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In the rooms where war, peace, and power are decided, words matter most. The Diplomat brings you raw conversations with ambassadors, envoys, and negotiators who shaped the hardest decisions in U.S. foreign policy and Middle East diplomacy. Hosted by Joe Kawly. Recorded from Washington. Produced by Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).
Joe Kawly brings extensive experience from conflict zones in the Middle East to the power corridors of Washington. As a journalist, he’s seen how words can escalate a crisis or open the door to peace. A Georgetown graduate and former CNN Journalism Fellow, he’s known for connecting the dots others miss, so people don’t just hear what happened, they understand why it matters. As producer and host of The Diplomat, Joe brings clarity to diplomacy and politics, one conversation at a time.
[00:00:00.000] - Joe Kawly
Hello. Our conversation today is with Dr. Kenneth Pollack. Why? Because he studied the region through multiple times and eras. Cold War alignments, post-911, the Arab Spring, the Abraham Accords, and now we are watching something different unfolding and changing. Post-conflict recalibration, shifting alliances, and a strategic landscape that It feels unsett. Mr. Pollack, thank you for being with us. How do you describe the mood across the region, across the Gulf States, not just diplomatically, but in terms of how leaders are thinking about power and risk?
[00:00:49.640] - Kenneth Pollack
I think this is a very important and interesting set of questions, because as you're pointing out, you have both long-term trends and then immediate developments. I think that in some ways, they're moving in different directions. Some of the long-term trends, I think, are very hopeful. The development of regional economies, the blossoming of high tech, the renewed interest in the Middle East. In many ways, this is all very hopeful. And we even see some shoots of political change, cultural change, all of which I think is giving some degree of hope to the people of the region. But this comes, of course, against a background of two years of constant warfare. War affair across much of the Middle East. And that, too, I think, has been at best a mixed bag. On the one hand, I think that the destruction of Iran's axis of resistance has been very positive for many of the people and many of the leaders of the region who were very frightened of what Iran was up to. Iran was the great anti-status quo power, trying to create as much mayhem as they could. And so the weakening of Iran and its various actors out there, I think it's been hopeful.
[00:02:04.020] - Kenneth Pollack
On the other hand, we've seen massive suffering in Gaza, in Israel, in Lebanon, all across the region. We've also seen new forms of warfare that I think are very frightening to people, the ballistic missiles, the cruise missiles, the drones. This portends an impact on civilians that we haven't seen before. And of course, while Iran is now out as a a threat, they likely will come back. And I think for many people, Israel's unrestrained attacks on many have also caused considerable consternation.
[00:02:40.680] - Joe Kawly
You mentioned Iran. There's been a plenty of debate about how Iran might absorb or adapt to the consequences of the recent confrontation and war with Israel. From your vantage point, how has Iran's strategic calculus shifted, if at all.
[00:03:04.640] - Kenneth Pollack
I think we have to start by saying, I have to be careful. I can't see into the mind of Ayatollah Hamaleh, and he is the ultimate decision maker in Iran. So we always have to recognize that what's going on in his head is very hard to discern. That said, my strong sense of Hamaleh, and I want to start with just hamanai, is that he has concluded that the mistake that Iran and the axis of resistance made over the last two years was to become too involved, to become too aggressive against Israel, and that this created circumstances in which Israel and the United States were able to use their massive conventional military advantages against Iran and its allies, and that that was the mistake. I think what we're going to see from the Iranians for as long as Eita al-Chamenei remains alive and power in Iran is a reversion to their pre-October 7, 2023 strategy, which we know was a gradual strategy, subversion, support insurgencies, support militias in civil wars, try to erode Israel and other American allies from the bottom up, try to overthrow their governments, try to create problems that way. Don't take them on frontally in a way that Israel and the United States would then be able to use their conventional military power.
[00:04:35.860] - Kenneth Pollack
But I think there's also a huge question of what happens after Ayatollah Hamaneh, because, well, I think that he is going to go back to this gradual process of attrition war, I suspect that many others in Tehran were hearing from them. Many of the hardliners would like to embrace a much more confrontational strategy and pursue nuclear weapons. As the only way to prevent another Israeli or American attack on Iran. And so from my perspective, the great question mark is, what is Iran's grand strategy after Ayatollah Hamaneh?
[00:05:13.180] - Joe Kawly
So does this moment demand a shift in how Iran projects a power directly?
[00:05:20.680] - Kenneth Pollack
Yeah, I think in the short term, you'll see a slight shift in the sense that I think that what you're seeing already from the Iranians is a recognition that they and their allies have taken a terrible beating from the Israelis. That what they need to do is they need to pull back, they need to regroup, they need to rebuild their strength for the longer term. Lebanon is a great example of this, where the Iranians and Hezbollah have decided that Hezbollah will seed South Lebanon. They'll pull back to the central Beca, they'll build their strength. They're not willing to give up altogether. Together. They're making it very clear they're not going to disarm, not in the central Beca. They will in the south. But I think this represents how Iran is thinking about their strategy in the short term, which is they need to retrench for now, they need to lick their wounds, rebuild their strength, and then take another run at things later on.
[00:06:21.580] - Joe Kawly
How do you see that this moment is different for Iran, if you want to put it in a context that is historical? How does this compare to the previous turning points in Iran's behavior, whether after the Iran-Irak war, the Arab Spring, or the killing of Qasim Suleymani? Is this moment more fluid for Tehran or more constrained, since you're just mentioning that they want to build back again?
[00:06:50.860] - Kenneth Pollack
I think for the moment, it's more constrained. After the Iran-Irak war, we saw Iran shell of its conventional military power, but dramatically expand its unconventional warfare, its support for terrorism all across the region. After the Arab Spring, we saw more or less the same thing. Even after the death of Suleimani, where there was some chaos in Iran, nevertheless, they were able to go back on the offensive eventually and ultimately led to October 7, 2023. This time around, again, I think that the Iranian leadership understands that they made a terrible mistake, at least Khamenei does, and they have to pull back, rein in for it. What was the mistake? The mistake was themselves and the rest of the axis of resistance mounting these major conventional military attacks on Israel. Hamas on October seventh, Hezbollah joining in immediately afterwards on the eighth, the Houthis, the Hashty Shabi, all of these different groups attacking Israel overtly, which then invites motivated Israel to retaliate against them overtly. Again, at the end of the day, Israel has conventional military power that none of these groups or Iran can possibly match. And again, I think that was one of their mistakes.
[00:08:13.910] - Kenneth Pollack
I think that the Iranians and their allies thought that the ballistic missiles and the drones made them stronger than they really were. And so they attacked Israel, and they found out just how much more powerful Israel was. I think that they understand that that was a mistake.
[00:08:30.000] - Joe Kawly
If you're going to talk about the partnerships and alliances in the region with the United States, we've seen that the United States footprint in the region, and specifically in the Gulf, expanded and contracted over time. Fleets, air bases, diplomatic leverage. Where would you say the balance sits now between deterrence or diplomacy?
[00:08:57.540] - Kenneth Pollack
Great question. I think at the moment, You're seeing the United States shift more toward diplomacy. I think it's very clear that President Trump is looking for deals all across the region. He wants a deal to end the Gaza conflict, and I think ultimately to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict altogether. He wants a deal for Israel and Lebanon. He wants a deal between the United States and Iran. Right now, it's mostly about deals. But you're absolutely right that we have seen at moments, he's also willing to use military force, particularly against the Houthis, and then, of course, against Iran. It is worth recognizing, important to understand, the United States actually has very little military power in the Middle East. We typically only have three or four surface combatants. Sometimes we have an aircraft carrier. Sometimes we don't. We've got an army brigade, that's it, a Marine battalion, two or so Air Force squadrons. There really isn't much there. But those assets are very powerful, and And of course, the United States can bring other forces in whenever we need to do so. And so, of course, this gives President Trump the flexibility to right now be focusing on diplomacy, knowing full well that he can call in whatever military forces he needs to whenever he needs to.
[00:10:18.600] - Joe Kawly
You're saying it gives the United States and President Trump the power to move differently, right? What about the The Gulf countries, the Gulf States? Do you get the sense that the Gulf States are starting to recalibrate their expectations of Washington? Not just in terms of military guarantees, because that's always been the case. They want the military guarantees, the military protection from Washington, DC, and they get commerce and trade from other countries, from China, let's say. Or is this political alignment?
[00:11:00.540] - Kenneth Pollack
So I think this is a huge question. And what else is before October 7, 2023, what I saw all across the Middle East was first an increasing reliance on China for Trade, coupled with a set of questions about security. Could we really rely on the United States of America? Do we need to rely on the United States of America? Can we go it alone? Can we look to China for security assistance, or Russia, or some other country? What's been very interesting to me about the last two years is that while China continues to be a critical economic partner for the region, the United States has reemerged in terms of its security role, because the last two years have demonstrated that neither China nor Russia has the ability to project military power into the Middle East the way that the United States can, and only the United States can. Why is that?
[00:12:03.220] - Joe Kawly
Is it because of no military-based existence?
[00:12:07.240] - Kenneth Pollack
What is there? It's a combination of a lack of basis, but also a huge element of they just don't have the military forces.
[00:12:17.940] - Joe Kawly
Is this related to the PetroDular Agreement?
[00:12:21.320] - Kenneth Pollack
To some extent, again, yes. What if that fell apart? First, I think it's unlikely it would fall apart because, again, I think that what both parties, both Americans and Middle Eastern states, keep coming back to is this makes sense and nothing else does.
[00:12:41.280] - Joe Kawly
Do countries, specifically the BRICS countries, Would want the PetroDular Agreement to fall apart?
[00:12:48.100] - Kenneth Pollack
Certainly, some of them would. Absolutely. I think that the Russians, no question, they would. I actually don't think the Chinese would. I think that the Chinese benefit enormously from the American presence in the Middle East. After all, at the end of the day, what we want, what the Chinese want from the Middle East is really the same thing. We both want the oil to flow. We want it to flow cheaply. It supplies our economy, their economy, and the economies of all of our mutual trade partners. I think the Chinese are very happy leaving it to the United States to deal with the military stability of the Middle East. I don't think they necessarily want to replace us. I don't don't think that they would necessarily be looking to undermine that unless, of course, we get into a real trade war with the Chinese.
[00:13:37.060] - Joe Kawly
Saudi Arabia is navigating regional diplomacy with Iran and deepening the energy ties with China and still keeping the door open with the United States. Is this pragmatism of MBS hedging or a sign of broader strategic realignments for what this era, what this time means for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States?
[00:14:08.700] - Kenneth Pollack
I think it's all of the above. I think that there is an element of hedging because the United States, let's be very honest, has proven itself to be an unreliable security partner for Saudi Arabia. In 2019, the Iranians started attacking Iranian oil exports, including the massive facility at Abqaiq, and the United States did nothing. That's very concerning. So I think that they are looking to hedge. But I think that they're also asking the question, what new opportunities lie out there? And I think that you're also right, that there's a certain amount of practical flexibility going on there in that MBS just doesn't know what the future holds. He doesn't know where the United States will be. He doesn't know where China will be. He doesn't really know what Saudi Arabia's security needs are. And so if he can have a better relationship with the Iranians, why not try it? If he can have a better relationship with the Chinese, why not try that, too? If he can keep a good relationship with the United States, why not try that, too? It gives him flexibility to maneuver based on whatever the future holds. I think it's actually quite a clever approach on his part.
[00:15:17.680] - Joe Kawly
Do you think the United States would let allies like Saudi Arabia broaden their strategic trade, strategic energy ties with other countries, or they want exclusivity in this relationship? Because everyone wants and likes exclusivity in relationships, right?
[00:15:37.820] - Kenneth Pollack
Well, yeah. Look, everybody would love to have a monopoly, right? I guess that's a great way to make a lot of money. But I think the reality is that the United States government, A, recognizes that that's not possible, and B, that it's not necessary, right? That at the end of the day, what's important about Saudi oil is not that it comes to the United United States, it's simply that it flows to the world. The truth of the matter is the United States gets very little oil from Saudi Arabia, and we never have gotten much. My memory is that the most we've ever gotten from the Saudis was maybe 14% of our imports. And I may even have that wrong. But American oil comes overwhelmingly from Canada, from Mexico, right now from Iraq. It used to be from Venezuela. It is not from Saudi Arabia. So what we need is we need the Saudi's simply to sell their oil and to sell it at a reasonable price.
[00:16:36.700] - Joe Kawly
On a quick note, since you mentioned Venezuela, do you think what's happening right now is to have more oil flowing towards the United States with the new opposition leader. She won a Nobel Peace Prize. What does that mean to the United States? And do you see a war coming?
[00:16:56.140] - Kenneth Pollack
I'm not an expert on Venezuela. I wouldn't dare to To comment on it. I would make a fool of myself if I did. What I'll simply say is this. I think it's very clear that President Trump wants oil flowing. He wants lots of oil flowing, in part because I think that he believes that this is good for the US economy, and in particular because I think he believes that it will mitigate the inflation that's being created by his tariff policy. So it seems to be a balance of, yeah, I'm going to increase tariffs He has all kinds of reasons why he thinks the tariffs are a good idea, but I'm going to use low oil prices to prevent inflation from getting too bad. That seems to be his strategy. And so for that reason, he does seem to want as much oil production as possible. That's why he's been going to the Saudis and the other Middle Eastern oil producers and saying, Drill, baby, drill.
[00:17:53.260] - Joe Kawly
Let's go back to the region and Saudi Arabia, which put a contingency or a condition to welcoming the Abrahamic corps, which is what's happening in Gaza, having potentially a Palestinian statehood. The Gaza ceasefire has created a space for diplomacy. But it's also a moment where spoilers could reenter. Who do you think would be the spoilers that would benefit from shaking the ceasefire again?
[00:18:30.820] - Kenneth Pollack
Sure. The most obvious one is Hamas. At the end of the day, Hamas had short term reasons for doing this. But I think over the longer term, Hamas is determined to hold on to its weapons and hold on to its control of Gaza. And the ceasefire agreement specifically mandates that they have to give up their weapons and their control of Gaza. So right there, Hamas is the obvious candidate that, again, in the short term, they did it because I think they need to. Over the longer term, I think that they see the ceasefire terms as being death to them.
[00:19:07.960] - Joe Kawly
How is Iran reading the ceasefire?
[00:19:09.580] - Kenneth Pollack
That's the other great one out there. I think that we've seen it. The Iranians are the only ones out there condemning the ceasefire. That said, I'll go back to my earlier points. I think that Iran's ability to make trouble is limited. And again, I think even their desire to do so is limited because Because they can't afford to give the Israelis or the Americans a reason to hit them again militarily.
[00:19:36.110] - Joe Kawly
Is the Iranian regime seeing this phase as preparing to engage politically?
[00:19:42.420] - Kenneth Pollack
I don't think that the Iranians are preparing to engage in Gaza politically. I think that they are at least thinking about engaging with the United States politically. I think what they're thinking about with Gaza is, again, they want to preserve Hamas. They've got to help Hamas rebuild its capacity and then help Hamas regain control over the Gaza Strip. But they need to do it without provoking Israel or the Americans to hit Iran.
[00:20:10.600] - Joe Kawly
How about escalating asymmetrically elsewhere?
[00:20:15.180] - Kenneth Pollack
Entirely possible. But again, I think the strong sense that I have from Ayatollah Hamaneh is he does not want to get hit again. And he seems to believe, and he may not be wrong, that Prime Minister Netanyahu and possibly President Trump would love to have another opportunity to go after him. I actually don't think that President Trump does. I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu has about a half dozen different reasons why he would like to go after the Iranians again.
[00:20:46.140] - Joe Kawly
Then what signals, military, diplomatic, or economic, should the regional actors be watching for when it comes to Iran's next move in this phase?
[00:21:00.980] - Kenneth Pollack
On the diplomatic front, I think that the most important question is whether the Iranians are actually going to engage on the nuclear issue. The truth of the matter is, Iran is not acting like a country that was defeated militarily. They remain defiant, and they keep leading with, We are not going to do this, and we're not going to do that. So any change in that negotiating position, I think, would be a very, very important one. Beyond that, I think that the question becomes, to what extent are some of Iran's most important allies willing to engage diplomatically? Hezbollah, to my mind, is huge. Again, the Lebanese government has called on Hezbollah to to disarm. Everyone has called on Hisballah to disarm. We've seen Hezbollah take some small steps in that direction, but then also draw some very bright red lines about what they won't do. And again, to me, that's very consistent with where Iran is on all of this. But again, we should be looking, is there any wiggle room there? Is Hezbollah willing to do so? And then, of course, I think we do need to watch militarily for signs that Iran is now starting to rearm and rebuild all of its allies around the region.
[00:22:18.100] - Joe Kawly
Since we mentioned Lebanon and Hezbollah, there is a lot of talk and rumors that Trump might visit Lebanon. Do you think this is where does this rumor come from, you think?
[00:22:27.800] - Kenneth Pollack
I think it's from a of the folks in the region, particularly in Lebanon, hoping that he will do so.
[00:22:35.200] - Joe Kawly
Why would that be important?
[00:22:37.260] - Kenneth Pollack
Well, I think symbolically it'd be hugely important because it will demonstrate an American commitment to Lebanon. And again, there is an American commitment. And we have ambassador Barack and Morgan Ortega, both of whom have been deeply engaged in things, and they are a sign of American commitment. But obviously, the President himself going to Lebanon would represent an enormous this increase in that American commitment, something that I think Lebanese in particular would dearly like. I think it's possible, but I suspect that it would only happen if there were actually a disarmament of Hezbollah and then a peace deal between Israel and Lebanon.
[00:23:18.000] - Joe Kawly
Let's talk the last topic or theme in our conversation about some axis of alliances. There's a growing talk about a geopolitical alignment, China, Russia, Iran on one side, the US-aligned Gulf States on another side. But do you think this is an actual axis or more of a convergence of short term alliances or short term interests?
[00:23:50.520] - Kenneth Pollack
It's an interesting question. I'll say I think it's actually something in between. But I think that both have been somewhat weak weakened as a result of the last two years of war. So first, going into the war, the United States was increasingly disengaging from the region. And this was, of course, very frightening to our allies in the region, the Israelis, the Gulf States, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, all very, very unhappy seeing the US pulling back from the region, at the very least, diplomatically. Now, I think- You mean Biden era?
[00:24:26.860] - Joe Kawly
Yes. And the foreign policy of Biden.
[00:24:29.520] - Kenneth Pollack
Obama Obama, Trump won, and Biden, all of them pulling back from the region. I think in some ways, the war from the last two years has reinforced that trend, but made it a little bit easier. I mean, neither the Israelis nor the Arab States feel the same threat from Iran that they once did. And so I think that it's not just that they're maybe a little bit more comfortable with American disengagement. I don't quite want to put it that way. It's that they're less interested in the American demands that always come with American engagement in the region. You mentioned the Saudis. I think this is a really important point. I think the Saudis would still love to have a defense deal with the United States. I think they'd probably even like to normalize relations with Israel, but they're not as desirous of it as they were beforehand because they don't need it as much because Iran is weak. And then on the other side, I always felt that with Russia, China, Iran, it was more a confluence of enemies. They all hated the same people, but their interests were not terribly well aligned beyond that.
[00:25:40.580] - Kenneth Pollack
And what we've seen from the last two years of war is that the Russians and Chinese aren't willing to support the Iranians, in part because they can't, and in part because they're not interested in getting into a war in the Middle East with the United States, with Israel, with the Arab States on behalf of Iran. I think for both these reasons, we've seen both of these alliances weaken somewhat over the last two years.
[00:26:07.560] - Joe Kawly
Circling back to where we started, and you mentioned Hamini E, if Iran were to face a major shift in leadership or change in leadership, whether it's generational or ideological, what ripple effects would that send across the region, across Gulf countries? Would it reset the balance or just introduce new unpredictable?
[00:26:40.300] - Kenneth Pollack
Let's start with where you start with your question, which is dramatic change in Iran would be dramatic change for the region. Iran, for the past, arguably, 45 years, but certainly for the last 22 years since the demise of Saddam Hussein, Iran has been the greatest anti-status quo power in the Middle East. It has been the greatest force for mayhem and instability all across the region. And so serious change, especially the change that produced in Iran that suddenly wanted a better relationship with the region, with Israel, with the United States, that would be a major change all across the region. But we should also recognize that there are There are deeper trends, deeper currents out there. I began to mention this at the beginning of your questions to me. There's still a lot of unanswered questions in the Middle East. And again, I think that there's been some real progress in terms of economic reform, political reform, social reform, cultural reform, all of which I think are desperately needed, but they have not been fully answered yet. There's still as many questions or more questions than there are answers out there. And even If Iran were to suddenly become a benign status quo power, I simply think that those other trends would probably emerge to the fore.
[00:28:08.640] - Joe Kawly
You mentioned trends. If you had to name one underappreciated trend that might be shaping the future of the region, the future of the MENA region, the future of the Middle East, something the policy community should be paying attention to, what would it be?
[00:28:29.540] - Kenneth Pollack
Sure. I'll give you an answer because it's an area that I focus on a lot. It's been a big part of my own work and thinking, and I do think it underlies so much of what's going on in the region. And that is how the technology is transforming both the civilian and military sides of the Arab world. So for too long, I think the West has seen the Arab world as suffering from a knowledge deficit, right? Really unable to produce and contribute to the knowledge economy, the information economy. That's all changing. We've all gotten used to Arab militaries being simply unable to compete on the modern oil field. I think that the technology trends are going to change that, too, because we're moving from an era when platforms, tanks, planes, ships dominated warfare to an era when the munitions themselves themselves dominate warfare. In those circumstances, I think that the problems that Arab militaries have suffered from are going to abate dramatically.
[00:29:41.480] - Joe Kawly
The underappreciated trend that policy and the community policy in the region in the Middle East should be paying attention to is growing technology. On the surface, that doesn't sound very important, but maybe it is important down the line.
[00:30:01.300] - Kenneth Pollack
Absolutely. This is the point exactly that I'm making. Why? That the changes that we're seeing in technology now are profound because they're reshaping societies, how we talk to each other, who can speak to one another, at what level. This is huge. This is enormous. It means it opens up all kinds of new economic angles, and everyone recognizes that. We all understand the Internet is changing the economies. What we don't recognize is how it is changing basic human relations such that it's going to change our politics, it's changing our culture, it's changing our society. It's going to transform everything exactly the way the Industrial Revolution did.
[00:30:44.100] - Joe Kawly
Then what is your advice to the policy community and leaders of the Middle East to pay attention to that?
[00:30:54.640] - Kenneth Pollack
Don't assume that the past will be like the future. Don't assume that you can stifle change. Instead, get out ahead of the change.
[00:31:04.700] - Joe Kawly
I think that-What change?
[00:31:06.710] - Kenneth Pollack
Again, these transformations, these political, economic, social transformations that the technological change is already created.