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In the rooms where war, peace, and power are decided, words matter most. The Diplomat brings you raw conversations with ambassadors, envoys, and negotiators who shaped the hardest decisions in U.S. foreign policy and Middle East diplomacy. Hosted by Joe Kawly. Recorded from Washington. Produced by Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).
Joe Kawly brings extensive experience from conflict zones in the Middle East to the power corridors of Washington. As a journalist, he’s seen how words can escalate a crisis or open the door to peace. A Georgetown graduate and former CNN Journalism Fellow, he’s known for connecting the dots others miss, so people don’t just hear what happened, they understand why it matters. As producer and host of The Diplomat, Joe brings clarity to diplomacy and politics, one conversation at a time.
[00:00:00.000] - Joe Khawly
Alliances and political moves in the Middle East are shifting, and everyone in Washington feels it, even if they can't put a name on it. Turkey is making bold moves in Syria. The Gaza Stabilization Force is hanging by a thread, and Saudi Arabia is competing suddenly on all fronts. So you feel that the whole region is redrawing itself in real-time. And when the ground moves that fast or like that, we have to go to someone who can actually read the fault lines. Sonerga Gaptai, Director of the Turkish Research Program in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, one of the sharpest interpreters of Turkish power in this town in Washington, DC. We're meeting him in his office for this episode of The Diplomate. So let's head over there this exact moment to ask him the hard questions. Sonair Shahabtai, thank you for being with us. It's a great pleasure. Let's start with something that didn't get enough attention for the past few days and weeks. On November 12th, Turkey EPA and Egypt, held a joint meeting in Ankara. For the first time in years, they coordinated and they talked about Gaza, the reconstruction, the stabilization force, even the two a tight track.
[00:01:30.840] - Joe Khawly
What changed between the relationship with Erdoğan and Egypt and Sisi? Is this just a tactical coordination because of what's happening, because of the shift in the region, specifically after the few weeks and months and the years of wars, or the start of a deeper realignment between these two countries?
[00:01:52.020] - Soner Çağaptay
Goes back to the beginning of the Arab uprisings. When Morsy was ousted there by Sisi, Erdoğan called Sisi a dictator, threatened to take Egypt the UN Security Council, and Egyptian-Egyptian ties simply ruptured. For about a decade, there was very little political business. No visits, ambassadors were ousted. There was not a Turkish representation in Cairo. Economic ties continued because Turkish businesses had moved in the past decade to Egypt, especially textile businesses, to take advantage of cheap labor. But politically, the countries were in the Ice Age, and now they're coming out of the Ice Age. So what is going on? I think if you sit in Cairo and you look around, you see Turkey everywhere. There. Turkey is in Sudan, actively involved in that country's civil war. Turkey is in Gaza. It's now a participant to the Gaza peace plan, having sponsored it by bringing Hamas to the table. And to the west of Egypt, Turkey is in Libya. So if you sit in Cairo, you can't do Egyptian strategy without taking Turkey into account. And the missing piece was the chemistry between the two principles. The elites had started to talk to each other. Foreign ministries were engaging each other once again.
[00:02:56.400] - Soner Çağaptay
As I said, there were business ties. But Sisi, not He not only invited Erdoğan to Cairo, but he met him at the airport, literally at the doors of his plane, saying, Welcome to the Egyptian capital. Something quite significant is going on. The alignment, I think Egypt has become an inward-looking state in the past decade. It's no more a civilisational power that shapes the outcome of events in its region. It's really inward-looking and self-contained. Egypt is looking at its immediate neighborhood in Eastern Libya, which Egyptians consider to be their backyard, Sudan, extension of the Nile River and Gaza, and they see Turkey everywhere.
[00:03:33.700] - Joe Khawly
But Turkey and Egypt, they've been on opposite sides of the Muslim Brotherhood issue for years. Yes, 100 %. Did they agree now to put this on the side?
[00:03:45.600] - Soner Çağaptay
As part of, I think, the reset that Erdoğan or the Turkish elites in Ankara were going with Cairo, Turkey basically asked Brotherhood radios to go silent. It didn't kick the Brotherhood out, but it told Brotherhood activists to be quiet. They listened to Turkey's advice. There was a time when Muslim Brotherhood radios were broadcasting anti-regime propaganda in Istanbul. Now they run documentaries on nature. I'm simplifying this and maybe joking a little bit, but the shift of the Brotherhood activity in Egypt has gone from being very active politically to neutral. That's important for Egyptians. The other piece was Turkey's relationship with Hamas. Hamas is an extension of the Brotherhood. Egypt never accepted that support coming from Turkey. I think the developments around Israel following the October seventh attacks changed the Egyptian perception of Turkey's role in the region. I think Egyptians realized that only with Turkey, they can impose a peace on Israel. That probably worked because the missing piece in bringing Hamas to the table was that Qatar was selling Hamas to come to the table, but it looked like Qatari guarantees to Hamas did not really matter. Israeli struck at Hamas leadership in Qatar. I think Turkey probably told the Hamas people and said, Look, we can guarantee your security if you support this peace deal.
[00:05:07.580] - Soner Çağaptay
You have to come on board. If you do not come on board, we cannot protect you. This was telling the Hamas leadership, There's no place for you to go now that Qatar is also not safe. I think that's what made the Hamas leadership come on board. It's almost like Turkey was the missing piece that would bring the Hamas to the negotiating table. For Egyptians, this is not an ideal outcome. It makes Turkey a player in the Palestinian theater. But they're also coordinating because I think Egypt now sees that it can do so much more with Turkey in Sudan and in Libya. And Gaza is only one area of cooperation now. I think Egypt realized that it alone cannot bring Hamas to the table. And yet with Turkey, Hamas was coming to the table. And I think this is also how Trump sees Turkey's role in the Palestinian theater. I think Trump believes that Turkey at least halfway helped end the war in Gaza. Halfway meaning if Trump brought Netanyahu to the table, Turkey brought Hamas to table.
[00:06:00.760] - Joe Khawly
But Trump sees it this way, but the Israelis don't see it this way. At least Netanyahu's government doesn't see it this way.
[00:06:07.160] - Soner Çağaptay
Israelis don't have a benign view of Turkish involvement. I think they're completely alarmed by Turkey's newfound role in regional affairs. We looked at the region sitting from Kyra, and I said, If you sit in Kyra, you see Turkey to the east, to the south, and to the west.
[00:06:20.060] - Joe Khawly
But that's confusing. That's confusing for a lot of people. That's confusing for the Israelis. That's confusing also for a lot of people in Washington, DC.
[00:06:26.560] - Soner Çağaptay
If you sit in Israel now, Turkey is your neighbor to the in Syria. Turkish-backed HTS kicked out the Mossad regime. Turkey is the most powerful country in Syria right now. Turkey is present in Gaza somehow. I think the Israelis now have a Turkish threat that is brewing because they see Erdoğan as the Sultan who's restoring the Ottoman Empire. I don't think that's where Erdoğan is heading. I think Turkey wants to stabilize Syria for a very Turkish-serving goal. There are about 4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. They constituted nearly 5% addition to Turkey's population of 85 million people. The warm welcome that people gave to the refugees for about a decade is now gone. It's got a lot to do with the economy in Turkey not doing well. You have enterrefugee movements, powerful anti-immigrant political parties, challenging Erdoğan from all sides. He has elections to win in 2028, maybe early in 2027. And given that economy in Turkey is not doing very well, empty refugee sentiments will only rise further. So he wants some of these Syrians to go back. Not all will go back. Some are born in Turkey, some are in Turkey. Some speak better Turkish than Arabic.
[00:07:32.540] - Soner Çağaptay
But you could imagine if Syria stabilizes, many will go back, and the perception that the refugees are economic burden will no more be there. So that's the Turkey's very altruistic, Turkey-serving goal in Syria. They want stable Syria, so the refugees will go back.
[00:07:47.040] - Joe Khawly
That, in a way, makes sense regarding to Syria, but it doesn't really make sense for a lot of people who are trying to understand the vibe or the energy and the political moves that involves Trump, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu. How is this triangle makes sense? What are your sources telling you, specifically that you have a lot of people who work here in the Washington Institute, specifically about this, and they have also connections with the Israeli government. How does that make sense? How can you explain it?
[00:08:26.510] - Soner Çağaptay
Trump has really good ties with Erdoğan and Netanyahu. Erdoğan and Netanyahu don't have good ties with each other. It's an incomplete triangle. I think Trump is the connective tissue. Trump would ideally like Turkey and Israel to get along because they're Americas to allies. I think Trump maybe have actually imposed some a detente in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. There was some talk after Turkey brought Hamas to the table in Gaza that there could be Turkish military deployment to Gaza. That didn't happen with the US veto. Then at the same time, though, Trump also told the Israelis that they cannot carry out further air strikes in Syria. It's almost like Trump vetoed Turkish involvement in Gaza and further Israeli strikes in Syria simultaneously, imposing it at times between the two countries, telling the works. Gaza is Israel's backyard, don't go there, and telling the Israelis, Syria is Turkey's backyard, don't go there. That could be sustainable. I think for Syria right now, what you need is stability. That won't come if other countries are bombing Syria and doing strikes. I can also see how It could be productive in Gaza affairs because Egypt will always be resentful of an elevated Turkish role in the Palestinian theater, regardless of how much it works with Turkey, Libya, and Sudan.
[00:09:42.000] - Soner Çağaptay
So I feel like Egyptians now feel like they could be in the lead, and Turkey doesn't have to lead necessarily. I think for the Israelis, Turkey still constitutes a threat. I think it's elevated, it's irrational. Turkey and Syria is a fact, but Turkey and Syria is much better, 10 times better than Iran and Syria from the Israeli from the regional perspective.
[00:10:01.900] - Joe Khawly
You mentioned sterilization in relation to Gaza. When you hear Turkey and Egypt echo each other on the ISF or the International Civilization Force in Gaza, What are they worried about, Turkey and Egypt? What are they worried about in terms of ISF? And what part of the mandate is a deal breaker?
[00:10:27.860] - Soner Çağaptay
You mean for the Israelis or for the- For Both, Turkey and Egypt. I guess at this stage, what Turkey wants to see is a two-state solution, and it wants to see it today and not without further delay. Israeli politics is not there anymore. I think Israeli politics has swung to the right after the attacks of October seventh. Many of the people targeted were leftists and others who actually wanted a two-state solution, so maybe the attackers also can undermine this demographic base in Israeli society. Israeli society has moved away from a two-state coalition. Turkey wants to see that. I guess other regional actors and Egyptians and others also want to see that. The Egyptians and the Saud and the Turks and even the Qataris are, I think, united behind the Trump plan. We saw this at the UN vote, at the Security Council authorizing the plan. All Arab countries in Turkey, I guess, were lobbying at the same time for a positive vote in favor of this plan.
[00:11:23.740] - Joe Khawly
How do we understand that? Because Israel has made it clear no Turkish troops in Gaza, but Trump is giving Erdoğan credit, and Turkey says it has probably 2,000 troops ready. Behind the scenes, how can we explain that? What do you get from the conversations, behind the scenes movements and political alliances? Is Washington backing Turquie's participation or telling Ankara to stand down quietly?
[00:11:57.130] - Soner Çağaptay
I think Washington is not at all backing Turkish military role Gaza for the reasons that they think this is not going to be constructive. And on that, I agree. I think that Turkey would not come into Gaza as an honest broker. It's not that Turkey is for a Palestinian, it's for Hamas. It would make it not an honest broker in the conflict For me, the biggest risk, of course, is what if Israeli troops accidentally shoot a Turkish troops and kill a Turkish soldier?
[00:12:21.220] - Joe Khawly
You mean, Turkey will not join ISF, the international civilisation force?
[00:12:25.520] - Soner Çağaptay
I think it's very unlikely. I think there will be a Turkish role.
[00:12:27.780] - Joe Khawly
Very unlikely.
[00:12:28.540] - Soner Çağaptay
Very unlikely that Turkish There will be a military role for Turkey. I think Turkey will be there for humanitarian aid, relief, and reconstruction through its civilian agencies. But I cannot really foresee a role for a Turkish military deployment. Israelis would not want it, and I think Trump administration does not want it either. Washington and the Trump administration are seeing this, and they're saying, Let's not force ourselves into this choice. Eliminating that goes through not having a military role for Turkey. Honestly, I think Turkish policymakers, even though it looks like they want to be involved militarily, are probably taking a deep breath and saying, Oh, thank God we did not get involved. Because they also know that it's very messy for Turkey to be involved right now. It's very pro-Hamas, which means we'll have to protect Hamas if there's another conflict. What if the plan doesn't work out? What if There's another round of conflict while Turkish troops are there.
[00:13:18.000] - Joe Khawly
From Ankara's side, what's the line they want to cross just to be involved?
[00:13:23.960] - Soner Çağaptay
Do you mean military involvement?
[00:13:25.700] - Joe Khawly
Yes, in Gaza.
[00:13:27.100] - Soner Çağaptay
I think that there will be no military deployment, but there will be other deployment of other agencies and humanitarian assistance and relief and reconstruction aid going in.
[00:13:35.330] - Joe Khawly
But they want to be involved politically.
[00:13:37.140] - Soner Çağaptay
They do. They want to be more politically to use this to impose a two-state solution on Israel. They want to build institutions of that, starting with Gaza. I think there is regional consensus right now that this is what events should lead to.
[00:13:50.340] - Joe Khawly
What's some inside information or scoop that Israel or Netanyahu's cabinet is very worried about with Turkey's involvement, even if it's not militarily?
[00:14:02.360] - Soner Çağaptay
I see everyday new analysis coming from Israeli think tanks or newspapers reporting that Turkey is now in Israel's security doctrine. It's seen as a threat. As I said, I think this is elevated. Maybe it's inflated. Obviously, Turkey is hegemonic. It's a middle power. It's got a very powerful military. That's what makes it a middle power. But I don't think Turkey is the nefarious actor that Israelis make it into. Here's the main difference. If you compare Iran's influence in Syria and Turkey's influence. Is Turkey a fan of Israel? It's probably not. But Turkey's view of Israel is so different than Iran's view. Iran wanted to destroy Israel. That's the raison d'être of Iran's regime. Turkey has recognized Israel since 1949. It's not going to work for its destruction. It's actually trying to incorporate it into the region. So I think the two countries, Iran and Turkish view of role and involvement in Syria is very different. But the Israelis see this as a threat because they see Turkey as becoming really powerful and shaping the outcome of regional events. I think that's where we started our conversation, Joe. If you sit in Cairo or any regional capital, you're looking around, you're seeing that Turkey is everywhere, and you're asking the question, is this good or bad?
[00:15:10.480] - Soner Çağaptay
I think Israelis are doing the same, and they're being emotional about it. They're saying it's overall not good for us.
[00:15:16.080] - Joe Khawly
Do you think asking that question... Because you just compared that at least Turkey is not Iran.
[00:15:23.740] - Soner Çağaptay
It won't be, yeah.
[00:15:24.960] - Joe Khawly
But do you think there is some not relevance in in terms of comparing to Iran, but maybe it's similar in terms of the alliance with Hamas.
[00:15:35.780] - Soner Çağaptay
I think that's a no starter for the Israelis because they want Hamas to have no role in Gaza's future. They wanted to disarm, they wanted to disappear. Turkey doesn't have that vision, right?
[00:15:46.810] - Joe Khawly
It does not have that vision.
[00:15:47.760] - Soner Çağaptay
Absolutely not. Turkey ended one war halfway. Gaza, it brought Hamas to the table, so it did half of the lifting. In Syria, Turkey ended the war, which is a big deal without the US having to do anything. Only weeks after Trump came to power, Turkish-backed HTS took Damascus in under two weeks. That's a huge accomplishment. And Turkey is playing a role in facilitating the start of negotiations in Ukraine. And when and if there are peace talks, They'll probably be held in Turkey because Turkey is one of the few countries that Putin will travel to, and it's one of the few countries that both Ukrainians and Russians will talk to. So I think in the eyes of the Trump administration, this gives Turkey an elevated role. The administration's view of foreign policy is that the US should do less and allies should do more. An ally, Turkey, has already helped end one war, has done half of the work to end another war, and could help end yet a third war in Ukraine. So that means very elevated file. It's no accident that recently President Erdoğan of Turkey was here. He was received to our meeting with President Trump.
[00:16:53.380] - Soner Çağaptay
There's a lot of publicity, given that the last time Erdoğan came here was almost a decade ago. I think we're also talking about a significant amount of political chemistry between the two principles, Erdoğan and Trump. They like each other. Trump said that when he was voted out of office, Erdoğan stood by him. I think he appreciates that support. I guess this will result in some a reset in US-Turkish military ties. Turkey wants to buy advanced weaponry from the US, including F-35 fighter jets.
[00:17:20.400] - Joe Khawly
Let's link everything together. Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. You have called EIA, the most important stakeholder in Syria. But Saudi Arabia is clearly pushing a rival model. What does that look like on the ground right now? Where does Turkish influence end and Saudi influence begin?
[00:17:47.840] - Soner Çağaptay
Actually, you think of the two countries all being complementary? Turkey is bringing a lot of institutions to Syria. Syria went through an awful civil war. Half of its population was displaced. It lost much of its infrastructure infrastructure. So it needs state building again. Someone needs to provide services, reestablish and rebuild infrastructure. Turkey has agencies to do that, the government departments. From the high school, I went to Istanbul to general accounting office in Ankara, every Turkish institution is 200 years old. So there are seasons. I think that's what makes Turkey unique. In the region, it's got institutions that are capable and well-seasoned and are at least a couple of hundred years old. But Turkey is a resource poor country. It doesn't have the money. It should go with empowering these institutions. So if Turkey is to build a new highway or railway or internet infrastructure for Syria, it has institutions to do that, but not the money. So far, the Turks have relied on Qataris. Turkey's Middle East policy has relied on Qatar largesse, where Qatar brings money. Qatar is relied on Turkey's institutions because it's a small state with a small human resource pool. It doesn't have the depth to develop these institutions that you need to flex your muscles.
[00:18:59.160] - Soner Çağaptay
This was their I think, in various post-conflict places such as in Libya. I think this is also the vision, perhaps, going forward for Gaza. We have discussed that it will be unlikely that there will be a Turkish military deployment to Gaza, but there will be Turkish NGOs active for rebuilding and construction and humanitarian relief. I guess it'll be supported by Qatarian money.
[00:19:19.970] - Joe Khawly
Is that why Israeli politicians always see Turkish involvement because of the closeness to Qatar?
[00:19:28.360] - Soner Çağaptay
I think so. I think the You could say that the Middle East has now three poles, Iran and its clients, Israelis and GCC members, Gulf Cooperation Council members, and Turkey and Qatar are the third Pole. They're not opposing or in love with these poles. It's just a triangular relationship, but everyone dislikes everyone. So Israelis, therefore, view the Turkish Qatari Pole with consternation because they see this as the Pole that has supported the Brotherhood most regionally. What Turks are trying to in Syria, Joe, to go back to your question is they want to bring the Saudis board also to help with reconstruction. So far, what I've heard is that there's not enough Saudi money to justify reconstruction. I think much of the money is coming to pay for salaries of government workers and people in the military, but you need much more money in that, and I feel like we're not there yet.
[00:20:16.880] - Joe Khawly
Because an Israeli minister just said, Turquia is the greatest threat to Israel. But at the same time, the United States is working with Turquia on with Gaza and Syria, as you mentioned, and now with Egypt, and still sees Ankara as a key NATO player. How does Turkey manage being a security partner to Washington and a security threat to Israel at the same time.
[00:20:48.070] - Soner Çağaptay
Yeah, I think it goes through Turkey's elevated role in the region. Turkey is now Israel's neighbor in Syria, direct neighbor through its influence in Syria. It's there with all its institutions. If Even if Turkish troops are not deployed to Gaza through its humanitarian agencies and sponsorship of the Israeli Hamas peace plan, Turkey is a neighbor to Israel in the Gaza Strip. From the Israeli perspective, I think because of the past Turkish support to Brotherhood and Hamas, this is seen as nefarious and unwelcome. I think from Trump's perspective, Turkey is a partner because Turkey is helping end conflicts. There's a perception in Washington that this is the time of great power competition. You have China, Russia, both of which are aspiring global powers that are competing with the US for influence. It looks like going beyond the Middle East in Eurasia, so that means from the Balkans to China, and Muslim Africa Sahel and Horn of Africa. Turkey has significant hard and soft power. And beyond the administration, a lot of people look at Turkey as a partner in great power competition against Russia and China. I think Turkey's profile is elevated because of its role in helping end the wars for the administration.
[00:22:01.520] - Soner Çağaptay
And broadly speaking, it's seen as a very good middle power partner to the US in confronting Russian and Chinese influence globally.
[00:22:10.680] - Joe Khawly
But why we don't hear about normalization between Israel and Turkey? Can the normalization between these two countries happen? Because we hear stories about pushing for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel right now. Or are Ankara's ties to Hamas and the Brotherhood just too big as a block for the talk for normalization.
[00:22:34.720] - Soner Çağaptay
So Turkey is already in normal terms of Israel, but it's also in a political crisis driven by Erdoğan and Netanyahu. I think these are two leaders that don't like each other. You have bureaucracies that don't trust each other, and you have populations that don't like each other. Turkey saw the post October seventh only through the Gaza War, and there's very powerful anti-Israeli sentiments in Turkish society. Israeli Israelis who for decades were told that Turkey was their best friend in the world, now see Turkey as a threat, so they're also upset. I feel like from the presidents through government agencies, down to populations, you have lack of trust. In my view, Joe, until the president's change, there's no Erdoğan in Turkey or Netanyahu in Israel. We're not going to see a reset in the relationship. You're going to see this crisis mode and the relationship continue. Relationship will never collapse. Diplomatic ties still continue. The two countries have not extra They're added, they're ambassadors. There are still diplomatic ties. And what is more important, economic ties are still continuing. In the old times when Turkey and Israel had very good relations in the '90s, they signed free trade agreements.
[00:23:42.900] - Soner Çağaptay
Despite the ups and downs in the relationship, during the Erdoğan and Trump periods, the free trade agreements were not annulled. Trade continues. In fact, trade increases. You look at Turkish-Israeli ties. The first rupture happened in 2010 during the Mabi Marmarat flotilla incident when a Turkish-supported flotilla was trying to enter Gaza, Israelis boarded ships, killed nine people, nine Turkish citizens, including one US-Turkish dual citizen. It looked like the relationship had completely frozen. The next year The trade actually increase in volume. I feel like there are subcutaneous dynamics at play here, one of which is that the relationship is very old. It's six decades old, and it's not just going to rupture overnight. Secondly, you have business lobbies in both countries that want to promote a relationship. And third, Erdoğan, some people may call him ideological, even he knows that you need to have the economic basis of the relationship alive so it acts like a shock absorber and on which you can restore the relationship one day with Israel. I think Turkey Israel are already on normal terms because they have diplomatic ties. They're just in a crisis mode.
[00:24:51.080] - Joe Khawly
In the crisis mode, and it makes you question, what is Ankara's or Turkey's calculation? Is it to strengthen ties with NATO and United States and expand or to expand its own Middle East sphere?
[00:25:05.760] - Soner Çağaptay
I think Turkey wants to have stable neighbors to the south. Maybe the division is not that deep. Since the beginning of Iraq war and then following that, the war in Syria, means that for 20 years now, Turkey has had unstable neighbors to the south. Iraq destabilized and fractured during its civil war. The same thing happened in Syria. That has produced so much instability disability. Substate actors, ISIS and others, have used this to carry out attacks into Turkey. Turkey had to host millions of refugees. It lost its physical ability to trade with Middle East. At one point, you could not load goods onto trucks and send them to Jordan from Turkey or to Saudi Arabia because you had civil war and rupture relationships. It wants to have borders, internationally guarded, legitimate borders, and stable partner neighbors across the border. So I think I would start with that. That's how they what they want to get to in Syria. Erdoğan also sees this as a way of making a better impression with President Trump because Turkish role in Syria means that the US has to do less in Syria if Turkey has to do the heavy lifting.
[00:26:13.160] - Soner Çağaptay
As I said, the view of the administration is that allies should do more and US should do less. You could say that in every step Turkey takes in the Middle East, there's also an US angle, and these two are interlinked.
[00:26:23.600] - Joe Khawly
Let's look at the bigger picture. You look at this moment Turkey is talking to Egypt, competing with Saudi Arabia, navigating Israeli red lines in Gaza, positioning itself in Syria, and pushing for a Gaza role, as we have discussed earlier, all at once. Is this smart multivector diplomacy or strategic overreach?
[00:26:52.080] - Soner Çağaptay
I feel bad for the Turkish diplomats because they have to do so much. I mean, if you're sitting at the Turkish foreign Ministry, this is only one piece of what they're doing. In the meantime, they're also working with Russia, trying to end the war in Ukraine, doing stuff in Africa and elsewhere. I guess if you could group middle powers of which Turkey is a member into categories, you could say there are middle powers that punch below their weight and the middle power that punch above their weight. Turkey is in the second group. It does so much. When you look at the country's demographics and economic potential, it does a lot. I think this is a lot to do with the new foreign policy model that emerged under Erdoğan. Until Erdoğan, Turkey's foreign policy was exclusively Eurocentric, meaning it was all about joining the European Union and being part of the West. I think now, Turkey's foreign policy is multi-centric. Europe is still there. It's not disappeared. Europe is Turkey's most important economic partner. Turkey is economically integrated with the European Union, with which it's in a customs union. Economically, it will always be the most important part of Turkey's global identity.
[00:27:56.440] - Soner Çağaptay
But politically now, Turkey feels like it's also a Middle Eastern country and the Eurasian country. It has these areas, including Central Asia, Caucasus, and Black Sea Basin, where it deals with Russia, and it's also ever present in the Middle East.
[00:28:09.620] - Joe Khawly
It's going to be hard, as you said, for Turkish diplomats, or maybe it's an overreach. But In this overreach, what would failure look like? What's the pressure point that could force Turkey to scale back or shift course?
[00:28:25.180] - Soner Çağaptay
So Turkey already failed once, actually, in the last decade, when it had a singularly pro-Muslim Brotherhood Forum policy. It tried to empower the Brotherhood in Cairo, in Gaza, and elsewhere. That policy completely failed. The Brotherhood was ousted from power in Egypt quicker than it came to power. Then, of course, the drama in Turkish-Egyptian ties ensued for about a decade. But Turkey's support to the Brotherhood regionally meant that it became an anathema to wealthy Gulf monarchies which see the Brotherhood as their greatest regional and domestic security threat. So Turkey ended up having Bad ties or no ties with the Egyptians and Jordanians, Israelis, Emiratis, Saud, Bahrainis, and Kuwaitis. It also supported the rebels in Syria's civil war, which means it was on a collision course with Iran, that's back the Asaad regime, which means it had bad ties at that time with Iran's proxies and allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
[00:29:21.910] - Joe Khawly
What is the lesson for them?
[00:29:23.800] - Soner Çağaptay
The lesson Erdoğan took from this was you can't be ideological in foreign policy. I think this was the end of this singular Another commitment to the Brotherhood. Erdoğan is a master of 180s. Around 2010, he pivoted. He pivoted, he reached out to the Saudis. He offered to the Crown Prince a peace, and I think that was followed with the transfer of the court case that the cramp was allegedly played in the murder of Washington, was Columnus Khashoggi to Saudi courts. Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. If you transfer the court case to Saudi courts, the case is closed. That was followed with a reset with Emiratis, reset with Egyptians. Now, Turkey has a lot more friends in the region than it did about a decade ago. If you're asking me what failure would be now, it will be Syria going into another round of civil war. Syria not stabilizing, Syria falling into instability once again. That would create huge amount of burdens and risks for Turkey. Substate entities would take advantage of the vacuum once again. Turkey is in peace talks with the PKK. This is a Kurdish group. It's about the disband itself. The PKK has a Syrian branch called Syrian Democratic Forces.
[00:30:37.040] - Soner Çağaptay
They're supposed to follow the PKK's lead and disarm, but if Syria fractured, I cannot see the SDF integrating into Syria. If that doesn't happen, the PKK may not integrate or end up in a violent campaign against Turkey. I think if Syria doesn't work out, there'll be a huge failure for Turkey, both in terms of its impact on Turkey's internal dialog with the PKK, its regional role, threats that be coming from Syria as well.
[00:31:04.800] - Joe Khawly
Final question. What's the one part of Turkey's current strategy that most people in Washington, DC, are underestimating I think.
[00:31:16.460] - Soner Çağaptay
I would say the resilience of the institutions. What makes Turkey a really interesting foreign policy player is that if I was doing a 60-minute lecture on Turkey and people said, What are some of our main takeaways on Turkey? I would tell them, Turkey never collapses. Turkey can come very close to having a crisis. It never collapses. It's not because Turkey are superhuman. It's because of these institutions that are very old and very resilient. They're all dated back a couple of hundred years ago, back to a couple of hundred years. I think the institutions make it a very resilient player in global politics.
[00:31:48.020] - Joe Khawly
Sonair Chhabtaj, thank you for your time. This has been sharp and layered, and now we understand a bigger picture of the broken triangle, as you mentioned earlier.
[00:32:00.730] - Soner Çağaptay
Thank you for also me. It's a great pleasure to chat with you. I also enjoyed it.