
the AI system.

And there's no quality, little
or not very good

quality assurance of the data

that the AI system's
learning on.

And the individuals that are
coding the tasks,

I mean, they don't really
know whether the task

could or not.

I mean, but that has to impede
the development of AI

in terms of the assessment
of performance.

Well, in surgery, certainly
it is.

I mean, if you're looking
at all these

humanoid robots desperately
trying

to do everyday activities,
I think the thing

that's happening there is there's
so many people doing it

that it's an aggregate
result.

There's just so many, there's
like 100 humanoid

robotics companies in
China alone.

So you get enough of
them doing it

and they're all piling on
top of each other.

And no matter how much
they're screwing up,

there's enough of them doing
the right thing

that it accumulates.

And you just don't have that effect
with surgery simulation

because there's just not that
many people active in it

when you come right
down to it.

One of the things that has struck
me across the decades

where we've been hanging
out together

is everybody's looking
for an easy way

to actually do something
that's quite difficult.

And science, I mean, doing good
science, it's not easy.

You know, I mean, and I mean,
one of the things

that I'm shocked at is the
use of Likert scales

for the assessment of
performance.

Because again, it's a measure
of process.

Yeah, yeah.

I mean, in robotics, I'm
sorry, go ahead.

No, I was gonna say all those
hand-wavy things, right?

All those hand-wavy. One
to five, right?

One to five.

I mean, my fellows,
well, they

know my views on it,
don't they?

And they initially think that
Tony's got a thing

about Likert scales, and they
very quickly learn,

okay, for the binary metric-based
assessment,

you've got to watch the entire
video and score it.

And you have to learn how
to score it reliably

with somebody else that
you're paired with.

With the Likert scales, you
can watch it, you know,

about two to five minutes
of the video,

and you can score it
in one to five

on the different constructs.

I mean, that's not measurement,
so it's not.

Yep, yep.

So what's your current view

on the status of surgical
robotic simulation

and the metrics used to
assess performance?

I mean, you've worked on
these or you've--

Yeah, I've been around
them, yeah.

You've been around them?

They could be better.

I mean, you know, even doing
the simple things

like ring exercises and
stuff like that,

they still haven't verified that
the performance of the,

you know, like the
exact forces

that you grasp the rings with
and the exact forces

when you pull on the
stretchy ones,

that those actually reflect
what happens in real life.

So it's all based on tweaking
and tuning

to make it so that it's at
least objectionable

to the largest number
of people,

but that doesn't mean that
it's correct.

And I don't think it's ever,

unless they change how
they do things,

it's probably never gonna be,

you're never gonna know
how correct it is

when you come right
down to it.

But surely that should
be of concern

given that you said earlier

that the robot is something
that can actually hurt

a patient relatively easily

if the surgeon doesn't
actually know

how to use it properly
and safely.

Yeah, well, I'm not disagreeing
with you on that.

I mean, but the manufacturer's
goal

is to verify that it won't unintentionally
hurt somebody.

If it intentionally hurts somebody
because of the operator,

that's kind of not their
problem,

is there kind of their
point of view?

Unless of course it happened
so many times

because of something
that's clearly

a human user interface issue,

then that does become
their problem.

And so whose responsibility
is then

for the clinician to
be trained

to a level that allows them
to use the device safely?

Well, I would assume
it would be

the professional societies.

I mean, the ones that are
actually saying

that yes, you are a surgeon.

And if not the societies,

it's the hospitals themselves
giving privileges.

So then that would be sort
of the next level up

because the privilege
granting

is at a whole different level

than the device manufacturers,
right?

The device manufacturer
is just saying,

I taught you how to
use the device

in a way that we certify that
it can be used.

But the granting of privileges
is saying,

you know how to use this
gadget to actually

get a clinical result and
we're gonna take,

we end up having liability
for it

if you don't essentially,
right?

But in the US, you have
a much better,

I'm okay, it's problematic,

but you have a better
privileging system

than we have over in Europe.

I mean, once you're
qualified,

I mean, I was at a PhD viva
by last week

and one of the examiners
was saying

that he works in Sweden.

And once he's qualified as
a surgical specialty,

he can do almost anything.

He also works in New York.

And he said each procedure
that he wants to perform,

he has to be privileged
for it.

That seems like a better
system than here.

Yeah, yeah, no, I would
go with that,

but I think that's sort
of reflective

of sort of the old school,
you know,

doctors are geniuses
kind of thing

from the old days, right?

So, yeah, it's not--

You mean in Europe or the US?

Well, in Europe in that case,
I mean, I don't know if the

experience you said about in
New York, if that's uniform

across the US, I don't really
follow that.

It would be nice if it
was. I suspect

it's not. It's probably
highly variable.

I can only talk about, you
know, I've worked in Yale

and Emory and it was the case

in both of those like 20
odd years ago.

That's good.

But one of the problems, the Chief
of Cardiology, there was

a credentialing going
on for carotid

artery stenting with embolic
protection

and he was saying that he
had to go to one of

the credentialing committees
and I said,

"That sounds, you know,
pretty powerful."

And he said, "No,
not really."

He says the credentialing system
in a hospital is based on

the person who has the lowest

experience in that procedure
on the committee.

So there was again no
objective for it.

Nobody wants to have any kind
of social admittance of

social whatever that they
don't know what's

going on.

Yeah, okay.

I mean, I think that at some point
there needs to be some

objective assessment
of performance,

either at the end of
a course or a

verification, you know, at
a hospital level.

Because one of the things we're
learning is a lot of the

metrics in the past were used

for the assessment of
performance,

like how many procedures
did you do?

Did you do a fellowship?

How long was your fellowship?

These were the performance
metrics that

were used to say, "Okay, that
person's safe to

do the procedure."

But one of the things that we've
learned over the last few

decades since the
introduction

of the laparoscopic surgery,
to some

extent, maybe even to a large
extent, those sorts

of metrics mean nothing.

They're measures of
process again.

Yeah, well, they're social proof,
if anything, when you

come right down to it, right?

I know this person and I
think they're okay.

And that's kind of the
end of it, right?

Yeah, and do you think
that's okay?

No, of course not.

I mean, we fall back to what Rick
Satava and others went on

and on and on about
years ago,

about the way that the pilots
are done, right?

Mandatory training and mandatory
testing, right?

Yes, yes.

And that's that end of story.

And those simulators, just to
throw this in for reference,

those simulators are
verified.

Those simulators are verified
big time, that they give the

right movements, they
give the

right forces, you know, everything
on those simulators is

reflective of what happens in

real life.

But they cost like tens or hundreds
of millions to develop?

Absolutely.

And so why do you think that
the governments and the

departments of health have
not insisted

on the same level of

verification for the surgical
simulators?

Two things.

A surgeon can only kill one
person at a time.

And it's only one person's worth
as opposed to hundreds of

millions of dollars
for a plane

and however many hundreds of people
that are going to sue

the airline to be
really blown

about it.

Yeah.

Yeah.

But I mean, somebody cited in
that PhD, that globally,

there's the number
of deaths due

to surgical misadventure or surgical
skills deficits is

about the equivalent
of one full

jumbo jet going down per day.

Yeah.

And that actually doesn't
surprise me at all.

I mean, since air travel has
gotten so safe these days.

But you know, like I said, even
if it's that many, it's

still one surgeon killing
one person

at a time, widely distributed
as opposed

to 500 people in one
spectacular event.

So unfortunately, it just doesn't
get in people's brains.

Yeah.

I mean, the Bristol case is a
fairly famous case in the

United Kingdom where
there was

a in the Bristol Royal Infirmary,
there were two cardiac,

they were adult cardiac
surgeons

operating on children,
children and their

mortality rate in the Bristol
case report

said that there were there complication,
their mortality

and morbidity was about
twice the

national average.

I'm told privately
that it was

significantly higher
than that.

That went on for the guts
of 10 years.

And there took 10 years,
right?

Yeah.

I mean, their peers knew that
there were issues.

And it wasn't until it hit
the front pages of Sunday

newspapers that the
colleges of

surgeons, the Royal
College of

Surgeons was forced to
take action.

You know, that's a
very like I

said, that was that was
cumulative.

And it took a long time.

And I'm sure that there
was a whole lot

of social stuff going on
at the same time.

Right.

Like, yeah, these people
were known

to other people and blah,
blah, blah.

And you can't rat
them out or

whatever, whatever it's
going to be.

There's all kinds of stuff like,
like I said, back on the

airplane thing, it's
because it

all happens at once and the
stakes are so high.

If it happens one time,
you know, if if a

surgeon managed to kill
dozens of people in

the span of a week,
you know, it

would become a thing,
you know.

Yeah.

Yeah.

There was a wait, wait till
tell it wait till tell us.

Wait till telesurgery goes on
steroids and you have

somebody who's doing
way too many

cases.

They could make a big mess really
quickly, basically.

What do you mean?

Telesurgery goes on steroids.

You mean that there's a lot
of it being performed or?

Yeah.

And you could have a
certain you.

Well, you and I both know from
being in hospitals that, you

know, the head surgeons
bouncing

between operating rooms with the
fellows and the residents

in there doing doing the most

of the work, you know, and you
places where they have like

four, five, six operating
rooms

going at the same time.

But the the lead surgeon is

supposedly the lead surgeon
for all those.

Imagine what happens when you
have telesurgery.

Yeah.

I mean, but in the United States,
OK, that goes on, but

it's really not supposed
to go

on the lead surgeon supposed

to be in the room all
the time.

And they get away with it because
they sign off on the case

or they perform the important

part of the case.

You know, I mean, they wouldn't
get away with that in the

UK and Ireland, I
don't think.

Yeah.

Yeah.

I mean, there's no two systematic
reviews and meta analysis

on proficiency based
progression

training and comparison to
the training outcomes in

comparison to conventionally
trained quality

assured approaches
to training.

And the results are pretty
similar.

They basically show that
if you're trained

in a proficiency based
progression approach,

you're going to make between
60 and 58 percent fewer

objectively assessed
interoperative

errors.

And there's small scale evidence
that basically said and

the differences in clinical
outcomes

is about 60 percent as well.

So why do you think
that the PBP

approach hasn't been hasn't
had wider adoption?

I mean, this is 20 odd years
now, 24 years.

Well, I would guess, as
you well know,

it's a lot of work to do a
curriculum based on

this.

I mean, it's a whole lot
of work trying

to figure out what the
metrics are and what

progression is like in
an objective

manner to actually be able
to lay that out.

And it's a lot of work.

So I think that's a lot
of the problem.

And I think the other thing is
that I suspect that people

don't like the idea of having

to train to some kind of objective
threshold because they

have no idea how long
it's going

to take them to attain
it, frankly.

But the evidence that evidence
is out there now, you can

train somebody to proficiency

in one third of the
time than you

can using a conventional
approach.

And it's about less than
half of the cost

to train somebody using
the proficiency.

And I mean, that data
is published.

Yeah.

OK.

Well, maybe it's just the
words not gotten around.

This is too new.

People aren't listening.

I don't know what to
tell you there.

But it's well, it's not it's too
new in the general sense.

I mean, they've been teaching
people the same way for

hundreds of years,
if you will.

So this is still kind of
working its way.

I don't disagree with you because
I'm a big supporter of

proficiency based
progression, as

you know.

I think maybe one of the other
things is that it needs to

be made more readily
available

in some kind of an automation
way of doing it.

You know, you and I have talked
about that, like how you

could leverage machine
learning

to actually make it so
that you can

actually do it without having
to train people to do

the evaluations and
the likes,

which is one of the negating
factors.

Right.

Yeah.

Well, I mean, that's
something

still in the in the planning
process.

But I mean, I was asked the question
in Australia, I was at

the surgical robotics
meeting in

Melbourne and somebody asked
me, Tony, if

you've got all this, I
was talking about

proficiency based progression
training and robotics.

He said, Tony, if you've
got all this

evidence, why has it not
had wider adoption?

And I hadn't even thought
about the question.

But my answer was out before.

And clearly, I must have had
it in the back of my mind.

I said, a failure of
leadership.

I mean, the reason that
Orsi Academy, the

reason that the Arthroscopic
Association of

North America and to some
extent, now, Medtronic,

cardiovascular seems to
be going down

that road.

The reason is somebody
senior in the

organization said, OK, this
is what we're doing.

And this is not negotiable.

And I mean, but there doesn't
seem to be enough.

ERUS, The European robotic
urological society.

I mean, I showed the data on the
failure rate of the ARIS

fellowship program,
the number

of fellows that weren't
finishing.

And the president, Alberto

Breda, said, OK, we're
changing.

We're going to go and use a proficiency
based progression.

That's what I call
leadership.

I mean, but it's surgeries,
surgery.

They must have to have
more leaders.

And is it something
I'm missing?

I'm only an engineer as
far as that goes.

Yeah, but you've been around
this for a long time,

and I know that you're using
these things.

Yeah, well, you know,
a lot of people,

yeah, no, I'm just assuming
that they

don't think they need it for
whatever reason.

I mean, you've seen, you know,
in a few isolated cases,

you've seen people make
the decision that

they do need it, and that's
that, right?

I mean, it might also be, I

mean, like with flight
simulation,

I mean, that's all government
regulated.

It's mandated, you know,
and so you'd need

something like that, but I don't
know if that'll ever

certainly won't happen
in the United

States anytime soon, put it

mildly. But yeah, I would
think it.

Well, our current environment,
which insists that the

government can't do anything
right,

and all regulations are evil
for some reason, you know.

Yeah, I was in, it was a long

time ago, 2006, I was
in Australia,

giving a talk for the Royal

Australasian College
of Surgeons,

and part of the deal was that
I would talk to the aviation

industry about simulation
based training.

This was 2006, and one
of the leaders

of the aviation simulation
group come up,

he says to me, "Hold on
a second." He

said, "You have all this
validation data

about how effective it is in terms
of skills training, and

you can't, it's not adopted?"

And I said, "No." And he said,
"How come you've got it?" He

says, "We had no evidence
when it was

mandated." Somebody
in government

basically decided, "Okay,
this is a better way."

And I mean, I don't know how we
persuade them. A fellow of

mine said to me, "Tony,
this isn't

data and evidence thing.
This is a matter

of selling the idea to the
powers that be."

So you do a lot of work
and publish on

the developments in robotics
and simulation.

Where do you envision that

simulation based training
and robotics

are heading in the next
10 years or so?

Well, just like everything else,
it's going to all change

completely because of AI,
quite honestly.

I do think you'll see a lot more
enhancements of things,

like the simulators
because of AI

as time moves on. It's definitely
going to happen. I think

it'll become more pervasive
too,

because the threshold to do it...
So I could go out and

build a new simulator
now by myself

because of AI. I'm not going
to do it because it doesn't

really make a lot of sense
economically,

but I'd have the ability to do
it because of how well Claude

and OpenAI Codex and
all these other

things work now. It's going to
dramatically drop the bar.

Robots are a different
issue because you

still got to go through all
the development of the

mechanics and things. It's
not like AI is going

to make more surgical robots
pop out quicker, but you're

going to see a lot more
software enablement

in surgical robotics.
So there'll be

little automations, little
part-task automations

that are going to start showing
up. Same in surgical

simulation, you'll see
a lot more

sort of semi-automated instruction
things are going to

start showing up independent
of the

simulator cores themselves.
Yeah, you're

just going to see a lot more
of this for sure.

And how fast, do you think
that autonomous robotics

performance surgical procedures
will develop?

No, no, just no. So you've
heard me say

this, other people have
heard me say this,

I'm a real downer on this relative
to academics because

they're all wanting to
do this, is that

unless the financial structures
are changed, there's no way

that autonomous surgery
is going

to happen with commercial surgical
robots because they're

not going to allow themselves
to become

financially liable for what
their robot does. As it is

right now, they just
build the tool

and others use the tool and those
other people are the ones

that become liable from
use of that tool.

If they start automating things,
then they're doing

surgery, they're performing
medicine,

and that's a whole different world.
You'll see lots of AI

that is going to be
suggestive

of like, maybe you shouldn't do
that, or maybe you should

notice this other
thing there,

stuff like that. You'll see lots
of that, but close the

wound for me. I don't
think so.

You might have smart things.
Your stapler example is a

really good one. There is
a possibility that

some kind of a supervised stapler
that just performs that

little tiny task and
does it much

more uniformly and precisely
than the human does. You're

not going to see autonomous
procedures.

You could in a crazy situation
like Satava always used to

talk about, like battlefield
medicine,

or you're on your ship to Mars
or whatever it is, then

totally, I get that. But
in a general sense,

well, so there might be things
in the developing world that

this might be a possibility
to,

but I don't see it in
the Western

Europe. All the developed
markets, China, Asia,

Europe, the United States, I
don't see it. I just don't.

Yeah. I'm sure that the
clinicians will

have something to say about
it as well.

I mean, I assume they're particularly
aware of the

perceived threat of
autonomous

operators or do they have a realistic
understanding? This

is probably not going
to happen.

Yeah. Like I said, I think
it's a regulatory and a

financial issue and it's
not a technology

issue. I think they will
figure out how to

do it, but it's just like
with self-driving,

right? The self-driving cars,
they get freaked out by

things they haven't seen
before, right?

And they've been trying
really hard for a

really long time to get it
to all be perfect,

and it's still not perfect. And
you'd have to do the same

thing in surgery, and you
just don't have

the infrastructure that you have
for autonomous driving in

the first place, right?
In terms of

data collection. And as we know,
there's millions of miles

of simulated driving that's
used to train

the autonomous driving systems.
You'd have to do the same

thing for surgical robotics.
And that

would mean that you'd have to
verify the simulators being

accurate so that you know
that the footage

you're synthetically
generating is

actually reflective of what
happens in real life.

So that might be the only way
that we end up with good

surgical simulators. If
somebody decides

they're going to invest a huge
amount of money into

generating millions of hours
of surgical video

through simulation, they'd have
to actually verify the

Dickens out of it. So it
might be the only way

you're ever going to get a properly
verified surgical

simulator. But okay. So
you would have

a map and the physical forces
that are generated by the

different behaviors.
I'm saying the

endovascular again, because
I mean, you're working in a

confined space. And
I suppose the

metrics for that there would
be easier. I'm not saying

easy, but easier to generate.

But you would still need
the metrics

of the performance of
the procedure.

You know what the cardiologist or the
radiologist does what they need to.

Yeah, so you'd be we'd be verified.
We'd be building

physical stand ins for
the for the

for the patient and then
instrumenting the

hell out of them to get like
the forces and

torques and pressures and everything
else. And then we'd be

using those to verify
the actual,

you know, virtual simulations,
the other

computational simulations.
And from there,

you would take those simulators
used by clinicians, and

you'd probably be back
mapping the you'd

have them perform the procedures
people that everybody

agrees are good. And
then you'd be

back mapping the information
you pull out of those

simulators and turning those
into metrics,

basically. So you don't think
that the clinicians have

anything to worry about about
an autonomous

robot anytime soon?
No, I really

don't. I don't see it.
Yeah. Okay.

You will see part task automation, but
autonomous robots, no

Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think
that's entirely feasible.

OK, Dwight, thanks for
joining me and

Yeah Sure!

thanks for a very interesting
conversation.

Yep, absolutely.