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The Institute for Global Prosperity's ERC Project Takhayyul is carried out in eleven different countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, often included in the concept of the Global South, where people are more vulnerable to global changes and crises - as we have seen in the flood catastrophe in Pakistan. Many members of our team are scholars who have expertise in the geographies they grew up in. This series has been emerged due to the pressing issues that have been taking place in the contexts we work on and care about. The urgent need to create a platform where we can address the emergent issues as they happen, to channel our intellectual and academic expertise, combined with the deep care to the events taking place has prompted this podcast series.
Echoes of Gaza - Part 2
[00:00:00]
Sertaç Sehlikoğlu: Hello, everyone. Welcome to the seventh of our Takhayyul Nativeness and Emergent Issues podcast series organized by the members of the ERC project named Takhayyul at the UCL's Institute for Global Prosperity, the IGP. I am Sertaç Sehlikoğlu, the primary investigator of this five year project. The need to this podcast series emerged due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the members of this team, as many of you may already be familiar, are often native scholars who have expertise about the varied geographies they have grown up in. The project is carried in 11 different countries in Eastern Europe, Middle East, and South Asia, often referred to as the Global South. That being said, those very contexts are more vulnerable to global changes and crisis, as we have seen in the flood catastrophe in Pakistan as a result of the global warming. Thus, the members of this team have suggested to create a platform where we can address the [00:01:00] emergent issues as they happen with other scholars, intellectuals, and activists. Today's episode is the second of our Echoes of Gaza in the Global South. In our last episode, we had a fantastic conversation with the experts on South Asia, and today we are furthering this conversation with Turkey, Iran, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. And for this, I have the privilege of hosting three amazing friends and colleagues who are quite significant with the way they are able to pour their hearts and minds into what they do, what they author, how they think, in the way the terms intellectual, scholar, and or activist do not feel enough.
Alireza Doostdar is an Associate Professor of Islamic Studies and Anthropology of Religion at the Divinity School, the University of Chicago. He is the author of the Iranian Metaphysical Explorations in Science, Islam, and the Uncanny. He directs the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and he is [00:02:00] Faculty co-director of the Martin Marty Center for the public understanding of religion.
Sumeja Tulic is a Libyan born Bosnian writer and photographer. She writes about art, conflict, and everything in between. She is currently pursuing a PhD in cultural anthropology at the Graduate Center in New York. Halil Ibrahim Yenigun holds a doctorate in political theory from the University of Virginia.
Prior to his dismissal during the mass academic purges in response to the academics for peace petition, he was an assistant professor at Istanbul Commerce University. He has held several appointments since then and is currently associate director of the Abbasid program in Islamic studies at Stanford. Now I'd like to step aside and let Dr. Mezna Kato to host today's exciting conversation. Thank you.
Mezna Qato: Hello everyone. Thank you so much for [00:03:00] being here. Thank you Sertaj. It's an absolute delight to have these speakers. I will start with Ali Reza, and then move on to Sumayya and Halil. Ali Reza, you have the floor.
Alireza Doostdar: Thank you so much for inviting me to this great conversation. It's a pleasure to be with all of you. So I'm going to speak a little bit about the reverberations of the war. Echoes of Gaza, as the title of the talk is, in Iran. I think the significance of Iran for this conversation should be pretty obvious. Iran is the state that is the most publicly and probably in the most materially significant way supportive of Palestinian resistance groups and has been for decades now, since the Islamic revolution in 1979. And , I think its role is also significant because after the October 7th attack, there was some immediate speculation and accusation that the Iranian state was actually the main [00:04:00] actor behind the attack.
There was doubt cast on that accusation later on the of the Islamic Republic itself, senior leaders denied that they were behind the attack or that they even knew about the attack in advance, even though they supported it. And, I think even the initial accusations, so the parties to the initial accusations in the United States and Israel, there was a significant doubt that they also introduced their own intelligence information indicated that Iran didn't know about the attack.
But in any case, that doesn't reduce, I think, from the significance of the Iranian role, and the ways in which the current war echoes in Iran. I think that can be taken from many different perspectives. I'll just say a little bit about the Iranian state's perspective and all of this and where stands. And then I want to talk a little bit about two very different orientations towards the war in the Iranian opposition. So with the Islamic Republic itself they've obviously been supportive [00:05:00] of Hamas and of Palestinian Islamic jihad and nothing has really shifted with the current war. The speculation that Iran would actually get directly involved in the war didn't happen was something that came as a little bit of a surprise to some analysts. More broadly, what we're seeing is the consistency in Iranian diplomatic, political and material support where that's possible for resistance groups. And obviously that goes far beyond Palestinian resistance groups themselves, but also extends to what's sometimes called the axis of resistance, right? So in Lebanon with Hezbollah, militia groups in Syria and in Iraq, and also in Yemen with the Houthis, who are now, headline news with their closure of the Red Sea.
So, I think even though Iran officially, has not entered any kind of direct confrontation itself, it's central position within the axis of resistance and the fact that it [00:06:00] does support the Houthis, Hezbollah and so on, that should be factored into any kind of thinking about the broader regional, reverberations and the broader regional way in which this war is being played out.
That said, again, the senior leaders have been, I think, very insistent on them not having played a front and central role in the war itself, and any kind of planning, any kind of direct material support for Hamas, in the organization of the October 7th attacks. It's actually made for some criticism of Iranian leadership, both from regional supporters and allies, but also kind of mockery from some of the opposition that, oh, you know, Iran is all bluster when it comes to confronting Israel but when there's an actual opportunity for it to enter a direct engagement, it gets cold feet and withdraws from that., There has been some consistency here in so far as, the Islamic Republic as a state has attempted to ensure that it is not [00:07:00] jeopardizing its own security and essentially is able to enter into conflicts on its own terms rather than being dragged into one. That should be seen within a broader context where with the sanctions regime with, challenges Iran attempting to confront, , the sanctions in a context where there's a lot of political volatility also with the United States, right? What kind of administration is going to be in power two years down the road? And what kind of possibilities are there for any kind of political understanding with the United States and so on. Anyway I'll leave that there. I'm happy to talk more about this down the road. I think what's significant, given this, rather consistent state policy is what we're seeing from the opposition. So I'll talk just briefly about two very different perspectives. On the one hand, there's the right wing opposition, which includes monarchists and the diaspora primarily based in the United States. The standpoint in the right wing diaspora, which also includes support among the Iranian population itself, not always support for the monarchists, but [00:08:00] certainly the right wing perspective, which basically is translated to support not for Palestinians, but for Israel. The first way that this played out immediately after October 7th was, the accusation that this was actually Islamic Republic that was behind this. It was the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards. Hamas is nothing but an extension of the Quds Force. And the implication for that being that the response to the October 7th attacks should be an attack on Iran and a direct confrontation with the Revolutionary Guards. There have been figures, opposition figures, who've gone as far as saying that Israel and the United States, and other allies should attack Iran. They should attack Iran's nuclear facilities. They should attack military facilities and so on. Masih Alinejad for instance, the well-known activist and journalist based in the U. S, she said she would support an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. There have been others. One of them is this famous rapper by the name of Hichkas whose name means "nobody". He said that the U. S. and Israel should be attacking Iran [00:09:00] and essentially dislodging the Islamic Republic as a regime. So there's that and there's a kind of a popular resonance of some of this, which I find extremely unfortunate among parts of the population, which doesn't necessarily translate to support for attacking Iran, but certainly it's not pro Palestinian, right? So there were a few incidents that became famous. For instance, in one case, a football match in Azadi Stadium, which is the biggest football stadium in Iran, where supporters of the Persepolis team, Persepolis, they reacted to the appearance of a Palestinian flag in the stadium by chanting against Palestine. There have also been social media kind of videos of cases where were school children seemingly middle and high school kids have refused to chant pro Palestine protests. And instead, sometimes they've even chanted, anti Palestinian protests.
I think in both of these contexts, while we should see the resonance with some of the right wing pro monarchists in [00:10:00] particular positions that come out of the diaspora, I think what's significant within Iran is that because the support for Palestine and opposition to Israel has been an official policy in Iran for now over four decades, there's a way in which that official standpoint is seen, I think correctly by large parts of the population as fitting seamlessly with the parts of the governmental policy that are oppressive, right whether that's what we saw last year in terms of the crackdown on popular protests for women's rights and the violent response to that, the imprisonment of protesters, the killing of protesters, the arrest of students, the expulsion of students, the firing of faculty who were supportive of protesting students and so on and so forth. They see and they experience these kinds of policies and they experience the repression of the state and then they hear the state support for Palestine. So there's a kind of the enemy of my enemy is my friend type of [00:11:00] perspective that sometimes emerges.
So that's one thing to take into account but that's not universal. A very significant part of, and this is where I'll end, a very significant part of the Iranian opposition, both within Iran and outside, that is left leaning, including very significant figures and groups that were involved in the uprising last year. So feminists, and this is all over Iran, including in Balochistan, in Kurdistan, but also in Tehran and elsewhere, and in the diaspora. Left wing activists, and journalists and organizers who have come out in support of Palestine and what they have done, and this represents a sort of a third standpoint is to say that support for Palestine is essentially an intersectional issue, that support for Palestine comes from a principled standpoint where we are opposed to repression and to oppression no matter where it might occur. And in fact, just because systems of oppression [00:12:00] are connected to one another and mutually reinforce one another in the same way our movements should be connected to one another. There's a statement, for instance, by several hundred Iranian feminists who referred to a supportive statements that were issued by Palestinian feminists and Palestinian activists and journalists last year in support of Iranian protesters. And they said, just as Palestinians supported us, we support them and we refuse these dichotomies that have been imposed on us, such as the dichotomy between support for, the Islamic Republic or support for global imperialism and that their position is essentially the most consistent. Yeah, and I'll end there, I think, and I'm happy to continue the conversation.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much, Alireza. Sumeja, would you like to go next?
Sumeja Tulic: Thank you so much. It's such a pleasure to be here with you discussing our topic. I will continue along the lines of my the speaker before. The echoes of this dichotomy presumes that there is a [00:13:00] solidarity based on religious affiliation and on the other side, that dichotomy would be everything that is antithetical to that is somewhat felt in Bosnia and Herzegovina, though more than almost three decades to the end of the war, we are seeing an improvement in that respect. Most Bosnians, especially Bosniaks, meaning Bosnian Muslims, have almost an instinctual, affectual relation with Palestine, one of solidarity, and obviously it's largely premised on understanding of shared religious and cultural affiliation. But since the latest onslaught on Gaza and the viral exposure to media content from the Gaza Strip, the ability of viewers, including Bosnians, to see the mechanics of the attack, that solidarity, to those of us who are working towards the evolution of that solidarity from purely a religious one, [00:14:00] to a more civic holistic understanding of what it is to be a pro Palestinian and anti occupation is gaining a momentum. And mostly, if not, in totality due to the similarities of the events in Gaza to what some Bosnians and Herzegovinians in this experience during the 1992 to 1995 war. Large number of Bosnians in the years following the war had the experience to watch the trials of the International Tribunal for war crimes in former Yugoslavia. So a lot of people actually got to understand the language of the law of the international law. Some days after October 7th, when it became clear what was going to take place a lot of Bosnians, and that it's very visible in the public discourse on social media in particular, were drawing connections between the [00:15:00] 2001 verdict that identified war crimes and crimes against humanity as genocide in the verdict. The judge did imprint this thing that we now Bosnians understand to be one way to identify genocide that it doesn't have to have the proportions of that traditionally, people associate with the Holocaust that it can be the elimination, the systemic elimination of part of a group. So when we saw what was happening in Gaza, what is starting to happen in Gaza, Bosnians were quick to shout genocide. And obviously immediately in the few weeks following October 7th, there were several demonstrations and support gatherings and Bosnians have a very tainted relationship with protest. One of our first big protests in the 90s, where people gathered seeking a peaceful termination [00:16:00] to the turbulence of the early 90s before the full fledged war ended with the first two casualties of the siege of Sarajevo. So, going to protest, it's far from just walking to the public square. And that's not to say that there is a sense of danger, but there is over the years also a sense of disappointment. How much is achieved from such gathering? Nonetheless, there were several gatherings, mostly in Sarajevo, but also in smaller towns. And one of the gatherings happened in front of the history museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which happens to be across the avenue from the U S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So all the banners, all the chants were directed at the building across the street asking for a seize in military support to the Israeli army.
Aside from our support to the Bosnia and Herzegovina support to the resolution [00:17:00] in the U. N, which, by the way, as those of you who know, the political and constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it's difficult to predict how we vote, how do we side because of the ethnic composition and upon it based political system. Obviously the Bosnian majority, which is Muslim, either practicing or culturally identifying would based on that, one would assume that our votes would always be for Palestine for seize of any military activities there but it's unpredictable because it depends on political representative of which national group will be sitting in the UN or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Luckily, this time, we did well on our pre independent tradition, the long history of Yugoslavia in supporting Palestinian resistance and right to determination.
Along those lines, [00:18:00] the cultural sector in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown to be in footstep with other cultural institutions around the world, organizing activities and joining activities that amplify the voices of Gazans and Palestinians, both in Gaza, and in the West Bank. The Ashdod theaters monologues were performed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, widely shared. Obviously, the similarities in stories propelled further engagement. And, but unfortunately, that all being said, we also experienced something that I think many Bosnians, especially again, Bosnian Muslims who were the largest casualty victims of the war of the 90s that the head of our memorial center in Srebrenica in an interview given, in responding to criticism of him and his team [00:19:00] being silent on the events in Gaza has responded that this is not our battle and later on went to give an interview to the Haaretz newspaper comparing the events of October 7th, the activities of Hamas to the activities of the Chetniks, which is a royalist far right group with a history of killings that starts during World War two and continued during the 90s, not to say that such groups exist, obviously, and luckily for all of us do not operate militarily anymore, but their legacy is one of war crimes and unfortunately some of which is very similar. And I'm, out of respect, not out of hesitance or fear, do not like to make comparison because , I'm very aware that the plight of Bosnian Muslim, despite the silence of the international community, [00:20:00] as it was happening until it reached its tipping point, our refugees were welcomed in Germany and other European Western European capitals. So we are, despite what those who define and execute genocidal policies and programs against us are, we are still white people from Europe. So I'm hesitant to make comparison. What's happening in Gaza is atrocious and it's for Bosnian and Herzegovinians it was especially hard to take these ... from the Srebrenica Memorial Center's leadership where it went as far as to compare the techniques to the Hamas.
Of course we all understand what war crimes are and there is some time in a moment to adjudicate those, but the idea to compare in order to create an alibi for silence did not sit well with people. But we are yet to [00:21:00] hear a more resound rejection of such comparisons and even the silence that still in some way what defines the leadership of the memorial center in Srebrenica, of whom are, and I owe this fact to our viewers and participants, are themselves survivors of the genocide in Srebrenica.
So those are some of the movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and obviously I could talk more about some of the harassment experienced by the country's leadership, including our city's mayor, who was severely harassed by an Israeli businessman who conducts his business in Bosnia and Herzegovina for not condemning the attacks of October 7th and condemning the attacks of the Israeli military. The harassment went so far that the mayor had to present an [00:22:00] official complaint to the federal police of the country. So there are attempts at silencing, installing fear. Obviously Bosnia and Herzegovina depends on support from the European Union, and that obviously has implications on how much institutions say. But the overwhelming majority of people, including those who are non Muslims identify with the Palestinian cause, see what is happening there and feel immense solidarity. Luckily and fortunately the discourse on Palestine is slowly moving from the sphere of empathy based on religious affiliation to a more holistic understanding of what is endangered when war crimes and crimes against humanity are committed.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much Sumeja. Halil.
Halil İbrahim Yenigün: Thank you so much to include me in this great conversation. I am from Turkey. And, [00:23:00] maybe, a few words can be said about how the discourse in Turkey is part of that, but I'm here to do more than that. I wanted to not just to report what has been going on in Turkey, but to problematize some of the reactions to what is going on, the tragedy in Gaza. As many people know, the public opinion in Turkey has been for a long time now, with very few exceptions, very pro-Palestinian and some people just assume, since Erdogan is a pro-Palestinian, an Islamist leader, the opposition is on the other side, but that is not the case because in fact, the opposition, and especially the leftist socialist opposition has very deep roots going back to 1970s when they went to the camps of Palestinian Liberation Organization and Fatah. They were trained there back in the day. [00:24:00] While they were doing their leftist activism and opposition and militancy against the Turkish regime at the time. So, that tradition lives on, and, there is kind of a consensus, Palestinian consensus in the Turkish public.
That said, I want to problematize some of the aspects of this reaction both by the government and also in general, not just in Turkey, but also, in the so called, quote unquote, East in general. For a non Western, it is indeed important especially if you are based in Turkey, it is the easiest and the most convenient thing to bash the West because of its hypocrisy, which is true, which is out there, which is obvious. The question is whether the same people can see their own hypocrisy or like Eastern hypocrisy or Muslim hypocrisy, whichever you want to call it. What I observe is there is a very selective outreach. A lot of [00:25:00] the Muslim majority people, they are outraged by Gaza, but for some reason, the Masale in Sudan, they did not get their share in the news. People who call themselves Arabs gang rape Masalit women and kill their boys, not just men, but also all their boys, like the most textbook case of genocide and also say you are going to have now an Arab baby.
So this is really going on at this time as we speak. And for some reason all these countries in the East or Muslim majority countries don't report the news. So also like the colonization discourse now has become popular for better or worse. I have objections to that too. The rhetorical use is fine. But when it comes to describe a situation in its full complexity, yeah, it can take us only to a certain place. And this is especially true for [00:26:00] Turkey. Around the same time when Gaza became the world news and everybody talked about Gaza, no one really talked about, except very few interesting circles about Artsakh, the Armenian homeland for thousands of years, when Azerbaijan kept it on the blockade, which is, in some ways, even worse than the blockade on Gaza. And, what happened is, it ended up, as an ethnic cleansing. So when we were talking about the ones that resemble ethnic cleansing, and outrage, of course, rightfully, ethnic cleansing did happen in an Armenian homeland. And they see that as Armenian genocide version two. And what happened is Turkish newspapers even celebrated that and even call them cleansing. The word cleansing was used to describe that in the Turkish media, even in the opposition media.
Around the same time [00:27:00] when we use the colonization, Turkey started a new offensive against the Kurds in Syria and destroyed 80 percent of the infrastructure in Syria. And it actually already had its own colonization again in Afrin from 2018 onwards, right? Kurds are dispossessed and displaced. And in the state, not just jihadi families, but also Palestinians, they were settled as settler colonizers, basically. And street names are changed into Arabic and Turkish, and it's olive is stolen like in a very typical, basically colonial extraction of resources. The olive oil is stolen and sold in the world market under Turkish brands. So let alone big rallies by outraged Turks, it does not even make it to the mainstream news. We have to remember how Hamas, when Turkey colonized Afrin, said this exactly, Halit Mesar, "Turkey's [00:28:00] success, especially in Afrin, sets a serious example. Hopefully, we will all be blessed with the victories of the Islamic ummah in many parts of the world, as in Afrin." So that is what has been going on between Erdogan and Hamas.
If we look at the government side of things, of this equation in the Middle East, we know that Syrian and Saudi government, they both respectively bombed and killed much more Arabs than Israel. And now they pose as siding with the Palestinians and we have to live with this hypocrisy as well. While Turkey is harboring Hamas and also mobilizing masses, paying lip service to Palestine, also shouting Western hypocrisy to the Western people without even seeing its own colonization, Erdoğan's cronies and even his son is part of trade deals with Israel. And Turkey bolts increasing the trade deal like from 5 billion just a few years ago now to $15 [00:29:00] billion. When BDS organizers in Turkey try to organize, and actually I know some concrete cases where ZIM Holding dock workers' boycott in Auckland was taking place. Turkish government, Erdoğan government actively prevented the trade union of dock workers, that is actually pro government, pro Erdoğan. So Erdoğan government prevented them from joining that BDS action at the time back in 2014- 15 during the 51 day war.
So another issue that I want to raise is there's, of course, the cornering, by some of the Zionists and also some of the liberal West for not condemning Hamas enough and there are problems there, of course, but there are also equally problems when people take Hamas as a resistance organization that is doing legitimate resistance. And this is not basically, something made up, not real. This is very real. As it became [00:30:00] viral, the Auckland City Council's debate, if you have seen that, the youth said things like, Israel murdered their own people, not Hamas. Calling Hamas a terrorist organization is a racist thing. Hamas is the armed wing of the unified Palestinian resistance, asking to condemn Hamas's anti Arab racism. You could see on the other extreme, this kind of reactions. I'm saying this because, I really believe there must be a space created between two discourses, between competing outrage for only one side's dead. We have the capacity as humans to be equally outraged by both what Hamas did and also what Israel is doing. I think a space must be carved out to stand up for Palestinian rights and self determination. With an equal zeal to reject and condemn Hamas, and a space must be carved out, where one side doesn't only say, you bombed my people, and others say, you, my [00:31:00] relatives are kidnapped, raped, and killed. We have to acknowledge each other's losses first, and then give condolences. And this is not what is called the liberal two sidedism. We really have to acknowledge these aspects of the conflict. Thank you so much.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much. So I wanted to before I dive in with my own questions and then open it up to the floor if we can just go around and maybe perhaps get some thoughts from you all about each other's presentations. Let's start from the beginning.
Alireza Doostdar: Sure. Thank you. Yeah, I appreciate everything that's been said. I'll maybe just briefly in reaction to Halil's discussion. I think it's important to contextualize reactions, anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian reactions where they might be. For instance, the student movement's response. The campus activism that we're seeing in the United States is very different from, the context is very different and the sorts of expectations that we have are, there [00:32:00] should be very different from what we witnessed, say, in Iran or elsewhere. In Iran, the risky thing to do right now is not to protest in favor of Palestine, it's to do so while also maintaining consistency, which is again, what the leftist feminists have been doing. Their consistency is in being against oppression wherever it might occur, whether it's in Kurdistan, whether it's in Syria or it's in Palestine or wherever else. I think that's something to keep in mind. I'll leave it there for now.
Sumeja Tulic: I'll add to that. Far from me being able to speak on the student movement in opposition to the attack on Gaza in the U. S as a whole, but I can speak on what I have experienced in New York City and particularly in and around the Graduate Center in New York. There is an explicit emphasis that it's not just Palestine and but then we go on from Turtle Islands and so on. So there is a sense that there is [00:33:00] more happening, and it's not an isolated instance of imperial hegemony and violence, that there is more simultaneously happening. The issue of lack of awareness and expressed solidarity, I think, that lies with the lack of information and education and obviously a built in sense of who is your kin. Is it somebody who looks like you with whose tragedy, and culture and everything else you identify closely, which is the case with Palestine. There is no running around or hiding behind that. It's not the focal point off the so called Muslim / Arab world. But then, there is also lack of attention from leading institutions, including those of higher education to make their students those who need to be aware who need to vote and express their political opinions based on knowledge, not on only emotion.
There is a lack of understanding, and luckily or unluckily, I'm [00:34:00] still undivided, that torch is carried by social media, whatever social media is and however the algorithm runs. But simultaneously, as we experienced self initiated attempts at fundraising for Palestine through so called filters where media users are able to use a filter and by using the filter, a profit is generated that eventually is dispersed to aid organizations supporting Palestinians in Gaza. Simultaneously, there are filters for Yemen for, for Sudan and other places around the world. So there is a change happening. And again, what I'm saying is obviously limited to what I've experienced, to what I've observed studying social media networks and the way people, young people, especially interact.
Of course, Dr. Halil's comments stand and there's much to be discussed, but and I'm not going to do [00:35:00] justice and I'm not even going to try to paraphrase, but he did mention or put to question the decolonial discourse. What I would ask is that is it the problem of discourse or the selective sort of approach to it, onto what do we transpose it? And what instances and cases we include within such paradigms and then act accordingly.
Sertaç Sehlikoğlu: It's not a question really, but I do want to reflect on an interesting angle, something that's been bothering me quite heavily as well. So I completely agree with Sumeja's very important point, like comparing pains is not a good way to go, but the media selectivity in empathy is creating particular politics, is serving towards particular politics, and Gazans are also suffering from that because of that selectivity. Who we empathize, who do we do not empathize based on the media propaganda, media packaging, et cetera.
Then when it [00:36:00] comes to the case of Turkey, it's turning into a different angle that people are simultaneously empathizing, really feeling for Palestinians, and it's on the streets. I'm in Istanbul right now. It's everywhere. But also the public ability to question the increased trade and financial relations with Zionist institutions is not very... Like the kind of empathy and action do not seem to go well together. And I've been revisiting some of my field sites. Some of my interlocutors and even they feel a little bit disabled. There's not enough conversation how to turn that strong empathy, the strong set of feelings into activism, which is to me very concerning.
Mezna Qato: So there's a lot of ground to cover here.
Maybe drawing further from Sertaç's point. Each of you in a certain way talked about how Gaza clarifies, reveals, [00:37:00] and reconfigures ideological and political positions in different ways. Frankly, I think any state's use of Palestine is an old story. It's an old question, right? The different states, Iraq, also many states have taken up the banner of Palestine in order to bludgeon their own people with the stick of it. There is much to condemn in that, in the sense of, the way it produces distortions, creates sort of terrains of impossible comparison, and stymies. Internal dissent calls for democracy, et cetera. It upholds authoritarianism and in different forms and ways.
I'm stuck with something Sumeja you said, which is comparison has sometimes become an alibi for silence. And I've been thinking about that a little bit and as you all were speaking about how [00:38:00] also rejection of comparison, just as comparison, rejection of it, maintains hierarchies of suffering, it seeks to exceptionalize and therefore reject internal oppression, and it tries to swerve away from contradiction. So Palestine gets put on this pedestal in order to do that. And then any kind of comparative frame is rejected outright or subtly, etc. And then there's pushback against that. And there's resentment, a deep resentment around that comes up in activist circles and spaces and discourses in political movements across the region. I think also the demographies of the kind of protests we've seen in Turkey and Iran and in Bosnia and also elsewhere across the region reveals some of these kinds of contradictions and dynamics.
I don't know where I'm going with this, but I'm just reflecting along you all about how to think about this. I wonder if the [00:39:00] actually the response of the memorial, the Srebrenica memorial team reveals actually an interesting dynamic that we haven't mentioned, which is the influence of the visibilities and the claims making around moral high grounds. That also animates some of this discussion. And so therefore the complete bleeding of Hamas with Gaza and the people of Gaza and the Palestinians of Gaza, the ability to collapse the question of Palestine to a question of Hamas and then the kinds of rejections then that allows to develop and gain standing that also flattened history, flattened context, contingencies, etc.
So, yeah, so those are sort of some thoughts. I did actually want to ask you all each a question. So maybe I'll start with you, Sumeja. What do you think is really going on with what [00:40:00] those Srebrenica Memorial folks are doing? Is it a question of funders? Is it a question of making certain claims to around demands to the EU? Is it the threat of Germany? What is going on when they so overtly so strongly reject a comparison or articulate an exception?
Sumeja Tulic: Thank you for the question. And again, I hesitate to talk about the Bosnian case because we're here to discuss the ongoing, not the bygone in some sense. Before I say anything, most scholars and students of law and history and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina have nothing but the respect for the efforts of people in the memorial center. Their ongoing survival alone in Srebrenica, which is part of Republika Srpska and more often than not governed by right wing political parties that [00:41:00] deny, even decades after, every memorial stone has been erected. And it's a sea of dead people in front of you when you visit the memorial site and its attached graveyard. There's an ongoing denial, hate crimes and hate speech. So their existence there in that, on that territory is admirable and a service not only to Bosnian Herzegovina, but to all people who really stand behind never again.
That being said, the Bosnians and Herzegovinians and those especially attached to the Srebrenica genocide and the cause of making the world aware of what happened in July of 1995, still suffer from lack of recognition. And whenever that recognition comes, whoever sort of graces us with it is seen as a friend. And there is a lot of ties between the Srebrenica Memorial Center and the World Jewish Congress and other [00:42:00] pro-Israeli groups attached to the Holocaust cause that have granted the Srebrenica Memorial and the Srebrenica Genocide the recognition it sometimes feels. It's because there is an ongoing denial of the genocide, of the crimes committed there, all sort of lies and fictions are propagated. So I feel that there is an attempt to keep those friends to not to stir any waters. Again, I'm not in contact. I'm only a reader of the reports they publish of different activities they organized. Every year we have a burial of the remains, the identified remains of the Srebrenica genocide, and that event in itself gives an overview. Where is the cause? Who is in support of the cause? What are some of the issues that are faced? Sort of lends this interpretation that I just provided you with. It's an attempt to keep those who support a cause that is domestically [00:43:00] by the Serbian majority rejected over and over again, and even more fiercely as the in the last few years.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much Sumeja. Some of these questions around recognition echo debates internal to Palestinian society about the costs of recognition, the need for recognition and its costs politically, institutionally, international in terms of law, et cetera. So those are certainly not dynamics that are exceptional in that sense. And so some of what you're describing are very much in active mode also within Palestine. The denialism looks different. The dynamics of the denialism look different, obviously, and then, therefore, the political forces and the social forces that are thinking about them can configure themselves differently, but it's certainly something, and the question of denialism certainly animates some of those anxieties. So thank you so much for clarifying that. I do know also that some of the [00:44:00] memorials that are in Sarajevo, around various massacres and the war itself, have inspired, quite a few Palestinian museum curators and artists and archivists, in thinking about testimony, witnessing the politics of representation of violence, Silence, erasure, et cetera. It's very powerful in that sense as well.
Sumeja Tulic: And it's mutual. I think Bosnians have learned a lot from the from Palestinians and their decades long struggle. And again, that's why I highlighted the cultural sort of aspect of the response, because that's the most fruitful, most ongoing, most visible and substantive respond to what's going on in Gaza and has longevity. It precedes the October 7th. There are activities in solidarity, bringing together, not per se comparing, but bringing together what's going on, what's happening to Palestinians, and what has happened to [00:45:00] us with the denialism that you so perfectly framed.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much, Sumeja. Alireza I, so one of the questions I had for you was really about this question of the differing, you said there were three positions on Palestine, that you really helpfully outlined, which is the state, more opposition, but also the third way, as it were. I hesitate to call it that, but, I'm wondering if anything has changed as a result of Gaza. Has Gaza just clarified the lines? Or has it forced a reckoning of any kind? So that's one piece of that question. My other question was really about, so there is a kind of political antagonism given the way that
Palestine is taken up by the state and then the opposition to the state and all of that. But I'm wondering, is this a moment of inflection? Is there an inflection point here? Or is Gaza just more of a longer [00:46:00] standing set of ideological positions vis a vis Palestine that haven't really changed very much? Is there a moment where a genocide would make any of these folks rethink, one way or another.
Alireza Doostdar: Yeah. Thank you for that. To the first question, I want to draw attention to a slogan in the 2009 post election protest. So you'll remember perhaps, in 2009 there was a presidential election, between that, where the front runners were Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was up for re election , and Ahmadinejad was declared the victor and there were widespread protests that came to be known as the Green Movement protests, in opposition to the results of that election, right? With the argument that the election had been stolen, there was widespread fraud. One of the slogans that was widely heard by supporters of the Green Movement during that protest, was, ... neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I [00:47:00] sacrificed my life for Iran. I had talked about three positions. This might be like a fourth position, which, broadly tracks with some parts of the right wing discourse, but essentially it's more of a position of indifference towards Palestine and towards Lebanon. And it comes out of frustration with the way what people perceive. I don't think entirely inaccurately of the price that they pay for the Iranian government's support of Palestine, of the Palestinian cause., or at least of its support for Palestinian groups, right? And of support for Hezbollah. Whether that is the same thing as support for the Palestinian cause, I think is up for debate. I think parts of that indifference can be seen now, even when that doesn't translate to overt anti Palestinianism, right? Or pro Israeli discourse in the way that we see with some of the right wing groups. Now, what's been clarified, I think from that slogan, which we heard in 2009, right now we're at a position where we have, at least in terms of the articulated [00:48:00] discourse, there's the right wing very explicitly pro Israel position and then there's the left wing very explicitly pro Palestine position. And I think that it's not that Gaza has particularly an inflection point, but certainly it is a clarifying moment where especially coming on the heels of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, especially coming on the heels of Syria, that the left has seen very clearly, sort of the very different reactions that have, the very different reactions among pro democracy, supposedly Western states, to those different conflicts.
So I think that is clarifying and it's also clarifying in the sense of observing the reaction of the Islamic Republic as a state, right? So the very different reactions to atrocities by the Syrian regime and against its own population and against Palestinian refugees as well. Yarmouk, for instance, right? And it's direct involvement in those atrocities along with Russia, [00:49:00] the very different ways in which, some segments of the population react to that, and the way that they've reacted to Gaza.
So I think the clarification there, at least for the left, has been one of moral clarity and one of explicit articulation of a position that is cognizant of the of these different kinds of oppression that sometimes appear to be at odds with one another, but they might be mutually reinforcing. And also, further clarification, which might be more of an inflection point, I'm not sure, but inflection in the sense of attempts to actually draw out of their own national confines and reach out to activists and begin to build bridges with activists in Palestine, in Syria, in Lebanon, and in the diaspora, as well as elsewhere. So we saw some of this happening already last year right now with the statement that I described of feminists, that was immediately translated to Arabic, and to several other languages.
This has not been very common, I think, in the last several decades. To attempt to [00:50:00] speak to folks, in any language other than Persian or English. To think of an audience and for interlocutors and for potential allies who are not just sitting in Washington or New York or London or Berlin or where have you, but also in Baghdat, Beirut and in Gaza and so on.
Mezna Qato: Thank you Reza. Actually, this is maybe a question for both you and Halil, but I'm really curious about the question of diaspora. So one of the ways these kinds of clarifications have happened, I think, is also part about the way, Iranians and Turks in diaspora and across Europe and the UK and the US have also conveyed a different kind of read on Palestine vis a vis their experiences outside of the particular state frame within their country. And in ways, I'm also here asking vis a vis how Palestinians in the diaspora are trying to [00:51:00] understand different communities outside and their perspectives on what's happening. Kurds who are active in London, in Greenlands, for example, and they're thinking around Palestine now, their participation in protests, et cetera. Cause I don't think it's like a cut and paste where whatever, it's something transforms in diaspora, around what you do and what you think. And of course, these are older diasporas in many different ways. They arrive at different times. I'm not trying to say diaspora is a capital D, you know, the Iranian diaspora or anything like that. But just to kind of reflect on what the experience of not being in the state, but being outside of it, how does it transform? How does the encounter with other kinds of Palestinians transform potentially one's politics, Palestinian act, Palestine activism on campuses? What impacts it might have? I know for example, so many Turkish leftists have told me [00:52:00] that they come to protests on Palestine abroad that they wouldn't in Turkey because of their objection to the state or of the hypocrisies that some of which Halil outlined. Just a bit of a reflection on the diasporas of the Global South and their relationship to these questions.
Halil İbrahim Yenigün: So I wanted to make a distinction between bringing up certain other cases as an alibi for silence, which is very true. And I would call that whataboutism. I find it, on a polemical plane and this is, I think, different from another way of problematizing selective outrage. So that one is basically to understand the dynamics whereby certain big atrocities are making the news and certain other ones which are simultaneously happening and even in some worse ways than the other one they don't. And, I really [00:53:00] have an issue with like the progressive circles over here in the U. S., having done nothing about all other cases and when it comes to Palestine, it becomes a rallying point for them and, which is rightful. But what happens is I think, certain issues are appropriated into the culture wars and people are just trying to score points against their enemies inside. Like the progressives are now fighting with basically the right wingers and that is how it plays out in this case. And also about the issue that Sertac brought up about, how the issue of trade deals, how it is sidelined, ignored. It also has this flip side. What happens is, in many cases, when a sincere, BDS campaign is started, it suddenly perverts into boycott Coca Cola, boycott Starbucks, and then [00:54:00] boycott Jewish products. It turns into a Nazi era version of boycotting Jewish, basically, stores, which is clearly anti Semitism. And you can't really step up the boycott more sincere or more rational, strategic and just way of BDS into these debates for some reason. Those are the things that I want to say from the previous round, but also from, this round about the issue of the diaspora. Yeah, I think, that is right, but, also like in Turkey, there are simultaneous separate rallies for Palestine, with different positions. That is not, non existent. But when it comes to the European and American context, the diaspora here can find it easy to integrate themselves into the existing, leftist discourse of Palestine, to integrate [00:55:00] their own activism with them, which is already existent and which is already big. That gives an additional basically leverage. And as for the Islamist or conservative, pro Palestinian activism, they also find it easy to do it as part of global ummah and under that discourse with MSAs, with Islamic organizations in the UK, US, and elsewhere. And that becomes a more like ummah kind of performance of ummah feeling. That's what I have to say.
Mezna Qato: Thank you so much, Halil. Alireza or Sumeyya, any other thoughts?
Alireza Doostdar: I don't have a ton to say about the Iranian diaspora on Gaza in particular, because I don't see that they've been particularly active. I think the voices that tend to be heard are the right wing, the, uh, the monarchist voices. That's not to say that they're the majority, but I think indifference is prevalent. But that said, I think [00:56:00] there are some of what you had described in terms of people who go to protests who would not have done so in Iran itself, precisely for the same reasons. They don't want their voices to be co opted. I think there is some of that, but beyond this, I think the kind of left wing politics that I've been describing and the ethical consistency and the political consistency there. I don't think it's widespread enough in the diaspora for it to have turned into like a genuine movement. We see it on social media, but not super common beyond that, I would say.
Mezna Qato: Sumeja. Any final thoughts?
Sumeja Tulic: Yeah, just quickly. Also in Bosnia, whereas some previous demonstrations were avoided by the part of the citizenry that identifies with the so called, secular citizenship based totally on just a lot of belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina and not an ethnic group that is defined according to religious affiliation. So previous protests were heavily aesthetic, on the level of aesthetic. Presenting people with Salafi, [00:57:00] more conservative, political and religious, affiliations and belongings. So there was an almost a knee jerk reaction to avoid such gatherings with what's happened since October 7th. That seems to be everybody's understanding that these are your fellow Bosnians and that if they're part of the struggle and solidarity is expressed in that manner, so be it. So there is an internal sort of consolidation or understanding, beginning to understand our own complexities, and vis a vis unfortunate event.
When it comes to left the left and the progressive in the U. S. , I would just quickly say that part of that Left and the progressive side is also comprised of migrant populations, some of whom are actually in precarious situations, being students and on various visas. So their struggle and their acts of solidarity are by no means, engagement in cultural wars, [00:58:00] attempts to get at the other side, be it the liberals, or the conservative Republican side, they're actually genuine understandings of solidarity, I would say, and they come at a cost. Me being talking to you today, is a risk I had to take with myself. I'm a person who is here on a student visa. I don't know if this and other acts of solidarity, that by no means are in support of acts of terrorism of and or violence or any of the acts that disqualify one from attaining a U. S. visa. I'm not engaging in those activities and yet just talking to you here today, choosing to be here today and to present, a perspective on what's going on vis a vis Bosnia and Herzegovina and Gaza was a risk I had to take. So yeah, there are culture wars, there are internal whirlings, but a great majority of it comes actually from, at a risk and from a genuine sense of solidarity and [00:59:00] obligation to do what needs to be done in face of great injustice. Thank you.
Sertaç Sehlikoğlu: I just want to say thank you very much for that points Sumeja, actually. When we're putting together today's event, we had conversations with a number of people and so many of them had raised this. I'm in XYZ country on a student visa, and I don't want my visa to be canceled, because I don't want to go back to XYZ country where I'm from, where I am, like, politically in a difficult situation. So layers and layers of precarity, still working towards solidarity, I think is the point I want to highlight.
Mezna Qato: Well, thank you all so much. This was a great conversation. And if it does anything, it shows that, there is no way to slap the idea of the global south's position on Palestine and make it in any way coherent. So thank you all so much. It's a real pleasure to be in conversation with you and to learn from you. Thank you.
Sumeja Tulic: Thank you so much. Thank [01:00:00] you.